]Midterm Exam

Comparative Electoral System in Muslim Societies

Instructor: Philips Vermonte, Ph.D

Libasut Taqwa_ 02222110013

(MA student of Political Science_Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia)

2. Summarize the debate about which electoral system is best to mitigate conflict in plural
societies and provide your own analysis which one that is more achievable

- It should be noted that plural societies are not automatically in line with conflict. I am on
the same page with Stewart et. all (2008) when mentioning that “conflict can occur
anywhere, and does not only occur in certain societies, whether in plural or homogeneous
societies.” Although it must be admitted, the potential for conflict to occur in
heterogeneous societies is greater because the variance of interests is also large. Besides,
the majority of heterogeneous communities can coexist with each other unless there are
certain issues, especially those included in the multidimensional horizontal inequalities:
political participation; economic aspects; social aspects; and cultural status.

The paragraph above is my sole argument which showed that maybe the problem is not
only about the electoral system, and that is why, choosing which one of the electoral
systems is best to mitigate conflict is quite difficult if we neglect the context, especially the
internal circumstance of the country. Based on several readings, such as Lijphart (2004),
Norris (2004), and Reilly (2006), I can conclude that several points should be taken into
consideration in assessing which one of the electoral systems can best fit with plural
societies. Lijphart argues that the idea of reforming the electoral system is important
because some of the states with plural societies only copied their former colonial ruler in
maintaining the electoral system. Furthermore, Lijphart stated that PR (proportional
representative) is the best system for divided societies. In this context, ensuring broadly
representative parliamentary elections is an important consideration for a divided society.
Here Lijphart also writes that only in this system, power sharing among group
representatives, and group autonomy can be achievable. Because it guarantees
representation, PR, is arguably the best way for divided societies. Reilly expands this
argument. He focused on how electoral system can encourage cooperation and
accommodation among rival groups and therefore reduce the salience of ethnicity. Reilly
proposes a single transferrable vote (STV) system which functions like a proportional
representation system. In this point of view, the candidate does not need to win a majority
of the vote, but rather a minimum quota. Therefore, this model can better represent
minorities and prevent conflict. However, it needs three conditions as a prerequisite for STV
to work smoothly; First, among political leaders and general electorate should exist a core
group of moderates who are ready for the incentives generated by preferential voting.
Second, the system continuity is really important because it will stabilize the electoral
process and the system can be consistently worked into several elections ahead. Third,
different groups need to pool votes in several different districts to make sure the
inclusiveness of the voters, and then the cross-ethnic logic of preferential voters can be
materialized.

However, Lardeyret (2004) and Quentin Quade (2004) reject Lijphart and to some extent
Reilly’s arguments on PR. Lardeyret agreed that PR favors the representation of ‘minorities,’
in a way that a pressure group -ethnic, religion, or ideology- can have a chance to win seats.
But the PR system tends to exacerbate the conflict in society. Lardeyret took the rise of the
National Front (FN) in France as an example. The introduction of the PR system during the
1980s, on the one hand, made FN, a far-right party that condemns immigration, grow
saliently and influence the wider public. On the other hand, this situation triggered the left-
wing anti-racist movement in France that was unfortunately similar to FN in terms of
discrimination. Expanding the argument, Quade, on the other side took Weimar Germany
and pre-Mussolini situation to show that PR will only promote extremism, fragmentation, or
vulnerable government coalition. Instead of promoting PR, Lardeyret and Quade
confidently proposed Plurality/majority system as they think that this system will produce a
more stable government, democratic, and also more efficient in terms of giving the choice
of who will govern to the voters rather than to the smaller elites that negotiate the
government secretly after the election. Of course, majority system will neglect
representation and prioritize more on governability. But, in the case of plural societies, the
term ‘representativeness’ is somehow the core issue that can not be neglected because we
want to prioritize governability. Without representation, the country will lack of recognition,
and the lack of cultural recognition and equity will be provocative for political mobilization.
Political mobilization along lines of identity recognition demands is a central feature of many
conflicts.

Reflecting on these discussions, to some extent I may prefer Mix-member electoral system.
One of the reasons is that I might choose a moderate position to combine those two
advantages of the previous systems. Besides, majoritarian methods for allocating seats to
single-seat constituencies usually give alternative governments a clear choice, but it also
tends to allow majority governments to rely on significantly fewer votes than a majority. PR
system, on the other hand, tends to result in coalition governments that do not allow voters
to choose between competing government options because governments are likely to be
formed through post-election negotiations (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2003). But, as added by
Shugart and Wattenberg, a mix-member electoral system can become an option when an
‘extreme’ situation exists. Therefore, it can not be as easy as possible to realize the system.
For instance, the case of Hyper-Personalistic in Japan when Japan had experienced over
forty years of uninterrupted rule by one party, that encouraged legislators to develop a
personal support group. Or, the case of Hyper-representative systems which produce
governments that are based on coalitions that have not been foreshadowed in election
campaigns like what occurred in Italy and Israel. This system can not be generalized when
we have no cases like Japan, Italy, or Israel.
Lastly, I reiterate what Norris argues that there is no single best electoral system and it will
be based on the internal circumstances of the country. My personal opinion is, first,
electoral reform is needed to find the best way of engineering this procedural democracy.
We cannot depend on the only system if we know that it will not be working well in
guaranteeing conflict management. But at the same time, consistency is also important to
make sure the system can work and develop well in several elections ahead. Second, I agree
that the PR system, regardless of its disadvantages, is the best alternative to mitigate
conflict in our contemporary situation, particularly in a plural society. But the system is not
enough yet. We need to make sure the coalition works well, the power-sharing reflects the
need for representativeness, and the minorities are recognized properly in the context of
basic rights and other needs that represent democracy.

5. A) Discuss the evolution of the terms regarding political parties! Why political parties
are formed? B) Explain the origins of political parties in Europe and discuss the formation
of social cleavages that affect the formation of political parties in Europe.

- In the era of aristocrats and kingdoms, the idea of political parties is harmful to the
existence of the status quo, because it will reduce the authority of the state and the lay
people will have a channel to oppose the King publicly. Therefore, the demand for political
parties will be pressured by the authority. During that time, the idea of a party is similar to
the ‘faction’ term which have a bad image and was seen as evil from the state stability
perspective. The classical era then changed, especially during the European modern state
was established along the way European develop the idea of political parties. As Charles Tilly
explains that during the beginning of modern Europe, the state needs to collect taxes from
the people to finance the war. The more they want to expand the military, the more taxes
they need. Therefore, the state's taxes were higher, in order to pay for the credits received
from the capitalists to finance the war (Tilly, 1992). The greater the credit, the greater the
tax to the community. This situation also creates circumstances that make the greater the
tax, the higher the demands for civil and political rights.

To materialize political demands, people then form political parties to promote their joint
endeavors, the national interest upon some particular principles on which the people are all
agreed (Sartori, 2005). Here, the political parties then change the idea of a sovereign
relationship between the ruler and the people and form an equal position when political
parties and the ruler (the state) are the subjects of sovereignty. However, the formation of
political parties also emphasizes deep social cleavages in European societies. Lipset and
Rokkan, assert that social identities formed the basic building blocks of party support (Lipset
and Rokkan, 1967). That social cleavage, Norris (2004) adds, is born from classical unbalance
relationships among groups in Europe, such as between the landlord and the worker,
Catholics, and Protestants, or between the left and the right movement. All of those groups
then formed their own political parties that guarantee and struggle for their own political
interest. Unfortunately, the organizational linkages between the political parties and their
voters gradually strengthened over the years along with stable patterns of party
competition revolving around the salient primary cleavages dividing each society such as the
role of class in Britain or religion in France.

Source: Personal elaboration from various sources

Regarding the political parties’ evolution, I think two main evolutional changes should be
addressed. Before the 1960s (or around 1920-1960) we face what we know as the mass-
membership parties period. A situation when political parties are based on loyal
membership and truly rely on the ideological differentiation or the charisma of the leaders.
Political parties are the representation of people’s ideology and therefore the parties belong
to its member and the leaders. The case of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and
Soekarno of Indonesia were examples of how charismatic leaders run their parties. This era
also makes stream politics (Politik Aliran) like in the Indonesian context, that separate
people based on political parties and their ideological preferences.

After the 1960s, the nature of political parties changes because of several main issues in
international affairs that also affect local politics. The rise of the cold war, the new
emergence of countries, or the increase of various societal-political and economic problems,
made the problems more fragmented, and ideological classification tend to be not sufficient
in tackling that problem. Therefore, political parties tend to lose their ideology as a
signature and try to catch all issues to become moderates because it can be sufficient to
gain masses and powers. In addition, the party that loses its membership means that it loses
financial resources, because before the 1960s, the political party members, will support
their parties in various ways including financing. Thus, the political parties will depend on
the state budget to run their activities which will affect badly to the parties’ independencies.
This situation can affect the relationship between the voters and parties-politicians and to
some extent involves corruption, and money politics, which makes the elections purely
transactional.
4. Discuss the Electoral System of the country where you are coming from! Why the
system is adopted? Do you think it is successful in achieving the objectives it is oriented?
Have there been any electoral reform that ever takes place? If yes, explain, if no, why?

- In general, Indonesia is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world. It means
that a country like Indonesia, according to Lijphart, is suitable for a PR electoral system.
Historically, the electoral system in Indonesia has been changed three times with several
modifications. In the first 1955 election, Indonesia used PR system. The fact that it was used
because of the idea of representativeness during that time. Almost 30 parties joined the
election and ideological parties such as PNI, Masyumi, and NU won the election.
Unfortunately, the 1955 election is the first and only election held during that time. The
challenge of the authoritarianism of Soekarno and certain political and economic problem
brought the country to an unbalanced situation to hold another election. Only After The Old
Order, Soeharto seized the power and became president, and the second election was held
again in 1971. During this regime, all 7 elections from 1971-1999 were held under a
majoritarian system.

We can argue how far the election provides transparency and represents the idea of
procedural democracy. But the fact that this regime is also practically one of the longest
autocratic regime in Indonesia’s history reflect the issue of government stability and
accountability. Soeharto’s regime was known for the idea of simplifying political parties
which indirectly hinders the development of a plural multiparty to become an opposition to
the regime. Therefore the electoral system should be devised to support the chances of the
president’s man to win the elections. The more Soeharto’s candidate wins, the more
supporter of the president. After the fall of Soeharto in 1999, Indonesia tried to improve its
system and change (reform) it to PR. According to Mietzner (2019), this change was
considered because the drafters of the electoral system and political parties in Indonesia
after 1998 were very concerned about two major issues that destabilized Indonesian
democracy in the 1950s; First, the atomization of the electoral system parties could lead to
ineffective government, as political fragmentation overthrew democracy in the late 1950s
Second, there was the risk of the emergence of local political parties that could spill over
into race-based politics and local identity, which not only created divisions but also fueled
the regional rebellions of 1956 and 1957. These two things have led to the use of PR in
elections from 2004-2019.

In the 4 elections since the reformation, in my opinion, the hope to emphasize

representation politics has been quite realized. Also, the General Election Commissions
(KPU) must be appreciated for their hard work in holding elections in a big area like
Indonesia without causing riots that threaten the existence of Indonesia's multicultural
diversity. However, in several studies on the democratization index, Indonesia is said to be
experiencing a gradual decline. This setback was also influenced by the current electoral
system. Open-List proportional Representation in certain situations actually encourages the
practice of money politics that is severe and cannot prevent serious corruption by
politicians. Apart from that, discussions on changes to the electoral mechanism by looking at
the various deficiencies of the current system, do not occur much at the level of
policymakers. In addition, the idea of electoral and presidential thresholds also hinders
political equality between political parties and prevents the voters to choose their
candidates without really relying on political parties’ considerations.

3. What are the reasons for electoral reform to a) Happen, b) not Happen?

- In the context of electoral reform, of course, we cannot mention a single factor. As the
context also works for the electoral system, I also think that reformation needs its context.
This kind of context also varied among countries based on priorities. One country can
change the whole system, and another country can reform particular issues such as district
magnitudes or modification of multitiered methods of seat distribution (Katz, 2009). Shugart
(2001) also suggests that electoral reforms must be analyzed in terms of both contingent
and inherent factors. Inherent because an electoral system has an inherent tendency
towards “systemic failure,” understood as outcomes that are inconsistent with the
normative model of democracy with which it is associated (Shugart, 2008). Contingent,
because of the coming to power of a previously disadvantaged party and a pro-reform vote
to be cultivated. Norris (2010) also mentioned rational choice theories that assert the public
may demand institutional reforms, as part of the agenda‐setting process. On the other hand,
the lack of legitimacy is also a major factor catalyzing political pressures for electoral
change. Besides all of that, I will also explore several situations where electoral reform can
happen and vice versa, and what are the salient reasons for not doing electoral reform.

One of the salient reasons is that the electoral system can be changed because of fairness,
inclusiveness, and women-minorities representativeness consideration. For example, during
the Soeharto regime, Indonesia experienced unfair elections for almost three decades, thus
one of the notions of electoral reform is that the election should be fair and inclusive for all
citizens. The Soeharto regime election has been known as LUBER (Direct, General, Free,
Secret). Direct means that voters are required to vote in person and may not be
represented; General because the general election can be followed by all citizens who
already have the right to vote; Free because it means that voters are required to cast their
vote without any coercion from any party; and Secret because it means that the vote cast by
a voter is confidential and known only to the voter himself.

After reformasi, Indonesia add JURDIL (Honest and fair) to the election principle to show
that both of these principles does not exist (were neglected) during the Soeharto regime.
"honest" implies that general elections must be carried out by the rules to ensure that every
citizen who has the right can vote according to his will. "fair" is equal treatment of election
participants and voters, without any privileges or discrimination against certain participants
or voters. Here, electoral reform occurred as an antithesis of the previous regime.
There is also another consideration for electoral reform, for instance, the entire political
system is in the process of disintegration. The old electoral system was no longer able to
accommodate the interests of unity as a country. Therefore, to prevent further
disintegration, changes to the electoral system could be considered; Or, a political crisis
culminating in the reform of the regime framework. The occurrence of a sudden change in
political leadership such as a revolution and democratization, or a political crisis due to
external intervention or the inability of the regime to manage the country, will also
encourage changes in the electoral system. Moreover, political actors and scholars, after
considering various possibilities, rationally decide that they are interested in a new
approach or a new electoral system (Mietzner, 2019). The role of several electoral system
experts in the adoption of the alternative vote in Australia in 1918 or in The Fiji Constitution
Reform Commission of 1996, according to Farrell and McAllister (2006) proved the role of
this aspect. Besides that, based on what Renwick (2010) has shown in his study, somehow
the idea of electoral reform occurs when politicians retain control, particularly in established
democracies, primarily by way of elite majority imposition. The regime also wants to change
the system because it might provide a long benefit for them. Moreover, reform may also be
triggered by an imagined crisis such as the communist threat as happened in early 1950s
Italy (Katz, 2009).

However, we have to realize that electoral reform is not an easy task. That is why not all of
the regimes have successfully reformed their electoral system. Katz (2009) even said that
major reforms of national electoral systems remain quite rare in modern states. Even more,
the actors need more than institutional chances to make it happens. Here, I could say that
Electoral reform will not happen because the regime or political groups may not want to
change/reform it. After all, pragmatically it will harm their political-power interest. Electoral
reform may be neglected because the political elites will only prioritize government stability,
as happens in the Middle East in several durable authoritarian regimes that do not even
organize elections because they do not want the opposition to win. Secondly, electoral
reform may take more budget spending, regulations negotiations, etc that may need
months or years to be executed. It will also neglect other important issues such as
economic, education, social, and cultural that might be more important than electoral
reform. Third, if we believe that the electoral system is one of the best ways to build and
foster a democratic political culture, and an active and pluralistic civil society, so electoral
reform may take many years (at least) to see an effective state in maintaining electoral
system sustainability. If we deny this point, it may involve a miscalculation for the
stakeholders to continue reformation.

1. Compare and contrast different electoral systems that we have discussed in class.
Remember to make key references to items (district magnitude, different formulas of
translating votes into seats, electoral outcomes in terms of the number of political parties
produced or governability or different aspect of representativeness that might affect the
electorates in general) that highlight the strength and/or weaknesses of each of the
systems.

- At least, we have discussed three kinds of electoral systems so far. First is the majoritarian
or plurality system. Second Proportional Representatives (PR), and Third, Mixed-member
electoral system (MMS). Before Comparing and contrasting all of those systems, it is really
important to reiterate that the electoral system is the formula by which votes are
aggregated in a democracy to determine the winners and losers of seats in an assembly. It
means that the electoral system can really matter in elections and democracy. However, it is
also should be noted for the first time that Academic literature shows (Norris, 2004;
Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005) that electoral systems cannot maximize all the desired
outcomes that should be obtained from the electoral process; such as legitimacy, inclusivity,
accountability, or producing a cohesive, responsive government.

The most common multiple or majority voting systems are the so-called First Past the Post
(FPTP), alternate voting, and, less commonly, block voting. For example, FPTP is used in the
United Kingdom and the United States, but it is also used in countries such as India,
Malaysia, and Pakistan. Besides FPTP, the majoritarian system also has A two-round system.
A "TRS," takes the first round of voting, produces two winners, and competes in the second
round of voting. TRS has long been associated with France and is also used in Liberia, for
example. One of the advantages of these systems is that they usually produce clear winners
or winning coalitions (majority coalitions). The disadvantage is that the TRS system, due to
its numbers, can lead to a so-called fabricated majority and disproportionate results. The
number of votes cast for a party or candidate who lost on both ballots.

Several studies show that majority systems (Ljphart, 2004) suppress minority representation
(depending on factors such as the geographical distribution of minority groups), oppose
smaller parties, and tactically (or Manipulative) have been found to lead to voting. In recent
years there have been systematic calls in both the UK and the US to reform the FPTP voting
system and move to a more proportional system. As reiterated by Katz (2008), nowadays,
most of the electoral reforms tend to adopt PR system as their new system.

On the other side, in Proportional representatives, the system is designed to compare the
percentage of votes cast in elections for a particular political party or candidate to the
percentage of seats won within the body (D. Sisk, 2017). For example, South Africa's
National Assembly has its 400 members elected through a closed-list PR system in which
voters choose among political parties. In such a system, parties move down the list until all
seats won by that percentage are filled. party size is the number of candidates elected by a
political party within a constituency. As parties grow in size, a more balanced ticket will be
more successful in persuading parties to nominate women and minority candidates for
election. However, under another sub-system, which is called STV (Single Transferable
Vote), nominating too many candidates can be counterproductive, as initial votes are split
and candidates may be eliminated before they receive carry-over votes from other parties.
An example of this was seen in one constituency in the 2017 Scottish local elections. In this
constituency, Voters rank the candidates by their order of preference. After each round, the
second-preference votes of the eliminated candidate are transferred among the political
parties until enough winners emerge to fill the seats. But we also have to note, some of the
PR system disadvantages, as also mentioned throughout this answer sheet. Thus, PR system
can contribute to inclusive politics and promote minority representation albeit it also fosters
the proliferation of political parties, leading to chaotic and often protracted coalition
negotiations, resulting in a lack of governmental coherence.

After all, trying to complement both sides of the weaknesses and strengths of the
majoritarian and PR system, with several modifications of the two systems into a
combination, in certain contexts becomes necessary, as has been seen in Fiji, Italy, and
Israel. The Mix-member electoral system or mixed-member proportional (MMP) system,
basically wants to try to balance the strengths and weaknesses of different systems.
Technically, Parallel elections combine a plural or majority system with a proportional
system. Mixed systems are used in Japan and South Korea, and can also be found in Russia
and some sub-national organizations in countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia (D. Sisk,
2017), or long-established democracies such as Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and
Venezuela (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003). Those countries have entailed various hybrids
of competing majoritarian/plurality and proportional principles. One of the best-known
MMP systems is in Germany, where each voter votes for the district or regional candidates
and parties on national lists.

On District Magnitude, etcetera

There is almost universal agreement among electoral scholars that a key determinant of an
electoral system's ability to convert cast votes proportionally to seats won is the size of a
constituency. That is the number of members elected in each constituency. In a one-
member system such as First Past The Post (FPTP), Alternative Vote (AV), or a two-round
"TRS" system, the constituency size is one. Voters elect one representative. In contrast, a
multi-legislative system, by definition, has more than one member elected in each district.
In a proportional system, the number of elected representatives in each district largely
determines the proportionality of the election results.

Systems that achieve the highest level of proportionality use very large electoral districts
(https://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esg04.htm). Such constituencies allow even very
small political parties to be represented in parliament. For example, in a district with only
three members running for election, a political party must receive at least 25% +1 votes to
secure a seat. A party that is supported by only 10% of its voters cannot win a seat, and
therefore the votes of the party's supporters are wasted. Or, On the other hand, if the party
secured 50+1%, the main issue is no longer power sharing, but stability. it will In contrast, in
a nine-seat constituency, 10% +1 of the votes guarantees that the party wins at least one
seat. This means that not only are the results more proportional, but smaller parties are
more likely to be elected. Both in terms of the geographic size that comes with it, it weakens
as districts get bigger. This sometimes happens in societies where local factors play a large
role in politics and in societies where voters are expected to maintain close relationships
with voters and act as "representatives" in parliament.

In Addition, A voter usually has two votes for the candidate in MMS, one for the district
representative and one for the party list. List voting usually determines the number of seats
allocated to each political party in parliament. After a district winner is determined, a
sufficient number of candidates are selected from each party list to "boost" each party to
the total number of seats in Congress, depending on the votes of the party's entire list. All
list votes for political parties that have not reached the election threshold are removed
before list seats are distributed. As the parties thus eliminated lost seats, the number of
seats for the parties that have reached the threshold will improve. Any direct seats won by
independent candidates are subtracted from the parliamentary total used to apportion list
seats.

Although there is a ‘wide range of options from which to choose when designing a mixed
electoral system, another example provided by Shugart and Wattenberg (2003), in the
context of Germany and New Zealand. In New Zealand, for example, there are 120 seats in
the House of Representatives. Thus, the magnitude of allocation in this MMS system is 120.
In Germany, list allocation is carried out in 16 Land (state) districts averaging a magnitude of
41. Such an average magnitude of allocation makes for a very proportional system.
Nonetheless, each party's Land lists are themselves linked such that the magnitude of
allocation is equivalent to the size of the entire assembly, which is 626.

Lastly, to achieve proportionality, other parties require "balance seats", increasing the size
of parliament by twice the number of overhang seats, but this is not always done. Until
recently, Germany increased the size of parliament by the number of overhang seats but did
not use the increased size for apportioning list seats. This was changed for the 2013 national
election after the constitutional court rejected the previous law, not compensating for
overhang seats had resulted in a negative vote weight effect.

In my opinion, the main thing is that this mixed-member is intended to address specific
'extreme' issues, for example, if a country has a high level of plurality, but on the other
hand, it also requires stability and accountable state management. The problem of
corruption, collusion, and nepotism, apart from the problem of representation, also a way
to lead to a crisis that needs to be addressed immediately, one of which is through the
electoral system. In certain contexts, this MMS is also recommended to be implemented in
Indonesia, with the various considerations that have been mentioned.

apart from all that, I agree that election systems must be tailored to the country or context
(such as a city) and carefully designed to meet the needs of key communities. In practice,
countries, especially urban areas, vary so much that many scholars and practitioners believe
that such systems should be designed to balance inclusiveness with other goals, especially
accountability.