Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and lending business.

Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend loans to various individuals. Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. Mangali thereafter extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale. The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition. Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that their was conspiracy between her and the borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some irregularities which attended her arrest. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the irregularities of the entrapment operation may nullify Eugenios conviction 2. Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of conspiracy HELD: Petition GRANTED. On the alleged irregularities attending Eugenios arrest and custodial investigation Petitioner contends that her arrest following the NBI entrapment operation was illegal because i t was conducted by a division of the NBI which does not deal with estafa or fraud and without the participation of the police. Petitioner also alleges that after she was arrested, she was neither i nformed of her constitutional right to counsel nor afforded her right to a phone call. Petitioner concludes that these irregularities tainted the NBIs entrapment operation, rendering the same without any probative value in determining whether or not a criminal act has been committed. Respondent does not contest petitioners claim on the alleged irregularities which attended her arrest. Nevertheless, such irregularities, assuming t hey did take place, do not work to nullify petitioners conviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the c orrect remedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure to timely raise this objection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitant submission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only did petitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participation during the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary. As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel during custodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, the tainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence against the accused. The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy to render petitioner liable as principal to Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following modes: (1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; (2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; (3) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; (4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (5) Altering true dates; (6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning; (7) Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or (8) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused. However, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused. Taking into account admitted facts and unrebutted claims, her participation in the events leading to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt as to her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner. As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions . This also explains why she was present in all the occasions Mangali met Saquitan and Ty she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to receive commission from Mangali. On petitioners disclosure to Mangali that TCT No. 171602 is registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office. The prosecution did not rebut this. In sum, we hold that the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed, when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.

G.R. No. 169431 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007 People of the Philippines, appellee

vs Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, appellant Ponente: Tinga Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the consolidated judgment of the RTC of found guilty of 2 counts of murder reclusion perpetua for each count, plus 2 victims. the court of appeals affirming Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was sentenced to the penalty of indemnity for the heirs of the

In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged with the murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan the accused conspired, confiderating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims. Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was affirmed. Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of cULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge). Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was files against Regino who was likewise arrested. MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the TC by including Regino in the information, but then the latter had left Culion already. Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters

away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall. Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot. On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found him guilty. Issues: (1) Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and (2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premediation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling: (1) There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded. Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 oclock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in the killing.

In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession. The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession. For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellants claim that he had never met Abad. The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant. (2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver. Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellants counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. (3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that appellants bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility. First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves.Second, the prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. The actual date

of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession. (4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated. Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. There must be such corroboration so that when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other evidence. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellants statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court. Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellant s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.