De La Llana v.

Alba

DOCTRINE:

“Independence of Judiciary”

Judicial reorganization must be done in good faith.

“No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.” (Art. VIII, sec. 2, par. 2)

FACTS:

 Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled “An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes,” the same
being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it mandates that judges
of lower courts (except the CTA and the Sandiganbayan), unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separate from the judiciary.
 They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix compensation and allowances of the
Justices and Judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed.
 Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack
on the constitutionality of this statue, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, he allegations of absence of good faith as well
as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law.

ISSUE:

WON Batas Pambansa Blg. Should be declared unconstitutional for colliding with the security of tenure
enjoyed by justices and judges – NO.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

RATIO:

1.) Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has
been amply demonstrated.
2.) The Batasang Pambansa did not act arbitrarily in enacting the assailed law, but rather, in good
faith. The law was created after much study, and the circumstances called for a pressing need to
create a major reform in the judiciary.
3.) There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report
as "both pressing and urgent."
4.) Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced.
Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the
attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
 quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing
of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the
reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the
court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the
foreseeable future."
5.) Nothing is bettersettled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court
and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions.
6.) The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts,
metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There
is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the
Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response
to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
7.) It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever
legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the
majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v . Labang it was stressed that with the
provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there
is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches."
8.) Removal is distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of office. After abolition of
office, there is in law no occupant, while in removal, there is an occupant who could lose his
position. This is an issue of abolition of office. In this case, the question of tenure does not arise.
In the case of abolition of an inferior court (as in the case at bar), there is no difference between
removal and abolition of office.
9.) To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to re organize
inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones.
10.) Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the
grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads
as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges,
municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set
forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a standard is thus clear.