Crises of Democracy – Adam Przeworski – 2019

Chapter 9
 Antagonisms turn into political conflicts when they entail views about what the government
should coerce us to do or when some groups tries to impose their will onto others by force
(e.g. blocking an abortion clinic)
 Dimensions in which distinct conflicts differ:
1. How divided are people about what they most want to occur in regard to a
particular issue?
2. How much do individuals care when outcomes deviate from their ideal preferences?
3. How closely related are positions on different issues? (e.g. Are those people who
dislike abortion and immigration the same?)
 If yes –cleavages are superimposed (e.g. protestants approve of abortion
while evangelicals do not)
 If no – cleavages are cross-cutting (e.g.divisions in working class over
commitment to democracy)
 More utility loss from deviating from peak preferences if the conditions are met, so more
conflict.
 A natural govt strategy is to try to appeal to unity.
 Some conflicts have no peaceful solution, if the midpoint of preference peaks is not
acceptable to all parties.
 Political institutions orderly manage conflicts by:
1. Structuring conflicts
2. Absorbing conflicts
3. Regulating conflicts according to rules

Regarding (1):

 Conflicts are orderly if all political forces think that, at present, or in the not so distant
future, they have something to gain by working inside the political institutions and little to
gain by acting outside the institutional realm.
 If organisations cannot discipline the actions of their followers, “spontaneous” outbursts of
conflict can occur.
1. If parties lose connection to the people, the lose their ability to discipline their
political actors.
 Political systems mould the way in which social forces organise into political actors
 Regulation of functionally defined interests (trade unions, lobbyists, etc…) shapes the
dimensions of conflict

Regarding (2):

 Absorbing conflicts occurs when those political forces which could potentially promote their
interest in other ways have incentives to direct their actions within the institutional
framework.
 To be successful at absorbing conflict, institutions have to roughly reflect each political
force’s power outside the institutional framework, or some group will simply leave the
framework.

Regarding (3):
  Institutions regulate conflicts if the losers accept outcomes determined by applying
institutional rules.
o Sometimes a political actors may use political institutions, but if they get an
unfavourable outcome, they reject it and work outside the institutional framework.
(e.g. legislature passing a law which causes protests).
 One important aspect of institutions is whether they provide determinate rules about which
conflict should be terminated. (e.g. no conflicting constitutional clauses)
o If not, the distinction between institutional and non-institutional conflict break
down.
 Cannot say whether different institutional framework would have saved certain
democracies, but you can say that certain frameworks lead to more stable governments.

 The most important institution for resolving conflict in democracy is elections.

Elections as methods of processing conflict:

 Elections held resolve conflict peacefully because the very prospect that governments may
change gives political actors to keep acting peacefully acting within the system. Knowing
this, governments have incentives to not repress opposition by eliminating the chance that
government may change, thus forcing them to take up violent means outside institutions.
 Author thinks voting does not induce compliance because people willing respect a decision
making process they got to take part in. Instead, they think that it is “flexing muscles”, a
reading of the chances of eventual conflict. The opposition sees that they are outnumbered
and thus could not win whilst the government sees that a potentially substantial part of the
population would put up resistance.
o Elections are regulated conflict. Ballots are “paper stones”.
 Elections have to have enough stakes (if voting for lots of governments changes relatively
little in people’s lives they will not go and vote again) but cannot have to many stakes either
(this will alienate the opposition who see their losses as permanent and long-lasting and will
turn away from elections).

Government and Opposition between elections:

 Could argue that the prospect of winning future elections already helps maintain the public
order.
 Court orders are respected because the court is thought of as impartial, each side should
think they have a reasonable chance of winning next time.
 When demonstrations end in violence, they are thought of as “spilling outside institutional
boundaries”.
o Could be strategic decision or occur spontaneously.
 Box score – Rate of which bills proposed by executive are accepted by the legislature.
 Riots are more common when the executive is mot at all effective in getting its bills passed
or if the legislature is little more than a rubber stamp.
  Democratic institutions are successful at peaceful regulation of conflict when governments
are sufficiently able to govern but the opposition has an important voice in policy making.
 Breakdowns of public order spiral
o People support authoritarian controls more if there is visible violence (even if it is
against an authoritarian leader) meaning governments have incentives to portray
protest against them as illegitimate or violent.
o State repression and violence can force more opposition outside of the institutional
framework.
 Faced with a breakdown of public order, govts can either revert to oppression (starting a
spiral of unrest) or they can abandon their policies render them unstable if done too often.

How democracies fail:

 When elections have no consequence or if incumbents abuse their advantage to the point of
making elections non-competitive.
 Miscalculations by governments or different opposition groups can lead to institutional
breakdowns.
 If govts interpret all opposition as subversive as repress it, they push opposition groups
outside of the institutional framework turning it into resistance.
 When opposition groups refuse to accept the outcome of institutional rules, govts ay be
forced to repress them to maintain public order.
 Failure to find a balance between concession and repression.

Chapter 5
 “The signs that we may be experiencing a crisis include (1) the rapid erosion of the typical
party system, (2) the rise of the xenophobic, racist, and nationalistic parties and attitudes;
and (3) the decline in support for “democracy” in public opinion surveys.” pg 83

Erosion of the Traditional Party System:

 The 50-year stability of the centre-left, centre-right party system is remarkable.

 “a new party crossed the threshold [of 20% of the vote] once every 7.6 years between 1924
and 1977 and once every 2.3 years after 1977 [to 2014] “.
 Since 1999 and 2007, the movement of voters across parties has increased.
 Electoral volatility is mainly due to the entry and exit of parties.
 This methods (of looking at comparing election results to the one closest to 1924)
underestimates initial stability (many countries had 3 -4 party systems) but also
underestimates the recent erosion.
o Parties have effectively shifted to the right (even traditionally centre-left parties)
 Effective number of parties has increased since the early 1980s.
 All shows that the old party system is falling apart
o Either a sign of crisis or a healthy democratic realignment.
 Author argues that it is a crisis because it will give rise to parties with less respect for
democratic norms and values.

The Rise of Right-Wing Populism:

  Populism is a twin of neoliberalism, both have a singular focus when it comes to the creation
of the social order (the market, or the people).
 Populist parties (right and left and centre, think La Republic En Marche) are:
1. Anti-establishment
2. Institutional is so far as they reject the traditional representative democracy model
and want new forms of Democracy (e.g. direct democracy).
3. Arguing that institutions are “stifling the voice of the people”
4. Highly protectionist
5. Oppose globalisation
6. Anti-Europe
 Left wing populists are very egalitarian whilst right-wing ones are interested in keeping
support from the petite bourgeoisie.
 Left- and right-wing populists diverge on the issue of racism, xenophobia and immigration.
 Generally radical right support has been growing.
 The trend is not uniform, peaked in different countries at different times.
 The trends as reported by Armingeon et all (2016) do not take into account traditional
parties shifting to the right (e.g. PiS, Fidesz).
 Erosion of traditional parties does not necessarily mean the erosion of the centre (could just
be people in general turning away from those perceived as politicians).
 Erosion of support for traditional parties coincides with declining turnouts.
 Expect a negative relation between turnout and right-wing vote share (Guiso et al., 2017)
 Right wing electoral success could be due to either increasing number of voters for them or
a withdrawal of centrist voters.
 Why might centrist voters withdraw, two not necessarily competing hypothesis:
1. Convergence of centre-left and centre-right parties after 1970s stagflation, with a
slight movement away from each other again after 2008.
2. Traditional parties distanced themselves from voter preferences in the
“authoritarian”, or “cultural” dimension. More specifically, on the immigration issue.
 Centre parties don’t adopt the xenophobic preferences of the electorate because it would
alienate them from their traditional “cosmopolitan” support. The find an equilibrium where
they maximise their votes, but this ends up with them still being distant from some voters
on the “cultural” dimension.
 Immigration divides people independently of the left-right dimension, but it is not sure what
else does. (in France) (Piketty, 2018)

Decline in Support for Democracies in Surveys:

 Downturn in confidence in Democracy was generally found.

o Although it increased in some countries
 Downturn in support was larger in countries harder hit by the financial crisis of 2008 (e.g.
Greece and Spain).
 Declining confidence in other, general, institutions e.g Newspapers, Banks in America
 Survey question responses are informative but not predictive.
 People’s conceptions of Democracy vary largely from a defined set of political institutions to
“economic and political equality” (which is believed by many ordinary citizens).
 Some people want effective or expert led government, but still want a say in deciding what
this government is.

Chapter 10 – Subversion by Stealth

Democratic Backsliding
 Process of politicians staying in office by undermining democratic institutions.
 Democratic backsliding or deconsolidation – gradual erosion of democratic institutions.
 Usually govts who do this try to disable potential blockers e.g. media, opposition, judges, the
streets, etc…
o Steps include harassing opposition, constitutional reforms, partisan control etc..
 Opposition could, in principle, stop this via legal measures
o In reality govts overcome these measures.
o All the opposition can do is slow them down
 Opposition is still considered an effective threat, because they can sometimes force the govt
to back down.
 Przeworski’s questions:
o Why some govts go down this path?
o Can a government be stopped without being removed from office?
o Would a potential opposition be able to remove the government and reverse its
policies?
 Question is about “how” not “when”. Question is “can it happen anywhere?”

Stealth
 Democracies and constitutions do not have some kind of in-built check to prevent autocrats.
 All steps may be legal and constitutional. Do not realise that you have crossed the line away
from liberal democracy until its too late.
 Citizens don’t know how to act when govt takes anti-democratic steps but pass policies that
help them
 Protests after elections may be ineffective because the opposition just looks like a sore loser
 Changes can appear constitutional or democratic if the courts are packed.
 It may be difficult to call any singular step undemocratic or unconstitutional
 Stealth – govt taking steps, which cannot be clearly called undemocratic and
unconstitutional, but which result in the opposition not being able to remove the govt or
“enlarge its discretion in making policies”.

Dynamics of Subversion from Above

 Answering the, can govt be dissuaded or removed question
  Each step it takes to achieve its goals or increase incumbency advantage, the govt
weighs up what will be more significant: its gained chance of staying in office or the
increased amount of opposition it will face.
 Individual people at each step weigh up whether or not to support the govt. Some
oppose regardless, but some, who like democracy and the govt’s policies, make a
calculation about what they find more important, the benefits they see of policies or the
damage done to democracy.
 Those who care about democracy must rise at the onset of actions that could
cumulatively erode democracy, if they wish to stop a backsliding govt.
 Individuals must be willing to turn against govts that they feel are benefiting them (e.g.
good growth). They must be able to see and understand the long-term effects of small
govt changes which increase incumbency advantage.
o Is this even consistent with rational theory? Do people think this way?
 Opposition is limited in their ability to persuade people because they will criticise
regardless.
 Rarely do backsliding govts lose elections. Either people do not care about democracy or
don’t see the long-term implications

Could It Happen Here?

 Conclusions are speculative and lots of other conditions matter.

 Can conclude that people rising up to defend democracy is not a given.
 The difficult challenge to citizens is that stealth obscures the long-term danger of actions

Chapter 1 – The Past: Crises of Democracy

 Consolidated democracy - a democracy that at some point functioned according to

institutional rules in one in which governments changed as a result of elections at least twice
(88 since 1918)
 It is very hard to place some regimes as a dictatorship or a democracy. Sometimes it is just
too difficult to classify. This has become more common as countries starts to break-down (as
described in chapter 10)
 This section looks at the clear and obvious collapses of democracy.

Chapter 2 – General Patterns

  Goal is to analyse collapse and survival of democracy according to different kinds of
crises (economic, broadly political, and narrowly governmental).
 Only aims to show correlation, not causality.
 Economic crisis – per capita incomes fall by at least 10% during consecutive years.
 Economic crisis does not guarantee a crisis of democracy and if a democracy survives
its electoral effects are short-lived (swing to the right in the short term and then in
the long-term it swings back).
 Political crises:
o Conflicting claims over who should govern
o Competent court declare the govt to have broken the const or unable to
govern
o Conflict between separate powers renders govt unable to function
o Govt forced to resign or repress opposition due to popular demand or
military demands rather than as a decision of the legislature or courts
o Not a long coalition making process or impeachment (so long as it is orderly)
 5/15 democracies collapsed after experiencing a political crisis.
 Economic stagnation (long-term low growth) was more common, income was lower
and income inequality was higher in democracies that collapsed.
 Presidential systems were the most likely to see collapses.
o Author thinks that it is because there was no VoNC available. When the
President becomes unpopular or unable to work with the legislature, the
President still remains in office.
 Govt crises data is vague and unreliable.
 What it does show is that democracies that experience a lot of crises collapse more
often; especially if they are Presidential systems.
 (again unreliable data) shows that it is not the frequency or volume of ant-govt
demonstrations that correlates to govt breaking down, but instead how violent
those demonstrations are (e.g. general strikes, riots).
 The more experience of democracy a country builds up (changing of govt due to
elections) the less likely it was for democracy to collapse.

Chapter 3 – Some Stories

 The four stories are Weinmar Germany and Chile collapsing and France and USA
institutionally resolving its problems.
 Weinmar – power grab while already in office
 Chile – Military coup to defend capitalism
 America – existing institutions resolved the problem
 France – Major institutional reform used to keep democracy alive

Germany, 1928 – 1933

  Economic crisis did strike in the form of hyperinflation, unemployment and a large downturn
in per capita incomes, although gini was low around 0.33 (pg 42)
o Caused divisions especially over ue payments and reparation payments.
 Massive polarisation and anit-democratic sentiment on the left and the right. (communists
and nationalist against the peace treaty)
 Governments were unstable and unable to form governments that were sufficiently
homogeneous to be able to govern.
 Due in part due to increasing splintering and a trend of increasing numbers of effective
parties.
 The large parties that would have to form govts together were often too split on economic
and (pro/anti democracy) dimensions for them to form govts
 Parties were also not homogeneous as leaders often struggled to sell their compromises to
their parties
 There was large amounts of violence in Germany as well. Each party had loosely associated
paramilitary units. Political violence peaked in 1923, then went down again. But by 1931 the
Nazis had caused it to increase again. (see pg 48 for graph)
 Vote share of the traditional parties declined as the period wore on.
 Turnout decreased until the Nazis became popular, they brought people back into the
system (voting) which they had become disillusioned with.
 The final coup against the Weimar system was done entirely legally due to a loophole in the
constitution.
 Nobody in Weimar Germany expected Hitler to be able to consolidate his power.
Conservatives thought that they could use and control Hitler.

The author concludes that institutional design matters. The electoral system made it difficult for
governments to form and there were gaps in the constitution.

He also concludes that the events were not foretold. No one at the time, not even Hitler, expected
them to unfold the way they did.

Chile, 1970 – 1973

 Democracy started in 1938 but was well entrenched with losers accepting election results.
 Very big ideological and economic divides. The rich overwhelmingly supported right-wing
candidates and the working-class left-wing candidates.
 Chilean economy was highly concentrated which led to high income inequality for the time
and a rural-urban cleavage. There were also large differences between different jobs in the
working class.
 1970 election
o Allende won with a narrow plurality
o Right-wing parties tried to stop him by using constitutional loopholes
o Eventually chosen President with support of Christian Democrats.
o Allende led a coalition of left-wing parties who formed his cabinet but who had no
majority in either legislative house.
 Allende could not form compromises with the Christian democrats palatable to his own
coalition
 Allende had no control over his coalition
o He had barely been chosen as his party’s candidate
o Socialist party turned towards insurrectionism in 1971
 Allende wanted nationalisation reforms and managed to get a deal with the Christian
Democrats, but these backed out at the last minute.
 After legislative and vetoing back and forth, Allende used an old-unused provision to
intervene in states “paralyzed by labor unrest”.
o Led to chaos as workers started to spontaneously organise
 Executive and legislative stand-still occurred. The opposition didn’t have enough votes to
impeach, even after the 1973 election. Censured ministers would get reshuffled to different
positions.
 After issues about searching government property for weapons, the legislature declared that
the govt had violated constitution.
 The new head of the military become Pinochet after they decided they could no longer stay
apolitical. Road to the coup was opened.
 Signs:
o US assisted terror campaign on the Right to create political instability (killed the
head of the armed forces)
o More land occupations by peasants and more strikes than under previous President
o General violence and strikes meant that the military had to first enter government in
1972
o By June 1973 violence became daily and the cycle could not be stopped despite govt
accommodations and attempted Catholic Church mediation.
 Politically the violence did not change distributions of support. Large parties got roughly the
same amount of votes in 1969 and 1973 and turnout increased; no dissatisfaction with party
politics.
 Through most of the period a military coup seemed likely and after the loss of the 1973
election would be welcomed by the Christian Democrats. There were even failed attempts.
No one expected it to be as bloody or long as it was.

Author notes that Allende has little control over his own coalition. Peasants were occupying land
against govt wishes and an armed left-wing group was not even in govt.

Divided government between the Executive and Legislature led to governing stand-still. Leg is
forced to resort to impeachment and President forced to try to claim emergency powers.

Conflict between capitalism and democracy. If the popular will demands the upper class
abdicate some of their privileges, will they?

France, 1954 – 1962 and 1968

 Fourth Republic – Parliamentary Democracy born in 1946. Held elections in 46, 51, and
56
 Threats:
o Several insurrectionary strikes
 o Colonial wars which divided society, military units and civilian organisations and
led to two attempted coups.
o Proportional representation law brought in to try and reduce Gaullist and
Communist influence.
o Lots of governments that were very unstable (in office average of 173 days) and
often no government. The same parties were often in government.
 Signs
o No government was able to pass a comprehensive plan to deal with Algeria
without falling.
th
 Last 4 Republic govt was formed by Charles de Gaulle in 1958
o No agreement over whether he was complicit in the events that brought him to
power.
o There was a Pro-Gaulle coup d’état in Algiers which Gaulle took advantage of
o Acceded to power legally and ruled by decree for 6 month until a new const
could be written
 Const got approved and Gaulle became first President.
 Public opinion and Gaulle’s preferences were shifting towards independent Algiers
which eventually led to military confrontation, unrest and a confirmatory referendum
that allowed independence.
 Largely military and economic burden from the war, which led to deep divisions,
protests, and repression of protests.
 Outcome:
o Military rose in arms to instal a General to power. This general governed by
decree and supressed civil liberties, such as controlling the press.
o But he did not become a dictator and even the rebels only wanted Algeria to
remain French. They weren’t against republican ideals.
o French institutions survived De Gaulle.

Institutional change preserved French democracy as it strengthened executive power and allowed
governments to govern. Yet it may have been an accident of history. If a character such as De Gaulle
was not available to take large powers, but still hold democratic ideals, Democracy would not have
survived. (Maybe fall of Weinmar was an accident too)

(Unrest in 1968 did not seriously threaten govt and stability was restored after govt won
overwhelming re-election)

United States, 1964 – 1976

 America had seen threats to its democracy but it never ceased to function.
 Threats in the 60s
o urban riots
o Political assassinations
o Divisions over Vietnam War
o Repression of protestors
 Signs
 o Violence during 1968 electoral campaign (Chicago)
o Enemies list was drawn up and opponents on it were put under surveillance. They
were harassed by CIA, FBI, IRS
o 48 convictions around the Watergate scandal.
 Outcome
o Institutions and check and balances functioned correctly
o Courts forced the release of the tapes and Congress investigated and impeached,
this even had support from Republicans.

Would the system have worked if Republicans had controlled both houses of Congress?

Chapter 4 – Lessons from History: What to Look for

 What to pay attention to

o Economic conditions
o Age of democracy
o Extent and intensity of political divisions
o How do our institutions function. Can they act decisively to form government when
in crisis but also prevent the usurpation of power.
 Future is not determined by present conditions but it does influence and shape the actions
of people.