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    AR96 3 Bartov Accounting Method1

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    Alternative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity: ‘Theory and Evidence Eli Bartov; Gordon M. Bodnar The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 Mul., 1996), 397-418. Stable URL: bhtp:flinks,jstor-org/sici?sici~0001-4826%28 19960179297 143 A3%3ICI97%3 AAAMIAA£3E2.0.CO%3BL-X ‘The Accounting Review is currently published by American Accounting Association. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at htp:sseww jstor org/aboutiterms.html. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you hhave obtained prior permission, you may aot download an entie issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and ‘you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher eegarding aay futher use ofthis work. Publisher contact information ray he abained at ftps jtor.orgourmaleaaaso. hl. Each copy of any part ofa JSTOR transenission must contain the same copyright tice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission, ISTOR isan independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive ot scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact suppom@jstor org. up:thwwwjstor orgy Wed fun 23 03:40:50 2004 gus oe Alternative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence Eli Bartov New York University Gordon M. Bodnar University of Pennsylvania ABSTRACT: Previous research has demonstrated that information asymmetry translates into higher transaction casts for trading shares of the firm which, in turn, raise the required rate of return and fower current stock price. The information asymmetry perspective suggests that, ceteris panbus, managers Wishing 0 maxi- mize the value of their firms have incentives to reduce the degree of information asymmetry by switching to newly available accounting techniques which make financial statements more informative to investors, Fitms with greater infarmation asymmetry are predicted to be more likely to switch to more informative accounting methods when they become available. Tests on the chaice of functional currency among U.S. multinational firms support these predictions after controlling for variables such as the debt-equity ratio, interest coverage, size, and the relative size of the foreign currency adjustment in the financial statement. Key Words: Accounting choice, Information asymmetry, Liquidity, Share turnover, Foreign currency translation. Data Availability: Data can be retrieved from sources identified in the artcte. We woul keto thank Yakow Acihud, Lovey rows, Pal Healy, ils Hakansson, Bob Holthausen, Apil Klein, Dave Larcker, Ferrando Penalva, Sieve Pesan, Jostiua Ronen, Chit Saudh, Robert Verecchia, and pateioans ia seminarsat Baruch allege, UC Berkeley (Haas), SUNY arDutfai, MIT (Sleas), NYU Stem} Penneyvania What.on), Rutgers (Camden), and Tel Aviv University for helpful earsments and insshts. We aso ackoowledge cansbutons of an ad hoe arocite editor, We thank Basra leraings fr research suistance. This paper, Tortely ted, "Account Choices and the Information Environment. Theeey and Evidence." was also pretented at fe Fast Intemational {Conference an Contemporary Accounting [sues ia Taipei, Tawan, and athe Eth Anal Conference on Finan sl eonomies and Acecunting it Ann Athot. Mietigas. Both audorsacknowledge financial suppor fan the John M.Olin Foundation. Sidi day 1994 Accepted Novanber 1995, 397 398, ‘The Accounting Review, July 1996 L INTRODUCTION fundamental question in accounting research is how accounting choices are made by hhas demonstrated that variables such as financial leverage and size are important for explaining cross-sectional variation in aécounting choices, one rationale for accounting choice that has received less attention is the information asymmetry perspective. Loosely stated, this perspective suggests that value-maximizing managers have incentives to chaase more informta- tive accounting techaiques 10 reduce the degree of informacion asymmmetcy among market participants Previous studies demonstrate that greater information asymnmetcy among market paticipants translates into higher transaction costs and lower liquidity for trading shares of the firm, thus raising the required rate of return and lowering current stock prices. In Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), for example, a credible commitment by managers to improve diselasures (i... increase the precision of public information about firm value) cesults in higher current stock price due to reduced information asymmetry and increased liquidity. However, improved disclosure by the firm is also associated with costs, such as preparation costs and proprietary costs. Thus, stared more formally, the information asymmetry perspective implies that managers maximizing firm value will choose accounting techoiques, from the set, available, that reduce information asymmetry to the point where the expected benefit of additional disclosure is offset by the expected costs of making the disclosure. When this equilibrium is perturbed by the introduction of anew opportunity for improved disclosure, managers should choose this new technique ifthe expected benefits greater than the expected cost af implementation. However, al firms are aot equally likely to choose the new accounting method that improves disclosure. As explained in detail below, firms with high information asymmetry are more likely to choose the new accounting method than firms for which information asymmetry does not represent a serious problem.t “To test this implication of the information asymmetry perspective, two problems raust be addressed. The first problem is the identification of a credible new disclosure opportunity {accounting technique) that would decrease information asymmetry among market participants boy increasing te informativeness of the financial statements toinvestars, We testthe information asymmetcy perspective's implications with respect to the choice of the functional currency for foreign subsidiaries as required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 52 (Foreign Carreney Translation). This accounting choice provides a suitable framework for hee reasons. First, firms ean choose between two different accounting methorls—cither the current rate method (foreign cucrency as functional curreney) a the teraperal method (dollaras the functional currency)—for measuring and reporting the impact of exchange rate changes an foreign ‘operations. Although SFAS No. 52 provides guidelines for choosing the functional currency, these guidelines are broad and itis possible for a frm to justify either choice, providing managers with some discretion. Second, there is both anecdotal (ex ante) and empirical (ex post) evidence. (o suggest that the choice of the foreign currency as functional currency results in financial + While ou study i the fist Bul on price beoretial work chat alates information asyrumeuy co liguidhty and frm Value in aveffou a eabance understanding of aceourting choices, thet exists pir tesetch (eg Bawnex etal 1975: Holthaysen and Letewich 1983; Holthassea 1990) that bas considered the "information peespecive." a concept sormetihat elated (the information asymmetry perspective. The nfermation perspective suggests that manazes choose secounting mathods that provie racket parties with beer infertation abo he eurrent an faire cae Hows of thee fara: However, Holihausen (1980, 716) notes tha “the infor aton perspective admitedly nat well specified," and tbat i may be dificule to distinguish fom de conxacting perspective of aecouning chalet. Bartov and Bodnar—Aluernative Accounting Methods, Information Asyoumetty and Liquidity 399 statements which provide better information about a firm's future cash flows than the ché the dollar as functional currency. Third, finally, this choice is required of all U.S. multinationals, so there is a large sample. ‘The second problem with testing this perspective isthat the degree of information asymmetry among market participants is not observable; an empirical proxy for this variable must be identified. We use two measures based upon the volume of trade in the firm's common stock. ‘While clearly imperfect, these measures reflect the fact that trading volume is relatively low in socks where uninformed investors perceive high information asymmetry (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985: Merton 1987). ‘Our empirical findings support the predictions of the information asymmetry perspective. Specifically, measures of information asymmeiry are positively telaied to the likelihood of choosing the foreign currency as functional currency by the sample firms. This finding holds up ‘even after controlling for other variables shown by prior research to be imiportaat in explaining, 0.32), the interest coverage variable becomes HLICOV and LLICOV is zet0. To consider the importance of the telative size of reporced foreign activities for the choice of functional currency, we caleulate the currency adjustment ratio for ficrai (CURADJ,) as the ratio ‘of the absolute value of the total foreign currency adjustment reported in the financial statement {income statement item plus the change in the Cumulative Translation Adjustment) to total assets for the year 1982." Pia sie is ot incloded ince cepresson a it contalied fr diecty i the tet that allow. Fis wit standard deviations of eatings changes, OCGEPS), which are rooce tha fiteen stasdard deviations away ftom the can ae ‘iopged (3 firms. The results of he cegression are (standard errs in pareatheses INFOASYM, = «O507 + 0255 @AEPS), + €, e018) (133) ‘The regression iscun on 717 observations (due wo data availabilty calculate the standard eco of ernigs), andi is signiesntat the § percent eve, Indeed, te regzession's explanatory power issonger than i ppears a the dependent ‘arable ie iezaze wth eror. Stil, Uispeablem ste serious fr 09 purpose the parameterenimates are urine ‘Theeesidual cy eptesets ou ist adjusted tessureofifarmaionasyanmeny fo fam i(INFOASYML), We do aot ssethusretidvalsnaval sharetorevermessoreforour Univariate ss since the assumption ecessaty forthe wrists ete that the observations ate indepandent (3 islaied, Islet, we ue the Unadwled annwsl share trmover, IxFoasyM. *Onservations with fewer than ten days oF daly share turnover data within the four windows around easnings tnncuncerents are excluded he foe vations fos varsble(727) sess chan he fal samle(788)3¢ sores donot separately repack, loresgncurcency adjuvant he neomestateten tag ioctl Algo, we chase [96224 oppared tothe Yen ‘of se ewte so tha all Gens’ foreign currency adjustments are based upon sila exchange rate changes. 408 ‘The Accounting Review, Tuly 1996 Data Deseription For the sample firms and for al other Compustat fiems, table | reports @ comparison of the fest, second, and third quactiles for five descriptive statistics: firm size, coal sales, debt-equity ratio, dividend yield and sales growth. (Descriptive statisties are for 1983, acbitrarily chosen.) Both firm size and total sales for the sample firms exceed those for Compustat firms that are not in the samiple. This finding is consistent with prior research (e.s.. Bartov and Bodnar 1994) and reflects the fact that multinational companies are Jarger than other publicly traded companies. ‘Table | also shows thatthe sample firms have a higher dividend yield and lower leverage than ‘Compustat ems that are notin the sample. These findings arcexpected because larger firms tend ‘obe less leveraged and to pay higher dividends, Finally, the five-year average growth ratc of sales does not differ substantially between the sample firms and the remaiaing Compustat firms Based on major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) groups, the proportion of firms choosing the dollar as functional currency and firms choosing the foreign currency is coughly similar (see discussion of Table 5 below). The 630 (158) firms that have chosen the foreign currency (dollar) as their Functional currency are from 50 (36) two-digit SIC industries. A broad cross-section of industries is represented in both sub-samples, V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. Univariate Tests Results of univariate tests for our prediction based upon the information asymmetry perspective, along with each of the control variables are shown in table 2."" The differences in the means of the variables between the two groups of firms are always in the direction predicted above, A two-sample t-test is carried out to determine whether the differences in means are statistically significant. Each hypothesis is supported at standard levels of significance. ** Our proxies for information asymmetcy are both different between firmschoosing he foreign ‘currency as functional currency and firms choosing the dollar: Forthe univariate tests, the residual cumover measure is replaced by the raw share turnover variable, [NFOASYM.” The mean of INFOASYM is significantly higher for firms choosing the dollar, 0.68 versus 0.50. The results ate similar for the daily turnover measure of information asymmetry, despite fewer observations. ‘The mean of INFOAS YM2 is significantly higher for firms choosing the dollar. 0.72 versus 0.49. Given the market perception thatthe choice of foreign currency is more informative about the tue economic performance of the firm, these results are supportive of the information asymmetry perspective as @ hypothesis for explaining accounting choices. ‘The results for the control variables are also in agreement with the predictions outlined above, Firms choosing the foreign currency as functional currency are larger on average than ficms choosing the dollar. The former have a mean marker value of 5.36 (measured as the natural log of firm size in millions of dollars), whereas the latter havea mean market value of 4.95. Debtto- equity ratios are also significantly different between these two types of fiems; firms choosing the foreign currency as functional curtency are less leveraged. The mean debt-o-equity ratio for 2isignificance levels for all ests are beted pan ne-ted cst 2ntann-Whieney U-test are slso conducted as e-paranttrc univariate tess ofthe hypotheses. Theresals ofthe Mann= ‘Whitney U-ess are similar othe parametric test wil theexcepuion thane eterest coverage ratio ores With IA leverage isnot signet Asrnemioned, we donot Use the residl nual share tuover measue, INFOASYMI, for ourunivariste est, a8 the ssumptionaf independence among te observations s ste. they al wil suffer fromthe same estimation etre We therefore use the aw annual snare turnover variable, enated INFOASYM, in ks place or ave unvarae tet 409 Bartow and Bosinar—Altemative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity a0 ostr owt ors ort soot ast 000 v0 sero sizo 0090 eo P90 soner Knbs 1 @>q. 000 S100 1000 0000 0 szv0 e000 prog puspiata.'€ 000 ene LITve z999 ostosl —on'ste— oes 00 ce9091 eV Or opt TELEES OODLE ARIS wou g Jo 2ayeA EY Conse £0 wpe 10 0 worpayy 0 ois SJUSUYISZ wormed acaos II sony rsndanay pus aidureg ang 409 sopspers sanduosog TATEVL ‘The Accounting Review, July 1996 9 ap toa ae soe UE UNE pau poe ch on we SSA 0990 (Ry 8100 zetVD ROD Int sor L120 trtoo ravano (wos0aLe@ szso 20) KE ISTL—FRGST ODL 99 toe lesz wR AQDINE (ceu nes] cuRADI 013 1.000 e384 e727 “Table Notes: INFOASYM is the residual fom across sectional regression of onal she tutoveeon the snd deviation cf earmngs over a ive year ier; al arer vaibles age defined in ble 2. The tepered numbers are Pearson come aon coelicients, Significant athe & percent evel for ewe tied tet, Sigifesn ac the S peteent evel fr ewov tale test ‘The multivariate regression results are fully supportive of the un variate results. In particular, the coefficient estimates of both share turnover variables (i.e. the proxies for information asymmetry) are negative and significant atthe one percent level, Since shace turnover s inversely correlated with the level of information asymmetry, these negative estimates suggest that information asymmetry is associated with the choice of functional currency in the predicted direction, Therefore, information asymmetry appears to be an important variable in explaining the use of functional currency, even after controlling for all the other variables discussed above."* ‘The coeiticients on the control variables are also consistent with their univariate results, with the ‘exception of firm size in panel B which is aot significantly different from zero. Sensitivity Tests One concern in interpreting the results shown in table 4s a possible confounding effect due toindustry. Table S displays the distribution of firms within each industry group according totheit ‘choice of funetional currency. Inevery industry group.a minority affirms chose the dollar asthe functional currency." An industry effect appears unlikely because ofthe broad crass-section of industries represented inthe sample and the similar proportion of firms choosing each functional currency within each industry group. Nevertheless, we test for the presence ofan industcy effect Since NASDAQ-teporteé volume may double or even triple count the res from he sller tothe pachater (tothe Jnchsionofimeealerwansacions, we eplicae te analysis tepocedin panels A and Baer delering all NASDAQ firms While thisresuled in a oss of 125 (8) observahons far panel AB) the rescis(na reported ee for parsimony) were simiee Our ests cover only (86 dalla frns and 626 fosian currency firms hecate twa fies ofeach typ ate dropped de ‘o-nasepaned SIC code ae wo foreign cutenzy fms with SIC cedes between 100-599 (Agreulture are dropped 3s there ae ne companies tha selected the della asthe funtional crtenc in his 2p Bartov and Bodnar~-Altemnative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity 413. TABLE 4 Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Foreign Currency as Functional Currency Panel A: Multwariate Logistic Regression with INFOASYM! Number of Observations = 666 Dependent Variable 1, firm chooses foreign currency as functional currency én = 547) 0, if fiem chooses dollar as functional currency {a = 119) INFOASYMI FSIZE DEBTEQ LLICOV_HLICOV_CURADJ Expected Sign 2 - + = - = + Coefficient 058 = 07130116 = 0300 0.002.058 0.031 Sid Ersor 0353) 236) 0.058) @.12) 009) 0036) (007) Significance 0050 = oor -0m23- 000827053 0.000 (one-tailed) Chy-Squaced statistic (Hy: all model parameters (expect the intercept) ate zero}: 59.74 (p=0.000) Ponel B: Mudtivariare Logistic Regression with INFOASYM2 Number of Observations = 384 Dependent Vaciable | if fim chooses foreign currency as functional currency (n= 326) = O.if fem chooses dollar as functional currency in = 58) Incercept INFOASYM? FSIZE DEBTEQ LLICOV_HLICOV_CURADI Expected Sign > = + - - ~ + Coefficient 2575-1028 0045-0407 0015-0095 a.028 Std Ercor 6%) (0340) (0.086) (0.223) 010) 0030) 0.009) Significance 900 00018010035 01084 = 0.028 0.004 (one-tailed) Chi-Squared statistic (yall model pacameters (expect the intercept) are zero}: 30:89 (p=0.001) Table Notes: Vanbles areas defined i ables 2 and, There are 122 fewer observations thatthe fl sample (a 788in panel -Abecause of missing aloes for INFOASYSM2 (3) er CURADI (3. Pael Bas fever cservtions heeauseINFOASYM2. ‘ould be constructed ot aly 401 fers of ow sample 2nd sore of Bese firs did no have data ealeatate CURADS, Teste or LLICOV are based upon ine pedienon of 2 negative elie ditecily by replicating the univariate tests (or the information asymmetry peespective by major industry groups ‘These results are presented in table 5 and show that both the cross-industry mean (0.669) and the median (0.731) of INFOASYM are substantially higher for firms using the dollar as the functional currency than for those firms using the foreign currency as the functional eurrency (mean = 0.492, median = 0.488). The differences in means and medians are both statistically significant atthe one percent evel. In addition, the difference has the correct sign for 14 cut of the (7 industry groups, and a signs test indicates that this ratio is significant at the ewo percent 414 ‘The Accounting Review, July 1996 TABLES Univariate Tests of the Information Hypothesis by Industry Mean INFOASYM for Mean INFOASYM for firms using the Dollar firms using the Foreign asthe Functional Currency as the Functional Irahsey Currency ON Currency Ny Difference Mining oot 15, 0.499 » 0.098 ‘Construction 0361 6 0.463 7 0.106 ood and Tobaceo 0732 5 044s 2 0.287 Textiles 0.764 2 sis 2 0249 ‘Wood and Furnicure 0337 2 0352 " 0015 Paper and Books 0475 9 0304 26 0.081 Chemicals and Petroleum 0.325 4 oaks 36 0.159 Plastic and Cement 0.639 4 0.834 20 0.205 Steel and Machinery ara B 0.470 158, 0.002 Electronic Equipment 1072 18 asst 32 0st “Transport Equipment 0753 6 osi2 32 241 Medical Equipment 0.788 n 0599 45 0.186 Jewelry and Tays 0.835 a 0.488, 2 0347 “Transpocation and Utilities 0928 10 613 te ots Wholesale Trade 0788, 1 0320 a 0.428 Retail Trade 08s? 6 0.626 ” 0.231 Services 0703 9 0.606 2% 0.103 CrosseIndustry Mean 0.669 92 0.178 Std Excor of the Mean 00447) p-value iooory Cross-Industry Median 0.731 oss 0.20 p-value (0.0071 “Tale Notes: The variable INFOASYM is 25 defined io able 2. Agriculture i ited ftom this industry analy a boc of, he sample rms inthsindosy ehse te foregacurteneyasa foeigncurtencyInaditon, twa femsafeacheype me deop pe ue to missing SIC codes Ths, tal delaras functional eaten fas mires 136 and tl fate cuneney as fatal ‘arency fem ntmber 626, P-value are fr onetaled este level. Similar results (not reported) are obtained (or the daily turnover measure of information asymmesry (INFOASYM2), despite the smaller number of observations, These results increase the confidence chat industry effects are not influencing the results ‘A second type of corroborating evidence examines the change in share tumover following the selection of a foreign curvency as the functional currency, ie., 2 switeh to the new more informative accounting method. If this switch reduces information asymmetry as hypothesized, then theory (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) implies that liquidity ((rading volume) should goup. Aces to ad dsr contol dummies wo the enulvarne logic eegressions resultedin a allure ofthe estimation to covert. Baztov and Bodnar—Altemative Accounting Methods, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity 415, We test for this implication by comparing the change in annual trading volume in the year following the selection of the functional currency. The change in annual trading volume for the i® firm (AVOL,) is measured as the share turnover ratio (INFOASYM) of the t® firm in the year following the selection of the functional currency (year 1) minus the share turnover ratio in the, ‘year the Selection was made (year 0), scaled by the share tumover ratio in year 0. Table 6 shows that, as expected, the mean of AVOL for firms selecting a foreign currency as the functional currency is positive (0.259) and significant atthe one percent evel; the mean of AVOL for firms selecting the dollar as the functional currency is negative (-0.091,) but insignificant at conven- tional levels. The difference in means is highly significant, indicating that the trading volume of firms selecting a foreign currency as the functional currency increased relative to the trading, volume of firms selecting the dollar as the functional currency.” Similar results hold for the median AOL. VI. CONCLUSION ‘This paper explores the relevance of information asymmetries for explaining accounting policy by focusing on the informational effects of alternative financial reporting methods on firm value, Firms operating in environments of varying complexity have diffecent degrees of information asymmetry due to the limited flexibility of the cequiced ceporting technology. This information asymractry among market participants translates into higher transaction costs for trading shares ofthe firm: these higher transaction costs raise the required cate of retum and, thus, lower current stock prices. Ceteris paribus, managers wishing to maximize the value oftheir firm A patel groblem with this rest thatthe definition of AVOL. assumes that dhe mnfluence ofthe selection af the anctonaleureney an Wading volume occurs in the yea following the sleetion rather dha inthe year ofthe witch itself Totestthe sensi ofthe esulea this definition, we replicate the estedefining the change io wading volume asthe share wrnover of te frm inthe year following the selection ofthe functional cureney mir te share "rover Inthe sear prior othe year te selection was mace {year I) ealed bythe shace turnover in year—1, Resuls using tis ‘measure (nareepored are simula to ioe eported ia table suggesting thaou findings arc ot sensiveta Ihe chee ‘ofthe base year whe calvlaing the change in Wading volume. TABLES ‘Tests for Changes in Trading Volume Following the Selection of the Functional Currency x Mean AVOL — Medan AVOL Firms choosing a foreign currency as the functional eurrency 592 029 0087 ‘Firms using only the dollar as the functional currency 144 0.091 0267 p-values for two-sample tests ofthe null hypothesis that VOL,...,2 AOL gy 0.00 0.00 ‘Table Notes. The change a share wmoser fo he fim (AVOL,) is messued a the hase turner ratio af He Feria he yes Tllowing the selection of he functional urency minus he'sbate wove in he yea the selection was est epated {he annual financial statements (year 0), seated by the share arover a year 0. N iste munher of abserations. 416 ‘The Accounting Review, July 1996 will have incentives to reduce the degree of information asymmetry among market participants by switching (o new accounting techniques that make financial statements more informative co investors. ‘We test the information asymmetry perspective on the choice of the functional currency as required by SFAS No. 52. Results ftom both univariate and multivariate tests support the implications of the information asymmetry perspective, Measures of information asymmetry based upon trading volume-are significantly related to firms" probabilities of choosing the foreign, ‘currency as their functional currency in the predicted direction. This finding, is consistent with high information asymmetry firms reducing informational asymmetries and increasing Hiquidity ‘through improved diselosureby switching to moreinformative accounting methods. This relation holds even after controlling for economic characteristics ofthe firms, other variables commonly used in prior research to explain accounting choice, and anecdotal explanations for the choice of functional currency. Icis important to note that, while the empirical implications of the information asymmetry perspective are borne out by the data, there may be other theorics with similar implications. As Friedman(1953,9) states, "ifthere is one hypothesis thats consistent with the availableevidence, there are always an infinite number that are,” Our assumptions—which include (1) the currentrate method is more informative than the temporal method and thus reduces information asymmetry, (2) managers are tirm-value raximizers, and (3) the choice of the functional currency is discretionary—appear reasonable, but they represent generalizations that are not likely to be true in every case.* Thus, the interpretation of the results should be viewed cautiously at this point. We expect future research to develop methods and identify settings which allow further ‘examination of the information asymmetry perspective and other theories of accounting choice. For exampleunder a altenative hypothesis there may havc heen no discretion for managersinselecting the funcional ‘currency. 2nd the guidelines providecby the regulators (Rased upon ater economic tefrs) result es wth high information asynmety choosing the foeign cutrency a funcional euteney. Under such a nepretation, the ess in tabled age of less eeonomie interest than (he resulta table 6 and he “credit forthe proved ud celine fromthe switch othe foreigncurtency athe funcional cureney esto regulators nett vale -mmevizing manages Sul ca main result Rel: electing & more informasive accountng med leads eo improved Laid. REFERENCES ‘Abarhanell,J.S., W.N.Lanen,andR.B. 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