People v. Echagaray [G.R. No. 117472.

February 7, 1997]
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with
murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim,
life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not
beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist
who, as such, does not take human life."

People v. De la Cruz (G.R. No. L-5790

April 17, 1953)

In other words, and referring to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 509, under
the first theory the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive
under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to
the kind of offenses prescribed. If it is not, the imposition by the judge of a stiff
penalty but within the limits of the section will not be deemed
unconstitutional.2 The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the
court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable
disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would,
under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.

Perez v. People (G.R. No. 164763 Feb 12, 2008)

The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.

US v. Ang G.R. No. L-8956

February 4, 1914

In a former case we discuss at length the nature and the gravity of the injury to the
body politic which it is asserted would result from the unchecked spread of the
opium habit, and we then expressed our belief that the legislator was clearly within
his prerogative in enacting the statute defining an penalizing the unauthorized use
of the drug and its derivatives. (U.S. vs. Lim Sing, 23, Phil. Rep., 424.) Adhering to
the doctrine and the reasoning of that opinion we have no hesitation in holding that
in prescribing a minimum penalty of P300 for the violation of the penal provisions of
that statute, the legislator did not exceed the limits of the discretion conferred upon
him in that regard, and that this penalty is not therefore excessive in the sense in
which that word is used in the Philippine Bill of Rights.

People v Estoista (G.R. No. L-5793 August 27, 1953)

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual."