CASE DIGEST: GSIS & GARCIA V. VILLAVIZA, ET AL.

FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of

the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza,
Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B.
Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and
Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in
accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as
follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office
of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support
for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously
entered the GSIS premises;
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS
management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was
barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005
from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A.
6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC
Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus
Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm
and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation
Unit during office hours.

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office

memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security
Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon.On the same day, the Manager of the
GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a
memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in
writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be
administratively dealt with.

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together

with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo datedJune 6,
2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents
explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous
reaction after learning that their former union president was there.Aside from
some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that
hearing as it might also affect them.For her part, respondent Villaviza
submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at
the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor
about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing.These letters were not
under oath.

PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005.Respondents were
again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days
from receipt thereof. None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions
finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the
penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of
the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and
reduced the penalty to reprimand.

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to
the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. The CA upheld the CSC.

Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review.

ISSUES: 1) What is the probative value accorded to respondents letters of

explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager? 2)
Whether the respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges.

HELD: The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners.
Petitioners own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS Amended Policy and
Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:

If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from
receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he
shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or
the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file
an answer merely translates to a waiver of his right to file an answer. There is
nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted.It has not
done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear
and convincing evidence.

REMEDIAL LAW: suppletory character

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in a suppletory character. Suppletory is defined as supplying
deficiencies. It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to
apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.There is,
however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of
failure to file the required answer.What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by
the prosecution.

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in
this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same.Among them are immaterial
allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the
complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not
mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and
correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in
favor of the petitioners.We must not forget that even in administrative
proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have
the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint or in the formal charges.

POLITICAL LAW: CSC resolution no. 02-1316

As defined in Section 5 of CSC ResolutionNo. 02-1316 which serves to regulate

the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or
mass action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the
GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists,
some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive
of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the
purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution

No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is
prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in
the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person
in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation
of their rights and interests.Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom
of expression.It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service,
the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom
can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

A review of PGM Garcias formal charges against the respondents reveals that
he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the
twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day
marched there or just simply appeared there simultaneously. Thus, the
petitioners were not even sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or
so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a concerted one.The report of
Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcias formal
charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,

Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the
Investigation Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties
for the duration of this incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also
observed that the protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists,
carefully planned this illegal action as evident in their behavior of arrogance,
defiance and provocation, the presence of various recording gadgets such as
VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad mouthing of the security
guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the collusion regarding
the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as reported earlier.

The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts.It did not show
respondents unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work.It also
failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and

CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or
mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights.Measured against that
definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted
activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at
said conclusion.
People vs Enojas, GR # 204894

Facts

The defendant, taxi driver Enojas, was stopped by police while parked
suspiciously in front of a glass shop. Enojas provided the police with
identification that the officers suspected to be fake. The officers then asked
Enojas to accompany them to the police station. Enojas agreed.

On the way, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. The officer who
went into the store apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed the
officer. The other officer got out of the car upon hearing the gunshots.
Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene. Later, the
police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They
monitored the messages on the phone and communicated with the other
suspects, resulting in an entrapment operation.

Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006
before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the conviction. The accused then appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Decision Overview

The defense argued that the prosecution failed to provide direct evidence that
the accused shot the victim. The Court ruled that circumstantial evidence can
be sufficient to convict if: “1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.” The Court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to provide a basis for conviction of the accused. The Court, however,
disagreed with the Court of Appeals, which found “that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms” made
the killing of the police officer a murder. Rather, the Supreme Court found that
the accused could only be found liable for homicide.

The Court found that the text messages were properly admissible because the
police officer, posing as Enojas, had personal knowledge of the messages and
was competent to testify about them. Further, the accused argued that they
were arrested without a valid warrant. The court found that even if this
were the case, it is not grounds for reversing a conviction. Thus, the Court
lowered the crime to that of homicide and lessened Enojas’ sentence to 12
years in prison.

A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC             July 17, 2001

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Rule 1
COVERAGE

Section 1. Scope. – Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply
whenever an electronic document or electronic data message, as defined in
Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.

Section 2. Cases covered. – These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and
proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.

Section 3. Application of other rules on evidence. – In all matters not

specifically covered by these Rules, the Rules of Court and pertinent provisions
of statutes containing rules on evidence shall apply.

Rule 2
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. Definition of terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following

terms are defined, as follows:

(a) "Asymmetric or public cryptosystem" means a system capable of generating

a secure key pair, consisting of a private key for creating a digital signature,
and a public key for verifying the digital signature.

(b) "Business records" include records of any business, institution, association,

profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit, or for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.
(c) "Certificate" means an electronic document issued to support a digital
signature which purports to confirm the identity or other significant
characteristics of the person who holds a particular key pair.

(d) "Computer" refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus,

which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other
means with the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process,
correlate, analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information, data, text,
graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform
any one or more of these functions.

(e) "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a

transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using
an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial
untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately
determine:

i. whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and

ii. whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the
transformation was made.

(f) "Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document or electronic data message

bearing a digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.

(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or

stored by electronic, optical or similar means.

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of

information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules,
the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic
data message".

(i) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive
information that crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only
with a matching electronic key.

(j) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or

sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to
or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document
or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and
executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating,
signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.

(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations,

text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.

(l) "Information and communication system" refers to a system for generating,

sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or
electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar
devices by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related to
the recording or storage of electronic data messages or electronic documents.

(m) "Key pair" in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its
mathematically related public key such that the latter can verify the digital
signature that the former creates.

(n) "Private key" refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.

(o) "Public key" refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.

Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the

parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of
cases.

The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the
international origin of Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act.

Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based

documents. – Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document,
record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall
be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.

Section 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if

it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and
related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.
Section 3. Privileged communication. – The confidential character of a
privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form
of an electronic document.

Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Section 1. Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall

be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.

Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two

or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is
a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces
the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of
the original.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to

the same extent as the original if:

(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or

(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in

lieu of the original.

Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an

electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its
authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document

offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by
any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to
have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of
the judge.

Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. – A document

electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a
notarial document under the Rules of Court.

Rule 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

Section 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature

authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as
the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.

Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature

may be authenticated in any of the following manner:

(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital

signature and verify the same;

(b) By any other means provided by law; or

(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the

genuineness of the electronic signature.

Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. – Upon the

authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:

(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;

(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of
authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to
indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein; and

(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature
operated without error or fault.

Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the

authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those
mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a
certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;

(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from
the time it was signed; and,

(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.

Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. – In assessing the

evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be
considered:

(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or
communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures,
controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data
message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any
relevant agreement;

(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is

recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer
programs or software used as well as programming errors;

(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the
communication and information system;

(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the
communication and information system upon which the electronic data
message or electronic document was based; or

(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the electronic document or electronic data message.

Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any

dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system in
which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or stored,
the court may consider, among others, the following factors:

(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device
was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic
document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of
the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the
proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or

(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and
ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings
and who did not act under the control of the party using it.

Rule 8
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record

or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by
electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and
kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the
regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation
by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on
hearsay evidence.

Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. – The presumption provided for in

Section 1 of this Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of
the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation,
transmission or storage thereof.

Rule 9
METHOD OF PROOF

Section 1. Affidavit evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and

evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit
stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic
records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to
testify on the matters contained therein.

Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. – The affiant shall be made to affirm

the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a
matter of right by the adverse party.

Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

Section 1. Electronic testimony. – After summarily hearing the parties

pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation of
testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court shall
determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and
conditions as may be necessary under the circumstances, including the
protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.

Section 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. – When examination of a witness

is done electronically, the entire proceedings, including the questions and
answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypist or other recorder
authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by
him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole
or in part, had been electronically recorded.

Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. – The electronic evidence and

recording thereof as well as the stenographic notes shall form part of the record
of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of such proceedings.

Rule 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be
shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. – Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party
to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability
of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.

A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic

communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.

If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic

document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

Rule12
EFFECTIVITY

Section 1. Applicability to pending cases. – These Rules shall apply to cases

pending after their effectivity.

Section 2. Effectivity. – These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August
2001 following their publication before the 20th of July 2001 in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
- RCBC vs Oracion, GR # 223274

Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the Court
cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed electronic
documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are considered functional
equivalent of paper-based documents. and regarded as the equivalent of original documents
under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means,
shown to reflect the data accurately.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed
by these Rules."

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. - All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary
weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively
show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it
failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed the
complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood in
relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of
petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative
value.

In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified
person, the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records
and excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint fall
within the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to be excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules.
In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They correctly
regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit History
Inquiry, and not necessarily the original thereof. Being substitutionary documents, they could not
be given probative value and are inadmissible based on the Best Evidence Rule.
The Best Evidence Rule, which requires the presentation of the original document, is
unmistakable:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions . - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:
[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at
or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall
be regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more
copies are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3
above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a "print-out or
output" based on the definition of an electronic document, or a "counterpart" based on
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable . - When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
Firstly, petitioner cannot, on one hand, seek the review of its case by the Court on a pure
question of law and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant its Petition,
nonetheless. For the Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be presented to
justify the same. A review on a pure question of law necessarily negates the review of facts.
Petitioner has not presented any compelling equitable arguments to persuade the Court to relax
the application of elementary evidentiary rules in its cause.
Secondly, petitioner has not been candid in admitting its error as pointed out by both the
MeTC and the RTC. After being apprised that the annexes to its complaint do not conform to the
Best Evidence Rule, petitioner did not make any effort to comply so that the lower courts could
have considered its claim. Rather, it persisted in insisting that the annexes are compliant. Even
before the Court, petitioner did not even attach such documents which would convince the
Court that petitioner could adduce the original documents as required by the Best
Evidence Rule to prove its claim against respondents.

Francia vs Abdon, A.C. # 10031

“It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.  For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.” 26

In Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.,27 the Court reiterated that a preponderance of evidence is necessary

before a lawyer maybe held administratively liable, to wit:
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
to or has greater weight than that of the other.  It means evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.  Under Section 1 of
Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer subsists
and the complaint against him must be dismissed.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the
evidence submitted by the complainant fell short of the required quantum of proof.  Aside from
bare allegations, no evidence was presented to convincingly establish that the respondent
engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, particularly in extortion and influence-peddling.

Firstly, the transcript of the alleged exchange of text messages between the complainant and the
respondent cannot be admitted in evidence since  the  same  was  not  authenticated  in 
accordance  with  A.M.  No.  01-7-01-SC, pertaining to the Rules on Electronic Evidence. 
Without proper authentication, the text messages presented by the complainant have no
evidentiary value.

The Court cannot also give credence to the affidavits of Pena and Demillo which, on close
examination, do not prove anything about the alleged transaction between the complainant and
the respondent.  In his affidavit, Pena, an officer of AGLO, the organization assisting the union
members of NEECO III, alleged:

THAT, sometime in the first week of November 2006, the former workers and employees of
NEECO III informed me of their desire to engage the services of a third party to help facilitate
the expeditious release of a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
96096, and that they already contacted a friend of mine, Mr. Raul Francia, who knows somebody
who can help us work on the CA case;
THAT, in succeeding separate meetings with Mr. Francia, he intimated to me on various
occasions that he had contracted a certain Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon, a labor arbiter based in San
Fernando, Pampanga to facilitate the expeditious release of a favorable decision from the Court
of Appeals;

THAT, I gathered from Mr. Francia and based on the information given to me by the former
workers and employees of NEECO III, Labor Arbiter Abdon asked for [P]1 [M]illion to cover
the amount to be given to the justices of the Court of Appeals handling the case and facilitation
and mobilization fees;

THAT, sometime towards the end of the first week of December, the former workers and
employees of NEECO III met with Mr. Francia at our office.  They handed to him
[P]350,000[.00] as downpayment for the [P]1 [M]illion being demanded by Mr. Abdon, the
balance of which would have been payable on a later agreed period;

THAT, the [P]350,000[.00] was sourced by the former workers and employees of NEECO III
from their personal contributions; and

THAT, soon after the meeting with the former workers and employees of NEECO III, Mr.
Francia left to meet with Labor Arbiter Abdon to deliver the money.

It is clear from the foregoing that Pena never had the opportunity to meet the respondent.  He
never knew the respondent and did not actually see him receiving the money that the union
members raised as facilitation fee. His statement does not prove at all that the alleged illegal
deal transpired between the complainant and the respondent.  If at all, it only proved that the
union members made contributions to raise the amount of money required as facilitation fee and
that they gave it to the complainant for supposed delivery to the respondent.  However, whether
the money was actually delivered to the respondent was not known to Pena.

The same observation holds true with respect to the affidavit of Demillo, an acquaintance of the
complainant, who claims to have witnessed the transaction between the parties at the Makati
Cinema Square.  She alleged that she saw the complainant handing a bulging brown supot to an
unidentified man while the two were at the open dining space of a café. Upon seeing the
complainant again, she learned that the person he was talking to at the café was the respondent
LA.

Demillo’s affidavit, however, does not prove any relevant fact that will establish the
respondent’s culpability.  To begin with, it was not established with certainty that the person
whom she saw talking with the complainant was the respondent.  Even assuming that
respondent’s identity was established, Demillo could not have known about the complainant and
respondent’s business by simply glancing at them while she was on her way to the supermarket
to run some errands.  That she allegedly saw the complainant handing the respondent a bulging
brown supot hardly proves any illegal transaction especially that she does not have knowledge
about what may have been contained in the said bag.

The complainant miserably failed to substantiate his claims with preponderant evidence. 
Surely, he cannot prove the respondent’s culpability by merely presenting equivocal statements
of some individuals or relying on plain gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination. 
Considering the lasting effect of the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment on a
lawyer’s professional standing, this Court cannot allow that the respondent be held liable for
misconduct on the basis of surmises and imagined possibilities.  A mere suspicion cannot
substitute for the convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer.

The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless.  He has, nonetheless, engendered the suspicion
that he is engaged in an illegal deal when he introduced the complainant to Vistan, who was the
one who allegedly demanded P1,000,000.00 in facilitation fee from the union members.  The
records bear out that the complainant, at the outset, made clear his intention to seek the
respondent’s assistance in following up the union’s case in the CA.  The respondent, however,
instead of promptly declining the favor sought in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety,
even volunteered to introduce the complainant to Vistan, a former client who allegedly won a
case in the CA in August 2006.  It later turned out that Vistan represented to the complainant that
he has the capacity to facilitate the favorable resolution of cases and does this for a fee.  This fact
was made known to him by Vistan himself during a telephone conversation when the latter told
him he was given P350,000.00 as facilitation fee. 34  His connection with Vistan was the reason
why the complainant had suspected that he was in connivance with him and that he got a portion
of the loot.  His gesture of introducing the complainant to Vistan precipitated the idea that what
the latter asked of him was with his approval.  It registered a mistaken impression on the
complainant that his case can be expeditiously resolved by resorting to extraneous means or
channels.  Thus, while the respondent may not have received money from the complainant, the
fact is that he has made himself instrumental to Vistan’s illegal activity.  In doing so, he has
exposed the legal profession to undeserved condemnation and invited suspicion on the integrity
of the judiciary for which he must be imposed with a disciplinary sanction.

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a “lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.”  For, the strength of the legal profession
lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. 35  It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high
regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach.

Also, the respondent, as a member of the legal profession, has a further responsibility to
safeguard the dignity of the courts which the public perceives as the bastion of justice.  He must
at all times keep its good name untarnished and not be instrumental to its disrepute.  In Berbano
v. Atty. Barcelona.
WHEREFORE, for having committed an act which compromised the public’s trust in the justice
system, Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of ONE (1) MONTH effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely.

Bartolome vs Maranan, A.M. # P-11-2979

The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of
₱200,000.00, which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for
annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case
decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case.
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain
conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge
thereof.  In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages
as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text
messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the
respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself
admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and thatthe
cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages
originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment
operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted.
The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD containing pictures taken during the
entrapment conducted by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009.
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of
events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed
to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the
recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The complainant
herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint against the
respondent, "Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama ng aking reklamo na
nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking reklamo. Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text
messages niya ang kanyang modus operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang
makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in
administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties
in obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.
The Court totally agrees with the OCA’s finding that the respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent’s assertion
that Bartolome is a fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her
exact address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal and text message contacts
between them. In the absence of supporting evidence, the claim that the complaint against her is
pure and simple harassment orchestrated by persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural
allegation.
The respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that should have governed her
life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the complainant, she committed a crimeand an
act of serious impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply
affected the people’s confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the
impression that decision can be bought and sold.
The Court finds respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer Ill, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Her retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits are ordered forfeited.1âwphi1 This decision
shall be immediately executory.
The Court further Resolves to REQUIRE Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite and Atty. Renante C. Bihasa, to file their Comments on their alleged
participation in the anomalous activities of the respondent, within fifteen ( 15) days from notice.
This directive is without prejudice to the investigation of all or selected employees and officials
of the Branch, who may have participated in anomalous transactions relating to annulment of
marriage.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to submit to this Court, within thirty
(30) days, a list of the annulment of marriage decisions of Judge Fernando L. Felicen for the past
ten (10) years, indicating therein the judgments made and the names of participating lawyers and
prosecutors.

A.M. NO. 004-07-SC             November 21, 2000

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
Section 30. Sexual abuse shield rule. -
(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding
involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove
that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence
shall be admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the
evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires
a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the
hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the
child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The
motion and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a
protective order set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing
in chambers except with his consent.

Maza vs Turla, GR # 187094

Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's report and its
supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or require the
submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of
preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly
conducted.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order ,and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners seek to have the
Orders2 dated July 18, 20083 and December 2, 20084 of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City,
Branch 40 in Criminal Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P nullified and set aside and the criminal
cases against them dismissed.

Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, and Rafael V. Mariano
(petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented Gabriela
Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna Party-List (Bayan
Muna), while Rafael represented Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis).

Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector
Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the
death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. That the named individuals
conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List.
Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy
Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. On July 18, 2008,
Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla issued an Order37 on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla
held that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed
in the Palayan cases and remanded the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another
preliminary investigation. 
Judge Turla further held:
In this case, the undue haste in filing of the information against movants cannot be ignored. From
the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that
the state prosecutors were overly-eager to file the case and to secure a warrant of arrest of
[petitioners] without bail and their consequent detention. There can be no gainsaying the fact that
the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they.
will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the
judiciousness of judges and the prudence of the prosecutors. There is however, a standard in the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The determination has not measured up to that
standard in this case.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Judge Turla added that her order of remanding the Palayan cases back to the provincial
prosecutors "for a complete preliminary investigation is not a manifestation of ignorance of law
or a willful abdication of a duty imposed by law ... but due, to the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in [the cases] and not just 'passing the buck' to the panel of prosecutors
Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no
basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the evidence submitted
by the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have determined the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases.

Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no
basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the evidence submitted
by the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have determined the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases.
Petitioners assert that under the Rules of Court, in case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, Judge Turla could "order the prosecutor to present additional evidence [or] set the case for
hearing so she could make clarifications on the factual issues of the case."

Moreover, petitioners argue that the setting aside of the Joint Resolution establishes the non-
existence of probable cause against them. Thus, the cases against them should have been
dismissed.

Petitioners aver that the documents submitted by the prosecution are neither relevant nor
admissible evidence. The documents "do not establish the complicity of the petitioner party-list
representatives to the death of the supposed victims."
Issue: 
Whether or not the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor in order to
conduct a complete preliminary investigation. 

Held: 
Yes, the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor. 
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge
has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable
cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence
of probable cause. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the
prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest
warrant, or require the submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case
for another conduct of preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary
investigation was improperly conducted. Hence, the trial court judge erred in remanding the case
back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.
Respondents filed their Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General, raising the
following arguments:
I
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR VIOLATING THE HIERARCHY OF
COURTS.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ACTION IN REMANDING THE CASES FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS A RECOGNITION OF THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PURPOSES OF
FILING APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
III.
THE PROSECUTION RIGHTLY FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO WARRANT THE
FILING OF THE INDICTMENTS.
IV.
A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS NOT A PRONOUNCEMENT OF GUILT BUT
MERELY BINDS A SUSPECT TO STAND TRIAL.
V.
THE ISSUE OF ADMISSIBILITY OR INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY
ADDRESSED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND NOT DURING
THE EARLY STAGE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

Respondents also allege that respondent Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly impleaded. There was
no showing that he exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions, for which certiorari may be
issued.

On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her constitutional duty to determine robable cause,
respondents counter that she did not abandon her mandate. Her act of remanding the cases to the
public prosecutors "is a confirmation of her observance of the well-settled principle that such
determination of probable cause is an exclusive executive function of the prosecutorial arm of
our government."

Furthermore, respondent prosecutors' finding of probable cause is correct since evidence against
petitioners show that more likely than not, they participated in the murder of the alleged
victims.62 The prosecutors' finding is not a final declaration of their guilt. It merely engages them
to trial.

Finally, respondents argue that the "issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is

properly addressed during the trial on the merits of the case and not during the early stage of
preliminary investigation."

Petitioners filed their Reply on September 24, 2009. Aside from reiterating their allegations and
arguments in the petition, they added that direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction
was allowed as their petition involved legal questions. Moreover, the inclusion of Secretary
Gonzalez as nominal party-respondent was allowed under Rule 65, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.
The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation,
the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a trial on
the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the
prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused," the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary
investigation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 18,
2008 and December 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 in Criminal
Case Nos. 1879-P and 1880-P are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial
Court, Palayan City, Branch 40 for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in
accordance with this Decision.

Pollo vs Constantino-David, GR # 181881

Facts:
            Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No.
IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under
the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
            An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David.  The letter contained information about an employee of CSC which also
acted as a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the CSC. 
            Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions."

  The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from
the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents
of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that
most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters
in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this
finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone
on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
            Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous
letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
"lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing
expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-
incrimination.
 
Issue:
            Whether or not the search conducted in the Petitioner’s office computer and the copying
of his personal files without his knowledge and consent transgressed his constitutional right to
privacy.
 
Held:
            No.      
 
Ratio:
            The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. But to fully understand this concept and application for the
purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of
pronouncements in another jurisdiction.
            The "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-
cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions
as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither
unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We
hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests
of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness
under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope
of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must
consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place,’"
            The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases
in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit.

Navarro v. CA, GR 121087 (1999) 

FACTS:
 
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
 

ISSUE: 
 
Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
 
RULING:
 
Yes. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made.                                  
 
The law provides:                                                       
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dicta-phone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie- talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.    

RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

People vs Barte, GR # 179749

Facts:
Under review is the decision promulgated on September 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the decision rendered on May 18, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 28, in Mandaue City convicting the accused-appellant of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly. Eddie Barte Y Mendoza
was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended,
following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth P l00.00 to a police officer-poseur
buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-bust operation conducted in Consuelo
Village, Mandaue City.
P02 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other police officers
conducted the buy-bust operation at about 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 on the basis of
information received to the effect that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of shabu.
During the pre-operation conference, P02 Cabatingan was designated as the poseur buyer, and
his back-up officers were P02 Baylosis and P03 Ompad. P/Insp. Grado provided the buy-bust
money with marked serial number to P02 Cabatingan. The buy-bust team then proceeded to
Consuela Village at about 9:10 of that evening on board a Suzuki multicab driven by P03
Ompad. At the target area, P02 Cabatingan met with the accused-appellant, and informed the
latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth "a peso." Upon the accused-appellant's assent to his
offer, P02 Cabatingan handed the buy¬bust money to him, and in turn the latter gave to him a
small sachet with white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-arranged signal by
touching his head. The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to the accused-
appellant as policemen. They frisked and arrested him, and brought him to the police station.
In his defense, the accused-appellant declared that he was sitting alone near the chapel of Basak,
Mandaue City near their house in Consuela Village at around 9:30 in the evening of August 10,
2002 when police officers suddenly came and arrested him. In undertaking his arrest, the officers
pointed their guns at him and forced him to go with them. They brought him to the police
precinct on a Suzuki multicab, and upon their reaching the station, the arresting officers searched
his person and found his ID inside his wallet. He was not informed of the reason for his arrest.
He was subsequently detained. The arresting officers only informed him of the charges against
him on the next day.

RTC rendered its decision on May 18, 2004 convicting the accused-appellant, and giving full
credence to the testimony of P02 Cabatingan, and ruled that the Prosecution thereby established
that the accused-appellant had sold shabu to P02 Cabatingan. Upon the appeal of the accused-
appellant, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and likewise denied his motion for
reconsideration on August 8, 2007.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:
No, the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Evidently, it is the Court’s jurisdiction that it
convicts the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. Conformably
with this standard, it is mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and search for every
error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted, and to
correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt against the accused.
Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two
things, namely: ( 1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were
inspired by any improper motive. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are
"susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion." The
high possibility of abuse was precisely the reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such
abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from abuse and violation of their
rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be presented
in court. In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must
be proven, to wit: ( 1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, the essential requisites
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the following, namely: (1)
the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.
Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast
doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the
buy-bust operation. The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during
the trial was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.
Therefore, the Court acquits accused EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA of the violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended; and directs the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to release EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA from custody unless he is detained thereat
for another lawful cause.

Catalan vs Catalan, GR # 183622

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Meropein
Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not
a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the appellate
court. Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation.
She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce
decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage,
the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor
should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in
Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.In fine,
petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of
the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant case.

Noveras vs Noveras, GR # 188289,

Subject Matter: What need not be proved; judicial notice; when hearing necessary
Summary: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June
2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
The RTC recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personal status are those of the US. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been
dissolved. Thus, the RTC considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the
absolute community of property instead of a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property.
However, according to the SC, RTC erroneously proceeded to liquidation because the parties
failed to prove the authenticity of the divorce decree. Thus, there was no valid recognition of the
divorce decree in the Philippine court. It follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines and cannot yet proceed to liquidation. Doctrines: For Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Parties: Petitioner DAVID A. NOVERAS (David)
Respondent LETICIA T. NOVERAS (Leticia) Facts: David and Leticia got married in 1988 in
Quezon City. They moved to California, USA and eventually acquired American citizenship.
They begot two children. They acquired several properties in the Philippines and in the US. In
2001, David returned to the Philippines due to business reverses. In 2002, Leticia executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell their house and lot in Sampaloc,
Manila for P2.2Million. Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA, which the
court granted on 24 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two
children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the US, while Philippine properties were
awarded to David. On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. RTC RTC dissolved the absolute community of
property of the parties. RTC awarded the net assets of the absolute community of property of the
parties in the Philippines to David only, with the properties in the US remaining in the sole
ownership of petitioner Leticia. The RTC recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the
laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their
marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued
by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. Under their law, the parties’ marriage
had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one
for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the
legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property.

 With respect to their property relations, the RTC first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before
their marriage. Then, the RTC ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US
law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. CA CA modified the RTC
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.

Issue/s: 1. WON the CA erred in not recognizing the California judgment which awarded all the
US properties to Leticia. (NO.) 2. WON the petition for judicial separation of property should be
granted. (YES) Arguments: David argues that:

The CA should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine
properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. Allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already
granted all US properties by the California court.

Ratio:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property xxx (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the
record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such
official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. o Based on the records,
only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. The divorce
decree also had no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained. o Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The RTC, therefore, erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. YES – the petition
for judicial separation of property should be granted. **Note that the RTC did not tackle this
issue because RTC treated the petition as petition for liquidation.  For Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.  The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
NO – CA did not err when it refused to recognize the California judgment.

The records are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than
a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been
proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once
confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent
for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted
by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted. The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime that governed the parties.

Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED

Dimaguila vs Monteiro, GR # 201011

DOCTRINE: The hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 provides that entries in official records
are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's
attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.

FACTS:
Respondent, Spouses Monteiro et al., filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the
RTC, against The Dimaguilas. The complaint alleged that all the families were co-owners and
prayed for the partition of a residential house. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed
of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro. The Dimaguilas and the other defendants
countered that there was no coownership to speak of in the first place. In their Answer, they
alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio, had long been partitioned equally
between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. upon
resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or
Admit Amended Complaint, which was then granted. The amended complaint abandoned the
original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the
subject property occupied by the Dimagui as and other defendants, specifically, the portion sold
to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas' admission that the subject property had already been partitioned between Perfecto
and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and that during their lifetime, the
brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion and Vitaliano
of the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as well as their
heirs and successors-in-interest. In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas
admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been actually divided into
southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned
only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they
argued the existence of a co-ownership, contrary to their original position. Sps. Monteiro
presented the certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of
Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been
partitioned into southern and northern portions. It also concluded that the Dimaguilas were
stopped from denying this partition and the Bilihan document was regular and authentic absent
any evidence to the contrary.

ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not there was a partition of the subject property 2. Whether or not the 1/3
portion of the southern half of the subject property was sold to the respondent spouses
RULING

YES. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue
that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the
answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. The Court notes that it is a purely self-
serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, under Article 1431 of the CC, that through
estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on
the petitioners' admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for
recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now
estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would
actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to
corroborate the petitioners' admission.
Under the best evidence rule, Rule 130 Sec 3(d) when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides
that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody or the record. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public
officers. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 provides that entries in official records are
an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's
attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein.

People vs Janjalani, GR # 188314,

FACTS: On February 14, 2005 night, the bus conductor of RRCG bus noticed two men
running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus and so the conductor obliged and let
them in. Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, immediately became wary due to their unusual
conduct. One of the two men sat two seats behind the driver while the other sat at the back of the
bus. Both of them paid for two passengers. At that point, Andales became certain that the two
were up to no good. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. The bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus due to a Makati ordinance prohibiting the unloading except at designated bus
stop. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two
immediately got off the bus. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion and saw that the bus was
on fire. He ran out of the bus and when he went back he saw their passengers either lying on the
ground or looking traumatized.
After the explosion, the spokesperson for Abu Sayyaff announced over radio that the
explosion was a valentine’s gift for the former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Accused
Trinidad, in an exclusive interview, confessed his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing.
Baharan, in another exclusive interview, likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident.
Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devises for the bombing. The accused were then charged with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused members of Abu Sayyaf remain at-large. On their arraignment for the multiple murder
charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused
Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohm pled not guilty to both charges. The trial court asked
whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they plan guilty to the heavier charge of
multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defence counsel conferred
with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The
two accused acknowledge the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment.
After the Information was read to
them, Baharan and Trinidad plead guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea
of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of the said plea.

COURT’S RULING:
The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching
inquiry.” Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argued that the trial court did not conduct a
searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. Trial court judges
are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
that prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching applies more so in cases
of re-arraignment.
In People vs Galvez, the Court notes that since accused-appellant’s original plea was not
guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea
to guilty. According to the Court: The stringent procedure governing the section of a plea of
guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to
leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching
inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases which it was the defence counsel who explained
the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in the case. Nevertheless, the
Court ruled that they are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
The Court observed that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously plead guilty to another
charge - multiple murder - based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder
charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan
and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession, and
the other via judicial admission. Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it
unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the “searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the
case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of
the condemnatory judgment under consideration.
Trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his... plea and shall require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for
collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into
by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were
needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then
delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P 5,820,000.00.
However, despite having made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim
Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with
interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff "to
attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality. The Municipality filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which the action had been brought was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or
document that would evince the supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. It also
filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued,
invoking, among others, immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a
municipal corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from
execution and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, the Municipality’s claim of
immunity from suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal
corporations with the power to sue and be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
order.
It is interesting to note at this point that in their bid to have the case dismissed, petitioners
theorize that there could not have been a contract by which the municipality agreed to be bound,
because it was not shown that there had been compliance with the required bidding or that the
municipal council had approved the contract. The argument is flawed.  By invoking
unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds, petitioners are in effect acknowledging the
existence of a contract between them and private respondent — only, the said contract cannot be
enforced by action for being non-compliant with the legal requisite that it be reduced into
writing.  Suffice it to say that while this assertion might be a viable defense against respondent’s
claim, it is principally a matter of evidence that may be properly ventilated at the trial of the case
on the merits. 

In other words, the Statute of Frauds only lays down the method by which the enumerated
contracts may be proved.  But it does not declare them invalid because they are not reduced to
writing inasmuch as, by law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.  The object is to
prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on
the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to
be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The effect of noncompliance with
this requirement is simply that no action can be enforced under the given contracts.  If an action
is nevertheless filed in court, it shall warrant a dismissal under Section 1(i), Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, unless there has been, among others, total or partial performance of the obligation on
the part of either party.
It has been private respondent’s consistent stand, since the inception of the instant case that she
has entered into a contract with petitioners.  As far as she is concerned, she has already
performed her part of the obligation under the agreement by undertaking the delivery of the 21
motor vehicles contracted for by Ople in the name of petitioner municipality.  This claim is well
substantiated — at least for the initial purpose of setting out a valid cause of action against
petitioners — by copies of the bills of lading attached to the complaint, naming petitioner
municipality as consignee of the shipment.  Petitioners have not at any time expressly denied this
allegation and, hence, the same is binding on the trial court for the purpose of ruling on the
motion to dismiss.  In other words, since there exists an indication by way of allegation that there
has been performance of the obligation on the part of respondent, the case is excluded from the
coverage of the rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the statute of frauds, and
either party may then enforce its claims against the other.

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of
Hagonoy is valid.
HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number.   In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the purchase
money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book,
at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) calendar days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may
allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he or she cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his or her sworn statement as contemplated in the
preceding paragraph and his or her compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections
are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.

RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed
or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of
the proceedings.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be
entered for him. (1a)
(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (n)
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records
transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the
information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of
the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after
arraignment. (n)
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea
bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of
failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to
enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged with
the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment
shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other
causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period. (sec.
2, cir. 38-98)
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, circ. 38-98)