Professional Documents
Culture Documents
enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest; provided, That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice
shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding
paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack.- In the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may
not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a
municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission,
or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice
of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, or after office hours, the arresting
police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to
the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the
said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel
concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons
concerned; Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the
suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established,
shall be released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorismeven if they have been granted bail
because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and their outstanding
balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or
financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication
equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind
and nature belonging:
The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the
time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
739
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was
convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible
in evidence.
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first
four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in
Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The same was not, however,
what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT
WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any
evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that
indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
and in any proceeding.
Held:
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searchedalthough not that specified in the search warrantis
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal
because the alleged information was received by the police on June 19, 1994
and therefore, they could have applied for a search warrant. The said
contention is without merit considering that the information given by the
informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is indication that the
informer knows the courier, the records do not show that he knew his name.
On bare information, the police could not have secured a warrant from a
judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.
Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the subsequent
search on his person is justified. An arresting officer has the right to validly
search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier,
the policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents
of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the
same and upon cursory inspection, it was found out that it contains
marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and
cartoon which should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing
a crime. In short, there was no probable cause for these policemen to think
that he was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court
considering the fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that
the informer was a reliable one who had supplied similar information to the
police in the past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect
the case for the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. He is
merely a corroborative witness to the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable cause for a
warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES
IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY
DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144 SCRA
1; PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, 163 SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA,
October 2, 1997; PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching
party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA.
The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the appellant
was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the
strength of a tip from an informer received by the police the previous
afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. The
search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On Appeal, the SC
reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest
any suspicious behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the
attention of the police.
1.
Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants
issued on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are
officers, directing the peace officer to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, typewriters and other documents or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements
since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK
LAWS, TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the
Constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that:
a. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents, books
and things to be seized;
b. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against
them;
a.
Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the
petitioners valid?
b.
that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or
actual, of the existence of said right;
c.
that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same
in their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality
separate and distinct with its officers. An objection to an unlawful search and
seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD
PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY
OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE
does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the
following doctrines:
(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the judge alone makes this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge.
It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutors present to him. By itself, the
prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting
documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in
assisting the judge to make his determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary
investigation proper. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for
the issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released.
4. 4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC
no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority
was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective
on January 1, 1985.
5.
In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the
certification of the prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he has not personally determined the existence
of probable cause. The determination was made by the provincial prosecutor.
The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal
Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in
Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his
personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the
issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same
functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report
and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of
these should be before the judge.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA 393
The word personally after the word determined does not necessarily mean
that the judge should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally
before issuing the search warrant or warrant of arrest but the exclusive
responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. As such, there is no need to examine the complainant and
his witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the
existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the
complainant and his witnesses.
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to
determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
concerned)
JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO.
92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a
warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge, HON. JAIME SALAZAR,
Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in
the day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila, WITHOUT BAIL,
NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND
NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
a. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute
books;
a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that the information filed against the
petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing
that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The petitioners
contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED
THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES
COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF, MUST THEREFORE BE
DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. Read in the context of
Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION.
b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a
complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was filed by the NBI Director
and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation
was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR
OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN
INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS
CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT, IF WARRANTED BY THE
EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the
respondent judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to personally
go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Also, the
petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest
without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by
examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled
that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by
PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. MEREBY BECAUSE
SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY
A RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT
DUTY , GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD
NOT HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE
SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL
DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. In
the light of the Courts affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against
him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion
which is bailable before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A
CORRECT PROPOSITION.
NOTES:
Held:
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge
is the normal venue for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The correct course was for the petitioner
to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE
INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE
THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioners premise that the information charges a
non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a
motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not. Is Operation
Kapkap valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 scra 174
Warrantless search and seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the
corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen. They approched these persons
and identified themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away
because of the other lawmen, they were unable to escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated
from the accused and several days later, an information for violation of PD
1866 was filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was
sentenced to sufferreclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the
principal evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
offense had been committed and that accused-appellant had committed it.
The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen and in aplace not exactly forsaken.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them
less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been
apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 oclock in the morning. But he was arrested at
11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with his companion.He was not skulking in the shadows but
walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his
being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
them innoent, why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding
his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers,
as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their
suspicion was all about.
xxx
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support
the arresting officers suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes and his
hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the Court
held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
effected while he was coming down the vessel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
have also not been satisfied. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time
of Mengotes arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the
arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone
caller, and about a crime that had yet to bem committed.
xxx
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of
Mengotes identity, let alone the fact that he was involved in the robbery
of Danganans house.
In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, this Court
declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personalknowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in
his presence or within his view. (SAYO vs. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised
Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People
vs. Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested
and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly
because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on
any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a
criminal act is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over
liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
xxx
The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant
might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over zealousness
to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of
a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had
invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be
the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of the law, because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of
Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search conducted was
illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution
against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court held that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of
an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private
individual and corporation) on the union office of the private respondents is
valid.
Held:
The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil
Code. The fact that the union office is part of the hotel owned by the
petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. The alleged reports that
the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities
does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of
the union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was
surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search warrant.
g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. (Valid since the
constitutional provision is not applicable to him; when it is not valid)
The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti,
a criminal case, the issue was whether an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of ones constitutional rights may be invoked against the
State. In other words, the issue in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by
a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the
State, is admissible.
Read:
1.
by a private person
Carpio-Morales, J.
The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis
International Hotel Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel
in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution. They
arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was
opening the Union Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union
office despite objections thereto by forcibly opening the same. Once inside
the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the
confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no relation to Shirley), received
said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. Marti refused.
However later, following standard operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner
and husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection, before delivering
it to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to
contain gloves. Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside
the box. Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI, he told them that the
boxes to be shipped were still in his office. In the presence of the NBI agents,
Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that
the dried leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v. Bryan
(457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v. us
(373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329 sw 2d 135).
NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest
must be done at the place where the accused is arrested. As such, if
accused was arrested while inside a jeepney, there is no valid search
incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and
thereafter search the said place)
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of
the dried leaves. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of
Manila convicted accused Marti of violatingsec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accuseds right
against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?
Held:
1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only
against the state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United
States constitution, the SC may consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise
doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US cases, the constitutional provision
against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against
private persons. If a search was initiated by a private person the provision
does not apply since it only proscribes government action. This view is
supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot
be extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the
search. He opened the packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI
agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. This did not convert it to a
search as contemplated by the constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible
evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, likewise applies only to the
government and its agencies and not to private persons.
f.
ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in
the street during a buy-bust operation, the search of his house nearby is not
a valid search incidental to a valid arrest)
PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338
Where the gun tucked in a persons waist is plainly visible to the police, no
search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any license for said
firearm, he may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. No warrant is necessary in such a
situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest inside the
nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126. This is a valid
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant
place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he
requested that he will bring his car to the Police Station after his warrantless
arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE
BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall
under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia
and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused.
2.
discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the
testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the wellknown exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a
search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is
admissible as evidence in any proceeding.
3.
c.
PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid
waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver or consent should be given by the
person affected, not just anybody. Example: The landlady could not give a
valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said tenant
himself should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs.
Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel
room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house
allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching for
rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they instead seized an unlicensed
firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)
6.
a.
b.
c.
MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near them.
As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The
search is valid)
d.
MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient
to validate warrantless arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR
NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
zonings and saturation drives
on the
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left. This is so
because Art. III, Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in
Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals,
164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend ones sense of justice (Rochin vs.
California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes necessary as
long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. However, the
remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one
victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for
the executive department and the trial courts. The problem is appropriate for
the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence
supporting their allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed and
prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by
the petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until
such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a
specious pretext for inaction. We have held that technical objections may be
brushed aside where there are constitutional questions that must be met
(RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603; TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41
SCRA 702; PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS. ERICTA, 35
SCRA 481; GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS.
CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in
fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not
be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone
makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of a burning house who
has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A
SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY
COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS
STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court
should instead categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are
violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be stopped
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives, hand grenades and ammunition intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense x x x;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x
.
In support of said application, P/Lt. Florencio Angeles executed a Deposition
of Witness dated October 31, 1987 .
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant
was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. Edgar Dula Torre
and Major Maganto;
4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando, a member of the searching team
executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudentes office a bulging brown envelope with three
live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old newspapers;
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant
on the grounds that:
2.
GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a
serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge must issue
a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of probable cause)
i. Searching questions
b. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions
and answers;
Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No.
82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant;
searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge
DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14 as
well as its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, presided by
the respondent Judge, an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant
for violation of PD 1866 against the petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that:
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one
specific offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme
Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and
on April 20, 1988, the same judge denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there
probable cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which
is to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
The probable cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. (Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable cause must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY
JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28
PHIL. 566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that he has been informed that
Nemesio Prudente has in his control and possession the firearms and
explosivees described therein, and that he has verified the report and found
it to be a fact. On the other hand, Lt. Angeles declared that as a result of
continuous surveillance for several days, they gathered informations from
verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not
licensed t possess them. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and
his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that he verified
the information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact, YET THERE
IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN
SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY
HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might have clarified this point if
there had been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In
fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not,
vis-a-vis the said applicant.
In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following test must be
complied with in an application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition based on personal knowledge or notThe true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of
a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts
merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do
not come up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much
so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the
issuance of the questioned search warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
694, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus
insufficient. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record.
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge
because as shown by the record, his questions were too brief and short and
did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. On the contrary, the questions asked were leading
as they called for a simple yes or no answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI,
June 23, 1988, the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general
manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, this requirements are stringent but the
purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the
place intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180). In the case at bar, the
warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of the PUP,
more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well
as the Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the one specific offense requirement
considering that the application for a search warrant explicitly described the
offense: illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under PD 1866.
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of
the search warrant provided the constitutional requirements are complied
with.
a.
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge
from an informant, the same is not valid)
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and
witnesses should be attached to the record of the case)
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in the affidavits
of witnesses are mere generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive
statements of particular acts, the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2.
3.
PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked
to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid
since there could have been no searching questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA,
83988, September 29, 1989
GR No.
Held:
Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW
289), or simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a
light therein (Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila may be
considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and
to thwart plots to destabilize the government. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPAs sparrow units, not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS
EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUALS
RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER
REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.
True, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE COST OF OCCASIONAL
INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE
CITIZEN, THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE
PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND
PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the military checkpoints
in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints upon
order of the NCRDC Chief.
Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:
The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the
ground of national security.
RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15,
1990
Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 15 June, 1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal
as these measures to protect the government and safeguards the lives of the
people. The checkpoints are legal as where the survival of the organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are
in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further that the military
officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT
BODILY SEARCH.
Read
also
the
RESOLUTION
ON
THE
MOTION
RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
FOR
Read also:
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a
NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which contains
marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. Here , there is a
probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on
drugs)
2.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant
was given by the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy marijuana
from the accused then return to the police headquarters with said article.
Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. The
arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu
and its paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead,
said gun is inadmissible in evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO)
l. Properties subject to seizure
Read:
1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as amended
2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558
m. Warrantless searches and arrests
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if the arrest
was illegal. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon
posting of the bond by the accused)
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
2.
The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by applicant or any other person;
3.
In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath
and affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
4.
The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Search
warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants
fail to meet the test of particularity, especially since the witness had furnished
the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. THE SEARCH
WARRANT IS SEPARABLE, AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE
WARRANT.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25