The Rule of the Majority

In the introduction to the present treatment of democratic freedom,

democracy was described as a particular form of political regime,
viz., the regime which attempts to realize the political idea by
placing the governing personnel under the control of the governed.
Whether the democratic procedure is successful or not in keeping
government confined within proper limits is a question that we left
out of this initial consideration. In fact, no objection to democracy is
more common than this: democracy easily gives birth to a
particularly formidable kind of tyranny, that of the majority. Men in
power, if allowed to believe and to make others believe that theirs is
the government of the people, are prone to consider that their
actions are indefectibly related to the common welfare; in other
words, democratic origin inspires the governing personnel with a
ruthless reliance upon their own judgment. Further, majority
support gives government a power greater and harder to check than
almost any power held by a minority; this is why one-party
organizations, aware of the precarious lot which would be theirs if
they were delivered to the consequences of their oligarchical
character, try so hard to give themselves the appearances of
majority government.

The danger of oppression by the majority is so obvious that the

history of modern democracy is haunted by the ambition of
including the minority in the controlling electoral body. The method
calculated to achieve such inclusion is known as "proportional
representation."{10}

This method admits of many varieties, and more are devised every
day, or so the story goes. But the general idea is simple enough. Let
the government be likened to a pie; we are three, they are two; in
the majority system we get the whole pie, and they do not get
anything. It is not fair; the pie should be divided into five parts; the
majority should get three and the minority two. This demonstration
of proportional representation was proposed by sincere supporters
of the system and cannot be interpreted as a malevolent caricature.
True, the comparison between the government and a pie conveys
the disquieting impression that the competing parties intend to
observe the laws of fair play in the division of covered advantages --
as if they were planning to raid the treasury. Prior to elections the
political problem concerns the establishment of power; but the
answer of the proportionalists concerns the distribution of the
advantages that the possession of power is expected to yield. The
upholders of proportional representation are so worried about
justice in the actual operation of government that they want an idea
relative to distribution to preside over the phase of constitution.

They claim to eliminate majority oppression and guarantee

equitable government by including the minority in the governing
personnel. No wonder that new methods of proportional
representation are continually devised; for the whole system is
made restless by the character of its ideal. Majority plus minority
equals unanimity. Unanimity is known to be a precarious thing.
Under the appearance of justice, proportional representation
signifies permanent uncertainty.

It is hardly necessary to recall the conclusions of our preceding

analysis of unanimity as a means of procuring united action. Under
the ideal circumstances of a society made exclusively of enlightened
and virtuous persons, unanimity can work in so far as the means to
the common good is uniquely determined. When the means to the
common good is not uniquely determined -- as a matter of fact, it is
never uniquely determined in all its particulars and modalities --
unanimity cannot be achieved except by luck. With regard to
political assemblies where ignorance and ill will are frequent, it
should be said without any qualification that unanimity is a casual
affair. In so far as an organization tends toward government by
unanimity, it delivers itself to the uncertainties of chance
occurrences.

Imagine an electoral body divided into six million liberals and four
million conservatives. Suppose that the assembly, elected according
to a system of strict proportional representation, comprises sixty
liberals and forty conservatives. Suppose that the principle of the
equitable division of the pie is observed in the constitution of the
cabinet, made, accordingly, of six liberals and four conservatives.
This is already a picture of weak government; further application of
the principle of proportional representation would make it weaker.
What about premiership? Either the premier will be a man of
the majority -- but this would set a restriction on the principle of
proportional representation -- or we have to imagine such a clumsy
procedure as a rotating system giving the premiership to a liberal
for six days and to a conservative for four days out of every ten.
But the principle of proportional representation would not yet be
thoroughly applied. What happens when there is a question of
passing a measure on which the parties disagree? A parliament may
be divided into sharply distinct party organizations; a government
may be constituted by a coalition of parties; conceivably, the
presidency can rotate; but a measure cannot be split. The only
choice is this: unanimous action or no action at all. Now unanimous
action has the character of a compromise. Proportional
representation causes weakness wherever it does not cause
inaction.

Does it follow that no concession should ever be made to the

principle of proportional representation? A really poor system may
happen to be the best under particular circumstances. It is up to the
prudence of the statesman to determine whether the circumstances
do or do not call for some skilful combination of the majority
principle and the proportional representation principle. Unanimity is
a most uncertain way of procuring united action; yet there are
situations in which the constitution of authority is impossible, so
that action has to be united by way of unanimity if it is to be united
at all. Such has been the case, so far, with regard to the over-all
strategy of war coalitions; such is the case in the Security Council of
the United Nations. If procedures based upon unanimity happen, in
a few cases, to be necessary, procedures that are related to
unanimity without going so far as to imply it are likely to be
necessary in less infrequent cases. But let it be kept in mind that
any concession to a system which embodies a tendency toward
government by unanimity means increased danger of weak and
uncertain measures, compromise, deadlock. Some decisions are of
such a nature as to demand a wide margin of popular support. The
rule of the two-thirds majority for certain measures, e.g., the
ratification of treaties, may have to be consented to; but special
action will be needed to compensate for the danger of a stalemate
that this rule implies.{11} As a preventive measure, proportional
representation seems to enjoy a distinguished place among the
means of restraining the majority. True, it asserts a principle of
equitable distribution when the political process is still in the phase
of constitution, as a result of which the benefit of a possible check
on oppression by the majority is outweighed by the evils of
weakness and confusion.