DEFINING ART

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James D. Carney
THB MAIN problem in giving the semantics of words is that of explaining
the nature of the link between words and the objects they denote. From
Frege and Russell to the present, the solution has been sought in the de-
scriptions of the objects that users of the word associate with the word.
These descriptions are the intension of the words, and the traditional
view is that the intension of a word determines its extension. Following
this solution, the term 'work of art', in its primary or classificatory use,
has an intension, since it denotes objects. The recent discussion of the
question whether 'work of art* can be defined has assumed this most
plausible solution to the problem of how the extension of a word is fixed.
This intension for 'work of art' has been thought to be either a description
made up of a conjunction of features, each necessary and conjointly suffi-
cient for the application of 'work of art'; or a disjunction of features,
some sub-set of which is sufficient, it being necessary that if x has most
of the features then it is denoted by 'work of art'. Let us call the former
a Mill model for terms and the latter a Wittgenstein model.1
Those favouring a Mill model for 'work of art' have often defended
their view by arguing that if'work of art' satisfies a Wittgenstein model,
then undesirable consequences follow. For example, such a supposition
removes the basis for traditional theories of art, it leads to critical singu-
larism, and it must result in the abandonment of aesthetics as a coherent
discipline.2 On the other hand those favouring a Wittgenstein model
often defend their view by arguing that a Mill model for 'work of art'
would foreclose conditions for new art categories.3 These arguments
take the form of a disjunctive syllogism where the disjunctive premise is:
'work of art' satisfies either the Mill model or the Wittgenstein model.
But what if this does not exhaust the alternatives?
In this paper I will outline a plausible third alternative, an alternative
suggested by Saul Kripke's and Hilary Putnam's recent work on terms.4
It is a view which denies that the extension of a term must be determined
by an intension. I will argue that if this view is applied to 'work of art',
then none of the above consequences follow and that it is not implausible
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to suppose that 'work of art' satisfies this third alternative. The overall
conclusion of this paper is that the alternative that 'work of art' satisfies
the Kripke-Putnam model should be given serious consideration in
aesthetics.
In section I I will suggest two reasons for rejecting the Mill model
for 'art' which have so far not received sufficient attention. I argue in

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section II that the consequences widely thought to follow from rejecting
the Mill model for 'work of art' do not follow. I also review in this section
the primary objection to the Wittgenstein model. The Kripke-Putnam
model for terms is outlined in section III. In the final section I apply this
model to 'work of art' and answer some of the objections to such an
application.

If 'work of art' in its primary or classificatory use satisfies the Mill

model, then one can provide a correct definition of the form: 'is a work
of art' means 'is F', where 'F' is a conjunction of features. Recently George
Dickie has suggested that the following may be such a correct definition:
(i) 'is a work of art' means 'is an artifact and is such that some society or some sub-
group of a society has conferred on it the status of candidate for appreciation'.5

This 'institutional' definition is, I believe, promising, and more will be

said about it shortly.
There have been two types of objections to defining art. First, proposed
definitions have been met with counter-examples.8 Second, we have been
warned that if we close 'work of art' by specifying necessary conditions,
we take away the very condition for new categories of art.7 This second
objection, as Maurice Mandelbaum has pointed out, fails to distinguish
the question of whether a set of necessary conditions can be provided for a
term from the question whether future denotata may or may not have
genuinely novel properties.8 Though some Mill-type definitions may
exclude new categories of art, they need not. Some may even encourage
new categories of art, as Dickie's definition does. This leaves counter-
examples and a type of argument which provides a weak inductive base
for generalizations concerning whether one can provide a Mill-type
definition for 'work of art*. Are there, then, any stronger arguments?
There are two general objections to a Mill model for 'work of art'.
I will merely outline the first, but will go into more detail with the
second.
The first objection comes from W. V. Quine's indeterminacy of trans-
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 JAMES D. CARNEY
lation thesis.9 Quine's thesis is that there is nothing to be right or wrong
about with respect to intension-hypotheses, i.e. hypotheses of the form:
(2)'...' means' '. Quine's argument is that if meaning is anything,
it is stimulus meaning. The stimulus meaning of 'p' for person A is the
disposition that A has to assent or dissent to 'p' in the presence of certain
stimuli. Evidence for questions of meaning, then,is restricted to behaviour-
istic data—the forces impinging on the sense organs and observable

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behaviour, vocal and otherwise. Given this as the only objective evidence,
Quine argues that, with respect to any term, more than one hypothesis
like (2) is always compatible with the evidence. So questions of meaning
cannot be settled by objective evidence. And from this the ontological
conclusion is drawn that there is no intension.
Here is a substantial and general objection to those who favour Mill-
type definitions for 'work of art'. It goes far beyond producing alleged
counter-examples to proposed Mill-type definitions. It is a general
argument against the supposition that words have intensions. Since the
object of a verbal definition is an intension, if there are no intensions
then there is no object for a definition of the term 'work of art'. If this
objection is successful, then it is by supposing an erroneous theory of
meaning that many have been led to think that defining 'art' is a legiti-
mate activity. I will not discuss this objection in this paper but will refer
the reader to a recent paper in which I argue that Quine's thesis should be
abandoned.10 I will assume in this paper that terms can have intensions.
The second objection takes the form of a complex dilemma. It is that
a Mill-type definition either excludes new categories of art, is too broad,
or is circular. Many have supposed that the genus of any Mill-type defini-
tion for 'work of art' is artifactuality. What, then, is the differentia? The
differentia will either make use of intentional relational properties,
properties relating a person's intentions or attitudes to artifacts, or it
will not make use of them. If the latter, then such definitions will exclude
new categories of art, since the manifest properties (extensional properties)
of works of art are bewilderingly dissimilar. If the former, then the de-
finition is circular. Consider again Dickie's definition (1). Dickie feels
that this definition avoids the difficulties of earlier attempts at a definition
for 'art'. For example, it does not preclude new and novel forms of art,
and it makes use of non-manifested, relational aspects of art. In clarifying
the definition Dickie says artifacts are things people put together and they
are natural objects if someone, say, 'picks up a natural object, takes it
home, and hangs it on the wall'.11 Appreciation in the above definition
is not a special kind of aesthetic appreciation, but is the kind of apprecia-
tion we have for things in and outside of art—finding their qualities
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worthwhile or valuable. 'Society' in the definition is identified with the

'artworld'. The artworld is 'the broad social institution in which works
of art have their place.'12 The artworld includes artists, producers, museum
directors, theatre-goers, art critics, art historians, philosophers of art,
and so on. It is not difficult to see that Dickie's definition runs the risk of
being circular on at least two counts. First, artifactualizing a natural object,

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say putting a piece of driftwood in an art museum, may come to be just
treating a natural object as art. This means that a natural object can acquire
its artifactuality or be artifactualized by the existence of an intentional
relationship between it and a person(s).13 Second, artworld, if defined,
may make reference to art. Dickie himself says that the definition is cir-
cular since he suspects that the artworld cannot be described independently
of art, but that this circularity is not vicious since the circle is not small
and uninformative.14
One can appeal to the history of art in an attempt to generalize this
second objection. If we compare works of art, for example sonnets with
buildings, an ornate chest with a sonata, and so on, we see that they display
such a bewildering variety of manifest features that we can hardly expect
them to have any such properties in common. As the historian of aesthe-
tics W. Tatarkiewicz has noted, four kinds of intentional relational
properties have been suggested as the differentiae for 'work of art' : 15
(3) the artist's intentions (e.g. Croce)
(4) the effect of the art object on people (e.g. Dickie)
(5) relation to reality (e.g. Plato and art as imitation)
(6) specific value (e.g. Batteux and beauty)

To each of these possible differentiae one can apply the dilemma of its
being too broad or circular. We have already applied this to a variation of
(4) above. Now let us consider (3). We can say that the artist's intention
is to represent reality, create significant form, express his experiences, and
so on. In each case if 'reality', 'significant form' or 'experience' is reality
in general, form in general, and so on, the resulting definitions are too
broad. If it is artistic form, aesthetic perception of reality, and so on,
the definition will be circular. The same argument is applicable to (5)
and to the variations of (3), (4), (5) and (6). A particularly interesting
variation of (6) would be the object's having unity, grace, balance, and so
on, properties which Sibley and others have called aesthetic properties.
Aesthetic properties are those which call upon the exercise of taste, not
just taste in general, but aesthetic taste. Of course, that the dilemma
applies to each of the historical differentiae requires an extensive analysis,
but it is not implausible to suppose that the dilemma can be applied to the
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 JAMES D. CARNEY
differentiae that have been proposed in the history of art. Note that each
of these differentiae makes use of intentional relational properties. A
thesis of Brentano's, lately developed by Chisholm, is that there is no
breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in
other terms.16 (Quine says, I believe correctly, that indetermination of
translation implies Brentano's thesis.)
Dickie suspects that his definition is circular since the artworld cannot

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be described independently of art. But he says that this circularity is not
vicious since the circle is not small and uninformative. Now there is no
question that large circular explanations can be informative and that
short ones are not informative. But if any kind of circularity can be
avoided in coming to an understanding of the meaning of a term such as
'work of art', this is desirable. This problem of circularity in definitions
can be avoided if 'art' has no intension in the first place, if there is
no object for a definition. If 'art' satisfies the Kripke-Putnam model, as
we will see, it is supposed that 'work of art' does not have an intension,
and thus this problem of circularity is avoided. Nevertheless the theory
accounts for the meaning (extension) of a term.

II
Rejection of the Mill model for the term 'work of art' in its classi-
ficatory use has been widely thought to have substantial consequences for
aesthetics. As is widely known, Morris Weitz argues that if 'work of art'
is not susceptible to a Mill-type definition, then traditional theories of
art are attempts at the impossible.17 On his view theories of art such as
x is a work of art if and only if x imitates nature (Plato)
x is a work of art if and only if x expresses the artist's feelings (Tolstoy)
x is a work of art if and only if x has significant form (Bell)
x is a work of art if and only if it expands human awareness (H. Osborne)

are logically vain attempts to define what cannot be defined, to state the
necessary and sufficient conditions of that which has no such conditions.
But theories of art are not definitions for 'work of art" in its classificatory
use, at least not on the surface. They hypothesize the nature of the
universal property of art. So in order for Weitz's consequences to follow,
theories of art must imply definitional claims, that is it must be necessary
that all universal properties are definitional properties. But this is
questionable even if it is the case that, historically, once a theory of art is
formulated and believed, it is taken in a definitional way. For if 'art' has
no intension, then a universal property of art will not give one a
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defining property. Theories of art are taken as providing necessary and

sufficient conditions for 'work of art' in its evaluative use, its use as syno-
nym for 'good work of art', 'beautiful' or 'worth contemplation'.
Also theories of art have been taken as determining the extension of'work
of art' in its classificatory use, that is as determining whether 'x is art'
is true. But on the Kripke-Putnam model (outlined in section III) the
extension of 'work of art' can be determined by a theory without the

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theory describing the intension of'work of art'.
A second alleged consequence which follows from rejecting the Mill
model for 'work of art' is found in Kennick's argument that if the search
for a Mill-type definition is impossible, then we must give up all attempts
to formulate the critical standards of critical appreciation and appraisal
in art.18 For any critical judgement in art, to be justified, must be sup-
ported by reasons, and such reasons logically presuppose general rules
or standards. There can be such general standards only if we can define,
in a Mill way, 'work of art'. This second argument is perhaps more telling,
so let us expand it as follows:

1. There are three ways to fix the extension of a term, namely enumeration, Mill
conditions, or Wittgenstein disjunctions.
2. If 'work of art' satisfies a Wittgenstein model, then we cannot indicate the sum
total of the things to which the term applies.
3. If we cannot indicate the sum total of the things to which the term applies, then
we cannot rationally state general criteria for comparative evaluations of art.

T\ejustification for this argument may be developed as follows: Line (1)

is necessary if intension is the only way to determine extension other than
enumerating the individuals that are works of art. For line (2) the argument
would be that if a term satisfies a Wittgenstein model, then the best
one can do to determine its extension is to identify some of the para-
digms, list the relevant features, and say that anything that has a sufficient
number of them falls into the extension of the term. What are the relevant
features? Those features responsible for family resemblance among the
paradigms, since we must assume that there is nothing in common on a
Wittgenstein model. What is the criterion for 'x has a family resemblance
to y', and who determines what it is? More importantly, what are the
limits to the application of a term that satisfies a Wittgenstein model?
If it is family resemblance, then how do we handle a case like this for a
term which is regarded as a paradigm of a Wittgenstein term, 'game':
some non-games resemble some games more than other games, for ex-
ample street fighting resembles boxing more than boxing resembles
chess.19 How can one defend the Wittgenstein model for 'game' with
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 JAMES D. CARNEY
respect to such a case short of proposing something that games have in
common? It will prove useful here to distinguish open texture of a name
from what Richman has called 'wide-open texture'.20 When a term like
'warm' or 'bald' admits of borderline cases it is open textured. Many
terms do not have precisely fixed boundaries. A term can satisfy a Mill
model and be open textured. Terms which would satisfy a Wittgenstein
model would be wide-open texture terms, for it is unclear what features

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are the family resemblance features and when a collection of such features
constitutes a criterion for applying the term. If 'work of art' is a wide-
open texture term, then it is less than rational to lay down general stand-
ards for ranking works of art if the class is so vaguely determined.
I suggest that the primary weakness of the above argument is to be
found in the first premise. If the extension of a term can be determined
in a way other than enumeration or intension, and if this other way does
not result in wide-open texture, then the argument fails. On the Kripke-
Putnam model, which is considered next, the extension of a term is not
determined by enumeration or intension. And terms satisfying this model
are not wide-open texture terms.

Ill
Kripke's and Putnam's model for terms is best understood by beginning
with proper names and asking how on Kripke's account the reference of a
proper name is fixed.21 From Frege and Russell, through Strawson and
Searle, the solution of this problem has been sought in the description
of the object that users of the proper name associate with the name. For
if 'Pegasus' is just short for 'the winged horse of Bellerophon', then
whatever is winged and a horse of Bellerophon is the referent of the name
'Pegasus'. A looser view has proper names connected by sense with a dis-
junction of descriptions. For example, 'Aristotle' and the disjunction:
The greatest man who studied under Plato, the author of the Categories,
the founder of the Academy, or . . . None of the descriptions in such
a cluster are necessary, but some unspecified subsets of descriptions provide
criteria for the application of the proper name.22 Obviously, this is how
proper names would be construed on the Wittgenstein model. In these
accounts reference of a proper name is fixed by some definite description
or disjunction of descriptions satisfied by the referent and known or be-
lieved to be true of that referent by the one who uses the proper name.
In each case we have this picture: I want to name an object; I think up
some way of describing it uniquely and then associate via sense a name
with the description.
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 DEFINING ART

Kripke says that in general this account for proper names fails. There
is a better account of how the reference of proper names is fixed. The
reference of a proper name is fixed by the fact that the individual who uses
a proper name is causally linked to other individuals in his community,
some of whom were in a position to pick out the bearer of the name either
ostensively or by description. For names of a person the picture is some-
thing like this: A baby is born. His parents perceive him; they are causally

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affected by him. His parents give him a name. The parents pass on the
name to others. They cause others to intend to designate the object they
have in mind.23 Each receiver of the name must intend to use it with the
same reference as the person from whom he heard it. People who use the
name may not have any description in mind, that is they may not be able
to make any statement of the form: By 'a' I mean . . . . Or they may even
have a mistaken description in mind. Still they refer to the person by
virtue of membership in a community in which the parents gave the
baby the name and passed it on. On this view what a name refers to must
be determined by this historical connection of the name and the object.
One can only find the referent of a name by tracing the history of acquisi-
tion of the name back to the dubbing occasion. On this view of the
reference, a name is a rigid designator in that on all occasions of use it
refers to the person dubbed when the name was introduced. Thus the
name in use refers to x independently of what the user of the name on the
occasion of utterance may want to pick out.24 For example, suppose a is
dubbed 'a'. The name is passed on to Alice. Alice says 'a is attractive'
wanting to pick out the philosopher in the corner, who in fact is b. If a
is not attractive, then Alice's utterance is false even though she may be
said in some sense to have referred to the philosopher.
This account for proper names is carried over by Kripke to terms for
species and natural kinds, terms such as 'tiger', 'gold', 'water' and 'human
being'; terms for natural phenomena such as 'heat', 'light', 'sound' and
'lightning'; and adjectives such as 'hot', 'loud' and 'red'. 25 In all these
cases there is an introducing event where some originating samples may
be picked out ostensively or by description, for example: 'Gold is the
substance instantiated by the items over there', 'Gold is the yellow, shiny,
heavy, metallic stuff on the table', 'Heat is that which is sensed by sensa-
tion S' or 'Electricity is the cause of such-and-such an experimental effect'.
When a description is used it is not sense-related or intensionally-related
to the term. When the term is introduced it is intended that it refer to a
certain substance (as with the case of 'gold' and other substance words)
or to whatever causes such-and-such (as with 'electricity') or to those
natural kinds (as with 'tiger'), even if we do not know the internal
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 JAMES D. CARNEY
constitution of the stuff, the nature of the cause or how, say, tigers are
set off from other species. Generally scientific investigation may and
usually does discover features related to the internal structure and con-
stitution of, say, gold; for example gold is the element with the atomic
number 79. Even if most of us rely on manifest characteristics of gold—
shiny, yellow, heavy, malleable, metallic—in using the word 'gold', if we

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are in doubt whether something is gold we can appeal to the experts
(metallurgists) who understand the discovered constitution of the ex-
amples that serve as paradigms of gold. Our use of 'gold' borrows its
extension from the expert's use—and the experts sort gold out from non-
gold in terms of the scientific theories of gold.
On this account a term such as 'gold' does not have an intension.
Dictionary entries would be based on our scientific theories of gold
coupled with the manifest features we commonly use to recognize gold.
But none of these recognizing features need be true of gold. For example
it is possible that gold is not yellow. The dictionary may set down some of
the features which make up the internal constitution of gold, for example
gold is the element with an atomic number 79. But even in this case this
is not part of the sense of 'gold'. Though for Kripke it is not possible
for gold not to have the atomic number 79, this is because we intend
'gold' to denote a certain stuff with a certain internal constitution and if
having atomic number 79 is part of this structure, then it cannot be that
gold might not have an atomic number 79. How then is extension de-
termined for a word like 'gold' ? The extension of such a term depends
upon the actual nature of the particular things that serve as paradigms,
and this nature is not, in general, fully known to most speakers but is
known by the experts.26 So we, if in doubt, rely on experts, and they
follow the best scientific findings available.
Can this account be extended to all terms? Can it be applied to terms
such as 'table' and 'bachelor'? I think not. A term like 'bachelor' in its
accurate adult use is introduced as a synonym for 'adult male not pre-
viously married'. This being so, 'bachelor' has a sense, in contrast with
Kripke-Putnam terms, and the sense-hypothesis is true: 'x is a bachelor'
means 'x is an adult male not previously married'.
It is such terms that satisfy the Mill model if any terms do. A word like
'table' is learned in an ostensive way. It is" learned in childhood by induc-
tion from observed paradigms. We are rewarded by parents and others
when we apply the word correctly, and we are negatively reinforced when
we fail. Correctness is determined by similarity to paradigms. The ex-
tension of 'table' does not depend upon the actual nature of paradigm
examples of tables; there is no special knowledge presupposed in using
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'table'. There is no table theory; there are no table experts. Such words
satisfy the Wittgenstein model, if any words do.

IV
Let us now suppose that the term 'work of art' satisfies the Kripke-

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Putnam model.
If 'work of art' satisfies this model, then the attempt to provide a
correct intension-hypothesis of the Mill or Wittgenstein type is theoreti-
cally misguided. But for 'work of art' to satisfy this new model, what
would be necessary? There would be introducing events for 'art', para-
digms dubbed by the term 'art', and the belief by those who introduce the
term 'art' that the paradigms have a nature or a universal property. If the
paradigms have a universal property, then there is a way to determine
with certainty whether x is art: x is art if x has the universal property. So
this property would determine the extension of 'art' in the same way that
being an element with the atomic number 79 determines the extension of
'gold'. If 'work of art' satisfies the Kripke-Putnam model, then the intro-
ducing events would be the distant historical acts with the original samples.
The paradigms would be the original samples and those added through
art history. Is it reasonable to think that the paradigms could have a nature
or a universal property? On the Kripke-Putnam model if the supposition
that there is one uniform property in the originating samples of gold
proves wrong, then we either drop the term or declare that there are
two kinds of gold. If 'work of art' satisfies this model, then if there is no
one property of the paradigms, what then? Since we have not in fact
dropped the term 'work of art', 'work of art' must have either various
extensions or different extensions on each occasion of use. If it has various
extensions, then there must be a universal property within each subset
of paradigms, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that there could be a
universal property for the whole set of originating paradigms. On the
other hand, to suppose that 'art' has a different extension on each use is
counter-intuitive.
Assuming, then, that the paradigms can have a universal property, who
would determine the universal property of the art paradigms and what
would they go by? It is not unreasonable to suppose that what Dan to,
Dickie and others have called the 'artworld' is the subclass in a society that
determines the universal property and that they rely on theories of art
to do this.27 The artworld would be analogous to the metallurgists for
'gold', and art theories would play a role similar to scientific theories and
'gold' in that they would be taken as hypothesizing the extension-deter-
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 JAMES D. CARNEY
mining property of art. Danto has written that 'what in the end makes
the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a
Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into
the world of art. . . .>28 I suggest that what Danto says can be taken as
implying that the extension of the term 'art' is determined by the theories
of art held by the artworld, and that Danto's philosophy of art may well

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presuppose a Kripke-Putnam model for 'work of art'. If so, this may
be taken as evidence for the plausibility of 'work of art' satisfying the
Kripke-Putnam model.
Let us now consider some objections to this application of the Kripke-
Putnam model. First objection: The Kripke-Putnam model as it applies
to terms other than proper names applies to terms for things about which
we can make scientific discoveries and develop scientific theories, for
example substances (gold), natural species (tigers) and natural phenomena
(electricity and heat). How can we have scientific theories about a work of
art? Reply: One does not need a scientific theory about art for the model
to apply- Theories of art such as the imitation theory or expression theory
would be adequate, since they hypothesize a universal property for
paradigms. Yet although some have seen striking parallels between
scientific theories and theories of art, the most noteworthy difference in
this context is the relatively greater diversity of theories in art and the
disagreements at times in history as to the favoured theory.29 But this
relatively greater diversity of theories in art need not damage the applica-
tion of the Kripke-Putnam model unless something rules out there being
a universal property among the paradigms. And this cannot be done by
claiming that 'art' satisfies the Wittgenstein model without begging the
question. Also diversity of theories does not necessarily imply diversity of
extension. To useQuine's example, being a creature with a heart and being
a creature with a kidney determine the same extension. Agreement on
extension is what is necessary for practices of the artworld to go on.
Second objection: Theories held by the artworld have undergone his-
torical changes. For example, the representational theory of art was
favoured by the artworld at one time and at a later time the expression
theory was favoured. Does not this imply the counter-intuitive results
that the artworld could retract the status of art from some objects and that,
for example, the artworld could expel all of Shakespeare's writings as
art? Reply: As indicated earlier for 'gold', if the supposition that there .
is one uniform substance in the initial samples proves wrong, we drop
the name 'gold' or declare that there are two kinds of gold. Analogously,
if the art world expelled all the artifacts we take as paradigms, we would
drop the term 'work of art'. If they expelled paradigms in favour of new
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paradigms, this would constitute a new introducing event for the term
'work of art'. If the artworld decided that all of Shakespeare's plays were
not works of art, this would be analogous to the paradigms of gold
failing to have a uniform substance. We would probably declare that
there were two kinds of works of art. Of course the identical object could
at one time be judged a work of art while at another time it might not be

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judged a work of art. Danto's example is Picasso's painted neckties, for
there would have been no room in the artworld of, say, Cezanne's time
for painted neckties.
Third objection: At times there have been conflicts between subsets
of the artworld over whether something is art. How could such disputes
be understood if 'work of art' satisfies the Kripke-Putnam model? If
theories determine our knowledge of extension, then how could such
disputes be other than verbal and how can you have a verbal dispute if
'work of art' does not have an intension? Reply: There can be such con-
flicts. For example in the early part of this century, when non-representa-
tional and abstract paintings were first introduced, the traditional critics
of the artworld said these works were not works of art, while the modern
critics insisted that they were works of art. On the Mill or Wittgenstein
model for 'work of art' such disputes could be one of two kinds of verbal
disputes.31 On these models it could be a pseudo-type of verbal dispute
where, for example, we might have the disputing parties really saying:
Traditional critics: x is not an artifact which represents nature.
Modern critics: x is an artifact which has significant form.

Or on the Wittgenstein model we could have a word-extension type of

verbal dispute. Suppose both parties agreed on the semantic features that
are features of paradigm examples, and suppose that both parties would be
prepared to endorse the same disjunctive definition for 'work of art'.'
Cubism and other non-representational art have some of these features
but do not have a large enough subset to constitute a clear criterion for
applying the term 'work of art'. Yet these artifacts have enough of these
semantic features so that the artworld is disinclined to find them clear
examples of non-art. The dispute is over whether Cubism and the other
non-representational artifacts should or should not come under the exten-
sion of 'work of art'. On the Kripke-Putnam model the dispute would
be factual in that it would be non-verbal. The traditional and modern
critics would agree on the paradigms. They would disagree on whether
the features they believe are to be part of the nature of the paradigms
are to be found in the new artifacts. Paul Ziff, who has written about this
dispute, quotes a modern critic, Roger Fry, as saying that the new art
202
 JAMES D. CARNEY
makes images which by their freedom from representation make a strong
appeal to our disinterested and contemplative imagination.32 If we sup-
pose that the traditional critics found that the agreed-on paradigms had
such an appeal, but that they did not find it in the new artifacts, then the
dispute would be over whether the new art has this appeal. Judging by
history, many would be inclined to say that the traditional critics were
mistaken. The new art has this appeal and the traditional critics, at least

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for a time, were not prepared to see it. Another possibility on the Kripke-
Putnam model is that the traditional critics' belief about the nature of the
paradigms differed from that of the new critics. Let us suppose the tradi-
tional critics found the paradigms pleasing because of the representation-
alism of the paradigms. The new critics find them pleasurable because of
the presence of, let us say, new forms. The dispute here is over what is
the nature of art. It would be analogous to physicists' disagreeing on
whether the basic stuff is particle-like or not. How is such a dispute settled?
To get the traditional critics to accept the new artifacts as art requires not
a change in capacity to perceive but rather a revision of the traditional
critics' theory of art. A new theory that both sides could support could
settle whether Cubism is or is not art. In these variations on non-verbal
disputes, when a settlement occurs, a revision would not take place in the
definition of 'work of art'; rather beliefs would change or one party
would have its capacity to perceive changed.
We may arrive at George Dickie's institutional theory of art by con-
verting his definition, (i), in section I, into an art theory.13 If 'work of
art' satisfies the Kripke-Putnam model, then this conversion would be
from nothing to something. But let us ignore this difficulty and note that
on his theory of art the universal property of art objects is that the art-
world regards them in a certain way. If Dickie's theory is satisfactory, all
other art theories are false. If Dickie's theory is satisfactory, then one would
be misguided in asking what reasons the artworld has for deciding that
some objects are art and others are not, since asking for such reasons is to
ask for theories. If the artworld decides what objects are candidates for
appreciation, then on this theory art is a conferred status, conferred by
the artworld. A work of art can be identified as such only relative to a
social context.34 A man can intend to create a work of art but it does not
lie with him alone that his creation will be a work of art. A subgroup of
society, the artworld, determines what is a work of art.
A similar consequence follows from the application to 'work of art' of
the Kripke-Putnam model if we assume that we can only know the uni-
versal property of the paradigms through the favoured art theory. Sup-
pose that the universal property of the paradigms is that they express an
203
 DEFINING ART

artist's intuitions (Croce and CoUingwood). A man could create a work of

art independent of a social context by creating an artifact that expresses
his intuition (he could actually just have an intuition on some accounts).
If the artworld said it was not art but if it had the property in question,
it would be art; the artworld would be mistaken. This cannot possibly
happen on Dickie's theory. But if knowledge of the property is dependent
on the favoured art theory as knowledge of the nature of gold depends

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on accepted scientific theory, then neither the artist nor the artworld
would know or recognize that his artifact is art unless it had the property
hypothesized by the favoured theory. In other words, if 'work of art'
satisfies the Kripke-Putnam model, then art is a conferred status in the
sense that an artifact will be known and recognized to be art by anyone
only vis-a-vis the favoured theory of the artworld.
The Kripke-Putnam model applied to 'work of art' avoids the prob-
lems reviewed in the first section. Counter-examples.to definitions are in-
appropriate since no intension-hypotheses are involved: The objection
from Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis is avoided since the view
does not presuppose that 'work of art' must have an intension if it is to
have an extension. Finally, it avoids the complex dilemma since it is not a
view which implies an intension-hypothesis for 'work of art'. The objec-
tions in section II do not apply since the extension of a term satisfying the
Kripke-Putnam model can be fixed by non-intensional related necessary
and sufficient conditions. If these conditions can be explained in a non-
circular manner, then the problem of circularity is avoided altogether.
Needless to say, there is a host of problems. For example, what are the
details of the Kripke-Putnam model? Does this model, using as it does
the notion of nature and universal property, presuppose a controversial
essentialism? How well does the model explain the relation between
word and object, if it takes 'intending to use the same reference' and 'in-
tending to dub paradigms' as primitive? All these questions will be left
unanswered in this paper. The point of the paper is to outline what ap-
pears to be a viable alternative to the traditional assumption that 'work of
art' must satisfy either the Mill or Wittgenstein model, and to show in
what ways this new alternative avoids difficulties confronting the tradi-
tional alternatives.
To argue that 'work of art', understood in its primary or classifactory
use, is definable using a Mill model because the Wittgenstein model has
unacceptable consequences, or that the Wittgenstein model is the way to
define 'work of art' since the Mill model has unacceptable consequences, is
a weak argument if there is a third alternative. The Kripke-Putnam model
is a third alternative. I have argued that it is not implausible to suppose
204
 JAMES D. CARNEY
that 'work of art' satisfies this model. The alternative that the term 'work
of art' satisfies this model ought to be seriously discussed and may well
hold out better prospects for aesthetics than the approaches considered
up to this time.

REFERENCES

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1
These remarks are not to be taken as
implying that J. S. Mill or Wittgenstein
countenanced any of this. Wittgenstein
is commonly taken to have held this view
about terms. Mill says that all general
terms are connotative; such a predicate
as 'human being' is defined as the con-
junction of certain properties which give 10
necessary and sufficient conditions for
humanity—rationality, animality, and
certain physical features. This remark of11
Mill's is quoted in S. Kripke's 'Naming
and Necessity', Davidson and Harman
(eds.), Semantics of Natural Language
(1972). P- 322-
2
See, for example, H. Osborne's 'Defini-
tion and Evaluation in Aesthetics',
Philosophical Quarterly, January 1973.
3 18
See, for example, Morris Weitz, 'The
Role of Theory in Aesthetics', The Jour-
nal of Aesthetics and Art Critcism, 1956.
The paper is reprinted in Morris Weitz
(ed.), Problems in Aesthetics (1971). Page
numbers to Weitz's article come from
the book.
4
This alternative account is found in S.
Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity', op.
cit. and Hilary Putnam, 'Meaning and
Reference', The Journal of Philosophy,
November 1973.
6 21
George Dickie, 'Defining Art,' American
Philosophical Quarterly, July 1969, Aesthe-
tics, (1971), Chapter Eleven, and Art and
the Aesthetic, An Institutional Analysis
(1974), p. 34. Since the emphasis in this
discussion is not directly concerned with
the aesthetic and non-aesthetic features
of a work of art, I have left out 'a set of
the aspects' in Dickie's definition in Art
and the Aesthetic, p. 34.
6
Weitz, op. cit., p. 178.
205
' Ibid., p. 176.
8
Maurice Mandelbaum, 'Family Re-
semblances and Generalizations Concern-
ing the Arts', American Philosophical
Quarterly, July 1965.
9
See, for example, W. V. Quine, Word
and Object, (i960), Chapter Two.
Carney and Van Straaten, 'Translational
Indeterminacy and Substitutional Quan-
tifiers', Foundations of Language, July 1974
Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, op. cit., p.
44.
12
Ibid., p . 29.
13
See Gary Iseminger, 'The W o r k of Art
as Artifact', British Journal of Aesthetics,
Winter 1973.
14
Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, op. cit., pp.
43-4-
Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, 'The Prob-
lem of Defining Art Today', British
Journal of Aesthetics, 1971.
18
See Quine, op. cit., pp. 219-22.
17
Weitz, op. cit., p. 170.
18
William Kennick, 'Does Traditional
Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake', Mind,
1958.
19
This counter-example is given by Robert
J. Richman, 'Something Common',
The Journal of Philosophy, 1962, p. 829.
80
Ibid.
Putnam's work has been directed to
words for natural kinds and substances.
Knpke has developed the theory for both
proper names and these other terms.
Putnam's earlier approach to terms
comes close to a Wittgenstein model.
See, for example, his 'The Analytic and
the Synthetic,' Minnesota Studies in
Philosophy of Science, Vol. Three.
82
This account has been stated by John
Searle in 'Proper Names', Mind, 1958.
 DEFINING ART
83
Michael Devitt develops this theory and
shows some of the complexities in
'Singular Terms', The Journal of Philo-
sophy, April 1974. H e argues that the
intentional idioms here can be given a
physicalistic reduction.
24
This point is made in David Kaplan's
'Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice',
Hintikka, Moravcsik, and Suppes (eds.),
Approaches to Natural Language (1973).
Kaplan also encapsulates the theory for
proper names in this article.
25
Kripke, op. cit., p . 322 and p. 327.
26
Putnam makes this point well in 'Mean-
ing and Reference', op. cit.
27
Dickie, op. cit. Arthur Danto, 'The Art-
world', The Journal of Philosophy, 1964
and 'Artworks and Real Things',
Theoria, Vol. X X X K , 1973.
28
Arthur Danto, 'The Artworld', op. cit.,
p. 581.
29
Parallels between art theories and scienti-
206
fic theories have been noticed by
Thomas S. Kuhn in 'Comments',
Comparative Studies in Society and History
May 1968.
30
Danto, 'Artworks', op. cit.,
31
These t w o kinds of verbal disputes are
discussed in Carney and Scheer, Fun-
damentals of Logic (Second Edition,
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1974), Chapter Three.
32
Paul Ziff, 'The Task of Defining a
W o r k of Art,' reprinted in Marvin
Levich (ed.), Aesthetics and the Philo-
sophy of Criticism, (1963).
33
Art and the Aesthetic, op. cit., p p . 50-2.
34
This point has been stressed b y several
authors independently o f this theoreti-
cal account. See, for example, Diffey's
' T h e Republic o f A r t ' , British Journal
of Aesthetics, 1969, and Joseph Margolis,
' W o r k s o f A r t as Physically Embodied
and Culturally Emergent Entities',
British Journal of Aesthetics, Summer
1974-