VIOLETA BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010

Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
Acting on a complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani
Province with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a
certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations
using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in
Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its
investigation from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious
associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and Local
Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check
in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as
the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended
the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents
against the officials involved.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation of public
funds? Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of
conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial
court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the
mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,
without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of
conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately
proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no
hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her
name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals
the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that
the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision;
signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash
advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer
Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the
initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved
for payment, and with petitioners signature as the payee.
The Sandiganbayan faulted

petitioner for immediately encashing the

check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is
unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioners name and, as
payee, she had the authority to encash it.
All told, there is reasonable
doubt as to petitioners guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be
acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When
guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of
right. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July
5, 2010 Parricide Facts:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellants legitimate wife,
with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 oclock in the
morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangay
captain of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. Rositas bloodied
body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters away from their
house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the
stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still conscious. Beside him were a
bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While the windows of the house
were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already opened. Inside the two
bedrooms of the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies
of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also
bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional
Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen days. Melodys
grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had heard Rosita
shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when appellant was
asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not
know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Is the
accused guilty of the crime charged? Ruling:
YES. Parricide is committed
when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution.
Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual
stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no
one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is
not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can
sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial
evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination
of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence
which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.
In the
killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so
sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the

attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected
than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound
asleep and totally defenseless. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LUIS ANTONIO
GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009 Parricide Facts: On appeal is the
21 January 2008 Decision of the Court of affirming the conviction of appellant Luis
Antonio Garchitorena of the crime of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the16th day of [August 2000], in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, being then the legitimate husband of FLORDELIZA
TABLA GARCHITORENA, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
said FLORDELIZA TABL[A] GARCHITORENA, his wife, by then and there shooting
her with a gun, hitting her on the head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and
mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA.
Issue: Is accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES.The elements of the crime of
parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of
the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It was
stipulated during the pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24
August 1999. That the appellant killed the victim was proven specifically by
circumstantial evidence.
As aptly stated by the trial court:

In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding that accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fact that accused and
the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the shooting incident
occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument between the spouses, as
narrated by the accused to the police investigator and during trial. Thirdly,
accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In this, the Court finds criminal
purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court of improbability of the deceased
shooting herself.

While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution

on the killing of the deceased by the accused, the established circumstances
aforestated, however, constituted an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other

[hypothesis] that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an

unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it
cannot be overcome by inaccurate and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused.

_______
People v Yanson- Dumancas

Facts: One Rufino Gargar, Jr. was abducted and detained. He was
thereafter shot and killed while blindfolded, by a group of persons; most of
whom were members of the police force, alleged to be under the direction, and
undue influence of one P/Col. Nicolas Torres, and acting upon the inducement of
accused Yanson-Dumancas.

Issue: Whether accused Yanson-Dumancas could be held liable of the

crime as a principal by inducement.

Held:

There are two ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime,

namely: (a) by using irresistible force or (b) by causing uncontrollable fear.
There is nothing to conclude that the accused used either of the methods on the
accused-appellants. Likewise, there are two ways of inducing another to commit
a crime, specifically: (a) by giving a prize, or offering a reward or promise, and
(b) by using words of command. There was no evidence to show that the
accusedcommitted any of the foregoing acts prior to the commission of the
crime. In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the
following must be present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the material executor. There must
exist, on the part of the inducer, the most positive resolution and the most
persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the strongest kind of temptation to
commit the crime.