Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Christoph Hellmann is currently writing his PhD thesis on Strategy-as-Practice at the Chair for
Strategic Management at EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL, Germany. Furthermore, he also works
as a management consultant for different companies in Germany. Academically, he focuses on the
philosophy of science, general sociological theory and their application to issues of strategic
management.
Andreas Rasche is currently working at the Chair for Business Administration at the Helmut Schmidt
University, Hamburg, Germany and is finishing his PhD in strategic management at EUROPEAN
BUSINESS SCHOOL, Germany where he is also teaching business ethics. His research interests
include the institutionalization of ethics initiatives in multinational corporations, reflections about the
theory of strategic management, as well as the relation between the sociology of practice to strategy
and ethics.
Hellmann, Rasche
This paper provides an overview of definitions of the term social practice and its
relation to the Strategy-as-Practice research community. Based on the work of
Bourdieu, Giddens, Latour, and de Certeau, we outline and discuss a variety of
notions of the concept of social practice to show differences and commonalities. We
relate these insights to the literature on Strategy-as-Practice to illustrate that a
theoretical discussion of the term strategy practice can uncover issues that have
remained unexplored so far. We thereby identify opportunities for future research by
highlighting those aspects of strategy practices that have not attracted much
attention within our community. In fact, we propose to (a) differentiate stronger
between strategic activity and strategy-as-practice, (b) to put a stronger focus on the
role of objects (e.g., computers) within strategy practices, (c) to not neglect the fact
that strategy practices account for both, stability and change, (d) to explore the way
strategists share, discuss, and develop strategy practices in so-called communities of
strategy formation and (e) to start a debate about what constitutes an appropriate
unit of analysis that acts as a ground for empirical investigations.
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The second part of the paper discusses implications of these different theoretical
views for the Strategy-as-Practice community. The different theories allow us to
identify so far underappreciated aspects of strategy practices. In particular, we
highlight five issues: First, a theoretical discussion of practice theories demonstrates
that there needs to be a stronger distinction between strategic activity and strategy
practices. Second, following Latour (2005), we emphasize that the practice turn also
incorporates a turn to things (Preda, 1999) stressing the importance of materiality.
We will argue that discussing Strategy-as-Practice necessarily involves considering
the role of artifacts. Third, based on works of Latour (1986) and Giddens (1979), we
emphasize that strategy practices account for both, stability and change and discuss
some practical implications of this insights. Fourth, we highlight the need to research
the way strategists share and develop strategy practices. We propose to integrate the
notion of communities of practice (Lave/Wenger 1991, Brown/Duguid 1991) arriving
at what we would call communities of strategy formation. Finally, the fifth issue
discusses whether we already possess an adequate unit of analysis that can guide
empirical investigations.
The third part of the paper discusses how we deal with the variety of understandings
regarding the term strategy practices. As already indicated, this paper focuses on
theories of practice that are just one possible alternative for conducting research
within the Strategy-as-Practice field. We discuss how we should deal with a diversity
of opinions and argue for the adoption of Gallisons (1999, 1997) idea of trading
zones between scholars with different perspectives. We feel that to understand our
community as a trading zone, in which scholars from diverse backgrounds that apply
different
methodological
approaches
and
possess
distinct
metatheoretical
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Repitition of activities
becomes a practice
To fully grasp the difference between activity and practice and their modes of
explication, we need to take a closer look at the relation between both terms. A good
point of departure to approach this discussion are Cranachs (1980) three
perspectives from which praxis and thus also activity and practice could be
investigated:
a subjective perspective relating to mental contents (e.g. know-how and knowthat knowledge, preferences, values, internalized norms) of the one carrying
out a bodily movement and
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objective
objective
Practice
Activity
manifest
manifest
Praxis
Praxis
subjective
subjective
time
time
In Figure 1, describing and explaining a punctual activity within praxis refers only to
the manifest perspective answering the question what is visible, e.g. how did the
actor move her body or what artifacts did she use. In Figure 2 however, a series of
activities is seen as a coherent one labeled practice. Now, we employ
simultaneously elements of the objective perspective (e.g. social structure), the
subjective perspective (e.g. individual preferences) and their interaction (e.g how
does social structure influence individual preferences) to describe and explain the
coherence of activities describable in manifest terms. Thereby, the focus of the
analysis is extended to include not only the question what is visible but also why did
it became visible and why is it visible across several actors scattered across time
and space, i.e. why is what human beings are doing patterned and why do we
recognize it as such. Of course, Figure 2 lends itself for different and perhaps farfetched interpretations; the only point we would like to take forward is that a
description of practices involves an explicit attunement to all three perspectives.
Taken together the three perspectives and their relationship allow for a conceptual
framing of a practice definition. A practice may be understood as a
[] routinized type of behaviour which consists of several
elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities,
forms of mental activities, things and their use, a background
knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of
emotion and motivational knowledge. (Reckwitz, 2002: 249)
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In this definition of practice, forms of bodily activities and things and their use are
part of the manifest perspective whereas mental activities, understanding, knowhow, states of emotion and motivational knowledge can all be located within the
subjective perspective. The objective perspective gets relevant when assuming that
the instantiation of these elements is not only individually but also collectively
routinized. Despite this seemingly trivial conceptualization of a practice, it can be the
point of departure for a more in-depth discussion (Schatzki, 1996, 2001; Reckwitz
2002; Hrning 2001). As indicated in the introductory section, scholars that define
social practices usually put a focus on specific aspects that refer to the list of issues
highlighted in Reckwitz definition. In what follows, we discuss four different scholars
(i.e. Bourdieu, Giddens, de Certeau, Latour) and demonstrate how these scholars
have highlighted issues that are listed in Reckwitz definition of a practice.
her
deliberate
control
(Bourdieu,
1979:
169;
1992:
100,
144;
Bourdieu/Wacquant, 1996: 154). These dispositions and schemes are built qua
socialization (Bourdieu, 1985: 69; Bourdieu/Wacquant, 1996: 173). Thus, the habitus
is an opus operatum, i.e. a structure being structured, as it gets determined by those
objective structures surrounding the actor and makes it appear as if the actor
followed explicit rules or a rational calculus (Bourdieu, 1979: 165, 2001: 176).
However, as a system of dispositions the habitus also demarcates the insuperable
scope of an actors activities: One the one hand, the habitus might be interpreted as
practical knowledge allowing the actor to attribute meaning to a given situation, on
the other, it provides her with schemes of applicable activities. This does not mean
that the habitus determines activities in a mechanistic fashion as the habitus itself is
evolving and the characteristics of the situation in which it is applied may vary.
Nevertheless, looking at the habitus as the primary influence on activities and praxis,
the habitus functions as a modus operandi, i.e. a structure revealing a structuring
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effect as the habitus leads to a praxis that is both the result of and the basis for
objective structures. Hence, the objective and the subjective perspective are
inextricably linked: The subjective perspective applies practices as routine forms of
thinking and acting representing and recreating the fabric of objective structures.
Theorizing practices thus needs to start at the manifest side as they can not be
directly accessed and calls for a historical reconstruction of the structures that
structured the habitus.
scholars.
First,
practices
are
routinized,
stable,
and
institutionalized features of social systems that persist across time and space. Actors
draw upon these institutionalized features in their conduct. Second, practices are
always situated. Although there is a routinized part to them, actors also change and
adapt practices within their course of action. Practices are reproduced and thus
constantly enacted according to the situation at hand. Giddens (1979: 54) says it
precisely: All social practices are situated activities [] (emphasis in the original)
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thick description (Geertz, 1973) of practices that are not meaningful per se but gain
meaning only in the process of application.
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being labeled specifically strategic where in fact, not all away-days are probably
strategic in nature. Using strategy as does not imply that the practice (or
whatever follows after the as) under scrutiny is exclusively strategic. Although this
difference is admittedly minor and elaborating this point may be perceived as
quibbling we feel that one would loose degrees of freedom when using strategic as
opposed to strategy as.
Hellmann, Rasche
grounded in reading Hrning (2001), this view suggests that only the active process
of using artifacts actualizes the artifacts ability to act and their meaning within a
certain context. Furthermore, as the active process of using is only possible to be
accomplished by human actors it follows that there is in fact an ontological
asymmetry between human and non-human actors in the creation of practices. This
ontological asymmetry does also lead to a slight shift in the analysis of practices,
which should now reflect how human actors are stimulated, i.e. impeded and
reassured, in their active enactment of practices mediated and not co-created by
artifacts. Thus, the actors implicit knowledge and its heterogeneous application is
pronounced from a methodological point of view (Wieser, 2004: 99). Of course, one
might also come to this conclusion by a reading of de Certeau.
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pattern of activity are fully defined with regard to their performance in praxis only.
By contrast, the ostensive aspect of practices allows us to explore what a practice is.
Ostensive aspects, as Feldman/Pentland (2003: 101) remark, are often codified as
standard operating procedures or exist as taken-for-granted norms.
What are the consequences of the ostensive/performative distinction? First, scholars
have to be aware that research on practices is based on a paradox. One the one
hand, every practice has endless variations because every performance of the
practice in praxis is different. On the other hand, every practice can be identified
(e.g., as a codified statement), recognized, and summarized by practitioners (see for
example Aaltonen, 2003). Second, the distinction between ostensive and
performative aspects informs future research. Scholars interested in studying the way
ostensive aspects influence the performative dimension of practices ask in which way
practices act as a template for behavior. How do strategists use existing notions of
practices as ready-made justifications for their actions? When studying how
ostensive aspects influence performative ones, scholars are primarily concerned with
the ways strategists are guided by and refer to the visible aspects of practices (i.e.
their codifications). By contrast, scholars exploring how performative aspects
influence ostensive ones study how strategy practices are enacted as well as
modified and in which way modifications are recognized and incorporated as
ostensive. Those researchers should also address how and whether the ostensive
aspects of strategy practices are maintained over time.
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domain in general and the practice in particular. Interaction does not necessarily
means face-to-face conversations, although according to Wenger et al. (2002: 34)
direct conversations are necessary to sustain the community over time, but can also
be based on teleconferences or regular document sharing.
The interpretation of domain, practice, and community with regard to the work of
strategizing demonstrates that communities of strategy formation represent loci
where strategists reflect, advance, and learn about their practice however not
necessarily conduct this practice. In other words, whereas the practice is usually
performed in the everyday praxis of the strategist, a community enables practitioners
to share experiences and extend their ideas about this practice. Take the example of
a strategy concept, say the Balanced Scorecard, that represents a shared practice.
While most practitioners, who are either directly or indirectly concerned with the
practice Balanced Scorecard, do their work regarding implementation of the concept
in their department, a community is the place that allows these people to share
experience, learn from each other, eventually modify the concept, fill it with new
meaning, and try to forget about outdated interpretations. Communities host
discussions about practices, give them shape, and continually recreate their
belonging knowledge. Communities, as Peltonen/Lms (2004: 255) remark, retain
knowledge in living ways and understand learning as a task of improvising around
practices in praxis.
Hellmann, Rasche
practices (i.e. their institutional traces). Yet, from our perspective, to study strategy
practices solely as practices-in-use overemphasizes the role of conduct. To explain
this issue, we look at Giddenss (1984) distinction between institutional analysis and
an analysis of strategic conduct.
Giddens (1984: 288) distinguishes between two types of research possible within
structuration theory, institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct. In
institutional analysis, he suggests to concentrate on the reproduction of structural
properties in social systems. Considering that for Giddens (1984: 377) structural
properties are institutionalized features of social systems that stretch across time and
space, institutional analysis is about investigating institutions as frequently
reproduced structured features of social life. The analysis of strategic conduct
focuses on the modes in which actors draw upon structural properties and is thus
concerned with the contextually situated activities of definite groups of actors.
(Giddens 1984: 288) An analysis of strategic conduct concentrates upon how actors
reflexively monitor what they do and how they draw upon institutionalized features in
the constitution of interaction. The distinction of both forms of analysis reflects
Giddenss perspective that practices are routinized forms of activity yet always
situated (and thus enacted) in time-space (see discussion in section two). Although
structuration theory assumes that there is no clear-cut line between these levels of
analysis as both refer to the duality of structure, Giddenss distinction helps to clarify
some issues regarding an appropriate unit of analysis.
When researching strategy practices as routinized forms of behavior one looks at
institutionalized features of social systems. That is why Giddens (1979: 65) regards
the practices that are constitutive of social systems as institutions. This is not to say
that institutional analysis investigates how people make sense of these practices, but
that it treats practices as institutionalized aspects of social systems. By contrast, an
analysis of strategic conduct explores the modes in which strategists draw upon
these practices. So, talking about an analysis of strategic conduct implies to explore
how people make sense, apply, modify, extend, and eventually replace strategy
practices, while institutional analysis is concerned with identifying, describing and
explaining practices themselves. For Giddens, the main difference concerns the
treatment of institutionalized properties. Whereas institutional analysis problematizes
the very existence of institutions and asks whether they exist at all, the analysis of
strategic conduct treats institutionalized properties as methodologically given by
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Conclusions
To conclude, our reflections on the Strategy-as-Practice research agenda
demonstrate that there are still unanswered questions regarding the methodological
and conceptual status of the field. Without doubt, one could raise various other
issues here. Pye (2005), for instance, argues that the field has not yet considered the
rich linkages between the practices of organizing and strategizing. Our main
message is that an unquestioned answer regarding how we define our key terms can
be more dangerous than unanswered questions on the level of the unit of analysis
(i.e. strategy practices); if not in the short, then at least in the long run.
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We believe that our community needs to work more on its underlying terminology. To
enhance understanding between Strategy-as-Practice scholars, we need more
discussions of our key terms. We suspect that such discussions will help us to
identify research problems that are unique to our community and distinguish us from
other ongoing research within the broader field of strategic management. The most
dangerous thing, from our perspective, would be to rush into a premature
convergence of key assumptions and methodologies. Dafter/Buenger (1990) and
others have rightly remarked that the rituals of normal science have ensnared
mainstream strategy research. Following Chia (2004), we believe that Strategy-asPractice provides a much-needed forum to debate those beliefs and assumptions
that often remain unquestioned within the currently predominant institutional and
resource-based traditions.
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