From E.Chenoweth,M.J.

Stephen, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent

Conflict, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 some remarks from Chapter 9:
Conclusion
- we have argued that historically, nonviolent resistance campaigns have been more effective in
achieving their goals than violent resistance campaigns. This has been true even under conditions in
which most people would expect nonviolent resistance to be futile, including situations in which
dissent is typically met with harsh regime repression. The only exception is secession campaigns,
which have been historically ineffective whether nonviolent or violent
- we have argued that the historical success of nonviolent campaigns is explained by the fact that the
physical, moral, and informational barriers to participation in nonviolent campaigns are substantially
lower than in violent campaigns given comparable circumstances. The lower barriers to participation
translate into a higher degree of more diverse membership in nonviolent campaigns, which proves to
be a critical factor in explaining the outcomes of resistance campaigns in five keys ways.
*First, mass, diverse participation tends to result in higher levels of civic disruption through mass
noncooperation, which causes erstwhile regime supporters, including the security forces, to reevaluate
their interests and preferences and become more willing to shift loyalties to the resistance. At the end
of the day, most people want to survive and to be on the winning side of a conflict, so nonviolent
contestation increases the incentives for loyalty shifts.
*Second, regime repression against large, nonviolent campaigns is more likely to backfire against the
perpetrator than when repression is used against large, violent campaigns. Backfiring, whose effects
are amplified for reasons described earlier, often results in even greater mobilization, shifts in loyalty
among erstwhile regime elites, and sanctions against the offending regime.
*Third, campaigns that exhibit large-scale civilian participation are more likely than small campaigns
to win meaningful support for their cause in the international community and to cause their opponent
regimes to lose support among important regional or international powers.
*Fourth, large nonviolent campaigns tend to be better at evading and remaining resilient in the face of
regime repression.
*Fifth, large nonviolent campaigns tend to be more adept at developing tactical innovations than small
campaigns, allowing them to maneuver and adapt to conditions more easily than small campaigns.
- we have also shown that just because a campaign is nonviolent does not guarantee its success.
Campaigns do not succeed simply because they have won the moral high ground, as some may
suggest. Rather, the ability of the campaign to make strategic adjustments to changing conditions is
crucial to its success, whether it is nonviolent or violent. But it is very difficult to predict or generalize
which campaigns will be strategically competent until after some visible gains have been made.
Because strategic ability is not observable at the outset of a campaign, we downplay its significance as
a statistical pattern; however, the actual significance of the ability to outthink and outmaneuver ones
adversary is obvious to anyone who has studied conflict.
- there appears to be no general trend indicating that there are types of opponents against whom such
strategic maneuvering is impossible. Contrary to theorists who emphasize structural factors in
determining whether a conflict will succeed or fail, we find no such patterns. Nonviolent campaigns
succeed against democracies and nondemocracies, weak and powerful opponents, conciliatory and
repressive regimes. Thus conditions shapebut do not predeterminethe capacity for a nonviolent
resistance to adapt and gain advantage under even the direst of circumstances.
- Although violent campaigns do succeed from time to time, they often do so only with the help of a
foreign sponsor, which helps them to demonstrate credibility to potential recruits, elevate their
material capabilities against the opponent, and evade authorities through foreign sanctuary. Half the
successful violent insurgencies received overt support from state sponsors, whose support sometimes
attempted to supplement the shortfall of willing recruits. In countries in which violent insurgencies
have been victorious, we find, however, that the country is much less likely to become a peaceful
democracy after the conflict has ended. On the other hand, in analogous countries where mass,
nonviolent campaigns have occurred, we see a much higher rate of postconflict democracies and a
much lower rate of relapse into civil war. This does not mean that there will not be any sharp political
contention or democratic backsliding following a successful nonviolent transition. But it does mean
that political contention is more likely to transpire through nonviolent channels.

From G.Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (4th
edition), Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2010 - extracts
Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways.
- The first mechanism is the least likely, though it has occurred. When members of the opponent group
are emotionally moved by the suffering of repression imposed on courageous nonviolent resisters or
are rationally persuaded that the resisters cause is just, they may come to accept the resisters aims.
This mechanism is called conversion. Though cases of conversion in nonviolent action do sometimes
happen, they are rare, and in most conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant
scale.
Far more often, nonviolent struggle operates by changing the conflict situation and the society so that
the opponents simply cannot do as they like. It is this change that produces the other three
mechanisms: accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Which of these occurs depends
on the degree to which the relative and absolute power relations are shifted in favor of the democrats.
- If the issues are not fundamental ones, the demands of the opposition in a limited campaign are not
considered threatening, and the contest of forces has altered the power relationships to some degree,
the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching an agreement, a splitting of differences or
compromise. This mechanism is called accommodation. Many strikes are settled in this manner, for
example, with both sides attaining some of their objectives but neither achieving all it wanted. A
government may perceive such a settlement to have some positive benefits, such as defusing tension,
creating an impression of fairness, or polishing the international image of the regime. It is important,
therefore, that great care be exercised in selecting the issues on which a settlement by accommodation
is acceptable. A struggle to bring down a dictatorship is not one of these.
- Nonviolent struggle can be much more powerful than indicated by the mechanisms of conversion or
accommodation. Mass noncooperation and defiance can so change social and political situations,
especially power relationships, that the dictators ability to control the economic, social, and political
processes of government and the society is in fact taken away. The opponents military forces may
become so unreliable that they no longer simply obey orders to repress resisters. Although the
opponents leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to their original goals, their ability to act
effectively has been taken away from them. That is called nonviolent coercion.
- In some extreme situations, the conditions producing nonviolent coercion are carried still further.
The opponents leadership in fact loses all ability to act and their own structure of power collapses.
The resisters self-direction, noncooperation, and defiance become so complete that the opponents
now lack even a semblance of control over them. The opponents bureaucracy refuses to obey its own
leadership. The opponents troops and police mutiny. The opponents usual supporters or population
repudiate their former leadership, denying that they have any right to rule at all. Hence, their former
assistance and obedience falls away. The fourth mechanism of change, disintegration of the
opponents system, is so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender. The
regime simply falls to pieces.
In planning liberation strategies, these four mechanisms should be kept in mind. They sometimes
operate essentially by chance. However, the selection of one or more of these as the intended mecha
nism of change in a conflict will make it possible to formulate specific and mutually reinforcing
strategies. Which mechanism (or mechanisms) to select will depend on numerous factors, including
the absolute and relative power of the contending groups and the attitudes and objectives of the
nonviolent struggle group.