Critique of Final Draft MOA for Allocation of Discretionary Mortality in GYE

January 2016

What follows are 8 changes that are important enough to warrant comment and/or recommendation to
the agencies involved in crafting the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Management and
Allocation of Discretionary Mortality of Grizzly Bears in the Greater Yellowstone Area (hereafter the
MOA), in Final Draft form as of December 4th 2015.
For each change I start with a simple statement of what that change would be and then follow with my
rationale.

I. The guidelines for mortality rate in the Table on page 4 should be reduced by several
percentage points for each population segment and corresponding population size.
Assuming static fecundity, the mortality rates given in the Table on page 4 of the MOA are based on the
assumption that the rates associated with a population threshold of 674 bears are those of a stable
population.
This assumption is not tenable and, because of that, the mortality rate guidelines need to be made more
conservative. Insofar as the 7.6% rate for independent females is concerned, Doak & Cutler (2014a)
showed that the estimated population growth rate produced by the IGBST based on this mortality rate
was biased high. In other words, this female mortality rate is not that of a stable to growing population.
Doak & Cutler (2014b) sustained their argument in a response to the attempted rebuttal of their work
by the IGBST and affiliated scientists.
On top of this, the agencies are proposing to calculate annual mortality rates for each cohort based on
dividing an estimate of total mortality by an estimate of total population size. This is a fundamentally
different calculation from that used to arrive at the 7.6% and 15% rates for independent bears, which
were derived from analyzing the annual survival of radio-marked bears. In other words, this is a
comparison of apples with oranges, without any exact understanding of how the one calculation
correlates with the other. In fact, the assumption that these two calculations are functionally equivalent
invokes an argument rooted in the failed assumption (see immediately below) that the population was
growing during 2001-2012. Basically, the IGBST contends that the ratios of dead to live bears calculated
during 2002-2012 must be those of a stable to growing population, equivalent to death rates for the
period calculated from fates of radio-marked bears, given that the population was growing. But the
problem is, of course, that the population very likely wasnt.
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This brings me to the problems with Chao2. The MOA proposes use of the Chao2 method for all
estimates of population size and, from that, trend. One key problem with using this overall approach is
its vulnerability to bias introduced by variation in search effort and sightability of bears. Doak and Cutler
(2014a) clearly demonstrated this problem, along with the likelihood that much of the putative increase
in the Yellowstone grizzly bear population from the mid-1990s to the late-2000s was simply an artifact
of increased aerial search effort and concurrent increases in sightabilities of bears.
This has implications for my argument here. All of the putative increase in population size between 2001
and 2014 is likely to have been an artifact of continued increases in search effort and increasing use of
army cutworm moths by Yellowstones grizzlies. The figure below (Fig. 1) illustrates these trends:
increasing effort and moth site use during 1998-2014 in the graph to the left and presumed increases in
numbers of females with COY (the basis for all estimates of total population size) in the graph to the
right.

Fig. 1. The figure at left shows 3-year sums of hours spent searching for grizzlies during aerial
overflights by management agencies (the burgundy dots and trend line) and 3-year sums of numbers
of moth sites known to be used by Yellowstones grizzlies (green dots and trend line). The figure at
right shows trends in 3-year sums of unduplicated females with cubs-of-the-year (darker gray dots)
along with the presumed correction for adult females that went unseen made by the Chao2 method
(lighter gray dots).
This likelihood that Chao2-based estimates of population trend are spurious is supported by the trend
evident when using the more reliable mark-resight method to estimate population size, as shown in
Figure 2 below. The trend shown by mark-resight is flat to declining, which is consistent with what we
have seen of trends in total estimated mortality when pro-rated against Chao2-based estimates of
population size; which is all the more remarkable given that (as I note above) the trend in population is
inflated when using Chao2. Figure 3 shows the dramatic increase in this rate (equivalent to the
calculation being proposed in the MOA) during recent years for both males and females. Such a sharp
increase is what you would expect for a declining population.
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Fig. 2. This graph shows the trend in estimated size of the Yellowstone grizzly bear population based
on the mark-resight method. The light gray dots correspond to median estimates and the dark gray
dots to the lower quartile of these estimates. The red lines are fitted trend lines.

Fig. 3. The trends in 3-year running averages of estimated total numbers of independent male (red
dots) and female (burgundy dots) grizzly bears dying in Yellowstone, divided by the total numbers of
each sex estimated to be alive in the population at the beginning of the year using the Chao2-method.
These numbers are similar to what the calculation proposed in the MOA would produce.

II. A guideline for total mortality rate, with the intent of producing population growth, is
needed for an estimated population size of 600 bears.
The rationale for recommendation II is pretty straight-forward. Managers should set a goal, expressed in
terms of total mortality rates, that will likely produce growth in the Yellowstone grizzly bear population
should it drop below the basement number of 600. Even taken at face value, the mortality guidelines
currently set for any population less than or equal to 674 are, by their own admission, rates associated
with a stable population at best.

The agencies may argue that they already have a provision for eliminating virtually all Discretionary
mortality once 600 is reachedtantamount to a drop in total mortality rate. I would argue that this is
not enough and that an explicitly named target rate would provide incentive to reduce what the
agencies are currently calling Non-discretionary mortality once the population is at or near 600 (see my
point VII, below, for more on the problems of using Discretionary and Non-discretionary).

III. Review of current management approaches should be mandated whenever mortality

guidelines are exceeded during any two consecutive years, for any of the three specified
cohorts of bears, rather than the standard of three consecutive years specified in the
current MOA.
The current MOA specifies that a review of management leading to potential changes in harvest would
occur only if recommended mortality rates were exceeded in 3 consecutive years. If the sequencing was
right (e.g., 2 years of excess followed by one year within bounds, followed by two more sequences of
this nature), this protocol would allow the states to kill bears in excess of recommended guidelines for 7
out of 10 years, which, taking all of the other elements of the MOA at face value, would be a recipe for
producing a declining populationand without provision for introducing a timely change in
management. Under the current approach, a check would only be introduced if estimated population
size dropped below 600, at which point, options for reversing course would be intrinsically limited.
With the change recommended here (review after 2 rather than 3 successive years of violated mortality
rate targets), timely review would be triggered much more often and with the prospect of actually
reversing course prior to excessive declines in the bear population. In light of this logic, it would be
interesting to know why the states chose to go with 3 rather than 2 years in the first place. Certainly, the
current proposed approach is not precautionary or in any other way conservative.

IV. The number of Discretionary mortalities allotted to the state management agencies
should be calculated using a different method. Specifically: A forecast of total target (or
desired) mortality for independent males, independent females, and dependent young
should each be calculated based on applying the appropriate mortality rate for the
corresponding cohort to the current estimated size of the cohort. This resulting value
should be reduced by 68% for independent females and 60% for independent males to
account for historical rates of Non-discretionary mortality, with the residual 32% of
forecast female deaths and 40% of forecast male deaths available, then, for allocation as
Discretionary mortalities for the coming year. Of these Discretionary moralities, 10%
of independent females and 3% of independent males should be allocated to the
National Park Service, again based on historical rates. The remainder would then be
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available for allocation to the State wildlife management agencies as a basis for
planning Discretionary mortalities, including those that would be part of a sport hunt.
In this recommendation I am essentially asking the parties to the MOA to fundamentally rethink and
recast how they are forecasting the number of grizzlies available to be killed for Discretionary reasons,
most notably as part of a sport hunt.
Critically important: As near as I can tell the MOA makes no provision for anticipating the number of
Non-discretionary mortalities as part of the process of forecasting how many bears will be available for
a sport hunt or for management removals in a coming year. Given the current language, I am also
unclear on how a mounting number of Non-discretionary deaths during any given unfolding year will
translate into the timely introduction of a curb on the numbers of Discretionary deaths being meted
out by managers and hunters. All of this adds up to a current approach that is hugely risky and that
ignores well documented historical patterns.
Also critically important: the current MOA makes no provision for so-called Discretionary mortalities
that might occur in National Parks. It certainly makes no up-front allocation of such mortalities to the
NPS, which seems to be a naked and arrogant power play on the parts of the involved States
Insofar as historical patterns are concerned, figure 4, below, shows what we know. First of all (and see
my point VII below about terminology), my reading of the MOA leads me to more-or-less correlate
Discretionary kills with current management removals and Non-discretionary mortalities with most
other categories, which allows for some reference to past data. Notice that there are not any major or
otherwise abrupt trends in the proportions of grizzlies killed in Yellowstone National Park or for nondiscretionary reasons. Insofar as management removals are concerned, there does seem to be a longerterm trend towards an increase, but interrupted by a prolonged relative stasis.
But the more important point pertains to long-term averages. The historical deaths that can be
unambiguously categorized as non-discretionary amount to 50% of the total. Management removals
amount to only 31%. Moreover, if you look at the proportion of independent males and females that
were killed for reasons other than management removals outside the National Parks for the period
2000-2014, these figures are 60 and 68% for the respective sexes.
It seems to make unimpeachable sense to account for these long-term historical patterns when
forecasting what percentage of total target mortality would be available for management removals,
whether by uniformed employees or licenses hunters. After all, total mortality is the starting point
derived from applying the mortality rate guidelines (or targets) to total estimated population size. So, if
you were to anticipate, based on reasonable foreknowledge, what the non-discretionary mortality
might be during an up-coming year outside of a National Park setting, you would take 60% of the males
of 68% of the females off the table, leaving you with potentially 40% of the total male deaths and 32% of

the total female deaths as candidate for allocation to all of the relevant parties for planned removals,
and this for the entirety of the ecosystem.
Which brings me to the National Parks, which are currently left entirely out of the picture. Again, if you
were to look at historical data, 2000-2014, you would find that roughly 10% of the management
removals of adult females and 3% of the management removals of adult males occurred inside a Park. It
makes sense, then, to allocate this percentage of the so-called Discretionary mortality calculated
according to the method described above to the Parks each year. So the fraction of total mortality
available to be killed for Discretionary reasons on lands under state jurisdiction would, for males, first
subtract 60% of the total allowable mortality to account for anticipated Non-discretionary deaths and
then 3% of that residuum to provide the National Parks some fraction of Discretionary. For females the
figures would be 68% and then 10%.
Without considering the Parks or non-discretionary mortality, you have a system of sport harvest that
is subsidized by bears living in unhunted jurisdictions. You also have a system that is based on untenable
assumptions about the facility with which any state agency will be able to mitigate foreseeable nondiscretionary mortality through the rapid introduction of firm constraints on any yet unrealized
discretionary kills during any given year.

Fig. 4. These graphs show historical trends in the proportion of total grizzly bear deaths in Yellowstone
that could be unambiguously assigned to the future category of Non-discretionary (top), that
occurred in Yellowstone National Park (middle), and that were due to management removals, which
roughly correlates with Discretionary.
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V. Occupancy guidelines for adult females need to apply to all portions of the DMA, not
just the PCA, stratified on the basis of what are currently called Flight areas.
The current approach outlined in the MOA would load essentially all of the Discretionary mortality
allotted for independent females on those without dependent young (lone females) outside of National
Parks. Under current provisions, no sport harvest of females accompanied by dependent young would
be allowed. This amounts to the brunt of the sport harvest for the cohort being borne by lone females
on the periphery of the DMA. Thinking this through, then: on average, only 1 of 3 adult females will be
without young during a given year. Moreover, some percentage of these lone females will be inside
National Parks where they will not be subject to hunting. As a result, something less than 33% of the
adult females in the population (say, 25%), all of which will be concentrated on the ecosystem
periphery, will be subject to essentially a sanctioned slaughter each year. And remember, the current
approach essentially uses Park females to subsidize the sport harvest outside (see above).
The end result will be patently unsustainable harvest of females on the periphery, which is probably the
tacit intent. Additional results will be two-fold. The source-sink structure of the population will be
amplified which, according to Doak (1995), will lead to increased overall vulnerability to unintended and
long-lagged population declines. And dynamics leading to additional unpredictable outcomes will be
introduced by slaughtering females that would otherwise have given birth to cubs the following year.
One potential curb would be the fact that, with many fewer females giving birth to cubs any following
year, estimates of total population size based on observations of females with COY would be smaller,
which might then lead to a lower Discretionary kill the next year. But, then, there would be a pulse of
cubs from females that subsequently escaped slaughter, which would lead to an inflated estimate of
population size and a resulting inflated sport harvestand so on. I dont think we know where this all
leads other than to many fewer females on the ecosystem periphery and much less predictability
regarding the consequences of management actions.
Which brings me to the point of the suggested change. A requirement for sustaining occupancy of all
management units (AKA flight areas outside the PCA; see figure 5 immediate below) by reproductive
females would introduce a strong curb to the current excesses built into the plan, which have very
punitive implications for females outside National Parks. Alleviating these current excesses would result
in proportionately greater numbers of females on the periphery, which would foster eventual
connectivity between Yellowstone and the NCDE.

Fig. 5. Map A, above, shows the PCA (delineated by red, as shown in map B) relative to the full extent
and partitioning of the DMA (in yellow). The current MOA only provides for insurance of occupancy by
adult females within the units contained by the PCA and leaves occupancy of all the other units
(Flight Areas) in the DMA up in the air when it comes to presence of reproductive females.

VI. The MOA needs to specify that population monitoring will continue at the same
intensity (neither more nor less) and according to the same design as occurred during
the 5 years prior to delisting.
Given the problems introduced by the MOAs current provisions to excessively harvest a single cohort of
adult females on the ecosystem periphery (see above), I am deeply concerned by what I see as the
potential for compensatory games on the part of especially Wyoming. Taking a very cynically
perspective, Wyoming could respond to substantial declines in numbers of females with COY on the
periphery by simply increasing aerial search efforts focused on National Parks and areas remote from
hunter activity. This ploy could work for a while because of the extent to which the current method for
estimating population size is influenced by search effort (see Recommendation I). Search harder for
adult females in areas not heavily impacted by the sport hunt, and you can (at least temporarily) pull
more bears out of the hat to support a larger population estimate and a resulting greater number of
Discretionary kills for the forthcoming year in areas where that kill will more likely happen. If such a
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strategy were to be pursued, it would amplify the problematic spatial and temporal dynamics that I
described under recommendation V, above.
Which brings me to the point of this recommendation, which is pretty simple. A commitment on the
part of the state agencies to maintain the current level and distribution of aerial effort devoted to
finding females with COY would essentially debar the cynical strategy I describe here.

VII. Terminology for referring to bear mortality should be changed from Discretionary
versus Non-discretionary to Management versus Other.
The semantics of the current distinction between Discretionary and Non-discretionary mortality lead
to confusion. Moreover, the distinction is disingenuous. By using these terms, state managers lead both
themselves and their readers to assume that they have no control or influence over so-called Nondiscretionary mortalitiesthat this category of mortalities needs to happen or is the result of some
act of God. This is not the case. History has shown that managers do, in fact, have substantial influence
over the so-called Non-discretionary mortalities through activities such as law enforcement, education,
and sanitation. They even have self-professed influence over natural mortalities in that there is ample
evidence for the extent to which sport harvest of specific cohorts of bears can amplify or dampen levels
of mortality caused by conspecificsespecially infanticide. In other words, Non-discretionary
mortalities can, in fact, be Discretionary.
When you look at the more concrete categories of bear deaths that managers are allocating to
Discretionary versus Non-discretionary, it turns out that they are making a fairly straight-forward
distinction. Discretionary deaths are simply those that will be directly sanctioned by managers and
meted out by either uniformed employees of a state agency, by Wildlife Services, or by those licensed to
act on the agencys behalf (e.g., licensed hunters). Non-discreationary deaths are simply all others
resulting from the actions of those (including other animals) who are not explicitly and directly
authorized, in any immediate sense, to kill grizzly bears.
Of relevance to my recommendation IV, above, the current category of Discretionary correlates closely
with historical deaths of grizzly bears caused by managers responding to conflict situations, including
threats to human safetyin other words, management removals. Non-discretionary correlates with
all of the other historical categories. My point being that it is a lot more straight-forward and less
misleading to simply refer in future to Discretionary kills as Management kills and Non-discretionary
kills as simply Other.

VIII. The MOA needs to clarify how uncertainty in annual estimates of total population
size will be treated when comparing these estimates to population thresholds given in
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the Table on page 4. I recommend that the agencies use the lower 50% confidence (or
credible) interval for any current-year estimate of population size.
This recommendation pertains to something less consequential than the issues addressed by my other
points above. Nonetheless, it would perhaps help not only the stakeholders in grizzly bear management,
but also the managers themselves to clarify whether they will be using a central point estimate or some
point within the range of uncertainty as a basis for comparing annual population estimates with
population benchmarks used to guide application of mortality rates. Uncertainty in annual estimates is
especially important given that management will be reconfigured on an annual basis in light of these
estimates (e.g., for determination of expendable bears) rather than on the basis of any moving average;
and especially given that the current MOA essentially allows managers to exceed mortality rate targets 2
out of every 3 years without any provision for review.
Having made a case for just simply clarifying what they will do with uncertainty, I would go further and
recommend that the States actually use the lower bound of a confidence or credible interval, depending
on what kind of inference is used to estimate population size. This would be a conservative,
precautionary, approach. A 95% lower bound would do a better job of insuring that true population
size was being captured, but a 50% lower bound might be viewed as a compromise, although allowing
for the possibility of missing true size roughly 50% of the time when considering the overall bounds of
the interval.

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