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David
Hume
(1711-1776),
whose theories
were
Introduction: Egoism
Hedonism originates from the Greek term hedone which means pleasure. According
to this theory, men do always desire his pleasantness. It is a quality because of which
an experience becomes good or valuable. Hedonism is of two types: ethical and
psychological. An ethical hedonism belongs to good action and right action. A good
action is good when it produces satisfaction to an individual based on its
consequences. On the other hand, a right action is always right on the basis of needs
for which an individual is satisfied.
Whenever we know that my action is either good or right, then we need to raise such
questions: i. What men ought to do? How we ought to desire?
In philosophy, egoism is the theory that ones self is, or should be, the motivation and
the goal of ones own action. Egoism has two variants, descriptive or normative. The
descriptive (or positive) variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human
affairs. That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and they
cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes that people should be
so motivated, regardless of what presently motivates their behavior.
1. Descriptive /Psychological Egoism
The descriptive egoists theory is called psychological egoism. Psychological egoism
describes human nature as being wholly self-centered and self-motivated. Examples of
this explanation of human nature predate the formation of the theory, and, are found
in writings such as that of British Victorian historian, Macaulay, and, in that of British
Reformation political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. To the question, What proposition
is there respecting human nature which is absolutely and universally true?,
Macaulay, replies, We know of only one . . . that men always act from self-interest.
(Quoted in Garvin.) In Leviathan, Hobbes maintains that, No man giveth but with
intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts the
object to every man is his own pleasure. In its strong form, psychological egoism
asserts that people always act in their own interests, and, cannot but act in their own
interests, even though they may disguise their motivation with references to helping
others or doing their duty.
Evaluation: Opponents claim that psychological egoism renders ethics useless.
However, this accusation assumes that ethical behavior is necessarily other-regarding,
which opponents would first have to establish. Opponents may also exploit
counterfactual evidence to criticize psychological egoism surely, they claim, there is
a host of evidence supporting altruistic or duty bound actions that cannot be said to
engage the self-interest of the agent. However, what qualifies to be counted as
apparent counterfactual evidence by opponents becomes an intricate and debatable
issue. This is because, in response to their opponents, psychological egoists may
attempt to shift the question away from outward appearances to ultimate motives of
acting benevolently towards others; for example, they may claim that seemingly
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altruistic behavior (giving a stranger some money) necessarily does have a selfinterested component.
For example, if the individual were not to offer aid to a stranger, he or she may feel
guilty or may look bad in front of a peer group.
On this point, psychological egoisms validity turns on examining and analyzing moral
motivation. But since motivation is inherently private and inaccessible to others (an
agent could be lying to herself or to others about the original motive), the theory
shifts from a theoretical description of human natureone that can be put to
observational testingto an assumption about the inner workings of human nature:
psychological egoism moves beyond the possibility of empirical verification and the
possibility of empirical negation (since motives are private), and therefore it becomes
what is termed a closed theory.
A closed theory is a theory that rejects competing theories on its own terms and is
non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. If psychological egoism is reduced to an assumption
concerning human nature and its hidden motives, then it follows that it is just as valid
to hold a competing theory of human motivation such as psychological altruism.
Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other-centered, and
other-motivated. Ones becoming a hermit (an apparently selfish act) can be
reinterpreted through psychological altruism as an act of pure noble selflessness: a
hermit is not selfishly hiding herself away, rather, what she is doing is not inflicting
her potentially ungraceful actions or displeasing looks upon others. A parallel analysis
of psychological altruism thus results in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism.
However, psychological altruism is arguably just as closed as psychological egoism:
with it one assumes that an agents inherently private and consequently unverifiable
motives are altruistic. If both theories can be validly maintained, and if the choice
between them becomes the flip of a coin, then their soundness must be questioned.
A weak version of psychological egoism accepts the possibility of altruistic or
benevolent behavior, but maintains that, whenever a choice is made by an agent to
act, the action is by definition one that the agent wants to do at that point. The action
is self-serving, and is therefore sufficiently explained by the theory of psychological
egoism. Let one assume that person A wants to help the poor; therefore, A is acting
egoistically by actually wanting to help; again, if A ran into a burning building to save
a kitten, it must be the case that A wanted or desired to save the kitten. However,
defining all motivations as what an agent desires to do remains problematic: logically,
the theory becomes tautologous and therefore unable to provide a useful, descriptive
meaning of motivation because one is essentially making an arguably philosophically
uninteresting claim that an agent is motivated to do what she is motivated to do.
Besides which, if helping others is what A desires to do, then to what extent can A be
continued to be called an egoist? A acts because that is what A does, and
consideration of the ethical ought becomes immediately redundant. Consequently,
opponents argue that psychological egoism is philosophically inadequate because it
sidesteps the great nuances of motive. For example, one can argue that the
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psychological egoists notion of motive sidesteps the clashes that her theory has with
the notion of duty, and, related social virtues such as honor, respect, and reputation,
which fill the tomes of history and literature.
David Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix IIOf Self
Love), offers six rebuttals of what he calls the selfish hypothesis, an arguably
archaic relative of psychological egoism. First, Hume argues that self-interest opposes
moral sentiments that may engage one in concern for others, and, may motivate
ones actions for others. These moral sentiments include love, friendship, compassion,
and gratitude. Second, psychological egoism attempts to reduce human motivation to
a single cause, which is a fruitless taskthe love of simplicityhas been the source
of much false reasoning in philosophy. Third, it is evident that animals act
benevolently towards one another, and, if it is admitted that animals can act
altruistically, then how can it be denied in humans? Fourth, the concepts we use to
describe benevolent behavior cannot be meaningless; sometimes an agent obviously
does not have a personal interest in the fortune of another, yet will wish her well. Any
attempt to create an imaginary vested interest, as the psychological egoist will
attempt, proves futile. Fifth, Hume asserts that we have prior motivations to selfinterest; we may have, for example, a predisposition towards vanity, fame, or
vengeance that transcends any benefit to the agent. Finally, Hume claims that even if
the selfish hypothesis were true, there are a sufficient number of dispositions to
generate a wide possibility of moral actions, allowing one person to be called vicious
and another humane; and he claims that the latter is to be preferred over the former.
Utilitarianism