Causes of the Second World War: Review notes

The peace treaties after World War One

Treaty dictated to the Germans: a dictated peace (diktat) which the Germans were
forced to sign, not allowed to discuss or negotiate the terms.
Expectation that treaty would be based upon President Wilsons 14 points and idea of
self-determination, when in fact this self-determination was denied to many Germanspeaking people.
War guilt clause (article 231) placed entire moral responsibility for starting the war on
the Germans.
This then led to reparations and the financial commitment for paying the cost of Allied
war damage. Sum left as a blank cheque at the treaty, but later fixed at 6,600 million
in 1921.
Loss of territory and colonies - lost 10% of its population, areas like Alsace and
Lorraine.
No airforce allowed, army reduced to 100,000 and no conscription allowed.
The terms of the treaty were seen as very harsh by Germany, and this led to a future
desire to overturn the settlement. As French Marshall Foch said on hearing the terms,
this is not a peace, it is an armistice for twenty years. The treaty played an important
role in both weakening the position of the new Weimar Republic in Germany, and driving
Adolf Hitler to found the Nazi party in 1920. In the longer term, Hitler was able to secure
support for his radical nationalist policies from both the right wing and the people at
large, by exploiting the perceived injustices of Versailles. Though the treaty was seen
as tough at the time, later historians have suggested that the problem was rather that
the treaty was not harsh enough. Germany was left hungry for revenge and with the
future capacity to become a great power and overturn the treaty, which given the
various circumstances of the 1920s and 30s is exactly what happened with Hitler.

Failures of the League

League of Nations set up in Geneva in 1920, following Paris peace settlements and the
ideas of President Wilson, as an international peace-keeping organization for conflict
resolution and humanitarian work.
Weakened by its refusal to allow Germany and USSR to join, which gave it the air of a
winners club. Furthermore, the US senate refused to join the League, meaning that
though it was Wilsons brainchild the USA were never members. From the start then the
League lacked the support of three of the worlds major countries.
Furthermore, the League lacked an army of its own and had to rely upon unanimous
decision making in the council in order to agree to taking any action. It was also
weighed down by administrative procedures, which meant in practice that it could take a
year before a decision could be reached, in the unlikely event of a unanimous vote. In
this way, the structure and Covenant of the League made it less effective as a peacekeeping organization.
The league enjoyed some support in the 1920s, settling disputes between smaller
nations (such as Finland and Sweden over the rights to land) and improving
international labour conditions and treating tropical diseases.
However, as Mussolini pointed out, the League was much less effective when it came to
settling disputes that involved major powers. This was clearly shown when Italy bullied
Greece over the Corfu incident in 1923, and the League decided in Mussolinis favour.
1931, Japan invaded Manchuria and China appealed to the League for help. The
League took over a year to make its report and to decide to condemn Japan, by which
time the invasion was complete. Japan simply left the League, which was left looking
weak and lacking in the conviction to enforce collective security.

1935, encouraged by the Leagues failure to act against Japan, Mussolini invaded
Abyssinia in the hope of establishing a new Italian empire. Though Abyssinia appealed
to the League for help, little effective action was taken. The Hoare-Laval pact disgraced
Western diplomacy, and the leagues economic sanctions were so weak that Italy could
continue their war effort. This was a disaster for the League - a member had ignored
the League and used violence and war to profit: the idea of collective security was
effectively dead from this point on.
The failure of the League of Nations and the idea of collective security in the interwar
period played a significant role in contributing to the Second World War. Though the
League had some minor successes in the more optimistic atmosphere of the 1920s, the
massive impact of the Great Depression brutally exposed the original weaknesses of
the League. Lacking the support of the major powers (USA never joined, Russia did not
join until 1934, by which time Hitler had removed Germany), not having its own army
and dependent upon unanimous decision-making among the oftentimes-squabbling
Council members, the League was virtually disabled in the face of aggressive
expansionist powers in the 1930s. The failure to protect Manchuria from Japan, and
Abyssinia from Italy, left the league looking toothless and discredited as an institution,
and this at a time when Europe was desperately in need of effective collective security.
It is arguably no coincidence that Hitlers aggressive expansionism intensified after
Mussolini exposed the fragility of the League as a means of preventing war.
The Depression

In October 1929, the Wall Street stock market in the USA crashed, leading to farreaching consequences for the rest of the world.
Largely dependent upon US loans, which were now being withdrawn, the Weimar
Republic in Germany was effectively brought to its knees by the economic and political
impact of the Great Depression.
The huge rise of unemployment in Germany, and the despair this created, led to a rapid
increase in popular support for Hitler and his radical Nazi vision of renewed German
greatness. This helped Hitler to rise to power - though in the end Conservative
politicians legally appointed him Chancellor in 1933.
The depression also encouraged the growth of aggressive expansionist policies from
extreme right-wing governments such as Italy and Japan. Faced with severe economic
problems, these powers sought both to distract their populations with glory and secure
vital economic resources through foreign policies based on conquest.
The economic impact of the finance crisis had an important impact on the ability of
Western governments to work together and enforce collective security. Most countries
looked inwards, and were more concerned with trying to protect their own interests than
acting in an international spirit and paying for world peace. In particular, the likelihood
that economic sanctions and military intervention would be used was significantly
reduced. This meant that the idea of collective security established after WW1 was left
as more of a dream than a reality.
The worldwide depression caused by the Wall Street crash in 1929 played an important
role in both weakening the idea of collective security and in encouraging aggressive
right-wing powers to pursue their expansionist foreign policies. Forced into difficult
economic situations, these fascist powers were more likely to attempt expansion as a
solution to their problems, as they were aware that the Western powers lacked the
political and economic capacity to take the action needed to stop them. In this way,
economic factors are significant in understanding both the foreign policies of Japan in
1931, Mussolini in 1935 and Hitler from 1935 and the decline of the League of Nations
and collective security. In these conditions, the weakened Western powers of Britain
and France, themselves hard-hit by the Depression, were more likely to turn towards a
foreign policy based on appeasing aggressively expansionist states.

Hitlers foreign policy aims and ambitions

In Mein Kampf (1924-5) Hitler laid out 4 key foreign-policy aims, which were later
carried out when he came to power: 1) overthrowing Versailles treaty in terms of rearming and recovering lost territory, 2) gaining lebensraum for Germany in Eastern
Europe, which would involve a future war with Communist Russia, 3) uniting all Germanspeaking people in his new Germany, including those in Austria, Sudeten and Danzig,
and 4) creating a racially pure German state that would the dominant power in Europe.
The dominant theme of his policy, beyond the short-term aim of overthrowing Versailles,
was the desire to expand eastwards for lebensraum as the economic base for his dream
of a racially pure German superpower; Hitler had a consistent ambition to control race
and space. (The radically new element is the stress on race, and the obsession with the
Jews that accompanied this which had such tragic consequences.)
Key steps taken by Hitler in trying to achieve his FP aims: 1) 1933, withdrew Germany
from League of Nations, 2) 1935, announced a German army of 550, 000 and
introduced conscription, 3) 1935, Anglo-German Naval Agreement to allow larger navy,
4) March 1936, re-militarising the Rhineland, 5) 1936 - 7, supporting Franco in the
Spanish Civil War, 6) 1938, anschluss with Austria, 7) 1938, Sudetenland after Munich
agreement, 8) 1939, rest of Czechoslovakia, 9) 1939, Nazi-Soviet Pact then invasion of
Poland.
The question of just how far Hitler had a clear foreign policy plan, and to what extent
this can be seen as the primary cause of the war, has been hotly debated among
historians. The orthodox view of Hitler put forward by those like Hugh Trevor-Roper
stressed that Mein Kampf provides clear evidence of long-term goals and a blueprint
for future action, which is consistently followed when Hitler later comes to power.
According to this interpretation, the major cause for the Second World War was Hitlers
desire for the expansion of Germany. However, Taylors revisionist view of Hitler is as a
man of improvisation and spur-of-the-moment thinking. He dismisses Mein Kampf as
wishful day-dreaming, and argues that Hitler took advantage of the opportunities
presented to him in the 1930s to follow traditional German aims of Eastward expansion.
He therefore challenged the orthodox view that WWII was Hitlers war, and suggested
it was at least as much due to the failures of the European statesmen. A useful middle
position has been argued by Alan Bullock, who argues that Hitler had clear long-term
goals which he pursued using opportunistic methods and tactics. While Hitlers actions
clearly dont seem to have the absolute certainty one would expect from a masterplanner, there seems little doubt that he was broadly pursuing the central aims laid out
in his writings, and that in this sense it makes sense to talk of this being Hitlers war.
Appeasement

Policy of trying to solve international conflicts through compromise and negotiation,

followed chiefly by the British in the 1930s as the League of Nations was largely ignored
after the failure in Abyssinia.
Neville Chamberlain chiefly followed the policy from 1937, and believed that
appeasement could help to bring order and lasting peace to international relations.
He believed that Germany had some fairly legitimate grievances about territory and
economic resources, and that resolving these through peaceful negotiation could
prevent war with Hitler.
The classic example of this policy in action is the Munich conference, September 1938,
over Hitlers claims over the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Under Mussolinis
supervision, this agreement saw Britain and France giving in to Hitlers demands and
handing him the Sudetenland without even consulting Benes, the Czech prime minister.
Hitler then showed, in March 1939, how little respect he had for the agreement, and his
earlier promise that he only wished for the Sudetenland, by invading and annexing the
rest of the country. This brought Europe still closer to war, as though Britain and France

did not respond in this instance they pledged to defend Polish independence, the next
likely target of Hitlers aggression.
Appeasement has been a hugely controversial issue among historians as a possible cause of
war since Chamberlains policies in the 1930s. The orthodox view developed directly after the
war blamed Chamberlain for failing to challenge Hitler earlier, and argued that he thus played an
important role in bringing about war. A striking version of this view was given by A.J.P. Taylor in
1961, when he argued that Hitler was an opportunistic statesman rather than a clear planner in
foreign policy, which meant that appeasing him simply encouraged him to be bolder in seizing
new opportunities to expand. The release of British government documents more recently,
however, has allowed a more sympathetic view of appeasement to emerge. Chamberlains
policy is now seen as having been shaped by a complex range of domestic, national and
international considerations, as hoping for the best while preparing for the worst in that it
allowed Britain the time to re-arm until in a position to be able to challenge Hitler militarily.
Ultimately, how far appeasement was a contributing factor to war depends on the view one
takes of Hitler as a statesman. If he was, as Taylor argued, an opportunist without clear
objectives then of course appeasement was a dangerous policy that made war more likely.
However, if, and as the evidence tends to suggest, he was more of a planner with a clear set of
objectives then war would have been inevitable at some point anyway - in which case
appeasement was a perfectly reasonable policy choice, in the sense of buying time before the
forthcoming war.

Nazi-Soviet Pact

Following the failure of Britains half-hearted attempts to make an agreement with

Stalin, Germany and the USSR signed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August
1939.
The pact saw the two great ideological enemies pledge not to attack each other, but
they also secretly agreed to split Poland between them and identified spheres of
influence in Eastern Europe and the Baltics.
Hitler made the agreement to avoid war on two fronts, and hoped that it would scare
Britain and France from acting to honour their pledge to Poland. He saw it as a shortterm measure, to allow him to deal with the West first - he still planned to invade the
USSR in the future.
Stalin wanted to try and avoid war with Nazi Germany as long as possible, but was fully
aware of Hitlers intentions to invade. He saw the agreement as a way of buying time
to prepare for this future war. He also hoped that Germany and the West would exhaust
each other in the war, leaving the USSR as the strongest nation.
Having made this agreement, Hitler could go ahead and invade Poland on 1st
September. On 3rd September Britain and France kept their word to Poland, and
declared war on Germany.
(The world war in Europe had started, in September 1939; though a fully global war
would not start until 1941, when the Japanese brought the USA into the conflict by
bombing Pearl Harbour.)
The Nazi-Soviet Pact served to make war inevitable. It was yet another example of
Hitlers opportunism and willingness to be flexible in order to achieve his foreign policy
aims, and the alliance with Russia meant that he was free to pursue his goal of
annexing Poland. Hitler might have been expecting Britain and France to back down
again and appease him, but in this case he was wrong and his invasion led to the start
of World War II in Europe, when Britain and France finally decided to challenge him.
Some historians have therefore argued that Stalin, in making the pact that allowed
Hitler to invade Poland, is at least partly to blame for war breaking out when it did, in
September 1939. Though it is impossible to know for sure, it seems unlikely that Hitler
would have been prepared to invade Poland if he had feared resistance from both the
East and the West. In this sense Hitler can be seen as the wars prime aggressor , but
Stalins role contributed to the timing of the wars outbreak.

Long and Short Term Causes of World War II

Long Term Causes:
The League of Nations
-Initially began as a way to curb future aggression by European nations
-Lacked enforcement mechanisms and failed multiple times to demonstrate authority.
-Failed to do anything during the Manchurian
-Failed to do anything when Hitler annexed Austria
-This directly resulted in Hitler's belief that the League of Nations would do nothing but slap
him on the wrist if he pursued aggressive expansion policies, and therefore there was no
reason for Hitler not to began expanding German territory.
-This was a long term cause of World War II because it revealed the true lack of power
European nations had in stopping countries from acting aggressively.
The Treaty of Versailles
-Treaty established after World War I to stop Germany from going to war again
-Harsh mandates on military size, industrial capacities, and foreign policy limitations.
Resulted in the German economy doing incredibly poorly and relying on foreign government
(like the US) for support
-Created huge resentment of European nations in Germany, and as a direct result sparked
serious German nationalism
-This was a long term cause of World War II because it united Germany in hate for foreign
nations, caused the German economy to be reliant on foreign loans, and created a desire
among Germans to restore Germany to its former power. All of these eventually resulted in
the Nazi party being able to come to power by promising to fix all of these problems.
The US Economic Crash
-US economy was based heavily in stocks and 'imaginary money', and when it crashed the
US loss extreme amounts of capital
-During this time, Germany was relying heavily on foreign loans from the US to sustain its
economy
-When the US economy crashed, it was forced to stop its loans to Germany which resulted in
extreme inflation and economic depression in Germany.
-This was a long term cause of World War II because it further increased animosity towards
foreign nations and the treaty of Versailles, and eventually lead to German military revival as
a justification to repair the German economy.
Short Term Causes:
Neville Chamberlain's Appeasement Policies
-Chamberlain believed he could stop German military expansion if he gave into German
demands to acquire the Rhineland
-Essentially gave Germany whatever they wanted in exchange for German promises to 'not
go to war in the future'
-This resulted in Germany being able to acquire the Rhineland and begin rebuilding their
military.
-This was a short term cause of World War II because it enabled Germany to gain land
without going to war and to re-arm without causing serious international backlash

The Anschluss
-Hitler claimed that Austria desired to be a part of Germany
-Using intimidation tactics and diplomacy, he managed to acquire Austria without firing a
single shot.
-Gained significant amounts of land and population for Germany
-This was a short term cause of World War II because it showed Hitler that foreign nations
were powerless to stop him from acquiring large pieces of land as long as he didn't use force.
Also showed the power of German diplomacy which enabled him to justify foreign policy
options based on expansion without war.
Hitler's Invasion of Poland
-September 1st, 1939, Hitler invades Poland
-This forces Britain and France to declare war on Germany to stop expansion into the rest of
Europe
-This was a short term cause of World War II because it marked the beginning of physical
aggression of Germany and the beginning involvement of foreign countries to stop Germany
using military force.
Causes Of World War 2
The root causes of World War 2
We can count many causes of World War 2, political and others, but the three root causes of
World War 2 were :
1. The Prussian Militarism - developed in 200 years of history, it was the force that
made Germany so powerful, and made it possible for a man like Adolf Hitler to gain
total control of it.
2. Adolf Hitler - a madman and political genius, Adolf Hitler re-ignited the Prussian
militarism after the German defeat in World War 1, and with this great power under
his total control, he started the greatest and cruelest war in history, in his planned
attempt to vastly expand Germany and to dominate the entire world.
3. Appeasement - Britain and France could easily stop Hitler when Germany was still
weak, but their war-traumatized pacifist desire to totally avoid violence just helped
Hitler rebuild Germany's military strength more rapidly, until it was too late to stop
him.

Otto von Bismarck

The Prussian Militarism
For many centuries, the territory of modern Germany was divided between over 300
German-speaking small and independent political units ruled by small absolute princes.
Prussia, in eastern Germany, with Berlin its capital city, was one of these many countries.
The Prussian militarism started with Friedrich Wilhelm I, "The soldier king" of Prussia (17131740), then a small kingdom around Berlin, and developed for over 200 years, making
Prussia one of the most militarist countries in history, "A military that has a state". Prussia

was an efficient and strictly disciplined military-oriented state, with a militarist mentality and
the world's most effective army. Prussia was initially just a small agricultural state with little
resources, but "The soldier king" and his successors, with an impressive combination of
merciless iron will and organizational talent, converted it to a modern Sparta. Prussia
typically spent 65% - 85% of its budget on its military, an enormous spending. Such a
system could be sustained for so long only by a combination of :

Strict, efficient, professional, and blindly obedient civil service that ran the state for its
king, and for his strict, efficient, professional, and blindly obedient army. The
backbone of Prussia's civil and military services were the Junkers, (the word means
young lords in old German), the conservative and militarist aristocratic land owners,
who were Prussia's officer Corps and held almost all the senior and medium-level
civil positions.

An education system which produced hard working obedient people, aware of their
duty and willing to sacrifice.

Expansion. Prussia's formidable military strength, and its willingness to use it,
enabled its rapid territorial expansion by a skilled combination of military victories and
power diplomacy. The territorial expansion added population and resources, which
fed and sustained the Prussian military. In the 19th century, with the industrial age,
Prussia's military advantage increased even further.

Prussia's successful expansionist militarism reached its peak under the leadership of Otto
von Bismarck, "The Iron Chancellor", who was its prime minister for 28 years (1862-1890). A
great statesman and diplomat, Bismarck's political vision was to unify the many German
states to one great country, a German Empire in Prussian domination, by a combined
campaign of "Blood and iron" and diplomacy. Bismarck achieved that goal in less than a
decade, with a series of wars and diplomatic maneuvers, and dedicated the rest of his long
tenure to solidify his great achievement, both by helping to keep Europe in peace, and by
keeping Prussia and its Junkers class in power in their new Empire, while skillfully capping
calls for democracy.
Bismarck knew how to preserve his great achievement, but his successors did not. In 1914
the peace in Europe collapsed into World War 1. After four years of terrible and futile
carnage in both sides, the combined weight of several great powers finally overcame the
German military. The German High Command in 1918 did not wait for the collapse, and
stopped the war when they realized that they're about to lose, saving the country from
further destruction.
As a result of the defeat, monarchy was abolished, the large German military was
dismantled, later re-established under very severe limitations of its size and equipment, the
exhausted country was required to pay unbearably enormous compensations to the equally
exhausted victors, and democracy was established, in the country of people who were
taught to strictly obey their superiors, not elect them (there were elections in Germany
earlier, but the Reichstag (Congress) had no real authority).
On the surface, the new German republic seemed a different country, a peaceful and
disarmed democracy that was no longer a threat to its neighbors, and became a prolific and
influential center of modern arts and science.
But under the surface, it was still the Prussian Germany, with the Junkers in power in the
civil and military service (including the admired wartime supreme commander as president),
with a limited military force, but one that was formed from the finest war veterans and

demonstrated great resourcefulness in bypassing the limits dictated by the peace treaty, and
the country was in a financial crisis and a political chaos, and many Germans blamed the
peace treaty's dictations of their country's troubles, and wanted to restore its national pride
and past greatness, which above all meant a desire to restore Germany's military strength.
Adolf Hitler
With all the power of great, long-term, political, social, economical and cultural forces that
shape human history, historians are awed by the great role of key individuals, the ability of
the right person at the right time and place to deeply affect the direction of history.
When World War 1 ended in a German defeat and the large German military was
dismantled, most Germans accepted the new reality and did their best to build their new
post-war civilian life, in difficult economic circumstances. For Adolf Hitler, who was a plain
soldier in the war (severely wounded twice, decorated twice for bravery in battle), the
prospects of new life and career were even less promising.
A high-school dropout who was a poor homeless nomad in Vienna before the war, Hitler was
not even a German citizen, he was an Austrian who volunteered to the German military
when World War 1 started. He had no family or friends in Germany, no contact with his
family in Austria, and a [theoretical] attempt to evaluate his social skills by his relations with
his fellow soldiers during the war, or with women, before and after the war, would also
suggest a very unpromising future, since Hitler was unpopular in his unit, the other soldiers
thought he was weird, and he was very inhibited with regard to women.
From such an unpromising start point, the chance that such a person can rise from so low to
becoming an extremely popular and successful political leader, seemed practically
impossible,
but
Hitler
did
that
in
just
13
years.
In 1920 he resigned from the army (he was still technically a soldier) to enter politics as the
leader of a very tiny unknown extreme right political group, not even a party yet, and in 1933
he was elected the Chancellor of Germany, and quickly abolished democracy, as he said he
would, and became a dictator of absolute power.
For Hitler's full biography, read my Adolf Hitler essay. Here I'll describe the unique set of
qualities of Hitler's personality, and then explain why without them Hitler, or anyone else,
could not lead Germany so fast to a second war, a World War that shook the world and
almost drowned it in blood.
In his authoritative book "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich : A History of Nazi Germany",
William L. Shirer writes about Hitler :
"The man who founded the Third Reich, who ruled it ruthlessly and often with uncommon
shrewdness, who led it to such dizzy heights and to such sorry end, was a person of
undoubted, if evil, genius. It is true that he found in the German people, as centuries of
experience had molded them up to that time, a natural instrument which he was able to
shape to his own sinister ends. But without Adolf Hitler, who was possessed of a demonic
personality, a granite will, uncanny instincts, a cold ruthlessness, a remarkable intellect, a
soaring imagination and, until toward the end, an amazing capacity to size up people and
situations, there almost certainly would never have been a Third Reich.
It is one of the great examples of the singular and incalculable power of personality in
historical
life.
To some Germans and, no doubt, to most foreigners it appeared that a charlatan had come
to power in Berlin. To the majority of Germans Hitler had, or would shortly assume, the aura

of a truly charismatic leader. They were to follow him blindly, as if he possessed a divine
judgment, for the next twelve tempestuous years."
Hitler was an exceptional speaker, a demagogue. His speeches might now seem weird or
funny, and that's what foreigners thought of him until it was too late, but the effect of Hitler's
speeches on his political audience was almost hypnotic. First of all, that's what gave him the
leadership of the tiny group that he joined, as the other few members, and others who joined
later, quickly realized that their only hope of ever getting anywhere in politics depends on
Hitler's gift of speech. Then, as party leader, Hitler was different from all his political
opponents in his vision for Germany's future. Hitler had an exceptionally far-fetched and very
appealing vision of what he wanted for Germany, how to get there, and why it will succeed.
Hitler didn't just promise a better future like politicians do. He promised them the world. He
convinced them that it's theirs by natural right and that they have the power to take it for
themselves, that they are a "Masters race" of superior people, and he was so convincing that
they believed him. By that, Hitler dwarfed all his political opponents, and slowly, year by year,
but at an increasing rate, more Germans listened to his message and became supporters.
Hitler's words were also backed by brutal street violence. German politics in those years was
not just speeches, and Hitler operated, ruthlessly, a private army of 500,000 street
gangsters, the S.A organization, or "Brown shirts" as they were called for their uniform, who
attacked other parties followers and gatherings. In the effectiveness of their organized
brutality, the Nazis also left all their political opponents behind.
Those in power, the leaders of mainstream parties and the widely respected president, saw
the danger in Hitler and disliked him, but they kept underestimating him until it was too late,
and after the 1933 elections, he overcame all of them in a political negotiation in which they
did not realize what he was trying to achieve and why, and so he got what he needed while
his political opponents thought that the deal they made with him will keep him under control.
So in 1933 Hitler did the unbelievable and became the prime minister of Germany, and his
partner Goering became minister of the Police. The Nazi party was a minority in a coalition
government, but Hitler and Goering immediately used the emergency authorities of their new
roles, combined with massive street violence that totally ignored the law. But since by then
the Nazis were the police, the law meant nothing. Hitler was the law in Germany between
January 1933 and his death in 1945.
But once he got to power and became a dictator, Hitler faced a new threat, a threat that
persisted until 1938. The German military quickly learned of Hitler's plans for a new war.
Feeling responsible for saving Germany from disaster, since it was still so weak militarily,
groups of senior officers seriously planned to remove Hitler in a military coup, but Hitler, who
needed the Generals for his intended war but did not trust their enthusiasm of him and his
plans, always outsmarted them, sometimes very narrowly, until when the war started, the
series of German victories made the Generals put these plans aside.
The Generals returned to attempting to remove Hitler when he was losing the war, and in
1944 he survived an assassination attempt by the military by pure luck, when a bomb
exploded next to him in a room where he held a meeting.
But even after overcoming his domestic opposition, Hitler still had to face the world outside,
the far stronger and increasingly worried European powers, Britain, France, Russia, and
Germany's smaller neighbors which were protected by alliances and shared strategic
interests with those powers, above all the interest to avoid having a militarist and mighty
Germany next door again.

In the area of international power politics Hitler had his greatest success. He was a
statesman the world had not seen before, an exceptional poker player who played an
incredibly dangerous game and won time after time, a series of amazing victories which time
after time convinced the worried Generals to delay their plans to remove him, and further
increased his already high popularity at home, making him, for a few years, the most
genuinely popular dictator in history, which is why the Germans kept following him later, like
a losing but still hopeful gambler, all the way down to disaster.
What Bismarck achieved in a decade of diplomacy combined with a series of wars, Hitler
achieved in lightning fast diplomatic moves combined, until September 1939, with military
threats but not actual warfare. Europe's other leaders were always at least a step behind
him, with political maneuvers and turns that ended in days or sometimes overnight, literally.
It was unprecedented in diplomatic history, and Hitler managed, with incredible skill and
astonishing success, using all the characteristics of his unique personality described above,
to arrange and initiate a series of crises on the brink of war, and come out the winner with
great gains, territorial and other, time and again, and without actually starting a war, a war
which until 1939 he was going to lose because the German military was still too small and illequipped to win.
The German Generals knew it well and were rightfully worried, the European leaders knew
it, and Hitler knew it, and still, time after time, between 1935 and 1939, he won with weaker
cards, thanks to his exceptional personal abilities in a fast paced diplomatic game of threats
and negotiations, of alternating between reason and fury, of deception, temptation,
intimidation, lies, stress. Just like his former domestic political opponents, most of whom
were dead or imprisoned by then, Europe's political leaders also underestimated and
misjudged Hitler, and many of them also ended up dead or imprisoned by him, sometimes
not much later after meeting him as peers.
Neville Chamberlain

Appeasement
But having to deal with a talented diplomatic opponent like Adolf Hitler can not be accepted
as an excuse for the political leaderships of France and Great Britain, which could easily put
an end to Hitler's dangerous game before 1939, when he still lacked the military power to
survive active resistance to his actions, a resistance that was likely to quickly knock him
down, either by military defeat or by a military coup.
The appeasement of Hitler, by Britain and France mostly, was not just the result of the
incompetence and pacifism of particular top politicians like Neville Chamberlain in Britain,
and Edouard Daladier, Paul Reynaud, Georges Bonnet in France. These elected leaders
represented the nationwide pacifism of their war-traumatized nations, which resulted from
the enormous and futile carnage in the battlefields of World War I, that ended in 1918 and
was therefore still firmly in the memories and thoughts of all adults.
The blindness that led to the continued and repeated appeasement of Hitler in crisis after
crisis, all of which he initiated, was the result of two logical flaws in the thinking and decision
making of the British and French political leaders, and also, which is even worse, in the
thinking of the top Generals, mostly of the French military. Since these were logical flaws,
they are inexcusable, as political and military leaders have the responsibility to make
decisions based on reality, even if unpleasant one, not on single-sided desires and wishes.
Furthermore, they were repeatedly warned, by Winston Churchill and others, and even by
high ranking members of the anti-Nazi opposition in the German military and foreign office,
but all warnings were dismissed until it was too late.

The two logical flaws in the British and French national thought were:
1. The wide belief, based on the first World War, that war has become futile, a fruitless
mutual
mass
carnage.
This belief was false because it relied on two false assumptions:
o

The assumption that the opposing forces in a future war will be generally
equivalent as in the first World War.

The assumption that modern military technology made war between

equivalent enemies a futile carnage.

Based on these two unchallenged false assumptions, Britain and France greatly
reduced their military manpower and largely neglected military modernization and
military technology development, and persisted with that policy even when they knew
that Hitler's Germany, like 18th century Prussia, was making a maximum national
effort to build the strongest and most technologically advanced military force, in a
total violation of the 1919 peace treaty.
By that, these nations' military forces were gradually reduced from a decisive
superiority over the small post-war German military, to an increasing inferiority,
technological, tactical, and professional. Britain and France made these assumptions
false by their own unilateral action and in-action that was based on these
assumptions.
The British military establishment was finally alarmed in 1938 and hurried to start
closing the gap as they could in the months left before war finally started in 1939.
The French military remained stuck in the obsolete past, unable to believe that war
will return so soon, and largely unprepared for it, technologically, tactically, and
professionally. The few warning voices within the French military, like that of Colonel
Charles De Gaulle, were suppressed and dismissed until it was too late.
2. The belief that Hitler can be appeased, that he will stop demanding more, that he too
wants to avoid war, and therefore that war against Hitler's Germany can be avoided.
The British and French leaders and their military, diplomatic, and intelligence
advisors should all have known or at least suspect that this was not so, and act
accordingly. Hitler made no secret of his long term plans and intentions. He clearly
warned the world of his intentions, both in the book he wrote in 1923, which sold
many millions of copies since he became the leader of Germany, and in his many
speeches and direct diplomatic threats in all the years since. Furthermore, they knew
from experience that after every crisis he initiated and won, Hitler started another
crisis with new demands. But all that was ignored and Europe's leaders and
diplomats were willing to accept Hitler's deception which time and again claimed that
he was making one last justified demand and even willing to make reasonable
concessions about it. A total lie, time and again.
The British government finally opened its eyes to the frightening reality in march
1939, when less than six months after Hitler was given part of its ally
Czechoslovakia, Hitler swallowed the rest of Czechoslovakia with a threat of
immediate invasion to it, and just three days later clearly marked his next target,
Poland. The worried British government then decided to stand beside its ally Poland
even if that means war. The French government still tried to avoid war even after the
war started with Hitler's invasion to their ally Poland, and after the last minute

ultimatum to Hitler to stop the invasion was ignored, and unwillingly joined the war
only following a British diplomatic pressure to stop hesitating and stand beside it.
The result of the appeasement policy was that Britain and France did nothing more than
diplomatically protest when Hitler violated the peace treaty (and later with treaties that he
signed), started a major rearmament plan, largely increased military manpower, sent his
army to the neutral Saar border region (with clear orders to retreat immediately in case of
French military response, but this never came), sent his army to the demilitarized Rhine
border region, annexed Austria by combination of political murders and threat of invasion.
When Hitler demanded the strategically important western region of Czechoslovakia, they
put unbearable pressure on the Czech government, their ally, to immediately give this
territory to Hitler to avoid war that Hitler threatened to start, and still did not act when Hitler
swallowed the rest of Czechoslovakia with a threat of immediate invasion. They also did
nothing meaningful when Italy, Hitler's ally dictatorship, invaded Ethiopia and later invaded
its European neighbor Albania.
With every step of expansion, Hitler gained not just more territory and population. He also
got the natural resources in these territories, the industry, and the equipment of the
dismantled armies of the nations he swallowed, and the military strength of these nations
was removed from the potential order of battle of his future enemies.
Czechoslovakia is a key example. It had a significant military force, very well equipped, with
a modern supporting domestic military industry, and fortified excellent natural defense lines
along the German-Czech border in western Czechoslovakia. The Czechs wanted to fight for
their country and could fight well with their modern military and excellent defenses, and
definitely with military help from France and Britain, their allies, but they were betrayed by
France and Britain which played Hitler's game and threatened the Czechs that by not
surrendering these regions to Hitler as he demanded, they, the Czechs, risk being blamed
for starting a war. Under enormous pressure by both allies and enemies, the Czechs gave
that land and all the military equipment in it to Hitler and remained almost defenseless, only
to be forced to complete their surrender to his next threat of immediate invasion just months
later. In addition to the valuable territorial and industrial gain, and to removing a significant
military force from his list of enemies without firing a shot, Hitler also gained the entire
equipment of the dismantled Czech military. This modern equipment, in plenty, was used by
the German military in World War 2, and in the invasion of France, two German armor
divisions were using solely Czech tanks, and the Czech military industry was producing
plenty more for Hitler's army.
Tojo

The Japanese Militarism

One can not write about the causes of World War 2 without referring to the Japanese
militarism, that was very similar to the German militarism, and which put Japan in the hands
of militarist leaders with expansionist aggression similar to Hitler's. After all, Japan started
the war in East Asia even before Hitler became dictator of Germany, and its militarism was
defeated only after Hitler's.
It is my opinion that if the attention and military resources of all the world's other major
military powers were not committed to the European war against Hitler's Germany, Japan
would have kept its military aggression limited to its never ending war in China, which
between and 1931 and 1945 consumed the majority of the resources and attention of the
Japanese army and remained Japan's original and main goal. If the USA, Britain, France,

Russia were not so busy with Hitler, it is likely that Japan would not have expanded its
Chinese war to a rapid and easy conquest of the European colonies in the entire South East
Asia, and would not attack the US in the Phillipines and Pearl Harbor, and that even if it had,
its success would have been significantly smaller and shorter.

Causes of the Second World War

The Second World War was caused by:
a. Hitlers Aims
1. To unite German speaking people (using NSD which had been denied at the Treaty
of Versailles.
2. He wanted lebensraum (living space) in order to gain self-sufficiency (autarky)
3. He wanted to dominate Europe and the World
To achieve any of these aims would involve breaking the Treaty of Versailles (28/6/1919),
and this could lead to war.
b. The aggression of Hitlers Allies
1. Italy Mussolini wanted a Fascist-Roman empire in the Mediterranean and Africa
(e.g. Abyssinian invasion in 1935.)
2. Japan Japan wanted a Nipponese empire in the Pacific, extending into China and
Australia (e.g. Manchurian invasion in 1931)
Germany, Italy and Japan were hostile to Communism (USSR), and this way a cause of war
and vice versa.
c. Democratic powers were passive
1. USA Isolated
2. France France was unlikely, and reluctant, to intervene against Germany, because
she could not rely on Britains and Americas support.
3. Britain Between 1934 and 1937, Britain was sympathetic to German recovery.
Between May 1937 and March 1939, Britain appeased Germany.
These powers could have stopped Fascist aggression earlier than 1939.
d. The League of Nations failed to keep peace

See other notes.

Conclusion
War was caused by a combination of a to d, but Hitlers aims and actions were the main
cause of war.
Reasons for Causes of War
Refer to map showing nine causes of war.
The Second World War was caused by Fascist aggression and the failure of democratic
powers to stop this aggression.
1. The rearmament of Germany was a cause for war because it broke the Treaty of
Versailles (28th June, 1919)
2. The remilitarization of the Rhineland (7th march, 1936) was a cause of war because it
broke the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts (1925)
3. The Rome-Berlin Axis (October 1936) was a cause of war because it united the
aggressive fascist powers and divided Europe into hostile camps.
4. Chamberlains appeasement policy (after may 1937 March 1939) was a cause of
war because it broke the Treaty of Versailles and Treaty of St. Germain
(10th September, 1919)
5. The Anschluss of Germany with Austria (13 th march, 1938) was a cause of war
because it broke the Treaty of Versailles and Treaty of St. Germain (10 th September,
1919)
6. The Nazi annexation of the Sudetenland after the Munich conference
(29th September 1938) was a cause of war, because it broke the Treaty of St.
Germain.
7. The Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, cause war because it defied
the Munich agreement and ended Britains appeasement policy.
8. The Nazi-Soviet Pact (29th August 1939) caused war because it sealed Polands
downfall.
9. The Nazi invasion of Poland (1st September 1939) caused war because Britain had
guaranteed Polands borders.
Causes of the Second World War (Detail)
See Map and Summary Sheet
Nine Steps to War
1. The Rearmament of Germany

German rearmament began after Hitler left 1932-4 Geneva Disarmament Conference,
stating that as the powers would not disarm to his level, he would rearm Germany to their
level. By 1935 rearmament was well underway. This involved conscription and munitions
factories.
Rearmament alarmed the French who, feeling insecure, reinforced the Maginot line (built
between 1929 and 1934). This was a line of steel and concrete fortifications stretching from
Belgium to Switzerland and was called a gate without a fence because Germany would be
able to avoid it and invade France via Belgium. France remained passive without Britains
support.
Britain was sympathetic towards Germany and even signed an Anglo German naval Treaty
(June 1935) allowing Germanys navy to be 35% of the size of the Royal Navy. Hitler used
his new found arms to support Franco in the Spanish Civil War (1936-9) Hitler sent the
Condor Legion of the Luftwaffe to bomb Guernica on 26th April, 1937. Guernica was razed to
the ground and Franco went on to conquer the Basque areas of Spain. Hitler had used
Spain as a practise ground.
2. The Remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936)
Having broken the Treaty of Versailles once, Hitler risked doing it a second time by marching
30,000 troops into Cologne on 7th March 1936. France, with 250,000 troops mobilised,
remained passive because Britain would not support her. Britain took the view that Germany
was marching into her own back yard.
To show that his remilitarization was popular, Hitler held a plebiscite, which showed that
98.8% were in favour. He went on to build his own defensive fortification, the Siegfried Line.
3. The Rome Berlin Axis (October 1936)
Originally Mussolini did not want to be Hitlers ally and in 1935 talks were held with Britain
and France at the Stresa Front, but these came to nothing when Anthony Eden of Britain
threatened oil sanctions against Mussolini during the Abyssinian crisis. This caused the
Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936. Mussolini and Hitler strengthened their alliance on two occasions
a. The Anti-Commintern Pact (November 1937) with Japan.
b. The Pact of Steel (May 1939).
4. Britains policy of Appeasement (May/June 1937 March 1939)
Neville Chamberlain became British Prime Minister on 28 th May 1937, and followed the
policy of appeasing Germany, believing that all Hitler wanted to do was unite German
speaking people. In so doing, Hitler would break the Treaty of Versailles (28th June 1919) but
Chamberlain did not believe Hitler would cause war. Churchill disagreed, citing Mein Kampf
(1924) where Hitler had written that Germany must regain lands in the East by the power
of the sword.
Chamberlain had misinterpreted Hitlers aims. (We have the benefit of hindsight.)
5. The Anschluss with Austria (13th March, 1938)

Austrian Fascists wanted to unite with Germany but Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor,
wanted Austria to be independent. He was unable to gain support from abroad (France and
the Little Entente) so agreed to meet Hitler in Berlin. He was persuaded to accept Hitlers
henchman Seyss-Inquart as Minster of the Interior. Rioting in Vienna increased under SeyssInquarts leadership and Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart invited Hitler to assist him
and on 13th March, 1938 troops from the Wermacht entered Austria. In a plebiscite on the
Anschluss a vote of 99.75% in favour was recorded. This was rigged by biased questioning.
Hitler made it seem that he had been invited into Austria, in fact he had incited the union.
6. Hitler Gained the Sudetenland (29th September, 1938)
The Sudetenland was lost by Austria in the Treaty of St. Germain (10th September 1919) and
hereby Czechoslovakia gained 3 million German speaking people. After the Anschluss the
Sudeten German leader, Konrad Henlein, demanded a union with Germany. Unable to
receive help from France, the Czech Premier, Benes, mobilised alone. Fearing war,
Chamberlain met Hitler on three occasions at Berchtesgaden, Godesburg and at Munich.
Munich Agreement (29th September, 1938)
This was signed by Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier. Benes was not present. It
said:
a. Hitler could take the Sudetenland the following day without a plebiscite
b. Hungary and Poland could take border districts from Czechoslovakia
c. Britain and Germany would never go to war.
Chamberlains Reaction
On his return to England, Chamberlain announced that he had gained peace with honour,
peace in our time. The majority rejoiced, except Churchill.
Hitlers Reaction
In public Hitler seemed satisfied, but in private he exploded saying that fellow Chamberlain
has spoiled my entry into Prague.
7. The Fall of Czechoslovakia (March 1939)
In March 1939, Hitler forced Lithuania to give him Memel where most people spoke German.
So far Hitler had only taken German speaking territory, so Chamberlain could still appease
Hitler. However, in March 1939, Hitler threatened to bomb Prague, so the Czechs
surrendered. Chamberlain realised appeasement had failed, so he began to rearm Britain
and guarantee peace in Poland.
8. Nazi-Soviet Pact (29th August, 1939) The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
By the summer of 1939, Hitlers plans to invade Poland were complete. He realised that to
invade Poland mighty cause Britain to attack him from the West but he was more concerned
to avoid a Russian attack from the east. Therefore to avoid a war on two fronts, he arranged
the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which said that if either country went to war the other would remain
neutral.

Hitler gained the chance to invade Poland with a war on one front, if Britain supported
Poland.
Stalin of USSR gained time to rearm in case Hitler attacked him later, and the chance to gain
the eastern half of Poland. This would provide the USSR with a bufferzone.
9. German Invasion of Poland (1st September, 1939)
German tanks invaded West Prussia and Posen on the 1 st September 1939 using blitzkrieg
tactics. (This is a lightning, sudden attack co-ordinating air, then land forces). Chamberlain
sent an ultimatum (a warning with a threat) saying that if Hitler did not withdraw from Poland
by 11am, 3rd September 1939, Britain would declare war. On 3rd September, Britain, followed
by France, declared war on Germany.
Causes of the Second World War - Vocabulary

Lebensraum living space, e.g. Hitlers aim to take land from bordering states to
achieve self-sufficiency (autarky)

Anschluss union, e.g. Austria and Germany (March, 1938)

Appeasement to give into an aggressor little by little, in the hope of preventing war.
E.g. Britain appeased Germany (May/June 1937 March 1939)

Blitzkrieg lightning attack, co-ordinating air and land forces. e.g. Germanys attack
on Poland (1st September 1939)

Remilitarization rearming and area, e.g. Germany remilitarized the Rhineland

(1936)

Plebiscite (referendum) a vote on an issue, e.g. Hitlers plebiscites on

remilitarization and the Anschluss of Austria and Germany (Hitler fixed his
referendums in 1936 and for the Anschluss in 1938, so no-one expected him to have
a plebiscite for the Sudetenland. He fixed them by biased questioning.)

Ultimatum a warning with a threat, e.g. Britains ultimatum for Hitler to leave
Poland by 11am on the 3rd September 1939.

Buffer zone a protective barrier of land, e.g. Eastern Poland taken by the USSR as
protection against a future German attack.

Rearmament manufacturing of weapons and conscription, e.g. Germany (after

1934), Britain after the taking of Sudetenland

Autarky self-sufficiency economically, e.g. Germany under Hitler and Schacht to

enable Germany to avoid imports

Aggression hostile or violent action, e.g. Germany was aggressive towards

Czechoslovakia (March, 1939) and Poland (1st September, 1939)

Diktat none-negotiated decision/arrangement, e.g. The Munich Agreement, forced

onto Czechoslovakia (1938)

Passive to spectate, i.e. not take part in the action, e.g. Britain and France were
passive towards the German remilitarization of the Rhineland (March 1936)

Incite devious planning, e.g. Hitler incited the Anschluss (March, 1938)

Causes of the Second World War (Summary)

Long term, Short term and Immediate Causes
Long term
a. The harshness of the Treaty of Versailles (28th June, 1919) on Germany:
o

Land losses

Reparations

War Guilt

b. The failure of the League of the Nations to:

o

Keep peace

Bring about disarmament

Short term
a. a. Hitlers aggression:
o

His aims

His actions (see steps to war: 1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9)

b. The aggression of the other powers:

o

Italy Abyssinia (1935), Rome-Berlin Axis, Anti-Commintern Pact, Albania

Japan Manchuria (1931), Anti-Commintern Pact (November, 1937)

Russia Nazi-Soviet Pact, Invasion of Poland

c. The democracies were too passive

o

USA isolation

France would not do anything without Britains support

Britain sympathetic towards Germany, e.g. Anglo-German Naval Treaty

(1935) and later appeased her (May/June 1937 March 1939)

Immediate

a. German invasion of Poland (1st September, 1939)

Hitlers Foreign Policy

Brief Summary
1933 Germany left the League of Nations.
1934 Attempted Nazi coup in Austria crushed.
Poland and Germany sign alliance.
1935 Germany broke the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles
1936 German troops reoccupied the Rhineland.
Rome-Berlin Axis signed
1938 Anschluss with Austria.
Sudetenland handed to Germany as a result of the Munich conference.
1939 Rest of the Czech lands occupied by the Germans.
Germany invaded Poland.
WWII began.
Hitlers Foreign Policy Aims
When Hitler came to power he was determined to make Germany a great power again and
to dominate Europe. He had set out his ideas in a book called Mein Kampf (My Struggle)
that he had written in prison in 1924. His main aims were
1. To destroy the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany after her defeat in World
War One. Hitler felt the Treaty was unfair and most Germans supported this view.
2. To unite all German speakers together in one country. After World War One there
were Germans living in many countries in Europe e.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland. Hitler hoped that by uniting them together in one country he would create a
powerful Germany or Grossdeutschland.
3. To expand eastwards into the East (Poland, Russia) to gain land for Germany
(Lebensraum- living space).
His tactics involved using the threat of violence to achieve his aims. He realised that his
potential foes, France and Britain, were reluctant to go to war and were prepared to
compromise to avoid a repeat of World War One. He was also an opportunist who often took
advantage of events for his own benefit.
His foreign policy successes in the 1930s were to make him a very popular figure in
Germany. As one German political opponent described:
Everybody thought that there was some justification in Hitlers demands. All
Germans hated Versailles. Hitler tore up this hateful treaty and forced France to its
knees. people said, hes got courage to take risks
1933-4

Hitler protested at the fact that the Allies had not disarmed after World War and he left the
disarmament conference and the League of Nations in 1933. He intensified the programme
of secret rearmament.
In 1934, Germany and Poland concluded an alliance, the first of his infamous ten year nonaggression pacts. This caused a surprise in Europe at the time. The alliance broke
Germanys diplomatic isolation while also weakening Frances series of anti-German
alliances in Eastern Europe. For the next five years Poland and Germany were to enjoy
cordial relations. However like many of his agreements, this was atactical move and Hitler
had no intention of honouring the agreement in the long term.
In July 1934 an attempt by Austrian Nazis to overthrow the government in their country was
crushed. The Austrian Prime Minister Dollfuss was killed in the attempt. Hitler at first
supported the attempted coup but disowned the action when it was clear it would fail. Italy
reacted with great hostility to the prospect of Austria falling into Nazi hands and rushed
troops to the border with Austria.
In January 1935 the Saar voted to return to Germany. This region had been placed under
the control of the League of Nations by the Treaty of Versailles. This allowed the French to
exploit its coalfields for 15 years. The vote to return to Germany was supported by over 90%.
It was a major propaganda boost for Hitler who could claim that his policies had the backing
of the German people.
In March, using the pretext that the other powers had not disarmed, Hitler announced that
Germany was going to reintroduce conscription and create an army of 36 divisions. He also
said that Germany was going to build up an air force (the Luftwaffe) and expand her navy.
All of these actions were against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles but were very popular
in Germany.
Britain, Italy and France formed the Stresa front to protest at this action but took no further
measures. This united front against Germany was further weakened when Italy
invaded Ethiopia.
A factor that helped Hitler was the attitude of the English. They felt that Germany had
been very harshly treated at Versailles and there was a lot of sympathy for the
German actions. The memory of the horrors of the First World War was also still very
strong in Britain. They were also very anti-communist and worried more about Stalin.
Protecting their own interests, the British concluded a naval agreement with Hitler that
limited the German navy to 35% of Britains. No limit was placed on the number of
submarines that Germany could develop.
The Rhineland 1936
Under the Treaty of Versailles the Germans were forbidden to erect fortifications or station
troops in the Rhineland or within 50 kilometres of the right bank of the river. In 1935 when
Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, Hitler ignored international protests and supported Mussolini.
This ended Germanys international isolation and the Italians signalled their acceptance of
German influence in Austria and the eventual remilitarisation of the Rhineland.
Most people expected the Germans to send troops into the Rhineland, the question was
when? On 7 March 1936, in one of his many Saturday surprises, Hitler announced that his
troops had entered the Rhineland.

The British were not prepared to take any action. There was a lot of sympathy in Britain for
the German action. Without British support the French would not act. The French had built
the Maignot line, a series of forts on the German border and felt secure behind it.
The force that Hitler had sent into the Rhineland was small but he had gambled and
won.
He said
The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking
in my life.If the French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to
withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal
would have been wholly inadequate for even moderate resistance.
He drew the conclusion that Britain and France were weak and that he could get away with
more aggressive actions.
Alliance with Mussolini 1936
In June 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. Both Hitler and Mussolini sent aid to General
Franco who was fighting against the popularly elected government of Spain. This closer cooperation between the two Fascist dictators led to an alliance known as the Rome-Berlin
Axis. It was an agreement to pursue a joint foreign policy. Both agreed to stop the spread of
communism in Europe. This relationship became closer in 1939 with the signing of The
Pact of Steel.
Austria 1938
Hitler had long wished to bring the land of his birth under German control. There was a Nazi
party in Austria and many in Austria supported the union of both countries. Although there
had been a failed coup attempt in 1934, Germany had extended its influence in Austria by
1938.
In February 1938 the Austrian Prime Minister, Schuschnigg, met Hitler
at Berchtesgaden in the Alps. At the meeting the Austrian chancellor was threatened and
was forced to place leading Austrian Nazis in his Government.
On his return to Austria, Schuschnigg tried to stop spreading German influence by calling a
referendum. This enraged Hitler and Schuschnigg was forced to resign. German troops
were invited in by the new Nazi Prime Minister, Seyss-Inquart.
Hitler returned in triumph to Vienna where he was greeted by euphoric crowds. This was the
city where before World War One he had lived as a down and out. Hitler incorporated Austria
into the Reich as the province of Ostmark. This event became known as the Anschluss.
Again the British and French did nothing. The new Prime Minister in Britain was Neville
Chamberlain. He wanted to prevent another European war breaking out. He decided to
follow a policy called Appeasement.
Appeasement was a policy of giving into Hitlers reasonable demands in order to
prevent war. It was a very popular policy in Britain at the time.
The Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia) 1938

The next target for Hitler was the country of Czechoslovakia. It had been founded after
World War One. It was the only democracy in Eastern Europe and possessed a good army.
It also contained a number of national minorities (it was nicknamed little Austria-Hungary)
including a large German minority in an area known as the Sudentenland. Hitler
encouraged the Germans living there to demonstrate against Czech rule. The leader of
the Sudeten German Party was Konrad Henlein.
Hitler decided to use the grievances of the Sudeten Germans to bring the area under
German control. He secretly set the date of 1 October for war with Czechoslovakia if the
issue was not resolved. Throughout the summer of 1938 the crisis grew worse. The Sudeten
Germans backed by Nazi propaganda agitated for greater autonomy (independence).
Chamberlain hoped to avoid war and felt that there was some justification in the German
demand for the region. He flew to Germany and met Hitler twice,
at Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg. However although it seemed an agreement had
been reached, Hitler made new demands and it looked as if Europe was on the brink of war.
Mussolini was ill prepared for a war and proposed a conference of Britain, France, Germany
and Italy. This met at Munich on 28 September. The Czechs were not even invited. The
British and French agreed to Hitlers demands and it seemed as if the threat of war was
averted. Chamberlain and Daladier, the French Prime Minister, received heroes welcomes
when they returned home. The Czechs were bitter at the loss of territory including most of
their border fortifications and were now virtually powerless to resist the Germans.
In March 1939, Hitler took over the rest of the Czech lands after encouraging the Slovaks to
declare independence under German protection. The Czech president, Hacha was invited to
Berlin and was threatened that if he did not agree to German occupation, Prague would be
bombed. Significantly this was the first non-Germanic land that Hitler had seized. This
occupation outraged public opinion in Britain and marked the end of appeasement. In
the same month the German speaking town of Memel was seized from Lithuania.
Poland 1939
The occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia had led Britain to guarantee Poland that if she
was attacked she would come to her aid. Under the Treaty of Versailles the newly created
state of Poland was given the German speaking port of Danzig and land known as
the Polish Corridor in order to give it access to the sea.
Hitler wanted to destroy Poland in order to gain living space (Lebensraum).Hitler demanded
the German speaking town of Danzig from Poland and the building of a motorway to link
East Prussia with the rest of the Reich.
However the demand for Danzig was not the real issue for Hitler. He said
Further successes can no longer be attained without the shedding of bloodDanzig
is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in
the eastthere is no question of sparing Poland.
He accused the Poles of mistreating the German minority in other parts of Poland. Nazi
propaganda greatly exaggerated stories of attacks on the German minority. The Poles
refused to hand over the town of Danzig.
A Very Surprising Alliance!

As the summer wore on tension grew. Both Britain and France and Germany were trying to
gain the support of the USSR in the event of war. Stalin did not trust Britain and France and
felt they were encouraging Hitler to attack Russia. He had been greatly angered by the
Munich agreement.
Although both Germany and the Soviet Union had been bitter enemies up to 1939, the world
was stunned to learn that they had reached an agreement on 23 August 1939. This was
a Ten Year Non-Aggression pact. Both countries benefited from this agreement. For the
Soviet Union it allowed her more time to prepare for war and she gained a lot of territory in
Eastern Europe. Germany was assured that if she attacked Poland she would not have to
face a two-front war.

Nazi Soviet Non Aggression Pact

Secret Additional Protocol.
On the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Pact between the German Reich
and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the
two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of
their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the
following conclusions:
Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the
Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of
Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and
U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized
by each party.
Article II.
In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the
Polish State, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be
bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the
maintenance of an independent Polish State and how such a state should be
bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political
developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly
agreement.
Article
III.
Article
IV.

With regard to South eastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its
interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest
in these areas.
This Protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

War

Hitler hoped that the news of the Pact with Russia would stop France and Britain from going
to war if Germany attacked Poland. He was surprised when Britain and Poland concluded a
mutual defence treaty. Mussolini informed him that Italy was unprepared for war and he
postponed the invasion of Poland. A flurry of diplomatic activity achieved nothing and on 1
September Germany invaded Poland. On 3 September Britain and France declared war on
Germany.
World War Two had begun.