DUMLAO VS COMELEC 96 SCRA 392

Facts:
BP 52 was enacted in connection with January 30, 1980 Local Elections. The
petitioners question Sec. 4 of the said law on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence. The first
paragraph of Sec. 4 reads any retired elective provincial city, municipal official,
who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 yrs. of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective office from which he retired. On the other hand, par. 2 of Sec. 4
provides: Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insureccion, rebellion or other similar
crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this
Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein and the filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court of military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such facts.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforecited provisions of Sec. 4 of BP 52 are violative of the
constitutional principles of equal protection and presumption of innocence.

Held:
Par. 1, Sec 4 of BP 52 does not transgress the constitutional guarantee mentioned
the first par. Of Sec 4 is VALID. As adverted to in many decisions, the equal
protection clauses does not prohibit classification, provided it complies with the
requisites what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
The distinction here is substantial. The 2nd par. of Sec 4 however, violates the
constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so, since a candidate is
disqualified from running for a public office on the ground alone that charges have
been filed against him. In this wise, it is as if he is placed in the same category as a
person who has already been convicted of a crime whose penalty carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.