Separation of powers

The Legislative branch is authorized to make laws, alter, and repeal them through the power
vested in the Philippine Congres
The executive branch carries out and enforces laws
The Judicial branch holds the power to settle controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable.

Checks and balance

Veto power
Judicial review
election
CASE DIGEST
SPS DACUDAO VS. SEC. RAUL GONZALES
PETITIONERS SPS DACUDAO, who were from Davao, FILED A NUMBER OF CHARGES FOR
SYNDICATED ESTAFA AGAINST DELOS ANGELES IN THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
AFTER GAINING DISHONORED CHECKS FROM LEGACY GROUP OF COMPANIES.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOJ ISSUED THE DOJ DO-182 DIRECTING ALL PROSECUTORS TO
FORWARD ALL THE CASES FILED AGAINST DELOS ANGELES JR. Et.al TO THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE SPECIAL PANEL FOR ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION TO PANEL
MEMBERS EXCEPT FOR THE SAME CASES THAT WERE FILED IN CAGAYAN DE ORO
WOULD HAVE TO BE FORWARDED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF SPECIAL PANEL DOJ FOR
PROPER DISPOSITON.
Due to the turn of events, THEY FILED DIRECTLY TO THE SC PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS, IMPLEADED THE SOJ GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR
ISSUING DO-I82 CONTENDING THAT THE SAME IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.
Issue: W/N THE PETITIONER’s DIRECT FILING OF THEIR CASE TO SC PROPER?
HELD:
THE SUPREME COUR RULED IN THE NEGATIVE. THE COURT SAID THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAVE UNRULY DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS BY COMING
DIRECTLY TO THE COURT WITH THEIR PETITION. THE REASON WHY THE HIERARCHY OF
COURTS SHOULD BE OBSERVED IS TO SHIELD THE COURT FROM HAVING TO DEAL WITH
CAUSES THAT ARE ALSO WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE LOWER COURTS AND FOR
THE COURT TO BE LEFT WITH MORE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS THAT THE CONSTITUTION
HAS ASSIGNED TO IT. IN A CASE, IT WAS HELD THAT THE SC IS THE COURT OF LAST
RESORT AND CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE BURDENED WITH THE TASK OF DEALING
WITH CASES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. ITS JURISDICTION IS SAID TO BE WITH DEALING
OF CASES WHERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND WHERE IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST.
AS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF CERTIORARI, THE SC SAID THAT SUCH IS NOT
EXCLUSIBE AS THIS IS SHARED WITHT RTC AND THE CA ALTHOUGH WITH THE LATTER,
PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF BP 129, THE CA’S JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF
EXECUTION WAS RESTRICTED TO THOSE IN AID OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE DIRECT PRESENTATION OF THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS PERMISSIBLE, THE COURT HELD THAT THE PETITION
MUST STILL BE DISMISSED.
The court dismissed the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit.

 
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official capacity as
FISCAL AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT et. al.,
G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts:
PJI is a daily periodicals publisher company. Private respondents of this case are also the
stockholders with the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists Inc. PJI obtained from DBP
certain financing accommodations and as security executed a first mortgage in favor DBP and in
return PJI gave DBP a percentage of voting rights. To be able to attend in meetings in cases
where DBP may be unavailable due to some circumstances, DBP employed Olaguer as its proxy
and was elected chairman of the Board and CEO of PJI. However, in a complaint filed by private
respondents PJI for injunction and damages with the RTC Manila, it was alleged that Olaguer
failed to comply with his commitment and have committed certain illegal acts which gave rise to
the filing of several complaints against him. But prior to the resolution of these complaints, his
appointment as board member of the DBP was terminated by PCA. Nevertheless, Olaguer
continuous to exercise full control of PJI. An Interim Agreement was set for the purpose of
electing new board of directors but will not take place as Olaguer have been appointed as fiscal
agent for PCGG and that all his actions are reported to PCGG which was assigned to the
sequestration proceeding of the properties and assets of former President Marcos to which PJI
was later on found out to be included therein.
Private respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO enjoining petitioners
from sitting and acting as members of the board of directors for PJI.
The trial court issued an order granting the petition for issuance of writ of Pi or TRO against
petitioners enjoining them from holding special stockholders meeting and sitting and acting as
members of the Board.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the party of Olaguer on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners but was denied thus this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding Olaguer's
appointment as fiscal agent of the PCGG.

Ruling:
No. Olaguer, being a fiscal agent of the PCGG and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
PJI, was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds,
moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinate, business associates, dummies,
agents, or nominees," civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision
of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the
exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals
have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive
Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere
with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG.

In the issues raised by private respondents before the trial court judge of petitioners’ non
compliance, illegal acts and right to sit and act as corporate officers of PJI, the Court said that
such matter should be raised to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners as fiscal agents of PCGG cannot
be sued before any ordinary courts but only with the Sandiganbayan.

CEFERINO PADUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, 

G. R. No. 141949 - October 14, 2002
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll
rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway.

The above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the
newspapers of general circulation. Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said
Resolution, it appears that Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the
TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway
Project – Stage 1.CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to
be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event of a "significant currency devaluation."

Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated, CITRA alleged that there
was a compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project
and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRA’s petition remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to file
an "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval," this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the
"Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board" (TRB
Rules of Procedure) which provides:
 "SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application or petition for the
approval of the initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any stage, thereafter, the Board may
grant on motion of the pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed for without prejudice to a
final decision after completion of the hearing should the Board find that the pleading, together
with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto and such additional evidence as
may have been requested and presented, substantially support the provisional order; Provided:
That the Board may, motuproprio, continue to issue orders or grant relief in the exercise of its
powers of general supervision under existing laws. Provided:
Finally, that pending finality of the decision, the Board may require the Petitioner to deposit in
whole or in part in escrow the provisionally approved adjustment or initial toll rates." (Emphasis
supplied)

·CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval" without prejudice to
its right to seek or be granted provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB
Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act on its own
initiative. Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita, as toll payer assail before this
Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001- 89.
· As a toll payer, Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the
required publication and in violation of due process; (2) alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a
collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an
"investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."
· Private respondent CITRA, in its comment counters that: (1) the TRB has primary
administrative jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy because its function is to restrain acts about to be done and not acts already
accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 2001- 89 was issued in accordance with law; (4) Section 3,
Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is constitutional; and (5) private respondent and the Republic of the
Philippines would suffer more irreparable damages than petitioner.

Issue:

Whether TRB has jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate
adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway

Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The TRB has the jurisdiction to issue Res 2001-89
authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments. The TRB as agency assigned to supervise the
collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities has the necessary expertise, training and
skills to judiciously decide such matter. The subject of argument of petitioner Zilacita was said to
be of a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in
determining the assailed rates which is within the province of the TRB.

The Court took cognizance on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion
of administrative remedies. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject
to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner Padua’s "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee
Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcita’s "Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.

Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to
refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,we ruled: "x xx, if
the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court."

SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA G.R. NO. 164785. APRIL 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesiani Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner‘s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program AngTamangDaan.

ISSUE:

W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.

HELD:
            1.)  Yes.  The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and
functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative,
or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law.
The authority given should be liberally construed.  A perusal of the PD 1986
reveal the possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in
Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or
television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…”
Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline
illusory.

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step

in an administrative investigation.  And the power to discipline and impose
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person
subject of the complaint.

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by

MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by said
statute.  The IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to
motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures.  The
MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the
restrictions petitioner envisages.

Imposition of 3 month suspension on the television program ang dating daan.

2.)  No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in
response to a written notice after petitioner appeared before that Board for a
hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee was
made.  Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue any time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it
was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated
PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for
such violation.  At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out
even without a hearing

 Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied.  Petitioner argues that he
was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.  The equal
protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed.  The Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under
the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for
one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB.  For another,
he offers no proof to such allegations.
3.)  No.  The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of
the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his
avowed evangelical mission.  The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.

4.)  No.  The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial
injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or
subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition,
or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression.  Prior
restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.  The freedom of
speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be
invoked when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern.  The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant one
the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments
must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights
of others.  A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech.  Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the
analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the
show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the
utterances susceptible to children viewers.  The Court emphasized on how the
uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the
context that they were used.
RCPI vs NTC
FACTS
PRIVATE RESPONDENT ALEGRE FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE NTC FOR POOR
SERVICE. HIS WIFE SENT TWO RUSH TELEGRAMS BUT DID NOT REACH THEIR
DESTINATIONS ON THE EXPECTED DATES. AS FOR THE COMPLAINT, PRIV
RESPONDENT REQUESTED FOR IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE SANCTION AGAINST
THE COMPANY. NTC DIRECTED RCPI TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT AND SET THE
INITIAL HEARING OF THE CASE ON AFTERWHICH RCPI MOVED TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT.
NTC PROCEEDED WITH THE HEARING THEN AFTERWHICH DENIED THE MOTION
OF RCPI FOR DISMISSAL. AND UPON RESOLUTION, NTC RENDERED RCPI
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR DEFICIENT AND INADEQUATE SERVICE AND
IMPOSED A FINE.
ISSUE: WON THE NTC IS AUTHORIZED TO IMPOSE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES ON
TELEGRAPHY COMPANY WHICH FAILS TO RENDER ADEQUATE SERVICE TO A
CUSTOMER.
HELD. NO. NTC IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO IMPOSE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES ON
TELEGRAPHY COMPANY. NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine.
Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an
administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any
certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or
regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated,
disobeyed, defied or disregarded. 

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the
Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit
grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic
agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the
coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency.

There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: 
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any
order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective

DECISION APPEALED FROM IS REVERESED AND SET ASIDE FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION OF THE NTC TO RENDER IT. TRO WAS MADE PERMANENT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

LLDA VS CA GR 110120 Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA (Environmental

Law) GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS:
TASK FORCE CAMARIN DUMPSITE OF OUR LADY OF LOURDES PARISH IN
CALOOCAN CITY FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE LLDA SEEKING TO STOP THE
OPERATION OF AN OPEN GARBAGE DUMPSITE IN CAMARIN CALOOCAN CITY
DUE TO ITS HARMFUL EFFECTS ON HEALTH OF THE RESIDENTS AND A
POSSIBILITY OF WATER POLLUTION. UPON INVESTIGATION, The LLDA Legal and
Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from
LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850. UPON FINDING OUT THAT THE WATER
WAS CONTAMINATED WITH BACTERIA, THE LLDA issued a CEASE and DESIST
ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.
MEANWHILE THE LOCAL CITY OF CALOOCAN FILED AN ACTION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. IN ITS
COMPLAINT IT SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED AS THE SOLE AUTHORITY
EMPOWERED TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH AND SAFETY AND ENHANCE THE RIGHT
OF THE PPL IN THE CITY TO A BALANCED ECOLOGY WITHIN ITS TERRITORY.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the
City Government of Caloocan?

2. Whetjer the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:  Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4.
Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished • As a general
rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum
RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER ISSUED BY LDA WAS
AUTHORIZED UNDER RA 4850 AND EO 927 TO MAKE, ALTER OR MODIFY
ORDER REQUIRING DISCONTINUANCE OF POLLUTION. THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN ALLEGED THAT SUCH POWER WAS NOT
EXPRESSLY CONFERRED BY LAW BUT THE COURT SAID IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS ALSO SUCH POWERS AS ARE
NECESSARILY IMPLIED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS EXPRESS POWERS. AND IN
ITS EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER UNDER ITS CHARTER AS A REGULATORY AND
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY WITH RESPECT TO POLLUTION CASES IN THE LAGUNA
LAKE REGION, THE AUTHORITY OF LLDA TO ISSUE A “CEASE AND DESIST
ORDER IS IMPLIED.

PETITION WAS GRANTED. TRO WAS MADE PERMANENT

It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna
and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative

agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of
its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE:
HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

FREEMAN VS. SEC

FACTS.

MATIENZO V ABELLERA G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988

FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The
respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. Private respondents
filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess"
taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
operators." The respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and
granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which
legalization was sought. The petitioners alleged that the BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding
special permits to the private respondents. They argue that neither the Board of Transportation
chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed, to
legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six
(6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that,
thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board can grant such permits

RULING:

YES. Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among
others "To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles
as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators
into legitimate and responsible operators." It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of
the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of secret operators by replacing or
allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones". In view thereof, it is maintained that
respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under
PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so, without taking disciplinary
measures against the said operators.

Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue
provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the
alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the
expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for
their illegal acts. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its
broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve
the avowed purpose of PD 101. It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a
board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the
light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law The fate of
the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the records of the
case, acceptance of the respondent's applications appears to be a question correctly within the
discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take
cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof
only when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, PD 101 does not
require such notice or hearing for the grant of temporary authority . The provisional nature of the
authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards
against its abuse. As to the applications for legalization themselves, the Public Service Act does
enjoin the Board to give notice and hearing before exercising any of its powers under Sec. 16
thereof.

CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA, Petitioner, vs. EMELITA

BERNARDO, EVELYN BERNARDO as Guardian of Erlyn,
Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo,* Respondents.

FACTS: Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by

Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera
(Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and
trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig,
Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters.

Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by

their predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on
acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo.The parcel of land was later on covered
by Tax Declaration No. CD-006-0828 under the name of the
respondents.

Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject
property consisting of about 700 square meters was bought by Diosdado
Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the
death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot.

The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the
subject property.ggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the
surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present
case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of
lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the
proceedings before the said body.

Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle

and decide the question of ownership over the subject land. Further, the
present case cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties
never resorted to violence in resolving the controversy. Petitioner
submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.

ISSUE: Has COSLAP jurisdiction to decide the question of

ownership between the parties?

HELD: The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)

No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.It is an administrative body established as a means of providing
a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among
small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to
avoid social unrest.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to
it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP
has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it,
to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction
for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one
of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is
critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action.In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the
particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of
the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action
thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem

In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of respondents' complaint. The present case does not fall under
any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of
E.O. No. 561.The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive
in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be
characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate
action.
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim
of ownership over the subject property, which is an action involving title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction
of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial
Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject property

Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings
therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. A judgment
issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be
the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there
was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were
before the proceedings.

Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the

jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water.
Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. GRANTED.

G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON,

Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-
Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:

President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to

petitioners EvalynFetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon (Calderon) as
Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress,
however, adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could
act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential
appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer
re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec
Commissioners for more than four months.

Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement

benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No.
1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its
resolution. However, in its subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the
basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the Fetalino
and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim appointment
expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall
under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a
lump sum benefit of five years salary. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A.
Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the
assailed subsequent resolution.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement

under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity;

B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year

lump sum gratuity is already final and executory;

C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over

the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled

to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as
amended.

The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only
when two conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the
applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when
an actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized
that retirement entails compliance with certain age and service
requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by
operation of law.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the
Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the
service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon and
Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended,
since they never completed the full seven-year term of office. While the
Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo
as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office, the Court have also positively ruled in that case that an ad
interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality
of judgments.

Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary

actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary

actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs.
Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of the
assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and
proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of
judgments.
Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they
have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided
under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a
form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension,
employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire
contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their
compensation.

DENIED

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION , Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for
his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the
request. Charges include: 1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. Attempt to
evade or defeat tax 3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television 4. False statement or entries 5. Election
contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds: 1. He found it premature to
secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in
the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD
1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied
with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of
unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. The department is not in position
to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is
bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties. Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge
Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers,
as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Discussions: The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are

confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to
harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.

Ruling/s: No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL. GR No. 150178 444

SCRA 428 26 NOVEMBER 2004 Callejo, Sr., J.:

FACTS: On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with CHED against Florian Gaoiran
(petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College (AAIC), a statesupervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. Edmond M. Castillejo,
Administrative Officer II of the same school, charged petitioner of mauling him while he was
performing his duties. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal complaint
filed by Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal
complaint for assault to a person in authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Angadanan-San Guillermo. The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED. Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service,
conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling incident. After the fact-finding
investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against the petitioner for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued
the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998. The petitioner did
not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against him. Instead, he filed
with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain
enforcement of the preventive suspension order. Having served the suspension, the case was
dismissed for being moot and academic. Petitioner then sought reconsideration of the formal
charge and preventive suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath
and that he was not informed nor apprised of the complaint against him. Joel Voltaire V. Mayo,
who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of CHED, issued a Resolution
dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner on the
ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath. However, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then
Chairman of CHED, unaware of the existence of Mayo’s resolution, issued another Resolution
dated June 3, 1999, finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Petitioner was dismissed form service. Petitioner then filed with the
RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite that a
previous Resolution already dismissed the administrative complaint against him. The RTC sided
with the petitioner and declared the Resolution of Alcala null and void. On appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. It declared as valid Alcala’s Resolution. Hence, this
petition for review. The petitioner continuously argued that the letter-complaint is inexistent
because it was not made under oath and does not contain a certification of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner cites Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292
and Section 4(d) of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform Rules of
Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Legislation). Hence, the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension stemming from it is likewise null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should be deemed inexistent as it was not made
under oath.

HELD:
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in Book V of EO No. 292,
Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A. It must be pointed out that, while the
letter-complaint was not verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that
Castillejo filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These
documents could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In
fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only
unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for
violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct. It is not totally uncommon that a government is given
wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. Administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. In any case, the letter-
complaint of Castillejo is not a “complaint” within the meaning of the provisions cited. The
letter-complaint did not by itself commence the administrative proceedings against the petitioner.
It merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot uphold the
petitioner’s contention as it would result to an absurd and restrictive interpretation of EO No.
292. It was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that
constituted the complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge in her capacity as the OIC. As
the complaint was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority under EO No. 292, the same
need not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of
non-forum shopping. Jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case. Petition is denied.

Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission (362 SCRA 304, 2001)

[G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001.]
PUNO, J.:

Facts:
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service
while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.

In a letter 3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department
of Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a
rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers.  Mr.
America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning
for a fee of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher’s board examinations.

CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC Region IV Director Amilhasan to
conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona’s eligibility, after verification from the Register of
Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that Remolona’s name is not in
the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees for December 10, 1989
does not include the name of Remolona. 

During the preliminary investigation, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written
statement of facts regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolon.
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility,
that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.
Based on the foregoing.

Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery
C. Remolona, and Atty. HadjiSalupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and
dishonesty.

Issue:

Whether Remolona’s right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation
because he was not assisted by counsel. 

Ruling:

The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he
was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1
and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.

The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. 12

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal

proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article
VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel
is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As
such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution. 

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III (535 SCRA
265, 2007)
G.R. No. 173034. October 9, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by
President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.  One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of
Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:

W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating
the RIRR.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents,
UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our
domestic system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the
1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of
the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public
of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the
Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are
merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented
any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states,
were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in
nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the
land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since
all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and
distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk
Code.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

ADMINISTRATION (POEA) Citation : G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 Ponente : CRUZ,
J.:

Facts :
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797
and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued
that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses. The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to
move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue : Whether or not POEA is duly delegated to promulgate its own regulations.

Held :
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos
and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20
of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested
with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen." Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the
cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National
Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the
executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment
practices."

Yazaki Torres Manufacturing Inc. vs CA

Facts:
The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the
administration of the PAG-IBIG Fund created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1530. The
Fund has been intended for housing purposes to be sourced from voluntary contributions from its
members. On June 17, 1994, it was amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7742. Under the new
law, the coverage of the Fund extends to all members of the Social Security System and
Government Service Insurance System, as well as their employers. However, membership is
voluntary for employees earning less than P4,000.00 a month. Yazaki Torres Manufacturing,
Inc., a corporation organized under Philippine laws, applied for and was granted by the HDMF a
waiver from the Fund coverage for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1995. The HDMF
found that petitioner's retirement plan for its employees is superior to that offered by the Fund.
On September 1, 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees amended Rule VII of the Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 7742. After its waiver from the Fund coverage lapsed,
petitioner applied for a renewal. The ground relied upon was once again its “superior retirement
plan” to that of the Fund. Subsequently, the HDMF Chief Executive officer disapproved
petitioner’s application on the ground that its retirement plan is not superior to that provided by
the Fund. The petitioner interposed an appeal to HDMF Board of Trustees, but the Board denied
the appeal. Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. CA
denied the petition. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied once again
by the CA. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
HDMF's Resolution denying petitioner's application for renewal of waiver.

Ruling:

NO. It is a doctrine of long-standing that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming
under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. For the exercise of
administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that best be discharged by the
government agency concerned and not by the courts. In this case, there is no showing that the
HDMF arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously denied petitioner's application for renewal of its
waiver. It conducted the necessary investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation of
petitioner's retirement plan vis-a-vis the Fund. This Court thus holds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
affirmed the denial of petitioner's application for renewal of waiver by the HDMF. The grant of
waiver or exemption from the coverage of the Fund is but a mere privilege granted by the State.
There is no provision whatsoever in R.A. No. 7742 or its Implementing Rules and Regulations
that the HDMF shall automatically renew a waiver from the Fund coverage upon an application
for renewal. The task of determining whether such application should be granted is best
discharged by the HDMF, not by the courts. Hence, the petition is DISMISSED. Constitutional
Principle or Issue : Delegation of Powers The legislative power has been described generally as
the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is
thus part of such legislative power. However, the legislature cannot foresee every contingency
involved in a particular problem that it seeks to address. Thus, it has become customary for it to
delegate to instrumentalities of the executive department, known as administrative agencies, the
power to make rules and regulations. The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to
the administrative agency charged with its implementation. In this sense, rules and regulations
promulgated by an administrative agency are the product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. Hence, in general, rules and regulations
issued by an administrative agency, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by law, have the
force and effect, or partake of the nature, of a statute. The law delegated to the HDMF the rule-
making power since this is necessary for the proper exercise of its authority to administer the
Fund. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, this grant of express power to formulate
implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter, or
repeal the same.

Secretary Vincent S. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines G.R. No.
159149/June 26, 2006 / Castro, J

FACTS.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders.
The law also provides a monetary penalty of P20,000 to P50,000 against those who violate the
said law. Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33. LPG
Refillers assailed the circular as B.P 33, the delegating statute, does not expressly penalize the
acts enumerated in the circular.
RTC : Circular is nullified on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in B.P 33
Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC

ISSUES:
W/N RTC erred in declaring the circular null and void and prohibiting the implementation of
the same ---- YES
HELD
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law,
(1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute
itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. 2. The circular
complies with both requisites. For the first, the circular merely enumerates the various ways by
which the criminal acts enumerated in B.P 33 may be committed. As to the second, B.P 33
provides a penalty of P20,000 to P50,000 against those who violate the said law. 3. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the
range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as
to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation
of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides
penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg.
33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. 4. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg.
33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and
which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law,

Javellana vs. DILG

Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the
practice of his profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was
an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10,
1980in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged
inthe practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department. On the other hand,
Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly
that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law

Held:

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution iscompletely
off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and
authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid
conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code
does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal
officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that
sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to
lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate
to, or affect, the area of public service.

GMA Network, Inc. v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (514 SCRA
191, 2007)
CORONA, J.:

Facts:
GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On
January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing
"Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD
1986.
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15,
19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the
MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order
Issue:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner.
Ruling:
MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the
basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987,
particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or
filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third
offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the
ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable
since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular
and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.