Judicial Case Digests

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT CASE DIGESTS | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
I. De Llana vs. Alba

112 SCRA 29
FACTS:
Petitioners questions the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act
reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." De la Llana,
a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges
that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for
the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good
faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of
any support in law.
After exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by
memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 1
No, What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. Nothing is better
settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body
if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.
The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: "We
find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners
from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents and, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased
to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial
courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities and municipal circuit trial courts.
There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For
the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed
II. Government Service Insurance System vs. Heirs of Fernando Caballero

G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision and the Resolution, dated December 17, 2002 and April 29,
2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot
situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a
residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.
CMTC misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its
working capital. Its representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board of
directors in an appropriate board resolution to participate in the bidding
Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said
corporation has no authority to do so
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim
and directed Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of ₱249,800.00.
The foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment
which was not turned over to petitioner, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of
the consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA, in its Decision dated
December 17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of
the judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of ₱249,800.00, in favor of
petitioner, be deleted.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that GSIS'
counterclaim rentals collected by private respondent from Carmelita Mercantile Trading
Corporation is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment by GSIS
of docket fees before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,"
cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of
the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's
independence − fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance
for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a
vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress
to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution, dated December 17,
2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300,
are AFFIRMED.
III. Garcia vs Board of Investments

191 SCRA 288
FACTS:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments
(BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation,
formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the
products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the
BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site
transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique
Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the
investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who
risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of
the investors without considering the national interest.
RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta
as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is
shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of
a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.
Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken
because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well
as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that
petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner
should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by
Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest
in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of
Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon
Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989,
(Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of
registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha
as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.
IV. PACU vs. Sec. of Education

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
FACTS:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075
and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners
of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought
to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a
permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted
the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that
the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent
to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary
of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because
the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it
suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to
him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal
discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper
court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented
by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied.
V. Tan vs Macapagal
43 SCRA 678
FACTS:
A five-page petition filed by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V.
Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as
taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the
validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, would have this Court declare that it is "without power, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of
government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution merely empowered to
propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down
therein."
Such a plea of the utmost seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page
pleading. It is understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as
possessed of merit. Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court issued a resolution dismissing
it. Then came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration.
It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on
a secondary authority. The show of diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is
something else. A perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are oblivious of the
authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by its conformity
with the law as it stands.
In this sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be eroding ancient faiths. Considering,
however, the compulsion of the fundamental principle of separation of powers, this Court cannot
exercise the competence petitioners would erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming that
they have the requisite standing, which is the first question to be faced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a declaration of the alleged
nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention.
2. Whether or not the petitioner in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good
sense to wait before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute.
RULINGS:
1. In the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." There
has been a relaxation of this rule. So it was announced by the present Chief Justice in Pascual vs.
The Secretary of Public Works. Thus: "Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may
be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the 'expenditure of public funds, by an officer
of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." Moreover,
where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed of
the requisite personality to bring a suit. Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, it was a member of the
Senate who was heard by this Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the
congressional resolution proposing the parity rights amendment. Likewise, in the latest case in
point, Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought the action
challenging the validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He
was quite successful too. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do
qualify under such a category. Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is
indicated. Nor should petitioners feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, a member of the Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his
action for prohibition instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment
as such suit could be distinguished from the present.
2. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had
to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being
left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically
asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action”.
The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do
or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only
"when * * * properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding."
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence
lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its
responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be
respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function well. Such should be the case
not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its powers are transcendent,
amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter
the organization and functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much
more imperative that the rule of noninterference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time
comes.
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends
to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid
of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and
until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced it is
controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot
therefore be sustained.
WHEREFORE , the motion for reconsideration is denied.
VI. Kilosbayan vs. Morato

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the
first case has settled and contends and the questions of (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc.
has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (RA No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any
party in operating an on-line lottery. Petitioners contends that these questions can no longer be
reopened.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of on of the original
majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.), it was not surprising that the first
decision in the first case was alter reversed. In any case, a reexamination of the two question is
barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a “formal
commitment” not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead
submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (RA No. 1169, as
amended) the same with the PGMC which made substantially the same manifestation. They
believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous since their view reexamination was not
barred by the doctrine of Stare Decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the
case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five dissenters in the first case to form a
new majority of eight.
ISSUES:
WON that the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for
striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them, and;
WON the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people’s organizations “effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making”
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative and the motion for reconsideration was denied.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the
contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. Therefore, does not
raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract of law, which petitioners, bot being privies to
the agreement, cannot raise not does Kilosbayan’s status as a people’s organization give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the contract. The constitution provides that “the
State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means”, their right to “effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged.” (Art XIII, 15-16)
VII. Dumlao vs. COMELEC

95 SCRA 392
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4.Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy and the petitioners is the proper party of the
case.
RULING:
No. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing
said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision.
No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no
ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition
for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual
record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction of respondent
COMELEC.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that
neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been called to have
been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at
stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress.
VIII. The Province of Cotabato vs. Republic

G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
FACTS:
The piece of writing being assailed in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation
document, namely the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The Solicitor General explained that this
document, prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a
codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to
have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Subsequently, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the consolidated cases at bar
based on changed circumstances as well as developments which have rendered them moot,
particularly the Executive Department's statement that it would no longer sign the questioned
peace negotiation document.2Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as well as other sectors,
continue to push for what they call a "complete determination" of the constitutional issues raised
in the present Petitions.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two
requisites.3
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy —
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents
a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there
is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court must decide the case even if it is moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great
public interest these cases have generated. After all, a court of law, and not of public opinion.
The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for
allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of
government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the
fundamental principles of constitutional law.
The Executive Department has already manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General,
that it will not sign the MOA in its present form or in any other form. It has declared the
same intent to the public. For this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions
cannot be moot for they are still capable of repetition is to totally ignore the assurance given by
the Executive Department that it will not enter into any other form of the MOA in the future. The
Court cannot doubt the sincerity of the Executive Department on this matter. The Court must
accord a co-equal branch of the government nothing less than trust and the presumption of good
faith.
Therefore to avoid repetition yet escaping judicial review and to educate the bench and the bar
the court must decide the case even if it is moot and academic already.
IX. Joya vs PCGG

G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino,
requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic
of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's
of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two
(82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies
The sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were
turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
On motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional petitioners: Charito Planas,
Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Carlo Medina, Patricia Ruiz,
Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz
Veto Planas.
On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the
incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as additional
respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether OR NOT petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition
RULINGS:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.6 But the most important are the first two (2)
requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action
and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
related party.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
X. Umali vs. Guingona

G.R. No. 131124, March 21, 1999
FACTS:
Osmundo Umali, petitioner, was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal

Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 19, 1993 to March 15,
1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 194. On August 1 1994, President Ramos
received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal
revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more
particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said
confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the
preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter
to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send his
answer, copies of Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three (3) years, and Personal
Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on Augsut 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On
August 23, the petitioner filed his require answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the
PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding an prima facie evidence to support
six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the
recommendation of the PCAGC, then Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the
law.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s decision.
Rulings:
3. No. The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for
the first time at such late stage of proceedings below.
Wherefore, in the light of foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the
exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly AO No. 152
is considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.
XI. Laurel vs. Garcia

187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
under the Reparation Agreement entered into with Japan. The other three (3) properties include
Nampeidai Property (present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial
Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for consulate staff) and
Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now vacant).The Reparations Agreement
provides that reparations valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance
with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments.
The procurements are to be divided into government sector and those for private parties in
projects, the latter shall be made available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned
entities in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government Sector” for the Chancery
of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major
repairs. However, the Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that time.Although
there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to have buildings built at the
expense of the lessee, the same was not acted favorably upon by the government. Instead,
President Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations’ capital goods and service s in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter,
amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government pushed for the
sale of reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been
postponed and later restrained by the SC. Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the
subject property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of Japan where the
property is located. They relied upon the rule oflex situs which is used in determining the
applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court
dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive order contravenes the
constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the bidding
for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days
before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment ofrequirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance to comply with
Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a
minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax under Japanese law of about
50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutionality of the executive order was the real issue in this case.
RULING:
No. Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of
the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize
its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of
the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting
hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a
fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine
government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not
uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court stated that the
constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that
"[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the
Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the
Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of
Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable
nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be
patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national
economic development projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the proposed
1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the
issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property from
public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the
property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by petitioner
Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are
properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the
case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application ofa statute or general law.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of
prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi
property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made
PERMANENT.
XII. Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

G.R. No. 171101, 22 November 211
FACTS:
RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and
private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered
by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential
expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from
the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
The OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed
it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB
(farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its
implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative
modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the
preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers.
Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers –
the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions
before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They
claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and
that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of
the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the
Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2
and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered
by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the
PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65. On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the
invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP
compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM,
this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic
concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners for the revocation/nullification of SDOA (herein respondents) are
real party-in-interests.
2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional.
3. Whether or not sec 31 of RA 6657 is the lis mota of the case.
Ruling:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their respective leaders
are real parties-in-interest.
The SDOA identifies the “SDP qualified beneficiaries” as “the farmworkers who appears in the
annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by HLI.” Galang and the Supervisory group who were admittedly
employed by HLI comes within the definition of real party-in-interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, as one benefited or injured by the judgment in a suit, and thus, entitled to sue.
Assuming arguendo that they are not regular farmworkers, Article XIII of the Constitution
categorized them as “other farmworkers” entitled to “receive a just share of the fruits” of the
land.
2. In this issue on constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657, FARM seeks to invalidate the said
provision of the law because it allows corporations to use stock distribution as its mode of
distribution or transfer instead of an outright agricultural land transfer, which they believe
impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers envisioned under Section 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution. HLI counters this matter by saying that agrarian reform is not only
about transfer of land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the challenge on the constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 and its counterpart
provision in EO 229 failed.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the reason it failed was because of failure of the intervenors to
question its constitutionality in the earliest opportunity, and instead, slept on their rights and
received benefits derived from the same. As early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved
the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, its members received
benefits from the SDP without so much protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years
after approval of the SDP via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said
plan and approving resolution was sought to be revoked. Furthermore, AMBALA did NOT
question the constitutionality of said provision but focused on the flaws and gaps in the
subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondent Sol. Gen. did not question it,
and such question was only raised on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with
the Court.
It has been stressed by the Supreme Court that the question on constitutionality will not passed
upon by the Court unless it is raised at the first or earliest possible opportunity by the proper
party.
In terms of the lis mota of the case, the invalidity of the provision was not alleged, but rather it is
the alleged application in the SDP that is flawed was raised.
The Supreme Court also noted that Section 5 of RA 9700 superseded Section 31 of RA 6657 vis-
à-vis the stock distribution component of said provision, where Section 5 of RA 9700 provides:
“That after June 30, 2009, the mode of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition.” Thus, stock distribution is no longer an available option under existing
law. The issue has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court ruled that there appeared to have been no breach of the fundamental law.
Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
“The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE
LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the
right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.”
The law is clear – farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to OWN DIRECTLY OR
COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two modes of land
distribution—direct and indirect ownership. No language is found in the 1987 Constitution that
disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity
through which collective ownership can be exercised. The term “collectively” is said to allow
indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition
of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of
juridical entities composed of farmers.
Even in the definition of agrarian reform itself in RA 6657 allows stock distribution— “the
redistribution of lands… to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless… to lift the
economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to physical
redistribution of land, such as production or profit sharing, labour management and the
distribution of shares of stock which allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the
land they work.”
The SC believed that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT inconsistent with the State’s commitment to
farmers and farmworkers to advance their interests under the policy of social justice. This is
believed to be the modality of the legislature for collective ownership by which the imperatives
of social justice may be approximated, if not achieved.
Also as contended by FARM that stock certificates do not equate to land ownership, still, the
Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable
interest in the assets of the corporation, which includes the agricultural lands. A share of stock
typifies an aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or right to share in its proceeds to the extent
when distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of
the capital of the corporation. However, the FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands
owned by the corporation when the latter is eventually dissolved and liquidated. The policy of
agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the
farmers. The Court also reasoned that there can be no guarantee of a successful implementation
of agrarian reform, whether there is actual distribution or not. Accordingly, the principle of “land
to the tiller and the old pastoral model of ownership were non-human juridical persons were
prohibited from owning agricultural lands are no longer realistic under existing conditions.
3. No. The section of RA 6657 of the CARP law is not the lis mota of the case. The non-
compliance of TADECO is the heart of the controversy.
XIII. Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB

38 SCRA 42
FACTS:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to a
statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this appeal from a lower court decision.
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage.
On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff
countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims
that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2
extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription.
RULING:
YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official.”
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of
the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive
in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were
started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to
May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years,
two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August
10, 1959 dismissed.
XIV. People vs. Mateo

G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
FACTS:
Ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten different were
filed against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in dates in the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac.
Accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent.
Appellant denied all allegations and dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious
“retribution” of a vengeful stepdaughter. He took private complainant to task after his son,
Marlon Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong
Navarro inside the room of their house.
He also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a friend of private complainant, had caught
his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice
with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at night and leaving her siblings
alone in the house.
The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal
of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of
express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
RULING:
No, Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in
the Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.”
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of
the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate
court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural
matter.
During the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that
the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of
acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has
had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been
given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court.
A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with
the discussions hereinabove set forth.
XV. Maceda vs. Vasquez

G.R. No. 102781, April 22 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1)
the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite
this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction on the case.
RULING:
No. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to
allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action.
XVI. In Re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera

Act. No.6052, Dec 2003
FACTS:
In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought the suspension or disbarment of
Respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera (1) for misrepresentation through his concealment of the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and (2) for violation of the
“rotation rule” enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491.
The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against Atty. de Vera before the State Bar
of California. The action arose from an insurance case he had handled involving Julius Wills III,
who had figured in an automobile accident in 1986.
Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made the transfer for the sole purpose of becoming IBP national
president. Complainant stressed that respondent neither resided in Agusan del Sur nor held office
there. A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letter-request of respondent,
asking the Supreme Court to schedule his oath-taking as IBP national president. On the other
hand, AM No. 05-5-15-SC referred to the letter-report of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from
the latter’s positions as IBP board member and executive vice-president, for committing acts
inimical to the board and the IBP in general.
The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the IBP board approved the
withdrawal of a Petition docketed at the Supreme Court as “Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al
v. Senate of the Philippines et al. - SC-R165108. Subsequently, during the plenary session held at
the 10th National IBP Convention, respondent allegedly made some untruthful statements,
innuendos, and blatant lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition
On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP National President Cadiz,
praying for the removal of the IBP board membership of Atty. De Vera, who had allegedly
committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP in general. The following day, during its 20th
regular meeting, the IBP board resolved by a twothirds vote to remove respondent from his
positions as a member of the board of governors and as the executive vice-president (EVP) of the
IBP.
On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy in the EVP position, brought about by
the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally
elected and declared as EVP. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished that
position. Thus, on June 25, 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new
EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar.
On June 28, 2005, IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme Court's approval of Atty.
Salazar's election and assumption of office as national president, in the event that Atty. de Vera
would be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; or should his removal from his
positions as member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP be approved by
the Court.
Protesting the election of both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, respondent also denied having
committed acts inimical to the IBP and its board. He maintained that his removal from his two
positions had been done without due notice and due process.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the judgment in AC No. 6052 constituted a bar to the filing of AC 6697.
2. Whether or not in the course of his practice of law, Respondent Atty. de Vera committed
malpractice amounting to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines.
3. Whether or not the board of governors validly removed respondent from his positions as
governor and EVP of the IBP.
Ruling:
Res Judicata
1. The Court unanimously held in a per curiam Decision that AC No. 6052 did not constitute a
bar to the filing of AC No. 6697. The two administrative cases involved different subject matters
and causes of action. In AC No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to
run for the position of IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present Administrative
Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to practice law.
The two aforementioned cases did not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants
sought to prevent respondent from assuming his post as IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao; the
cause of action referred to his alleged violation of IBP bylaws. In the second case, what was
principally sought was his suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action was his alleged
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moral Turpitude
2. In resolving the second issue, the Court cited Maquera,[5] according to which a judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign court’s action included
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction.
The Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his client’s father and attorney-in-
fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his
own personal use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use of his client’s funds was highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this matter. The conduct
of Atty. de Vera -- holding on to the money of his client without the latter’s acquiescence -- was
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It was clear that by depositing the $12,000 check in
his own bank account and using it for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice,
gross misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed that, where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the amount involved
in this case, the Court considered the penalty of suspension for two years appropriate.
The Court found that the transfer by Atty. de Vera of his membership to the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter was within his rights. He could not be deemed to be guilty of unethical conduct or
behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyer’s Oath punished
lawyers for aspiring to be the IBP national president or prohibited them from doing perfectly
legal acts in accomplishing that goal.
Validity of the Removal
3. The Court ruled that the constitutional provision on due process safeguarded life, liberty and
property. The position of EVP of the IBP, however, was not a property within the constitutional
sense. Further, there was no right to security of tenure over that position, as all that was required
to remove any member of the board of governors for cause was a resolution adopted by two
thirds of the remaining board members. Furthermore, in administrative proceedings, the essence
of due process was simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. The cross-examination of
witnesses was not indispensable to due process. Neither was an actual hearing always essential,
especially under the factual milieu of this case. Atty. de Vera’s actuations during the IBP
National Convention in question had been witnessed by all the members of the board, upon
whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor was placed,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Atty. de Vera received a copy of the Complaint against him; indeed, he was present in the
meeting when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of stenographic notes of the meeting
on May 13, 2005, in which he was removed, it was patent that he had been given a fair
opportunity to defend himself against the accusations of Atty. Rivera. Under the IBP rules, the
expulsion of an IBP governor was done via a Resolution adopted by two thirds of the remaining
members. The phrase “remaining members” excluded the complainant and the respondent. Of the
7 remaining members qualified to vote, 5 voted for expulsion, while 2 voted against it. The five
votes still added up to the two thirds vote required for expulsion.
Removal for Cause
4. Conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity are inherent in the internal life of
an organization. Like that of any other organization, however, the effectiveness of the IBP would
be diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body. The impression would be that
the IBP, which speaks through its board of governors, does not and cannot authoritatively speak
for its members. Its prestige and reputation with lawyers, as well as with the general public,
would diminish accordingly.
Because of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, no fault was attributed to
the expulsion from the board of Atty. de Vera, who had insisted on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion. The cause
for expulsion was legal, because the effectiveness of the board as a governing body was being
lessened.
XVII. Chavez vs. JBC

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel
C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez (petitioner).
The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has
constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.
As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process
of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the
resolution of the issue a day longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an
option. In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that
the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the
two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its
mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC
composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a
representative of Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time
the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby
DENIED.
XVIII. Jardeleza vs Sereno

GR No. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014
Facts:
The present case begins from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto
Abad (Associate Justice Abad Before his retirement in accordance with its rules, the JBC
announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position.
The JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the
Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General
of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was
included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews..
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza
received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC
member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings
held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on
June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition) 5 praying that the Court, in
the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing
the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to
which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and
copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made
part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and
supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the
same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to
reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing the JBC to
disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any
adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated
by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light on a
classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s
integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential
legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice
Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice
Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious.
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a
remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate
Justice vice Associate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes. Jardeleza’s allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Court’s supervisory
authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under
the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority covers the overseeing of
whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.
On the second issue, while it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
mean that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is
availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of
due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is
not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the
precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant,
who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in
the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
By no means does the Court intend to strike down the “unanimity rule” as it reflects the JBC’s
policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza
received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does
not rescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that
Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the
President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice
Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT,
rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-
010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the
President of this Decision.
XIX. Oposa vs. Factoran

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
FACTS:
petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said
petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
XX. Kilosbayan vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 187167
FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines
of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left
undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly
five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under
scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio,
length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline
for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as
citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522
on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,embodying the terms of the Treaty of Parisand ancillary treaties,and (2) RA 9522
opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA
9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah
and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit;
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522; and
3. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as
citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.
XXI. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona Jr.

G.R. No. 134577
FACTS:
July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original
petition for quo waranto under Rule 66, Section 5 Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Sen.
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Sen. Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.
August 04, 1998, upon receipt, the Court required the respondents and the solicitor general to file
comment thereon within a non-extendible period of 15 days from notice. August 25, 1998 both
respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective comments. In the regular course,
the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions
for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the
hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special
and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case,
this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Somena as presiding officer, convened
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the Eleventh Congress. On the agenda for the day
was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President
was Sen. Marcelo Fernan. Sen Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by
Sen. Miriam Santiago by a vote of 20-2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of
the Senate. Sen. Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority” while
only those who had coted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority”
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad
filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. WON Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader.
2. WON respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption
and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is entitled by law thereto. A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the
solicitor general or a public prosecutor. For it to be successful, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In the case at bar, petitioners present not
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
The Court also hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such
by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility."
XXII. IBP vs Zamora

G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP
Ruling:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no
justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PN
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
XXIII. Gonzales vs. Narvasa

G.R. No. 140835, Aug. 14, 2000
FACTS:
In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit
expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally,
petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with
information on certain matters.
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as
Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are
being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on
March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this
case was considered submitted for decision.
ISSUES:
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is
a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner
asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is
totally excluded by the Constitution – the amendment of the fundamental charter.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges
that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President
and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22)
presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants. Petitioner asserts that, as in
the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these positions.
III. Right to Information
Finally, petitioner asked to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora to answer his letter (Annex "D") dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and
a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to
Malacanang.
RULING:
The respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and
statutory duty to answer petitioner’s letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of
public concern – that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public
property. With regard to petitioner’s request for copies of the appointment papers of certain
officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject
to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered
to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
It must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a
taxpayer’s suit. In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case
and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. In other
words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his
pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
XXIV. Demetria vs. Alba

G.R. No. 71977, Feb. 27, 1987
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of
the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for“.
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of
the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for“.
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who
were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under
consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and
that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as ground therefor the
abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
ISSUES:
Constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
RULING:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16 [5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer of funds form one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is
for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void for being
unconstitutional.
XXV. Pimentel vs. Ermita

472 SCRA 587
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo ("President Arroyo") through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
("Secretary Ermita") to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul
M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap ("respondents") as acting
secretaries of their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from
performing the duties of department secretaries.
Antecedent Facts
The Senate and the House of Representatives ("Congress") commenced their regular session on
26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives,
was constituted on 25 August 2004.
ISSUE:
The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as

acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session.
RULING:
Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically opposed lines of thought. Petitioners
assert that the President cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power.
In contrast, respondents insist that the President can issue such appointments because no law
prohibits such appointments
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically
the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications
to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the
Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners
forget that Congress is not the only source of law. "Law" refers to the Constitution, statutes or
acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial
decisions.
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted

textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad-interim appointments must be
distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo's issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT CASE DIGESTS | CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

I. De Llana vs. Alba

II. Government Service Insurance System vs. Heirs of Fernando Caballero

III. Garcia vs Board of Investments

IV. PACU vs. Sec. of Education

VI. Kilosbayan vs. Morato

VII. Dumlao vs. COMELEC

VIII. The Province of Cotabato vs. Republic

IX. Joya vs PCGG

X. Umali vs. Guingona

Osmundo Umali, petitioner, was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal

XI. Laurel vs. Garcia

XII. Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

XIII. Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB

XIV. People vs. Mateo

XV. Maceda vs. Vasquez

XVI. In Re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera

XVII. Chavez vs. JBC

XVIII. Jardeleza vs Sereno

XIX. Oposa vs. Factoran

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

XX. Kilosbayan vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 187167

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit;

3. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

XXI. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona Jr.

XXII. IBP vs Zamora

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

XXIII. Gonzales vs. Narvasa

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants

III. Right to Information

XXIV. Demetria vs. Alba

XXV. Pimentel vs. Ermita

The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as

In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted

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