Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Revolution
Korean War
Zhen Fan
Three-anti/five-anti campaigns
Anti-Rightist Movement
Lin Biao
Gang of Four
Tiananmen Incident
19761989, Era of Restructuring
Economic reform
Sino-Vietnamese War
Tiananmen protests
Sichuan Earthquake
The Beijing Olympics
Shanghai 2010 Expo
See also
Constitutional history
History of China
History of Beijing
History of Shanghai
Generations of leadership
1st: Mao
2nd: Deng
3rd: Jiang
4th: Hu
5th: Xi
Culture
Economy
Geography
Politics
Education
China portal
One study noted that average pay levels in the catering sector exceeded wages in higher education.[6]
The economic performance of China was poor in comparison with other East Asian countries, such as Japan, South
Korea, and even rival Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China. The economy was riddled with huge inefficiencies and
malinvestments, and with Mao's death, the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership turned to market-oriented
reforms to salvage the failing economy.[7]
Course of reforms
Economic reforms began after Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies
ousted the Gang of Four Maoist faction. By the time Deng took power,
there was widespread support among the elite for economic reforms.
As the defacto leader, Deng's policies faced opposition from party
conservatives but were extremely successful in increasing the country's
wealth.
197884
Deng's first reforms began in agriculture, a sector long neglected by the
Communist Party. By the late 1970s, food supplies and production had
become so deficient that government officials were warning that China
was about to repeat the "disaster of 1959" - the famines which killed
tens of millions during the Great Leap Forward.[8] Deng responded by decollectivizing agriculture and emphasizing
the Household-responsibility system, which divided the land of the People's communes into private plots. Farmers
were able to keep the land's output after paying a share to the state. This move increased agricultural production,
increased the living standards of hundreds of millions of farmers and stimulated rural industry.[9]
Famous billboard of Deng in Shenzhen, one of
the most successful Special Economic Zones
created by his reforms.
Reforms were also implemented in urban industry to increase productivity. A dual price system was introduced, in
which state-owned industries were allowed to sell any production above the plan quota, and commodities were sold
at both plan and market prices, allowing citizens to avoid the shortages of the Maoist era. Private businesses were
allowed to operate for the first time since the Communist takeover, and they gradually began to make up a greater
percentage of industrial output.[10] Price flexibility was also increased, expanding the service sector.[]
The country was opened to foreign investment for the first time since the Kuomintang era. Deng created a series of
special economic zones for foreign investment that were relatively free of the bureaucratic regulations and
interventions that hampered economic growth. These regions became engines of growth for the national economy.[]
198493
During this period, Deng Xiaoping's policies continued beyond the initial reforms. Controls on private businesses
and government intervention continued to decrease, and there was small-scale privatization of state enterprises which
had become unviable. A notable development was the decentralization of state control, leaving local provincial
leaders to experiment with ways to increase economic growth and privatize the state sector.[] Township and village
enterprises, firms nominally owned by local governments but effectively private, began to gain market share at the
expense of the state sector.[] Conservative elder opposition, led by Chen Yun, prevented many major reforms which
would have damaged the interests of special interest groups in the government bureaucracy.[] Corruption and
increased inflation increased discontent, contributing to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and a conservative
backlash after that event which ousted several key reformers and threatened to reverse many of Deng's reforms.[]
However, Deng stood by his reforms and in 1992, he affirmed the need to continue reforms in his southern tour.[] He
also reopened the Shanghai Stock Exchange closed by Mao 40 years earlier.
19932005
In the 1990s, Deng forced many of the
conservative elders such as Chen Yun into
retirement, allowing radical reforms to be
carried out.[] Despite Deng's death in 1997,
reforms continued under his handpicked
successors, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji,
who were ardent reformers. In 1997 and
1998, large-scale privatization occurred, in
which all state enterprises, except a few
large monopolies, were liquidated and their
assets sold to private investors. Between
2001 and 2004, the number of state-owned
enterprises decreased by 48 percent.[]
The Lujiazui financial district of Pudong, Shanghai, the financial and commercial
During the same period, Jiang and Zhu also
hub of modern China
reduced tariffs, trade barriers and
regulations, reformed the banking system, dismantled much of the Mao-era social welfare system, forced the PLA to
divest itself of military-run businesses,[13] reduced inflation, and joined the World Trade Organization. These moves
invoked discontent among some groups, especially laid off workers of state enterprises that had been privatized.[14]
The domestic private sector first exceeded 50% of GDP in 2005 and has further expanded since.[15] However, some
state monopolies still remained, such as in petroleum and banking.[16]
2005present
The conservative Hu-Wen Administration began to reverse some of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 2005. Observers
note that the government adopted more egalitarian and populist policies.[17] It increased subsidies and control over
the health care sector,[18] halted privatization,[4] and adopted a loose monetary policy, which lead to the formation of
a U.S.-style property bubble in which property prices tripled.[19] The privileged state sector was the primary recipient
of government investment, which under the new administration, promoted the rise of large "national champions"
which could compete with large foreign corporations.[4]
Agriculture
During the pre-reform period, Chinese
agricultural performance was extremely
poor and food shortages were common.[]
After Deng Xiaoping implemented the
household responsibility system, agricultural
output increased by 8.2 percent a year,
compared with 2.7% in the pre-reform
period, despite a decrease in the area of land
used.[] Food prices fell nearly 50%, while
agricultural incomes rose.[]
A more fundamental transformation was the
economy's growing adoption of cash crops
instead of just growing rice and grain.[]
Vegetable and meat production increased to
the point that Chinese agricultural production was adding the equivalent of Californias vegetable industry every two
years. Growth in the sector slowed after 1984, with agriculture falling from 40% of GDP to 16%; however, increases
in agricultural productivity allowed workers to be released for work in industry and services, while simultaneously
increasing agricultural production.[26] Trade in agriculture was also liberalized and China became an exporter of
foodstuffs, a great contrast to its previous famines and shortages.[27]
Production of wheat from 1961 to 2004. Data from FAO, year 2005. Y-axis:
Production in metric ton.
Industry
In the pre-reform period, industry was largely stagnant and the socialist system presented few incentives for
improvements in quality and productivity. With the introduction of the dual price system and greater autonomy for
enterprise managers, productivity increased greatly in the early 1980s.[28] Foreign enterprises and newly formed
Township and Village Enterprises, owned by local government and often de facto private firms, competed
successfully with state-owned enterprises. By the 1990s, large-scale privatizations reduced the market share of both
the Township and Village Enterprises and state-owned enterprises and increased the private sector's market share.
The state sector's share of industrial output dropped from 81 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 2005.[] Foreign capital
controls much of Chinese industry and plays an important role.[]
From virtually an industrial backwater in 1978, China is now the world's biggest producer of concrete, steel, ships
and textiles, and has the world's largest automobile market. Chinese steel output quadrupled between 1980 and 2000,
and from 2000 to 2006 rose from 128.5million tons to 418.8million tons, one-third of global production.[] Labor
productivity at some Chinese steel firms exceeds Western productivity.[] From 1975 to 1992, China's automobile
production rose from 139,800 to 1.1million, rising to 9.35million in 2008.[29] Light industries such as textiles saw
an even greater increase, due to reduced government interference. Chinese textile exports increased from 4.6% of
world exports in 1980 to 24.1% in 2005. Textile output increased 18-fold over the same period.[30]
This increase in production is largely the result of the removal of barriers to entry and increased competition; the
number of industrial firms rose from 377,300 in 1980 to nearly 8 million in 1990 and 1996; the 2004 economic
census, which excluded enterprises with annual sales below RMB5million, counted 1.33million manufacturing
firms, with Jiangsu and Zhejiang reporting more firms than the nationwide total for 1980.[] Compared to other East
Asian industrial growth spurts, China's industrial performance exceeded Japan's but remained behind South Korea
and Taiwan's economies.[31]
Services
In the 1990s, the financial sector was liberalized.[38] After China
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the service sector
was considerably liberalized and foreign investment was allowed.
Restrictions on retail, wholesale and distribution were ended.[39]
Banking, financial services, insurance and telecommunications
were also opened up to foreign investment.[40]
China's banking sector is dominated by four large state-owned
banks, which are largely inefficient and monopolistic.[41] China's
largest bank, ICBC, is the largest bank in the world. The financial
sector is widely seen as a drag on the economy due to the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE)
inefficient state management.[42] Non-performing loans, mostly
made to local governments and unprofitable state-owned enterprises for political purposes,[43] are a big drain on the
financial system and economy, reaching over 22% of GDP by 2000, with a drop to 6.3% by 2006 due to government
recapitalization of these banks. In 2006, the total amount of non-performing loans was estimated at 160billion
Government finances
In the pre-reform era, government was funded by profits from state-owned enterprises, much like the Soviet
Union.[46] As the state sector fell in importance and profitability, government revenues, especially that of the central
government in Beijing, fell substantially and the government relied on a confused system of inventory taxes.
Government revenues fell from 35% of GDP to 11% of GDP in the mid-1990s, excluding revenue from state-owned
enterprises, with the central government's budget at just 3% of GDP.[47] The tax system was reformed in 1994 when
inventory taxes were unified into a single VAT of 17% on all manufacturing, repair, and assembly activities and an
excise tax on 11 items, with the VAT becoming the main income source, accounting for half of government revenue.
The 1994 reform also increased the central government's share of revenues, increasing it to 9 percent of GDP.[48]
Effect on inequality
Gini-coefficient of national income distribution around the world (dark green: <0.25, red:
>0.60)
Increased inequality is attributed to the disappearance of the welfare state and differences between coastal and
interior provinces, the latter being burdened by a larger state sector.[56] Some Western scholars have suggested that
reviving the welfare state and instituting a re-distributive income tax system is needed to relieve inequality,[57] while
some Chinese economists have suggested that privatizing state monopolies and distributing the proceeds to the
population can reduce inequality.[58]
References
[1] Dahlman, Carl J; Aubert, Jean-Eric. China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st century. WBI Development Studies. World Bank
Publications. Accessed January 30, 2008. (http:/ / www. eric. ed. gov/ ERICWebPortal/ custom/ portlets/ recordDetails/ detailmini.
jsp?_nfpb=true& _& ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED460052& ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no& accno=ED460052)
[2] Maddison, Angus (2007): "Contours of the World Economy, 12030 AD. Essays in Macro-Economic History", Oxford University Press,
ISBN 978-0-19-922721-1, p. 382, table A.7.
[3] Engardio, Peter China is a private sector economy, http:/ / www. businessweek. com/ magazine/ content/ 05_34/ b3948478. htm (2005)
[4] Scissors, Derek, Liberalization in reverse, http:/ / www. heritage. org/ Research/ Commentary/ 2009/ 05/ Liberalization-in-Reverse (2009)
[15] 8km.de, Chinas Private Economy Grows Up (http:/ / 8km. de/ 2006/ 19/ )
[16] China names key industries for state control, http:/ / www. chinadaily. com. cn/ china/ 2006-12/ 19/ content_762056. htm, (2006)
[18] The times, China's New Healthcare could cover millions more, http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ world/ article/ 0,8599,1890306,00. html
[19] Chovanec, Patrick (2009-06-08). "China's Real Estate Riddle". Far East Economic Review. http:/ / www. feer. com/ economics/ 2009/
june53/ Chinas-Real-Estate-Riddle. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
[20] China has socialist market economy in place (People's Daily Online, 2005).
[29] 8:47pm ET (2009-02-04). "China poised to be worlds largest auto market - Autos- msnbc.com". MSNBC. http:/ / www. msnbc. msn. com/
id/ 29022484/ . Retrieved on 2009-04-28.
[38] Haggard, Stevens et al (2008), 339
[52] Sharma S.. China's Economic Transformation. Global Dialogue. 2007 Jan 1;9(1/2): 29-38. In: ABI/INFORM Global [database on the
Internet] [cited 2010 Oct 28]. Available from: http:/ / www. proquest. com/ ; Document ID: 1929024531.
[53] James A Dorn. Economic development and freedom: The legacy of Peter Bauer. Cato Journal. 2002 Oct 1;22(2): 355. In: ABI/INFORM
Global [database on the Internet] [cited 2010 Oct 28]. Available from: http:/ / www. proquest. com/ ; Document ID: 343568221.
[54] Remnick, David. 1997. Can Russia change? Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1, (January 1): 35-49. http:/ / www. proquest. com/ (accessed October
28, 2010).
[58] Weiyin, Zhang, "Completely bury Keynesianism", http:/ / finance. sina. com. cn/ 20090217/ 10345864499_3. shtml (February 17, 2009)
[68] The Lang-Gu debate: a debate that has not yet ended, http:/ / news. hexun. com/ 2008-10-30/ 110671788. html
10
Sources
Allen, Franklin et al. (2008), "China's Financial system: Past, present and future", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G.
Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Benjamin, Dwayne et al. (2008), "Income inequality during China's Economic Transition", in Brandt, Loren;
Rawski, G. Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Brandt, Loren et al. (2008), "China's Great Transformation", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's Great
Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Bransetter, Lee et al. (2008), "China's embrace of globalization", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's
Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Cai, Fang et al. (2008), "The Chinese labor market in the reform era", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas,
China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Haggard, Stevens et al. (2008), "The political economy of private-sector development in China", in Brandt,
Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Herston, Alan et al. (2008), "China and Development economics", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's
Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Huang, Jikun et al. (2008), "Agriculture in Chinas Development: Past Disappointments, Recent Successes, and
Future Challenges", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge:
Cambridge university press
Naughton, Barry et al. (2008), "A Political Economy of Chinas Economic Transitionin China's Great
Transformation", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge
university press
Perkins, Dwight et al. (2008), "Forecasting China's growth to 2025", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas,
China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Rawski, G. Thomas et al. (2008), "China's Industrial Development", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas,
China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Svejnar, Jan et al. (2008), "China in light of other transition economies", in Brandt, Loren and Rawski, G.
Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
Wong, P.W. Christine et al. (2008), "China's Fiscal system: a work in progress", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G.
Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
External links
Fengbo Zhang: Speech at Future China Global Forum 2010 (http://sites.google.com/site/
futurechinaglobalforum/), Remembering Chinas Reform and Open Policy on the 30th Anniversary (http://sites.
google.com/site/wuhanchina1980/)
11
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
//creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
12