Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.

Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:

This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan

Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past
twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of
Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco
filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10
additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which
was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco
then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative
function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no

property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control
for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend,
modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and

circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the

case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be
juris privati or private use only.

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos
Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned
that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st
Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of
the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions
(Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain
from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates
disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments
executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the
management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element
of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation

of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such
as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City
Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its
work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which
concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly
those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise
and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which
may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or
administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots
Association
GR No. 116356, 29 June 1998, J. Panganiban

FACTS:

Private respondent Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint against petitioner

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. for sum of money, alleging that petitioner has unpaid
fees for pilotage services rendered by respondent.

Petitioner disputed the claims of respondent by assailing the constitutionality of

Executive Order 1088, from which respondent based its claims. It maintains that
rates of pilotage fees should be based on circulars issued by the Philippine Ports
Authority since it has been given the power to set the rates by virtue of PD 857.

The lower court ruled in favor of respondent and this decision was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

EO 1088 is valid.

The Court adopts its pronouncement in Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of

the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals:

E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing
the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or
fees. The reason is because EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates.
Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the
imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all
Philippine ports.

xxx

xxx

xxx

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease
them below those mandated by EO 1088

Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and
ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." An administrative
agency, like PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is
to enforce it. Thus, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such
as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

Petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and RODRIGO DE LOS REYES vs.
HON. ARMANDO ANSALDO, in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, and RAMON
MONTILLA PATERNO, JR. G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994
Nature of the Case A petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction or issuance of TRO, against jurisdiction of Insurance
Commission.
Facts:

Paterno wrote a letter of complaint to Ansaldo (Insurance Commissioner) alleging

problems encountered by workers and public consumers as a result of Philamlifes
practices. Ansaldo sought the comment of De Los Reyes [Philamlife President], who
in turn sought a bill of particulars. Paterno responded that his letter was sufficient in
form and sought for a hearing. Philamlife countered that Paternos response did not
enable him to answer the letter of complaint. Thereafter, a hearing on the complaint
heard the validity of the Contract of Agency (CoA) complained of, requiring Paterno
to supply the specific provisions in the CoA which he claims to be illegal. Paterno:
(1) reiterated his initial letter of complaint; (2) prayed that the (a) provisions on
charges and fees in the CoA; (b) implementing provisions in the agents' handbook,
agency bulletins and circulars, be declared null and void; and (3) to reimburse
agents of the amounts deducted from charges and fees already collected with
interest. This was furnished by Ansaldo to Philamlife who thereafter submitted its
contentions, to wit: (1) Private respondent's letter of August 11, 1986 does not
contain any of the particular information which Philamlife was seeking from him and
which he promised to submit; and (2) [t]hat since the Commission's quasi-judicial
power was being invoked with regard to the complaint, private respondent must file
a verified formal complaint before any further proceedings. Meanwhile, Paterno
sought for the resumption of hearing in re his complaint and about a month later
executed his affidavit. Philamlife [through Manuel Ortega, SVP] questioned the
jurisdiction of Ansaldo and the locus standi of Paterno. Ansaldo thereafter notified
parties to a hearing. Philamlife [through Ortega] moved for quashal since subpoena
has no legal basis and Insurance Commission has no jurisdiction. The same was
however denied by Ansaldo. Hence, this petition.
Issue(s)
(1). Can the Insurance Commission preside over issues assailing the validity of a
Contract of Agency?
Held
(1). No. The general authority of the Insurance Commissioner is laid down in the
Insurance Code, among others, to regulate the business of insurance. Since a
Contract of Agency is not covered in the authority of the Insurance Commission to
regulate business of insurance, jurisdiction of Ansaldo is wanting. Ansaldo also has
no quasi-judicial power to speak of in the Insurance Code since xxx his power is
limited to claims and complaints involving any loss, damage or liability for which an
insurer may be answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance xxx".
This power does not affect the relationship between an insurance company and its
agents. In the same light, although the Insurance Code provides for the subject
Insurance Agents and Brokers, the same only speaks licensing requirements and
limitations imposed on insurance agents and brokers. Thus, it is clear that the
Insurance Code does not grant Ansaldo the authority to take cognizance of the case.

On the other hand, there are two classes of insurance agents: (1) salaried
employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of

the company; and (2) registered representatives, who work on commission basis.
The former is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (as it involves the Contract of
Employment and provisions of the Labor Code) and the latter by regular courts (as it
involves issues on the Contract of Agency and the Civil Code provisions on Agency).

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO.

88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts:

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the

court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in
the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6.
They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty
of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because
no

law

has

authorized

her

to

do

so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has
been

Issue:

ratified

by

the

Philippines.

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the

Held: "It

Philippines.

must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the

right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right

under international law, independent from although related to the right to

travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right
to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe
the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as
those

pertaining

to

the

liberty

of abode and

the

right

to

travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is
a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as
part

of

the

law

of

the

land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his
family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs
Auditor General
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities
this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of
the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of
Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred
from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec.
68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation
of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is
the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when
public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and
eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

Francisco Tatad et al vs
Secretary of Energy
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among
others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries
and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which
is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing

refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep
in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the
league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the
latter.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)

Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions
to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed
by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of
the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with
the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain

the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its
resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing
and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not
satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They
relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza
where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders
of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the
reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with
the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said
cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the
SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same
category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who
wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that
PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.
Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the
President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC
has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable
purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations,
the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review
class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness
is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to

dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic
freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review
that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass
the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to
be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers
may not be stopped from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages
in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and
stop it right there.

The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R.

No. L-52306. October 12, 1981]

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner

corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting
local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after
withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film
rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the
Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant
thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld
and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals
paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines. The last year that the
company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in
1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b)
of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35%

and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to

rents, etc. to gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner
issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency
withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The
company requested for reconsideration; where the
Commissioner did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71,
revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively
applied.
Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so
apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein ,the
prejudice the company of the retroactive application of
Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was
issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last
year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General
Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on
petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was
also made three years after 1968 for a period of time
commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a
position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no
longer control over them when the new circular was
issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.