The Politics of US Military Research in Greenland

in the Early Cold War

Nikolaj Petersen
Abstract. The focus of this article is US military research in Greenland and its role in Danish-American
political relations in the early Cold War period 19451968. This was a period of intense US research
activity that aimed to overcome the hostile Greenlandic environment and harness it for military purposes.
In the US-Danish defense agreement on Greenland of 1951 the USA got a free hand to develop three
so-called defense areas for military purposes, while it had to seek Danish permission for research and
other activities outside these areas. The two partners had differing, but mainly compatible, interests
in this process. The US interest was freedom to do research on the gigantic Greenland Icecap, while
the Danish authorities emphasized the protection of its sovereignty over Greenland. The article follows
the US research programs in the 1950s and 1960s and Danish responses in some detail, including the
intriguing and still mysterious Camp Century project and its relationship with the US Armys Iceworm
plan to deploy strategic missiles beneath the surface of the Greenland Icecap.
Keywords. Camp Century, Danish-American relations, Greenland, military research, project iceworm

1. American and Danish Research Agendas

Since 1941 the USA has had a military presence in Greenland in acknowledgment of
the fact that Denmark cannot bear the defense burden alone and that the USA has major
national security interests in the island. An important aspect of the US presence in
Greenland has been a lively military-related research program that aimed to overcome
the hostile Greenlandic environment and harness it for military purposes. It is the overall
thesis of this article, that the specific direction and intensity of this research have been
determined by the interplay of three factors: variations in the US security interest over
time, the special character of the arctic environment and the consent of the Danish Government. A main focus will be the latter aspect that is the role of US military research in
the Danish-American relationship until 1968. On 21 January of that year a nuclear-armed
B-52 bomber crashed on the ice outside Thule Air Base. This unleashed a major DanishAmerican crisis which profoundly changed Greenlands strategic role and accelerated
the reduction of US research in Greenland which was already under way (Olesen, 2011).
Over time, the US strategic interest in Greenland has varied in direction, scope and
intensity. At the outset, in 1941, it was driven by the German threat to the North Atlantic
Department

of Political Science, Aarhus

E-mail: petersennikolaj44@gmail.com

University,

Centaurus 2013: Vol. 55: pp. 294318; doi:10.1111/1600-0498.12023

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Aarhus

C,

DK

8000,

Denmark.

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lines of communication (LOCs) and to Greenland itself. In the Cold War the strategic
role of Greenland was derived from its geographical position astride the grand circles
between Continental America and the Soviet North, i.e. the likely trajectories of their
strategic weapons in a nuclear war. Today, the US interest in Greenland is inspired by
uncertainties caused by rogue states suspected of nuclear ambitions.
In particular, the US interest in Greenland has varied with its shifting grand strategies:
In the Second World War the strategic aim was to protect the Allied naval and air
LOCs in the Atlantic and prevent a German foothold on Greenland. In the early Cold
Warin fact, in a few weeks in late 1950a major strategic shift occurred with the
adoption of the Polar Strategy, the concept that the US strategic deterrent should be
based in the Continental USA with a fore post in Northern Greenland. The Polar
Strategy now gradually supplanted the Perimeter Strategy which rested on a retaliatory
attack from increasingly vulnerable bases on the Soviet perimeter, for example the UK
and North Africa (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 5560; Petersen, 2011). After 1961, the
adoption of the MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Deterrence), with its focus on strategic
stability, changed Greenlands main mission to strategic warning of missile attack.
After the Cold War the strategic emphasis is on missile defense against third-country
threats.
Furthermore, technology changes have affected the role of Greenland in US strategy:
Improvements in bomber range, the advent of nuclear missiles, improving radar
techniques and the promises of missile defense, to mention only the most important
developments (Petersen, 2011).
On top of this, the worlds largest island presents unique geographical, physical and
climatic challenges which must be mastered in order to realize its potential as a forward
defense bastion of the USA. Because the Arctic was almost terra incognita to the
USA as the Cold War began, military research became an important ingredient in this
endeavor. As stated in a Pentagon document of 1961 the USA had a vital interest in
the environmental sciences since the military services must have an understanding of,
and an ability to predict and even to control the environment on which it is required to
operate (Cited in Heymann et al., 2010, p. 13). Brge Fristrup, Danish scientific adviser
at Thule Air Base, concluded in his annual report for 1962 that this research was blessed
with a lavish funding and wide-ranging access to military transport and other kinds of
assistance, thus overcoming some major bottlenecks in arctic research. He also pointed
out that the American concentration of resources had led to significant scientific results
which could not have been obtained otherwise (Fristrup, 1960).
Another constraint on US research has been Denmarks sovereignty interests in
Greenland. The 1951 Defense Agreement between Denmark and the USA, which
remains the formal framework for the US military presence in Greenland, stipulates that
US military research activities outside three defense areas (air bases) require formal
authorization from the Danish Government1 . Hence the US research must be compatible
with Danish interests.
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Five such interests may be discerned from the Danish authorization policy (DUPI,
1997, Vol. 1, pp. 259260): First, in recognition of the vital importance of Denmarks
security link with Washington, it has been official policy to be as forthcoming to US
requests as possible. This has been an important ingredient in Denmarks so-called
Greenland Card policy, which rests on the notion that by accommodating US strategic
interests in Greenland Denmark earns a credit which may neutralize US criticism of
other aspects of its security policy (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 273276).
Secondly, Danish authorities have shunned publicity around US research and other
activities in Greenland so as to avert criticism from domestic opponents of Denmarks de
facto association with the US strategic deterrent, or from the Soviet Union, Denmarks
watchful neighbor across the Baltic Sea.
Thirdly, a major goal has been to insist on respect for Denmarks sovereignty over
Greenland, which was inevitably circumscribed by Denmarks inability to protect the
colony2 by its own efforts.
Fourthly, Denmark has insisted on a ban on fraternization so as to prevent contact
between US servicemen and the indigenous population. This sprung from a paternalistic
policy, aiming at a cautious, controlled modernization of the Greenlandic society. This
goal might be jeopardized by the peoples exposure to US materialist culture, resulting
not only in alcoholism and the spread of venereal diseases, but in a serious threat to
the very survival of the Inuit hunter culture. This problem was especially acute at Thule
where the Inuit settlement of Dundas lay immediately outside the defense area. This
played a role in the decision in 1953 to move the settlement 100 km to the north (DUPI,
1997, Vol. 1, pp. 185196).
Finally, the Danish government has been eager to protect and assist Danish research
in Greenland. As it were, Greenland had already been a priority target of Danish
research before the Second World War, when scientific exploration was used to bolster
the Danish sovereignty claims in a conflict with Norway over East Greenland3 . For
similar reasonsthis time with the USA as the challengerthe Danish government
supported research in Greenland after the War. But in comparison these efforts were
often constrained by funding and personnel limitations as well as dependence upon US
provision of transportation and other services.
The Danish approach differed by being almost entirely civilian and oriented towards
basic science, whereas the US emphasis was on applied military science.4 The Danish
research interest was also broader in scope than US interests and included Greenlands
biosphere, that is its flora and fauna, its mineral and biological resources, as well as
the material living conditions and culture of its people. This breadth of Danish research
interests is reflected in the contents of the Danish scientific monograph series Meddelelser
om Grnland , which since its first publication in 1879 has regularly published research
and expedition reports on Greenland (Meddelelser om Grnland , 1879ff.).
For good reasons, Danish scientists therefore considered Greenland their backyard.
They were especially on guard against US duplication of their research, which could
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easily turn into dominance because of the superior US resource base. This, and the
differing research agendas, limited the scope for cooperation, the most prominent
exceptions being in meteorological, climate and ionospheric research. In particular,
Professor Willi Dansgaards paleo-climate research profited from access to US ice
drilling probes from the Greenland Icecap (Dansgaard, 2005). Another beneficiary of
crucial US support was Professor Jrgen Rybners ionospheric research (see below).

2. The Treaty Framework and Its Implementation

From the outset, the US activities in Greenland have been regulated by treaty between
the USA and Denmark. The 1941 Agreement (printed in DUPI, 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 722)
was a highly skewed document, however, which gave Danish authorities few regulatory
powers, while its successor of 1951 (printed in DUPI, 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 144153) set up
a regime which aimed at balancing US and Danish interests with respect to US military
research in Greenland.

3. Under the 1941 Agreement

The 1941 Agreement, negotiated with Henrik Kauffmann, the independently acting
Danish Minister to Washington, aimed at protecting the trans-Atlantic LOCs and
preventing Nazi Germany from getting a foothold in Greenland (Lidegaard, 1996). From
the outset the Atlantic LOCs were supremely important to Allied warfare as conduits
of massive ship convoys of men and materiel to Europe as well as transfers of aircraft
using Greenland as a stepping-stone.
Both types of operation hinged on accurate weather forecasts, and here Greenlandic
data was critical. As a consequence, at the end of 1946 some 24 meteorological stations
were in operation all over Greenland, 6 of which were US-operated, one (Thule) operated
jointly by Danish and US personnel, and 15 operated by Danish personnel (Amstrup,
1978, p. 173; cf. DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 61).
At the end of the War, the Danish parliament ratified the Agreement expecting an
early return to normalcy that is a US evacuation of its wartime bases and installations
(See Amstrup, 1978; DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 7285). The other side of the coin was
a policy of increasing Danish presence in Greenland, including a resumption of prewar scientific explorations. In 1946 Grnlands Geologiske Undersgelser (Greenland
Geological Survey) was established, which sent several expeditions to Greenland in the
following years. Besides, Geodtisk Institut resumed its charting of Greenland with
an expedition to South Greenland in 1946 (Amstrup, 1978, p. 167). Thus, Denmark
saw scientific research as an important instrument for reasserting its sovereignty over
Greenland.
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To the dismay of the Danish government, however, the US showed no inclination to

leave Greenland; in fact, they offered to buy it. In December 1946 Secretary of State
James Byrnes told a startled Danish Foreign Minister (Gustav Rasmussen), that the
US considered a US purchase of Greenland the best solution to its defense problem
(DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 79). On the other hand, the US was willing to hand over most
of the weather stations to Denmark on condition that the existing level and quality
of service should be continued. This revealed a weakness in the Danish strategy for
re-conquering Greenland: the lack of trained and qualified personnel. There followed
complicated discussions between the Department of Greenland (in the Prime Ministers
Office), which saw no Danish interest in an expanded meteorological activity, the Meteorological Institute (DMI), which wanted to give priority to the needs of the expanding
commercial air traffic across the Atlantic, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
which argued in broader sovereignty terms: As Denmarks policy was to persuade the
US to evacuate Greenland, it should be as forthcoming as possible to the US, even if
this meant providing services which were militarily motivated (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp.
6668). This policy line ultimately prevailed. In July 1948 Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft
admitted at a press conference that the takeover of weather services had impeded other
changes in Greenland by demanding a disproportionate share of the available resources.
But as he argued: The weather services have unavoidably and undeniably had to be
furthered at the cost of other desirable activity (Amstrup, 1978, p. 175).
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1948 the Danish Government agreed to put negotiations
on Greenlands future role on hold until the international situation had cleared up.
When this happened, Denmark found itself among the signatories of the North Atlantic
Treaty in April 1949 (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 9098). But it took two more years
before the Greenland defense question was solved.
In the meantime, US military research interests in Greenland began to show. The US
Armys Corps of Engineers, which had studied arctic conditions in Alaska during the
war, now focused on Greenland, where research on conditions on the Icecap started in
1947. The leading research agency, established in 1949, was SIPRE (The Snow, Ice
and Permafrost Research Establishment), a civilian agency under the Army Corps of
Engineers, which merged in 1961 into the still existing CRREL, The Cold Regions
Research and Engineering Laboratory (Wright, 1986).
Also in 1947 the US Air Force began to test the feasibility of preparing air-strips
on the Greenland Icecap (Operation Snowman) and continued a major air mapping of
Greenland which had been initiated the previous year. The latter met with heavy criticism
in the Danish War Department, which urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protest
to the US that the mapping of Greenland was a Danish prerogative and that the US
activity was against international custom. The MFA was equally worried, but took little
action (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 6871). The 1941 Agreement gave hardly any room for
Danish influence over US activities.
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4. Negotiating the 1951 Agreement

With Denmarks accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, the defense of Greenland
became the concern of the entire allianceor so it was thought in Copenhagen. By
having the defense question multilateralized, the Danish government hoped to escape the
uneven bilateral relationship of the 1941 Agreement. But, as it transpired, NATO referred
the negotiation of a new agreement to bilateral settlement by Denmark and the USA.
The resulting Danish-American Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, signed on 27
April 1951, therefore perpetuated the previous bilateralism (Petersen, 1998a). The main
feature of the Agreement was the definition of three defense areas (air bases), Narsarsuaq
in South Greenland, Sondrestrom in Mid-Greenland and Thule in faraway Northwest
Greenland which with the adoption of the Polar Strategy became by far the most
important US asset in Greenland, both with respect to military operations and military
research.
In the Agreement Denmark committed itselfunder such conditions as may be agreed
upon to provide such meteorological and communications services in Greenland as
may be required to facilitate operations under the agreement (Art. V, 1). In addition it
agreed to make and furnish to the US Government topographic, hydrographic, coast
and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs etc. of Greenland as may be desirable
to facilitate operations under the Agreement. In case of Danish inability to provide
the required data the US Government, upon agreement with the appropriate Danish
authorities, might produce such surveys and photographs themselves and provide the
Danish Government with copies (Art. V.2).
Even though the article seemed to picture the Danish government as the subservient
provider of services to the US, the final text represented an important concession to
Danish interests compared to the US opening gambit, a draft treaty text, which was
presented to the Danish delegation at the start of the negotiations on 27 March.
In this draft, the US sought a general right to undertake topographic, hydrographic and
geodetic surveys and take aerial photographs in any part of Greenland and its territorial
watersagainst providing the Danish government with copies. In addition they sought
general, direct access to Danish meteorological data and communication systems in
Greenland (Danish translation in DUPI, 1997, Vol. pp. 101109).
The Danish negotiators were unhappy with this and other aspects of the US draft.
They were willing to give the US wide powers within the base areas, provided only
that Denmarks sovereignty rights were respected. But they were not prepared to give
the US a free hand outside the defense areas. The initial reaction was to formulate an
alternative text, according to which US authorities might perform the desired activities
according to a special agreement in each case. This text was, however, abandoned in
the final Danish counter-draft, which concentrated on US rights in the defense areas and
simply omitted any reference to Greenland outside those. Apart from considerations of
sovereignty important motives were to keep Greenland as the preserve of Danish research
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and cartography and to prevent contacts between US servicemen and the indigenous Inuit
people in Greenland.
In the ensuing discussions the Danish argued forcefully that cartography should remain
a national task. Denmark had made considerable cartographic progress in Greenland
compared to other arctic regions and wanted to finish the job on that basis. However,
the attempt to exclude Greenland outside the defense areas did not convince the US
negotiators who now openly complained that the Danes did not seem to understand what
it was all about. While the Danes envisioned a codification of US military assistance to
Denmark in the defense of Greenland, the US was concerned with obtaining such rights
in Greenland, which would optimize its contribution to the defense of the entire NATO
region, including the USA itself.
The US delegation consequently brought activities outside the defense areas back to
the negotiation table, but in a way which at least formally respected Danish sovereignty.
On that basis, a procedure for regulating US activities outside the defense areas was
agreed (see below), and on 9 April the Danish delegation could report to the government
that the US right to charting outside the defense areas had been limited, and that activities
there would require formal Danish permissions (UM 105.D.1.a).

5. The Politics of US Military Research in the 1950s

In the Defense Agreement of 27 April 1951, the USA accepted that topographic,
hydrographic, coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs, etc. outside the defense
areas would require the agreement of the Danish Government and should be conditioned
on Danish inability to do the job itself. The addition of etc. in the text became a
very important one, as the US research interest soon expanded far beyond the list of
the expressly mentioned activities. As far as it can be established, the Danes never
questioned or commented upon this expansion.
Danish permits were given in a procedure, in which the US in each case would send
an application via its Embassy in Copenhagen to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
The request was then discussed between the involved ministries, i.e. the MFA, the MoD
(Ministry of Defense), and the Greenland Department of the Prime Ministers Office.
These three departments became the central Danish players, as questions concerning
the defense of Greenland rarely reached the cabinet level and such mundane matters as
military research hardly ever. The same held true in Parliament and its secretive Foreign
Relations Committee.
First among equals was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), whose contact with
the US Embassy in Copenhagen was the central node in the Danish-American relationship with respect to Greenland. US applications were addressed to the MFA, which
coordinated the domestic policy process and formulated the official response. The three
departments were usually in agreement, but also had their specific interests. Compared
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to the two other departments the MFA tended to take a broad foreign policy view to
research applications. So while the Ministrys impulse was to be forthcoming to US
requests in order to build up trust and credibility in the USA, it was at times tempered
by considerations of non-provocation of the Soviet Union. This dilemma resulted in a
policy of silence to avoid domestic as well as foreign attention and critique.
The Greenland Department, which gained ministerial status in 1955, was the central
agency in the internal development of Greenland. After the War old time patriarchal
colonialism was replaced by a policy of cautious and controlled modernization, presided
over by the king of Greenland, Permanent-Secretary Eske Brun. The Departments
prime interest was to protect Denmarks sovereignty over Greenland and in particular
to enforce a ban on fraternization between US servicemen and the indigenous people.
Furthermore, Secretary Brun was on guard against US attempts to secure new defense
areas, especially in faraway North East Greenland, where Polar Strategy activists like
Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter and his aide, Col. (Ret.) Bernt Balchen, pleaded
for building another air base. Economic and technical problems killed the proposal,
and instead a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 5 May 1953, which gave
the Americans limited access to the runway at the Danish weather station Nord in NE
Greenland (MOD file 981.230-41).
During his period at the helm (19501964) Brun had close working relations with US
military authorities who came to regard him as for all practical purposes the final Danish
authority on Greenland matters of all sorts (A US generals characteristic, quoted in
DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 254). Thus, the above-mentioned MoU was negotiated and signed
by Secretary Brun and the US Embassy in Copenhagen.
The defense establishment had closer contact with US military authorities in Greenland
than the other agencies, primarily through a liaison officer at each of the three US bases.
It had two main interests: First to make sure that the US presence in Greenland did
not affect relations between the Danish and US defense forces in a negative way and
secondly to ensure its own primacy concerning the military aspects of the US presence.
The Ministry of Defense therefore had few reservations to the US activities at the
bases and outside. A draft instruction 1955 to the liaison officer at Sondrestrom directed
him to establish good relations with the base authorities in the spirit of the Agreement
(DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 262). Similarly, in 1955 the liaison officer at Thule informed
his successor of an instruction from the Danish Chief of Defense, according to which
it was in the Danish interest to avoid publicity on US military activities in Northern
Greenland (Transmission report 6 May 1955, Liaison officers files, MOD).
From the very beginning the US found the agreed authorization procedure cumbersome, and on 10 June 1952, the US Embassy in Copenhagen applied for a general
permission to carry out a number of experiments and projects on the Greenland Icecap.
In particular, the US sought unlimited operating rights with respect to projects on (i)
the use of the Icecap for air operations, (ii) air rescue operations on the Icecap, (iii) the
effectiveness of electronic equipment and (iv) general conditions of operations on the
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Icecap. The Danish Government was prepared to permit the requested tests, provided
these operations be confined to a specific area, defined in advance and expecting that
any surveys or photographs resulting from these operations could be made available
in due course to the proper Danish authorities. The US accepted these conditions and
proposed an area within a radius of 150 miles from Thule. In reply the Danish Government accepted the zone and the stipulated activities in it this year. As from 1954 the
150-mile zone was given clearance until the end of 19565 . At the same time, the US
began sending in annual programs for approval.
In 1959 the US went a step further and asked for approval of a 5-year research program
arguing that the usual annual procedure involved planning, as well as personnel and
budget problems. Detailed annual research plans would continue to be sent for approval,
though. The Ministry for Greenland had no serious objections, but the MFA counseled
against the proposal, fearing a loss of control. As a compromise it was decided to give
general biannual permissions and open the possibility for 5-year permissions in case
of major projects (DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 354; notice by N.O. Christiansen, MfG, 20
August 1959. MfG, Eske Bruns Files, box 51).
The three liaison officers were supposed to monitor US research activities both
within and outside the defense areas and report on them through the long military chain
of command which went via the (Danish) Greenland Command at Grnnedal in South
Greenland, and the Danish Defense Command on to the Ministry of Defense which was
supposed to inform the MFA and the Greenland Department. The liaisons reports were
usually competent concerning operational activities at the bases, while they were not
necessarily qualified for reporting on research activities.6 At any rate, the Greenland
Department soon felt a need for a more professional and direct monitoring, and in
March 1954 Permanent Secretary Eske Brun applied to the Ministry of Finance for an
appropriation to send a scientific liaison to Thule, who would serve directly under and
report to the Greenland Department. The letter argued that the expanding US research
activity created a number of problems for Danish scientists because of their natural
interest in Greenland as a scientific work-place. For this reason scientific circles had
proposed the appointment of a scientific liaison to ensure that the US scientists kept to
the Defense Agreement and that their projects were coordinated with Danish ones.7
When the MFA forwarded this proposal for a scientific liaison to the US, it met
with unexpected opposition from the State Department, which argued, that the 1951
Agreement only allowed for one independent Danish representation at Thule, namely the
military liaison officer. This was ill received in the Greenland Department, which was
interested in having an independent rapporteur at Thule. The MFA was despondent
as well and disagreed with the US interpretation of the 1951 Agreement. However,
Permanent Secretary Nils Svenningsen, MFA, who was miffed at the Greenland
Departments failure to inform the MFA before its initiative, found it futile to insist
on formalities, as this does not further mutual cooperation. He also conceded that
the US counter-proposal, to have the proposed scientific liaison join the staff of the
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military liaison as his scientific adviser, would be workable8 . Ambassador Kauffmann

in Washington likewise counseled caution9 . As a result the Greenland Department gave
in, but the affair left considerable irritation in Copenhagen where it was felt that its
liberal policy of permission was ill rewarded. This case is a clear example of the Danish
policy of being as forthcoming as possible.
The scientific adviser took over in the summer of 1954 and, as predicted by
Svenningsen, was able to establish good working relations with the US authorities at
Thule AB. In fact, the adviser had few complaints about the US research activities.
In his 1956 Report he noticed, that these were kept narrowly within the indicated
framework and that they did not overlap Danish research projects. His conclusion
was that the US exploited the given permissions fully, but would go far to avoid
conflict with Danish authorities. His sole complaint was that the US research reports
rarely came into the hands of the Greenland Department10 . The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was less confident, though. In July 1958 Prime and Foreign Minister H.C.
Hansen visited Greenland, on which occasion the MFA produced a five-page briefing
paper on US activities in Greenland, which also touched upon research projects outside
the defense areas These now covered most of Greenland and concerned construction
methods and techniques for building roads, camps and other military installations : : :
studies of suitable approaches to the Icecap, including a possible road from Thule to
Pearyland; investigations concerning crevasses, movements in the snow and studies of
snow and ice. This research activity was followed to a certain degree by Danish
scientists. But [b]y and large it must probably be said, that because of lack of personnel
and transport materiel it is increasingly difficult for Danish authorities to follow the
American activities : : : 11 . An early draft of 16 June stated that the scientific adviser
at Thule was unable to monitor the entire research program as he primarily followed
activities within the defense area and in the 150 mile zone. The draft concluded that the
US research activities in Greenland were probably insufficiently monitored. A handwritten comment on the document found this highly unsatisfactory from a sovereignty
point of view.12 The briefing paper reflected a concern over the expanding US research
activities in the late 1950s and the difficulties of keeping track. The Danish authorities
did not come across any clear example of unauthorized US research activities, but they
often found it difficult to determine whether the actual projects were covered by the
given permissionsthe more so because these permissions had been given on the basis
of frequently unclear and general applications. Another reason why it was difficult to
keep track, was that activities gradually spread to the entire island. In 1955 the US
applied for and gained permission to create two large experimental areas outside Thule
which covered most of North Greenland, and by 1959 research activities covered six
delimited areas all over the island (See map in DUPI, 1997, Vol. 2, p. 299). A further
reason why the Danish authorities found it difficult to follow the US research activities
was their extraordinary scope spanning the obviously military projects to what seemed
purely scientific projects. Additionally, the real purpose of a project was often blurred so
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that projects which appeared to be civilian, in fact had important military applications,
which the Danish authorities could not always decipher.

6. Military Research Projects in Greenland until 1968

The text of the 1951 Agreement had mainly reflected immediate Air Force needs, which
were derived from the implementation of the Polar Strategy. With time and the entry of
actors other than the USAF, the US need for research activities expanded rapidly, not
only in geographical terms, but also qualitatively. In this process the US Army became
the most active player on the US side, with a broad research agenda related to the
Greenland Icecap.

7. US Research Activities in the 1950s

Most research projects outside the defense areas in Greenland were carried out by the
US Army. However, the available archival sources are to a large extent products of the
application and approval procedure and hence tend to over-expose the Armys activities.
In contrast, the Air Force research activities were mainly tied to the defense areas and
hence outside Danish scrutiny. For instance, the Air Force did not need to apply for
permission to build the Geopole Station in 1957 near Thule AB, which was its principal
facility for research in geomagnetism, cosmic radiation, ionosphere, aurora, airglow
etc. Neither did James Van Allen apply for permission to do rocket research in the
1950s from naval ships near Thule AB, work that lead to the discovery of the earths
radiation belts13 . On the other hand the Army needed to apply for all, or nearly all, their
glaciological work. Nonetheless, it seems clear, that the Air Force showed a weakening
interest in research towards the end of the decade, mainly because the original AF
program was by and large exhausted by that time. The early Air Force research was intimately connected with the new role of Greenland in the Polar Strategy, which envisaged
Thule as a staging and refueling base for the long- and medium-range bomber fleet14 .
This meant there was interest in the impact of the harsh arctic climate, such as extreme
temperature and wind conditions, on flying operations. Furthermore, the Air Force had a
pressing need for geodetic and cartographic data so as to link geodetic data from North
America, Greenland and Europe. This was of vital importance for safe air navigation
in the Arctic as well as for wartime missions across the North Pole. Accordingly,
the US applied for permission in 1952 to conduct a major airborne geodetic research
project covering Iceland, South Greenland and Baffin Island. Permission was given on
condition that survey data would be supplied to Denmark as well15 . In 19551956 new
geodetic measurements were carried in the southern and central parts of Greenland
as part of the so-called HIRAN project which aimed at measuring exact distances
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between Europe and Canada16 . Other USAF research projects in the 1950s explored the
conditions for aviation and landing on the Icecap and for preparing emergency landing
strips and air rescue capabilities, in Project Mint Julep (1953) and Operation Groundhog
from 1955 onwards. The latter program envisaged a study of about 30 localities along
the eastern and northern rim of Greenland stretching from Scoresbysund to Thule17 .
In the late 1950s the remaining research interests of the USAF were concentrated on
ionospheric research and research into cosmic radiation. This reflected the coming of the
missile age.
When SAC (the Strategic Air Command) took over the Thule Air Base from the
NEAC (the North East Air Command) in 1957, the Danish scientific adviser noticed
a strongly reduced interest in the arctic environment as such18 . Thus, in 1958, Curtis
LeMay, Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF, complained to the Chief of Staff, US Army, that
Thules main mission suffered from overcrowding, and that research activities had to
be reduced in order to give it maximal operational effectiveness. He therefore asked for
the Armys research units, such as TAG (the Transportation Arctic Group) and SIPRE,
to be removed from the base.19
According to the scientific adviser the new SAC policy had disastrous effects on
several research programs, but the Army institutions suffered less because the major
part of their activities now took place in camps outside the base itself (see below).
A Pentagon directive from 1949 called for new research on snow, ice and permafrost;
trafficability of soils and slopes, mapping and charting; weather analysis and climatology, and geophysical aspects of communications and navigation (quoted by Heymann
et al., 2010, p. 15). The US Armys Corps of Engineers had main responsibility
for operating this original research program. The Corps was intimately involved in
the building of Thule Air Base (TAB) in 19511952 and remained, for more than a
decade afterwards, the main research agency in Greenland. A significant part of its
research in the early years was concerned with the feasibility of tactical warfare in the
arctic environment, including the possibility of establishing a land connection between
Thule and Northeast Greenland where the US was interested in establishing another
defense area.
The driving force in this was TAG, the US Armys Transportation Arctic Group, set
up in 1952 with a 5-year program consisting of two components. The first was a test of
standard and special equipment, such as vehicles, sleds, etc., to determine their performance in the special environment of the Greenland Icecap. On 8 June 1953, permission
was requested for a first test run across the Icecap from the Thule area to Cape Georg
Cohn in the bottom of the Denmark Fiord in Northeast Greenland. The second was
a study of the physical characteristics of the ice cap as they may theoretically affect
surface transportation and to locate major surface types and to describe physical properties in detail This research would be conducted in two other crossings of the Icecap.
Altogether the Icecap crossing projects in 1953 would engage 62 military and 28 civilian
personnel.20
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The test runs from Thule to Northeast Greenland were resumed with success in 1955
with a historical crossing of the North Greenland Icecap from Thule to Cape Georg
Cohn and back again. A press release claimed that this showed the Armys capability
to penetrate one of the last frontiers in the world (Press release, 3 October 1955, UM
105.F.19). By the end of 1957, the 5-year transportation project closed down, and the
TAG became more of an ordinary transport agency. According to the scientific adviser,
the US had now gained sufficient experience in moving safely on the Icecap, to set up
military installations there and also to perform military operations on a large scale,
if need be. Particularly important in the advisers analysis was the ability to transport
large quantities of goods on the Icecap all year round21 . This capability soon came into
demand in connection with the building of camps on the Icecap itself.
By 1953 the US had seemingly given up its interest in a defense area in Northeast
Greenland22 , and its projects soon covered large parts of Greenland. The Armys
interest now veered towards studies of road-building on the Icecap and ramp studies
(passage onto the Icecap). While plans for building permanent roads on the Icecap never
materialized, research was increasingly focused on the possibilities of settlement and
military activity underneath the ice surface. This research took place in camps in the
vicinity of Thule and was conducted by SIPRE.
Besides the above-mentioned projects which had a more or less obvious military
applicability, the US also conducted projects in which the military element seemed
less visible or even absent. These projects were mainly conducted by SIPRE. In his
final summer report of 1956 the scientific adviser listed all research projects under
way, noticing that he had not come across projects which could be considered directly
overlapping with existing or past Danish projects. He mentioned, though, that the
Americans had taken probes from the Icecap for oxygen isotope research which
resembled Dr. Willi Dansgaards isotope investigations in Southern Greenland, and that
it would be natural to investigate the possibilities for cooperation23 . As mentioned,
such a cooperation was eventually established which allowed Professor Dansgaard to
document his theory on historical global climate changes (Dansgaard, 2005).
In his list of US research projects, the scientific adviser distinguished between three
types. The first comprised studies with direct military application: Approach road and
transfer points (i.e. access to the Icecap); snow compaction with a view to construct
runways on the Icecap; snow trafficability; finding way and detection of crevasses;
snow structures; ice tunnel, snow drifts, white out24 , visibility and heat radiation; and
reconnaissance for a southern approach to the Icecap.
The second group comprised basic studies which were necessary conditions for the
military projects: Basic crevasse studies; ramp studies; studies of ice movements25 ;
snow structures; patterned ground studies; ice cliff studies and steep ramp studies;
trip map, ice edge; and seismic research.
The third group had less obvious practicality: Ice drilling techniques; polar glaciology,
seismic research, and snow studies of the Greenland and Canadian Icecaps.
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8. US Armys Military Research around 1960

US research activities in Greenland peaked in the late 1950s, and went steeply down
in the 1960s, so that by 1966 the scientific adviser proposed that his position should
be abolished for lack of work26 At the same time Danish control was expanded in
1962 at the initiative of the Scientific Commission for Greenland and the Ministry for
Greenland, which expressed dissatisfaction with the existing procedure and proposed
that a representative of the US programs should give the Commission an oral briefing
each year. The proposal was forwarded by the MFA, and the US obliged27 .
The Armys ice and snow studies were intensified in the late 1950s and increasingly
directed towards the building of camps on (or rather in) the Icecap. Most of this
research took place in scientific camps within reach of Thule: Camp Tuto (in operation
19541966), Camp Fistclench (19571960) and Camp Century (196066). Over the
years the largest and most important camp was Camp Tuto (Thule Take-Off) which was
situated at the ice rim ca. 25 km SE of Thule at a place where access to the Icecap
was relatively easy. The camp which could accommodate up to 1000 men, but normally
housed half that number, had two main functions: It was the checkpoint for all traffic
onto the Icecap, and it housed a plethora of scientific projects. A major program at the
camp was a 400-m long tunnel drilled into the glazier with coal mining gear.28
In 1957, SIPRE started another drilling experiment on the Icecap which produced a
300-m long ice core. This program was capped in 1966 when the first complete ice
core, 1390 m long, was drilled at Camp Century. It was on the basis of this core sample
that Willi Dansgaard could document his path-breaking theory about long-term climatic
changes (Langway, 2011).
The short-term object of this research, though, was to explore the possibilities for
building sub-surface camps on the Icecap. At Camp Fistclench, which was built in 1957
on the Icecap in order to concentrate on ice and snow studies, a decisive breakthrough
was obtained with a new cut and cover digging technique, which used huge snow
milling machines to dig trenches in the ice surface, which were then covered with
corrugated steel roofs or other roofing.29
This tunneling technique was used in 19591960 in the construction of Camp
Century, the City under Ice, which was officially described as an effort to learn how
to construct military facilities on the Greenland Ice Cap, incorporating all previously
developed ice cap construction methods and techniques (Clark, 1965, Summary, p.
25). As explained to the Danish authorities, its purpose was to test various constructions
under arctic conditions, explore practical problems with a semi-mobile nuclear reactor
as well as support experiments on the Icecap.30
The project was initiated in September 1958, when the US Army Corps of Engineers
and SIPRE outlined a preliminary design of Camp Century; the camp was subsequently
built by the US Army Polar Research and Development Center from July 1959 to
October 1960, when it was finished except for the placement of the nuclear reactor.
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Ten percent of the camp was built in the 1959 building season, the rest in 1960 (Clark,
1965, pp. 26, 5758). The camp was placed 150 miles east of Thule and built to
accommodate about 225 men.

9. Project Iceworm
By this time in the late 1950s the US Army had acquired considerable experience with
the Arctic environment and with techniques to handle it. This formed the background
for Project Iceworm, the Armys imaginative attempt to claim a stake in the US
missile deterrent. In 1959 the Army lost out in the inter-service competition for the
first generation of US strategic missiles, but bounced back in March 1960 with a bid
for an alternative deployment of the next-generation missile, the solid-fuel Minuteman
missile (Armacost, 1969; Weiss, 2001). This was to redress the downward trend in the
Armys budget allocations in the 1950s which left it with only 22% of the defense budget
compared to the Navys 29% and the Air Forces 49% (Huntington, 1961, p. 413). No
wonder that the Army began to think hard about its potential role in nuclear affairs.
While the Air Force proposed to deploy the Minuteman in hardened underground silos,
the Armys Engineer Studies Center suggested a mobile deployment and concealment
as a better protection against enemy attack. The basic concept of its proposal named
Strategic Value of the Greenland Icecap31 was to deploy so-called Iceman MRBMs (a
two-stage version of Minuteman) in covered trenches of the same type as in Camp Century beneath the ice surface. The system would eventually comprise about 600 missiles
with a range of 3500 nautical miles and cover altogether 80% of all relevant Soviet targets. The missiles would be placed 4 miles apart in thousands of miles of cut-and-cover
trenches whose floor would be 28 feet beneath the surface. The whole system was to be
controlled by a number of hardened launch control centers and mounted on a railway
system under the ice. The system would thus be both mobile and concealed (Baldwin,
1985, pp. 5356; DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1: pp. 319326; Weiss, 2001; Petersen, 2008).
The relationship between Camp Century and Iceworm is still somewhat of a chickenand-egg problem. Anyhow, the fact that the two projects were hatched in the same
milieu, the Army Engineers, suggests an intimate link between them. Was Camp Century
a highly publicized cover project for Iceworm? If so, Iceworm was not only part of
the original design of Camp Century, but its very rationale. Or should Iceworm be
interpreted as an afterthought or a quick fix to the Armys strategic problem? If so,
Iceworm was not part of the original Camp Century idea, but grafted onto it later. Too
little is known about the genesis of either project to decide which came first. What we
know is that by March 1960, when the major part of Camp Century still remained to be
physically constructed, Iceworm was a developed concept, adopted by the Army as its
gambit in the inter-service game.
It is not the intention here to relate the whole known history of Project Iceworm,
which has been told elsewhere (Petersen, 2008). The initial proposal of March 1960 had
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no apparent political effect, possibly because a general skepticism towards MRBMs

had developed at that time and attention had shifted to ICBMs. Both the Air Force
with the silo-based Minuteman and the Navy with its mobile and concealed Polaris
missile argued against Iceworm and were undoubtedly happy to see it stay in the
fridge.
But that was not the end of Iceworm. In January 1962 it was reintroduced into
the debate as a possible solution, not to the deterrent needs of the USA, but to the
European demand for an independent NATO deterrent. The pressure on the Kennedy
Administration to do something was strong after the NATO Ministerial Meeting of
December 1961, where a European deterrent had figured prominently in the discussions,
and something had to be done. In this situation the Iceworm proposal surfaced once
again, and its military potential and political feasibility was now discussed in earnest
by a high-ranking study-group set up for that purpose between the State Departments
Policy Planning Staff and the Department of Defense.
The study group concluded that the military and strategic premiums of Iceworm would
be very high, and while an analysis of the likely Danish response made it concerned,
it was not despondent. Under certain conditions Denmark might give a green light to
Iceworm. Therefore it summed up its discussion in the following way:
Alhough no clear prognosis can now be made, the acceptability of Iceworm as a NATO
capability is promising enough to be pursued. It should be generally acceptable to the NATO
nations, aside from Denmark and Norway, and Danish acquiescence, perhaps not without
agonizing appraisal of the concept, is possible, but cannot be assured. Further research into
Iceworm, toward the end of presenting it to NAC [North Atlantic Council] should therefore not
be discouraged on political grounds.32

Eventually the Kennedy Administration decided against a hardware solution in the

shape of a physical NATO force by proposing an improvement of nuclear consultation
in the Alliance. This was probably what the Administration had preferred from the
beginning, but a contributing reason for ditching the Iceworm was technical.
By 1962 it was clear that the concept of Camp Century and subsurface camps was
badly flawed, as it turned out that the Icecap was much more plastic than expected.
This was the disappointing conclusion of a report dated 31 December 1961, on The
construction of Camp Century from the Polar Research and Development Center 33 . As a
result of the movement of the ice, tunnel roofs and walls had to be constantly maintained,
and in 1962 the roof of the nuclear reactor hall had to be lifted five feet when it threatened
to crush the reactor. These hard physical facts were probably what killed the Iceworm.

10. The Danish Reaction to Camp Century

While the report of the joint State Department and Department of Defense study group
ended on a guarded conclusion, it was wildly optimistic as to the likelihood of a Danish
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acceptance of Iceworm. As it happened, the Danish government had no idea what was
brewing in Washington D.C., even though a lengthy report on Camp Century in the
July 1960 issue of Det Bedste, the Danish edition of Readers Digest, could have given
it a clue. The article focused on the scientific activities in the camp, but also stated that
if it should be necessary to give priority to military installationsfor example launch
pads for ICBMs or guided missilesall plans, installations and all materiel is ready
(DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 325).
The Danish governments response to a proposal to realize Project Iceworm, however,
is easy to predict: A flat No! Since 1951 the Danish Government had not allowed new
defense areas in Greenland. Therefore it was extremely unlikely that Denmark would
have accepted any proposal that could make the entire island into one gigantic defense
area34 . Accepting Iceworm would totally compromise Denmarks official non-nuclear
status and explode the myth that it applied to Greenland as well35 . It would furthermore
be at odds with Denmarks general non-provocation policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Finally, it would almost certainly break up the government coalition between Social
Democrats and defense-sceptical Social Liberals.36
Being unaware of the Iceworm program, the Danish governments chief concern
with Camp Century was the installation of a nuclear reactor to generate electricity
to the under-ice community. In May 1959 the USA applied for permission to set
up a research and development sub-surface camp on the Icecap with two specific
purposes: (a) to test and demonstrate arctic construction techniques, and (b) to test and
demonstrate the feasibility of providing electricity and heat by the use of a semi-mobile
nuclear power reactor. The latter request was made despite an urgent Danish plea to
refrain.
The request was discussed in a high-level inter-departmental meeting on 20 August
1959, in which Permanent Secretary, Nils Svenningsen, MFA, expressed grave concerns
that the reactor might generate an unpleasant public debate with extremely unfavorable
effects on the on-going domestic defense talks37 . Permanent Secretary H. H. Koch of
the Danish Nuclear Energy Commission had other concerns. He wondered why the
camp would be so large and questioned why 60 scientists were needed to work on
experiments with a reactor which was already in operation elsewhere. With a triple
negation he did not feel convinced that the purpose of this camp was not something
which was not clearly told38 . The Ministry for Greenland had no serious objections to
the establishment of Camp Century, while the MoD was of the opinion that the research
establishment would not change the military situation as it did not represent any
military factor (!)39 . The outcome of the meeting was a request to the liaison officer
at Thule to find out how far the construction of the camp had progressed. The Liaison
reported back that the station was named Camp Century, but that it only consisted so
far of a 10 by 60 m hole in the Icecap40 .
Despite concerns the camp was approved in principle on 14 September 1959, and the
final approval for the reactor was given on 10 January 1960, on condition that the USA
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took full responsibility for any damages it might cause and that Denmark would be
informed about radiation levels in the nuclear waste, any technical changes that might
impact security and that the US would remove all radioactive parts after use41 . While
the latter three conditions were accepted, it took 2 years before the USA conceded the
first one42 .
In December 1963 the Danish government was told that the reactor would be removed
in l964. This happened in October 1964, but the reactor had closed down 1 year earlier,
presumably because the movements of the ice threatened to crush it. With that an
important chapter of the US presence in Greenland also closed.
With the closure of Camp Century in 1966 the US Army reduced its research activities
and at a meeting on 14 May 1968, an Army representative told the Danish Commission
for Scientific Exploration in Greenland, that because of the US military engagement
in Vietnam it was no longer possible to obtain necessary research appropriations. The
Army therefore had to drop its Greenlandic programs43 .

11. US Research Projects in the 1960s

The US Air Forces research interests were increasingly directed towards space and
strategic warning against nuclear attack. In 1958 Greenland had been linked with the
DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line across Canada, which was designed to warn against
a Soviet bomber attack. Simultaneously with the building of Camp Century another
construction process took place in Thule, which was to have far more consequences,
namely the construction of BMEWS, the colossal Ballistic Early Warning System against
a Soviet ICBM attack. When the radar went into operation in 1960, Thules role arguably
changed to become a stabilizing factor in the game of mutual deterrence.
But the Thule Radar had some weak, destabilizing spots: The radar itself was
vulnerable to missile attack, and both it and its radio communication links with NORAD
(North American Air Defense Command) were vulnerable to blackouts caused by the
solar wind and the aurora borealis. Such blackouts which occurred on the heels of solar
eruptions and which could last for up to a week, had been a problem for arctic aviation,
military and civilian, from the very beginning. This spawned a lively US interest in
ionospheric research, for which Greenlands geographical location near the magnetic
North Pole was ideal, beginning with establishment of an ionosphere station at the
Narsarsuaq air base in 1950. The following year Danish scientists built, with US help,
an ionosphere station at Godhavn (on Disko Island), and in 1957, when Narsarsuaq
was abandoned, they took over the operation of the station there. This showed an early
Danish interest in using Greenlands ideal location for ionospheric research, which went
back to Professor P.O. Pedersens pioneering work in the inter-war years (Taagholt,
1972). The leading Danish figure was now Jrgen Rybner, whose research projects
were executed within the framework of the Danish Meteorological Institute and The
Technical University of Denmark, but were largely funded by the US National Science
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Foundation, the National Bureau of Standards and US military bodies (Taagholt, 1972;
Heymann et al., 2010, p. 30).
The USAF initiated its own major ionospheric program at Thule in 1960, which was
readily accepted by the Danish government. However, a request in October 1963 for permission to carry out a balloon project from Thule caused second thoughts in the Danish
MFA and was eventually rejected. The project would have involved the launch of some
50 balloons, designed to circle the polar region in altitudes of 30 km with instruments for
measuring basic geophysical and solar terrestrial phenomena. The hitch was that the
USA had tried to have the project approved as part of The International Year of the Quiet
Sun, but failed because of Soviet opposition. The US request specifically mentioned the
possibility of some of these balloons intruding into Soviet airspace. While the ministries
for Greenland and Defense had no objections to the program, the MFA felt that the
straying of balloons into Soviet airspace might cause reactions such as attempts to shoot
them down, diplomatic protests with references to the U2 affair in 1960, and renewed
Soviet allegations that Denmark had given up sovereignty over Greenland and that the
US defense areas were used for war-provoking purposes44 The question was referred
to Foreign Minister Per Hkkerup with a recommendation to reject the application,
among other things because Denmark had no way of evaluating the possible military
importance of the balloons. This settled the matter, and with profound regret the USA
was informed that the launching of balloons from Thule or elsewhere in Greenland
could not be approved45 . The USA returned in 1966 with an application for a similar
balloon project from Thule, which raised the same Danish concerns as the previous one,
and after some discussion the USA decided to transfer the experiments to Antarctica.
On the other hand, Denmark reacted positively to a US request in 1964 to launch meteorological rockets from Thule, and on 9 July 1964, a formal agreement was concluded
under the 1951 Agreement to allow this for the duration of the Defense Agreement46 .
In February 1968 the first rocket was launched carrying a Danish ionospheric
experiment.47 This was one month after the B-52 crash on the ice-bound sea outside
Thule AFB.

12. Conclusions
Military research was always a side-show in the military operations that took place out
of the defense areas (Petersen, 2011). Yet research activities at times grew to a level,
where SAC protested that it hampered its mission of strategic deterrence. At the same
time, in the late 1950s, the US Armys interest in snow and ice research of every kind
narrowed down to a plan to turn the Greenland Icecap into a gigantic missile base. After
the technical problems with maintaining the city under the ice had manifested itself,
the entire concept was abandoned, and by 1966, when Camp Century closed down,
US research in Greenland continued in a much lower gear. This prompted the Danish
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scientific adviser to suggest that his post should be abolished for lack of projects to
report on. This was in stark contrast to the situation a decade earlier when the Danish
authorities complained about an overload of control tasks.
Above it was suggested that the direction and intensity of the US research efforts in
Greenland could be explained by, the interplay of the US security strategies, the unique
character of the arctic environment and the need for Danish consent. In the period under
consideration two major strategic shifts took place. First, the Polar Strategy, which
was implemented from early 1951, meant that Thule Air Base was developed as a key
base for staging and later air fuelling SACs bomber fleet on strategic missions. A
number of research projects inside and outside the defense areas aimed at including the
whole island in this overall strategy. This required the build upfrom near-scratchof a
broad spectrum of expertise in the arctic environment as well as the solution of specific
problems. For instance, the early interest in the trafficability of the Icecap should be
seen in the context of plans (which never materialized) for another air base in Northeast
Greenland, some 600 miles closer to the Soviet Union.
The other major strategic development was the consolidation of the MAD doctrine
in the early 1960s with its emphasis on developing a second-strike capability based on
strategic warning and the hardening/concealment of the US missile force. Concretely,
the ionosphere research and Camp Century/Project Iceworm were spin-offs of this
development. Even though not perfect, there is a case for considering Iceworm the secret
crowning glory of the US Army engineers snow and ice programs. First, we know
that the US Army at a certain time placed their bets on Iceworm as a project which
would give it a role in the deterrent hierarchy; secondly, Iceworm as sketched out fitted
nicely into the construction principles of Camp Century; and thirdly, there were specific
features of Camp Century which made limited sense without an Iceworm reference.
The first was the test of a mobile atomic reactor. There was no obvious need for a
reactor in a camp of Camp Centurys size (as it happened, the camp was powered by
conventional generators for much of its lifetime). Conversely, when talking about a large
and complex system like Iceworm, nuclear power was the only feasible energy source.
Another curiosity was the small piece of railway in Camp Century. There was hardly
any use for railway transportation within the camp or between the camp and Thule,
either. Again, the railway makes sense in an Iceworm context, as a transport system for
moving Iceman missiles around like in the MX system discussed, but never deployed in
the 1990s.48
The second factor, the unique Greenland environment, was a major stimulus for
research in itself. A great number of US projects were, in fact, self-explanatory, such as
tests of the functioning of weapons, vehicles, instruments etc. under arctic conditions, or
the study of the problems with constructing buildings, runways, roads etc. on snow, ice
or permafrost. But other projects were probably initiated simply because an interesting
research problem presented itself, and because resources were available to take them
on. The Greenland Icecap was a formidable scientific challenge in itself, quite aside
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from its possible utilization for military purposes. As noted by Heymann et al. (2010,
p. 30) it is an open question to what extent military interests shaped research programs
at these institutions or to what extent civilian scientists managed to seize the opportunity
of military funding for their own research interests. The latter was at least what SAC
suspected in the late 1950s.
The Danish attitude to the US research activities in Greenland was the third determining factor. It distinguished sharply between the defense areas and the rest of Greenland.
In the 1951 Agreement the USA was given an almost free hand with respect to
activities within the defense areas, and the Danish Government did little to exploit its
remaining possibilities for insight. In their applications to the Danish Government the US
never explained, in detail or in broad terms, what the strategic purpose or context was.
The Danish government rarely asked questions, and neither the military liaison officers
nor the scientific advisers made such speculations in their reports, nor did the involved
departments in their handling of applications discuss the broader strategic context as they
understood it. The only known instance is the doubts expressed on Camp Century by
Permanent Secretary H. H. Koch. But such concerns were not followed by real efforts to
find out.
On the other hand, the Danish authorities insisted on full formal control of activities
outside the defense areas. In the first place, this meant respect for the existing regime
while actual on site control proved difficult to obtain. The Americans for their part
were primarily interested in flexible application and permission procedures, and also got
certain concessions to that effect. The basic application and permission procedure was
retained, however. The result was a trade-off between US security interests, which the
Danish government had little wish to be associated with, and supreme Danish interests in
sovereignty rights, the protection of the native Greenlanders from corrupting influences
on their way of life, as well as the wish to keep Greenland as a privileged playground
for Danish research.
By and large, the trade-off functioned in a way which both parties found satisfactory.
This balance was a delicate one, though. In certain periods the Danish system was on the
verge of overload from an expansion of US research projects both in quantity and space.
Another problem was the, often, blurred line between military and civilian research. This
was especially the case with Camp Century, which was widely publicized and yet not
properly understood by the Danish authorities as well as by the international scientific
community.
NOTES
1. The treaty is printed in DUPI (1997, Vol. 2, pp. 144153).
2. Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953, when it became an integral part of Denmark. In 1979
it received Home Rule status, which was replaced in 2009 with a Self Government constitution.
Foreign and defense policy is still the prerogative of the Danish Government, though.
3. In 1931 the government of Norway subscribed to a claim of sovereignty over part of East Greenland
raised by Norwegian hunters active there. Denmark reacted by referring the case to The International
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4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

315

Court of Justice in The Hague which ruled in Denmarks favor in 1933. See Laursen (1966) and
Drivenes and Jlle (2006, pp. 296307).
There were exceptions, though. Important Danish research was conducted by formal defense
agencies, such as the Geodetic Institute or DMI (Denmarks Meteorological Institute) or by real
defense agencies like Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt (Defense Research Institution). Conversely, there
was an important civilian component in the US research, but as the 1951 Agreement only covered
military research, it was presented as such to the Danish authorities.
US note 615, 10 June 1952. UM 105.F.9; Danish note verbale, 25 October 1952. UM 105.F.9.a;
US note 333, 10 February 1953. UM 105.F.9.a; MFA notice, 26 July 1956. UM 105.F.16.
On the military liaisons, see DUPI (1997, Vol. 1, pp. 261264).
Letter PMs Office to Ministry of Finance, 26 March 1954. UM 105.F.8.
Letter to Washington Embassy, 26 June 1954. UM 105.F.8.
Notice on meeting Kauffmann-Brun, 6 June 1954. UM 105.F.8.
Scientific advisers final report Summer 1956. UM 105.F.8.
MFA notice 25 June 1958. UM 105.F.9.a.
MFA notice, 16 June 1958. UM 105.F.9.a.
I thank the issue editors for having drawn my attention to these examples.
The original rationale for Thule was the staging of the heavy B-36 bomber, which was home-based
in the Continental USA, but would stop over in Thule to take on fuel and other provisions before
continuing their mission against the Soviet Union. Later, with the introduction of the medium B-47
bomber, the main task became air refueling as to extend its reach. The introduction of the truly
intercontinental B-52 reduced Thules role in the strategic offensive. Instead it obtained a central
role in strategic warning with the building of the BMEWS radar in 1960. See Petersen (2011).
US note No. 34, July 1952; Danish note verbale August 1952. UM 105.F.19.
MFA notice 15 August 1955; UM 105.F.9.
Cf. US note 153, 2 November 1955. UM 105.F.9.
Concluding report, Summer 1958, 10 February 1959. UM 105.F.9.
See Memorandum for the Chief of Staff US Army, 20 March 1958. Records of the Army Staff,
entry 63/DCSOPS, 1958, folder 091 Greenland, box 11, NARA. In 1959 Permanent Secretary Eske
Brun was told by the Chief of Staff, USAF Eighth Air Force, that he considered all scientific
projects at Thule superfluous and troublesome. In his view US scientists seemed to have gotten the
impression, that Thule was a place where one could draw on the USAF for support for private pet
projects. Letter Brun to Svenningsen, 17 September 1959. Eske Bruns Archive, box 51, MfG.
US note 499, 8 June 1953. UM 105.F.20.
Preliminary Report from the scientific adviser, 30 July 1958, UM 105.F.8.
As the Danish government proved unwilling to allow further defense areas in Greenland, the USA
acquiesced to the building of a Danish-operated landing strip at the weather Station Nord , in
the northeastern corner of Greenland, which could be used for emergency landings, but not for
ordinary operations. See DUPI (1997, Vol. 1, pp. 338342).
Final Report, Summer 1956. UM 105.F.8.
On white-out studies, see Martin-Nielsen (2012).
On ice movement studies, see Martin-Nielsen (2012).
Report to military liaison, 12 August 1966. UM 105.F.9.a
Letter MfG to MFA, 8 December 1961, Eske Bruns Archive, box 52, MfG.
On Camp Tuto, see Fristrup (1964), Taagholt (1977), and DUPI (1997, Vol. 1, pp. 356357).
On Camp Finchclench, see Fristrup (1964); UM notice 25 February 1959; US note 20 February
1959. UM 105.F.2.b/1. The Danish-American exchange of notes referred to a disagreement on
whether the USA had permission to place the camp just outside a former radar station on the
Icecap (Site 2). The Danes ended up accepting the US explanation that it was covered by the Site
2 authorization.

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N. Petersen

30. US report on Camp Century, 18 April 1962. UM 105.F.2.b/2; Clark, 1965; Fristrup, 1962, 1964;
Taagholt, 1977; DUPI, 1997, Vol. 1, pp. 357360.
31. The document has not been found, but is thoroughly discussed in a paper, dated 1 February
1962, on Deployment of NATO MRBMs on the Greenland Icecap (The US Armys Iceworm
Concept). RG 59 PPS Records Lot 60 D 124, box 121. Folder Europe January to May 1962,
NARA. Reproduced in DUPI (1997 Report, Vol. 2, pp. 314348). See also Baldwin (1985,
pp. 5356).
32. DUPI, 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 343344.
33. Ministeriet for Grnland, Flles departementschefarkiv 19501976, pk. 86, MfG.
34. As mentioned Denmark had declined to create a fourth defense area in Northeast Greenland, and
in 1958 the four Dew Line Radars were not made formal defense areas.
35. Denmark declared itself nuclear-free in 1957, but gave at the same time a top-secret green light to
the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Greenland. See Petersen (1998b).
36. As a matter of fact Denmark had reacted promptly and forcefully when Col. (Ret.) Bernt Balchen,
proposed the deployment of MRBMs in Northeast Greenland in The New York Herald Tribune
22 October 1957. Danish fears that this was an official feeler were hardly correct, but they
demonstrated the governments sensitivity to being associated with the US deterrent. According
to Balchens diary, the initiative came from the newspaper, and the article was written without
contacts with his former employers. K.158.7053. Bernt Balchen Collection, folder 258. Air Force
Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
37. Mr. Svenningsen probably referred to difficulties within the three-party coalition government over
a new defense settlement and the publics sensitivity to nuclear issues.
38. Report on meeting 20 August 1959. UM 105.F.2.b/2, and Flles Departementschefarkiv 19501978,
box 83, MfG.
39. MoD to MFA 5 September 1959, Flles Departementchefarkiv box 82, MfG.
40. Tel. Liaison Thule Air Base to MoD, 23 August 1959. Ministry for Greenland Archive, box 83.
41. Danish note verbale, 10 February 1962. UM 105.F.2.b/2.
42. US note verbale, 24 September 1962.UM 105.F.2.b/2.
43. Notice on meeting 14 May 1968, in Flles Departementschefarkiv, box 87, MfG.
44. MFA notice 7 November 1963. UM 105.F.9.a.
45. Danish note verbale 18 November 1963. UM 105.F.9.a.
46. Danish note to US embassy 9 July 1964. UM 105.F.9.a.
47. Meddelelse til pressen vedrrende Raketeksperimenter fra Grnland, 29. februar 1968,
Ionosfrelaboratoriet, Danmarks Tekniske Hjskole, Lyngby, signed J.K. Olesen & Peter Stauning.
UM 105.F.9.a.
48. This argument is not necessarily weakened by the fact that the railroad was installed in 1962 and
presumably after Iceworm had been given up.

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Columbia University Press).
Baldwin, W. C. (1985) The Engineer Studies Center and Army analysis. A history of the U.S. Armys Engineer
Studies Center19431982 (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Corp of Engineers).
Clark, E. F. (1965) Camp Century. Evolution of concept and history of design, construction and performance.
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Drivenes, E. A. and Jlle, H. D. (eds.) (2006) Into the ice. The history of Norway and the polar regions, Vol. 1
(Oslo: Norsk Gyldendal).
DUPI (1997) Grnland under den kolde krig. Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 19451968, 2 Vols.
(Copenhagen: DUPI).
Fristrup, B. (1960) Nogle amerikanske undersgelser af Grnlands indlandsis, Tidsskriftet Grnland , 1960,
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Fristrup, B. (1964) Further investigations of the Greenland Ice Cap, Geografisk Tidsskrift, 63, 121129.
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Greenland: science and technology in Cold War settings, Scientia Canadensis, 33(2), 1142.
Huntington, S. (1961) The common defense: Strategic programs in national politics (New York: Columbia
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Langway, C. C. (2011) Willi Dansgaard, Arctic, 64(3), 385387.
Laursen, D. (1966) Danmark Ekspeditionens politiske betydning, Tidsskriftet Grnland , 1966(12),
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Petersen, N. (1998a) Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: theoretical and empirical analyses,
Scandinavian Political Studies, 21, 128.
Petersen, N. (1998b) The H.C. Hansen paper and nuclear weapons in Greenland, Scandinavian Journal of
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Petersen, N. (2008) The Iceman that never came: Project Iceworm, the search for a NATO deterrent, and
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90115.
Taagholt, J. (1972) Danish ionospheric research, Arctic, 25(4), 250262.
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279291.
Weiss, E. D. (2001) Cold War under the ice. The Armys bid for a long-range nuclear role, Journal of Cold
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Engineering Laboratory).

Archives
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Archives, Copenhagen (UM), especially:
UM 105.D.1.a. Agreement of 27/4 1951 between Denmark and the United States on
the Defense of Greenland.
UM 105.F.8.: Scientific adviser to the Thule liaison officer, 19541968.
UM 105.F.9.: American activity outside the defense areas, 19531968.
Ministry for Greenland, State Archives, Copenhagen (MfG), especially:
Permanent Secretary Eske Brun File 19401961. Box 4952.
Permanent Secretary Files 19501978. Box 5992.

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Ministry of Defense Files, State Archives, Copenhagen (MoD), especially:

DUPIs unedited notes on monthly reports from the liaison officer at Thule Air Base.
State Department, RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD, especially:
Decimal Files 19491962.
Lot files. Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 1962.
US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL.
Bernt Balchen Collection.

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