(American University Studies VII_Theology & Religion_ Vol.205) N. Joseph Torchia-_Creatio Ex Nihilo_ and the Theology of St. Augustine_ the Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond-Peter Lang Publishing (19

Creatio ex nihilo and
the Theology of St. Augustine

The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond
N. JOSEPH TORCHIA, 0. P.
Creatio ex nihilo
and the Theology

of St. Augustine
American University Studies
Series VII
Theology and Religion
Vol. 205
PETER lANG
New York Washington, D.C./Baltimore Boston

Bern Frankfurt am Main Berlin Vienna Paris
N. Joseph Torchia, 0. P.
Creatio ex nihilo and the
Theology of St. Augustine

The Anti-Manichaean
Polemic and Beyond
PETER LANG
New York Washington, D.C./Baltimore Boston
Bern Frankfurt am Main Berlin Vienna Paris
ISBN 978-1-4539-1077-1 (eBook)
Dedicated To My Parents,
per quorum carnem introduxisti me in hanc uitam.
(Confessiones IX, 13, 37)
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Contents
Preface
Initial Observations/The Christian Doctrine of Crea tio
ex nihilo: Some General Presuppositions/The Significance of Creatio ex nihilo for Augustine/Methodology/
The Relation Between Augustine's Life and Thought/
Augustine and Neoplatonism/A Word on Texts/
Acknowledgements/Notes
Introduction The Scriptural, Patristic, and
Philosophical Background of St. Augustine's
Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo
Creatio ex nihilo in Scripture/Patristic Theories of
Creation: The First to the Fourth Centuries/The Philosophical Background/The Debate Concerning Plato's
Timaeus/Later Platonism and Early Patristic Theories of
Creation/Possible Influences on Augustine: A Tentative
Hypothesis/Concluding Remarks/Notes
Chapter 1 The Manichaean Cosmogony:
A Point of Reference
The Religion of Mani/Methodology/The Manichaean
Cosmogony/Assessment: The Three 'Moments'/The
Manichaeans' Understanding of Creation: Salient
Themes/Concluding Observations: Augustine's
Knowledge of Manichaeism/Notes
Chapter 2 Saint Augustine's Exegesis of Genesis
The Act of Creation/The Ontological Status of Amorphous Matter/The Ontological Status of the Nihil!
Creatio ex nihilo Defined/Conclusion/Notes
ix
65
97
VIII
Contents
Chapter 3 Augustine's Refutation of the

Manichaean Cosmogony
135
Opposition to Manichaean Claims of Authority/The
Primordial Conflict/The Two Bordering Regions/Creatio
de nihilo Affirmed/The Five Natures of the Region of
Darkness/The Goodness of the Whole/Evil as a Corruption of the Good/Salient Features of Augustine's Refutation of the Manichaean Cosmogony/Conclusion/Notes
Chapter 4 Augustine's Theodicy
Introductory Remarks/The Divine Nature/Corruption
Redefined/The Order of Creation/Evil Defined/Diverse
Senses of Evil/Creation and the 'Nihi/'/Conclusion/
Notes
165
Chapter 5 A Defense of Monotheism

193
The Contra Faustum Manichaeum : Salient Features of
Faustus's Critique of Catholic Teaching/Monotheism vs.
Polytheism/Monotheism vs. Dualism/Conclusion/Notes
Chapter 6 Creatio ex nihilo in Augustine's
217
Anti-Manichaean Polemic: A Brief Recapitulation
Introduction/The Exegetical Background of Augustine's
Anti-Manichaean Polemic/Augustine's Response to
Mani's Cosmogony/The Problem of Evil/The One, True
God/Concluding Assessment/Notes
Chapter 1 Broader Theological Implications
of the Doctrine
231
The Divine Nature and the Act of Creation/The Finitude
of Creatures/Human Nature, Free Will, and Sin/The
Necessity of Redemption and Grace/Divine Sovereignty
and Predestination/Conclusion: A Summary of Key
Themes/Notes
Epilogue: Creation, Contingency, and
Augustine's Theology
257
Bibliography
261
Name Index
275
Subject Index
277
Preface
Despite the seeming inexhaustiveness of investigations into the life

and work of St. Augustine of Hippo, his theology of creation remains
a relatively neglected area of his thought. This void in scholarship is
surprising, when one considers the importance which the doctrine of
creatio ex nihilo assumes in Augustine's writings. In a very real sense,
this seminal Christian teaching constitutes a crucial, if not the pivotal,
element in his theological deliberations on a wide variety of topics.
For this reason, it might serve as a useful point of departure for assessing the mainlines of Augustine's theology as a whole.
But it is interesting to observe that Augustine's theology "as a whole"
is rarely, if ever, addressed. Why is this the case? A somewhat facile,
yet thoroughly apt response immediately suggests itself: Augustine
himself was a rather non-systematic theologian. This is not to say that
his theology developed in a haphazard or poorly organized fashion.
But in actuality, Augustine's writings reveal a continually evolving inquiry concerning a wide range of perennially compelling theological
problems. This is borne out, I think, by the fact that no single area of
his theology can be treated in complete isolation from the others.
For the most part, Augustine dealt with theological problems in the
context of the controversies that prompted them. In this respect, the
very nature of his thought dictates the method that should be employed in its investigation and analysis. As Eugene TeSelle has observed, the most appropriate method will be "cinematic," that is, one
which enables us to appreciate Augustine's theologizing as an ongoing endeavor. 1 In spite of this fluidity, the internal unity of Augustine's
theology should not be overlooked. While it was constantly changing
in order to confront new doctrinal challenges, it was very much an
evolving whole that exhibited a marked continuity over his lifetime. 2
In order to appreciate this continuity, we require a recurrent motif
Preface
that enables us to discern certain salient features on the Augustinian

landscape. Augustine's theology of creation (and more specifically,
the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo) fulfills this particular role in a highly
effective manner.
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo provides a vital component in
Christian teachings regarding the relationship between God and the
entire universe of being, including humanity. The doctrine holds that
ultimately, any reality other than God was brought into existence from
non-existence by a free, generous act of the Divine will. Such an explicit formulation of creatio ex nihilo came to the fore as Christian
theologians defined their understanding of the Godhead in strict monotheistic terms, in opposition to pagan charges that Christianity was
polytheistic or even atheistic.
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo also assumed a prominent role in
Christian refutations of Gnostic dualism and its conception of matter
as an independent ontological principle that is coeternal with God.
Such a dualistic interpretation of reality found one of its clearest expressions in Manichaeism, a Hellenistic religion that has been described
as the last and greatest manifestation of Gnosticism. The Manichaean
dichotomy between the principles of Light and Darkness (that is, Good
and Evil, respectively), provided the chief characteristic of this amalgam of ideas drawn from Persian Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and
Christianity.
St. Augustine developed what would become the most extensive
Christian refutation of Manichaeism. His extended polemic against
the sect spanned the period from his composition at Rome of the De
Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum (A.D.
387-388) until approximately A.D. 398-400, with the completion of
the Contra Faustum. 3 In the anti-Manichaean polemic, then, we have
a helpful vantage point from which to survey his early intellectual evolution. Augustine, in fact, had been a member of the Manichaean religion for more than nine years. His rejection of Manichaeism (both as
a personal religion and as an intellectual outlook) paved the way for
his acceptance of teachings derived from the libri platonicorum and
subsequently, for his intellectual conversion to Christianity.
Like most other aspects of Augustine's thought, the anti-Manichaean
polemic has been the focus of much scholarly attention. Yet, it appears that no full-length study has been devoted chiefly to the role and
significance of creatio ex nihilo in these writings. 4 The importance of
the doctrine in this polemical context, however, invites more in-depth
Preface
XI
analysis than is now available. The present work will attempt to provide just such an analysis. The very enormity of the anti-Manichaean
corpus, however, necessitates a certain selectivity in one's use of primary sources. In this respect, it is not my intention to develop an
exhaustive treatment of Augustine's polemical writings against the
Manichaeans. Rather, I wish to focus upon works which, in my estimation, offer the most thoroughgoing use of the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo in attempting to undermine Manichaean teachings. Accordingly, I confine my investigation to two groups of writings.
The first group of writings under investigation encompasses
Augustine's three great commentaries on the opening chapter of Genesis: the De Genesi contra Manichaeos; the De Genesi ad litteram
liber unus imperfectus; and the De Genesi ad litteram. In a very
real sense, these works exhibit Augustine's use of the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo on its most basic level, that is, in the context of an extended
exegesis on the seminal Scriptural account of creation. In this way,
the doctrine served as a crucial component in his refutation of
Manichaean teachings regarding cosmological origins. Indeed, the very
task of commenting upon the beginning of Genesis (as early as A.D.
388-89, with the composition of the De Genesi contra Manichaeos)
and expounding upon its implications provided Augustine with the
occasion for developing a theology of creation in the first place. This
theology of creation, subjected to continual refinement, would become
a key feature of his subsequent anti-Manichaean works. The second
group of Augustine's writings under investigation encompass a series
of three treatises which he composed in the years following his consecration as Bishop of Hippo (i.e., A.D. 397-400): Contra epistulam
Manichaei quam vacant fundamenti; De Natura Bani contra
Manichaeos; and Contra Faustum Manichaeum.
The Christian Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo:
Some General Presuppositions
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo reveals a number of important presuppositions regarding God and His relationship to creatures. These
presuppositions demand some clarification if we are to appreciate fully
the transformation of the doctrine in Augustine's hands and its ramifications for Christian theology in general. 5 In its most basic sense, the
doctrine under scrutiny holds that God made all things (both of a
spiritual and material nature) from nothing. 6 The causal dependence
XII
Preface
of creatures upon God is total, since created things owe their entire
existence to the creative efficacy of God. The means whereby God
creates all things from nothing must be distinguished from the creative processes undertaken by human beings. Since God needs nothing in order to create, it can be said that He creates all things from
nothing.
But an important corollary attaches to this teaching: an affirmation
of creatio ex nihilo is correlative with an affirmation of the temporal
creation of the world. Once we affirm the causal dependence of all
things upon God, we must acknowledge that the visible universe did
not always exist. In this respect, the creation of the universe coincided
with the origin of time. Accordingly, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
is antithetical to those theological or philosophical outlooks which
endorse the eternity of the world. 7
From a Christian perspective, the act whereby God creates all things
from nothing is a free one. Indeed, the God of Christianity is not
some finite deity determined by spatio-temporal Jaws. God creates
neither under compulsion (by the dictates of His own nature) nor under constraint by external influences, but on the basis of a free decision. 8 Although a motive can be established for creation (that is, Divine goodness), this motive is determined by nothing whatsoever. While
creation is wholly consistent with God's goodness (since what is good
seeks to share its goodness), God need not create simply because He
is good. Rather, He creates because He chooses to do so.
A question might also arise as to whether God was bound to have
created the best of all possible worlds. In this context, a distinction
must be made between (1) the contention that whatever God creates
is good, and (2) the assertion that God was bound to have created the
best world (among an infinite number of possible worlds at His disposal). If God were bound to have created the best of all possible
worlds, then His freedom would not be absolute. 9 Only one alternative
is acceptable: God created the V(llry world that He chose to create. 10
Finally, Christian theology views creation as an expression of Divine omnipotence. But Divine omnipotence also finds expression in
God's sustaining of created being. If created being is drawn out of
nothing by God, then it is inherently mutable, corruptible, and liable
to pass out of existence. By virtue of its radical contingency, creation
as a whole requires the continual support of God if it is not to degenerate into the utter non-being from which it was generated. 11
The notion that God sustains the existence of that which He creates is closely aligned with the idea of Divine Providence. In Christian
Preface
XIII
terms, Divine Providence presupposes a personal God Who lovingly

orders and regulates creation. 12 This teleological vision of reality
(wherein God is viewed as directing all things toward their proper end)
provides the foundation for Augustine's response to the problem of
evil. From this optimistic perspective, even evil can be situated within
the scope of Divine Providence. If God allows evil (either on the basis
of human choice or through natural catastrophes), it is only for the
realization of the greatest long-range good.
While all of these teachings are implicit in Augustine's use of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, this particular study focuses specifically
upon the fundamental dictum that God created all things from nothing. This understanding of creation in the most absolute, uncompromising terms is central to Augustine's refutation of Manichaeism. For
Augustine (as for many of the Fathers), matter is the ultimate referent
in the act of creation. If matter (as the basic constituent of spiritual
and corporeal realities) was created from nothing, then everything
comprised of matter can likewise be said to have been created from
nothing. In effect, the creation of matter from nothing establishes the
creation of everything else from nothing as well.
The Significance of Creatio ex nihilo for Augustine
In the De vera religione (composed by A.D. 390), Augustine presents

an unequivocal affirmation of the creation of all things (other than
God) from absolute non-being. In articulating this doctrine, Augustine
also provides a comprehensive statement regarding the motive and
end of creation:
In all cases divine providence . . . recalls to its true and essential nature
whatever manifests defect, i.e., tends to nothingness, and so strengthens it.
But you say, Why do they become defective? Because they are mutable. Why
are they mutable? Because they have not supreme existence. And why so?
Because they are inferior to him who made them. Who made them? He who
supremely is. Who is he? God, the immutable Trinity, made them through his
supreme wisdom and preserves them by his supreme loving-kindness. Why
did he make them? In order that they might exist. Existence as such is good,
and supreme existence is the chief good. From what did he make them? Out
of nothing. That out of which God created all things had neither form nor
species, and was simply nothing. Therefore, the world was made out of some
unformed matter, that matter was made out of ... nothing. 13
In the foregoing statement, we find two correlative teachings which

represent salient features of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nih i/o:
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Preface
first, the supreme omnipotence of God as ultimate Creator of everything which exists; secondly, the complete dependence of creation
upon God for its very existence. From this standpoint, God creates in
a wholly unqualified sense-that is, from nothing through a free act of
the Divine will. Augustine's recognition of the unique character of
creatio ex nihilo is evident in a passage from the De diversis
quaestionibus octoginta tribus, which contrasts the creative activity
of God with that of human artists:
That supreme art of the omnipotent God through which all things have been
made from nothing, which is also called his Wisdom, also works through
artists to produce things of beauty and proportion, although they do not
produce from nothing, but from some material such as wood or marble or
ivory or whatever other kind of material is supplied for the artist's hands. But
these artists cannot make something from nothing . . . 14
As the supremely existent reality, God is the Author of every being

which does not enjoy existence in the fullest sense, as He alone does.
In this respect, a being which is created from nothing cannot be placed
on an ontological par with the Divine nature. "Nothing could exist in
any way," Augustine affirms, "if it had not been created by him." 15 In
Augustinian terms, the denial that God created all things from nothing is tantamount to a denial of His supreme power.
. . . when they affirm that there is a nature which God Almighty did not
create, but of which at the same time He fashioned this world, which they
admit to have been disposed in beauty, they thereby deny that God is almighty, to the effect of not believing that He could have created the world
without employing, for the purpose of its construction, another nature, which
had been in existence previously, and which He Himself had not made. 16
According to Augustine, the act of creation is the very expression

of a Divine will which requires neither corporeal things, nor spatial
relations, nor time for its actualization. 17 Two implications follow from
this teaching. On the one hand, God needs nothing external to Himself in order to create. This self-sufficiency is underscored by the fact
that anything other than God depends upon Him for the goodness
and being that it possesses. 18 On the other hand, the unconstrained
Divine will transcends the demands of natural law or cosmic necessity. In this respect, Augustine imputes the motive for creation to
God's love of what He wills to create. 19
But the fact that Augustine roots the motive for creation in the
operation of God's will severely delimits the scope of inquiry on this
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XV
issue. Any attempt to further question what moves God's will would
only undermine God's supremacy as first Cause, and thereby, open
the possibility of an infinite regress of causes.
But if they say 'Why did God decide to make heaven and earth?' . . . they
seek to know the causes of the will of God though the will of God is itself the
cause of all that exists. For if the will of God has a cause, there is something
that surpasses the will of God-and this we may not believe. One who asks,
'Why did God will to create heaven and earth?' is looking for something
greater than the will of God, though nothing greater can be found. 20
Methodology
By way of introduction, I trace the emergence of the doctrine of creatio

ex nihilo in the Christian tradition and its diverse formulations in the
early patristic period. This initial phase of my investigation is amplified by a consideration of pagan speculation regarding cosmological
origins. The length of this Introduction, I believe, is justified on two
grounds. First, it can stand on its own as a concise history of the
development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo from the first through
the fifth centuries, along with a potentially useful catalogue of pertinent literature on this topic. Secondly, it assumes a more specific relevance for the present study by offering the reader some insights into
the broad range of influences that were probably operative in
Augustine's theology of creation.
The theories of creation delineated in my introductory statement
stand in sharp contrast to the Manichaean creation account highlighted
in Chapter 1 ("The Manichaean Cosmogony: A Point of Reference").
By means of an exposition and analysis of illuminating primary
sources, I explicate the key features of Manichaean cosmogony and
its dualistic interpretation of reality. This treatment sets the stage for
a detailed examination of Augustine's responses to the Manichaean
world-view and its theological implications in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 ("Saint Augustine's Exegesis of Genesis") addresses his
interpretation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (chiefly but not
exclusively) in the context of his Scriptural commentaries (De Genesi
contra Manichaeos; De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus;
De Genesi ad litteram). In this connnection, I focus specifically upon
Augustine's treatment of the creation and formation of matter, the
ultimate constituent of all creatures. On the basis of this historical and
conceptual background, each of the following three chapters provide
XVI
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a textual exposition and analysis of a key anti-Manichaean writing

which draws heavily upon the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o.
Chapter 3 ("Augustine's Refutation of the Manichaean Cosmogony")
investigates Augustine's critique of the Manichaean vision of reality as
it unfolds in the important but largely ignored treatise Contra epistulam
Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti liber. Chapter 4 ("Augustine's
Theodicy") focuses upon his response to the problem of evil as it
emerges in the De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos, the locus classicus of his contribution to this perennial theological and philosophical debate. Chapter 5 ("A Defense of Monotheism") addresses the
Contra Faustum Manichaeum (specifically, Books XX-XXI) and
Augustine's refutation of Manichaean criticisms of the God of Sacred
Scripture, particularly as they pertain to His role as Creator. After a
concise summary of findings in Chapter 6 ("Creatio ex nihilo in
Augustine's Anti-Manichaean Polemic: A Brief Recapitulation"), my
concluding Chapter 7 ("Broader Theological Implications of the Doctrine") delineates a number of issues which can be viewed as outgrowths of Augustine's affirmation of God's creation of all things from
nothing. In this respect, my treatment of select anti-Manichaean writings opens the way for a delineation of the broader theological implications of Augustine's use of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, with a
special focus upon his understanding of the Divine nature, the status
of finite being, the problem of evil, the relation between free will and
sin, the character of redemption, and the scope of Divine sovereignty.
As we will see, then, the importance of the doctrine for Augustine
extends well beyond the parameters of his anti-Manichaean polemic.
The Relation Between Augustine's Life and Thought
Any assessment of Augustine's theology must be attuned to the deep

personal dimension of his thought. In this respect, his theology was
very much an outgrowth of his own lived experience, both before and
after his conversion to Christianity. Indeed, Augustine's theology can
no more be divorced from his spiritual struggle and the various doctrinal controversies which motivated and inspired his work, than it can
be viewed in isolation from the historical and cultural milieu in which
it emerged. From this standpoint, an adequate treatment of Augustine's
use of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in an anti-Manichaean context
must take into account the various circumstances which prompted this
extended polemic, as well as the reasons for his attraction to
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XVII
Manichaeism. The same considerations apply to the assessment of his

subsequent theology, especially what he wrote in response to the
Pelagians. In this connection, an appreciation of the existential underpinnings of Augustine's thought must also encompass a sensitivity to
the evolution of his ideas and the gradual refinement of his teachings. 21 This point, as we shall see, has a particular relevance in respect to the development of Augustine's theology of creation.
In methodological terms, the Confessiones will serve as our continual touchstone in probing Augustine's development of a theology
of creation. While the reliability of this work as an historical source
has been called into question, it remains our best referent for understanding Augustine the man during some of the most significant years
of his life. 22 For, it is in this greatest of spiritual autobiographies that
we have Augustine's own account of the chain of events which led
him into the Manichaean camp and the prolonged process whereby he
found his way to the Catholic faith.
Augustine and Neoplatonism
It is clear that Augustine's thought exhibits the influence of a wide

range of sources that include {at the very least) Sacred Scripture, Cicero
and the Stoics, Origen, Ambrose, Tertullian, and Marius Victorinus.
But as the Confessiones {VII,9,13) disclose, it was the libri
platonicorum which exerted an especially decisive influence upon
Augustine. His encounter with these writings precipitated nothing less
than a radical transformation of his entire outlook. In this connection,
we must address the troublesome issue regarding the origin of the
libri platonicorum: were they written by Plato himself, or by later
Platonists such as Plotinus and his disciple Porphyry? The first possibility, for all practical purposes, can be ruled out. As twentieth century scholarship has ably demonstrated, the /ibri platonicorum did
not, in all probability, encompass the writings of Plato, but rather,
selections from Plotinus, Porphyry, or both philosophers. 23
In this study, I prescind from any attempt to resolve this particular
question. {Indeed, it is doubtful whether the question is capable of
definitive resolution after the passage of over 1600 years and to the
satisfaction of everyone.) Occasionally, however, we do confront certain aspects of Augustine's thought which display an apparent affinity
with Neoplatonic insights. In these cases, I accept the tentative but
highly persuasive hypothesis that the libri platonicorum opened Au-
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gustine to a uniquely Plotinian vision of reality. 24 In keeping with this

presupposition, I avoid precise textual comparisons aimed at proving
Augustine's reliance upon specific portions of the Enneads, and claims
regarding when he might have read them. Instead, I use Plotinus as a
highly illuminating referent for our understanding of some of the key
aspects of Augustine's philosophy and theology. Accordingly, my
methodology stresses (1) interpretation over proof of derivation; and
(2) textual analysis over parallel textual comparison. 25
From a purely practical standpoint, I feel that prolonged efforts at
Quel/enforschung (with the exception of topics relating directly to the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo) extend beyond the scope of this work.
Much study has been devoted to the Neoplatonic heritage of Augustine's
thought, and I rely upon this vast corpus as support for the hypothesis I am adopting. But it must be stressed that my endorsement of
this particular hypothesis should not be construed as a rejection of a
corresponding Porphyrian hypothesis, or even the possibility that the
libri platonicorum were the work of some otherwise unknown philosopher. 26 For the purposes of the present study, however, the Enneads constitute a rich source of philosophical insights which offer an
excellent touchstone and highly practical tool for assessing the
Neoplatonic background of Augustine. After considering this issue for
some time, it is my sense that Plotinus provided the most likely inspiration for the libri platonicorum, in whatever manner they might
have been edited (or by whom) in the texts Augustine actually read.
The foregoing conclusion proceeds from the fact that we find a remarkable consonance between Augustine and Plotinus, not merely in
regard to specific themes or ideas, but in regard to their respective
visions of reality. As Augustine matured as a thinker, however, he
would make increasing efforts to "adjust" insights drawn from
Neoplatonism (and pagan philosophy in general) and creatively adapt
them in service of his own Christian world-view and personal faithcommitment.
A Word on Texts
Texts and translations of Augustine's writings are listed in the comprehensive Bibliography at the conclusion of this study. Primary texts
and translations of the writings of authors which appear less frequently
will be cited as they occur in the accompanying endnotes. In citing
Augustine's works, the following method is employed: the title and
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XIX
citation are followed by the appropriate reference to the Latin text and
page number, e.g., Contra Faustum Manichaeum I(l): CSEL XXV
(VI,l), 251.
Acknowledgements
I would be remiss if I failed to mention three great teachers and scholars whose learned insights and constructive criticism greatly enhanced
my understanding of this topic: Gerald Bonner (during his tenure as
Visiting Professor of Early Christian Studies at The Catholic University of America), the late Rev. Robert Eno, S.S. (Department of Church
History, The Catholic University of America), and Dr. Therese-Anne
Druart (School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America). I
also wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Thomas Halton (Department of Greek and Latin, The Catholic University of America), for
encouraging and guiding my interest in the development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo during the course of advanced graduate
studies in Patristics. Finally, I thank Professor Frederick Van Fleteren
for his critical reading of the initial draft of this work and accompanying editorial suggestions.
Notes
1.
Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 20:
In order to catch Augustine the theologian at work we shall approach
his thought not as a finished product, a "system" or at least a single
complex of ideas, but as a process of reflection and discovery. And such
a method is suited to the subject matter, for Augustine's thought proceeds by way of ceaseless inquiry; he often refrains from making final
judgments, and even when he makes them he is prepared to modify
them in the light of fresh examination. Consequently each stage in his
thinking must be examined in and for itself in the attempt to discover its
exact pattern and framework: what is taken for granted, what is a problem to him, what options lie at hand, what resources he has for bringing
a problem to its resolution. There will be a continuity in his thought, but
it will be the continuity of a process of becoming; there will be coherence, but it will be a coherence that is always changing. The method of
study, then, must be 'cinematic'-Augustine's thought must be seen as a
constantly changing whole.
TeSelle points out that he has borrowed the "cinematic" image (which he
adopts in characterizing the method to be followed in studying Augustine)
from Olivier du Roy's L'intelligence de Ia foi en Ia Trinite selon saint
Augustin. Genese de sa theologie trinitaire jusqu 'en 391 (Paris, 1966), 19.
2.
cf. the comments of Gerald Bonner in his St. Augustine of Hippo. Life and
Controversies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1986), 314:
. . . we should consider the fact that Augustine saw the corpus of his
writings as a cohering whole with each part supporting the rest and
recognize that we cannot dismiss any part of his writings out of hand, as
views abandoned with the passage of the years, but must rather compare such views with other works, to see if they are really as contradictory as some would have us believe.
3.
Augustine's anti-Manichaean polemic encompasses (among others) the following works: De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum
(A.D. 388); De Genesi contra Manichaeos (A.D. 389); De vera religione
(A.D. 390-391); De libero arbitrio (A.D. 391-395); De duabus animabus
contra Manichaeos (A.D. 392); Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum (A.D.
392); De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber (A.D. 393); Contra Faustum
Manichaeum (A.D. 398-400); Contra Felicem Manichaeum (A.D. 398); De
Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos (A.D. 399); Contra Secundinum
Manichaeum (A.D. 399); De Genesi ad litteram (A.D. 401).
4.
This statement demands some qualification. As indicated in this study (and in

the accompanying Bibliography), a number of works are available concerning
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XXI
Augustine's theory of creation and human origins. While some of these works
do provide a marginal treatment of Augustine's use of the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo, none is devoted exclusively to this topic (at least on the basis of my
most recent research).
5.
An fine survey of the teachings and presuppositions connected with the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is provided by John A. Hardon, The Catholic Catechism (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975),
68-83. Hardon helpfully delineates the act of creation in terms of three key
questions (p. 69): (1) How did God bring the world into existence? (2) How is
the world governed and preserved by God? (3) Why did God create the world?
6.
Strictly speaking, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo refers to the creation of

everything other than God. In this respect, "creation" encompasses visible,
observable reality and spiritual reality that is not accessible to us through the
senses (i.e., angelic natures or the soul). Some tacitly assume that the doctrine merely pertains to the creation of the visible universe alone, since this
process is explicitly discussed in Genesis's account of the six days of creation.
The teaching that God created everything from nothing is upheld by all
Christian creeds. A detailed statement of the teaching was issued by the Fourth
Lateran Council (1215), Constitutions on the Catholic Faith, #1, trans.
Norman Tanner in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume I (London:
Sheed & Ward, Ltd., 1990; Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
1990), 230:
We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God
one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible,
spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the beginning of
time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is
to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as
it were of both spirit and body in common.
7.
This statement requires some comment. The Christian doctrine of creatio ex

nihilo does not necessarily require a temporal origin of the universe (although
Genesis affirms this when it states In the beginning, God created heauen
and earth). St. Thomas Aquinas, for one, denied that one can prove (on
philosophical grounds) that the universe was created in time. While Aquinas
believed in the temporal origin of the universe on the basis of Divine revelation, he saw no conflict between the notion of causal dependence and the
existence of the universe from eternity. Since God exists eternally, He certainly could have created the universe from eternity. Aquinas likewise denied
that philosophical arguments could prove that the universe did not have a
temporal origin.
cf. Summa Contra Gentiles II, 31-38; Summa Theologica Ia, 46, I; De
Potentia 3, 17; De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes.
8.
In this connection, note the statement of the First Vatican Council (18691870), Dogmatic Constitutions on the Catholic Faith, ch. 1, trans. Jan Brayley
in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume II, 805-806:
XXII
Preface
there is one true and living God, creator and lord of heaven and
earth . . . distinct from the world, supremely happy in himself and
from himself, and inexpressibly loftier than anything besides himself
which either exists or can be imagined. This one true God, by his goodness and almighty power, not with the intention of increasing his happiness, nor indeed of obtaining happiness, but in order to manifest his
perfection by the good things which he bestows on what he creates, by
an absolutely free plan, together from the beginning of time brought
into being from nothing the twofold created order, that is the spiritual
and the bodily, the angelic and the earthly, and thereafter the human,
which is, in a way, common to both since it is composed of spirit and
body.
cf. St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos 134, 10: CC xl, 1945: Causa
omnium quae fecit, uoluntas eius est.
9.
The notion that God created the best of all possible worlds receives its classic
expression in a modern context by Leibniz. For him, God chose to create "the
best of all possible worlds" on the basis of the principle of perfection. From
this standpoint, what God does is directed toward what is objectively best.
Accordingly, God chose the world which will yield the maximum of perfection.
10.
This issue has important implications for the problem of evil and the theodicies
that Christian thinkers have developed to reconcile the apparent disparity
between a perfect and loving Creator and the suffering that we encounter in
the world. Augustine's theodicy emphasizes the goodness of the whole of
creation. From this holistic perspective, even the evil that we experience has
its place within the universal ordo established by God. But while God permits
evil, the effects of evil can never mar the inherent goodness and beauty of
God's creation. For those who espouse the "goodness of the whole" response
to the problem of evil, our limited viewpoint does not allow us to appreciate
the majesty of the totality of creation, and the fittingness of things within this
scheme. In the final analysis, God's choice of this particular world (along with
its deficiencies or its potential for deficiency) must remain a mystery to human
beings.
11.
cf., St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram V,20,40: PL xxxiv, 3/1,335: nunc

operari Deum, ut si conditis ab eo rebus operatio ejus subtrahatur, intercidant.
12.
cf., the statement of the First Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on

the Catholic Faith, ch. 1, trans. Ian Brayley in Decrees of the Ecumenical
Councils, Volume II, 806:
Everything that God has brought into being he protects and governs by
his providence.
13.
De Vera Religione xvii,34-xviii,36: CCXXXII, 208-209: ita diuina prouidentia,

cum sit ipsa omnino incommutabilis, mutabili tamen creaturae uarie subuenit
et pro diuersitate morborum alias alia iubet aut uetat, ut a uitio, unde mors
Preface
XXIII
incipit, et ab ipsa morte ad naturam suam et essentiam ea quae deficiunt, id

est ad nihilum tendunt, reducat et firmet.
Sed dicis mihi: Quare deficiunt? Quia mutabilia sunt. Quare mutabilia sunt?
Quia non summe sunt. Quare non summe sunt? Quia inferiora sunt eo, a quo
facta sunt. Quis ea fecit? Qui summe est. Quis hie est? Deus incommutabilis
trinitas, quoniam et per summam sapientiam ea fecit et summa benignitate
conseruat. Cur ea fecit? Vt essent. lpsum enim quantumcumque esse bonum
est, quia summum bonum est summe esse. Vnde fecit? Ex nihilo. ld igitur est,
uncle fecit deus omnia, quod nullam speciem habet nullamque formam, quod
nihil est aliud quam nihil. Quapropter etiam si de aliqua informi materia factus
est mundus, haec ipsa facta est de omnino nihilo.
14.
De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, quaestio 78: CC xliv (A), 223:

ars ilia summa omnipotentis dei, per quam ex nihilo facta sunt omnia, quae
etiam sapientia eius dicitur, ipsa operatur etiam per artifices, ut pulchra et
congruentia faciant, quamuis non de nihilo, sed de aliqua materia operentur,
uelut ligno aut marmore aut ebore et si quod aliud materiae genus manibus
artificis subditur. Sed ideo non possunt isti de nihilo aliquid fabricare . . .
15.
De Ciuitate Dei XII,5: PL 41, 353: Quae cum ita sint, Deus qui summe est,
atque ob hoc .ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est (quia
neque illi aequalis esse deberet, quae de nihilo facta esset); neque ullo modo
esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset . . .
16.
De Fide et Symbolo 1,2(2): PL 40, 181: Cum enim dicunt esse naturam quam
Deus omnipotens non creaverit, de qua tamen istum mundum fabricaverit,
quem pulchre ordinatum esse concedunt; ita omnipotentem Deum negant, ut
non eum credant mundum potuisse facere, nisi ad eum fabricandum alia natura,
quae iam fuerat, et quam ipse non fecerat, uteretur . . . Aut si omnipotentem
Deum fabricatorem mundi esse concedunt, fateantur necesse est ex nihilo
eum fecisse quae fecit.
17.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251; 1,9(16): PL xxxiv,3/1,

252.
18.
De Genesi ad litteram IV,16(27): PL xxxiv,3/1, 306-307: Porro alia res bona

praeter ipsum nulla est, quam ipse non fecit; ac per nullo praeter se alio bono
eget, qui bono quod fecit non eget.
19.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251.

cf. Athanasius, De lncarnatione 3, which attributes the motive for creation to God's goodness. Accordingly, the creation of everything from nothing (through the Word) is an expression of Divine goodness. The notion that
the emergence of reality is the outgrowth of Divine goodness is also prominent in Neoplatonism. For Plotinus, the diffusiveness of the One (and the
subsequent generation of being other than the One) is the result of the One's
absolute goodness, since that which is perfect and good must give of itself
(Enneads V.4(7).1; V.1(10).6).
20.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,2(4): PL xxxiv,3/1, 175: Si ergo isti dixerint,

Quid placuit Deo facere coelum et terram? Causas enim voluntatis Dei scire
XXIV
Preface
quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet
causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas
est credere. Qui ergo dicit, Quare fecit Deus coelum et terram? respondendum est ei, Quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est coeli et terrae, et ideo
major est voluntas Dei quam coelum et terra. Qui autem dicit, Quare voluit
facere coelum et terram? majus aliquid quaerit quam est voluntas Dei: nihil
autem majus inveniri potest.
cf. Confessiones Xl.10(12): CC xxvii, 200.
21.
Olivier Du Roy (Intelligence de Ia Foi en Ia Trinite Selon Saint Augustine

(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966), p. 15) defined the method to be followed in conducting investigations into the thought of St. Augustine. In this
study, I am observing the first two principles of this method: "Cette methode
se voudrait a Ia fois phenomenologique, genetique et structurale. Methode
phenomenologique, c'est-a-dire visant a Ia atteindre !'intuition qui meut Ia
pensee augustinienne et qui, ne s'epuisant dans aucune formulation successive, relance perpetuellement sa recherche. Comme nous l'avons deja dit
ailleurs, notre attention se protera aux tatonnements et aux hesitations, indices d'une visee qui ne s'epuise pas dans ses expressions. Methode genetique,
puisqu'il s'agit de saisir le jaillissement de cette pensee et son intuition directrice
dans uncle elaboration progressive. Methode structurale enfin, car il s'agit
bien d'une puissante synthese dont les materiaux, d'origines tres diverses,
sont integres dans un plan d'ensemble sans cesse remanie."
22.
For an illuminating discussion of the debate surrounding the question of the

value of the Confessiones as an historical source, see Gerald Bonner's Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controversies, pp. 42-47.
23.
The investigation of this question can be traced to the nineteenth century.

Seminal studies in this area include the following: M.N. Bouilet, Les Enneades
de Plotin, 3 volumes (Paris, 1857-1861); L. Grandgeorge, Saint Augustin et
le Neoplatonisme (Paris, 1896); Prosper Alfaric, L'Euolution Intellectualle
de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1918); Charles Boyer, Christianisme et
neop/atonisme dans Ia formation de Saint Augustin (Rome, 1923); Jens
Norregaard, Augustins Bekehrung (Tiibingen, 1923); Paul Henry, Plotin et
/'Occident (Louvain, 1934).
24.
The writings of Robert J. O'Connell, S.J. provide compelling evidence m

support of this particular hypothesis. In this connection, the following books
and monographs are worthy of consideration: "Ennead VI, 4-5 in the Work
of St. Augustine," Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes (1963): 1-39; "The
Plotinian Fall of the Soul in St. Augustine," Traditio 19(1963): 1-35; "The
Enneads and St. Augustine's Image of Happiness," Vigiliae Christianae
17(1963): 129-164; "The Riddle of St. Augustine's Confessions: A Plotinian
Key," International Philosophical Quarterly 4(1964): 327-372; St.
Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968); Saint Augustine's Confessions. The Odyssey of
Sou/(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Preface
XXV
Press, 1978); "Pre-Existence in the Early Augustine," Revue des Etudes

Augustiniennes 26 (1980): 176-188; "Faith, Reason, and Ascent to Vision in
St. Augustine," Augustinian Studies 11 (1980); The Origin of the Soul in
St. Augustine's Later Works (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987).
For critiques of O'Connell's position (and/or responses), see: Goulven
Madec, a note in Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 11(1965): 372-375;
and "Une lecture de Confessions VII, ix, 13-xxi,27," Revue des Etudes
Augustiniennes 16(1970); 79-137; Olivier DuRoy, L'lntelligence de Ia Foi
en Ia Trinite selon Saint Augustin (Paris, 1966); G.J.P. O'Daly, "Did St.
Augustine Ever Believe in the Soul's Pre-Existence?" Augustinian Studies 5
(1974): 227-235; F.E. Van Fleteren, "Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Augustine," Augustinian Studies 4(1973);
33-72; and "A Comment on Some Questions Relating to Confess/ones VII:
A Reply to O'Connell," in Augustine. Presbyter Factus Sum (edited by Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J., Earl C. Muller, S.J., and Roland J. Teske, S.J.),
Collectanea Augustiniana (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 531-540.
25.
For a more detailed application of this methodology, seeN. Joseph Torchia,

"Plotinian To/ma and the Fall of the Soul in the Early Philosophy of Saint
Augustine," Dissertation Abstracts International 48, issue #4 (1987),
Fordham University.
26.
In support of the thesis that Porphyry provided the Neoplatonic inspiration

for Augustine, see: W. Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle, 1933); J. J.
O'Meara, Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine (Paris, 1959);
F. E. Van Fleteren, "Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the
Thought of St. Augustine," Augustinian Studies 4(1973): 33-72.
Introduction
The Scriptural, Patristic, and

Philosophical Background of
Saint Augustine's Doctrine
of Creatio ex nihilo
By the fourth century, A.D., the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o had

received an explicit formulation by a number of prominent Church
Fathers. One of its most technical and detailed expositions is found in
the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo. But Augustine's understanding of this doctrine can be viewed as the outgrowth of a long series of
developments which span the first four centuries of the Christian intellectual tradition. Accordingly, Augustine's approach to creatio ex
nihilo must be viewed within the larger Patristic context in which it
emerged.
But the very Fathers upon whom Augustine might have drawn for
inspiration and guidance were themselves influenced by two major
traditions: on the one hand, that of Sacred Scripture; on the other
hand, that of the Graeco-Roman speculation on cosmological origins.
An introduction to the present study, then, demands an investigation
of the process whereby Christian thinkers refined and clarified the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This investigation will further isolate
some of the basic presuppositions that underlie this fundamental Christian teaching, and assess its possible philosophical sources. Such an
investigation will provide a means of determining (at least on a tentative basis) the influences that might have been operative in Augustine's
treatment of the doctrine of creation in his commentaries upon Genesis, in his extended polemic against the Manichaeans, and in a broad
range of theological deliberations. Let us begin with a look at the
major Scriptural referents for Christian deliberations on creation.
... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo
Creatio Ex Nihilo in Scripture

The most explicit articulation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in
Scripture is found in 2 Maccabees (7 :28):
So I urge you, my child, to look up at the sky and the earth. Consider everything you see there, and realize that God made it all from nothing (yvwvm
ott el; ouK ovnov E:n:OLY]OEV aim'.t 6 8e6~). just as He made the human
race.
It should be observed that a number of modern writers question whether

this particular text presents an unequivocal statement of creatio ex
nihilo. Indeed, the crucial phrase~ OVK ovtwv is rather ambiguous
and translatable as either "from the non-existent" or merely "from
things which did not exist" (that is, a preexistent amorphous matter). 1
Despite arguments of modern commentators to the contrary, however, early Fathers such as Theophilus of Antioch and Origen relied
upon this text as an unequivocal pronouncement of creation in its
most literal terms, that is, as a bringing into being out of that which is
non-existent. 2 The language (of 2 Maccabees) is unique because it
provides the verbal formula (~ OVK ovtwv) which is central to the
notion of creation in an absolute sense, that is, creation from what is
not. Such a teaching stands diametrically opposed to pagan theories
of cosmological origins, which would define creation in figurative terms
as the formation or ordering of a preexistent matter.
But having confronte:l 2 Maccabees (7:28), we must assess the
importance of the verbal formulae which a Scriptural text employs in
articulating its teaching on creation. This issue is relevant for the present
purposes precisely because the locus classicus of creation accounts
in Scripture (i.e., Genesis 1) does not necessarily describe creation
"from nothing" (at least not in the explicit language that we find in 2
Maccabees 7:28).
In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; the earth was waste
and void; darkness covered the abyss, and the spirit of God was stirring above
the waters. 3
But in the absence of such technical language, are we justified in

concluding that Genesis does not teach creatio ex nihilo?This problem touches upon a scholarly debate concerning the import of the
opening verses of the Bible: does the lack of an unequivocal pronouncement in Genesis 1 that God brought the world into existence
"from nothing" mean that its priestly writers did not endorse the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo? Conversely, if Genesis does not affirm
creatio ex nihilo, can we infer that it teaches the notion of creation
from a preexistent matter?
Exegetes diverge in their responses to these questions, and scholarly opinion can be divided into two groups: some assert that Genesis
1.1,ff. indeed upholds creatio ex nihilo (even if it is only implicit in
the text), while others contend that Genesis does not support the
doctrine. An implication of these positions concerns the status of matter
(as the constituent of created things): if the language of Genesis 1.1 ,ff.
can be construed as referring to a primordial matter, then the former
group would contend that God first created the matter which became
the chaos or abyss, while the latter group would maintain that a preexistent matter was already at hand when God created the universe. 4
Some of those who read creatio ex nihilo into Genesis 1.1,ff.
reinforce their position by means of an analysis of the terminology
which the text employs. In this respect, Genesis describes the act of
creation by means of bara (NJ~). a verb which designates a type of
activity unique to God alone, or "the term par excellence for God's
creative activity." 5 Conversely, commentators who maintain that God
created from a preexistent matter can cite Wisdom XI.1 7 for additional Scriptural support:
And indeed your all-powerful hand which created the world from formless
matter (ou yap ipt6pEt ~ :rtavwMvallo~ oou xdp Kai K-r(oaoa -rov
KOOI!OV
U!!Op<j>ou UAl'J~) did not lack the means to unleash a horde of
bears or savage lions ... or unknown beasts . . .
es
Of course, this passage could also be construed as implying that God

made the formless matter out of which he created the world. Such an
interpretation, however, necessitates an accompanying theory of a
dual or sequential creation (whereby God first makes matter from nothing and then forms it). However, neither Wisdom XI.17 nor Genesis
1 specifically discuss creation in these terms. 6
But the answer to the question before us, I believe, depends on
one's conception of the scope and extent of the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo itself. If we ground the doctrine exclusively upon the ontological categories of being and non-being, then we might contend that
Genesis does not depict creation in the same way that it is articulated
in 2 Maccabees (7:28). If, however, we understand the doctrine in
terms of the utter dependence of the world and humanity upon God,
then we could certainly hold that Genesis upholds creatio ex nihi /o in

its strictest sense.
In actuality, the language of both 2 Maccabees (7:28) and Wisdom
XI.17 reflects a Hellenistic outlook that differed markedly from the
world-view of the writers who produced Genesis. Consequently, the
very question as to whether Genesis taught creatio ex nihilo might
well presuppose a causal way of thinking that would have been foreign
to its priestly writers. 7 For them, the important issue was the fact that
God made the world and placed an indelible imprint of His goodness
upon creation. They were simply not preoccupied with abstract speculations concerning that from which God created the world, or what
preceded the act of creation. 8 For the priestly writers who produced
Genesis 1.1 ,ff., a world devoid of the goodness, beauty, and order
that God imparted was, for all practical purposes, "nothing." In the
Hellenized Judaism that produced 2 Maccabees, however, creation
was characterized in more radical ontological terms as a bringinginto-being from .that which is not. 9 From this standpoint, the import
of Genesis 1 and 2 Maccabees can be viewed as the same, despite
the differences regarding language and imagery exhibited by these
texts. Proceeding from this discussion of relevant scriptural references,
let us now consider some significant early Christian statements
regarding creation.
Patristic Theories of Creation:
The First to the Fourth Centuries
The following survey will highlight some of the key expressions of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in the early Christian intellectual tradition. The list of authors under investigation is necessarily selective. I
focus upon thinkers, who (in my estimation) are representative of genuine innovations in the articulation of this teaching from the first through
the fourth centuries, A.D. 10 At the outset, it must be stressed that the
formulation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o emerged only gradually. Initially, Christians accepted the teaching of Genesis regarding
creation from a primordial chaos as an article of faith. It was assumed
that the world depended upon God for any goodness, beauty, and
order that it possesses. But as Christianity encountered paganism,
greater precision regarding scriptural teaching on the origin of the
world was required. On the one hand, Christians felt obliged to address pagan criticisms and to correct erroneous assumptions about
their teachings. On the other hand, Christian intellectuals raised new

theological and philosophical questions regarding cosmological origins as a result of their own contact with the Graeco-Roman thoughtworld.
1. The Apostolic Fathers
In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, discussions of the theological

significance of the cosmos do not entail systematic theories of creation. In Ignatius of Antioch, for example, the cosmos is generally
depicted as a region that stands in sharp contrast to an enduring spiritual realm; in this sense, it is viewed as a mere stage in our journey to
our ultimate spiritual destination. 11 In this respect, Ignatius's discussions of the cosmos are directed toward goals of a practical, pastoral
nature rather than toward purely speculative ones. Despite this general trend in the Apostolic tradition, however, two documents are worth
some consideration in the present context: I Clement's Epistle to the
Corinthians and The Shepherd of Hermas.
I Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians (c. A.D. 95) provides a
detailed statement regarding the order inherent in the created universe. While the Epistle contains no reference to creatio ex nihilo, it
firmly establishes the dependence of the cosmos upon God for its
harmony. For Clement, universal harmony serves as a model of ecclesiastical concord. But universal harmony can only proceed from God,
its ultimate standard. In this respect, the harmony that we observe in
nature is an outgrowth of God's providential concern for creation as a
whole.
In chapter 20 of the Epistle, we find a detailed enumeration of the
expressions of God's care for the universe. This care is revealed in
celestial motion; in the regular succession of day into night and night
into day; in the circuit of the planets; in reproductive and growth processes; in the regulation of unknown parts of the earth, oceans, and
other worlds; in natural phenomena; and in the peaceful coexistence
of lesser creatures. 12 In effect, Clement develops an optimistic, teleological vision of the universe that is closely akin to what we encounter
in both Scripture and in the rationalism of the Hellenic tradition. The
concord, order, and peace observable in all things points to the operation of a Divine Law that assumes a personal, providential role in
creation. 13
For Clement, God is the "Great Demiurgos" (6 f!Eya~ 6ru.uoupy6)
responsible for cosmic order. 14 It should be observed here that Clem-
ent uses the term Demiurgos in a manner consistent with other early
Fathers of the Church to describe the creative role of the Godhead. 15
But the issue as to whether God created the universe from nothing, or
whether His creative activity encompasses a shaping or ordering of
preexistent matter, is not addressed. It is merely assumed that as supreme Creator, God is responsible for the universe, and conversely,
that the entire universe depends upon God for its goodness. 16
In contrast to Clement, The Shepherd of Hermas provides an explicit affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. This affirmation emerges in
connection with an injunction regarding the contents of true belief:
. . . believe that God is one, who made all things and perfected them, and
made all things to be out of that which was not, and contains all things,
and is himself alone uncontained. 17
Apart from this isolated utterance, no more is said regarding the nature and scope of God's creative activity. Nonetheless, the mere articulation of this teaching {in a didactic context) indicates that a faith
commitment to the notion of creation from nothing in an absolute
sense was present in the Christian tradition from the outset. For detailed formulations of the doctrine of creatio ex nih i/o, and a sensitivity to the complexities of this teaching, we must turn to the next generation of Christian thinkers-the second century Apologists.
2. Creation Accounts in the Apologists
The Apologists' speculation regarding the origin of the world was closely
linked with their fundamental objectives: to refute pagan charges of
immorality or treason against Christians; to reveal the errors inherent
in pagan religion and culture; to demonstrate the superiority of Christian wisdom over that of pagan philosophers. 18 In carrying out these
objectives, the Apologists challenged polytheism and idol worship, as
well as materialistic and dualistic interpretations of reality. An excellent focal point for the assessment of such developments is the apologetic literature of the second century, A.D. An examination of such
writers as Justin the Martyr, Athenagoras of Athens, Tatian of Syria,
and Theophilus of Antioch provides an effective means of tracing the
emergence of an explicit articulation of the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo.
For Justin, God constitutes the ultimate Cause of the universe. An
important implication of this causal primacy is a radical ontological
difference between God and what He creates. From this standpoint,
only God can be unbegotten (aytvvl]tO~) and incorruptible

(li<j>Sapto~); anything that exists or will exist (other than God) must
be subject to corruption and capable of annihilation. 19 Therefore, only
one God can exist, the God that "created and formed this universe." 20
But while reason discloses the necessity of a first Cause that is
immune to the negative effects of change, Scripture provides further
insights into God's creative activity. According to Justin, these insights are derived from what "we have learned from tradition." 21 "We
have been instructed," he maintains, "that God, in the beginning, created in His goodness everything out of shapeless matter for the sake
of men." 22 In Apology II, Justin provides a more refined treatment of
the creative process, attributing it specifically to the agency of the
Word. 23
In keeping with his affirmation of the superiority of Platonic philosophy, Justin upheld the compatibility of Scripture with the Timaeus.
This is borne out in Apology I, where he contends that "God changed
shapeless matter and created the world." 24 Justin attributes the source
of this theory to Genesis 1 (1-3). For him, such teaching is the basis
of both the Christian and the Platonic understanding of an indisputable truth: " . . . that God by His Word created the whole world out of
matter, of which Moses had already spoken. "25
The fact that Justin perceived such a kinship between Mosaic and
Platonic teachings raises some important questions. Did he reject a
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in favor of a notion of creation in terms
of a "shaping" or "ordering" of amorphous matter? The language just
considered tends to support the latter alternative. Further support is
found in Apology I, where Justin refers to the day on which God
transformed the darkness and matter and made the world. 26 In this
respect, Justin seems to have assumed that the primordial "darkness"
to which Genesis 1 refers was matter.
But the belief that creation involved God's action upon an amorphous substrate need not necessarily rule out a theory of creatio ex
nihilo. Indeed, Justin might have thought that God had brought matter into being before He transformed it into the world of our experience. Such a view would presuppose a sequential creation whereby
the production of matter (as the basic "stuff" of things) preceded the
making of the world. Justin, however, does not explicitly develop such
a theory. Yet, in the Dialogue with Trypho (chapter 5), he clearly
rules out any possibility that matter could have existed from eternity:
since God alone is unbegotten and incorruptible, matter had to be
begotten in order to serve as the basis of creation.
Technically speaking, then, a theory of creatio ex nihilo can be

extracted from Justin's writings. But such a theory is implicit rather
than explicit. Justin, in fact, maintains something of a dual allegiance
to both the Scriptural and the Platonic interpretations of the emergence of the cosmos (or, an uneasy alliance between these outlooks).
In this respect, he appears to have assumed uncritically (like other
early Fathers) that what Plato taught was derived from Moses, and
thus, wholly consistent with Scriptural teaching. 27
Like Justin, Athenagoras of Athens displays a well-defined distinction between God and matter. For both writers, the crux of this distinction lay in the fact that God is uncreated and eternal, while matter
is created and perishable. 28 As in Justin's Dialogue with Trypho,
Athenagoras attributes the role of Creator to the uncreated God. In
this respect, Athenagoras proceeds from the metaphysical presupposition that what truly exists is unbegotten, and hence, causally dependent upon nothing else for its being. This position is consistent with
the general thrust of Athenagoras's monotheism: if God is ontologically
distinct from all things, there can be no room for a second god or
other gods. 29
Athenagoras underscores the difference between God and the material world by means of an analogue with clear Platonic overtones.
God and matter, he maintains, are as far removed as the artist from
his materials.
. . . for as is the potter and the clay (matter being the clay, and the artist the
potter), so is God, the Framer of the world, and matter, which is subservient
to Him for the purposes of His art. 30
In one sense, this statement is consistent with what Athenagoras holds

regarding the ontological dependence of matter (and all things) upon
God. But, if taken in isolation, the passage might also suggest that
creation involved God's action upon a preexistent material substrate.
Like Justin, Athenagoras does not offer further speculation as to
whether God begot matter prior to the formation process that he next
describes:
But as the clay cannot become vessels of itself without art, so neither did
matter, which is capable of taking all forms, receive, apart from God the
Framer, distinction and shape and order. 31
Such statements, of course, must be balanced with what we encounter elsewhere. Indeed, Athenagoras also makes a clear distinction
between an uncreated, eternal Godhead and created, perishable matter. 32 Such a contention dispels any thought that Athenagoras believed
that God and matter were somehow eternally coexistent. In this sense,
it was necessary that God begot matter before He shaped and ordered
it into intelligible form.
But we still encounter an apparent ambiguity in Athenagoras's discussion of the dynamics of creation. While he clearly stresses the radical contingency of matter, we also find a suggestion of the notion of
a preexistent substrate which provides the raw material of creation.
This suggestion becomes more pronounced when we consider
Athenagoras's striking assertion regarding the creative activity of the
Logos:
... He came forth to be the idea and energizing power of all material things
which lay like a nature without attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser
particles being mixed up with the lighter. 33
Here, we find a passage that complements Athenagoras's artisan

analogue. The implication, it appears, is that matter lay in an amorphous state prior to its formation by the Logos. But such a theory
need not necessarily rule out creatio ex nihilo entirely. According to
Athenagoras, God (as "Maker of the universe") creates all things through
the agency of the Logos, the Father's Son in idea and operation. 34 On
the basis of this contention, we might infer that matter was originally
generated from non-being. But the difficulty lies not so much in what
Athenagoras says about creation, but in what he leaves unsaid. As in
the case of Justin, a theory of creatio ex nihilo can be inferred from
his discussions. But nowhere do we find it articulated in an explicit
way.3s
More clarity on this issue is found in Tatian of Syria. In Tatian's
Oratio ad Graecos, we observe a continuity with themes encountered
in both Justin and Athenagoras. Tatian describes God as unbegotten,
eternal, and wholly distinct from the material order. He highlights God's
distinctness from creation in these terms: because God is eternal, He
did not begin to be in time, but constitutes (as Creator) the beginning
of all things. 36 In contrast to matter, God is a Spirit; while God does
not pervade matter, He is creatively responsible for what Tatian describes as "material spirits" and "shapes that are in matter" YIn broader
terms, Tatian characterizes God as "the Father of both sensible and
invisible things." 38 Like Justin and Athenagoras, Tatian also depicts
God as creating through the Logos-the expression of His goodness
10
and power. While God exists prior to all things, the beginning of things
coincides with the generation of the Logos, the "first-born of the Father". 39 Tatian's theory of the generation of the Logos provides the
basis of his account of creation, and it is here that he departs from his
predecessors.
To a great extent, Tatian resolves the ambiguity that we encounter
in Justin and Athenagoras. He accomplishes this by specifying separate stages in the creative process: the begetting of the Logos coincides with the beginning of all things; once begotten, the Logos "in
turn begot our creation by fabricating matter." 40 Tatian leaves no doubt
about his position: matter is not eternal, because it is not like God,
Who is without beginning. Rather, matter "was originated and brought
into being . . . by the sole creator of all that is." 41
Here, Tatian effectively links God's roles as "Maker" and "Framer"
of the universe. For the begetting of being {and the matter which
underlies it) is only the initial stage in the creative process. Tatian
posits a second movement which entails the ordering of this raw,
amorphous substrate:
It is possible to see that the whole construction and creation of the world has
derived from matter, and that matter itself has been produced by God in such
a way that we are to think of it partly as raw and formless before its separation, partly as organized and orderly after its division. 42
In effect, Tatian constructs a causal chain proceeding from begetter to

begotten: God begets the Logos, the Logos begets matter, and the
world emerges from the Logos's formative action upon matter. This
formation is effected by means of what Tatian describes as a "division" {buiKpWL}, whereby the matter generated by the Logos was
first separated into parts, and then, arranged into what is beautiful
and orderly. 43 Thus, he envisions a common origin of all things. Once
differentiated, the universe and its phenomena emerge in varying degrees of beauty and harmony.
Despite these refinements, Tatian still depicts creation in terms of
an imposition of form upon what is disordered and amorphous. A
clear rejection of this model is found in Theophilus of Antioch, who
provides an unambiguous expression of the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo. This formulation emerges in the context of an analysis of the
significance of the various appellations of God {including the title of
"Creator"). Theophilus first considers the term "God" {8E6) itself:
because God is uncreated, He has no beginning; because He is im-
11
mortal, He is wholly unchanging. 44 In Theophilus's probing linguistic

analysis, 86~ is revealed as an extremely fertile term that encompasses a whole range of creative and providential functions. 45 In this
context, his discussion of terminology expressing God's creative status merits special attention.
Theophilus maintains that God is both "Demiurge" and "Maker"
because He is "creator and maker" of the universe. 46 At first glance,
the formula might appear redundant. But this conjoining of the activities of "creating" and "making" has a specific purpose, underscoring
the fact that God's creative role is more than a demiurgic formation or
ordering. This is borne out by Theophilus's unequivocal assertion that
"God made everything out of what did not exist," bringing it into
existence. 47
But it is interesting to observe that Theophilus does not rely upon
Genesis 1 for his Scriptural support. Instead, he grounds his affirmation of creatio ex nihilo upon 2 Maccabees (7:28) and its pronouncement of creation from utter non-being. In effect, Theophilus uses a
Scriptural referent which wholly endorses his commitment to the notion of creation in an absolute sense. In this respect, he directs his
remarks to the Platonists. In an apparent reference to the Timaeus
(28c), he criticizes what he perceives as a striking inconsistency: while
the Platonists acknowledge that God is uncreated, they hold that matter is also uncreated and hence, coeval with God. 48 In response,
Theophilus presents a simple but devastingly effective rebuttal: if God
and matter were both uncreated, eternal, and immutable, then God's
absolute sovereignty would be compromised. 49 Any creator who allowed the possibility of such coexistence would not truly be God, at
least not in any ultimate sense.
Theophilus extends this critique to the Platonic understanding of
creation itself. Focusing upon Plato's artisan analogue (the basis of
Athenagoras's creation account), he queries: "What would be remarkable if God made the world out of preexistent matter?" 50 In this sense,
Theophilus subtly undermines any attempt to define creation in terms
of a "shaping" or "ordering". The uniqueness of God's power lies in
the fact that He can make "whatever he wishes out of the non-existent," just as "the ability to give life and motion belongs to no one but
God alone." 51
In the creation theories of the second century Apologists, we find
two levels of discourse regarding creation: while Justin, Athenagoras,
and Tatian imply (or strongly suggest) creatio ex nihilo, only Theophilus
12
provides us with an explicit, unqualified expression of the doctrine.

Justin, Athenagoras, and (to a lesser extent) Tatian display something
of a dual allegiance. On the one hand, they wished to remain faithful
to Scriptural teachings. On the other hand, however, they attempted
to explicate the biblical account of creation by means of insights derived from pagan Greek philosophy. Justin, it appears, simply assumed
that Plato and Genesis were saying roughly the same thing. Two possibilities can be entertained here.
First, Justin's emphasis upon the compatibility between Moses and
Plato might be viewed as a severe compromise, whereby Scriptural
and pagan creation accounts were placed on an equal footing with
Plato's theory of cosmic generation. On the other hand, however,
Justin might have had a purely apologetic goal in mind, wishing to
show the venerability of Mosaic wisdom over the wisdom of the greatest of the Greek philosophers. 5 2 But even if this were so, Justin would
have still viewed Genesis and the Timaeus as exhibiting rather similar
teachings. Indeed, Justin's claim that Plato derived his own understanding of creation from Genesis might suggest that Justin himself
viewed Genesis in Platonic terms (that is, as no more than an "ordering" of preexistent matter). Athenagoras does not provide much more
clarity on this issue. Tatian recognizes the importance of positing separate stages or phases in the creative process. In this regard, Tatian
made a point of demonstrating that God created matter prior to its
transformation into a world exhibiting intelligibility, form, and order.
In this context, the importance of Plato's Timaeus and its account
of the world's generation (28b-3lb) for both Christians and non-Christians cannot be underestimated. The Timaeus served as the key philosophical referent for late antique philosophical discussions regarding
the origin of the universe. Pagans grappled with the import of the
Timaeus just as Jews and Christians grappled with the import of Genesis. Early Christian intellectuals, in fact, found a close parallelism
between the Timaeus and Genesis. 53 The recognition of such a parallelism, in fact, might have led some Christians to interpret Genesis
exclusively from a Platonic perspective. Indeed, three of the second
century Apologists under scrutiny here (i.e., Justin, Athenagoras, and
Tatian) exhibit varying degrees of reliance upon the Platonic notion
that creation constitutes an imposition of form upon formless matter.
In Theophilus, we observe a conscious effort to demarcate a genuine Christian understanding of creation from anything that the pagan
tradition offers. For him, the creative efficacy of God lies in the fact
13
that God made everything out of what did not exist. In effect,
Theophilus brings to the fore the uniqueness of the Christian conception of creation, that is, as a bringing into being from absolute nonbeing. In this respect, he is representative of a general movement
toward the emancipation of Christian creation accounts from the limitations of the ideas and imagery of the Timaeus.
In general, all of the second century Greek Apologists we have
considered directed their arguments against mainstream pagan thinkers. But implicit in their critique of classical philosophical theories of
cosmological origins was a refutation of teachings rooted in Gnosticism. "Gnosticism" refers to a wide range of philosophico-religious
teachings which emerged in late antiquity. Like the Platonists and Stoics who bore the brunt of Theophilus's attack, the Gnostics taught
that matter was eternal and unbegotten. In bringing this section to
conclusion, let us briefly examine some salient features of the Gnostic
outlook. 54
To begin with, religions which fall under the heading of "Gnosticism" tended to promote an understanding of reality that was radically
dualistic in character: sharp ontological distinctions were made between God and the world, humanity and the world, and (on an individual level) between spirit and matter. Adherents to such religions
were firm in the conviction that the true inner self must always remain
at odds with a universe and a body in which they can never be at
home. Accordingly, Gnosticism in all its forms tended toward an
"acosmic" attitude. In this respect, the universe was viewed as an evil
place which should have neither emerged nor been created. Conversely,
the creator or architect of the universe was seen as a hostile enemy
rather than as a providential ally. Some expressions of this approach
(e.g., those found in the Valentinian myths, in the mythological cosmology of Bardesanes, and in the religion of Marcion) posited a further dualism between the supreme God and an inferior demiurge identified with the God of the Jewish Old Testament. In those schemes,
the demiurge created the world from an eternal material substrate,
and accordingly, was held responsible for all of the world's evil.
In this painful situation, the only hope for salvation lay in the prospect of release from the vicissitudes of earthly existence-not merely
upon death, but by means of an indifference (and even ambivalence)
toward the world. Salvation was only open to those with an understanding of this state of affairs. Thus, Gnostic systems tended to distinguish between an "elect" who possessed such privileged knowledge
14
(gnosis) and those simple believers who accepted the world on its own
terms, thereby subjecting themselves to its corrupting influence. In
the patristic tradition, we find the most explicit condemnation of Gnosticism in the writings of Ireneaus and Tertullian.
3. lrenaeus and Tertullian
In actuality, Irenaeus and Tertullian provide little in the way of original
contributions to the development of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 55
Their impact upon the Christian tradition proceeds more from their
skills as polemicists rather than their gifts as speculative thinkers in
their own right. But since their deliberations on creation emerge in
connection with refutations of a major controversy in the history of
early Christianity, they merit at least passing consideration in this survey. For, it was their formulations of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
in an anti-Gnostic context which would come to be viewed as the
orthodox position on this topic.
Irenaeus (born c. A.D. 150) assumed a prominent role in early Christian refutations of the different expressions of Gnostic dualism. In
response to the Gnostic tendency to distinguish God from a creative
demiurge, Irenaeus argued that God is the ultimate and sole Creator
of everything in heaven and on earth from absolutely nothing. 56 Indeed, the mark of God's preeminence over everything else is borne
out by the fact that God called into being what previously had no
existence at all. 57 For Irenaeus, the affirmation of God's role as supreme Creator is inextricably bound up with an affirmation of monotheism and Divine omnipotence. From this standpoint, the designation of God as Creator in the most absolute sense can only mean that
He is the sole and all-powerful Maker of everything which exists. 58
Tertullian (c. A.D. 155-c. A.D. 220) also viewed the notion of the
eternity of matter as incompatible with the affirmation of Divine supremacy. This position comes to the fore in his polemical treatise
against Hermogenes. In effect, Tertullian opposes Hermogenes' theory
of the eternity of God and matter by means of a skillful reductio ad
absurdum argument: if (as Hermogenes maintains) the good was neither made from matter (since matter is evil), nor from God (since
nothing can be made from God's own substance), then the good (and
by extension, all things) must have been made from nothing whatsoever. 59 In response to the charge that Genesis did not explicitly teach
the creation of all things from nothing, Tertullian advances a less
convincing argument from silence. Insofar as God is wholly capable of
creating in this manner, it was not necessary to affirm it. If, however,
15
God did rely on preexistent matter in creating, the Bible would certainly have stated it {precisely because this constitutes such a far-fetched
claim). 60
By the beginning of the third century, a well-defined Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo had emerged that was completely distinct
from Greek cosmological theories. The fact remained, however, that
Christian thinkers would continue to use language and ideas derived
from pagan thought in their explication of this particular teaching.
But for the most part, patristic discussions of creation were outgrowths
of a defense of biblical teachings, or alternatively, a critique of the
errors inherent in pagan or semi-Christian Gnostic ones. For a treatment of creation that entails a systematic exposition of relevant scriptural passages, we must look to Origen.
4. Origen's Theory of Creation
In his role as the Church's first great systematic thinker, Origen's contribution to the development of a Christian doctrine of creation is
highly significant. Origen provides a clear articulation of creatio ex
nihi/o. At the outset of the De Principiis, he expounds upon the
Church's teaching regarding the origin of the world in terms of three
components: first, that the world was made; secondly, that the world
took its beginning in time; and thirdly, that due to its inherent corruptibility, the world will be destroyed. 61 Origen qualifies exactly what
he means by the phrase "the world was made," challenging those who
uphold the notion of a preexistent, eternal material substrate that coexists with God. 62
Thus, the teaching that "the world was made by God" can only
mean that God is the ultimate creative principle responsible for the
existence of all things (including human beings). Implicit in Origen's
remarks is a commitment to creation in the most literal sense. But
despite his contention that such a theory of creation is "proved by
many declarations throughout the whole of Scripture," the biblical
support he enlists is meager indeed. Rather than drawing upon any
pronouncements from the Septuagint, he refers instead to "that little
book which Hermas wrote" and the pseudepigraphical Book of Enoch
(ch. ii.S) in support of his dual contention that God created all things,
and conversely, that all things are creatively dependent upon God. 63
While Origen firmly upholds the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o, he
nonetheless affords matter a prominent role in the creative process,
specifically in regard to the emergence of corporeal being. In this connection, Origen stresses the limitations of the Platonic model of ere-
16
ation and its basic presuppositions regarding the eternal, unbegotten

character of matter. 64 An implication of the pagan position is that
whatever comes into existence requires a prior material cause to account for its generation. According to Origen, the deficiency of this
position lies in the fact that it proceeds from a limited understanding
of God's nature and the scope of Divine power.
For Christians, the uniqueness of God's creative efficacy lies in the
fact that He brings matter into being from nothing, without the need
for some preexistent material substrate (as does Plato's demiurge). 65 In
this respect, Origen divided the act of creation into an originative or
generative phase (whereby matter was brought into existence from
nothing) and a formative phase (whereby order and form were imposed upon the material substrate). 66 In this respect, Origen views
matter as the necessary prerequisite for the existence of everything
other than God. Because matter is wholly indeterminate, it is capable
of every transformation. By virtue of this mutability, it assumes the
character of that level of being to which it is led by the soul's movements.67
In De Principiis Ill, Origen adds further precision to his teaching of
creatio ex nihilo, affirming that the world took its beginning in time.
This teaching, he asserts, constitutes "one of the dogmas of the
Church." 68 For Origen, the clearest source of information regarding
the world's origin is to be found in the Mosaic account of Genesis:
This account may well enshrine certain deeper truths than the mere record of
the many passages, using the letter as a kind of veil for profound and mystical
doctrines; nevertheless the language of the narrator certainly indicated this,
that all visible things were created at a definite time. 69
In this context, Origen's teaching concerning the temporal origin of

the world is correlative with his teaching concerning its consummation: the present age will give way to a dissolution in its own corruption. 70 Likewise, Origen aligns his deliberations on creation with a
theory of a universal fall from a higher spiritual life of unity to a lower
corporeal existence characterized by diversity and change, and susceptible to decay. 71 Creation thus represents but one stage in an ongoing cyclic process involving the generation of spiritual creatures,
their fall into bodies, their redemption, and eventually, their return to
a condition of primordial unity.
In affirming creatio ex nihilo, Origen severely criticizes the Platonic model of an ordering or shaping of eternally existent matter. For
... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihi/o
17
him, matter does not constitute an independent reality in its own right,
but represents a created component in the process whereby God invests the world with form and intelligibility. In this respect, Origen
relied upon the notion of a dual creation that entails the generation of
formless matter from nothing and its ordering. While Origen finds his
scriptural source for the teaching of a temporal creation of the visible
world in Genesis, his discussions of creatio ex nihi/o are grounded
upon the more explicit language of the Shepherd of Hermas and 2
Maccabees. In due course, however, Genesis became the principal
focus for patristic discussions of creatio ex nihilo. This is especially
evident in the Hexameron tradition and the extensive commentaries
upon the book of Genesis which it produced.
5. The Hexameron Tradition
By the fourth century, A.D., Christian thinkers had developed anumber of refined commentaries upon Scriptural teachings regarding creation. Notable examples of this work are found in the Hexameron
homilies of Basil of Caesarea and Ambrose of Milan. In its broadest
terms, the Hexameron genre of exegesis focused upon the six days of
creation, as depicted in Genesis. Let us begin with a consideration of
Basil's work. Basil's Hexameron homilies are said to have been delivered during Holy Week of A.D. 378, the year of his death. 72 Prominent Fathers such as Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Jerome,
and Ambrose shed great praise on these writings for their penetrating
insights. 73
By his own admission, Basil strives to interpret Scripture in its most
literal sense, contrasting this approach with those of exegetes who
consider themselves more astute than the revelations of the Holy Spirit.
From his standpoint, scriptural pronouncements concerning creation
must be understood as they are presented to us in the sacred text. 74
Accordingly, the words In the beginning God made the heavens and
the earth (Genesis 1.1) cannot be interpreted in allegorical, metaphorical, or figurative terms. Rather, they must be viewed as referring to an
actual event which coincided with creation in its fullest sense, that is,
as a bringing into being out of nothing. For Basil, the authoritative
character of the teaching of Genesis proceeds from its author, Moses. 75
Basil's ensuing exegesis of Genesis 1.1 focuses upon two key points:
first, the source of the orderly arrangement of visible things; secondly, the fact that creation did not happen fortuitously, but originated in God. In this context, he adapts a Platonic image in service of
18
his own understanding of God as the ultimate causal principle of the

visible universe: the Maker of all things brought the visible world into
being by the mere inclination of His will, like potters who exercise
their craft without diminishing their art or power. 76
But Basil is also critical of the Platonic depiction of God along the
lines of an artisan. In Platonic terms, God merely imposes His plan
upon preexistent matter, thereby "fashioning" the universe as the artisan fashions his crafts. 77 In this respect, Basil focuses upon the verb
"Jtmf:w" (that is, to create in the true sense), as opposed to "evepyf:w"
(to produce) or "u<j>(atf]!lL" (to fashion). 78 From this standpoint, God
not only informs matter but brings the very substance of things into
being from nothing. Accordingly, Basil opposes the notion that matter is uncreated and eternally co-existent with God. He specifically
challenges this thesis in his exegesis of Genesis 1.2 and its teaching
that the earth was invisible and unfinished.
In opposition to those who interpret the passage as referring to
uncreated matter, Basil presents two arguments. First, he contends
that matter could not be uncreated, since what is devoid of quality,
form, and beauty could not be on the same level as God. But if matter
is uncreated, then its substance would be comparable to that of God,
and thereby, matter could serve as a standard against which the Divine intelligence is measurable. 79 Basil's second argument is a variation of the first: if God acted upon an inferior substrate, then the
product would be unequal to the power and dignity of its Creator. In
that case, God must create a defective product, by virtue of the baseness of the material upon which He would be constrained to act. 80
By virtue of his affirmation that God creates all things, Basil denies
that God and the world are coeternal, and rejects any attempt to assign the same nature to God and to material reality. But if God is
responsible for bringing the world into existence, a corollary attaches:
prior to its creation, the world did not exist. Creation, then, coincides with the emergence of visible things and the initiation of temporal process. Basil, therefore, affirms a temporal origin of the visible
universe, and conversely, its temporal corruption and consummation. 81
While Basil affirms the causal dependence of the visible universe
upon God for its existence, he does not explicitly articulate a doctrine
of creatio ex nihilo. He moves in this direction, however, when he
affirms that God creates "the nature of that which exists." 82 This nature constitutes those realities which the mind can grasp only by contemplation: rational, invisible natures and the entire orderly arrangement of spiritual creation. 83 In this respect, the beginning of the visible
19
world and time cannot itself be a temporal event: if God is the supreme Creator of the universe, then He could not be subject to temporal limitations. The perfection of the Creator's art lies in the supramundane world beyond time that is without beginning or end. 84 The
visible world was added to what already existed as a kind of training
ground for human souls. 85 In this respect, time {and temporal process)
is attuned to the world and its changing, corruptible realities.
For Basil, the scriptural dictum In the beginning He created refers
to a beginning according to time. But the beginning to which Genesis
refers does not pertain to the start or initiation of everything which
exists. Rather, it encompasses only those visible things which emerged
after the creation of invisible, spiritual reality. In this regard, Basil
draws a clear distinction between {1) the creation of an eternal order
existing outside of time, and {2) the creation of a visible universe exhibiting temporal process. 86
Like Basil of Caesarea, Ambrose of Milan delivered his Hexameron
homilies during a single Holy Week {c. A.D. 387).87 While Ambrose's
commentary clearly exhibits the influence of Basil, it also displays a
creative originality that is reflected in Ambrose's use of the allegorical
method of exegesis and his wide-ranging adaptation of insights derived from classical authors. 88 In a manner consistent with the allegorical method, Ambrose's discussion of the opening lines of Genesis
represents an attempt to penetrate the deeper meaning embedded in
Scriptural teachings regarding the origin of the world.
At the outset, Ambrose assesses the deficiencies inherent in pagan
theories of creation. His critique is directed principally against the
Platonists and their contention that God made the world out of preexistent matter. A corollary of this teaching is that the world is eternal
and incorruptible. 89 In contrast to these theories, Sacred Scripture
teaches that God is the Author and origin of all things {including matter). Like Basil (and Fathers such as Justin the Martyr}, Ambrose
grounds the authority of Genesis upon the authorship of Moses. 90
Ambrose finds further support for this position in the Gospel of John
(8.25). In God's designation as the beginning, Ambrose finds an affirmation of His role as supreme Creator of all things. 91 Drawing further
upon John (1.3}, Ambrose identifies the beginning with the Word,
since all things were made through him and without him was made
nothing that was made. 92
In the Scriptural affirmations that God created in the beginning
(Genesis 1.1) and that God constitutes the beginning of all things
(John 8.25}, Ambrose finds a clear refutation of pagan theories of
20
cosmological origins. Accordingly, God neither anticipated "a late and

leisurely creation of the world out of a concourse of atoms," nor did
He depend upon the contemplation of preexistent matter in order to
fashion the world. 93 God is the true Author of all created things. But if
the world required a beginning, then there was a time when it did not
exist. In this respect, God is the Creator of everything from nothing. 94
Ambrose's detailed analysis of the term beginning underscores the
significance of creatio ex nihilo. For him, the term assumes several
connotations in the present context.
The term 'beginning' ... is concerned with the category of time when we
deal with the question of the time when God made heaven and earth . . . at
the commencement of the world, when it began to come into being . . . If we
apply the term to number, then it is right that you understand that at first He
created heaven and earth; next, hills, regions, and the boundaries of the inhabitable world. Or we may understand that before He created the rest of
visible creatures . . . He created heaven and earth. But, if you apply the term
to foundation, you will see ... that the beginning is the foundation . . .95
Let us consider each of these connotations on a separate basis.

In its temporal sense, beginning pertains to the origin of the world.
As Ambrose later points out, the origin of the world coincides with
the start of time, since "time proceeds from this world, not before the
world." 96 In its numerical sense, beginning pertains to an order of
emergence, whereby the creation of heaven and earth precedes the
creation of the specific features of the visible world. Here, Ambrose
adopts an analogue that was prominent in the creation account of
Athenagoras, likening God to an architect Who first lays the foundation, then plots out the various parts of the building, and finally, adds
the ornamentation. 97
Ambrose's exegesis of Genesis (1.2) and its teaching that the earth
was invisible and without form points us to the final and most seminal sense of the term beginning: in foundational terms, the teaching
that God created in the beginning means that God brought the very
principles of all realities into being from nothing. Accordingly, the
creation of heaven and earth and the creation of all aspects of the
world are dependent upon a fundamental act of creatio ex nihilo on
the part of God. 98
Ambrose supplements the teachings which he derives from Genesis with a commentary upon Romans 11.36:
For from him and through him and unto him are all things.
According to Ambrose, from him refers to the material of creation
21
itself; through him refers to the operation by which the universe is

unified and harmonized; unto him refers to the end to which God
directs all things. 99 The first member of this series of acts on the part
of God designates the creation of matter ex nihilo. 100 Ambrose's articulation of this teaching stands in direct opposition to the teaching
that the world (or matter) is co-eternal with God, or that it subsists on
its own. While writers acknowledged that God is the cause of the
world, they did not recognize God as its ultimate cause. Instead, they
made God dependent upon preexistent matter. But since God can
only create in the most absolute sense, nothing can be co-eternal with
God or totally self-subsistent. 101
In the Hexameron homilies of Basil and Ambrose, several common features are discernible. Ambrose's work clearly reflects the influence of Basil. A point of divergence, however, is apparent in their
respective exegetical approaches: Basil professes to undertake a purely
literal interpretation of Scripture, while Ambrose was one of the key
exponents of the allegorical method. Despite this difference in their
exegetical approaches, both writers provide an incisive analysis of the
opening lines of Genesis. Their respective discussions revolve around
the central thesis that God is the supreme Creator of everything which
exists. In this connection, Basil and Ambrose strongly criticize the
teaching that matter is uncreated and therefore, co-eternal with God.
In contrast to pagan theories regarding the preexistence of matter,
Basil and Ambrose stress that matter and the world had a definite
beginning. This beginning, they further affirm, coincided with the origin of temporal process. While Ambrose is more explicit in his affirmation of creatio ex nihilo, Basil clearly affirms that God created the
principles of what exists (as well as the visible universe). In this respect, Basil leaves no doubt about his interpretation of Genesis. On
the basis of the arguments and analysis which he brings to bear, a
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo can be clearly inferred from his homilies.
The Philosophical Background
While each of the Fathers considered above depicts God as "Creator"

or "Maker" of the universe, they provide rather different theories regarding God's role in the act of creation. On the one hand, these
differences might be explained on the basis of a reliance upon disparate Scriptural accounts: Justin, for example, focused upon Genesis I
(1-3) and Wisdom XI.17 (with its depiction of creation as a formation
22
of formless matter), whereas Theophilus and Origen used 2 Maccabees

7:28 (and its unequivocal pronouncement of creation from nothing)
as their biblical touchstone.
On the other hand, however, such differences might also point to
varying degrees of dependence upon sources external to the JudaeoChristian tradition. As one scholar has observed, the doctrine of creation "provides a major link between Christianity and Greek philosophy."102 In this connection, an adequate assessment of the Greek
philosophical background of patristic commentaries on creation should
address the doxographies of the Middle Platonists-those successors
to Plato's Academy that would have been well known to early Christian intellectuals. 103 Middle Platonism represented an amalgam of ideas
derived from Platonism, as well as the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. At this point, an examination of some key Middle Platonists is
in order.
The Debate Concerning Plato's Timaeus
The question of cosmological origins was one which provided an important commonground between pagan and Christian thinkers. In this
respect, their joint search for an ultimate cause of the universe appears to have been bound up with the basic human desire to find
meaning and intelligibility in the world. 104 In later Platonic circles, this
concern revealed itself in an ongoing debate which proceeded from
Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of the generation of the universe
in the Timaeus. At Timaeus 27c, Plato entertained two options:
. . . we . . . who are going to discourse of the nature of the universe, how
created or how existing without creation . . . must invoke the aid of gods and
goddesses (lj_~.t<i~ <'>E "tou~ ;tEpi "toil ;tUV"tO~ Myou~ ;tOLELo8m ;t'l.)
!tEAAOV"tU~, lJYEYOVEV f] KUL ayEVE~ eo"tLV . . . avayKT] eeou~ "tE KUL
8Ea~ ;tLKUAOU!-LEVOU~) . . . 105
Plato concluded (Timaeus 28b-c) that the universe must be created,

and thus, that it must possess a beginning:
. . . was the world . . . always in existence and without beginning, or created, and had it a beginning? Created (yyovev), I reply, being visible and
tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible, and all sensible things are
apprehended by opinion and sense, and are in a process of creation and
created. Now that which is created, must . . . of necessity be created by a
cause.
23
The translation of "yf.yovEv" as "created" must be taken in a highly

qualified sense. Plato (as well as all of the pagan Greek thinkers considered here) did not develop a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Rather,
the Ti mae us provides an account of the generation of the world through
the operation of an external cause, that is, the Demiurge (Timaeus
28c 2-3). According to Plato, the demiurge "took over" disordered
motion and ordered it (Timaeus 30a 3-4), thereby forming the world
according to an eternal model and transforming it into an animated,
rational creature (Timaeus 30b 1-c 1). Because the demiurge is good,
it wished to share its goodness (as far as possible) with the material
before it. In this respect, however, the demiurge does not function as
a true Creator (that is, one that creates from nothing), since it had the
preexistent matter of the Receptacle at its disposal. In the present
survey of Middle Platonist interpretations of Plato's teaching, this qualified sense of "created" (that is, what is formed or ordered by an intelligent, good cause) must be continually borne in mind.
According to Aristotle, Plato held a view that stood in direct opposition to his own theory of cosmic generation. In Aristotelian terms,
the world was eternal, imperishable, and consequently, without a temporal beginning. In this respect, Aristotle believed that Plato's assertion that the world was "created" (yf.yovv) was intended in a literal
sense.
. . . there are those who think it possible both for something ungenerated to
perish and for something generated to remain imperishable, as for example
in the Timaeus, where he says that the world has been generated but nevertheless will last for all time. 106
For Aristotle, such a teaching (as he interpreted Platonic teaching,

that is) was both false and blasphemous, since the very notion of a
temporal origin at least opened the possibility that the world can come
to an end. In later Platonic circles, the result was a general agreement
with Aristotle's view of the eternity of the universe, but a disagreement among certain thinkers regarding his understanding of the
Timaeus. 107
Various commentators (e.g. Xenocrates, Crantor, Eudorus, Calvenus
Taurus) maintained that Aristotle erred in regard to his literal interpretation of Plato. This group further held that the language of the Timaeus
was intended in a purely allegorical sense, and that the world was
eternal (in a manner consistent with Aristotle's own thesis). In this
connection, Calvenus Taurus (fl. c. A.D. 145) made an important con-
24
tribution to this debate, distinguishing between four senses of Plato's

teaching that the universe has been "created". This distinction is found
in Taurus's Commentary on the Timaeus (included by the sixth-century Christian thinker John Philoponus in his On the Eternity of the
World (p. 145, 13ff, Rabe). I here quote the relevant portions of
Taurus's discussion:
. . . we will discover that Plato does not use the word 'created' in the sense in
which we say that things which derive their existence from some beginning in
time are 'created'; for this is what has led the majority of interpreters astray,
when they hear this word 'created', into assuming that this is the meaning.
'Created', then, can have the following meanings: (1) That is said to be
'created' which is not in fact created, but is of the same genus as things
that are created. (2) That is also called 'created' which is in theory composite, even if it has not in fact been combined. (3) The cosmos is said to be
'created' as being always in process of generation. (4) One might also call
it 'created' by virtue of the fact that it is dependent for its existence on an
outside source, to wit, God, by whom it has been brought into order. 108
Taurus's Aristotelian intepretation of Timaeus 27c was generally

endorsed by the 'School of Gaius' .109 This Peripatetic approach is evident in two of its key representatives, Albinus (fl. c. A.D. 145) and
Apuleius of Madaura (born c. A.D. 123). Albinus adhered to the mainstream of second-century Platonism by upholding the notion of the
world's eternity.l1 In the Didaskalikos, Albinus contends that when
Plato held that the world was generated, he did not mean that there
had been a time when the world was not. In this respect, Albinus held
the corollary position that Plato used the term "yf-yovEv" in a figurative or allegorical sense.
On the surface, it would appear that the very notion of an eternal
universe rules out the need for a creator of any kind. Albinus's response to this problem proceeds from his conjoining of two seemingly
contradictory views regarding the notion of creation. First, he maintained that the world is in a state of perpetual becoming. 111 Secondly,
he maintained that the world is causally dependent. 112 While Albinus
posits an eternal generation of the universe, he also recognized the
need for an unbegotten cause that is responsible for sustaining this
ongoing process. Since what is continually becoming cannot account
for itself, it requires some external cause. Here, we see that Albinus's
theory of the origin of the universe incorporates the third and fourth
senses of genetos (as delineated by Calvenus Taurus), that is, what is
always in process and what depends upon some external source for
its ordering.
25
A similar interpretation of Plato is found in Apuleius's De dogmate

Platonis. According to Apuleius, Plato's assertion that the world has
come into existence encompasses two teachings: first, that the universe is eternal; secondly, that the universe has come to be. 113 While
Plato taught that the universe had no beginning or end (since it always
was), it seems to be created, since it is composed of elements which
exhibit the traits of created things. 114 But this position must be qualified: for Apuleius, the assertion that the universe has come to be
does not mean that it originated in time, but merely that it consists of
things that are not eternal in nature. 115 ln this respect, Apuleius adopts
the first sense of genetos specified by Calvenus Taurus: what is said
to be 'created' is not in fact created, but is of the same genus as
things that are created. Although the universe is composed of perishable things, it will not perish because it is eternally sustained by
God.
While Apuleius emphasizes the absolute transcendence of the
Godhead, he allows for a link between the gods and humanity. This is
accomplished by means of the elaborate demonology which he develops in his De deo Socratis. This work holds special interest in this
context, since it was the basis of an extensive critique by Augustine in
the De Civitate Dei. 116 At the outset of the treatise, Apuleius follows
Plato in positing a supreme God, the "lord and author of all things,"
who is free of the demands of necessity, and remains immune to any
obligations regarding action or passion. 117 But Apuleius also acknowledges that Plato rendered the gods so transcendent as to be completely aloof from human affairs and deaf to human supplication. 118
Such transcendence, however, necessitates some means of contact
between the divine and humanity. This contact is maintained through
intermediary gods (i.e., demons) situated between the uppermost ether
and the earth who communicate human aspirations to the higher gods.
The viewpoint represented by Albinus and Apuleius stood in opposition to the one endorsed by two other Platonists: Atticus and Plutarch.
Plutarch (born c. A.D. 45) and Atticus (fl. A.D. 176-180) are associated with the Athenian school of later Platonism. These thinkers interpreted Plato's teaching that the world "had come into existence" in
the most literal terms, thereby upholding the notion of a temporal
creation (but not creatio ex nihilo). According to Proclus, both were
committed to the belief that only disorderly motion existed prior to
the world's creation; this disorderly motion (maintained by the Maleficent Soul) was transformed into an ordered movement which reflects
the rational influence of intellect. 119
26
Atticus criticized the Aristotelians for the remoteness they assigned

to God. In this respect, he believed that the attribution of a creative
role to the Godhead is closely bound up with a notion of providence.
From his standpoint, the denial of creation would be tantamount to a
denial of cosmic rationality and order. According to Atticus, Plato
attached everything to God by making everything causally dependent
upon God. 12 Commenting upon the Timaeus, he depicted the ultimate cause of the universe as bringing order to the disordered mass
which changed "without measure and without order." 121 The raison
d'etre for this movement, Atticus contends, rests upon a valuative
judgment that is consistent with the operation of divine providence:
the Godhead "created" because it estimated that order was worth more
than disorder. 122
In Atticus's exegesis of Plato, the demiurge makes the world according to incorporeal, intelligible, abiding, and immutable models. 123
On the basis of Proclus's testimony, we know that Atticus viewed
what is without measure and order as unbegotten; in contrast, he held
that the world was "begotten at the moment of time." 124 By virtue of
their teaching that the world had a temporal origin, Atticus and Plutarch
clearly departed from the viewpoint of the majority of their fellow
second-century Platonists.
In the Middle Platonists just considered, we find expressions of two
dominant strains of thinking: the outlook represented by Plutarch and
Atticus maintained that the world did not always exist (and thus, that
it originated in time); in contrast, Albinus and Apuleius upheld the
world's eternity. An interesting (but somewhat uneasy) blending of
these positions is found in the first-century thinker, Philo Judaeus
(born c. 15-20 B.C.). Because Philo represents a confluence between
the Greek and Jewish intellectual traditions, his importance cannot be
discounted in the present context. In this respect, his deliberations on
creation unfolded against the background of Old Testament teaching.
Accordingly, Philo prefigured the work of Christian thinkers (in the
context of his own Hellenistic Judaism), attempting to interpret Genesis along Platonic, and to some extent, Stoic lines.
In the De Opificio Mundi, Philo criticizes the Aristotelians' contention that the world is eternal (that is, having no beginning and
lasting forever). These people, he argues, admire the world rather
than its Maker. 125 Echoing Plato's Philebus (30b-c), Philo posits two
constitutive parts of the universe: first, God, as the active causal Principle of things (i.e., the "most absolute and inviolate Mind of the uni-
27
verse"); secondly, the passive object upon which the Cause acts, incapable of motion in itself but moved, shaped, and ensouled by Mind. 126
According to Philo, God's action upon the passive principle transforms it into the world. In keeping with the teaching of Plato's Timaeus,
Philo posits order as "an attribute of everything which came into
existence." 127
Like the Christian Apologists examined above, Philo draws a sharp
distinction between an Unbegotten Godhead ('to ayEVTJ'tOV) and a
begotten, contingent universe. 128 But while he stresses the need for
an origin of the universe, Philo calls into question its temporal origin.
"Time," he contends, "begins either simultaneously with the world or
after it." 129 A similar notion is suggested in the Timaeus (38b), where
Plato asserts:
Time ... came into existence along with the Heaven, to the end that having
been generated together they might also be dissolved together, if ever a dissolution of them should take place ...
But Plato, it will be remembered, also used yEyovEv to designate the

demiurge's ordering of disordered, formless matter according to the
eternal model. 130 In view of Philo's own attachment to Platonism, we
must consider whether he likewise defined creation as an ordering of
some preexistent, amorphous mass, and more importantly, whether
he believed that God created the matter out of which the world was
formed.
Philo, however, is ambiguous on this crucial issue. In the De
Specialibus Legibus, he maintains that God produced all things out
of that "confused matter" through His incorporeal powers. 131 Similar
sentiments are found in the Heres, which refers to the chaotic material that God used for His work: soulless, discordant, dissoluble, perishable, irregular, and unequal. 132 But in the De Providentia, Philo
suggests that God first created matter, estimating the precise amount
that would be required for the formation of the cosmos. 133 This particular passage might be balanced against what we find in the De
Specialibus Legibus and the Heres, providing some room for the
possibility of a theory of a dual creation (on the order of what we find
in Tatian and Origen) whereby the origin of matter precedes the formation of the universe. 134
I conclude this treatment of philosophical discussions regarding the
origin of the universe with a consideration of Sallustius (or more precisely, Saturninus Salutius Secundus). In Sallustius, we find a fourth-
28
century writer who stood in direct continuity with the Platonists examined above. In this regard, he can be situated within the doxographical tradition which produced the convenient summaries of Platonic doctrine that we encounter in Albinus, Apuleius, Diogenes
Laertius, Maximus of Tyre, and Arius Didymus. 135 An investigation of
Sallustius is useful in the present context because it serves to highlight
certain pagan intellectual presuppositions that were in vogue during
the century in which Augustine was born and reached maturity.
Sallustius was a member of the school of Pergamum, the so-called
"theurgic school" of Neoplatonism. The Pergamene school was founded
by Aedesius (a pupil of Iamblichus, the central figure in the Syrian
school of Neoplatonism); accordingly, it exhibited a marked interest in
theurgy and the resuscitation of polytheism. 136 Sallustius's work De
Diis et Mundo (Concerning the Gods and the Universe) represents
an apology for polytheism that was probably written in support of the
anti-Christian campaign of Julian the Apostate (A.D. 361-363). 137
At the outset of the treatise, Sallustius enumerates the chief characteristics of the gods: "every god," he affirms, "is good, impassive,
and unchangeable." 138 From his standpoint, the gods never came into
being. Sallustius justifies this contention by means of the following
argument:
Whatever always exists never comes into being, and all things that have first
power and are by nature impassive do exist always . . .139
Furthermore, Sallustius holds that the gods are neither formed of bodies, nor limited by spatial extension, nor separated from the first Cause
or from each other. 140
Proceeding from this characterization of the gods, Sallustius focuses upon the first Cause itself. According to Sallustius, the first
Cause is one, supremely powerful, and absolutely good.
The first Cause must be one, since the unit is superior to all other numbers,
and surpasses all things in power and goodness, for which reason all things
must partake of it; because of its power nothing else will bar it, and by reason
of its goodness it will not keep itself aloof. 141
As the ultimate principle in the order of causality, the first Cause is

completely transcendent, surpassing everything in being and goodness. For Sallustius, however, goodness is the more fundamental attribute, since things exist by virtue of their participation in the goodness of the first Cause.
29
Now if the first Cause was soul, everything would be animated by soul, if
intelligence, everything would be intellectual, if being, everything would share
in being. Some in fact, seeing that all things possess being, have thought that
the First Cause was being. This would be correct if things that were in being
were in being only and were not good. If, however, things that are are by
reason of their goodness and share in the good, then what is first must be
higher than being and in fact good. 142
As we have already seen, the first Cause is closely aligned with the
gods. For Sallustius, the gods can no more be separated from their
first Cause than thoughts can be separated from the mind, knowledge
from the soul, or the senses from a living creature. 143 Sallustius divides the gods into two categories: the mundane and the supramundane. The supramundane gods are further classified according to three
groups: some make the gods; some make the intelligence; and some
make the souls. 144 The mundane gods, on the other hand, are those
which make the universe. 145 Their creative activity manifests itself in
four operations: some mundane gods cause the universe to exist; others animate it; others harmonize it from its different parts; and others
guard it once it is harmonized. 146
But an apparent contradiction is discernible in Sallustius's account
of the creation of the universe. On the one hand, he contends that the
universe is made by the mundane gods. On the other hand, he holds
that the "universe itself must be imperishable and uncreated." 147 For
Sallustius, "uncreatedness" and "imperishability" are correlative attributes. "If it does not perish," he teaches, "neither did it come into
being, since whatever comes into being perishes." 148 In this respect,
the universe reflects its ultimate Cause: because the universe exists as
a result of goodness, and God is always good, then the universe must
be eternally existent, just as light coincides with the sun or fire, and
shadows accompany bodies. 149
How does Sallustius reconcile these two seemingly disparate accounts of cosmological origins? His attempted solution to this problem begins in this way:
Everything that comes into being is created by technical skill or by natural
process or in virtue of a function. 150
Sallustius next distinguishes (1) creation by means of skill or natural

process from (2) creation by means of function (that is, a faculty or
power). According to this analysis, those who created by skill or natural process are prior to what they create; conversely, what they create
30
is subsequent to their creator. Those who create by function, however,

bring their creatures into being simultaneously with themselves. In
this respect, their function is inseparable from their nature, just as
light is inseparable from the sun, fire from heat, and snow from cold. 151
For Sallustius, the gods must create by means of function. If they
made the universe by means of skill, they would make its form but not
its being. If they created by nature, on the other hand, they would
have to give something of themselves to what they create. From that
standpoint, the universe would have to be incorporeal like the gods. (If
the gods were deemed corporeal, however, then one might inquire
how incorporeal things exist.) The only acceptable alternative is that
the gods create by function.
Everything made in virtue of a function comes into being with the possessor
of the function, and things so made cannot ever perish, unless their maker is
deprived of the functional power. Accordingly, those who suppose that the
universe perishes deny the existence of gods, or, if they assert that existence,
make the Creator powerless. Therefore, as He makes everything in virtue of
a functional power, He makes all things coexistent with Himself. 152
Sallustius's theory of creation was closely aligned with the majority

view that dominated later Platonist interpretations of the Timaeus.
This view, as we have seen, adhered to the Aristotelian understanding
of the universe as eternal (that is, without beginning or end). Those
who upheld this interpretation (like Albinus and Apuleius), however,
also read Plato's account of creation in allegorical terms. Sallustius
follows suit: for him, the universe is both imperishable and uncreated,
since that which does not perish could never have come into being.
Accordingly, the being of the universe parallels the eternal nature of
the mundane gods on whom it depends. In this respect, Sallustius
seems to have endorsed (like his second-century predecessor Albinus)
the third and fourth senses of genetos proposed by Calvenus Taurus:
that which is always in the process of generation and likewise, dependent ... on an outside source which brings it into order.
Later Platonism and Early Patristic Theories of Creation
The thinkers just examined offer theories of cosmological origins which

exhibit some clear affinities with the Scriptural understanding of creation. First, each emphasized the world's dependence upon an ultimate Cause external to the universe. The recognition of an ultimate
Cause is apparent both in those thinkers who designated the world as
31
eternally existent (as did Albinus and Apuleius), and those who viewed
it as having a temporal origin (as did Plutarch and Atticus). In this
respect, an important Middle Platonist innovation lay in the fact that it
shifted creative efficacy from the demiurge to the first Principle or
Monad (the Middle Platonic counterpart of God). 153 Secondly, each of
these thinkers was committed to the belief that the universe became
ordered (and thus, good) by virtue of the action of the Godhead upon
a disordered material substrate. Third, their theories of creation were
closely aligned with a belief in Providence. In this respect, they viewed
the universe from a teleological perspective, depicting creation in rather
optimistic terms as the means to the realization of rationality, intelligibility, and harmony on all levels.
We find, then, an intellectual common ground between pagans and
Christians on a number of levels. By virtue of this shared outlook,
Christian writers could draw upon a reservoir of insights in their endeavor to explicate Scriptural teaching regarding creation. But like all
pagan thinkers, the later Platonists assumed that "creation" constituted no more than an ordering of disordered matter. 154 To some extent, this viewpoint is even suggested in the Middle Platonism of Philo
Judaeus, who discussed the origin of the universe in the context of his
commentaries on Genesis. In contrast, Christians completely redefined the meaning of creation in a "literal" sense.
As we have seen, the "literal" intepretation of Plato's Timaeus by
later Platonists such as Plutarch and Atticus amounted to a belief in
the ordering of disorderly matter and thereby, the beginning of an
orderly cosmos. From a Christian perspective, such an act of "creation" was not creation in its fullest sense, since it constituted no
more than the type of work undertaken by artisans or craftsmen.
Christian thinkers viewed creation in its most literal terms as a "bringing into being". In this regard, the crux of the distinction between the
Christian and Platonist understandings of creation lay in their respective formulae: for the Platonists, creation emerged~ U!!6p<j>ou UAY)t;,
that is, from formless matter; for Christians, creation could only proceed ~ OUK ov'twv, that is, from what is non-existent. In effect, the
Christian understanding of creation presupposed a radical ontological
transformation from non-being to being. Thus, Christians could affirm that before God created the universe, nothing existed (including
amorphous matter).
But despite these fundamental differences in outlook, pagan philosophy offered Christian thinkers a set of dialectical tools (that is,
terminology, concepts, and arguments) that enabled them to interpret
32
Scriptural teaching in more precise ontological terms. In this regard, it

must be remembered that 2 Maccabees 7:28 (the text which provides
the most explicit statement on creatio ex nihilo in Scripture), was
itself the outgrowth of a Hellenistic influence upon Old Testament
ways of thinking. Even Theophilus (who openly disavows the Platonic
theory of creation, along with all pagan theories of cosmological origins) incorporated the metaphysical distinction between being and nonbeing in his definition of creation in its most genuine sense.
Patristic writers also adapted the classic Platonic model of creation
as an ordering or formation of matter for their own doctrinal purposes.155 But while certain early Fathers (e.g., Justin and Athenagoras)
stressed the sovereignty of God and the contingency of everything
else (including matter), they also provided evidence of a commitment
to a belief in creation from preexistent, uncreated matter. As already
observed, this belief might have been grounded upon the language
derived from the Septuagint renderings of Genesis 1 (1-3) and Wisdom XI.17 (with its explicit use of the formula~ a~6pcpou uA.11~) .
Such confusion and lack of clarity would only have been reinforced by
what these Apologists found in the Middle Platonic doxographies, as
well as in the biblically inspired speculation of Philo Judaeus.
In due course, Christian exegetes tended to interpret Genesis's reference to the primordial chaos, darkness, and abyss as symbolic of
an amorphous substrate which underlies the natures of existent realities. While such a motif bespeaks an attachment to Platonist ways of
thinking, Christians (apparently beginning with Tatian) recognized the
importance of demonstrating that matter (the ultimate constituent of
things) was likewise created from nothing. From this standpoint, matter proceeds from God, but remains ontologically distinct. In Christian
terms, matter can neither exist as a part of God (as the Stoic pantheists held), nor as an efflux of the One's goodness (as the Neoplatonists
held), nor as an independent reality in its own right (as the Gnostic
dualists held).
Despite his opposition to the notion of creation from uncreated
matter, Origen likewise imposed an account of the formation of matter upon the teaching of Genesis. For Origen, matter underlies the
changeable qualities of corporeal natures. Along with Tatian, he relied upon the notion of a dual creation encompassing (1) the generation of formless matter; and (2) its ordering or formation. Like other
early Fathers, Origen exhibits the influence of Middle Platonism and
its interpretations of the Timaeus. In this connection, Origen's theory
33
of creation displays a compatibility with the position of Plutarch and

Atticus that the visible world came into being in time. Philo, however,
provides the strongest Middle Platonic influence upon Origen (along
with Clement, that other prominent Alexandrian Christian thinker).
By the time that Basil of Caesarea wrote his Hexameron homilies,
a Christian intellectual tradition had developed which expressed its
teachings independently of pagan insights. But in a very real sense,
Basil was a thinker caught between two traditions. Or, as Stanislas
Giet has suggested, Basil's homilies are related to a "double tradition": the commentaries of Genesis and the pagan writings regarding
the origin and constitution of the world. 156 In respect to the sources
which were probably operative in Basil's commentaries on Genesis,
Giet cites Plato (especially the Timaeus), Aristotle (particularly his
cosmological, geographical, and naturalistic writings) and Stoic writings (chiefly, those concerned with the notions of finality and universal order) as possible influences. 157
Basil also exhibits the influence of Philo Judaeus. This Philonic
influence is particularly apparent in Basil's interpretation of the reference to God's creation of heaven and earth in the beginning. While
Basil interpreted this phrase as pertaining to the origin of visible creation (Hexameron 1.5), he likewise interpreted it in broader terms as
the origin of creation as a whole (that is, both visible and invisible,
spiritual reality) by an instantaneous, timeless act on the part of God.
From Basil's standpoint, the beginning of time is atemporal, just as
"the beginning of the road is not yet the road, and the beginning of
the house not yet the house." 158 Likewise, if God is the supreme Creator of all things, then He Himself could not be subject to temporal
limitations. A similar position is found in Philo, who likewise rejected
the notion that Genesis referred to the beginning in any temporal
sense. According to Philo, time did not exist prior to the emergence
of the universe; thus, the beginning was not meant in chronological
terms, but pertains to the creation of heaven, the exemplar of beauty
and order for the visible world. 159
Ambrose was the beneficiary of Basil's exegesis of Genesis and
transmitted its insights to the Latin West in his own Hexameron homilies. When Ambrose acknowledges those "more expert authors who
have precedence over us" (Hexameron IV,3. 11), he clearly had Basil
in mind. While Basil and Ambrose criticize pagan theories regarding
the preexistence of matter (and its co-eternity with God), their interpretation of Genesis also incorporates the philosophical notion of
34
matter. For both writers, matter provides the ultimate constituent of

created reality. But once created, matter stands in need of formation.
In this respect, Basil and Ambrose endorse the notion of a sequential
or dual creation that we observed in Fathers such as Tatian and Origen.
From this standpoint, God first created matter, then formed and organized it into intelligible reality.
In addition to insights derived from Basil, Ambrose's homilies make
extensive use of such classical sources as Cicero, Virgil, and Galen.
The influence of Philo (and Origen) can be detected in Ambrose's use
of the allegorical method of scriptural interpretation. 160 In this context, Philo deserves further mention. For, in addition to his impact
upon early Christian exegesis, Philo provided the inspiration for a
wide range of ideas which are operative throughout the Patristic
tradition.
In effect, Philo synthesized Hellenic thought and Old Testament
teaching in a manner that was highly adaptable in a Christian context.
In this connection, Wolfson cites three influential principles which
can be drawn from Philo's writings: first, that only God is uncreated,
while all other beings are created by God; second, that nothing can
be co-eternal with God; third, that eternity is correlative with the
Divine nature. 161 All of these points (with some modification and adaptation, of course) are implicit in the Christian doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo that emerged in the Patristic tradition. That doctrine drew a
clear ontological distinction between the Divine Nature and created
reality. Conversely, it affirmed the complete contingency of all things
upon God, not merely for formation or ordering, but for their very
existence. In the Christian recasting of these Philonic principles, God
is depicted as uncreated and unbegotten and creatures are viewed as
either begotten of God (as in the case of the Word) or created by God
(as in the case of all other things). 162 In this connection, the Word was
eventually characterized as eternally begotten of God, and thus,
coeternal with Him. 163 From this standpoint, matter could not have
eternally coexisted with God; if it had, it would have assumed a rank
equal to the Divine Nature. 164
Overall, an examination of the first four centuries of Christianity
discloses a prolonged process of critical adaptation, whereby ideas
derived from pagan philosophy were selectively utilized in commentaries upon Genesis and other Scriptural references to creation. While
the line between the pagan and Christian understandings of creation
was somewhat blurred at the outset, a distinct Christian interpretation
of the origin of the universe had emerged by the end of the second-
35
century that was unequivocal in its affirmation of creation from absolute non-being. While Christian writers set themselves at odds with
pagan views of cosmological origins, they still fell back upon their
ideas and motifs in articulating their teaching. This is particularly apparent in the Fathers' tendency to read an account of the formation of
matter (albeit created matter) into the opening lines of Genesis. 165 In
this respect, we might view Augustine's speculations on this topic as
the culmination of a complex series of developments. In bringing this
background discussion to a close, let us assess some of the influences
that might have been operative in his approach.
Possible Influences on Augustine: A Tentative Hypothesis
On the basis of the foregoing survey, an hypothesis can be developed

(at least on a tentative basis) regarding the range of influences operative in Augustine's formulation of a theology of creatio ex nihilo.
While no single influence can be established with certainty (that is, in
the absence of a direct quotation from a given author or an explicit
reference to a work), some apparent affinities between Augustine and
his predecessors are discernible.
Ambrose provided the most immediate influence upon Augustine.
This influence, in fact, might well have been exerted on a first-hand
basis. As we have seen, there is some conjecture that Ambrose's
Hexameron homilies were delivered during Holy Week of A.D. 387
(the same time that he baptized Augustine). But even if this were not
the case, it is hard to imagine that Augustine would have been unfamiliar with these detailed commentaries on Genesis by a figure who
had such an impact upon his spiritual and intellectual development. 166
Through Ambrose, Augustine would have gained access to insights
from a wide range of Christian and pagan thinkers.
In regard to patristic sources, Ambrose's Hexameron (as already
observed) drew upon the exegesis of Basil, as well as that of Origen
and Hippolytus. All of these commentaries bear the imprint of Philo
Judaeus and the allegorical method of exegesis which he inspired. On
the basis of this line of influences, Augustine was placed in touch with
the dominant interpretations, motifs, and themes that characterized
patristic discussions of Genesis from the first through the fourth centuries. We can assume with some confidence, then, that Augustine
would have been familiar with the main currents of Scriptural exegesis
proceeding from the Alexandrian and Cappodocian traditions. Indeed,
he followed a prominent trend in those very traditions when he read
36
the opening verses of Genesis in terms of an account of the creation

and formation of matter.
In addition to providing an important conduit for the transmission
of Greek patristic teachings to Augustine, Ambrose also would have
opened him to insights derived from the Graeco-Roman tradition. As
already noted, one of the key pagan referents in Ambrose's Hexameron
was Cicero. But Cicero, it must be remembered, was a major source of
Stoic teachings, particularly in ethics. 167 In this respect, Ambrose's
use of Cicero reflects a general receptivity among the Greek and Latin
Fathers to Stoicism-not only in ethics, but in cosmology as well. 168
The early Augustine, in fact, exhibits a clear reliance upon Cicero,
and in broader terms, Stoic philosophy. 169
But as Gerard Verbeke points out, a Stoic influence is also apparent in Augustine's theory of creation. 170 In this connection, Augustine
seems to have adapted the Stoic notion of rationes seminales as a
means of harmonizing the teaching of Genesis that God created all
things at the outset, with the recognition that the world is constantly
changing (Ecclesiasticus XVIII, 1). In effect, the doctrine of rationes
seminales enabled Augustine to reconcile the fact of natural process
with the notion that God established the general framework or plan
according to which things come to be, develop, and perish. 171
Along with the transmission of such Stoic influences, Ambrose was
also instrumental in Augustine's reception of ideas from Neoplatonism.
In this regard, the allegorical method of exegesis which he brought to
bear in his sermons was most probably mediated through Neoplatonic
sources. This mediation explains the enthusiasm with which Augustine greeted Ambrose's preaching at Milan: " ... I was led to him by
you, so that through him I might be led ... to you" (Confessiones V,
13,23). By virtue of his reading of the libri platonicorum, Augustine
would also have been exposed to one side of the pagan philosophical
response to the question regarding the origin of the universe. The
rejection of the temporal origin of the universe (and a corresponding
affirmation of its eternity) was upheld by Plotinus (and later, by Proclus
and the Athenian Neoplatonists).
Surprisingly, however, Augustine might have found some strong
philosophical support in Plotinian Neoplatonism for the notion of creation as a generation of being. Strictly speaking, Plotinus's metaphysics rested upon emanationism, a theory which explains the emergence
of reality by means of an effusion of being from an absolutely transcendent and wholly infinite source of power and goodness. Unlike
creationism (which upholds the ontological distinction between Cre-
37
ator and what is created), emanationism presupposes an ontological

continuum between an ultimate causal principle and its effects. 172
Nonetheless, we find an extremely fine line between emanation and
creation in the Enneads. 173 The overlapping of these theories is revealed in Plotinus's striking assertion that the One "makes" being. 174
It must be borne in mind, however, that the libri platonicorum
were not necessarily limited to writings by authors now classified as
"Neoplatonists." These sources might also have included some
doxographies generated by members of the Middle Academy. As we
have seen, it was the circle of Middle Platonists who had engaged in
an ongoing debate regarding the origin of the world and the proper
interpretation which should be applied to Plato's teaching on this topic.
In this connection, Augustine's knowledge of at least one Middle
Platonist can be affirmed with certainty: the De Civitate Dei contains
a prolonged discussion of Apuleius's demonology (as set forth in the
De Deo Socratis), with a quotation from the De Mundo. 175 In view of
this familiarity with Apuleius (a Latin author), it is entirely feasible that
Augustine knew the De Dogmate Platonis as well. Likewise, a familiarity with Sallustius's De Diis et Mundo (written c. A.D. 361-363)
cannot be entirely ruled out. While Sallustius wrote in Greek, it is not
unreasonable to conjecture that Augustine might have gained access
to ideas derived from the De Diis et Mundo through the mediation of
Latin writers.
On the basis of insights drawn from pagan writers (and patristic
refutations of them), Augustine had ample opportunity to acquaint
himself with the basic presuppositions of later Platonic arguments
supporting the world's eternity and the uncreatedness of matter. But
it would be erroneous to believe that these doctrines were exclusively
Platonic in origin. Such teachings (in one form or another) were also
prominent in Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and in the dualistic schemes
of the Gnostics. Gnostic dualism assumes a special importance here.
For, the principal focus of Augustine's refutation of the notion of
uncreated matter would be Manichaeism-the final expression of Gnosticism in the Christian era. In this connection, Augustine would have
been attuned to the traditional Christian refutations of Gnostic dualism through the writings of Tertullian.
Concluding Remarks
In formulating his interpretation of the Christian doctrine of creatio

ex nihilo, it is evident that Augustine had a rich patristic heritage at
38
his disposal. This patristic background provided him with a storehouse

of insights that he could employ on exegetical, doctrinal, and polemical levels. Augustine's treatment of the doctrine, in fact, exhibits goals
similar to those which we encounter in the creation accounts of his
patristic predecessors. First, he developed a detailed series of commentaries on Genesis in a manner consistent with what we find in
Basil of Caesarea and Ambrose of Milan. In this respect, Augustine's
exegesis reflects the influence of the Hexameron tradition, and its
depiction of the act of creation in terms of a formation of formless
matter. Secondly, Augustine exhibits a clear apologetic goal in his
attempt to define true Christian teaching against the Manichaean cosmogony and the conception of evil as a substantial reality in its own
right. Lastly, Augustine (like Origen} discusses creation against the
background of a broad metaphysical understanding of reality as a whole.
In this way, his treatment places us in touch with his theological deliberations on the Divine nature, the ontological status of created things,
and the relationship between God and humanity.
But although Augustine's treatment of creation reflects a rich patristic
heritage, it reveals his creative genius and originality as well. These
traits are evident in the manner in which he adapted pagan philosophical insights (derived indirectly from the Fathers and from pagan
writings directly} in the service of his own Christian interpretation of
cosmological origins, and in broader terms, the origin of being. In
addition to specific philosophical insights, however, Augustine inherited a general outlook from the libri platonicorum and Stoicism which
was highly amenable to a world-view grounded upon scriptural teachings. This outlook reflected the general optimism of Hellenic rationalism and its teleological presuppositions regarding the goodness, order, and harmony of the universe.
Notes
1.
In regard to modern interpretations of 2 Maccabees (7 :28), see Gerhard May,

Schopfung aus dem Nichts: Die Entstehung der Lehre von der Creatio ex
nihilo, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, 48 (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 1978), 6-8; David Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cosmogony," History of Religions 11(1971): 186-187; nn. 4-5; 21; Georg
Schuttermayr, '"Schopfung aus dem Nichts' in 2 Makk 7, 28?," Biblische
Zeitschrift, neue Folge, 17(1973): 203-222. For a detailed survey of exegetical problems surrounding 2 Maccabees 7:28, see The Anchor Bible (Vol.
41A). Translation, introduction, and commentary by Jonathan A. Goldstein
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1983), 307-311. Goldstein
follows the negative view-point, denying that the passage teaches creation ex
nih i/o.
2.
Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 1.4; Origen, Commentary on St. John's

Gospel18(3).
3.
cf. Septuagint version of Genesis I (1-3): 'Ev apxfl E:rtOLl]OEV 6 8eo~ "tOV
ovpavov KUL "tTJV yijv. 'H bE yij ~v a6pa1:0~ KUL UKU"tUOKEUU"tO~,
KaL aK6w~ E:rtavw 1:ij~ a~uaaou; KaL :rtveu11a 8eou E:rte<j>epe"to Emiva
1:ou uba1:o~.
4.
cf. W.R. Lane, "The Initiation of Creation," Vet us Testamentum 13(1963):

63-73. Lane holds that matter was present in a chaotic state when the world's
creation began. For a representative of the view that Genesis teaches that
God created the matter out of which the chaos was formed, see G. Ch. Aalders,
De goddelijke openbaring in de eerste drie hoofdstukken van Genesis
(Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1932). For an excellent overview of different interpretations of Genesis 1,1,ff., see Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11. A Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion, S.J. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House,
1984), 108-110. For a classic expression of the interpretation that Genesis
does teach creation ex nihi/o, see the commentary on Genesis I (1-2:4a) in
The Interpreter's Bible, volume 1 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1952), 467:
. . . P was endeavoring to present the idea of a creation ex nihilo, at
least in so far as he could conceive of it. But he was not only dependent
upon some version of the Babylonian creation myth; he was also . . .
under the necessity of retaining its representations in a recognizable
form. This accounts in part for the idea of an already existing darkness . . . and . . . chaos . . . but to counter any suggestion that
the chaos did not derive its existence from God, he prefaced his account
with the ideas of in the beginning of God's creating the heavens and
the earth.
5.
Luis J. Stadelmann, S.J., The Hebrew Conception of the World. A Philological and Literary Study, Analecta Biblica 39 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical
Institute, 1970), 5.
40
6.

James M. Reese (The Book of Wisdom, Song of Songs (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1983, 122-123) reads creation ex nihilo into
Wisdom XI.17:
The Sage draws upon a technical term from Aristotelian cosmology,
'matter,' to describe this . . . activity. Greek philosophers never reasoned about creation in the strict sense of the word, that is, the bringing
of beings into existence from no anterior being. For them matter was
eternal. Aristotle was the first to develop a philosophical system that
posited matter and form as incomplete and complementary principles
of physical beings. By imposing shape upon matter, form generated
individual physical beings. The Sage finds this terminology compatible
with the biblical teaching on God as absolute creator. It proved a good
tool for integrating Greek philosophy into the picture of God taught in
Jewish Scriptures.
For the opposing viewpoint, see David Winston's introductory remarks in The
Anchor Bible, Volumne 43 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1979, 38-40. Winston charges that Wisdom X/:17 teaches that formless
matter was eternal, and more drastically, that the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo formed no part of Jewish Hellenistic or rabbinic thinking.
7.
Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11. A Commentary, 108:

. . . the alternatives which this question raises come from a causal way
of thinking which does not belong to Gen 1. It goes beyond creation
and asks, 'Where did it come from?'
8.
cf. Conrad Hyers, The Meaning of Creation. Genesis and Modern Science
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1984), 65:
It is doubtful that the Priestly author viewed the issue of creation in

terms of the alternatives 'out of nothing' and 'out of something.' The
emphasis in the entire account is on creation as the creation of order . . . the establishment of a cosmos. While the idea of creation ex
nih i/o has been a matter of speculative interest in later generations, it is
a more abstract, philosophical concept. The expression is first encountered in the Hellenistic Jewish book of the second century B.C., 2
Maccabees . . .
9.
Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11. A Commentary, 110:

It is no accident that the idea of creation ex nihi/o occurs in literature
which is contemporary with the Wisdom of Solomon, namely, 2 Mace.
7:28 . . . Both formulations, that God created the world out of nothing
and that there was a formless matter before creation, first occur where
Judaism has come under the influence of Greek thought.
10.
I offer the following rationale for my selection of the Patristic figures under
investigation in this chapter. The documents from the Apostolic tradition were
chosen as a point of departure so as to demonstrate the faith commitment of
41
early Christians to the doctrine. I next provide a rather detailed discussion of

the Apologists; the four thinkers considered (Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, and
Theophilus) effectively demonstrate the process whereby a full-fledged expression of creatio ex nihilo emerged in the second century. lrenaeus and
Tertullian provide key refutations of Gnostic dualism and the theory of the
eternity of matter. I include Origen because he represents what seems to be
the fullest attempt to provide a systematic account of creation in this early
period (despite the fact that his creation account has some rather apparent
Gnostic overtones). Finally, I examine Basil of Caesarea and Ambrose of Milan
as representatives of the Hexameron tradition of Scriptural exegesis.
11.
Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Romans 11,2; 111,3; Epistle to the

Magnesians V.l.
12.
Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians XX.1-10.
13.
I Clement XXI.3. There is strong scholarly support for the contention that I
Clement exhibits a marked Stoic influence in its emphasis upon the operation of Divine Law and the exercise of Providence in the universe. In this
connection, seeR. Knopf, Die Lehre der zwolf Apostel in die zwei Klemensbriefe (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1920); Abbe G. Bardy, "Expressions stoi'ciennes dans Ia Prima Clement is," Recherches de science
religieuse 13(1922): 73-85; L. Sanders, L'hel/{misme de saint Clement de
Rome et le paulinisme (Louvain: Bibliotheca Universitatis Lovanii, 1943);
J.J. Thierry, "Note Sur 1:a EAUXLO"ta 1:6Jv ~wwv au Chaptre XX de Ia Ia
Clementis," Vigiliae Christianae 14(1960): 235-244. For a critique of this
thesis, see W.C. Van Unnik, "Is I Clement 20 Purely Stoic?", Vigiliae
Christianae 4(1950): 184.
14.
I Clement XX.11.
15.
cf. Justin the Martyr I Apology 8(2); Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 1.11;
Athanasius, Orationes tres adversus Arianos 1.12.
16.
I Clement XX.ll.
17.
The Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate 1.1, trans. Kirsopp Lake in The Apostolic Fathers, Vol. II, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1965): ... :rt(ouvoov,
on d~ EO"tLV 6 ee6~. 6 "ta J"tUV"ta K"tLOa~ KaL Ka"tap"t(oa~ KaL
J"tOLijoa~ EK "tOU 1-llJ OV"tO~ d~ "t(J dvm "ta J"tUV"ta KaL J"tUV"ta xwpwv'
j.lOVO~
{>f: ax mplJ"tO~ wv.
18.
In this context, I rely upon Johannes Quasten's classification of the Apologists' objectives in Patrology I (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press,
1962), 186-187.
19.
Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 5: PG VI, 488: "Ooa yrlp eon j.lEta tov
eeov ii EOtaL J"tOtE, taiJta, <jrumv <j>6apti]v EXELV' KaL ora tE

e!;a<j>avLo6f)vaL Kat 1-llJ dvm En" j.lOVO~ yap ayEVVTJtO~ KaL a<j>6apto~
6 eeo~ KaL bLa tOUtO 6e6~ EO"tL, ta {>f: AOL:rta :rtdvta j.lEta tOUtOV
yEVVTJta KaL <j>6aptrl.
42
20.
Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 11, trans. Thomas B. Falls in Saint Justin
Martyr, The Fathers of the Church (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948).
21.
Justin, I Apology 10; II Apology 4. Trans. Thomas B. Falls.
22.
Justin, I Apology 10 : PG VI, 340: KClL :n:a'tV't(l 'tTJV apxi)v aya8ov OV't(l
brll.lLOUpyf]oaL ClU'tOV s UJ.LOp<j>ou VAl]; lh' av8pw:n:ou~
bEbLbUJ.LE8Cl . . .
23.
Justin, II Apology 6.
24.
Justin, I Apology 59: PG VI, 416: "Iva bf. Kat :n:apa 'tv TJJ.lE'tepwv
bLbaoKdl..wv, /..eyoJ.LEV bf: 'tou A6you 'tou bLa 'twv :n:po<j>rJ'twv, A.a~6v'ta
'tOV nt..a't(l)V(l J.LU8rJ'tE 'tO d:n:ELV' UAl]V aJ.Lop<j>ov OUOClV O'tpE'IjiClV't(l
'tov BEov Ko<JJ.Lov :n:mf]am, aKouaan 'twv au't0t..EsL Lpl]J.Levwv llLa
Mwaew~. mu :n:pobEblJAWJ.LEvou :n:pw'tou :n:po<j>~'tou Kat :n:pEo~u'tepou
'tv v "Et..Am ouyypa<j>ewv . . .
25.
Justin, I Apology 59: PG VI, 416-417: "Qon /..6yq> ewu EK 'tWV

u:n:OKELJ.LEV(l)V KClL :n:pobl]AW8EV't(l)V bu1 Mwaew~ YEYEVf]08ClL 'tOV :n:aV'tCl
KOOJ.LOV' KClL nt..a'tWVCl KClL ol 'tClU'tcl /..Eyovn~ KClL TJJ.LEL~ EJ.LU80J.LEV'
Kat UJ.LEL~ :n:ELo8f]vm bilvao8E.
26.
Justin, I Apology67: PG VI, 432. Here, Justin refers to the first day on which
God "transformed the darkness and created the world" (f::n:ELbi) :n:pw'tl] tO'tLV
TJJ.LEpa, EV
6 8EO~ 'tO OKO'tO~ KClL 'tTJV UAl]V 'tpE'IjiCl~ KOOJ.LOV
E:rtOLl]OE).
27.
o:
Justin's use
the term s nJ.L6p<j>ou VAl]~ has prompted some scholars to
depict him as a Platonist or a dualist. For this position, see B. Aube, Saint
Justin, philosophe et martyr (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1861), 135; E. de Faye,
"De !'influence du Timee de Platon sur Ia theologie de Justin Martyr," in
Bibliotheque de /'Ecole des haute etudes. Science religieuse, v. 7 (Paris,
1896), 183. Others maintain that he taught the creation of matter, thereby
developing what amounted to a critique of Plato from a Scriptural perspective. For this viewpoint, see M.J. Lagrange, Saint Justin (Paris: J. Gabalda,
1914), 152. For a lucid outline of these various positions, see E.F. Osborn,
Justin Martyr (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1973), 48-49.
Justin uses verbs such as :n:oLEW, bl]J.LLOUpyew, and y(yVOJ.lClL in a rather
arbitrary manner to designate God's relationship to the world as an efficient
causal principle. Thus, subtle linguistic distinctions between creation in a literal and a figurative sense are simply not to be found at this early stage of
Christian apologetic. For a discussion of patristic interpretations of the Platonic notion of pre-existent matter, see Harry A. Wolfson, "Plato's Pre-existent Matter in Patristic Philosophy," in The Classical Tradition, ed. L. Wallach
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 409-420. Wolfson argues that while the Church Fathers (including Justin) adopted Plato's view of
pre-existent matter, they viewed this matter as having been created. Wolfson's
position is summed up in these terms (p. 414):
Whatever the Church Fathers may have believed with regard to Plato's
conception of his pre-existent matter, all of them reject the creation of
43
the world out of a pre-existent uncreated matter, though some of

them . . . admit its creation out of a pre-existent created matter.
cf. Gerhard May, Schi:ipfung Aus Dem Nichts, 134:
In Justins Aussagen iiber die Weltschopfung stehen philosophische und
spezifisch theologische Gedankenganze nebeneinander, die nicht wirklich
vermittelt sind. Den Schopfungsvorgang selbst versteht Justin als die
Gestaltung einer priiexistenten, ungeordneten Materie. Aber dariiber
hinaus hat das platonische Modell fur ihn keine Bedeutung. Die
Moglichkeit von lnkarnation und Auferstehung sieht Justin in dem
allmachtigen Willen des Schopfers begrundet, der alles vermag.
28.
Athenagoras, Legatio 4.1.
29.
Athenagoras, Legatio 8.
30.
Athenagoras, Legatio 15.2, trans. B.P. Pratten in The Ante-Nicene Fathers,

Vol. II (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989):
PG VI, 920: KUL 6 eeo~ bl)Jl.LOUpy6~. u:rtaKaouaa M. airtq) ~ VAT)
:n:po~ Ti)v TE)(.VTJV.
31.
Athenagoras, Legatio 15.2: PG VI, 920: 'AH' t:b~ 6 :rtl)AO~ Kae' eauTov
OKEUTJ yEVE08m )(.WpL~ TE)(.VTJ~ aMvaTo~. KUL ~ :n:avbex.i)~ VAT) aveu
TOU ewu TOU bl)JA.LOUpyou btdKpLOLV KUL O)(.TJJA.U KUL KOOJA.OV OUK
EA<iJA.~avev. The suggestion that matter existed in an indeterminate state
prior to its intelligible formation is likewise found in Athenagoras's De
Resurrectione 3.2, where he discusses the power which is capable of shaping
what the Platonists regard as shapeless substance and arranging in "many
different patterns that which is unstructure and disordered." This line of reasoning is carried even further in Legatio 19.4, where Athenagoras suggests
that God and matter are both necessary if there is to be intelligibility. In this
regard, he seems to make God and matter almost co-dependent in the formation process.
32.
Athenagoras, Legatio 4.1; 4.2; 15.1; 19.2.
33.
Athenagoras, Legatio 10.3: PG VI, 909: aH' t:b~ TWV UALKWV !;uJA.:rt<iVTWV
a:n:o(ou <j>UOEW~ KUL yf]~ O)(.ELU~ U:rtOKELJA.EVWV b(KTJV, Jl.EJA.LYJA.EV(I)V
TWV :rtU)(.UJA.EpEOTEpwv :rtpo~ Tel KOU<j>OTEpa, E:rt' UlJTOL~ Lbfa K(lL
vEpyeta dvm, :n:poEA8wv.
34.
Legatio 4.2.1t is through the Logos which "issues from Him," Athenagoras
maintains, that God "created, adorned, and now rules the universe" (Legatio
1 0.1). In the creative process that Athenagoras describes, the distinction between the Father and the Logos does not conflict with his affirmation of
Divine unity: the Father and the Son are one, since "God, Who is eternal
mind, had in Himself the Word or Reason from the beginning, since He was
eternally rational" (Legatio 10.3).
cf. Gerhard May, Schi:ipfung Aus Dem Nichts, 140-141:
Der Logos ist der Nus Gottes, der die Gesamtheit der ldeen in sich
umfasst. Ahnlich wie bei Philo fungiert er zugleich als ideales Paradigma
44

der Schopfung und als Schopfungsmittler. Gott lasst ihn aus sich
hervorgehen, urn durch ihn und nach dem Urbild der in ihm enthaltenen
ldeen der Materie zum Kosmos zu ordnen. Athenagoras versteht die
Weltschopfung eindeutig als die blosse Gestaltung der ungewordenen
Materie. Ganz selbstverstandlich vergleicht er den Schopfungsvorgang
mit der Formung des Tons durch den Topfer. Die Materie wird als gegeben
vorausgesetzt, und nirgends wird nach ihrem Ursprung gefragt.
Offensichtlich besitzt das platonische Weltbildungsschema fUr
Athenagoras fraglose GUltigkeit.
35.
For an expression of this viewpoint, see two works by Leslie W. Barnard. In

his Justin Martyr, His Life and Thought (Cambridge: University Press, 1967),
112, he states:
We must be content to state that Justin had no particular theory of the
origin and nature of matter. He is content to accept Gen. i.l as it stands
and to see in it no conflict with the teaching he had received from Middle
Platonism.
In his work Athenagoras, A Study in Second Century Christian Apologetic
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 115, he argues:
Athenagoras does not give a clear account of the process by which the
universe came into existence and this may be thought to be surprising
in so philosophical a writer. The fact that the origin and nature of matter was widely discussed by the eclectic thinkers of his day does not
appear to have worried him . . . and . . . he does not give any clear
explanation as to how this matter came into existence although . . . he
appears to hold that matter pre-existed in an undifferentiated form.
36.
Tatian, Oratio 4 in Oratio Ad Graecos and Fragments, ed. & trans. Molly
Whittaker in Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),
2-77: E>Eo~ 6 Kae' ~ll<i~ OU)(. E)(.EL oum:amv EV X.POV(Jl, !!OVO~ <'ivapx.o~
rov Kat au"to~ u:n:dpx.wv 'tc:i.JV OAWV apx.f). ":n:VEU~-ta 6 8Eo~." ou
btf)KWV bu1 'tTJ~ UAl]~. :n:VEU!-LU't(J)V bE UALKWV Kat 'tc:i.JV EV au'tfl
O)(.l]llU't(J)V Ka'taOKEUOadj~. a6pa'to~ 'tE Kat ava<j>f)~. aL08l]'tWV Kat
6pa1:c:i.Jv au1:o~ yqovw~ :n:a1:f)p.
37.
Tatian provides more detail regarding this notion of "material spirits" in Oratio
12: "We have knowledge of two different kinds of spirits, one of which is
called soul, but the other is greater than the soul; it is the image and likeness
of God. The first men were endowed with both, so that they might be part of
the material world, and at the same time above it."
38.
Tatian, Oratio 4.
39.
Tatian, Oratio 5: E>Eo~ ~v EV ap)(.l], 't~V be apx.~v A6you Mva~-tLV

:n:apELAi)<l>a~-tEV. 6 yap bw:n:O'tl]~ 'tc:i.JV OAWV au"to~ u:n:dpx.wv 'tOU
:n:av'to~ ~ u:n:6o"taOL~ Ka'ta !-LEV 't~V lllJbE:n:w YEYEVl]!-LEVl]V 3t0Ll]OL v
~-t6vo~ ~v.
45
In defining the relationship between the Father and His Logos, Tatian develops a theory of participation which underscores his understanding of Divine unity. According to Tatian (Oratio 5), the Logos was generated by division rather than a severance or "cutting-off" from the Father (yevovev [)
Km:a llEPLOJ.lOV, ou Kat artoA.orti]v). On the surface, it might appear
that there is no real difference between the terms that Tatian contrasts here:
"Kata llEPLOJ.16v" and "Kata artoA.orti]v" both imply the notion of partitioning. But in this context, "Kata !!EPLO!!OV" describes an act whereby that
which is removed from its source stands in close union with it. Such a relationship is far different from one wherein that which is produced is completely
excised from its source. In this regard, "llEPLOJ.16~" seems to designate a relationship of participation whereby the Logos is in full communion with the
Father, but nonetheless, distinct.
40.
Tatian, Oratio 5: 6 A.6yo~ EV apxfl YEVVT)8EL~ avteyEVVT)<JE tilv Kae'

lJilcl~ ltOLT)<JLV autO Eaut<j>, tilv UATJV llTJI!LOUpyfJaa~. . .
41.
Tatian, Oratio 5: yevlJtll [) Kat oux uno <'iHou yeyovura, 1-16vou b

uno tou rtdvtrov llTJ!!LOupyou rtpo~e~ATJ!!EVTJ.
42.
Tatian, Oratio 12: naaav E<JtLv Lllerv tou KOOJ.lOU tilv KataaKeuilv
<JUI!rtaadv te tilv JtOLT)<JLV yeyovuLav ~ UATJ~ Kat tilv UATJV [)
autilv UltO tOU eeou rtpo~E~ATJ!!EVTJV, rva to !!EV tL autf]~ <'irtopov
Kat aaxTJJ.ldnatov vof]tm rtpo tou llLdKpLmv A.a~erv, to M
KEKOO!!TJI!EVOV KaL EihaKtOV !!Eta tilv Ev autfl llLa(pemv.
cf. Gerhard May, SchOpfung Aus Dem Nichts, 153:
Tatian ist der erste uns bekannte christliche Theologe, der ausdrilcklich
den Satz aufstellte, dass die Materie von Gott hervorgebracht sei. Es
handelt sich dabei urn einen Gedanken, der frilher oder spater aus dem
biblischen Schopfungsglauben abgeleitet werden musste, sobald das
christliche Denken in eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der
philosophischen Prinzipienlehre eintrat.
43.
Tatian, Oratio 12: E<JtLV oiJv EV autT) 6 oupavo~ ~ UATJ~ KaL tel
<'iatpa ta Ev aut<j>" Kat TJ yrJ [) KaL ltclV to art' autf]~ ~q>oyovoU!!EVOV
tilv 6!-lo(av EXEL auata<JLV w~ elvm KOLvilv mivtrov yevemv. toutrov
[) OUt(l)~ urtapx6vtrov llw<jlopa tLVE~ tciJV e~ UATJ~ ELOLV <.0~ elvaL
tO J.lEV tL KaAALOV, to [) Kat auto !lEV KaAOv, ltATJV UltO tLVO~
KpELttOVO~
EAattOU!!EVOV.
44.
Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Auto/ycum 1.4.
45.
Under Theophilus's analysis, 8e6~ and other appellations of the Divine are
explained as well: God is "Lord" because He is "master of the universe"; God
is Father because He is "before the universe"; God is "Most High" because He
is "above everything"; God is "Almighty" because He "controls and surrounds
everything" (Ad Autolycum 1.4).
46.
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 1.4.
46
47.

Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 1.4, trans. Robert M. Grant in Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 2-147: Kai 'tel :n:dv1:a 6 Oeot;
E:rtOLlJOEV !; ouK ov1:wv dt; 1:0 Elvm . . .
48.
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 11.4: TIA.d1:wv b Kai o[ 'tt'jt; a[peoewt; au'tov

Oeov (JEV' 6(JOAoyoumv ayEVl]'tOV Kai :rta'tEpa KaL :1t0Ll]'t~V 'tON
OAWV Elvm d'ta U:1tO'tL0EV'tat Oeov KaL UAl]V ayEVl]'tOV KaL 'taU'tl]V
<j>aOLV OUVl]K(JaKEVat np 8Ecp.
49.
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 11.4: Ei {) 8Eot; ayEvl]'tOt; KaL UAl] ayEVl]'tOt;,

OUK E'tL 6 Oeot; :rtOLl]'t~t; nov OAWV EO'tLV Ka'tel 'tOUt; TIA.a'tWVLKOUt;.
oM IJ~V IJovapxa Oeou beKvu1:m, ooov 1:0 Ka't' au1:out;.
50.
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 11.4:

UAl]t; E:rtOLEL 'tOV KOO(JOV.
51.
be (JEya, EL 6 8eot; !; U:rtOKEL(JEVl]t;
Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 11.4: Oeou o ~ ouva(JLt; f.v 'tOU'tgJ <j>avepomm
l:va !; OUK OV't(I)V :n:oq1 ooa ~OUAE'tat . . . WO:rtEp ow Ell 'tOU'tOLt;

:1t(l0LV ouva'tW'tEpot; EO'tLV 6 Oeot; 'tOU avOpw:n:ou, OU'tWt; KaL 'tO !;
OUK OV't(I)V :rtOLELV KaL :1tE:1tOLl]KEVat 'tel OV'ta, KaL ooa ~OUAE'tat KaL
wt; ~ouA.nm.
Gerhard May (Schopfung Aus Dem Nichts, 163-164) delineates
Theophilus's position on creatio ex nihilo in terms of three key points:
Theophilus bek~mpft die Annahme einer ungewordenen Materie

grundsatzlich auf der gleichen Linie wie Tatian, aber seine Argumentation ist weiter ausgefOhrt und zeigt auch neue Aspekte. Drei
Hauptargumente lassen sich unterscheiden: 1. Wenn nach der Auffassung
der Platoniker nicht nur Gott, sondern auch die Materie ungeworden ist,
so kann Gott nicht mehr im vollen Sinn als Schopfer des Ails gedacht
werden und die gottliche 'Monarchie' ist nicht gewahrt. 2. Gott ist
ungeworden und daher seinem Wesen nach unveranderlich; ware auch
die Materie ungeworden, so ware sie eben falls unveranderlich und damit
gottgleich. Wir haben dieses Argument bereits bei Tatian gefunden. 3.
Es ware nichts Grosses, wenn Gott aus einer praexistenten Materie den
Kosmos geschaffen hatte. Er wOrde sich nicht von einem menschlichen
Handwerker unterscheiden, der aus einem gegebenen Material herstellt,
was er will. Gottes Kraft erweist sich gerade darin, class er aus nichts
schafft, was er will, so wie auch er allein Leben und Bewegung verleiht.
52.
Arthur J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the

History of Culture (TObingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1988), 59-60.
53.
John Whittaker, "Plutarch, Platonism, and Christianity," in Neoplatonism

and Early Christian Thought. Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong, ed.
H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London: Variorum Publications, Ltd., 1981),
60.
54.
My characterization of Gnosticism in this context draws upon a number of

sources which I have consulted over the years in my personal reading and
47
research. Among these, I have found the following works particularly helpful:
Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963); R. Mel.
Wilson, The Gnostic Problem (London: A.R. Mowbray and Co., Ltd., 1958;
G.W. MacRae, "Gnosticism," in The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967 edition), VI: 523a-528b (still an excellent survey of the topic, focusing on the
various forms, history, and doctrines of Gnosticism, as well as its relation to
Christianity); C.J. De Vogel, Greek Philosophy, Volume Ill (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1959). An extremely illuminating discussion of Gnosticism and its relation to
the Greek philosophical tradition is found in A.H. Armstrong's contribution
("Gnosis and Greek Philosophy") to the Festschrift fur Hans Jonas, edited
by Barbara Aland (Gottingen: Vandenhoech and Ruprecht, 1978), pp. 86124. In this monograph, Armstrong suggests four criteria for assessing the
Gnostic "state of mind": first, a sense of pessimism toward the world prompted
by the conviction that it is an evil place; secondly, a sense of alienation from
the world and a spirit of hostility to both the world and is creator; third, a
metaphysical understanding of reality that was radically dualistic; fourth, a
belief that salvation proceeds from the possession of some esoteric knowledge on the part of a select group of adherents. For a further consideration of
the salient themes of the Gnostic tendency in late antiquity (specifically, in
respect to its relation to Manichaeism), see my remarks below (Chapter I, pp.
66-6 7, and accompanying notes).
55.
For a discussion of the contribution of Irenaeus and Tertullian to the development of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in opposition to the idea of the
coeternity of God and matter, and to Gnostic dualism, see Anne M. Clifford,
"Creation," chapter 4 of Systematic Theology, Roman Catholic Perspectives, Volume I ed. Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 210-216; Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition (Volume 1), The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, 100-600 (Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 36-37; 86-87.
56.
Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 2.1(1).
57.
58.
59.
Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenes xv.1-2: CC i (pars 1), 409: Porro si bonum

neque ex materia factum est, quia non erat in ilia, ut in mala. neque ex deo,
quia nihil potuit ex deo fieri, sicut definit Hermogenes, inuenitur bonum iam
ex nihilo factum, ut ex nullo factum, ut neque ex materia neque ex deo. Et si
bonum ex nihilo, cur non et malum? lmmo cur non omnia ex nihilo, si aliquid
ex nihilo?
60.
Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenes xxi.1-3.
61.
Origen, De Principiis, Praefatio 7: Est praeterea et illud in ecclesiastica

praedicatione, quod mundus iste factus sit et a certo tempore coeperit et sit
pro ipsa sui corruptione soluendus.
48
62.
Origen, De Principiis l,iii.3. Koetschau's text trans. & ed. G.W. Butterworth
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966): Quod autem a cleo uniuersa creata
sint, nee sit ulla substantia, quae non ab eo hoc ipsum ut esset acceperit, ex
multis totius scripturae adsertionibus conprobatur, repudiatis atque depulsis
his quae a quibusdam falso perhibentur, uel de materia cleo coaeterna uel de
ingenitis animabus, quibus non tam subsistendi naturam, quam uitae qualitatem
atque ordinem a cleo insitum uolunt.
63.
Origen, De Principiis l,iii.3. cf. Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate 1.1. It should

be noted that Origen does not refer here to 2 Maccabees (7:28) and its explicit assertion that God created from non-being. He does, however, rely upon
2 Maccabees in his Commentary on St. John's Gospe/18(3).
64.
Origen, De Principiis II, i.4: Et miror quomodo isti culpent eos, qui uel opificem
deum uel prouidentiam huius uniuersitatis negant, et impie eos sentire arguunt,
quod tantum mundi opus arbitrentur sine opifice uel prouisore constare, cum
ipsi quoque similem culpam impietatis incurrant, ingenitam dicentes esse
materiam deoque ingenito coaeternam.
65.
Origen, De Principiis II, i.4-5.
66.
As we have seen, Tatian likewise adopts the notion of a dual creation, whereby
matter is begotten and then ordered. While it recognizes the creation of matter from nothing, such a theory reflects at least a lingering allegiance to a
Platonic viewpoint regarding the origin of the universe. Origen also does not
divorce himself from this model of creation.
67.
Origen, De Principiis II, ii.2: ... cum ad inferiores quosque trahitur, in

crassiorem corporis statum solidioremque formatur, ita ut uisibiles istas mundi
species uariasque distinguat
68.
Origen, De Principiis lll,v.l.
69.
Origen, De Principiis, lll,v.1: Quae licet maiora quaedam intra se contineat,

quam historiae narratio uidetur ostendere, et spiritalem in quam maximis
contineat intellectum atque in rebus mysticis et profundis uelamine quodam
litterae utatur: tamen nihilominus hoc indicat sermo narrantis, quod ex certo
tempore creata sint omnia quae uidentur.
70.
Origen, De Principiis Ill, v.l.

Origen likewise adduces Scriptural support from both the Old and the New
Testaments for his teaching regarding the world's final consummation. In this
respect, we must bear in mind that his remarks concerning the temporal origin of the world are correlative with those concerning its end. The close relationship between the themes of creation and consummation in the De Principiis is underscored by Origen's response to a classic objection to the possibility
of a temporal origin of the universe (De Principiis lll,v.3): . . . if the world
had a beginning in time, what was God doing before the world began?" Origen
meets this objection on the grounds that the present world is but one of many
worlds which preceded it or which will succeed it once it perishes (De Prin-
49
cipiis III, v. 3). From this standpoint, the charge that God was inactive prior to
creation is undermined. But in meeting this charge, Origen commits himself
to the heretical teaching that our world is but one among an infinite number
of worlds that have already existed, or which will exist at some future time.
71.
Origen, De Principiis III,v.4: ... scripturae sanctae conditionem mundi nouo

quodam et proprio nomine nuncuparunt, dicentes Ka"ta~oA.f]v mundi (quod
latine satis inproprie translatum constitutionem mundi dixerunt; Ka"ta~oA.f]
uero in graeco magis deicere significat, id est deorsum iacere, quod latine
inproprie, ut diximus, constitutionem mundi interpraetati sunt) . . .
72.
J.C.M. van Winden, "An Appropriate Beginning. The opening passage of

Saint Basil's In Hexameron," in P/atonismus und Christentum. Festschrift
fur Heinrich Dorrie (MUnster Westfalen, 1983), 307.
73.
cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Homily 43; for Gregory of Nyssa's remarks, see Migne
74.
Basil, Hexameron 9.1 (in Home/ies Sur L'Hexaemeron, 2e Edition. Texte

Grec, Introduction et Traduction de Stanislas Giet. Paris: Les Editions du
Cerf, 1968): "0 IJ.OL btKOUOL IJ.TJ avvEtb6"tE~ nvf:~, :rtapaywyat~ nat
KaL "tpo:rtoA.oy(at~ OEIJ.VO"tlJ"ta nva EK "tf]~ OLKELa~ aimi:Jv btawvo(a~
E:rtEX,ELPTJOUV "tO[~ YEYPU!J.IJ.EVOL~ E:rtL<j>lJIJ.LOUL. ,AA.M "tOU"tO EO"tLV eavn'>v
ao<j>wnpov :rtotouvw~ ni:Jv A.oy(wv "toil flvEiJ!J.a"tO~, KaL v
:rtpoa:rtotf]aEL 1;T)yi]aEw~ "ta eav"tou :rtapELadyov"to~. Nodaflw "to(vvv
w~ yeypa:rt"tm.
75.
Basil, Hexameron 1.1: Mwuaf]~ w(vuv EO"tLV 6 "tTJV auyypw<j>iJv "taU"tTJV
PG 44 (Col. 61); for Ambrose's quotes of Basil, see Migne PG 29 (Cols. 209210); for Jerome's comments, see Migne PG 29 (Cols. 1-2).
Ka"ta~ano!J.EVO~
76.
Basil, Hexameron 1.2: 'Q~ yap 6 KEpU!J.EU~ a:rto "tf]~ au"tf]~ "tE)(,VTJ~
!J.Up(a bw:rtA.daa~ OKEUTJ, oun "tiJv "tE)(,VTJV OU"tE Mva!J.LV 1;avdA.waEv
oihw KaL 6 wu :rtaV"to~ wuwu bTJt.ttoupyo~. oux evL KOOIJ.<J> aUIJ.IJ.E"tpov
"tTJV :rtOLTJ"tLKTJV E)(,WV buvaj..I.LV, aA.A.' EL~ "tO a:rtEtpo:rtA.datov
u:rtEp~a(vouaav, "tfl po:rtfl "toil 8EA.f]IJ.a"tO~ !J.OVTI d~ "tO Elvm :rtapf]yayE
"ta IJ.EYEflT) "t<i:JV 6pW!J.EVWV.
77.
Basil, Hexameron 2.2: Aihl) yap <l>TJOL, KUL a6pa"to~ "tfl <j>UOEL KUL
aKa"taOKEUUO"tO~, a:rtOLO~ ouaa "t<j> EUU"tf]~ A6y<p, KUL :rtUV"tO~ dbou~
KUL oxiJIJ.a'tO~ KEX.WPLOIJ.EVTJ, f]v :rtapaA.a~wv 6 "tE)(,VL"tTJ~ "tfl EU"U'tOU
ao<j>(<;t E!J.Op<j>WOE, KUL d~ "td!;tv ijyayE, KUL oihw bt' au"tf]~ OUOLWOE
"ta 6pW!J.EVU.
78.
Basil, Hexameron 1. 7: OUK ann "tLVL <j>wvfl x.pf]aa"tO 6 ao<j>o~ MwiJaf]~

:rtEpL auwu, an d:rtEV, 'Ev apx.fl E:rtOLT)OEV. OU)(,L EVTJPYTJOEV, oubf:
u:rtemlJaEv, ana 'E:rtoCTJaEv.
79.
Basil, Hexameron 2.2.
80.
50
81.
Basil, Hexameron 1.3: 'Ev apxfl E:rtOLl]OEV 6 ee6;. Ta a:n:o xp6vou

apl;djlEVU :n:doa &vdyK'I] KUL EV xp6vL~dA.n; :n:epi toil teA.ou;.
82.
Basil, Hexameron 2.3, trans. Agnes Clare Way in The Fathers of the Church,
Volume 46 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
itJ.lLOELa;
1963): 'E:rtOLl]OEV 6 eeo; tOV oupavov KUL t~V yf]v OUK
t;
EKdtepov, &A.A.' OAOV oupavov KUL oA.ov yf]v, aut~V t~V ouo(av t<j>
W'lEL OUVELAl]JlJ.lEVl]V. Ouxi yap 0X1']Jldtwv EOtLV EUpEt'l];, &A.A.' autf];
tf]; lj>uoew; tmv ovtwv bl]JlLoupy6;.
83.
84.
85.
Basil, Hexameron 1.5; 1.6.
86.
Basil also interprets the beginning in much broader terms, that is, the beginning of creation as a whole prompted by an instantaneous, timeless act on
the part of God. In this context, Basil appears to draw upon an argument
rooted in Platonism. As interpreted by Plato (Timaeus 37D), time is an image
of eternity. Basil interprets time along clear Platonic lines as an extension of
eternity that is correlative with an eternal mode of being (Hexameron 2.8:
49c-49d). For Basil (Hexameron 1.6), the beginning of time is atemporal, just
as "the beginning of the road is not yet the road, and the beginning of the
house not yet the house" ('Q; yap it apx~ tf]; Moil ou:n:w 6M;, KUL it
apx~ tf]; OLK(a; OUK OLKLU, OUt(l) KUL it toil xp6vou apx~ ou:n:w
xp6vo;).
87.
It should be noted that the exact dating of Ambrose's Hexameron homilies

has been the subject of some speculation. F.D. Dudden (The Life and Times
of St. Ambrose II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 713) endorses
the year A.D. 387 as the date of their delivery. This contention is significant
because Holy Week of A.D. 387 was also the time of Augustine's baptism by
Ambrose. 0. Bardenhewer (Geschichte der a/tkirchlichen Literatur III, 2nd
ed. (Freiburg B., 1923), 498-510), on the other hand, specifies A.D. 389 as
the earliest possible date of delivery (proceeding from Ambrose's reference at
Hexameron 3.1.3 to the triumph over the Arians).
88.
Pierre de Labriolle (History and Literature of Christianity, trans. Herbert

Wilson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1968), 281-282) offers an
opposing viewpoint, challenging Ambrose's originality as an exegete:
It is beyond dispute that in his time Ambrose had real renown as an
exegetist. From all parts people consulted him on difficulties presented

by the Old and New Testament. Nevertheless, from the historical point
of view, his method of interpretation offers nothing really fresh. In no
way aiming at writing scientific treatises on sacred hermeneutics, but
solely desirous of offering his sheep the truths pertaining to salvation in
51
a form most fitted to move them, Ambrose from preference employed

what is called the allegorical method of exegesis.
In a similar vein, Angelo Paredi (Saint Ambrose. His Life and Times, trans.
M. Joseph Costelloe, S.J. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1964), 264), points out that in modern times "scholars who have compared Ambrose's commentary with that of Basil . . . have accused him of
plagiarism." In these homilies, Ambrose also might have drawn upon the
Hexamerons of Origen and Hippolytus (now lost). In regard to classical authors, Ambrose makes liberal references to Galen, Virgil, and Cicero.
89.
Hexameran 1,1.1 (translated by John J. Savage in The Fathers of the Church,

Vol. 42; New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1961): PL xiv, 1/1, 123:
Deumque non tamquam creatorem materiae, sed tamquam artificem ad exemplar . . . fecisse mundum de materia ... quae gignendi causas rebus
omnibus dedisse asseratur: ipsum quoque mundum incorruptum, nee creatum,
aut factum existimare n t . . .
90.
Hexameron 1,2(5): PL xiv, 1/1, 124: Unde divino spiritu praevidens sanctus
Moyses hos hominum errores fore, et forte jam coepisse, in exordia sermonis
sui sic ait, In principia fecit Deus coelum et terram . . . ; initium rerum,
auctorem mundi, creationem materiae comprehendens; ut Deum cognosceres
ante initium mundi esse, vel ipsum esse initium universorum ...
91.
Hexameron 1,2(5): PL xiv, 1/1, 124: ... et ipsum esse creatorem mundi,
non idea quadam duce imitatorem materiae, ex qua non ad arbitrium suum,
sed ad speciem prepositam sua opera formaret.
92.
Hexameron 1,4(15): PL xiv, 1/1, 130: In hoc ergo principia id est, in Christo,
fecit Deus coelum et terra; quia per ipsum omnia facta sunt, et sine ipso
factum est nihil.
93.
Hexameran 1,2(7): PL xiv, 1/1, 125: Non ille, ut atomorum concursione

mundus coiret, serum atque otiosum exspectavit negotium; neque disciplinam
quamdam materiae, quam contemplando, mundum posset effingere . . .
94.
Hexameron 1,3(9): PL xiv, 1/1, 126: Non mirum ergo si Deus qui est sine
initio, initium omnibus dedit; ut quae non erant, esse inciperent.
95.
Hexameron 1,4(12): PL xiv, 1/1, 128: Ad tempus refertur, si velis dicere in

quo tempore Deus fecit coelum et terram, id est, in exordia mundi, quando
fieri incoepit ... Ad numerum autem si referas, ita convenit, ut accipias:
imprimis fecit Deus coelum et terram, deinde colles, regiones, fines
inhabitabiles. Vel sic: ante reliquas visibiles creaturas ... coelum et terram
fecit. Si vero ad fundamentum referas, principium terrae fundamenta esse
legisti . . .
Here, Ambrose refers to Proverbs 8(29-30): When he made the foundations of the earth, I was with him forming all things.
96.
Hexameron 1,6(20): PL xiv, 1/1, 132: Tempus enim ab hoc mundo, non ante
mundum . . .
52
97. Hexameron 1,7(Sermo 11)(25): PL xiv, 1/1, 135: Bonus artifex prius
fundamentum ponit: postea, fundamento posito, aedificationis membra
distinguit, et adjungit ornatum. Posito igitur fundamento terrae, et confirmata
coeli substantia ... subtexuit: Terra autem erat invisibilis et in incomposita.
It should be noted that in the English rendering of this quotation, I have
modified Savage's translation, using the literal English equivalent of "invisible" rather than the term "void".
98.
Hexameron 1,4(16): PL xiv, 1/1, 130: Auctorem enim Angelorum et

Dominationum et Potestatum facile intelligimus eum, qui momento imperii sui
hanc tantam pulchritudinem mundi ex nihilo fecit esse, quae non erat; et non
de exstantibus aut rebus, aut causis donavit habere substantiam.
99.
Hexameron 1,5(19).
100. Hexameron 1,5(19): PL xiv, 1/1, 131: Ex ipso principium et origo substantiae universorum, id est, ex voluntate coeperunt; quia unus Deus Pater, ex
quo omnia. Etenim tamquam ex suo fecit; quia uncle voluit fecit.
101. Hexameron 1,5(17): PL xiv, 1/1, 131: Pulchre ergo ait Moyses, quia fecit
Deus coelum et terram. Non dicit quia causam mundo ut esset, praebuit: sed
fecit quasi bonus quod foret utile: quasi sapiens quod optimum judicabat:
quasi omnipotens quod amplissimum praevidebat.
102. Eric Francis Osborn, Justin Martyr (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
1973), 46.
103. The most extensive scholarly work in this area has focused upon Justin and
Athenagoras. For the Middle Platonic background of Justin, see Carl Andresen,
"Justin und der mittlere Platonism us," Zeltschrift fur die neutestamentliche
Wissenschaft 44 (1952/3): 157-195 and Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik
des Kelsos wider das Christentum, in Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 30
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955): 312-344. For the Middle Platonic background of
Athenagoras, see Leslie W. Barnard, "The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras," in Epektasis, Festschrift for J. Danielou (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1972), 3-16; Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Structure of
Athenagoras' 'Supplicatio Pro Christianis'", Vigiliae Christianae 23(1969):
1-20; Bernard Pouderon, Athenagore d'Athenes. Phi/osophe Chretien (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1989), 115-123; 203-221.
104. John Whittaker, "Plutarch, Platonism and Christianity," in Neoplatonism and
Early Christian Thought. Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong, ed. H.J.
Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London: Variorum Publications Ltd., 1981),
59:
.. in the minds of many men . . . the question at issue was exacerbated by the realization that in some way the question of the nature of
the universe was inextricably linked with that of the nature of man. In
consequence the matter of the created or uncreated nature of the uni-
53
verse was not simply a scholastic question devoid of human relevance.

This question . . . was one that roused strong emotions in the first
centuries of our era.
105. Trans. R.G. Bury in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. & London:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
106. Aristotle, De Caelo I, 10, 280a 23-32, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William
Heinemann Ltd., 1939). cf. De Caelo III, II, 300b 16; Physica VIII, 1, 25b
17; MetaphysicaL 3, 107lb 31-7.
I have referred to the clear and concise synopsis of this rather complicated
debate provided by P. Merlan in his contribution to The Cambridge History
of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 47. John Dillon's The Middle
Platonists (London: Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1977) also provides a highly
informative treatment of various later Platonic positions in this controversy.
For Dillon's discussion of Philo, see pp.157-158; for Atticus, see pp. 252253; for Albinus, see pp. 286-287.
107. For another in-depth analysis of this debate, with a special focus upon the
alterations to the text of the Timaeus effected by later commentators, see
John Dillon's ':Tampering With The Timaeus: Ideological Emendations In
Plato, With Special Reference To The Timaeus," American Journal of Philology 110(1989): 50-72. Dillon (p. 72) characterizes the debate in these
terms:
Though many instances of emendation are ambiguous, there seems to
me to be a hard core left of instances where the text is being altered to
suit one doctrinal position or another. Broadly speaking . . . the battle
in the case of the Timaeus is between the supporters of a literal interpretation of the Demiurge's creation of the world and those who wish to
take it as a mythical representation of reality. Efforts to slant the text in
one direction or another may seem ... superfluous, since, if . . .
the Timaeus account is a myth, then even the most literal-sounding
descriptions should not disturb us at all ... but it is plain that many
Platonists, initially under the goad of Aristotle's provocatively literal interpretation, were concerned to leave as few handles as possible for
such an interpretation.
108. I rely here upon Dillon's translation of this important text in his The Middle
Platonists (242-243).
109. According to Dillon (The Middle Platonists, 266), Gaius was the teacher of
Albinus. He founded the school that is usually contrasted with the Athenian
school of second-century Platonism.
110. For an illuminating discussion of Albinus's position against the background of
the Middle Platonist debate concerning Aristotle's interpretation of the
54

Timaeus, see R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 119-120.
111. Albinus, Didaskalikos XIV,3, in Albinos, Epitome, ed. Pierre Louis (Paris:
Societe d'Edition Les Belles Lettres, 1945): crtav be ELltl] YEVl]'tOV Elvm
"COV KOO!lOV, oux oihoo~ UKO\JOtEOV au"COU, w~ OV'tO~ ltO'tE xp6vou,
EV ULVEL
'tfJ~ au1:0u uJtoatdaEoo~ <ipX,LKWtEpov n a[nov
112. Abinus, Didaskallkos XII, 2: 'E; EKUO"CO\J yap aA.ou 'tV 'tE't'tdpoov
au'tOV O'tOL'X,ELOOV EYEVVl]OE . . . ; Didaskalikos XIII, 3: tOll'tOL~ ovv
uJto 1:ou 8wu i] fJA.l] 't\JJtoo8Etaa EKLVEL'to !lEV 1:0 ltp'tov tor~
L'X,OOEOLV U'tUK'tOO~ ...
113. De dogmate Platonis 1.8,198, in Opuscules Phi/osophiques et Fragments.
Texte Etabli, Traduit et Commente par Jean Beaujeu (Paris: Societe d'Edition
Les Belles Lettres, 1977): Et hunc quidem mundum nunc sine initio esse
dicit, alias originem habere natumque esse: nullum autem eius exordium atque
initium esse ideo quod semper fuerit; natiuum uero uideri, quod ex his rebus
substantia eius et natura constet, quae nascendi sortitae sunt qualitatem.
114. De dogmate Platonis 1.8(198): Hinc et tangitur et uidetur sensibusque corporeis
est obuius. Sed quo ei nascendi causam deus praestitit, ideo immortali
perseuerantia est semper futurus.
115. Philip Merlan, contribution to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and
Early Medieval Philosophy, 71.
116. For Augustine's references to Apuleius and discussion of his demonology, see
De Civitate Dei Vlll,14-17; IX,1; 3;7; 8; 11-12; 16.
117. De Deo Socratis 111,124, in Opuscules Philosophiques et Fragments. Texte
Etabli, Traduit et Commente par Jean Beaujeu (Paris: Societe d'Edition Les
Belles Lettres, 1973): Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque
auctor est, solutum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendiue, nulla uice
ad alicuius rei munia obstructum
118. De Deo Socratls VI.l32-134.
119. Proclus,fn Timaeum, I, 276, 30-277, 7 Diehl, in Atticus, Fragments. Texte
Etabli et Traduit par Edouard Des Places (Paris: Societe d'Edition Les Belles
Lettres,1977, p. 73):TOLaU'tl]~ b' ovv 'tfJ~ ~l]'t~OEOO~ OUOl]~ nA.ou'tapxo~
!lEV KUL , A 't"CLKO~ KUL clAA.OL ltOAAOL 'tV nA.a'tOOVLKV Ka'ta xpovov
'tTJV YEVEOLV i]Kouaav Ka( <j>aaL y(yvw8m 'tTJV ~~'tl]OLV. EhE ayEVl]'tO~
Ka'ta xpovov 6 KOOI!O~, El'tE YEVl]'tO~ dvm yap ltpo 'tfJ~ KOOI!OltOLLa~
cl'tUK'tOV KLVl]OLV, alla be KLV~OEL ltUV'tOO~ EO'tL KUL xpovo~. WO'tE
KaL xp6vov Elvm ltpo 'tOU ltUV't6~' all a bE 't<j> ltUV'tL YYOVEVUL
xp6vov, apL8!lOV OV'ta 'tTJ~ 'tOU ltUV'tO~ KLV~OEoo;, cb~ EKE[vo; i)v 'tfJ~
ltpo tf)~ KOO!!OltOLLa~ OUOl]~ U'tUKtO\J KLVi)OEOO~ apL8!!6~.
cf. Proclus, In Timaeum, I, 381, 26-382, 12 Diehl, Des Places' edition,
74-75: 0{ !-LEV ovv ltEPL nA.outapxov 'tOV Xmpoova KaL , A't'tLKOV
55
A.mapro~ CtV'tE')(OV'taL 'tOl)"[(I)V 't(i)v PTJIJ.d't(I)V w~ 'tlJV ano xp6vou 't<j>
KO<J!.Lq> ytvEoLv a\nor~ IJ.Up'tupouv'twv KaL bi] Ka( <j>aOL npoEtvm

IJ.EV 'tlJV OKO<JI.LTJ'tOV UATJV npo 'ti'J~ YEVEOE(I)~, l'tpOELVaL bE KUL 'tlJV
KaKEpytnv 'lj!ux.i]v 'tlJV 'toi'no KLvouoav 'to l'tATJIJ.IJ.EA.t~ n6eEv yap ~
KLVTJOL~ nv ft ano 'lj!U')(i'J~; EL b' t'haK'tO~ ~ KLVTJOL~, ano O'taK'tOU
'lj!U')(i'J~ELPTJ'taL youv EV N61J.OL~ 'tlJV IJ.EV ayaeoubfJ 'lj!U')(lJV opea KaL
EIJ.<j>pova nmbaywyELV, 'tlJV b KUKEPYE'tLV a't<iK't(l)~ 'tE KLVEtoem
KUL 'tO {m' aU'ti'J~ bLOLKOUIJ.EVOV l'tATJIJ.IJ.EAO>~ ayELV El'tLYEVOIJ.EVTJ~ b
'ti'J~ ano 'tou bTJIJ.Loupyou KOOIJ.onmi:a~ 'tlJV IJ.EV UATJV IJ.Ee(o'taoem
npo~ 'tlJ~ 'tou KO<J!.LO oumaOLv, 'tlJV b KaKEpytnv vou IJ.E'taxouoav
EIJ.<j>pova Ol'tO'tEAELOem KUL 'tE'tUYIJ.EVTJV l'tOLELoem KLVTJOLV. ayEL yap
EL~ 'ta;Lv 'tlJV IJ.EV ~ 'tou Etbou~ IJ.E'touo(a, 'ti]v b' ~ 'tou vou napouo(a.
120. Atticus, Fragment 3, Des Places' edition, 46: 6 IJ.EV nA.<i'tWV
EL~
eEOv
Kat f.K eEOv n<iv't' av<innL.
121. Atticus, Fragment 4, Des Places' edition, 51: 'llapaA.a~wv yap, ' TJo(v,
'6 eEo~ l't<lV ooov i]V 6pa'tOV OU')( ~OU')(LUV ayov, l'tATJIJ.IJ.EAoJ~ b KUL
a't<iK'tW~ KLVOUIJ.EVOV' EL~ 'tal; LV ftyayEv EK 'ttl~ a'ta;(a~. ~YTJOUIJ.EVO~
'tOV't' EKELVOV l'tUV'tW~ cl!J.ELVOV .'
122. Atticus, Fragment 4, Des Places' edition, 51.

123. Atticus, Fragment 9, Des Places' edition, 69.
124. Proclus, In Timaeum I, 283, 27-30 Diehl, Des Places' edition, 73-74: "En
b KUL El'tUKOAOUefJOWIJ.EV 'tO[~ 'AnLKOU eau!J.UO'ta[c; {moetoEOLV,
oc; TJOL 'tO IJ.EV 'l'tATJIJ.IJ.EA6>~ KUL a'tdK'tO)~ KLVOUIJ.EVOV Elvm ayEVTJ'tOV'
'tOV b KO<J!.LOV ano xp6vou YEVTJ'tOV' KUL O>IJ.EV l'tEpL auwu 'tOU'tO
bi] 'tO ytyovE (Elpi'Joem) KaA.roc;.
125. Philo Judaeus, De Opificio Mundlll, 7, trans. F. H. Colson and G.H. Whittaker
in Loeb Classical Library(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1971).
126. Philo Judaeus, De Opificio Mundi II, 8.

127. Philo Judaeus, De Opificio Mundi II, 28. For Philo, those who reject the
causal dependence of the world upon God forfeit their claim to any of the
benefits which Divine Providence provides. In this context, he assumes that
causal efficacy on any level entails a concern for the products or effects of a
given operation. Just as artisans take pains to preserve their handiwork, God
cares for the world for which He is creatively responsible (De Opificio Mundi
11,10). From this standpoint, those who reject a Maker of the universe open
themselves to the prospect of cosmic anarchy and disorder.
128. Philo appeals to a form of the cosmological argument: that which is the object
of sense perception (i.e., visible things) is subject to becoming and process;
things in constant flux, then, require an origin that is removed from the realm
of changing things and immune to the negative effects of becoming (De Opificio
Mundi II.12). Philo's reasoning here requires some further clarification. The
56

classic formulation of the argument that Philo employs is found in Aristotle's
Metaphysics (11,2). This argument is later developed in St. Thomas Aquinas'
"Five Ways" to God (Summa Theologica, Pt. 1, Q. 2, Art. 3). Philo's argument seems to presuppose the argument against infinite regress that St.
Thomas's first three "Ways" utilize: a series of caused causes cannot extend
to infinity, because in that case, the entire series would stand in need of a
cause, and thus, it could never have come into existence at all. While Philo
recognizes that things which become require an origin, he fails to explain why
this is the case. Implicit in Philo's brief argument there seems to be the assumption that things subject to change (and which come into existence) ultimately require an uncaused Cause to account for their existence.
129. Philo Judaeus, De Opificio Mundi VII, 26. This contention presupposes the
following assumption: since time is a measured interval which is contingent
upon the world's movement, it must succeed or coexist with the emergence of
the world (De Opificio Mundi VII, 26). For Philo, the notion of an extratemporal origin of the world does not compromise God's status as Creator.
Indeed, the world can still be viewed as causally dependent upon God, whether
it emerged before, after, or simultaneously with the beginning of time.
130. Plato, Timaeus 538; 698-C.
131. Philo Judaeus, De Specialibus Legibus I, 329.
132. Philo Judaeus, Heres XXXII, 160.
133. Philo Judaeus, De Providentia 1.6-9. d. Decal. 58 (which teaches the world
was once non-existent).
134. John Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 158: "The doctrine of . . . the De
Providentia is much more definite about ... creation . . . than the rest
of Philo's writings ... yet not even this work . . . can be adduced to
prove a concept of creation ex nihilo in Philo."
135. Sallustius, Concerning the Gods and the Universe, ed. & trans. Arthur Darby
Nock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), Prolegomena 1.5, pp.
xxxvii-xxxviii.
136. Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Volume I, Part II (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1962), 220.
137. Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5 (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan
Publishers, 1972), 475a, s.v. "Neoplatonism," by Philip Merlan.
138. De Diis et Mundo!: on
rt~ flea~ ayafl6~.
on
artaflf)~,
on
a!!E't6j3Arp:o~.
139. De Diis et Mundo II: a[ 'toN flEWv OUCJLaL oM EyEVOV'tO (n1 yap ad
OV'ta oubErtO'tE yivE'taL' ad [! Eonv, ooa Mva!!LV 'tE EXEL 'ti]V
rtpW't'I'JV Kat JtOOXELV oubev rtEcj>UKEV).
57
140. De Diis et Mundo VI: oM EK aWJ..L<il:wv dai (Kai yap TON awJ..Lmwv
a{ buvdJ..LEL~ aamJ..LaLOL) oM TOl"t<J) rtEpLEXOUTUL ( (JWJ.t.mWV yap
TOlJTO yE) oMe n)~ rtpWTl]~ al"t(a~ f] aAA.f]A.wv XWPL~OVTUL . . .
141. De Diis et Mundo V: T~v rtpWTl]V alTtav J..LLav TE dvm rtpoai]KEL
(rtaVTO~ yap rtA.f]flou~ ~YELTUL J..LOV<i~) buv<iJ..LEL TE Kai ayaflOTl]TL
rtciVTa VLK~, Kal bul. TO"lho rtcivTa J..I.ETEXELV EKELVl]~ avciyKl]. ouMv
yap auT~V c'iAA.o KWAU(JEL bta T~V MvaJ.t.LV oM EalJT~V a<f>EXEL bt'
ayaflOTl]Ta
iJv
iJv,
142. De Diis et Mundo V: aAA.' d J..LEV

ljluxf], rtciVTa c'iv EJ..l ljluxa
d be
Kai VOlJ~, rtaVTU VOEpci, El be oua(a, rtcivTa oua(a~ JA.ETELXE. TOUTO
be EV l"tcUJLV lMvn~ TLVE~ EKELVO oua(av EVOJ..LLGav. EL J..LEV o-&v
J..LOVOV Ta OV"ta, ayafla bE OUK
UAl]fl~~ (c'iv)
0 A.Oyo~ El be bt'
ayaflOTT)Ta Ea"tl TE TU OVTa Kal J..LETELATJXEV ayaflou, Ul"tEpoiJmov
J..LEV ayaflOv bE dvm TO rtpWLOV avciyKT).
iJv,
143. De Diis et Mundo II: &amp oM vou a{

f.manpaL oM ~q)ou a{ alaflijan~.
cf. Nock, Prolegomena ll.ii, p. xlii:
iJv
iJv
vof]an~
oM
flux~~
a{
This view of the gods as functions of a First Cause had a certain popularity in the fourth century: it was a compromise which suited the tendency to monotheism.
144. De Diis et Mundo VI.

145. De Diis et Mundo VI.
146. De Diis et Mundo VI: TWv be eyKOUJ..LLWV o{ JA.EV Elvm rtowum Tov
KOGJ..LOV OL b aUTOV \jiUXOOOLV OL be EK bta<j>6pwv OV"ta apu6~01J(JLV
of be ~PJ..LOUJ..Levov <j>poupofut.
According to Sallustius, each of these four operations has a beginning,
middle, and end. Thus, the superintendents are twelve in number: the creators are Zeus, Poseidon, and Hephaestos; the animators are Demeter, Hera,
and Artemis; the harmonizers are Apollo, Aphrodite, and Hermes; the guardians are Hestia, Athena, and Ares.
147. f?.e Diis et Mundo VII: auTOV be TOV KOUJ..LOV c'i<j>flapTOV TE Kai ayEvT)TOV
ELVUL avaayKl].
148. De Diis et Mundo VII: ayEVl]TOV bE tKava JA.EV bEil;m Kai Tatha (El
yap J..L~ <j>fldpETm, oM yeyovEv, f:rtnbi] rtdv To ytv6J.t.Evov <j>fldpnm)
149. De Diis et Mundo VII.
150. De Diis et Mundo XIII: rtdv To ytVOJ..LEVOV f] TEXVTJ f] <j>iJaEL f] KaTa
MvaJ.t.LV YLYVETUL.
151. De Diis et Mundo XIII.
58
152. De Diis et Mundo XIII: :rtdv be -ro buvd11EL yLV611EVOV -rq) -r~v Mva11Lv
E)(.OV'tL ouvu<j>LO'tU'taL. KUL oub cmoA.eo8m :rtO'tE 'ta oii-rw; YLV011EVa
Mva-rm El 11~ 'tO'tJ :rtOLOW'to; a<j>EAOL n; 't~V Mvai1LV. WO'tE o[ 'tOV
K6011ov <j>Se(pov-rEI!; Seou; 11~ elvm A.eyoumv, ~ Seou; elvm A.Eyovn;
'tOV 8EOV :rtOLO'tJOLV aMva-rov. buvd11EL 11EV o-&v :rtav-ra :rtOLOOV EUU'tql
ouvu<j>(onJm :rtav-ra.
153. Gerhard May, SchOpfung Aus Dem Nichts. 3:
Fiir die Ausbildung der christlichen Schopfungslehre war aber am
wichtigsten die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Platonismus. Der mittlere
Platonismus, dessen Epoche von der zweiten Halfte des ersten
vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts bis in die erste Halfte des dritten
Jahrhunderts nach Christus reicht, hatte eine Hinwendung zu
theologischen Fragestellungen vollzogen, die ihm von vornherein ein
Affinitat zum christlichen Denken gab. Das zentrale metaphysische Thema
ist nicht mehr wie fiir den historischen Platon die Ideenlehre, sondern
Gott. Der Demiurge des Timaios, des fiir den Mittelplatonismus
grundlegenden platonischen Dialogs, wird mit dem hochsten Gott
gleichgesetzt, der als Nus und Inbegriff der Ideen gedacht wird.
154. A possible exception to the mainstream Middle Platonist understanding of
matter as eternal is found in fragments of Eudorus of Alexandria. On the basis
of the available evidence, Eudorus held that the supreme One is causally responsible for the existence of matter. cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis de Physica
Commentarii 181, 10 ff., Diehls; Alexander Aphrodisias, In Metaphysica
988a 10-11, Hayduck. For a discussion of Eudorus, see Dillon's The Middle
Platonists, 128.
155. Clemens Baeumker (Das Probleme des Materie in der Griechischen
Philosophie. Eine Historisch-Kritische Untersuchung (MUnster:
Aschendorffschen, 1890), 143-144) provides a convenient survey of Patristic
references to Plato's theory of preexistent, uncreated matter:
So Plutarch von Chaeronea (de an. in Tim. procr. c. 5, 10148), der
dieselbe iibrigens mit der von uns als primarer bezeichneten Materie
identificiert, Atticus (Euseb. praep. ev. XV, 6,4; vgl. Prod. in Tim. 84f85a; 87 A, 99c; 116b.e; 119b; 187b. Stob. ed. I, p. 894), Albinus und
andere Platoniker (Prod. in Tim. 84f. Vgl. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 300.352).
Auch von manchen christlichen Schriftstellern, wie Justinus (cohort. ad
Graec. c. 20, p. 19a; c. 23 p. 22; I Apologie c. 59, p. 92c), Theophilus
(ad Auto/. II. c. 4, p. 82c), Tertullian adv. Valent. c. 15; vgl.adv. Hermog.
c. 4)), Irenaeus (contr. haer. II, 14, 4 Massuet), Athanasius (orat. de
hum. nat. a Christo assumpta c. 2, tom. I p. 39 B. ed. Maurin),
Epiphanius (de haeres. I 6, vol. I p. 293, 30 Dindorf), wird gelegentlich
dem Plato eine solche ungewordene Materie als Stoff der Weltbildung
zugeschrieben, wahrend andere, wie Tatian (orat. ad Graec. c. 5, p.
145 C; c. 12, p. 151A), Athenagoras (suppl. pro Christian. c. 4, p.
58), Laxtantius (institut. christ. II 8), Clemens von Alexandrian (strom.
59
V 14, 89, p.699 P. vol. III, p. 70, 3-8 Dind.), Maximus (bei Euseb.
praep. ev. VII 22; vgl. Moller, Gesch. d. Kosmologie in der griech.
Kirche, Halle 1860. S. 561-564), Origenes (de princ. II 1,4 p. 78
Delarue; comment. in gen. p. 2) Gregor von Nyssa (de hom. opif. c.
23, vol. I, p. 210 Migne), Basilius (in hexaem. hom II, c. 2, p. 13 Garner), Augustinus (de civ. Dei Xll,15) u.s.w., die vielgestaltige Ansicht
von einer ewigen Materie bekampfen, aber ohne sie dem Plato beizulegen,
vielmehr durchweg gegen gnostische und verwandte Irrlehren sich
wendend. Dagegen verwarfen Porphyr und Iamblich (Prod. in tim. 116
C. Philop. de aetern. mundi VI 2) eine solche wortliche Auslegung und
mit ihnen aile diejenigen, welche den zeitlichen Ursprung der Welt bei
Plato als mythische Einkleidung zu bloss didactische Zwecke ansehen.
156. Stanislas Giet, Basile de Cesaree, Home/ies Sur L'Hexaemeron (Paris: Les
Editions du Cerf, 1968), Introduction, 49.
cf. the comment of Carolinne White, Christian Friendship in the Fourth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84:
Basil does not adopt a classical view of friendship unreflectingly but
rather adapts certain aspects of it to his thought on the Church and
monastic life,. making it serve a strictly Christian purpose, and to play
an essential role in the pursuit of this purpose.
157. Stanislas Giet, Basile de Cesaree, 56; 61-63. Basil's Stoic background has
also prompted much speculation. In this respect, Karl Gronau has traced a
Stoic influence upon Basil to the philosopher Posidonius's lost Commentary
on the Timaeus. cf. Karl Gronau, Posidonius und die jiidischchristliche
Genesisexegese (Leipzig-Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1914). In addition, scholars
recognize the possibility of a Plotinian inspiration for aspects of Basil's
Hexaemeron Homilies. 48,49, 50,51. cf. John M. Rist, "Basil's
'Neoplatonism': Its Background and Nature," in Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic (A Sixteen Hundreth Anniversary Symposium), edited by Paul Jonathan Fedwick (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981); A. Jahn, Basi/ius Magnus plotinizans (Bern: Supplementum
editionis Plotini Creuzerinae, 1838); Paul Henry, Les Etats du texte de Plotin
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1938), 159-166.
158. Hexameron 1.6.
159. De opificio mundi VII (26-27). Basil could have found a Christian precedent
for this thesis in Origen (Homilies on Genesis 1.11), who traced the "true
beginning" to the Divine Word, Who existed with the Father before the creation of the visible universe.
160. Pierre de Labriolle, History and Literature of Christianity, 282.
161. Harry A. Wolfson, "Plato's Pre-existent Matter in Patristic Philosophy" (source
cited in note 27), 415.
162. Wolfson, "Plato's Pre-existent Matter in Patristic Philosophy," p. 416.
60
163. Wolfson, "Plato's Pre-existent Matter in Patristic Philosophy," p. 416:

This adherence of Christianity to the first Philonic principle, in accordance with its own revised meaning of it, is emphasized in the wording
of the first two articles of the Nicene Creed (of A.D. 325): 'We believe
in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible. And in . . . the Son of God, begotten of the Father.' The same
reasoning was applied also to the Holy Spirit.
164. Hexameron 11.4.
165. Harry A. Wolfson, "Plato's Pre-existent Matter in Patristic Philosophy," 411412:
It is reasonable to assume that, while Philo and Tatian and Theophilus
and Augustine have all been led to this belief by an interpretation of
verses in the book of Genesis, they would not have put such an interpretation on those verses in Genesis unless they believed that Plato
taught that the world was created out of a preexistent created matter
and, as philosophers, they wanted to follow Plato. There is nothing in
Scripture which should have compelled them to believe in a double creation-the creation of a matter out of nothing and the creation of a
world out of matter.
166. The fact that Ambrose's sermons had a decisive impact upon Augustine is
clear. However, it is a matter of conjecture as to whether it was specifically
Ambrose's Hexameron homilies which prompted Augustine's conversion. A
challenge to this thesis (as articulated by Pierre Courcelle) is presented by
Goulven Madec (Saint Ambroise et Ia Phi/osophie (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1974), 71-72), who also provides a convenient survey of
scholarship on this topic:
. . . P. Courcelle (Recherches sur /es 'Confessions' de Saint Augustin,
2e ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, Editeur, 1950), p. 93-106) estime que les
sermons qui composent cet ouvrage, sont ceux qui ont influence de
fac;:on decisive !'esprit d'Augustin au printemps 386. II est certain que
ce sont des sermons d'Ambroise qui ont revele a Augustin le sens spirituel des Ecritures (Con/. V,14,24), et qui l'ont delivre de l'erreur ou
I' enfermaient les manicheens en denonc;:ant les anthropomorphismes
de Ia Bible. II est egalement probable qu'Augustin fait allusion aux sermons d'Ambroise, quand il raconte qu'il faisait 'effort pour bien
comprendre Ia doctrine qu'(il) entendait exposer; sur le libre choix de
nos volontes, cause de nos fautes, sur I' equite des jugements (de Dieu)
cause de nos souffrances' (Con/. VII,3,5). Mais je doute que ce soient
precisement les sermons sur I' Exameron qui aient exerce cette influence. Augustin nous dit qu'il entendait souuent Ambroise dire dans ses
sermons au peuple que Ia lettre tue et que !'esprit vivifie (Con/. Vl,4,6).
Et, comme le remarque Ch. Mohrmann (Compte rendu de P. Courcelle,
Recherches sur les 'Confessions' de saint Augustin, dans Vigi/iae
61
christianae, 5, 1951, p. 251), 'il ne faut pas oublier qu'il ne nous reste
que tn3s peu de Ia predication ambrosienne. Au cours des 23 ans de son
episcopat, combien de sermons Ambroise a prononces, qui jamais n'ont
ete fixes par ecrit ou dont le texte n'est pas parvenu jusqu'a nous!' En
ce qui concerne les sermons sur I' Exameron, bien que J.R. Palanque ait
enterine I' argumentation de P. Courcelle (Compte rendu de P. Courcelle,
Recherches sur les 'Confessions' de saint Augustin, dans Revue
d'histoire de l'Eglise de France, 38, 1952, p. 134), il me parait fort
improbable qu'ils aient ete preches durant une semaine sainte aussi agitee
que celle de 386 (J.R. Palanque, Saint Ambroise, p. 160-163, decrit
cette crise en se referant notamment a I' Epistula 20 a Marcellina). II
faut plutot les dater de 387 ou meme plus tard (Voir J.R. Palanque,
Saint Ambroise, p. 519).
167. Gerard Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 15. Verbeke
provides an informative discussion of the impact of Stoicism upon early Christian thought, and traces its influence into the Middle Ages.
168. For a survey of the Stoic influence upon Patristic treatments of the universe,
see Michel Spanneut, Le Stoi'cisme Des Peres De L'Eglise De Clement De
Rome A Clement D'Alexandrie (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), 350-385.
In regard to the scope and extent of Stoic influences upon the Fathers,
Verbeke (The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought, 5) offers the following observations:
. . . Stoicism's . . . influence may already be noticed in Rome during
the second century B.C. and is connected with names suxh as Panaetius
and Posidonius. Therefore, it is not surprising that Stoicism exercised
some influence on Christian authors at a very early point. Christian
moral teaching was influenced by Stoic categories at an early date. Among
Greek Christian writers one may cite Clement of Alexandria, Origen,
Gregory of Nyssa, and Nemesius of Emesa. Some of their works were
eventually translated into Latin and could be read directly by Western
philosophers and theologians. Some Latin Christian writers also passed
on the Stoic legacy to later generations. Among these may be mentioned Tertullian, Lactantius, Saint Jerome, Saint Ambrose, and Saint
Augustine.
169. For the influence of Cicero upon Augustine, see Maurice Testard, Saint
Augustin et Ciceron, 2 vols. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1958); H.
Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classics, 2 vols. (Gi:iteborg, Universitet;
Stockholm: Almsquist & Wiksell (distr.), 1967). For an analysis of an early
Stoic influence upon Augustine, see Ch. Baguette, "Une periode sto'icienne
dans l'evolution de Ia pensee de saint Augustin," Revue des Etudes
Augustiniennes 16(1970): 4 7-77. Baguette contends that Augustine experienced a marked Stoic influence derived from Cicero prior to his encounter
with Plotinian Neoplatonism. Baguette (p. 53) articulates his thesis in these
terms:
62

L'analyse va suivre un double but: premierement, il s'agit de montrer,
par une comparaison avec le De natura deorum, que Ia vision du monde
d'Augustin a Milan, a l'epoque ou ayant abandonne Mani il n'avait pas
encore decouvert les Enneades, releve bien d'une conception stokienne;
ensuite et parallelement, que cette vision nee sans doute de Ia
frequentation de Ciceron, peut s'etre nourrie egalement de Ia lecture
des ecrits de savants-philosophes tel que Pline.
A Stoic dimension can be detected in number of early works. In the De Beata
Vita (2.8, ff.), Augustine displays a clear reliance upon Ciceronian insights.
This reliance is evident in his reference to the Tusculan Disputations (in
connection with his etymological analysis of terminology relevant to the notion of privation), and to the Hortensius. The ethics of the early Augustine,
in fact, displays a general Stoic flavor, with its emphasis upon obligation,
conformance to the prescriptions of law, and an understanding of virtue in
terms of the exercise of reason. This Stoic orientation in Augustine's ethics is
especially evident in the Cassiciacum dialogues and in the first book of the De
libero arbitrio. In this connection, see R.J. O'Connell, "De libero arbitrio I.
Stoicism Revisited" in Augustinian Studies 1(1970): 49-68. Also, see my
article "The Significance of the Moral Concept of Virtue in St. Augustine's
Ethics," The Modern School man LXVIII (November, 1990): 1-17. The influence of Stoic materialism is evident in the De Immortalitate Animae (15.24),
where Augustine relies upon the notion of a universal animation of the world.
His early commitment to this materialistic position is acknowledged in the
Confessiones (VII, 1,2) and condemned as "rash" in the Retractationes (1.5.3).
170. According to Verbeke (The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought, 30),

Augustine had recourse to a Stoic doctrine in attempting to reconcile Scriptural teaching regarding creation with the facts of everyday experience:
On the one hand, he had to interpret the text from Genesis, according
to which God performed his work of creation in six days and sanctified
the seventh as well as a passage from Ecclesiasticus (XVIII, 1) which
states that God created all things at once. On the other hand, he could
hardly deny that the world is constantly evolving and developing. New
beings come to be and others pass away. Creation seemingly goes on
without interruption. In order to reconcile the biblical teaching with
daily experience, Augustine appeals to the Stoic theory of seminal reasons. Whatever happens in the world is not due to accident or to blind
fate. God himself, by means of seminal reasons, determined the course
according to which events will unfold during the flow of time.
171. For Augustine's discussion of the role of seminal reasons in creation, see De
Genest ad litteram 11,15,30; IV, 33,52; Vl,11,18-19; Vl,14,25; Vl,15,26;
Vl,16,27; V1,18,29; IX,17,32. While Verbeke (The Presence of Stoicism in
Medieval Thought, 32) imputes Augustine's doctrine of seminal reasons to
the Stoics, he also acknowledges that the teaching was adopted by Plotinus
63
and used within his philosophy. Accordingly, Augustine's use of the doctrine
might well have been mediated through Neoplatonic sources.
172. Plotinus's account of the procession of being from the One is best understood
in terms of the radiation of light from the sun, so that the One remains undiminished in its efflux (Ennead V.3(49).12.39-44). The One emanates because it is natural for that which is thoroughly good to share its goodness.
173. For an in-depth discussion of this issue and its philosophical implications, see
Lloyd P. Gerson, "Plotinus's Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?", Review
of Metaphysics 46(3), March 1993: 559-574. Gerson (pp. 572-573) qualifies the sense in which the Plotinian One is the "cause" of existence (that is,
as an "instrumental creationism"):
The problem of the equal versus subordinate status of VOV\; in relation
to the One comes plainly to the fore when we ask about the cause of the
being of everything else, especially everything else below "ljlux~. which
is of course another apxfJ and the source of an analogous problem.
When Plotinus analyzes the being of things in the world he will analyze
them into essence or image of essence and existence, positing the apxfJ
of each as VOV\; and One, respectively. That is, the One's proper effect
here is evident solely as the existence of things, not their ouoa, which
derives from the second apxfJ. The One, then, is represented as primary cause of existence, but ouoa is the instrumental cause of being.
Since there is no being without existence, the One's causal activity is
completely instrumental, including even ouoa itself, which as such does
not require a cause outside itself. In the being of ouoa, the One uses
ouoa as an instrument. So also with everything else.
174. Ennead Vl.8(39).19, trans. A.H. Armstrong in the Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1966-1988): "... one ought perhaps to understand that it was in this sense the ancients spoke of "beyond
being" with a hidden meaning, not only that he generates substance but that
he is not a slave to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his principle,
but he, being the principle of substance, did not make substance for himself
but when he had made it left it outside himself, because he has no need of
being, he who made it (ai..A' auTO\; apxi] Ttl\; OUOLG\; wv oux ain<j)
btOtf]OE Ti]v ouoav, ana 3tOLTJOG\; TGUTfJV E~W ELGOEV. EGUTOV, cll:E
ouMv l:OV dvat 0EOf.1EVO\;, 0\; E3t0Lf]OEV auTO)."
John M. Rist (Piotinus, The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 26) focuses upon this passage as an instance of Plotinus's
affirmation that the One is the creator of all finite things. As Rist points out,
Ennead Vl.8(39).19 asserts that the One has "made" Being four times. Rist
finds evidence of the impact of this passage upon Augustine in the
Confessiones VII, 9.13-14, where Augustine claims to have found a consonance between what he found in the libri platonicorum and the words of
John 1:1-5:
64

In them I read, not indeed in these words but much the same thought,
enforced by many varied arguments, that In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The
same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him,
and without him nothing was made. What was made, in him is life,
and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness,
and the darkness did not comprehend it.
175. For references to Apuleius's De Deo Socratis in the De Civitate Dei, see
note 102, above. For Augustine's quotation from Apuleius's De Mundo, see
De Civitate Dei IV,2.
Chapter 1
The Manichaean Cosmogony:

A Point of Reference
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo provided a key component in St.

Augustine's refutation of various aspects of Manichaeism. In this seminal Christian teaching, he found the origin of the intimate causal relationship between God and the rest of reality. In effect, the doctrine
establishes the utter dependence of all things upon God for any perfections they possess, and ultimately, for their very existence. In this
connection, the doctrine underscores a basic presupposition that is
rooted in the teaching of Genesis: if God is the supreme Creator of all
things, then everything which God creates is fundamentally good.
Accordingly, the affirmation of creatio ex nihi/o carries with it an
extremely positive vision of reality. This must be borne in mind when
approaching Augustine's attempts to refute Manichaean teaching.
In keeping with his grounding in the Scriptural tradition, Augustine
proceeded from a world-view that differed radically from what we find
in Manichaeism. At the outset, then, let us assess the conception of
reality espoused by his opponents, specifically as it pertains to its
cosmogony. In general terms, a cosmogony constitutes a mythical account of the origin of the universe. In this regard, cosmogony must be
distinguished from cosmology, a more sophisticated attempt to explain and understand the universe as a unified whole by means of an
integration of such disciplines as natural science, philosophy, and
theology.' In a manner consistent with its mythical contours, Mani's
account of creation was heavily laden with fanciful imagery, excessive
melodrama, an elaborate plot, and intriguing characters.
The Religion of Mani
By way of introduction, a few remarks regarding Mani and his religion

are in order. Mani was born in the Persian Empire on the 14th of
66
The Manichaean Cosmogony
April, A.D. 216. 2 His father Patik was a member of a Gnostic community (possibly a Mandaean sect) that practised baptism. Patik claimed
to have received a revelation directing him to take up the ascetic life. 3
In this connection, he probably exerted an influence upon Mani in the
cultivation of his own religious orientation. Mani himself would lay
claim to two Divine revelations-one in his early adolescence, and the
other in his mid-twenties. On the basis of these revelations, Mani
came to believe that he was the last of God's prophets, and as such,
that he was destined to bring a crucial enlightenment to mankind. He
likewise professed to be an apostle of Jesus Christ and identified himself with the Paraclete.
Early in his religious career, Mani ventured to India, apparently in
search of the religious wisdom to be derived from Buddhism. Upon
his return to Persia, he was received by Emperor Shahpuhr I, who
granted him complete freedom to preach his religious teachings
throughout the Empire. While these privileges were renewed by
Shahpuhr's successor Hormizd, Mani found opposition in Hormizd's
successor, Bahram I. Mani fell out of favor with the imperial court; he
was branded an enemy of the Empire's official fire-worshipping religion, and by implication, perceived as an enemy of the state. He died
in A.D. 276/277 after imprisonment and prolonged torture.
In doctrinal terms, Manichaeism appears to have been an amalgam
of elements drawn from Persian Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and
Buddhism. But despite its eclectic character, several salient features
enable us to interpret it in the context of the history of religion. In his
classic work on Manichaeism, Henri-Charles Puech enumerates three
closely related traits. Puech first focuses upon the fact that Manichaeism
presented itself as a universal religion with an ecumenical appeal. Secondly, Puech points out that Manichaeism was a missionary religion
that sought to disseminate its teachings over the whole world, and
thereby, win converts. Lastly, Puech stresses that Manichaeism was a
revealed religion, with its own body of scriptures that were instrumental in promoting its wide-ranging propagandistic campaign. 4
Manichaeism also reflects certain religious attitudes inherent in the
general cultural milieu of the Hellenistic period. In this connection,
the religion has been described as "the last and greatest manifestation
of Gnosticism." 5 As already observed, Mani had been exposed to a
Christian Gnosticism through his father. But Mani's own religion would
likewise exhibit some distinctive Gnostic tendencies. Puech provides
a convenient summary of these tendencies: first, a pessimistic view of
67
the human condition; secondly, the attribution of the world's creation

to a malevolent principle {rather than to God the Father); third, a
dualism between principles of goodness and evil {that is, between
God and the evil demiurgic creator of the world); fourth, a knowledge
of oneself and God (epignosis) that yielded a certainty of salvation by
virtue of a recognition of the fundamental kinship between one's own
soul and the Divine nature. 6
The consideration of the Gnostic dimension of Manichaeism has a
special applicability to Augustine. Once the Gnostic background of
Mani's religion is fully appreciated, we can see that Augustine's antiManichaean polemic was not merely directed against a single sect, but
against an entire outlook that permeated late antiquity. In this connection, W.H.C. Frend perceives a direct historical continuity between
Gnosticism and the North African Manichaeism known to Augustine.
As Frend observes, "the Manichees of Augustine's time were concerned with precisely the same problems as the Gnostics of two hundred years previously, and they answered in precisely the same way." 7
Methodology
As a world-religion in its own right, Manichaeism yielded a plethora of

texts and testimonia to its teachings. Its widespread popularity, its
pervasiveness throughout the Persian and Roman Empires {and even
beyond those vast borders), and the persistence of the tradition well
into the Middle Ages resulted in the generation of a formidable corpus
of writings. Recent discoveries have further enlarged our knowledge
of the religion and its doctrines. 8 But this sheer magnitude of available
material necessitates a certain selectivity in one's use of sources. Accordingly, my presentation makes no attempt at an exhaustive treatment of every aspect of Manichaean doctrine. I have attempted, however, to provide as much detail regarding the Manichaean cosmogony
{along with its more fantastic features) as possible. Such an assessment will serve as a helpful point of reference for my subsequent investigation of the role of creatio ex nihilo in Augustine's antiManichaean polemic. In broader terms, this assessment can stand on
its own as a brief but comprehensive synopsis of a key component of
Manichaean belief.
The discussion which follows draws chiefly upon two sources: first,
the Liber Scholiorum (c. A.D. 790-792) of the Nestorian Bishop
Theodore bar Khoni; secondly, the Fihrist or Catalogue of the Sci-
68
ences (c. A.D. 988) of Ibn Abi Ja'kub an-Nadim. In actuality, these
works stand on somewhat opposite ends of the doctrinal spectrum.
The Liber Scho/iorum (written in Syriac) contains a Christian polemic against Manichaeism which exhibits a clear disdain of its doctrines.9 The Fihrist (written in Arabic), on the other hand, offers a
rather impartial presentation of Mani's teachings that remains free of
the invective found in Christian sources. 10 But despite their divergent
goals and markedly different attitudes toward the subject-matter, these
documents are useful in the present context for a number of reasons.
To begin with, the Liber Scholiorum and Fihrist focus specifically
upon Mani's creation myth, offering elaborate expositions of the entire Manichaean cosmogony. In this respect, these documents discuss
all of the major themes that one might encounter in any number of
Manichaean sources: the primordial conflict between the Principles of
Light and Darkness; the struggle and defeat of Primal Man; Primal
Man's rescue; the creation of the heavens and the earths; and the
origin of the human race. Moreover, each work presents literal quotations from Mani, thereby serving as valuable touchstones for our knowledge of the founder's own teachings.
The Manichaean cosmogony was founded upon a pronounced metaphysical dualism. Such a dualistic understanding of reality can be defined in the following terms:
... a conception of two principles . . . whose founding activity or causality is characterized by a ... disparity of value between the two principles
themselves, as well as . . . between the respective realms which come into
existence through them . . .U
In a manner consistent with this definition, Manichaeism envisaged

primordial Principles of Light and Darkness which preceded the existence of the visible universe. Properly speaking, Mani's cosmogony
exhibits what might be characterized as a "radical dualism," that is, an
outlook presupposing the coeternity of two completely opposed Principles. 12 Although the Principles are depicted as eternally coexistent,
they share nothing in common and remain ontologically distinct. 13
This radical dualism not only places Manichaeism in continuity with
Gnosticism, but enables us to characterize it as an expression of Gnosticism as well. 14 In this respect, Mani's dualism and its Gnostic orien-
69
tation might be viewed as closely aligned: the very opposition of the

Principles of Good and Evil (and the subsequent encroachment of Evil
upon the Good) necessitates a revelation which "awakens" the enlightened from the malaise of the human condition and a rediscovery
of the authentic self. Dualism and gnosis, therefore, are reciprocal
notions.
The Liber Scholiorum characterizes Manichaean dualism in terms
of two Principles, one good and the other evil, which existed before
heaven, earth, and everything else in reality. 15 The Fihrist, on the
other hand, describes these Principles or elements as constituting the
very origin of the world. 16 In effect, Theodore and an-Nadim really
communicate the same idea: the two Principles provide the necessary
conditions for the subsequent emergence of the celestial and terrestrial realms. Thus, an-Nadim's designation of these Principles as the
"origin" of the world should be interpreted in strictly causal terms,
rather than in any temporal sense: while the Good and Evil Principles
existed before heaven and earth, they also provided the origin of heaven
and earth as their ultimate sources.
The Good Principle (the Father of Greatness in Theodore's rendering) inhabits the region of Light, while the Father's five Glories or
Dwellings (Intelligence, Knowledge, Reason, Thought, and Deliberation) existed outside of the Divine natureY According to Mani's detailed description, the region of Light was a majestic place, possessing everything attractive and appealing to the senses. 18 For Mani, the
Light was God Himself, and God remained wholly unrestricted by any
numerical determinants. 19 The Evil Principle (the King of Darkness),
on the other hand, dwelt in the region of Darkness in five separate
realms: Smoke, Fire, Wind, Waters, and Darkness. 20 In contrast to the
pleasant quality of the luminous region, the region of Darkness was a
murky, foul, and dense environment. 21 Although these Principles remained ontologically distinct, they existed in close proximity: the Light
was contiguous with the Darkness and no barrier separated them. 22
Such proximity and contiguity was only conducive to strife between
the regions. While the region of Light exhibited a state of complete
tranquility, this peaceful condition was disrupted when the King of
Darkness aspired toward his luminous counterpart. In contrast to the
good region, the evil region was characterized by a hostile spirit (designated by the Fihrist as "Iblis al-Qadim", that is, the Ancient Devil),
which sought to spread ruin, destruction, and annihilation. Descending to the lower regions, he consumed, corrupted, or slew anyone that
70
opposed him; coveting the upper regions, he opposed the radiances

of Light which intermingled with him. 23
This hostile disposition, in turn, introduced a turbulence into the
peaceful region of Light which made its Five Glories tremble. 24 But
rather than engaging any of His Glories in the impending conflict, the
Father entered into the fray Himself. 25 For assistance, the Father evoked
the Mother of Life, who evoked Primal Man, who then evoked his five
Sons. 26 Primal Man clothed himself with five divine principles: the
ether (zephyr), wind, light, water, and fire. 27 In effect, the five worlds
(that is, his Sons) performed the same service for Primal Man that
armour provides a combattant in time of war.
Once he had prepared himself in this fashion, Primal Man (along
with his entourage) submitted to the onslaught of the King of Darkness. Like Primal Man, the King of Darkness enlisted the aid of his
five Sons as protection: smoke, flame, obscurity, pestilential wind,
and clouds. 28 The Primal Demon and his cohorts then entangled Primal Man in a battle in which they mixed his five portions of Light with
their five portions of Darkness. 29 By virtue of this mixing, however,
the eventual defeat of the forces of Darkness was insured. In effect,
Primal Man gave himself as food to the Sons of Darkness. In this
context, however, he acted as one who offers his enemy a cake laden
with deadly poison. When the five dark races were intermingled with
the five luminous races, Primal Man descended into the abyss and
severed the roots of the principles of Darkness to prevent their further
proliferation. 30 He likewise ordered some of his angels to draw out the
mixture and place its ingredients near the region of Light. 31
But this strategem initially brought a tragic consequence: once consumed by the Sons of Darkness, the Sons of Primal Man lost their
intelligence and became contaminated with the evil of their opponents. 32 This situation necessitated a rescue operation of sorts whereby
Primal Man and his Sons would be released from their predicament. In
an-Nadim's account, the Father of Light sent forth another deity (the
"Man Beloved of the Lights") who descended and delivered Primal
Man from bondage in the lower regions. 33 In Theodore bar Khoni's
account, Primal Man's deliverance is accomplished by means of another series of evocations: when Primal Man regained consciousness,
he prayed seven times to the Father of Greatness and evoked the
Friend of Light, who in turn evoked the Great Ban or Builder, who
evoked the Living Spirit, who evoked his five Sons-the Custody of
Splendor out of his Intelligence, the Great King of Honor from his
71
Knowledge, the Adamas of Light from his Reason, the King of Glory
from his Thought, and the Supporter from his Deliberation. 34
Thus, Primal Man was found in the region of Darkness, and the
Voice of the Living Spirit revealed his form. 35 A discussion ensued, in
which Primal Man requested the gift of tranquility and peace from the
Living Spirit. 36 When the discussion concluded, the Voice and Primal
Man (as Appellant and Respondent, respectively) ascended to the
Mother of Life and the Living Spirit. The Living Spirit then clothed
itself with the Appellant, while the Mother of Life assumed the Respondent (the vocal expression of Primal Man, her Son). 37 The Mother
of Life (designated in the Fihrist as "al-Bahjah", that is, "Joyfulness")
and the Living Spirit next descended to the region of Darkness, where
the Living Spirit called to Primal Man. 38 Theodore continues in this
vein: the Living Spirit then commanded three of his Sons to kill and
flay the Archons (the Sons of Darkness), and to deliver them to the
Mother of the Living. 39 Once delivered, the Mother used their skins to
make the heavens and earths. 40 Each of Primal Man's Sons were assigned to his appropriate task within this scheme. 41
The Fihrist provides a variant account of creation, attributing the
production of these realms to the King of the region of Light (rather
than to the Mother of the Living). In this rendering, the King of the
World of Light commanded one of his angels to create the world, to
fashion it from the mixed particles, and to liberate the particles of
Light from their entanglement with the particles of Darkness. 42 The
stage was now set for the purification of the particles of Light from
pollution. Descriptions of this process are provided by Theodore bar
Khoni, the Thesaurus, and an-Nadim. Let us consider certain key
elements found in each source.
According to Theodore, the purification was initiated when the Living Spirit revealed his forms to the Sons of Darkness. 43 The Living
Spirit next made the "Wheels" (that is, Wind, Water, and Fire), descended, and formed them near the Supporter who bears the earths. 44
In addition, the King of Glory evoked and placed a covering over the
Wheels so that they might ascend over the earth-bound Archons, and
thereby, protect the five Luminous Gods from their burning venom. 45
These developments gave way to but another evocation, whereby the
Mother of the Living, Primal Man, and the Living Spirit implored the
Father of Greatness, who brought forth the Messenger. 46 The Messenger in turn evoked the Twelve Virgins (that is, the "Light-Ships"),
along with their vestments, crowns, and attributes: Sovereignty, Wis-
72
dom, Victory, Reconciliation, Purity, Truth, Faith, Longsuffering, Rectitude, Beneficence, Justice, and LightY When the Messenger came
to the Light-Ships, he commanded three things: first, that the three
Servitors move them; secondly, that the Great Ban (Builder) construct
the New Earth; and third, that the Three Wheels ascend. 48
Once the Light-Ships ascended and reached the middle of the heavenly region, the Messenger revealed his male and female forms to the
male and female Archons (the manifestations of the Sons of Darkness).49 This revelation provided the means of gaining the release of
the luminous particles from their imprisonment in the Archons' entrails. The liberation was achieved by sexual means: upon beholding
the forms of the Messenger, the lustful Archons emitted the Light
which they had consumed from the five Luminous Gods, and the sin
shut up in them was mixed with the Light which emerged. 50 The Messenger then hid his forms and separated the Light of the five Luminous Gods from the sin that was attached to them. After the sin was
emitted by the Archons, it fell on the earth: half fell on the moist part
and half fell on the dry. As a consequence of this sowing, what fell on
moist ground became a horrible monster in the likeness of the King of
Darkness; what fell on the dry part sprang up into five Trees. 51
The Thesaurus provides a more illuminating statement regarding
the release and destination of the particles of Light. According to this
rendering, some particles ascended, while others continued to mingle
with terrestrial plant-life.
At this beautiful apparition the burning lust of the infernal Powers increases
their basest thoughts are loosed from restraint . . . and through this . . . the
living soul which was held in their members finds release, issues forth, and is
mingled with its own Purest Air. There the souls which have been thoroughly
purified ascend to the Light-Ships, which have been made ready to convey
and ferry them to their native land. That part . . . which still bears the stains
of the hostile race descends in particles through ... heat and warmth, mingles
with the trees and the rest of the plants and all things sown, and takes on
various colors. By this alternate changing of divine and most beautiful personages, the Princes of the wet and cold race, whether male or female, are
relaxed, and that vital substance which is in them flies away; but that which
remains behind is, upon its release, brought down to the earth through the
agency of cold temperatures and mixed with every terrestrial element. 52
Despite this procedure, something of the Light still remained confined in the Darkness. According to the Fihrist, the sun and the moon
were created for drawing out this residue: the sun sifted out the Light
which was mixed with the demons of heat, while the moon sifted out
the Light mixed with the demons of cold. 53 This process will continue
73
until the only portion of the Light which is bound to the particles of
Darkness is what the sun and moon have been unable to extract. 54
According to the Fihrist, the mating of the Archons also resulted in
the generation of the first human beings. This generation was accomplished through two copulations. Adam (the first man) proceeded from
the first copulation, while Eve (the first woman) proceeded from the
second. 55 In Theodore bar Khoni's text, we find a somewhat different
explanation of Adam and Eve's generation. According to that account,
the Daughters of Darkness had already been pregnant by their own
nature. But upon beholding the beautiful forms of the Messenger, they
miscarried; thereupon, their aborted fetuses fell upon the earth, devouring the buds of the trees. 56 These abortions then recalled the
Messenger's forms and inquired as to his whereabouts. In response,
the Son of the King of Darkness demanded their sons and daughters
and offered to make them a form like the one they had seen. 57 In
response to this deceptive entreaty, they gave up their offspring. The
Son of the King of Darkness devoured the males and delivered the
females to his mate, who devoured them. 58 He then copulated with his
mate, who conceived and gave birth to Adam and Eve. 59
After his generation, Adam fell into a deep slumber. But the Mother
of Life, the Primal Men, and the Living Spirit sent Jesus the Luminous
(escorted by a god) to Adam. They seized the Demon and female
Archon and freed the imprisoned Adam from their grasp. 60 Once
aroused from his slumber, Adam received a revelation of his true identity. In this connection, Jesus also revealed the extent of Adam's plight
in the region of Darkness. 61 Adam's revelation was consummated when
Jesus made him taste the Tree of Life. At this point, Adam looked and
cried out against those who had enslaved him. 62 Jesus then enjoined
Adam to refrain from sexual involvement with Eve, and Adam obeyed
this command. 63
The Fihrist provides some interesting embellishments on the story
of Adam and Eve that serve to underscore the Manichaeans' belief
that Evil is inherent in human existence and their negative view of
sexual procreation. An-Nadim's account is rife with references to incest, rape, jealousy, and murder. The mainlines of this rather convoluted tale will suffice for the present purposes. According to an-Nadim's
narrative, the Archon impregnated his daughter Eve, who bore him a
son (Cain) that was ruddy in appearance and repulsive to sight. Cain,
in turn, impregnated Eve, who gave birth to a son that was white and
fair in appearance. Cain impregnated his mother once again, and she
bore two girls: one was designated the Wise of the Ages (Hakimat ad-
74
dahr), and the other was named Daughter of Corruption (lbnat alhirs). In a manner consistent with his rapacious nature, Cain took the
Daughter of Corruption (translated as the "Daughter of Avarice" by
Fltigel) for himself, and gave the Wise of the Ages to his brother Abel.
An angel instructed the Wise of the Ages to guard her soul, because
she was to be the mother of two perfect girls. But this same angel
impregnated her, and she bore Farjad ("Invocation") and Pur-Farjad
("Carrying Invocation"). 64
Abel became extremely distressed, believing that his mate had been
impregnated by his own brother. Although Eve informed him otherwise, Abel abandoned her, went to his mother Eve, and lamented over
what he assumed Cain had perpetrated. When Cain heard of this, he
grew angry at his brother, fell upon him with a rock, and murdered
him. Thereupon he took Abel's mate for himself. The Archons, Dominion (Sindid), and Eve grieved over Cain's crime. 65 The Sindid then
taught Eve the language of magic, so as to enchant Adam. Adam had
intercourse with Eve, and she bore a child. At the encouragement of
the Sindid, Eve set out to kill the child. But Adam took it, intending to
nourish it with milk and tree-fruit. The Dominion, however, sent the
Archons to remove the trees and cattle, so as to stifle Adam's plan. 66
In response, Adam made three circles around the child: on the first,
he wrote the name of the King of the Gardens or Paradise; on the
second, he wrote the name of Primal Man; on the third, he wrote the
name of the Spirit of Life. He then communed with God and prostrated before Him, begging for mercy toward the child. God extended
the crown of splendor to Adam. 67
When the Archons observed this, they departed. A tree called Lotus presented itself to Adam and provided milk for nourishing the
child (now named SchatiQ. Since the Sindid still hated Adam, he
commanded Eve to seduce him, and thereby, lure him back to enslavement. Accordingly, Eve aroused Adam's lust and had intercourse with
him. At this, Schati/rebuked Adam and prompted him to travel to the
East, that is, toward the Light and the wisdom of God. Adam left at
once and remained in that region until he died. Upon his death, Adam
was sent to Paradise (along with Schati/, Farjad, Pur-Farjad, and the
Wise of the Ages); Eve, Cain, and the Daughter of Corruption were
sentenced to hell. 68
Assessment: The Three 'Moments'

The foregoing cosmogonic account can be assessed in terms of three
"Moments", that is, the different "Times" of the great drama that con-
75
stitutes the basis of the Manichaean religion: the Former Time, the
Present Time, and the Future Time. 69 These three Moments are closely
related to Manichaean dualism: the conflict between the Principles of
Light and Darkness ultimately gives rise to the creation of the universe
and humanity, as well as to the consummation of the process whereby
the luminous particles are liberated from matter. 70
In the Former Time, the Principles of Light and Darkness were
contiguous but separate. At that point, the region of Light was peaceful and free of any corruption. The region of Darkness, on the other
hand, was beset with turbulence and unrest. The fragile coexistence
of Good and Evil was shattered when the Principle of Darkness encroached upon the region of Light and attempted to consume its inhabitants. The invasion of the region of Light initiated the second
Moment (that is, the Present Time), when Light and Darkness became
intermingled. This intermingling resulted in the emergence of the visible universe (along with animal and plant life), as well as the first
humans (and ultimately, their progeny).
In response to the onslaught of Darkness, God allowed the nature
of Light (through the agency of Primal Man) to be temporarily devoured by the King of Darkness and his Sons. The sacrificial action
whereby Light was mixed with Darkness really laid the groundwork for
the eventual triumph of Good over Evil. Primal Man's entrapment
necessitated his rescue and a reaction against his opponents. This
was accomplished by a series of evocations: one resulted in the liberation of Primal Man, while another resulted in the killing and flaying of
the Sons of Darkness. On the basis of this victory, the Mother of Life
crafted the heavenly and terrestrial regions with the skins of the defeated Archons.
On a cosmic scale, provision was made for the purification of the
Light which remained imprisoned in matter. This purification was accomplished in various ways. In the accounts of Theodore bar Khoni
and the Thesaurus, as we have seen, it was effected by the emission
of the vital substance from the Archons' bodies. In the Fihrist's rendering, the purification was naturally abetted by the actions of the sun
and moon in sifting out the luminous particles. But despite such remedial measures, some particles remained attached to corporeal substance. Accordingly, the rest of the Present Time is to be preoccupied
with achieving their final liberation and return to the region from which
they originated.
Figuratively, the visible universe might be depicted (at least from a
Manichaean perspective) as something of a great "laboratory" for the
76
slow "distillation" of the residual particles of Light. 71 Humanity is instrumental in this liberation process. But people also hinder it by
engaging in activities (e.g., sexual procreation and the consumption
of meat or seed-bearing foods) which would perpetuate the entrapment of Light in matter. In this respect, salvation first demands a
knowledge of this hazardous situation. Because of the soul's imprisonment in the body, it must be made aware of its true origins and the
appropriate means of gaining release from its imprisonment.
The purity . . . which was spoken about, is that which comes through knowledge, a separation of light from darkness, of death from life, of living waters
from turbid, so that (you) may know (that) each is . . . one another and . . .
the commandments of the Savior (so as to) redeem the soul from (annihilation) and destruction. 72
The paradigm of this illuminating gnosis is provided by the revelation of Jesus the Luminous (also called Jesus the Splendor) to Adam.
As the first human, Adam typifies humanity as a whole. Thus, what
holds true for Adam holds true for his progeny: human beings require
enlightenment in order to overcome the corporeal defilement besetting their essential selves (i.e., their souls). The very embodiment of
the soul presupposes an ongoing struggle between the spirit (that which
is most akin to the Principle of Light in human nature) and matter (the
repository of Darkness). Like Adam, then, all of humanity must receive that saving gnosis which will arouse the soul from the "slumber"
into which it has fallen under the negative influence of the body.
Jesus the Luminous represents but the initial source of revelation
for mankind. Accordingly, this particular revelation is reserved for Adam
alone. 73 Subsequent revelations are provided by No us (that is, Intelligence), the emanation of Jesus the Luminous. 74 In historical terms,
Nous constitutes the teaching of Mani, the source of all of the true
apostles who propagate his message throughout the world. 75 Those
fortunate ones enlightened by Nous are the Elect. By virtue of their
gnosis, they assume a special responsibility to facilitate the liberation
of Light. This is accomplished in two ways.
First, the Elect were required to adhere to a rigid moral code in
their practical lives. This code underscored the importance of refraining from those activities which would abet the further entrapment of
Light. According to the Fihrist, those who wished to enter the cult
were required to examine their souls; admittance would be granted to
those who were able to control lust and covetousness, to abstain from
meat, wine, and marriage, and to avoid injury to water, fire, trees, and
77
all living things. 76 For those unable to observe these prescriptions and
prohibitions, a devotion to work and righteousness, and the performance of prayer, intercession, and supplication would offset any unworthy actions. 77
Secondly, the Elect were required to maintain the "Three Seals":
the Seal of the Mouth, the Seal of the Womb, and the Seal of the
Hands. The Seal of the Mouth concerned the avoidance of evil words
and blasphemy; the Seal of the Womb concerned the avoidance of
sexual intercourse and procreation; the Seal of the Hands forbade any
activity (e.g. agricultural pursuits or the killing of animals) which would
contribute to the further imprisonment of the luminous particles. 78
Such injunctions have a clear ascetic tone. Indeed, "salvation" for the
Manichaeans meant nothing less than divorcing oneself from any bodily
pollution. In this connection, the Gnostic dimension of Manichaeism
comes fully to the fore: in a manner consistent with a key Gnostic
motif, human life represents a continual struggle to liberate the
soul (the authentic self) from the imprisonment of the body and the
ignorance of our true spiritual identity that accompanies corporeal
existence.
The final Moment in the Manichaean cosmogony has an
eschatological significance. The Future Time represents that point when
the particles of Light will be completely released from their entrapment in matter. This development will coincide with a great cataclysm.
The Fihrist describes this upheaval in terms of a conflagration which
will last for one thousand, four hundred and sixty-eight years; during
this period, the remaining particles of Light would be freed. 79 When
this conflagration has ended and the liberation of Light has been consummated, the forces of Darkness will retreat, enter a tomb that has
been prepared for them, and be enclosed by a great rock. 80 Upon the
return of Light to its own region (and the corresponding defeat of
Darkness), the cycle of Mani's cosmogenic myth has run its course.
Things are then restored to their original condition, when Light and
Darkness were wholly distinct.
The Manichaeans' Understanding

of Creation: Salient Themes
On the surface, it might appear that the Manichaeans' account of
creation presupposes the Gnostic notion of a fall, whereby a portion
of the divine substance descends into the region of Darkness and suffers under its negative influence. But such an interpretation would
78
miss a key feature of Mani's cosmogony. Properly speaking, Mani taught

that Light (under the agency of Primal Man) became commixed with
Darkness as the result of an evocation, rather than as a punishment
for some error or transgression. Primal Man became entangled with
Evil because he was commissioned to do so by the Father. Figuratively
speaking, Primal Man's struggle (and apparent defeat) assumed the
proportions of a classic "commando" operation: he was sent "behind
enemy lines," so to speak, so as to prepare the way for the subsequent
neutralization of his opponents. 81 Once entrapped in the entrails of
the evil Archons, Primal Man prevented any further proliferation of
the principles of Darkness.
This overall understanding of created reality differs markedly from
what we find in Genesis. Genesis (1.1-19) not only teaches that God
"created the heavens and the earth," but that "God saw that it was
good." This is something which Mani 's cosmogony could never admit.
In the myth supporting this scheme, the creation of the visible universe was the outgrowth of the hostile attack of the Principle of Evil
upon the Principle of Goodness. In this connection, the celestial and
terrestrial realms were crafted for the explicit purpose of liberating the
particles of Light which had been ingested by the evil Archons.
According to Mani's myth, the basic constituents of the visible universe were derived from the bodily residue of the flayed agents of
Darkness. In this respect, matter was inextricably bound up with Evil.
Matter (Hyle), in fact, was hypostasized and identified with the Principle of Darkness itself. From this standpoint, the Manichaeans necessarily took an extremely dim view of material reality. All foulness and
pollution were traced to the body and bodily existence. 82 The negative
character of matter and corporeal substance is further highlighted in
their accounts of the generation of humanity. Human generation was
depicted as the result of the mating of the Archons, or, as the result of
the Primal Demon's devouring of the aborted fetuses of the Daughters of Darkness.
By virtue of their radical dualism, the Manichaeans were not only at
odds with biblical teaching, but with the teleological perspective of
Hellenic rationalism as well. In this tradition, the world was good,
orderly, and purposeful. In this regard, Hellenism viewed the universe
in truly cosmic terms, that is, as an organized whole whose parts
contribute to the goodness and completion of all things. Such an outlook stood in direct opposition to the anti-cosmic mentality of the
Manichaeans. For the Manichaeans, the visible universe was but a
79
painful (albeit necessary) stage in the process whereby Light would

eventually be liberated from its imprisonment in matter.
In Augustine's reaction against Manichaeism, we find an optimism
toward the created order that is wholly consistent with the teachings
of Genesis and the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of
Graeco-Roman wisdom. Before addressing Augustine's antiManichaean polemic, I conclude this chapter with a brief assessment
of his familiarity with original Manichaean sources. Such an issue is
crucial, insofar as the viability (and credibility) of Augustine's antiManichaean polemic is heavily dependent upon the accuracy of his
portrayal of Mani's teachings.
Concluding Observations: Augustine's

Knowledge of Manichaeism
As a member of the Manichaean religion for some nine years, Augustine had acquired a rather good vantage point from which to criticize
its doctrine. But the degree to which he was familiar with Mani's writings has been a matter of some speculation. Two classic studies of
Manichaeism seriously called into question Augustine's authority on
this topic. According to De Beausobre (the author of the first detailed
work on Manichaeism), Augustine's deficiency as a commentator is
apparent on two levels: first, Augustine had only been an Auditor of
the sect, and therefore, could not have known the esoteric writings
only available to the Elect; secondly, Augustine could not investigate
primary Manichaean sources, because they were written in languages
(i.e., Greek, Syriac, or Persian) which he was unable to read. 83 While
De Beausobre impugned Augustine's authority on the basis of a supposedly inadequate knowledge of Manichaeism, Alfaric focused upon
Augustine's apparent lack of objectivity in dealing with the sect. According to Alfaric, the Augustine who believed in Manichaeism while
he was a rhetorician at Carthage had greater credibility than the convert to Christianity who would later engage in his vehement antiManichaean polemic. 84
Such attempts to undermine Augustine's authority are effectively
challenged by John P. Maher. According to Maher, Augustine provided a highly accurate portrayal of the Manichaean cosmogony that
was grounded upon a thoroughgoing knowledge of Mani's teachings.
In response to the charges of De Beausobre, Maher argues the following points: first, that Augustine's knowledge of Manichaeism should
80
not be assessed on the basis of what he knew (or did not know) as an
Auditor, but rather, on the basis of what he actually wrote against the
sect; secondly, that Augustine might well have had access to a latin
translation of key Manichaean teachings, despite any linguistic limitations on his part. 85 In response to Alfaric, Maher astutely points out
that Augustine's attitude to Manichaeism when he was an Auditor was
hardly one of uncritical acceptance. Rather, his reservations about its
teachings were present even during this period (as revealed in his
desire to confront and question the Manichaean bishop Faustus). 86
But what hard evidence exists to support the claim that Augustine
had a first-hand knowledge of Manichaean doctrine? Maher's response
to this question is based upon highly significant twentieth-century discoveries which have greatly expanded our understanding of the religion. 87 In this respect, he points out the remarkable parallels which
exist between Augustine's rendering of Manichaean theory and similar information found in the Egyptian Coptic manuscripts. 88 Such parallelisms seem to indicate that Augustine possessed a latin translation
of these writings. As Alfaric himself would later acknowledge, Augustine had probably seen an African Manichaean manuscript which served
as a kind of apologia of the faith. 89 On the basis of the arguments and
evidence which Maher musters, I think that one can reasonably acknowledge Augustine's authority as an expositor of Manichaeism, and
likewise, accept the veracity of his portrayal with some confidence. 90
This is further borne out by the extensive quotes from Mani's own
teachings that we encounter in his anti-Manichaean polemic.
A final question must be addressed: to what extent are the eighth
and tenth century Manichaean sources drawn upon in this chapter
(i.e., the Liber Scholiorum and the Fihrist, respectively) representative of the brand of Manichaeism with which Augustine would have
been familiar several centuries earlier? In addressing this question, it
should be observed that the eclectic character of Manichaeism (and its
diffusion over such a great area) gave rise to a number of versions of
Mani's cosmogenic myth. Despite these variations, however, some
features of the myth can be considered "mainstream" enough to have
been endorsed by most adherents of the sect, regardless of the region
or period in question. I have selected these particular documents as
referents precisely because they offer the reader a useful survey of
fundamental Manichaean teachings.
Where marked divergences arise between these accounts, they have
been duly noted. But while such divergences are occasionally appar-
81
ent (e.g., in the different explanations of the generation of the first

humans), the reader is also struck by the complementarity of the two
accounts. Rather than exhibiting drastically opposing viewpoints, they
mutually enhance and elucidate our understanding of the complicated
details of Mani's myth. What is equally striking, I think, are the consonances between the Liber Scholiorum and Fihrist and the extensive
quotations found in the Fundamental Epistle and the Thesaurus preserved in Augustine's own writings. In this connection, Augustine serves
as a major source of testimonia to Mani's teachings in his own right.
In view of such consonances, the importance of the temporal gap
between Augustine and the composition of the Liber Scholiorum and
Fihrist is significantly reduced. In my estimation, then, the fidelity of
these sources to the Manichaean teaching known by Augustine is borne
out by his own interpretation of Manichaean doctrine in the polemical
writings considered in the following chapters.
Notes
1.
As classic examples of cosmological approaches, I would cite the speculation

of the Pre-Socratic philosophers who were active in Ionia during the sixthcentury, B.C. While these thinkers (e.g. Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander)
incorporated the language and symbolism of myth into their speculation regarding the origin and nature of the universe, they based their conclusions
largely upon empirical observation. In this respect, Ionian speculation illustrates that transition from the passive reliance upon myth as a means of coming to terms with natural phenomena, and a more critical use of myth (in
conjunction with scientific investigation) as a means of arriving at something
of a rational explanation and understanding of nature. In contrast to such
approaches, the Manichaean creation-myth provides an example of cosmogony
par excellence, relying heavily upon complex symbolism, graphic imagery,
and sensational drama rather than empirical investigation and the accumulation and analysis of observable data. The irony here, of course, is that the
Manichaeans professed to provide a rational approach to truth! It was this
claim which was probably instrumental in drawing the young Augustine to the
sect.
cf. Confessiones III,6(10), for Augustine's remarks concerning the deceptive truth-claims of the Manichaeans.
2.
For background information in compiling this brief biographical sketch, I have

relied principally upon the following two authors: Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controversies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1986),
159-160; Geo Widengren, Mani and Manichaeism, translated by Charles
Kessler (New York; Chicago; San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965), 23-42.
For an assessment of the evidence regarding the determination of the date
of Mani's birth, see Henri-Charles Puech, Le Manicheisme. Son FondateurSa Doctrine. Musee Guimet Bibliotheque De Diffusion. Tome LVI (Paris:
Civilisations du Sud, S.A.E.P., 1949), 33.
3.
See Franc;:ois Decret, Mani et Ia Tradition Manicheenne (Paris: Maitres

Spirituels, 1974), 34-36 for a discussion of Gnostic baptist sects.
Samuel N.C. Lieu (Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China. A Historical Survey (Manchester, New Hampshire: Manchester
University Press, 1985), 31-32) provides greater specificity as to the nature
of the sect which Mani's father followed:
The baptising sects to which Patik gave his allegiance were Judaising
Christians who acknowledged Elchasaios (' AA.x.aoaro~) as their founder
(apx.TJy6~). Entry into such a sect for a gentile like Patik might have
involved circumcision and being educated in the Mosaic law. The members were vegetarians and were given to working in the fields. The main
83
cultic practices of the sect included the Eucharist which they celebrated
with unleavened bread and water, and regular ablutions which the members performed on themselves for the remission of sins and on their
food according to their rules of purity.
4.
Henri-Charles Puech, Le Manicheisme, 61-66:

Trois traits caracterisent de prime abord le Manicheisme. Le premier,
c'est qu'il est une religion universel/e, ou meme, dans dans I' esprit de
son promoteur, l'unique religion authentique capable de gagner
finalement a elle le monde tout entier.
Cette pretention a l'oecumenicite, liee a Ia nature eschatologique du
Manicheisme, explique immediatement le second trait fondamental de
Ia nouvelle religion: son caractere essentiellement missionnaire. Parce
qu'il est destine a etre l'unique religion du monde entier, Ia propagande
et Ia conversion de l'univers sont pour le Manicheisme un devoir permanent.
Cette religion oecumenique, missionaire de droit et de fait, est enfinet c'est le troisieme aspect caracteristique de sa physionomie-une religion du Livre. C'est meme, a certains egards, parce qu'il repose sur un
corps d'Ecritures unes et intangibles que le Manicheisme se croit en etat
de promettre a sa propagande un succes universe! et definitif.
For the view that Manichaeism constituted an autonomous and unique world
religion of its own (and hence, unable to be classified as either a Christian or
a Zoroastrian sect), seeK. Kessler, Mani. Forschungen iiber die manichaische
Religion. Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte des Orients.
Erster Band, Voruntersuchungen und Quellen (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1889). Lieu
(Manichaeism, 53-54), on the other hand, takes issue with the notion that
Manichaeism constituted a synthesis of Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism which resulted in a genuine world religion. In contrast, Lieu finds the
background of Mani's religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition:
. . . the Zoroastrianism and Buddhist elements were acquired in the course
of mission and were not fundamental to Manichaeism. The study of
Manichaean origins underlines the diverse and heterodox nature of early
Syriac Christianity and the extent to which it was subjected to both
Judaising and gnosticising influences.
5.
Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 161. For a discussion of the Gnostic
and other Christian influences in Mani's outlook, see Lieu, Manichaeism,
37-54. Lieu perceives the impact of various Gnostics upon Mani, including
Marcion (for his dissociation of God the Father from the creator of the world),
Bardesanes (for an inspiration of Mani's cosmogonic myth), and Valentinus
(for his understanding of the incarceration of the soul in the body and for
certain mythological details).
In regard to the means whereby these Gnostic influences were transmitted
to Mani, Lieu (p. 51) is somewhat sceptical:
84

Whether this gnostic influence came to Mani via the same channels as
the teachings of Marcion or Bardaisan or whether it was an integral part
of his Judaising Christian upbringing among the Elchasaites is hard to
determine.
6.
Henri-Charles Puech, Le Manicheisme, 69-72:

Plutot que du terme de 'syncretisme', je prefererais done, pour mieux
determiner !'essence du Manicheisme, user de celui de 'gnose'. En
avan<;ant cette definition, je ne pense pas seulement au fait que Mani a
passe sa jeunesse parmi des gnostiques baptistes . . . j e pense aussi, je
pense surtout, au type m~me de sa pensee ou de son attitude religieuse.
Comme tous les gnosticismes, le Manicheisme est ne de l'angoisse
inherente a Ia condition humaine. La situation ou il est jete est eprouvee
par l'homme comme etrange, insupportable, radicalement mauvaise.
Dieu, qui n'est que Bonte et Verite, n'a pas pu vouloir cet univers de
souffrances et de mensonge; il n' est pas responsable, ou pas directement
responsable, de I' existence du monde et des ~tres de chair. Force est
done d'attribuer Ia Creation a un Principe lui-m~me mauvais, inferieur
ou m~me, pour le manicheen, oppose a Dieu. Comme dans toutes les
Gnoses, nous aboutissons a une dualite entre le Dieu Transcendant et
Bon et le dieu createur et dominateur.
Comme dans toutes les Gnoses, egalement, cette connaissance de
soi et de Dieu contient en el1e-m~me Ia certitude du Salut. Se connaitre,
c' est en effet, se reconnaitre, retrouver et recuperer son vrai 'moi',
auparavant obnubile par !'ignorance ou nous plongeait notre melange
avec le corps et Ia Matiere: et gnosis est eplgnosis. II y a consubstantialite
entre Dieu et les ames; les ames ne sont que des fragments de Ia substance divine.
Comme dans toutes les Gnoses, enfin, !'illumination interieure
qu'apporte avec soi notre nous retrouve et Ia revelation que manifestent
les Ap6tres, organes du NoOs universe!, se formulent sous les especes
d'un savoir capable, non seulement de nous expliquer notre condition
presente, mais encore de relier cet etat actuel, d'une part, a une situation originelle, anterieure a Ia chute de nos ames, et, d'autre part, a une
situation future, qui sera precisement abolition du Mal et restauration de
notre condition primitive.
7.
W.H.C. Frend, "The Gnostic-Manichaean Tradition in Roman North Africa,"

The Journal of Ecclesiastical History IV (1953):16.
For early attempts to place Manichaeism within the Gnostic tradition, the
following seminal studies should be noted: W. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der
Gnosis. Forschungen zur Rei. und Lit. d. A/ten und Neuen Test. (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1907); R. Reitzenstein, Das iranische
Erlosungsmysterium (Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1921); Hans Jonas,
Gnosis und Spatantiker Geist. Vol. I: Die mythologische Gnosis. 2nd Ed.;
Vol. II, 1. Halfte: Von der Mythologie zur Philosophie (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954); (also by Jonas) The Gnostic Religion
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1963).
85
8.
For a discussion of the wide range of Manichaean sources and twentieth century discoveries, see Lieu, Manichaeism, 6-8.
9.
cf. Julien Ries, Introduction aux etudes manicheennes II. Le Manicheisme

considere comme grande religion orientale (XIXe siecle). Analecta
Louaniensia Biblica et Orientalia Ser. Ill. Fasc. 11 (Louvain: Publications
Universitaires De Louvain; Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1959), 401-402:
H. Pognon ... publie des extraits du Xle Livre des Scholies de bar
Khoni, consacre a l'etude des heresies (Inscriptions mandai"tes des
coupes de Khouabir, Paris, 1898). I..: auteur nestorien y refute notamment
le manicheisme, en etablissant une chaine doctrinale tiree d'ouvrages
manicheens et d'ecrits de Mani lui-meme. II veut montrer ainsi l'absurdite
de cette doctrine. Bar Khoni a rendu un grand. service aux etudes
manicheennes, puisqu'il nous livre des aspects tres originaux de Ia
cosmogonie manicheenne.
10.
cf. Julien Ries, Introduction aux etudes manicheennes II. Le Manicheisme

considere comme grande religion orientale (XIXe siecle), 374-375:
Cet ouvrage intitule Fihrist-al-ulum, Catalogue des connaissances, est

une petite encyclopedie de Ia litterature arabe, redigee par l'historien
an-Nadim. I..:auteur consacre le neuvieme livre aux diverses religions,
dont le manicheisme. Dans une monographie qui constitue Ia plus belle
etude du manicheisme au X!Xe siecle, G. Fliigel donne I' edition principes
du texte arabe consacre par an-Nadim a Ia doctrine de Mani (Mani,
seine Lehre und seine Schriften; ein Beitrag zum Geschichte des
Manichaismus, Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1862). Selon Fliigel, Ia notice
manicheenne du Fihrist est comme un carrefour ou se rencontrent les
sources occidentales et orientales. Tant qu'on n'aura pas de livres
manicheens proprement dits, cette source arabe rend possible une
meilleure orientation des chercheurs. Son auteur en effet est bien informe,
il a puise ses renseignements chez des temoins authentiques, chez les
adeptes memes d'une communaute manicheenne orientale. Comme
preuve nous avons de nombreuses citations introduites par les mots
'Mani dit' ou encore, 'les manicheens disent'.
Franz Cumont (Recherches sur le manicheisme 1: Cosmogonie Manicheenne
(Bruxelles: H. Lamertin, 1908), 2) contrasts the relative merits of the Fihrist
and the account of Theodore bar Khoni:
Cette source arabe, relativement pure, ou apparait une image decoloree
mais fidele en ses traits essentiels de Ia genese selon Mani, derive d'une
traduction approximative. Theodore au contraire, et cette circonstance
accroit singulierement Ia valeur de son temoignage, a ecrit en syriaque,
dans ce syriaque de Babylonie qui se rapproche parfois du mandeen,
c'est a dire dans Ia langue meme dont s'etait servi Mani, et il nous a
conserve notamment Ia forme originale des noms attribues par celui-ci
aux esprits celestes ou infernaux qui interviennent dans Ia creation.
86
11.
Ugo Bianchi, "The Contribution of the Cologne Mani Codex to the ReligioHistorical Study of Manichaeism," in Papers in Honour of Professor Mary
Boyce (Acta Iranica 24), Deuxieme Serie, Volume X (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985),
17.
12.
Ugo Bianchi, "The Contribution of the Cologne Mani Codex to the ReligioHistorical Study of Manichaeism," 17.
13.
Jes. P. Asmussen, XulfstulfnTft. Studies in Manichaeism (Acta Theologica

Danica), Volume VII (Copenhagen: Prostant Apud Munksgaard, 1965), 12:
According to the general view of the world of the Manichaeans, there
were in the beginning, when heaven and earth had not yet come into
existence, two principles ... light, the good, and darkness, the evil, of
equal strength, but otherwise having nothing in common, separated by
aboundary . . .
14.
Bianchi ("The Contribution of the Cologne Mani Codex to the Religio-Historical Study of Manichaeism," 16-19) connects the radical dualism of Manichaeism
with both an extremist form of Gnosticism and Zoroastrianism. For Bianchi
(pp. 19-20), the radicality of Manichaean dualism lies in the fact that it allows
no intermediary principles which represent a gradual diminution of the
Divine:
there is no room at all . . . in Manicheism and Zoroastrianism, for
those mythical entities which in the gnostic system of Valentinianism
owe their existence and their function to a process of ontological "devolution" affecting the world of light as a consequence of a "split in the
divine" and of the "crisis" of an "aeon" pertaining to a gradated Pleroma.
The Manichaean concept of the divine . . . cannot admit any 'diminution' or fall of the divine, a diminution or fall which, for Valentinus, is
responsible of the coming into existence of the demiurge and the visible
world.
N.B.: Subsequent references to the texts of Theodore bar Khoni (Liber
Scholiorum) and an-Nadim (Fihrist) are based on the following sources. For
Theodore bar Kh6ni, I rely upon the English translation of Dr. Abraham
Yohannan (with notes by A.V.W. Jackson) in A.V. Williams Jackson, Researches in Manichaeism With Special Reference To The Turfan Fragments.
Volume 13 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), hereafter referred
to as "Jackson." This reference will be followed by the appropriate page number from Jackson's text, followed by the other textual references which Jackson provides: H. Pognon, Inscriptions mandai'tes des coupes de Khouabir
(Paris, 1898), 127-131; 184-193; F.Cumont, Recherches sur le
manicheisme, I. La cosmogonie manicheenne d'apres Theodore bar Khoni
(Brussels, 1908), 1-80; H.H. Schaeder (with R. Reitzenstein), Studien zum
antiken Synkretismus aus Iran und Griechen/and(Leipzig und Berlin, 1926).
For the Fihrist, I rely upon the English translation of Bayard Dodge, The
Fihrist of ai-Nadim. A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture. Volumes
I and II (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970). Refer-
87
ences to the Fihrist include the appropriate citation from the original text,
followed by the corresponding page number from Dodge's translation.
15.
Jackson, pp. 222-223. Pognon text, p. 127 line I, tr. p. 184; Cumont, tr. p.
7; [Schaeder, tr. p. 342].
16.
Fihrist IX, 1 (Dodge II, p. 777).
17.
Jackson (p. 223, n.6) uses the term "Glories" as a translation for the Syriac
"Shekinah," meaning "dwelling," "tent," "tabernacle," or "majesty."
cf. F.C. Burkitt, The Religion of the Manichees. Donnellan Lectures for
1924 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925; reprinted, New York:
AMS Press, 1978), 19:
Mani represents the Father of Greatness as occupying five Dwellings:
we should say five Attributes, for the word is the Syriac form of the
Hebrew Shekinah. These five are . . . the qualities of a sane and intelligent mind.
18.
Fihrist IX,1 (Dodge II, pp. 786-787).
19.
Fihrist, IX,1 (Dodge II, p. 787).
20.
Jackson, p. 224. Pognon text, p. 127 line I, tr. p. 184; Cumont, tr. p. 7;
[Schaeder, tr. p. 342].
21.
Fihrist IX,1 (Dodge II, p. 787).
22.
23.
24.
Jackson, p. 224. Pognon text, p. 127, tr. 185; Cumont, p. 11 [Schaeder, p.

343].
25.
Jackson, p. 224. Pognon text, p. 127, tr. 185; Cumont, p. 11 [Schaeder, p.

343].
26.
Jackson (p. 224, n.8) uses the verb "evoke" to describe this summoning
process:
This verb is designedly chosen and used correctly since the Manichaeans
avoided any word like 'begot' or 'created,' that might imply sexual generation in bringing forth Heavenly Beings . . .
27.

cf. Jackson, p. 225. Pognon text, p. 127, tr. 185; Cumont, p. 11; [Schaeder,
p. 343].
28.
Fihrist IX, 1 (Dodge II, p. 779).
29.
Jackson, p. 226. Pognon text, p. 127, tr. 185; Cumont, p. 11; [Schaeder, p.
343].
88
30.
31.
32.
Fihrist JX,1 (Dodge II, p. 780).

cf. Jackson, p. 228. Pognon text, p. 127, 186; Cumont, p. 18; [Schaeder,
p. 343].
33.
Fihrist JX,1 (Dodge II, pp. 779-780).

Jackson (pp. 255-270) analyzes the Manichaean account of the rescue of
Primal Man, focusing upon such sources as the Liber Scholiorum, the Fihrist,
the Acta Archelai, the Turfan Pahlaui fragments, the Chinese Treatise, and
the Turkish Manichaean Fragment.
34.
Jackson, pp. 228-229. Pognon text, p. 127, end, p. 128 top, tr. p. 186; cf.
Cumont, p. 20; [Schaeder, p. 343].
cf. Hegemonius, Acta Archelai, 7.4-5 (quoted by Jackson, pp. 264-265):
Then was terribly afflicted the First Man there below by the Darkness,
and unless the Father had heard him when he prayed, and sent another
power, put forth by Himself, called the Living Spirit; and had not he (the
Living Spirit), after going down, given to him the right hand and brought
him up out of the Darkness, the First Man, in the olden time, would
have been in danger of being held down there. From that time, therefore, he left the soul below; and on this account the Manichaeans, if
they meet each other, give their right hands as a sign of having been
saved from Darkness.
35.
Jackson, pp. 229-230. Pognon text, p. 128, 187; Cumont, p. 24; [Schaeder,
p. 344].
36.
p. 344].
37.
p. 344].
According to F.C. Burkitt (in a Note in The Journal of Theological Studies XXXVI (1935): 180-181), the Call (Xrcrstay) and Answer (Pallva-xtay)
were hypostasized by the Manichaeans. He explains their manifestation in
this way:
The Primal Man, created or 'evoked' to repel the invasion of the Dark,
goes forth with his panoply, the Five bright Elements, but is overcome.
His bright Elements are swallowed up by the Demons of the Dark; he is
left in a swoon, or himself swallowed or surrounded. Somehow he makes
his condition known, and a fresh creation is evoked for his aid, consisting of the Friend of the Luminaries and his five helpers (the
Splendetenens, etc.). They come to the aid of the Primal Man, absorbed by the Dark, finding him by a Cal/, to which the Primal Man
replies by an Answer. This Call and this Answer are what we find
hypostasized in certain Manichee documents.
89
38.
39.
p. 344 bot.].
40.
p. 344 bot.].
41.
Jackson, p. 235. Pognon text, p. 128, 188; Cumont, p. 27; [Schaeder, p.

344 Bot.].
In this same passage, Theodore bar KhOni further relates that the Custody
of Splendor holds the Five Luminous Gods "by their waists"; and below their
waists the heavens were spread out. The Supporter (positioned on one knee)
bears the earths, while the King of Honor sits in heaven and posts guard over
the heavens and earths.
42.

The Fihrist (IX,l (Dodge II, p. 781)) further relates that the angels (sent by
the King of the World of Light) built ten heavens and eight earths. One angel
was responsible for bearing the heavens and another, for raising the earths.
43.
p. 344 bot.].
44.
p. 345].
45.
p. 345].
46.
Jackson, p. 240. Pognon text, p. 129, 189; Cumont, p. 31; [Schaeder, p.

345].
47.
Jackson, pp. 241-242. Pognon text, p. 129 I. 11, 189; Cumont, p. 35;
[Schaeder, p. 345 mid.].
F.C. Burkitt (The Religion of the Manichees, 108) describes the significance of the term "Light Ships" in these terms:
. . . the description of them suggests to me ... the heavenly Orbits or
Roads along which Sun and Moon are made to travel.
48.
Jackson, pp. 242-243. Pognon text, p. 129, 189-190; Cumont p. 37;

[Schaeder, p. 345 mid.].
49.
Jackson, p. 244. Pognon text, p. 129, 189-190; Cumont p. 37; [Schaeder,

p. 345 mid.].
50.
Jackson, pp. 244-245. Pognon text, p. 129, 189-190; Cumont p. 37;

[Schaeder p. 345 mid.].
cf. Thesaurus VII (quoted by St. Augustine at De Natura Boni Contra
Manichaeos 44). In the Thesaurus, the forms of the Father, rather than those
of the Messenger are said to entice the Archons.
90
51.
Jackson, p. 247. Pognon text, p. 130 l. 5, 190; Cumont, p. 39-40; [Schaeder,

p. 346 top].
52.
Thesaurus VII (quoted by Augustine at De Natura Boni 44): CSEL XXV

(VI,2): 882-883: hoc autem uisu decoro illarum ardor et concupiscentia crescit
atque hoc modo uinculum pessimarum cogitationum earum soluitur, uiuaque
anima, quae eorundem membris tenebatur, hac occasione laxata euadit et suo
purissimo aeri miscetur, ubi penitus ablutae animae ascendunt ad lucidas naues,
quae sibi ad uectationem atque ad suae patriae transfretationem sunt
praeparatae. id uero, quod adhuc aduersi generis maculas portat, per aestus
atque calores particulatim descendit atque arboribus ceterisque plantationibus
ac satis omnibus miscetur et coloribus diuersis inficitur. hac uero mutatione et
diuersitate diuinarum personarum ac pulcherrimarum humidae frigidaeque
stirpis principes masculi siue feminae soluuntur, atque id, quod in ipsis est
uitale fugit; quod uero resederit, laxatum deducitur in terram per frigora et
cunctis terrae generibus admiscetur.
53.
54.
55.
56.
Jackson, p. 248. Pognon text, p. 130, 191; Cumont, p. 40-43; [Schaeder,

p. 346 mid.].
57.

p. 346 mid.].
cf. De Natura Boni 42, which imputes the reply to the King of Darkness
himself, (rather than to the Son of the King of Darkness).
58.

p. 346 mid.].
59.

p. 346 mid.].
cf. Gerald Bonner, "Adam," contribution to Augustinus-Lexikon, Vol. 1
(Fasc. 1/2), edited by Cornelius Mayer (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. A. G.,
1986), 69:
The Manichees saw Ad. as a composite being, with a soul which was
largely light, though tainted with elements of darkness and trapped in a
material, and therefore evil, body as a result of being born of the Prince
of Darkness, Saclas, and his spouse, Nebroel: 'Adam dicitis sic a par
parentibus suis genitum, abortiuis illis principibus tenebrarum, ut
maximam partem lucis haberet in anima, et perexiguam gentis aduersae'
(mor. 2, 73); 'nam et a quibusdam principibus gentis tenebrarum sic
dicunt Adam primum hominem creatum, ut luminem ab eis ne fugeret
teneretur' (nat. b. 46); 'Adam et Euam ex parentibus principibus fumi
asserunt nates, cum pater eorum nomine Saclas sociorum suorum fetus
omnium deuorasset, et quidquid inde commixtum diuinae substantiae
91
coeperat, cum uxore concumbens in carne prolis tamquam tenacissimo

uinculo colligasset' (haer. 46,14).
60.
Jackson, pp. 250-252. Pognon text, p. 130 I. 22-p. 131, tr. p. 191-193;
Cumont, p. 46-48; [Schaeder, p. 346-347].
61.
Jackson, pp. 252-253. Pognon text, p. 130 I. 22-p. 131, tr. p. 191-193;
62.
Jackson, p. 253-254. Pognon text, p. 130 I. 22-p. 131, tr. p. 191-193;

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Lieu (Manichaeism, p. 8) delineates the course of events which occur in these

Moments by means of a quotation from a Chinese Manichaean Handbook
(Mo-ni kuang-fo chiae-fa i-/iieh (Compendium), T 214A, UV, 1280c281281a10; cf. E. Chavannes and P. Pelliot, 'Un traite manicheen retrouve en
Chine', Journal Asiatique, lle ser., 1 (1913), 114-16):
In the Former Time, there are yet not heavens or earths ... only Light
and Darkness . . . and . . . they are completely opposed to each other.
In the Present Time, Darkness invades Light and ... Light in turn enters Darkness . . . detests its departure from its original body and pleads
to leave the 'fiery abode'. One must . . . wear out the . . . body . . .
and . . . search for the cause of deliverance. In the Future Time . . .
Light once more belongs to the Great Light and Darkness returns to the
ultimate Darkness.
70.
Franc;ois Decret, Mani et Ia tradition manicheenne (Paris: Editions du Seuil,

1974), 80:
La doctrine fondamentale du manicheisme enseigne le dualisme radical
des 'Principes' antithetiques et l'histoire des 'Trois Temps' (ou 'Moments'), qui sont les phases au cours desquelles les 'Deux Principes'
deroulent leur drame. C'est dans ce drame, dont l'origine remonte au
Temps Anterieur, que Ia creation du cosmos s'est inseree. Et c'est comme
acteur de ce drame que l'homme doit jouer son role, a Ia place qui lui
est assignee, constituant en meme temps un champ de bataille a l'interieur
duquel se deroule le Combat.
71.
borrow the image of "distillation" from Burkitt (The Religion of the

Manichees, 32), who in turn quoted Cumont (Cosmologie Manicheenne, 49):
92

... Cumont adds: 'By making Adam taste of the fruit of knowledge,
Jesus and not the Tempter, revealed to him the depth of his misery. But
man will know henceforth the way of enfranchisement. He must consecrate his life to keeping his soul from all corporal defilement by practising continence and renunciation, so as to set free little by little from the
bonds of matter the Divine Substance within him and disseminated
throughout nature, and thereby join in the great work of distillation which
God is occupied with in the Universe.'
In this connection, Burkitt (p. 35) further quotes a Manichaean fragment preserved inS. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan,
ed. C.W. Mitchell (Text and Translation Society, 2 vols., 1912-1921), vol. II
clxxxiii (=1, p. 162):
Day by day diminishes (Yom min yom miz 'ar z'ar) The number of the
Souls [below) (minyanhen dnaphshatha)
As they are distilled and mount up (badmistallan wsalkan).
72.
The Cologne Mani Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780),trans. Ron Cameron and
Arthur J. Dewey (in Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations,
#15), 66-67: ~ "tovuv Ka8ap6"toTJ~ :n:Ept ~~ EA.E;eTJ aU"tTJ "tuyxrivEL ~
flux 'tfJ~ yvrooEw~. xwpLOI!O~ <j>W"tO~ a:n:o OKO'tOU~ Kat 'tOlJ eavriwu
"tTJ~ ~wfJ~ (Ka)t "t<i:Jv ~rov"twv Mri ('tw)v EK "t<i:Jv tE8ai!~W (I!E)vwv,
qv aA.A.i)A.wv Kat
Kat tva yvot(tE 0) 'tL EKritEpov "tuyxri{VEL
Ka( 't 0 0 0 0 0) "ta~ 'tO'iJ OW'tfJpo~ EV"to(A.a~ O:lt(l) )~ a:n:oA.u"tpWOTJ( 0 0 0 0 0) 0
T~v 'ljJU')(~V EK ("to'iJ OAET]p) ou Kat 'tfJ~ a:n:wA.Ea~.
0
73.
.)
Alexander Bohlig ("Manichaismus," in Theologische Realenzyklopadie, Band

XXII, Lieferung 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 33) further delineates
the fine-points of Adam's deliverance (drawing upon Theodore bar Khoni and
the Kephalaia):
Die besondere Folge der Menschenschopfung ist die Verzogerung der
Auslailterung des Lichts aus der Welt durch die Fortpflanzung. Sie zu
hemmen ist deshalb die nachste Aufgabe. Dazu muss der Mensch Uber
seinen Zustand aufgeklart werden. Das tut Jesus (Theodore bar Khoni
317). Er hatte vom Mond aus auch kosmische Aufgaben erfilllt und Rebellion im Kosmos niedergeschlagen (Keph. 53, 18-54, 9; 93,29-94,11).
FUr Adam erscheint er als Erwecker. Er zeigt ihm, class die Lebendige
Seele von dem Sinnen des Todes geknechtet wird. Darauf bricht der
Mensch in Wehgeschrei aus.
74.
Lieu, Manichaeism, 18.
75.
Lieu, Manichaeism, 19.

cf. Bohlig, "Manichaismus," 33:
Der Nus als Berufung wirkt in den Aposteln der Urzeit und den grossen
Religionestiftern, bis Mani den endgilltigen Weg im Rahmen seiner
93
Kirchengtiindung weist (Keph. 12, 9ff.). Die Aufgabe der manichi:iischen

Kirche war es, die Schicksale der Lebendigen Seele, d.h. der Lichtelemente, die in der Welt nach gefangen sind, den Menschen zu
verkunden und, wenn sie sich vom Nus zum Manichi:iismus bekehren,
fur die Erlosung von ihr im Kosmos zu sorgen. Aus dem Mythos konnten
die Gli:iubigen die Gtiinde fur den jetzigen Zustand erkennen und auch
diepseudowissenschaftlichen Grundlagen fur ihr Handeln entnehmen,
ebenso wie die endzeitliche Hoffnung. Aber auch die Beurteilung des
gegenwi:irtigen Handelns bedarf voller Bewusstwerdung."
76.
Mani also prescribed ten Ordinances (Fihrist IX,1; Dodge II, pp. 789-790)
for the Hearers (renouncing the worship of idols, lying, avarice, killing, and
adultery, as well as the recognition of the moral defects of neglect and lassitude in action), as well as an Ordinance of Prayer (seven for the Elect and four
for the Hearers).
77.
78.
Lieu, Manichaeism, 19-20.

cf. Bohlig, "Manichi:iismus," 33:
Durch die Vermischung von allem, was in der Welt und im Menschen ist,
ist alles fur das Handeln der Menschen empfindlich. Sundlos ist nur, wer
die drei Siegel, das des Mundes, des Schosses und der Hi:inde, einhi:ilt.
Was aus dem Munde herausgeht, bose Worte und Blasphemie, oder in
ihn hineingeht an unreiner Nahrung, ist sundhaft. Ebenso Ti:itigkeit, mit
der die Erde und was auf ihr wi:ichst, bearbeitet wird, aller Ackerbau und
alles Handwerk. Nicht zuletzt aber aller sexueller Verkehr und die
Erzeugung von Nachkommen. Der Mensch war aber durch seine Struktur
korperlich und seelisch von der Sunde gefesselt.
79.
80.

The extent to which the Manichaeans believed that all of the particles of
Light would eventually be liberated is open to question. In the Fihrist (IX,1;
Dodge II, p. 783), for example, it is stated that "the Masiyah among the
Manichaeans assert that something of the Light will still remain in the Darkness."
81.
Bianchi ("The contribution of the Cologne Mani Codex to the religio-historical study of Manicheism," 50) employs the military analogue I adopt here in
his depiction of the relationship between the Principles of Light and Darkness:
The Manichaean concept of the compactness of the divine-rooted in
the sharp opposition of the two "monoliths" of light and darknesscannot admit any diminution or fall of the divine . . . and no 'promotion' of inferior substance could be conceived by Manicheism . . . In
94

Manichaean terms, the Father of Greatness . . . is engaged personally in an enterprise against the world of darkness . . . which is a
'military expedition'. Since it would have been incompatible with the
status of welfare and peace of the light aeons to commit these to this
task, the Father chooses to send for this purpose his own 'soul', the
Primordial Man, who is 'evoked' ad hoc. Properly speaking, the decensus
of the Primordial Man . . . is not a fall, let alone a guilty fall . . ."
82.
The Cologne Mani Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780), in edition of Society of
Biblical Literature Texts and Translations, #15, Early Christian Literature
Series 3, trans. Ron Cameron and Arthur J Dewey; ed. Birger A. Pearson
(Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979), 66-67: KUL f.v "tOll"tW M
<j>av(E)pov Elvm :7tpobl]A.6T(a) 1:a :7taoav "t~v ~-t1!o(ap6)"tlJ"ta EK "tOU
mi>~-ta("tO EL)vm.
83.
I. De Beausobre, Histoire de Manichee et du Manicheisme, ed. J.H.S.

Formey. Vol. I (Amsterdam, 1734), 426; Vol. II (Amsterdam, 1739), 399ff.
84.
Prosper Alfaric, Les Ecritures Manicheennes (Paris: Emile Nourry, Editeur,

1918), I, 92ff.
85.
John P. Maher, O.S.A., "Saint Augustine and the Manichaean Cosmogony,"

Augustinian Studies 10 (1979): 99.
86.
John P. Maher, O.S.A., "Saint Augustine and the Manichaean Cosmogony,"

100: "The mind of the rhetorician of Carthage was by no means at ease
during his nine years in the ranks of the sect, and his fellow members, unable
to dissipate his doubts, begged him to wait for Faustus who, when he came,
would surely explain away the harassing difficulties. Would one, then, consider Augustine in this unsettled frame of mind an authority on the teachings
of the sect?"
87.
These discoveries pertain to the Coptic documents found in Egypt which were
published by H.J. Polotsky in two works: Manichiiische Homilien, Band I.
Manichaische Handschriften der Sammlung A. Chester Beatty (Stuttgart: W.
Kohlhammer, 1934); and Kephalaia (with Alexander Bohlig), Band I, 1. Halfte,
Lieferung 1-10. Manichiiische Handschriften der Staatlichen Museen
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1940).
88.
In this regard, Maher ("Saint Augustine and the Manichaean Cosmogony,"

100) cites the parallel between the names of the five gods listed in the
Kephalaia (38,91) and the same list that Augustine presents in the Contra
Faustum (15,16).
89.
Prosper Alfaric, "Un manuscrit manicheen", Revue d'histoire et de litterature

religieuses Vl(mars, 1920), 97-98:
On sait ... que les Manicheens d'Afrique tenaient particulierement aux
ecrits de leur Maitre. lis les lisaient attentivement, ils les discutaient avec
passion et ils les transcrivaient avec un soin pieux. Augustin en a vu de
nombreux exemplaires fort bien calligraphies sur de riches membranes.
95
Sans doute beaucoup de ces manuscrits ont ete detruits par l'autorite
catholique. Mais d'autres ont pu se conserver en se dissimulant.
cf. Alfaric, Les Ecritures Manicheennes, 61-62:
Cependant, de l'aveu d'Augustin, certains 'volumes de Ia secte' etaient

ecrits 'en latin, dans un style elegant'. Une oeuvre de ce genre, due a Ia
plume d'un docteur eminent, Fauste de Mileve, a vu le jour dans les
dernieres annees du !Ve siecle et elle a tout de suite obtenu une assez
grande vogue pour que Augustin ait cru devoir en faire une critique
detaillee. La litterature manicheenne a done ete bien representee en
Afrique, et pendant des siecles elle y a trouve des lecteurs.
In this connection, Gustav Bardy (article on "Manicheisme" in Dictionnaire
de Theologie Catholique, Tome Neuvieme, DeuxiE'!me Partie (Paris: Librairie
Letouzey et Ane, 1927), 1844-1845) argues (referring to Prosper Alfaric,
Les Ecritures Manicheennes, 58-68) that Mani's Fundamental Epistle(which
Augustine extensively quotes in his refutation against that writing) was the
same as the Pragmateia, one of the key sources in the Manichaean corpus:
P. Alfaric . . . pense ... que Ia Pragmateia, n'est autre que I'Epistola
fundamenti, deja rappelee tout a l'heure. Cette lettre . . . est un resume
de toute Ia doctrine manicheenne; et c'est un des ecrits que nous
connaissons le mieux, grace a saint Augustin qui en a compose une
refutation en regie, non sans en transcrire des passages importants.
90.
It should be noted that Maher's position is challenged by Franc;ois Decret in

his Aspects du Manicheisme dans /'Afrique Romaine. Les controuerses de
Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix auec saint Augustin, V. 1-11 (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1970). According to Decret (V.I, 10), Augustine's knowledge
of Manichaeism was sparse, at best:
Augustin, manicheen, ne semble pas avoir eu !'impression d'appartenir
en Afrique a une secte particuliere de Ia religion manicheenne. Sans
doute ses connaissances d'Auditeur sur le fondateur de cette eglise
semblent, a premiere vue, bien maigres . . .
Decret further observes (V. I, 28) that Augustine never gained access to crucial Manichaean doctrines that were reserved for the Elect alone:
Augustin a-t-il ete vraiment manicheen? N'est-ce pas Secundius, cet
Auditeur de Rome qui lui ecrivait: 'Je ne le puis cacher a Ta patiente
Saintete: il m'a semble, et c'est meme pour moi un fait certain, que tu
n'as jamais ete manicheen, que tu n'as pu connaitre les arcanes inconnus
du secret de Mani et que, sous le nom de Mani, c'est Annibal et Mithridate que tu attaques.' II est vrai qu' Augustin n' a jamais dQ connaitre
certains aspects moraux et disciplinaires de Ia secte, aspects qui n'etaient
devoiles qu'aux seuls 'Eius': c'est lui-meme qui nous le declare.
Augustine's effectiveness as an objective commentator on Manichaeism is
further called into question by Marie-Anne Vannier. According to Vannier
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('Creatio', 'Conversio', 'Formatio' Chez S. Augustin (Fribourg: Editions
Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1991), 50), Augustine's polemical interests
severely limited his view of the Manichaean religion:
La connaissance que nous avons du systeme manicheen devient de plus

en plus precise. Elle provient non seulement des sources anciennes
indirectes, mais aussi et surtout des textes originaux de Ia secte retrouves
depuis Ia fin du X!Xe siecle. Les traites d'Augustin ne sont done plus
determinants pour Ia connaissance du manicheisme. De plus, leur
caractere polemique tend a donner une vision reductrice de cette doctrine; encore que sur le theme precis de Ia creation, Ia discussion
augustinienne aille a I' essentiel et mette en echec les principes mt!mes
du manicheisme: ('emanation, le dualisme, le pessimisme anthropologique. D'autre part, Augustin rappelle que l'essence mt!me du
manicheisme se trouve contenue dans cette revelation que Mani aurait
rec;:ue et d'apres laquelle il y aurait 'deux principes et trois moments.
Les deux principes, c'est le clair et l'obscur; les trois moments, ce sont
le passe, le futur et le present', mais il ne s' attarde pas sur ces trois
moments. II choisit plutot de refuter Ia cosmogonie manicheene dans
son ensemble et s'attaque surtout a son dualisme.
Chapter 2
Saint Augustine's Exegesis of Genesis
An extremely important aspect of Saint Augustine's extended polemic

against the Manichaeans was his defense of Scripture against their
"ignorant and impious attacks." 1 More specifically, this defense assumed the form of a series of commentaries on the beginning of the
book of Genesis. 2 The motivation for this prolonged exegesis was
rooted in Augustine's own experience. His first serious encounter with
the Bible was the outgrowth of his reading of Cicero's Hortensius at
the age of nineteen and its profound impact upon his intellectual and
spiritual outlook. 3 On the heels of this conversion to the life of philosophy, Augustine delved into what he viewed as the genuine source
of wisdom: Catholic doctrine grounded upon Sacred Scripture. What
he found in the Bible, however, not only failed to satisfy him, but
aroused his contempt as well. In comparison to Cicero, the humble
style of Augustine's Old Latin translation was a deep disappointment. 4
But Augustine's difficulties with the Bible were not merely of a literary nature. He was also repelled by what he took to be its anthropomorphic depictions of God, and the immorality of the Old Testament
Patriarchs. 5 As he would later acknowledge, such interpretations were
the result of reading the text exactly as stated, without any attempt to
penetrate its inner meaning. 6 This negative attitude toward the Bible
was only reinforced by the extreme conservatism and anti-intellectualism of the North African Christianity with which Augustine was familiar. In Manichaeism, he found a religion which purported to provide a
rational approach to God that rejected the seeming crudities of the
Jewish Old Testament. While the Manichaeans took an extremely dim
view of the Old Testament, they held the creation account of Genesis
in special contempt. By virtue of their radical dualism and metaphysical materialism, they could not accept the teaching that the universe
(with all of the evil, suffering, and turmoil that it exhibits) had been
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created by a good, providential, and supremely perfect God. 7 For

Augustine, then, an adequate defense of Scripture against the
Manichaeans demanded a response to their erroneous opinions regarding the origin of the universe.
The Act of Creation
Unlike the creation commentaries of earlier Church Fathers like

Theophilus and Origen (which focused upon 2 Maccabees 7:28 and
Wisdom XI, 17), Augustine's chief Scriptural referent for discussions
of creation was Genesis (1: 1-2):
In the beginning God created heaven and earth, but the earth was empty and
void and darkness was over the abyss, and the spirit of God was borne above
the waters. 8
In a very real sense, Augustine's understanding of the doctrine of creatio

ex nihilo and its implications was forged in the context of his commentaries upon these opening verses of the Bible. Accordingly, I begin my formal investigation of the role of creatio ex nihilo in
Augustine's anti-Manichaean polemic with an assessment of his exegesis of Genesis 1.
It is interesting to observe that Augustine uses the formula creatio
ex nihilo in several different contexts. On its most basic level, the
formula refers to the origin and formation of matter. In Augustinian
terms, however, the formula is also pertinent to the discussion of angelic creation, the production of the visible universe (and its various
life-forms), and the creation of human souls (as well as the human
bodies they animate and vivify). But it can reasonably be said that
Augustine's entire interpretation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo
hinges upon his analysis of God's action in creating and forming matter. If matter (the basic constituent or substrate of all created reality) is
made from nothing, then by extension, everything that is comprised
of matter (i.e., spiritual and corporeal natures) can be said to have
been created from nothing as well.
. . . we correctly believe that God made all things from nothing. For, though
all formed things were made from this matter, this matter itself was still made
from absolutely nothing. 9
For Augustine, then, any discussion of the creation of angelic natures, the world, or humanity can ultimately be reduced to one con-
99
cerning the creation of mattter. From this standpoint, Augustine's teaching regarding the origin of matter provides the foundation for his accounts of creation on all subsequent levels. Accordingly, I confine the
present discussion largely to Augustine's delineation of the seminal
phases of the creative act as it emerges in his three great commentaries on Genesis 1: the De Genesi contra Manichaeos; the De Genesi
ad litteram fiber unus imperfectus; and the De Genesi ad litteram.
1. De Cenesi contra Manichaeos

Augustine's first attempt at Scriptural exegesis was the De Genesi
contra Manichaeos, written shortly after his conversion to Christianity. In his Retractationes (9, 1), he informs us that he wrote this treatise in defense of the Old Law against the errors of heretics. In this
context, of course, the term "heretics" has a direct applicability to the
Manichaeans. Augustine, however, was not merely motivated by the
desire to refute the errors inherent in the Manichaean interpretation
of Genesis. He also wished to provide a means of assisting his less
intellectually astute Catholic brethren who found themselves at a clear
disadvantage in meeting the Manichaean attacks on Sacred Scripture.
The Manichaeans are accustomed to attack the Scriptures of the Old Testament that they do not recognize and to mock and mislead by that attack our
weak and little ones, who find no way to respond to them. 10
The plight of these "weak and little ones" was something that Augustine could fully appreciate. For, he himself had been one of those
who derided the Bible and the Catholic understanding of its teachings. During his nine years as a Manichaean auditor, he shared the
conviction that the Catholica believed that God was circumscribed by
the form of the human body. 11 But this assumption says as much
about Augustine's theological presuppositions as it does about the
simple faith of North African Catholics. The young Augustine (like
most of the Western Church at this time) understood reality in the
materialistic terms which found endorsement in the theology of
Tertullian and Stoic philosophy. From this standpoint, the teaching
that humans were made in God's "image and likeness" (Genesis 1:26)
could only be construed as meaning that God had the contours and
appearance of a human body. 12 Augustine interpreted this teaching as
it was stated in Scripture, and in the process, viewed it (and anyone so
naive as to accept it) with disdain. His conversion to Manichaeism,
however, failed to free him from such a materialistic outlook and his
100
"carnal fantasies" regarding the Divine nature. Indeed, his difficulties

were only exacerbated by the incredible cosmogony and outlandish
beliefs he encountered in that religion. As he related, "I wished to
meditate upon my God, but I did not know how to think of Him except as a vast corporeal mass, for I thought that anything not a body
was nothing whatsoever." 13
By means of the allegorical method of exegesis to which Ambrose's
preaching had introduced him, however, Augustine found a profound
import in the very passages which he formerly derided. 14 Moreover,
the intellectual milieu of Milan opened him to a brand of Christianity
that was shaped greatly by Neoplatonism and its spiritualist metaphysics. As a result of these new influences upon his outlook, Augustine
acquired the tools which he would employ against the "carnal-minded"
Manichaeans and their scathing critiques of the Old Testament. In the
De Genesi contra Manichaeos, we find a prolonged attempt to penetrate those things which conceal the deeper meaning of the text, and
thereby, "exercise" the minds of those seeking its spiritual truths. 15 In
this way, Augustine wished to avoid the pitfalls to which a naive literalism could so easily succumb (as borne out by his own past experience}.16 This is not to say that the De Genesi contra Manichaeos
completely ruled out the possibility of imposing a literal interpretation
upon Genesis, or as Augustine puts it, attempting to understand the
text "exactly as the letter sounds." 17 Indeed, such an interpretation
should be esteemed, as long as it does not result in blasphemies against
the Divine nature and stands in harmony with Catholic doctrine. If
this is not possible, however, the only recourse is a spiritual understanding of the figures, enigmas, or allegories which point to incorporeal, invisible realities. 18 In the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, this
latter method of exegesis is fully operative in Augustine's analysis and
explication of the act of creation.
In the first book of the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, we find a
detailed treatment of the teaching that In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. In this initial verse of Genesis, Augustine found a
reference to the production of formless matter, the ultimate constituent of all created reality. From his standpoint, this teaching encompasses creation as an entirety: visible realities such as heaven and
earth are symbolic of that confused matter which God created for the
purpose of distinguishing and forming all things. 19 This amorphous
matter, he suggests, is what the Greeks called "chaos". 20 In this context, Augustine cites Wisdom Xl.l 7 (and its explicit reference to ere-
101
ation E~ &~t6p<j>ou VAl]~) for Scriptural support. The difference, however, between the Greek understanding of primordial "chaos" and
Wisdom's reference to "formless matter" (which Augustine now reads
into Genesis) lies in the fact that matter was created from nothing:
Hence, that unformed matter which God made from nothing was first called
heaven and earth, and Scripture said, "In the beginning God made heaven
and earth," not because it already was, but because it could be. 21
In logical terms, this formless matter represents a state of being

which "precedes" the emergence of specific things. In this respect,
the phrase heaven and earth pertains to what will be rather than to
what already exists, just as the roots, trunk, branches, fruit, and leaves
are present in the seed of the tree potentially. 22 From this standpoint,
the creation of heaven and earth entails the making of the "seed" or
raw material of what will become the visible heaven and earth. 23 For
Augustine, however, such "formless matter" is not expressed by heaven
and earth alone. It also emerges in three other phrases: (1) the earth
invisible and without order; (2) the abyss with darkness; and (3) the
water over which was borne the Spirit of God. Augustine's exegesis
runs as follows: first, it was designated as the earth invisible and
without order and the abyss with darkness because it was without
form and wholly lacking in any perceivable beauty; second, it was
designated as the water over which was borne the Spirit of God
because it lies in a passive and malleable state suitable for the formation of all things. 24
In the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, Augustine depicts this formation process in terms of a "bringing to unity," whereby that which
is wholly indeterminate undergoes a transformation into visible things.
Augustine addresses this topic in connection with his exegesis of Genesis 1 (9-10) and its reference to the gathering of the waters and the
appearance of dry land. In this connection, he employs the technical
term "corporeal matter" (materia corpora/is) as a means of designating a potential state of being, and more specifically. the physical world
and its phenomena. According to Augustine's analysis, the gathering
of the waters refers to the corporeal matter which is formed into the
beauty of the visible waters. 25 But his contention that this gathering
into one place constitutes the formation of something visible and tangible presupposes the key principle that "every form is reduced to a
rule of unity." 26 Accordingly, the Scriptural reference to the appear-
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ance of dry land is construed as that corporeal matter which receives

the visible form which the earth now possesses. 27
2. De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus
Augustine's exegesis of Genesis 1 was refined in the unfinished De

Genesi ad litteram fiber unus imperfectus, written around A.D. 393.
As indicated by the title, this later effort sought an exclusively literal
interpretation, but one that was free of the errors of the Manichaeans. 28
Yet aside from a brief delineation of four manners of explaining the
Law (i.e., in terms of history, allegory, analogy, and etiology), he provides no specificity as to exactly what he meant by a "literal"
intepretation (ad litteram) in this context. 29 Indeed, his understanding
of this term would undergo considerable change and revision over
time.
As we have observed, the De Genesi contra Manichaeos (11,2,3)
refers to those who interpret Genesis "exactly as the Jetter sounds." It
can be assumed that this phrase pertains to a literal interpretation. 30
But at this point, he was chiefly concerned with refuting the errors
inherent in an excessively anthropomorphic understanding of the text.
Accordingly, the Augustine who wrote the De Genesi contra
Manichaeos wished to avoid an interpretation based on some simplistic "surface reading" that would yield the sort of erroneous conclusions to which the Manichaeans (and the "weak and little ones" among
the Catholica) were highly susceptible. 31 In this respect, the polemical
concerns which dominated the De Genesi contra Manichaeos seem
to have shaped Augustine's view as to what constitutes a literal interpretation of Scripture. By the time that he wrote the De Genesi ad
litteram imperfectus, however, he had cultivated a far more sophisticated understanding of the literal sense that was attuned to the variety
of meanings embedded in the text. In this regard, his analysis of a
given passage frequently yields more questions than answers. The
speculative character of his investigation is underscored by his claim
that previous interpretations of Genesis (1: 1-3) should be viewed as
matter "for ongoing inquiry, for none of these views could be affirmed
without hesitation." 32 In carrying out this inquiry, Augustine's supposedly literal interpretation bears a striking resemblance to an allegorical one, in the spirit of his earlier De Genesi contra Manichaeos.
But despite its tentative nature, the De Genesi ad litteram
imperfectus opens with a firm statement regarding the contents of
the Catholic faith. At the center of this statement is an affirmation of
the role of God as supreme Creator of everything which exists.
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All of creation, whether intellectual or corporeal ... has been made by

God, not out of the nature of God, but out of nothing. 33
Creation, however, must be understood in trinitarian terms. As Augustine affirms, "this Trinity is one God and it is one God in such a
way that it is a Trinity." 34 Accordingly, God the Father is said to make
and establish all of creation through the coeternal, consubstantial Wisdom and Power of His only-begotten Son, and in the unity of the Holy
Spirit. 35
On the basis of this fundamental tenet of Christian faith, Augustine
explores several ways of interpreting the teaching In the beginning
God made heaven and earth. At the outset, he assesses which parts
of creation are designated by the phrase heaven and earth. For Augustine, these visible realities represent nothing less than the whole
of creation.
Thus this visible and ethereal firmament as well as that invisible creature of
supereminent powers was called heaven; so too, all the lower part of the
world along with the animals which inhabit it was called the earth. 36
Another possibility manifests itself: perhaps every invisible creature is

called heaven, while everything visible is called earthY Augustine
narrows down these various possibilities to two options:
We can ask whether Scripture called heaven and earth all the things which
were already distinct and formed, or whether it first called by the name of
heaven and earth that formless matter of the universe which was changed
into these formed and beautiful natures by God's ineffable command. 38
In this way, Augustine depicts the act of creation as the introduction

of distinctions and order into an invisible, formless earth (whereby it is
drawn out of confusion), or, as the formation of formless, confused
matter into the visible world.
In the former case, God organized the invisible and formless earth
which He already had created from nothing. In the latter case, God
organized matter (which He likewise created ex nihilo) into an orderly
world exhibiting form, beauty, and order. In effect, the issue can be
framed in terms of the following question: does God create on the
basis of an invisible, formless earth, or does formless matter itself
provide the ultimate constituent of created things? While Augustine
openly acknowledges the difficulty of resolving this issue, he clearly
favors the latter option.
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. the transformation and ordering of all the individual formed and distinct
things is called the world, but its matter is called heaven and earth, like the
seed of heaven and earth. This heaven and earth which were confused and
mixed up were suited to receive forms from God their maker. 39
Augustine's exegesis of Genesis 1.2 sheds further light upon his

understanding of creation from formless matter:
But the earth was empty and void, and darkness was present over the abyss,
and the spirit of God was borne over the waters.
On the basis of this teaching (and the teaching that In the beginning
God made heaven and earth) Augustine formulates a comprehensive
theory regarding the dynamics of creation. While heaven and earth
refers to the matter capable of receiving the visible form of these realities, the "matter" in question was the earth invisible and without
form (that is, an abyss or deep without form or light). Augustine further speculates that the abyss or deep was also designated as water
because of its suitability for movement and change. 40
On the basis of this analysis, Augustine imparts a profound significance to formless matter that encompasses its end, its character, and
its role .
. . . it is first called heaven and earth; for its sake matter was made. Secondly,
the earth invisible and without form and darkness over the abyss, that is, the
formlessness itself without the light, as a result of which the earth is said to
be invisible. Thirdly, water subject to the Spirit for receiving its acquired disposition and forms. And thus the Spirit of God is borne over the water so that
we might understand the Spirit as making, and the water as that from which
he makes, that is, the matter that can be worked upon. For we say that these
three, the matter of the world, unformed matter, and matter that can be
worked upon, are the names of one reality. Heaven and earth is rightly linked
to the first of these names; obscurity, confusion, deep, and darkness to the
second; and to the third the ease with which it yields as the Spirit of the
Maker is borne over it in order to work upon it. 41
According to this interpretation, matter provides the formless constituent of created things which is wholly lacking in order and beauty.
Such a substrate, however, possesses the potentiality for formation by
God into the totality of created being.
3. De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim
Augustine's theory of the formation of matter assumes a more profound import in the De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, written
105
between c. A.D. 405 and sometime after 420. While Augustine wished
to impose a literal interpretation on the text {i.e., one which discloses
what really occurred or the meaning that the author intended to convey), he combines this reading with a search for its allegorical or figurative significance {i.e., what the events or language typify or symbolize).42 A passage, however, can admit of both a literal and an allegorical
reading. 43 As Roland Teske observes, "by the time of De Genesi ad
litteram the literal sense seems to involve a highly sophisticated interpretation that is quite metaphysical and not what we would ordinarily
call the literal sense. "44
In keeping with his early exegetical concerns, Augustine still wishes
to safeguard the faithful against anthropomorphic, materialistic, or
sacrilegious depictions of God. The literal or proper sense is preferable as long as it does not result in scandalous or ridiculous portrayals
of the Divine {as well as people or events in salvation history). If the
literal interpretation fails this test, the allegorical or figurative
intepretation must be utilized instead.
Let them try with us first to take in the proper sense all the events narrated.
For who would not later applaud them when they understand what these
events also point to in the figurative sense as signs of spiritual realities or
affections or even future events? Of course, if it became utterly impossible to
safeguard the truth of the faith while accepting in a material sense what is
named as material in Genesis, what alternative would be left for us except to
take these statements in a figurative sense rather than to be guilty of an
impious attack on Sacred Scripture? 45
In this connection, we might apply the interpretation of Bertrand de

Margerie to Augustine's later exegesis of Genesis 1,1,ff., and speak
of a "plurality of literal meanings. "46 In this connection, de Margerie
draws an illuminating parallel between Augustine's theory of the plurality of literal meanings in a Scriptural text and his theory of seminal
reasons {i.e., the notion that all things were created by God simultaneously in the beginning, but in a potential state). 47
At the outset, Augustine addresses a number of questions regarding the import of Genesis 1: 1. As in his previous commentaries, he
subjects the phrase heaven and earth to an incisive inquiry. Does the
phrase refer to both spiritual and corporeal creatures, or to corporeal
things alone? Do these words pertain to the unformed matter of both
the spiritual and the corporeal worlds? Or, does heaven designate
only spiritual beings, while earth represents bodily matter in an imperfect, incomplete state? In this connection, Augustine theorizes about
106
the import of Genesis 1:2 as well: on the one hand, the words the
earth was invisible and formless might refer to the amorphous character of bodily substance; on the other hand, the words darkness was
over the abyss can describe the formless state of spiritual substance.
Once again, he does not offer any definitive response to these questions. The very range of the inquiry, however, demonstrates the speculative nature of the topic. Accordingly, he interprets matter in rather
broad terms as the formless substrate of both spiritual and corporeal
creatures. In this way, he speaks of a spiritual matter and a corporeal
matter corresponding to spiritual and corporeal realities, respectively.
But an important issue must now be addressed. Because of its
amorphous state, matter stands in need of organization. What constitutes the formative act whereby this is accomplished? Augustine's earlier commentaries on Genesis had defined formatio in terms of a
reduction to unity-the transformation of what is formless and confused into distinct, intelligible realities. In the De Genesi ad litteram,
Augustine reinterprets his theory of formatio in the context of his
trinitarian theology. While the De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus
recognized the creative role of the Trinity, this notion was confined to
Augustine's initial statement regarding the contents of Christian belief. In the first book of the De Genesi ad litteram, he more fully
integrates his understanding of the creative Trinity into his overall
theology of creation.
In the very beginning of creation in its inchoate state, which has been called
heaven and earth because of what was to be produced from it, it is the Blessed
Trinity that is represented as creating. 48
In the teaching In the beginning God created heaven and earth,

Augustine finds a statement regarding the creative roles of the Father
and the Son.
By the name of "God" we understand the Father, and by the name of "Beginning," the Son, Who is the Beginning, not of the Father, but first and foremost for the spiritual beings He has created and then also for all creatures. 49
The Son, then, constitutes the Beginning and the agent of the Father's
creative efficacy. "For here," Augustine points out, "the origin of created being is indicated still in its imperfect and formless state." 50 On
the basis of the teaching that the Spirit of God was stirring above the
water (Genesis 1:2), Augustine extends the role of Creator to the Holy
Spirit as well. By virtue of this teaching, he contends, "we recognize a
complete enumeration of the Trinity." 51 Here (as in his previous com-
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mentaries on Genesis), water designates the formless state of visible

things which is brought to unity and rendered intelligible by the Spirit's
operation.
We might say that by the term "water" the sacred writer wished to designate
the whole of material creation. In this way he would show whence all things
that we can recognize in their proper kinds had been made and formed, calling them water, because we observe all things on earth being formed and
growing into their various species from moisture. 52
The role of the creative Trinity is further evident in Augustine's

discussion of the conversion of the human will from finite things to
God, the means whereby it is brought to completion. In the De Genesi
ad litteram, he discusses this conversion as an image of the union
between the Father and His Word. According to this analogue, an
imperfect being which tends toward utter nothingness imitates the
Word (which exists in eternal union with the Father) when it turns
toward its Creator. 53 By means of this reinterpretation of forma tio as
a conversio or imltatio, Augustine places his theory of creation
squarely in a moral context. This development, of course, has a specific applicability to rational creatures possessing intellects and free
wills. Accordingly, whatever exists in a state of formlessness is identified with a life of folly and wretchedness. Conversely, beings which
turn toward the Word (the immutable light of Wisdom) not only exist,
but are rendered capable of living wisely and happily as well. As the
very Beginning of all creation, then, the eternal Divine Wisdom is the
source of intellectual life, formation, and perfection. 54
In the second book of the De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine discusses the conversion and perfection of creatures in terms of an orderly separation and individuation of species. From Augustine's standpoint, Genesis elucidates this process in clear trinitarian terms. For
him, the words And God said, 'Let there be,' refers to the action
whereby the Father finds a causal reason for the creation of things in
His own Word. 55 In the words And God saw that it was good, Augustine perceives a statement of the Spirit's loving endorsement of creation as a whole-not merely after it came into being, but even before
it was made. 56 In this respect, the Spirit's recognition of the goodness
of all things reflects the Divine goodness which both wills and sustains created reality.
As already observed, the creation and formation of matter involve
no temporal succession of events. For Augustine, formless matter and
what was formed from matter were created simultaneously, in the
108
way in which the sound of a human voice and the words it articulates
issue forth at the same time. Indeed, God was not required to first
create, and then, to form matter on a separate basis, any more than a
speaker must laboriously gather together sounds so as to form intelligible words. 57 In the final analysis, it suffices to say simply that "God
created formed matter." 58
Scripture, however, does suggest a priority of sorts. As Augustine
affirms, unformed matter (both of a spiritual and corporeal nature)
came first in creation. But this priority should not be construed in
terms of a temporal order of emergence; the priority in question is
causal. 59 For Augustine, God's decree to create is not articulated in
time: the act of creation transcends all temporal designations, despite
the fact that its effects are realized in time. Likewise, it is heard by a
creature (that is, the eternal Word or Wisdom of God) that transcends
time in its contemplation of truth. 60
The movements of the things to be formed and governed proceeds
from the Word's transmission of the intelligible expressions (rationes)
of its intellect. 61 But since creatures move in time, any talk of temporal
relations prior to creation is wholly meaningless. Motion, then, presupposes time and the existence of creatures. As Augustine affirms,
"a creature could not move if it did not exist. "62 Once again, any suggestion of a temporal order of emergence is misplaced. In this case,
the notion that matter precedes the formation of specific natures merely
indicates the limitations of human understanding and the requirements
of narrative technique rather than an actual sequence of events. 63
According to Augustine, the scope of Divine creation is all-encompassing. God, in short, is causally responsible for the existence of
every substance or essence .
. . . whatever the physical or seminal causes that play their part in the production of living things ... it remains true that only God . . . can create the
actual natures which are thus affected in different ways, each in its own kind.
His hidden power . . . gives existence to whatever . . . exists, in so far as it
exists at all. For the absence of God's creative activity would not merely mean
that a thing would be different in some particular way; it simply could not
exist. 64
The foregoing remarks presuppose a key distinction between two kinds

of form. First, Augustine posits those forms which are given to material things from outside (that is, from something external to them). In
this context, craftsmen or sculptors impart such forms to the objects
109
of their craft. Secondly, Augustine posits a form which works within

things, providing them with a certain causal efficacy of their own (e.g.,
procreation or growth). Since this latter kind of form must proceed
from a nature which is itself uncreated, it belongs only to the God
Who required no further material for the world's creation. 65
In a manner consistent with his predecessors in the Patristic tradition, Augustine entertains the possibility that God created on the basis of a preexistent material substrate. But in such a case, God would
have created the underlying material of creation from nothing as well.
As Augustine puts it, God can be characterized as the "founder of
natures" in the same way as Romulus would be designated the "founder
of Rome": just as the foundation of the city of Rome is ultimately
attributable to the will, design, and command of Romulus (rather than
to his architects or builders), God is ultimately responsible for everything which exists. In this case, He could not have created from any
material or used any workmen which He did not make Himself. 66
The Ontological Status of Amorphous Matter
As we have seen, Augustine discusses the formation of amorphous

matter in two contexts. In the De Genesi contra Manichaeos and De
Genesi ad litteram imperfectus, he depicts this process as a reduction to unity, whereby the amorphous substrate is transformed into
the specific intelligible natures of created realities. The later De Genesi
ad litteram, however, describes formatio in terms of a "conversion"
whereby that which is mutable, contingent, and oriented toward nonbeing adheres to its ultimate Ground in a manner analogous to the
union between the Word and the Father. At this point, I wish to focus
more specifically upon Augustine's interpretation of unformed matter,
the logical origin of the process which results in the universe of created being. Such an investigation will serve to clarify the fine points of
Augustine's overall theory of the generation of matter from nothing.
Augustine provides a detailed discussion of unformed matter in
Confessiones XI, XII, and XIII. These concluding books comprise an
exegesis of Genesis which complements the insights drawn from the
three major commentaries examined above. Once again, we find Augustine integrating the literal and allegorical interpretations of the text.
In a manner consistent with the Patristic tradition, Augustine viewed
the beginning of Genesis as a compendium of all Scripture and an
encapsulation of human history from our creation to our eternal rest
110
Saint Augustine's Exegesis of
Genesis
in paradise. 67 Conversely, he perceived his own spiritual journey (and

its accompanying struggles) as a portrait of the journey of fallen humanity as a whole in microcosm.
In Confessiones XII, Augustine attributes a quasi-existence to matter which places it precariously close to non-being. While formless
matter does not quite qualify as nothing (possessing an ontological
status of sorts), it still does not constitute any specific reality. Because
form represents a fundamental criterion of being, whatever is devoid
of form cannot exist in any complete or thoroughgoing sense. In this
respect, formless matter lacks the intelligibility which would enable us
to designate it as a nature.
This ontological deficiency generates an epistemological problem.
If unformed matter is lacking in form, it is unknowable: since it provides the matter of bodies, it cannot be an intelligible form; since it is
bound to what invisible and unordered, it cannot be a sensible form. 68
Accordingly, Augustine espouses something of an apophatic approach
in considering the unformed substrate. "When thought seeks what
mind may attain to in it," he contends, "does it not strive either to
know it by not knowing it, or to be ignorant by knowing it?" 69 The
obstacle here proceeds from the human mind's inability to conceive
something midway between form and nothingness that is neither
formed nor nothing. At best, amorphous matter constitutes an indeterminate near-nothing. 70
For Augustine, God's role as Creator is absolute, admitting no coequal principle of any kind. Consequently, formless matter is wholly
dependent upon God for even the quasi-existence it enjoys. God's
creative activity, of course, must be understood in trinitarian terms:
By the name of God, who made these things, I now understand the Father,
and by the name of Beginning the Son, in whom he made them. And believing my God to be the Trinity . . . I searched into his holy words, and behold,
your 'Spirit was borne above the waters.' Behold, the Trinity, my God, Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, creator of all creation 71
The contingency of creatures upon the triune God extends both to

spiritual and corporeal matter.
What claim did corporeal matter have upon you, merely to be invisible and
without form, since it would not even be such except because you made it?
Hence, since it did not exist, it could have no claim on YC:>U to exist. What
claim did inchoate spiritual creation have on you, even to float and flow
about ... but all unlike you, unless it were converted by that same Word to
the same Word by whom it was made? 72
111
Although it is a near nothing, unformed matter possesses the capacity or potential for intelligible formation by God. 73 Such a teaching, however, should not be interpreted in Aristotelian terms. Because
Aristotle's prime matter is always correlative with form, it cannot be
considered on an independent basis. But as Zum Brunn shows (quoting Solignac), Augustinian materia is neither pure negation nor a reality in its own right. Rather, it constitutes a kind of "dynamic negativity" -that is, a negativity emptied of form but bound up with mutability,
corruption, and the capacity for formation. 74
In actuality, Augustine's notion of matter asumes a marked Platonic character, or more precisely, a Neoplatonic character that exhibits marked Plotinian presuppositions. Like Augustine, Plotinus recognized the unlimited potential of matter for the reception of forms. 75 So
too, Plotinus attributed a unique mode of existence to matter that
places it somewhere between pure privation and the form inherent in
real things. But when Plotinus equates matter with privation, he does
so in a highly qualified sense, as an absence of form and a poverty of
goodness. 76
For both Plotinus and Augustine, then, formless matter cannot be
classified as complete nothingness. But herein lies the dividing line
between these thinkers. For Plotinus, reality was understood as a great
continuum in which matter is the terminus or endpoint of the One's
outpouring. In Plotinian terms, "creation" amounts to the emergence
of the different levels of the One's power and goodness. But while
Augustine's theory of creation encompassed a similar notion of a quasiexistent matter, it also stressed the creation of matter from nothing.
Matter, like everything else, depends upon God for its existence. Let
us now consider Augustine's interpretation of the nihil and its significance in his discussion of the act of creation.
The Ontological Status of the Nihil

Augustine's conception of nothingness must be approached against
the background of his metaphysics of being. Since nothingness is the
utter antithesis of that which exists, it can only be considered in terms
of existent reality. Any attempt to consider non-being in isolated, abstract terms is a contradiction: how could we meaningfully speak of
that which does not exist, or for that matter, even think of pure negation? This difficulty is deeply rooted in the metaphysical rationalism
and essentialism that Augustine embraced.
112
Both Parmenides and Plato had characterized absolute non-being

as a paradoxical, wholly contradictory notion. 77 Augustine echoes this
sentiment in the De Magistro:
... what does not exist cannot possibly be something. What then, are we to
do? Instead of saying that nihil signifies something which is nothing, shall we
say that this word signifies a certain state of mind when, failing to perceive a
reality, the mind nevertheless finds, or thinks it finds, that such a reality does
not exist?7 8
As in the case of formless matter, nothingness must be approached in

terms of the positive reality of which it is the contrary. But whereas
formless matter merely lacks the specificity which would allow for its
classification as a definite thing, nothingness is wholly lacking in
being.
Augustine treats being on three levels. God assumes the highest
place in Augustine's metaphysical scheme: in contrast to creatures,
God is supremely perfect, eternal, and immutable. On the second level
of reality, Augustine places spiritual creatures {that is, angelic natures
and human souls). Like God, spiritual creatures are immutable. But
this immutability is limited. While they are immutable in spatial terms,
they still experience volitional changes which open them to the possibility of moral and intellectual error. Souls are further subject to the
effects of temporal process and physical limitations by virtue of their
association with bodily life. In this connection, however, souls assume
a unique "mid-rank" position between spiritual and corporeal reality.
Corporeal natures, in fact, occupy the third and lowest level of reality.
Unlike spiritual natures, corporeal things are wholly mutable, and
thereby, wholly subject to the effects of temporal change and corruption.
On each of these levels of reality, we find a different expression of
being. God is the fullness of Being in Whom all creation participates
for its existence. Spiritual and corporeal natures, in turn, participate
in the Divine Being in a manner correlative with the degree of unity
they possess. In this context, "participation" does not involve any
equality of substance between the participant and that in which it
participates. Rather, it connotes a relationship of dependence, whereby
created things derive their being from God. Such dependence is complete and thoroughgoing, since creatures are brought into being by
God from absolutely nothing. In the Augustinian scheme, then, God
provides the ultimate metaphysical standard by which the reality of all
creation is measured.
113
In its truest sense, being pertains to a self-subsistent and completely

immutable nature. 79 As the supreme Being, God always remains the
same (that is, always identical with Himself), is immune to corruption
or alteration, and transcends any temporal limitations. The very supremacy of Divine Being rules out the possibility of another power
that is God's equal, or which stands in opposition to God's nature.
But despite Augustine's strong affirmation of creatio ex nihilo,
some commentators have perceived vestiges of a Neoplatonic conception of non-being (as a mere sterility or privation), or even echoes of
Manichaean Hyle in Augustine's account of creation. 80 While such
interpretations must be approached with reservation, Augustine does
exhibit some inconsistencies in his treatment of the nihil which merit
our attention.
In the De Beata Vita, Augustine (in the context of a moral discussion of the foundations of human happiness) depicts the nihil in rather
positive ontological terms as "all that flows ... is dissolved ... melts
and steadily perishes . . ." 81 But while this definition suggests a deficiency or lack of stability, it does not really designate absolute nonbeing. Only that which has some ontological status can "flow," "dissolve," "melt," and "steadily perish". Such language, of course, can
be attributed to the impossibility of adequately describing what is completely non-existent. But the very formula of creatio ex nihilo does
suggest a derivation from something which already exists-at least in
a limited or partial sense.
In its most common usage, the preposition "ex" indicates the starting point of an action or removal from a position, state, or situation
(i.e., "away from"). 82 In a more technical sense, however, "ex" can also
designate the material or substance out of which a thing is made or
the cause which underlies an action. 83 In this respect, there is an extremely fine line between (1) saying that God created from nothing
and (2) saying that God created out of nothing. The former phrase
implies that non-being was the terminus a quo of creation, and that
nothing existed in the absence of God's creative fiat; the latter phrase,
however, might well suggest that creation proceeded from something
which already existed.
In this connection, it should be noted that Augustine tends to use
the formula creatio ex nihilo interchangeably with creatio de nihilo. 84
On the surface, it might appear that this terminological variation is
insignificant. For all practical purposes, the prepositions "ex" and
"de" are synonymous in meaning and usage; both indicate a "movement away from" a given state or condition. 85 But like "ex," "de" also
114
designates that out of which something is taken or derived. 86 Accordingly, any ambiguity present in the formula creatio ex nihilo is present
in creatio de nihilo as well. But the ambiguity inherent in ex nihilo
(i.e., from which or out of which) only becomes more problematic in
Augustine's use of the phrase de nihilo.
As we shall see, Augustine (in the De Natura Boni Contra
Manichaeos) sharply distinguishes that which is from God ("ex Deo"
or "ab Deo") from that which is of God or out of God ("de Deo").
According to Augustine, that which is from God is finite being that
God makes from nothing (ex nihilo fecit). But that which is begotten
out of God (de Deo) refers to God's own substance (that is, His Word). 87
In this context, the preposition "de" clearly indicates a consubstantiality
between God and what is begotten out of His nature. Similarly,
Augustine's assertion that God created de nihilo might be construed
as imparting substantiality to the nihil.
But Augustine's clear metaphysical distinction between being and
non-being seriously weakens the force of any such claims. Likewise,
he repeatedly stresses the difference between creation in an absolute
sense (that is, creation from nothing) and creation in a figurative sense
(as an ordering or formation). But while the meaning which he attaches to creation in an absolute sense is well-defined and explicit, the
terms which he uses to express the act of creation are somewhat
variable. In all fairness, however, Augustine was confronting a problem that was rooted in the Latin language which expressed the biblical
teachings on this topic.
In the De fide et Symbolo, Augustine demonstrates the ambiguity
inherent in creation terminology:
No matter how excellent they say a creature is, if it is a creature it has been
produced (condita) and made (facta est). 'Produce' (condere) is the same as
'create' (creare), although, in keeping with Latin usage, the term 'create'
(creare) is sometimes employed in place of the word 'beget' (gignere). But the
Greek language makes a distinction: what they call ktisma or ktisis we designate as "creature" (creaturam), and when we wish to avoid ambiguity in
speaking we do not say "create' (creare), but 'produce' (condere). 88
Elsewhere, Augustine points out that Scripture (at least in its Latin
renderings) fails to provide precise distinctions between the verbs
"facere" and "creare." Likewise, the Greek verb "ktizein" is translated
rather arbitrarily as "creare," "constituere," and "condere." 89 In this
context, however, Augustine expresses his preference for the verb
115
"facere" when discussing creatio ex nihilo, and a preference for

"c rea re" when designating the ordering of existent matter. 90
This preference is also reflected in the De moribus Manichaeorum,
where Augustine provides one of his clearest commentaries upon scriptural terminology for creation:
. . . to create (creare) means to order and arrange (condere et ordinare). And
so in most manuscripts it is written 'I make good things and order evil things.'
To make (facere) is to give being to something that did not exist at all, but to
order (condere) is to arrange something that already exists in such a way that
it becomes greater and better. 91
In this passage, the verb "crea re" clearly designates creation in figurative terms (as an ordering or arrangement), while "facere" expresses
creation in the strict sense of a bringing into being from nothing. But
as one commentator has observed, "Augustine's expressions relative
to creation are somewhat fluid and must be interpreted strictly in their
context." 92 In this respect, the terminology that Augustine employs to
express creation from nothing assumes an ancillary importance. The
crucial consideration is the import which he attaches to the act of
creation that is described in Genesis.
Creatio ex Nihilo Defined

In effect, Augustine's exegesis of Genesis 1 provided the very basis
for his interpretation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In the De
vera religione (a major anti-Manichaean work composed around A.D.
390-391), we find what is probably his most thoroughgoing and comprehensive definition of this doctrine. In this context, he presents an
unequivocal affirmation of the creation of everything other than God
from absolute non-being. But in articulating this doctrine, he also provides a detailed statement regarding the motive and end of creation
that fully incorporates the notion of the creative Trinity. In this respect, God the Father creates through the agency of His wisdom, and
sustains creation by the love of the Holy Spirit.
In all cases divine providence ... recalls to its true and essential nature what-
ever manifests defect, i.e., tends to nothingness, and so strengthens it. But
you say, Why do they become defective? Because they are mutable. Why are
they mutable? Because they have not supreme existence. And why so? Because they are inferior to him who made them. Who made them? He who
supremely is. Who is he? God, the immutable Trinity, made them through his
116
supreme wisdom and preserves them by his supreme loving-kindness. Why

did he make them? In order that they might exist. Existence as such is good,
and supreme existence is the chief good. From what did he make them? Out
of nothing. That out of which God created all things had neither form nor
species, and was simply nothing. Therefore, the world was made out of some
unformed matter, that matter was made out of absolutely nothing. 93
In the foregoing statement, we find two correlative teachings which

represent salient features of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo:
first, that the Trinity creates everything which exists by virtue of the
supreme omnipotence of the Divine Persons; secondly, that creatures
are completely contingent upon God for their very existence. From
this standpoint, God creates in a wholly unqualified sense-that is,
from nothing whatsoever through a free act of the Divine will.
Augustine upholds the doctrine of creation from nothing in its most
literal sense. His recognition of the unique character of creatio ex
nihilo is evident in the De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus,
where he contrasts the creative activity of God with that of human
artists:
That supreme art of the omnipotent God through which all things have been
made from nothing ... also works through artists to produce things of beauty
and proportion, although they do not produce from nothing, but from some
material such as wood or marble or ivory or whatever other kind of material is
supplied for the artist's hands. 94
Unlike God, then, artists must always rely upon something which already exists as the subject of their art. God, however, brings created
reality into existence. As the supremely existent reality, God is the
Author of every being which does not enjoy existence in the fullest
sense, as He alone does. In this respect, a being which is created from
nothing cannot be placed on an ontological par with the Divine Nature. "Nothing could exist in any way," Augustine affirms, "if it had
not been created by Him." 95
Since God's omnipotence is correlative with creatio ex nihilo, the
denial of the doctrine would be tantamount to a denial of His supreme
power.
when they affirm that there is a nature which God Almighty did not
create, but of which at the same time He fashioned this world . . . they thereby
deny that God is almighty, to the effect of not believing that He could have
created the world without employing . . . another nature, which had been in
existence previously, and which He Himself had not made. 96
11 7
For Augustine, the act of creation is the expression of the unconstrained Divine will. As such, it requires neither corporeal things, nor
spatial relations, nor time for its actualization. 97 God's independence
as Creator is underscored by the fact that everything else depends
upon Him for any goodness and being they possess. 98
This Divine self-sufficiency likewise extends to the motive of creation. In opposition to the Neoplatonists, Augustine rejects the notion
that God produces in response to the demands of cosmic law or necessity, and imputes the motive for creation to God's Jove of what He
wills to create. 99 But Augustine's attribution of the motive for creation
directly to the Divine will severely delimits the scope of inquiry on this
issue: one could not, Augustine stresses, further question its causes.
For such questions would open the possibility of an infinite regress of
causes that calls into question God's supremacy as First, Ultimate
Cause.
But if they say 'Why did God decide to make heaven and earth?' . . . they
seek to know the causes of the will of God though the will of God is itself the
cause of all that exists. For if the will of God has a cause, there is something
that surpasses the will of God-and this we may not believe. Hence, one who
asks 'Why did God make heaven and earth?' should be told, 'Because he
willed to.' For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and the will
of God . . . is greater than heaven and earth. One who asks, 'Why did God
will to create heaven and earth?' is looking for something greater than the
will of God, though nothing greater can be found. 100
Conclusion
For Augustine, the indisputable fact (and most literal truth) drawn from
Genesis is that God is the supreme Creator of everything which exists. But an important corollary attaches to this teaching: as supreme
Creator, God relied upon nothing in creating. Stated in other terms,
God creates from nothing whatsoever. In Augustine's articulation of
the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, we find a sharp distinction between
being and non-being: being is correlative with goodness, and nonbeing is inextricably bound up with the corruption or privation of
existent natures. Such ontological deficiency constitutes an evil, but
an evil which does not exist in its own right. Herein lies the crucial
difference between Augustine's Christian metaphysics and the
Manichaean vision of reality. For the Manichaeans, evil constitutes a
nature that stands in radical opposition to God. From Augustine's
Christian perspective, however, only absolute non-being can be viewed
118
Saint Augustine's Exegesis of
Genesis
as the contrary to God. This point of divergence comes fully to the

fore in Augustine's critique of the Manichaean cosmogony. I now turn
to an investigation of this key component of the anti-Manichaean
polemic.
Notes
1.
De moribus ecclesiae 1,1(1): PL xxxii, 1309-11.
2.
Augustine's exegesis of Genesis emerges in five works: De Genesi contra

Manichaeos; De Genesi ad litteram fiber unus imperfectus; Confessiones
XI-XIII; De Genesi ad litteram; De Ciuitate Dei.
3.
Confessiones 111,4(7): CC xxvii, 30.
4.
5.
Confessiones 111,7(12)-7(13): CC xxvii, 33-34.
6.
7.
Robert J. O'Connell, S.J., St. Augustine's Confessions. The Odyssey of

Soul (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1969), 13.
8.
I provide my own translation of the Vulgate version here: In principia creauit

Deus coelum et terram terra autem erat inanis et uacua et tenebrae super
fadem abyssi et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas . .
9.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,6(10): PL xxxiv,3/1, 178: Et ideo Deus

rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista
materia facta sunt, haec ipsa materia tamen de omnino nihilo facta est.
Augustine's discussions of matter as the constituent of created natures must
be distinguished from his deliberations on the creation of the eternal reasons
(rationes, aeternae rationes, superiores rationes, rationes incommutabiles,
diuinae incommutabiles aeternaeque rationes, etc.) which exist in the Word
as the exemplars of creation. In addition, Augustine discusses the creation of
the seminal reasons (causales rationes, quasi semina futurorum, rationes
primordia/es, primordia causarum, rationes seminales, quasi seminales
rationes, or simply rationes)-the causal reasons by which God created living
things virtually or potentially (as opposed to the actual creation of matter
itself).
Cf. De Genesi ad litteram V,23(44-45); VI,6(10-18); XXIX; De Trinitate
111,8(13)-111, 9(16).
For a detailed overview of Augustine's treatment of the reasons or primal
causes, see John Hammond Taylor's translation of St. Augustine's The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Volume I, Ancient Christian Writers, No. 41 (New
York, New York; Ramsey, New Jersey: Newman Press, 1982), 252-254 (Book
IV, n. 67). In regard to Augustine's interpretation of the seminal reasons,
Hammond states:
. . . when God created He did indeed create all things simultaneously,

but . . . living things made in that original creative act were not made in
120

actuality in their own proper substances but only potentially in their
causal reasons placed in the earth by the Creator.
10.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, 1(2): PL xxxiv,3/1, 173: Solent ergo

Manichaei Scripturas Veteris Testamenti, quas non noverunt, vituperare, et
ea vituperatione infirmos et parvulos nostros, non invenientes quomodo sibi
respondeant, irridere atque decipere.
11.
Confessiones VI,3(4): CC xxvii,76.
12.
Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controversies (Norwich:

The Canterbury Press, 1986), 12.
13.
Confessiones V,10(19): CC xxvii, 68: Et quoniam cum de deo meo cogitare

uellem, cogitare nisi moles corporum non noueram-neque enim uidebatur
mihi esse quidquam, quod tale non esset.
Ironically, the very complexity of the Manichaean belief-system might well
have contributed to attracting the highly impressionable Augustine to the sect.
Like many of his contemporaries, he was undoubtedly drawn by the
Manichaeans' claim to provide a rational and scientific basis for its teachings.
Before the intellectual weaknesses and flaws of their cosmogony were revealed to him, Augustine seems to have accepted it in an uncritical fashion
(albeit with lingering doubts).
14.
Confessiones V,14(24): CC xxvii, 71.
15.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos II, 1(1), PL xxxiv,3/1, 195: Quae omnis narratio non aperte, sed figurate explicatur, ut exerceat mentes quaerentium
veritatem, et spirituali negotio a negotiis carnalibus avocet.
16.
Cf., Confessiones VI,4(6): CC xxvii, 77.
17.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos II,2(3): PL xxxiv,3/1, 197: Sane quisquis

voluerit omnia quae dicta sunt, secundum litteram accipere, id est non aliter
intelligere quam litter a so nat ...
18.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I,5(8): PL xxxiv,3/1, 177; II, 1(2): PL xxxiv,3/

1, 195.
19.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I,5(9): PL xxxiv,3/1, 178: coeli et terrae nomine universa creatura significata est, quam fecit et condidit Deus. Ideo autem
nominibus visibilium rerum haec appellata sunt, propter parvulorum
infirmitatem, qui minus idonei sunt invisibilia comprehendere. Primo ergo
materia facta est confusa et informis, unde omnia fierent quae distincta atque
formata sunt ...
20.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I,5(9): PL xxxiv,3/1, 178: quod credo a Graecis

chaos appellari.
21.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, 7(11): PL xxxiv,3/1, 178: Informis ergo ilia

materia quam de nihilo Deus fecit, appellata est primo coelum et terra, et
dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram; non quia jam hoc erat,
sed quia hoc esse pote rat . . .
121
22.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,7(11): PL xxiv,3/1, 178: Quemadmodum si

semen arboris considerantes, dicamus ibi esse radices, et robur, et ramos, et
fructus, et folia; non quia jam sunt, sed quia in de futura sunt ...
23.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, 7(11): PL xxiv,3/1, 178: sic dictum est, In

principia fecit Deus coelum et terram, quasi semen coeli et terrae, cum in
confuse adhuc esset coeli et terrae materia; sed quia certum erat inde futurum
esse coelum et terram, jam et ipsa materia coelum et terra appellata est.
24.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,7(12): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 179: Dicta est terra
invisibilis et incomposita et tenebrae super abyssum, quia informis erat, et
nulla specie cerni aut tractari poterat, etiamsi esset homo qui videret atque
tractaret. Dicta est aqua, quia facilis et ductilis subjacebat operanti, ut de ilia
omnia formarentur. Sed sub his omnibus nominibus materia erat invisa et
informis, de qua Deus condidit mundum.
25.
De Genesi contra Manichaeosl,12(18): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 181-182: Nunc vero

cum dicitur, Congregetur aqua, quae est sub coelo, in congregationem
unam; hoc dicitur ut ilia materia corporalis formetur in earn speciem quam
habent aquae istae visibiles.
In this quotation, it should be noted that Teske translates species as
"beauty". In an explanatory note following this text (in Saint Augustine on
Genesis, in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 84 (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 65-66, n. 61), he interprets
species as designating the "beauty" or the "form" of the visible waters, which
provide the norm or standard of unity in a given thing.
26.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,12(18}: PL xxxiv, 3/1, 181-182: Ipsa enim

congregatio in unum, ipsa est aquarum istarum formatio, quas videmus et
tangimus. Omnis enim forma ad unitatis regulam cogitur.
27.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,12(18): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 181-182: Et quod

dicitur, Appareat arida, quid aliud dici intelligendum est, nisi ut ilia materies
accipiat visibilem formam, quam nunc habet terra ista quam videmus et
tangimus? Superius ergo quod nominabatur terra invisibilis et incomposita,
materiae confusio et obscuritas nominabatur; et quod nominabatur aqua super quam ferebatur Spiritus Dei, eadem rursus materia nominabatur. Nunc
vero aqua ista et terra formantur ex ilia materia,. quae ipsis nominibus
appellabatur, antequam formas istas, quas nunc videmus, acciperet.
28.
Retractationes I, 17.
By his own admission, however, this enterprise proved too much for him
(Retractationes 1,17): "... my inexperience collapsed under the weight of so
heavy a load and, before I had finished one book, I rested from this labor
which I could not endure."
29.
De Genesi ad litteram fiber unus imperfectus 2(5): PL xxxiv,3/1, 222.
30.
Technically speaking, Augustine does not make an explicit distinction between the "literal" and "allegorical" methods of interpretation in the De Genesi
contra Manichaeos. This terminology emerges only later, when he reflects
122

on his initial exegetical endeavors. In the Retractationes (1,17), Augustine
states that in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, he had "explained the words
of Scripture according to their allegorical meaning, not presuming to explain
such great mysteries of natural things literally-that is, in what sense the statements there made can be interpreted according to their historical signification . . . "In the De Genesi ad litteram (VIII,2,5), Augustine further contrasts
the "allegorical" and "proper" (i.e., literal) senses of the text.
31.
According to Roland Teske, S.J. (Introduction to his translation of St. Augustine on Genesis, 27, n. 53):
Since the sort of blasphemous reading of the text he is concerned with
seems to be the anthropomorphic understanding of the Manichees, it
seems that Augustine at this time has a very literal understanding of
what it means to understand a text literally."
Overall, Teske's introduction to these texts provides an excellent treatment of
the technical aspects of Augustine's early exegesis.
32.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 3(10): PL xxxiv,3/1, 224:

Hactenus de hoc quae situm sit quod dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: nihil enim horum temere affirmare oportuit.
33.
De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 1(2): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 221: ita ut creatura

omnis sive intellectualis sive corporalis ... non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit
facta de nihilo.
34.
De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 16(61): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 244: Quae Trinitas

ita est Trinitas, ut unus Deus sit; ita est unus Deus, ut Trinitas sit.
35.
De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus 1(2): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 221.
36.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 3(9): PL xxxiv,3/1, 223: coelum et terra pro universa creatura positum videri, ut et hoc visibile aethereum
firmamentum, coelum appellatum sit, et ilia creatura invisibilis supereminentium Potestatum; rursusque terra, omnis inferior pars mundi, cum
animalibus quibus inhabitatur.
37.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 3(9): PL xxxiv,3/1, 223: An

coelum omnis creatura sublimis atque invisibilis dicta est, terra vero omne
visibile, ut etiam sic possit hoc quod dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram, universa creatura intelligi? Fortasse quippe non incongrue in
comparatione invisibilis creaturae, omne visibile terra dicitur, ut ilia coeli nomine
nuncupetur. Quoniam et anima quae invisibilis est, cum rerum visibilium amore
tumesceret, et earum adeptione extolleretur, terra dicta est . . .
38.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 3(10): PL xxxiv,3/1, 223:

utrum jam distincta et composita omnia dixerit coelum et terram, an ipsam
primo informem universitatis materiem, quae in has fermatas et speciosas
naturas Deo ineffabiliter jubente digesta est . . .
123
39.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 3(10): PL xxxiv,3/1, 224: ut

etiam ipsa digestio et ordinatio singularum quarumque rerum formatarum et
distinctarum mundus vocetur; ipsa vero materies coelum et terra, veluti semen coeli et terrae appellata sit; et coelum et terra quasi confusum atque
permixtum ab artifice Deo accipiendis formis idoneum. Hactenus de hoc quaesitum sit quod dictum est, In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: nihil enim
horum temere affirmare opportuit.
40.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 4(14): PL xxxiv,3/1: 225.

Cf. De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,7(12): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 179; 1,8(13-15),
3/1: PL xxxiv, 3/1, 179-180.
41.
De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus 4(15): PL xxxiv,3/1: 225226: ltaque primo coelum et terra, propter hoc enim facta materies; secundo
terra invisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae super abyssum, id est ipsa informitas
sine lumine, uncle etiam terra invisibilis dicta est; tertio aqua subjecta spiritui
ad habitum formasque capiendas: ideo super aquam ferebatur Spiritus Dei, ut
Spiritum operantem, aquam vero uncle operaretur intelligamus, id est materiam
fabricabilem. Cum enim ista tria dicimus unius rei nomina, materia mundi,
materia informis, materia fabricabilis, horum primo nomini bene adjungitur
coelum et terra; secundo obscuritas, confusio, profunditas, tenebrae; tertio
cedendi facilitas, cui jam ad operandum Spiritus superfertur artificis.
42.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,17(34): PL xxxiv,3/1, 259; Xl,1(2): PL xxxiv,3/1,

430. First and foremost, Augustine wished to determine the intended meaning of a passage. If this was not possible, he considered what the context of
the passage demands. If this was also impossible, he committed himself to
what faith demands of believers.
43.
Cf., De Genesi ad litteram IV,28(45): PL xxxiv,3/1, 314-315.
44.
Roland Teske, S.J., Introduction to Augustine on Genesis, 17-18, n. 39.
45.
De Genesi ad litteram VIII,1(4): PL xxxiv,3/1, 373: De proximo ergo attendant istam praesumptionem quo tendat, et conentur nobiscum cuncta primitus
quae gesta narrantur in expressionem proprietatis accipere. Quis enim eis
postea non faveat intelligentibus quid ista etiam figurata significatione
commoneant, sive ipsarum spiritualium naturarum vel affectionum, sive rerum etiam futurarum? Sane si nullo modo possent salva fide veritatis ea, quae
corporaliter hie nominata sunt, corporaliter etiam accipi, quid aliud remaneret,
nisi ut ea potius figurate dicta intelligeremus, quam Scripturam sanctam impie
culparemus?
46.
Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., An Introduction to the History of Exegesis,

Volume III. Saint Augustine. Translated by Pierre de Fontnouvelle (Petersham,
Mass.: Saint Bede's Publications, 1991), 65.
47.
Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., An Introduction to the History of Exegesis,

Volume III. Saint Augustine, 65:
124

Although Augustine himself did not point out the similarity, it springs to
mind spontaneously. Albeit invisibly, potentially, in their causes, the
secondary and derived meanings of an utterance by Moses existed in
the first and main sense, as seen and intended by him. We can say, in
more specifically Augustinian terms, that these meanings existed seminally in the first sense; and just as creation developed as circumstances
allowed, so did the meaning of the divinely inspired utterances develop
on the occasion of the appearance in history of new minds.
48.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,6(12): PL xxxiv,3/1, 250-251: Ut quemadmodum

in ipso exordio inchoatae creaturae, quae coeli et terrae nomine, propter id
quod de ilia perficiendum erat, commemorata est, Trinitas insinuatur Creatoris.
49.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,6(12): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251: intelligimus Patrem in Dei

nomine, et Filium in principii nomine, qui non Patri, sed per seipsum creatae
primitus ac potissimum spirituali creaturae, et consequenter etiam universae
creaturae principium est.
While Augustine recognizes the creative activity of the three Divine Persons, he still uses the terms "God" (Deus) primarily in reference to the Father.
According to Basil Studer, O.S.B. (The Grace of Christ and the Grace of
God in Augustine of Hippo. Christocentrism or Theocentrism? Translated
by Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press/Michael
Glazier, 1997), 110), "there can . . . be a tension between God the Father
and the one God . . . nonetheless, completely in line with the Bible, "God" is
used first and foremost for the Father."
50.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,4(9): PL xxxiv,3/1: 249: propterea Filii commemoratio

non ita fit quia Verbum, sed tantum quia principium est, cum dicitur, In principia
fecit Deus coelum et terram; exordium quippe creaturae insinuatur adhuc in
informitate imperfection is ...
51.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,6(12): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251: dicente autem Scriptura,

Et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquam, completam commemorationem Trinitatis
agnoscimus; ita et in conversione atque perfectione creaturae, ut rerum species digerantur, eadem Trinitas insinuetur . . .
52.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,5(11): PL xxxiv,3/1, 250: Quia sive aquae nomine

appellare voluit totam corporalem materiam, ut eo modo insinuaret unde facta
et fermata sint omnia, quae in suis generibus jam dignoscere possumus,
appellans aquam, quia ex humida natura videmus omnia in terra per species
varias formari atque concrescere . . .
53.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,4(9): PL xxxiv,3/l, 249: . . . informitate quadam

tendit ad nihilum; sed tunc imitatur Verbi formam, semper atque
incommutabiliter Patri cohaerentem, cum et ipsa pro sui generis conversione
ad id quod vere ac semper est, id est ad creatorem suae substantiae, formam
capit, et fit perfecta creatura ...
Cf. Gerhart B. Ladner, The Idea of Reform. Its Impact on Christian
Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers (New York; Evanston; London: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), 167ff. Ladner (167-169) delineates the significance of "conversion" in this context:
125
creation itself, insofar as it was a process of formation, included a

nontemporal act of conversion toward God to which all temporal historical reformation is related. The very first day of creation in St.
Augustine's interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis already manifests the fundamental principle which. he sees at work in the whole
economy of salvation: creation itself is unthinkable without God's immediate recall of His creatures to Himself and their conversion toward
Him. If even the spiritual caelum caeli needed conversion to God in
order to be truly formed, then all the more physical matter, nearly nonexistent in its unformed state, had to be converted to God in order to
assume form. And the creative act by which the initial recall and conversion were effected were the words "Let there be light" (Fiat lux). They
signify the role in creation of the divine Logos Christ, of the Word who
is Light and through illumination forms the created light of the spirit
and all other creatures, the Word through and in whom later also the
great reformation of man was to come.
An in-depth study of the significance of the notions of conuersio and formatio
in Augustine's deliberations on creation is provided by Marie-Anne Vannier,
in'Creatio', 'Conuersio', 'Formatio' chez S. Augustin (Fribourg: Editions
Universitaires Fribourge Suisse, 1991). Vannier (p. 62) describes the significance of these notions in this manner:
L' episode manicheen et Ia polemique qui lui fit suite, tout en faisant
entrevoir a Augustin les risques inherents a un usage unilateral de Ia

raison et de Ia volonte, lui a permis de penetrer le sens de Ia creation et
a, en quelque sorte, oriente son interpretation qui ne sera pas tant
cosmologique qu'anthropologique et qui s'articulera autour du scheme
creatio, conuersio, formatio. Cree et non emane d'un quelconque
principe, l'etre humain s'accomplit dans Ia mesure 6 il repond a
!'interpellation (admonitio) de son createur. Cet achevement, cette
formatio, synonyme de vie eternelle, de vision de Dieu . . . , n' a rien a
voir avec une fusion ou une reintegration au principe premier. Elle est
rendue possible par le Christ, qui est Sapientia non formata, sed per
quam formantur universa (De vera re/igione Xll,24). Ce role mediateur
du Christ, Augustin l'a per<;u au cours de son experience manicheenne
et c'est peut-etre Ia raison majeure pour laquelle il s'est detache de Ia
secte qui presentait une parodie du Sauveur. Ulterieurement, dans ses
commentaires sur Ia Genese, il s'attacha a faire ressortir que le Christ
est Forma omnium (De vera re/igione XI,21).
54.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,5(10): PLxxxiv,3/1, 250: Principium quippe creaturae

intellectualis est aeterna Sapientia; quod principium manens in se
incommutabiliter, nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione vocationis loqui ei
creaturae cui principium est, ut convertatur ad id ex quo est, quod aliter formata
ac perfecta esse non possit.
55.
De Genesi ad litteram 11,6(12); 11,6(14): PL xxxiv,3/l, 267-268.
56.
126
57.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,15(29): PL xxxiv,3/1, 257: non autem qui loquitur,

prius emittit informem vocem, quam possit postea colligere, atque in verba
formare: ita creator Deus non priore tempore fecit informem materiam, et
earn postea per ordinem quarumque naturarum, quasi secunda consideratione
formavit;
58.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,15(29): PL xxxiv,3/1, 257: formatam quippe creavit

materiam.
59.
De Genesi ad litteram V,5(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 326: Non itaque temporali,

sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies, et spiritualis
et corporalis, de qua fieret quod faciendum esset, cum et ipsa priusquam
instituta est, non fuisset: nee instituta est nisi ab illo utique summo Deo et
vero, ex quo sunt omnia; sive coeli et terrae nomine significata sit, quae in
principio fecit Deus ...
It should be noted that Taylor (in The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Volume
I) uses the highly technical term "substratum" as a translation for the rather
broad phrase de qua. The text literally reads "It was that from which (de qua)
was made what was to be made ... "
60.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,9(17): PI xxxiv,3/1, 252: Sed multum est ac

difficillimum capere quomodo dicatur, Deo non temporaliter jubente, neque id
temporaliter audiente creatura, quae contemplatione veritatis omnia tempora
excedit ...
In this context, the "creature that transcends all time in the contemplation
of truth" appears to refer to the Word in its role as the creative agent of God
the Father. Accordingly, the use of the term "creature" here should not be
construed as implying subordinationism. Rather, it underscores the fact that
the Word was begotten of the Divine nature.
61.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,9(17): PI xxxiv,3/1, 252: sed intellectualiter sibimet

impressas ab incommutabili Dei Sapientia rationes, tanquam intelligibiles
locutiones, in ea quae infra sunt transmittente fieri temporales motus in rebus
temporalibus vel formandis vel administrandis.
62.
De Genesi ad litteram V,5(12): PL xxxiv,3/1, 325: Motus enim si nullus

esset vel spiritualis vel corporalis creaturae, quo per praesens praeteritis futura
succederent, nullum esset tempus omnino. Moveri autem creatura non utique
posset, si non esset. Potius ergo tempus a creatura, quam creatura coepit a
tempore; utrumque autem ex Deo. Ex ipso enim, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt
omnia (Rom. XI,36).
It should be noted that Taylor (in The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Volume
I) loosely translates creaturae as "nature". The text literally reads "If there
were no motion of either a spiritual or corporeal creature
Cf. Confessiones XI.l4(17): CC xxvii, 202-203.
63.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,15(29): PL xxxiv,3/1, 257: Quamobrem, cum simul

utrumque Deus fecerit, et materiam quam formavit, et res in quas earn formavit,
et utrumque ab Scriptura dici oportuerit, nee simul utrumque dici potueri t . . .
127
Quia etiam cum dicimus materiam et formam, utrumque simul esse intelligimus,
nee utrumque simul possumus enuntiare. Sicut autem in brevitate temporis
contingit, cum duo ista verba proferimus, ut alterum ante alterum proferamus:
ita in prolixitate narrationis alterum prius quam alterum narrandum fuit,
quamvis utrumque, ut dictum est, simul fecerit Deus; ut quod sola origine
prius est in faciendo, etiam tempore prius sit in narran do . . .
Cf. De Genesi ad litteram V,5(14): PL xxxiv,3/1, 326.
A temporal order or succession is also suggested in the creation of the
hierarchy of creatures described in Genesis. In this scheme, some things were
created actually (insofar as God made them at the outset), whereas other
things were created in a potential or seminal state (so that God established
the necessary grounds for their emergence under the proper conditions in the
course of history). According to Augustine's interpretation, the created hierarchy unfolds in the following manner: first, creatures which know the Creator through the creature (specifically, the angels); second, the firmament
(with which the creation of the physical universe commences); third, sea and
earth (and on the earth, plant life potentially); fourth, light and stars; fifth,
the waters (and potentially, the fishes and birds that dwell in them); sixth,
terrestrial animals (in a potential state).
Cf. De Genesi ad litteram V,5(14): PL xxxiv,3/1, 326:
Oportebat enim ut primatum creaturae obtineret ilia natura, quae
creaturam per Creatorem, non Creatorem per creaturam posset
agnoscere. Secundo, firmamentum unde corporeus incipit mundus.
Tertio, species maris et terrae, atque in terra potentialiter, ut ita dicam,
natura herbarum atque lignorum. Sic enim terra ad Dei verbum ea
produxit, antequam exorta essent, accipiens omnes numeros eorum quos
per tempora exsereret secundum suum genus.Deinde, posteaquam haec
velut habitatio rerum condita est, quarto die luminaria et sidera creata
sunt, ut prius pars mundi superior, rebus quae intra mundum moventur
visibilibus ornaretur. Quinto, aquarum natura, quia caelo aerique
conjungitur, produxit ad Dei verbum indigenas suos, omnia scilicet
natatilia et volatilia; et haec potentialiter in numeris, qui per congruos
temporum motus exsererentur. Sexto, terrestria similiter animalia,
tanquam ex ultimo elemento mundi ultima; nihilominus potentialiter,
quorum numeras tempus postea visibilite explicaret.
64.
De Ciuitate Dei Xll,26: CC xlviii (pars xiv,2), 382-383: Quaelibet igitur corporales uel seminales causae gignendis rebus adhibeantur, siue operationibus
angelorum aut hominum aut quorumque animalium siue marium feminarumque
mixtionibus; quaelibet etiam desideria motusue animae matris ualeant aliquid
liniamentorum aut colorum aspergere teneris mollibusque conceptibus: ipsas
omnino naturas, quae sic uel sic in suo genere afficiantur, non facit nisi summus
Deus, cuius occulta potentia cuncta penetrans incontaminabili praesentia facit
esse quidquid aliquo modo est, in quantumque est; quia nisi faciente illo non
tale uel tale esset, sed prorsus esse non posset.
128
65.
De Civitate Dei XII,26: CC xlviii (pars xiv,2), 382: Cum enim alia sit species,
quae adhibetur extrinsecus cuicumque materiae corporali, sicut operantur
homines figuli et fabri atque id genus opifices, qui etiam pingunt et effigunt
formas similes corporibus animalium; alia uero, quae intrinsecus efficientes
causas habet de secreto et occulto naturae uiuentis atque intellegentis arbitrio,
quae non solum naturales corporum species, uerum etiam ipsas animantium
animas, dum non fit, facit: supra dicta ilia species artificibus quibusque tribuatur;
haec autem altera non nisi uni artifici, creatori et conditori Deo, qui mundum
ipsum et angelos sine ullo mundo et sine ullis angelis fecit.
66.
De Civitate Dei XII,26: CC xlviii (pars xiv,2), 383: Quapropter si in ilia specie,
quam forinsecus corporalibus opifices rebus inponunt, urbem Romam . . .
non fabros et architectos, sed reges, quorum uoluntate consilio imperio
fabricatae sunt, illam Romulum ... habuisse dicimus conditores: quanto
potius non nisi Deum debemus conditorem dicere naturarum, qui neque ex ea
materia facit aliquid, quam ipse non fecerit, nee operarios habet, nisi quos
ipse creaueri t . . .
67.
Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Confessions. The Odyssey of Soul

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1969). 21.
68.
Confessiones XII,5(5): CC xxvii, 218: Cum in ea quaerit cogitatio, quid sensus attingat, et dicit sibi: "Non est intellegibilis forma sicut uita, sicut iustitia,
quia materies est corporum, neque sensibilis, quoniam quid uideatur et quid
sentiatur in inuisibili et incomposita non est" . . .
69.
Confessiones XII,5(5): CC xxvii, 218: dum sibi haec dicit humana cogitatio,
conetur earn uel nosse ignorando uel ignorare noscendo.
70.
Confessiones XII,6(6): CC xxvii, 219: citius enim non esse censebam, quod
omni forma priuaretur, quam cogitabam quiddam inter formam et nihil nee
formatum nee nihil, informe prope nihil.
71.
Confessiones XIII,5(6): CC xxvii, 244: Et tenebam iam patrem in dei nomine,

qui fecit haec, et filium in principii nomine, in quo fecit haec, et trinitatem
credens deum meum, sicut credebam, quaerebam in eloquiis sanctis eius, et
ecce spiritus tuus superferebatur super aquas. Ecce trinitas deus meus, pater
et filius et spiritus sanctus, creator uniuersae creaturae.
72.
Confessiones XIII,2(3): CC xxvii, 243: Quid te promeruit materies corporalis,

ut esset saltern inuisibilis et incomposita, quia neque hoc esset, nisi quia fecisti?
ldeoque te, quia non erat, promereri ut esset non poterat. Aut quid te promeruit
inchoatio creaturae spiritalis, ut saltern tenebrosa fluitaret similis abysso, tui
dissimilis, nisi per idem uerbum conuerteretur ad idem, a quo facta est . . .
In Confessiones XII,2(2). Augustine delineates a scale or hierarchy of excellence regarding the creation of spiritual and corporeal natures, whereby
formless spiritual things are deemed better than formed bodies, and formless
corporeal beings are better than no bodies at all.
129
73.
Confessiones Xll,8(8): CC xxvii, 220: illud autem totum prope nihil erat,
quoniam adhuc omnino informe erat; iam tamen erat, quod formari poterat.
Tu enim, domine, fecisti mundum de materia informi, quam fecisti de nulla re
paene nullam rem, uncle faceres magna, quae miramur filii hominum.
74.
Emilie Zum Brunn, Le Dilemme De L'Etre et Du Neant chez Saint Augustin

(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1969), 93:
En ce premier 'moment', ce n' est encore que I' element materiel des etres
spirituels qui est cree, le fiat lux designant le second 'moment', celui de Ia
formation. Augustin caracterise cet element materiel par l'informite, definie
elle-meme comme une mutabilite fonciere, au sens qu'elle peut revetir n'importe
quelle forme: capax formarum omnium.
Cf. A. Solignac, Bib/iotheque augustinienne 14, note 23, 599 sq. (quoted
by Zum Brunn, p. 93, n. 70):
De meme qu'Augustin doit a Plotin une juste idee de l'~tre divin, illui
doit aussi celle de Ia matiere. Plotin donne en effet, tout comme Augustin,
Ia mutabilite, specialement Ia generation et Ia corruption, comme preuve
de Ia matiere (Enn.II,4,6) ... Ia notion augustinienne de matiere ne
correspond pas exactement a celle de Ia matiere prime d'Aristote qui
n'est pensable et n'existe qu'en correlation avec une forme. A travers
Plotin, Augustin rejoint plutot Ia notion platonicienne de xwpa . . .
pour Augustin, Ia matiere-tout comme le temps dont l'etre est tendance
a ne pas etre (Con/. Xl,14,17)-est une realite paradoxale nous dirions
aujourd'hui dialectique; ni negation pure, ni realite definie, mais
negativite dynamique. En tant que negativite, elle dit absence totale
de forme, informite absolue; en tant que negativite dynamique, elle est
le principe de Ia mutabilite, Ia mutabilite meme et Ia capacite de recevoir
les formes.
75.
Ennead 11.4(12).3.
A.H. Armstrong's remarks on Plotinus's understanding of the formlessness of matter underscore its affinities with what we find in Augustine ("Spiritual or intelligible Matter in Plotinus and St. Augustine," in Augustin us Magister I. Congres International Augustinien (Paris, 1954), 278-279):
We have . . . in Plotinus the conception of a formless, potential element in the intelligible world which is good, not evil, and not independent but generated or made by the One, which is formed and given
definite reality by returning in contemplation to its Source. We should
note that in his thought matter, the formless unbounded element, is
never simply static and neutral but always a dynamic tendency, a movement either towards form (in the intelligible world) or away from and
against form (in the sense world), either to greater unification . . . or
to indefinitely increasing multiplicity.
In this classic monograph, Armstrong offered a highly illuminating and
balanced assessment of the grounds for assuming that Augustine adapted
130

Plotinian insights in his exegesis of Genesis (and more specifically, in respect
to his interpretation of the creation and formation of spiritual matter).
76.
Ennead 11.4(12).16; 11.6(24).14.
77.
Plato, Sophist 237a-d, trans. F. M. Cornford in The Collected Dialogues of

Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1966):
The audacity of the statement lies in its implication that 'what is not'
has being. But ... the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified
against this, constantly telling us what he also says in his poem, 'Never
shall this be proved-that things that are not are, but do thou, in thy
inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.'
. . . setting aside disputation for its own sake and playing with words,
suppose one of this company were seriously required to concentrate his
mind and tell us to what this name can be applied-'that which is not.'
Of what thing or of what sort of thing should we expect him to use it
himself, and what would he indicate by it to the inquirer?
. . . this much is clear at any rate, that the term 'what is not' must
not be applied to anything that exists.
78.
De Magistro 11,3: CC xxix, 160-161: quod autem non est, nullo modo esse
aliquid potest. Quid igitur facimus? An affectionem animi quandam, cum rem
non uidet et tamen non esse inuenit aut inuenisse se putat, hoc uerbo significari
dicimus potius quam rem ipsam quae nulla est?
Augustine finds the very inscrutability of the nihil the occasion for a pun.
In this connection, see De Magistro 11,3: CC xxix, 161: Transeamus ergo
hinc, quoque modo se habet, ne res absurdissima nobis accidat.
Quae tandem?
Si "nihil" nos teneat et moras patiamur.
Ridiculum hoc quidem est et nescio quo tandem modo uideo posse
contingere, immo plane uideo contigisse.
79.
De Moribus Manichaeorum 11(1): PL xxxii, 1345: Hoc enim intellecto atque

perfecto, simul viderent id esse quod summe ac primitus esse rectissime dicitur.
Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum est, quod semper eodem modo sese habet,
quod omnimodo, sui simile est, quod nulla ex parte corrumpi ac mutari potest,
quod non subjacet tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea,
non potest. ld enim est quod esse verissime dicitur. Subest enim huic verbo
manentis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturae significatio. Hanc
nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere, cui si contrarium recte quaeras nihil
omnino est. Esse enim contrarium non habet, nisi non esse. Nulla est ergo
Deo natura contraria.
80.
In this connection, Robert J. O'Connell, S.J. (St. Augustine's Early Theory

of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1968), 187)
observes that Augustine's conception of the nihil (at least in his early writings) comes "uncomfortably close to the Neoplatonic non-being (me on)," and
131
the quasi-existence which Plotinus attached to that notion (Ennead 1.8). In

contrast to O'Connell's contention, Ludwig Koenen ("Augustine and
Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex," Illinois Classical Studies
3(1978): 159) proposes that Augustine's conception of the nihil assumes the
character of an a liquid, along with the negative qualities of Manichaean hyle.
Koenen (p. 159, n. 22) further observes that Augustinian nihil takes on almost the quality of being, just as matter is designated as a "near-nothing"
(paene nihil).
81.
De Beata Vita 2(8): CC xxix, 70: nihil est enim omne, quod fluit, quod soluitur,
quod liquescit et quasi semper perit.
82.
Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 628c-629c.
83.
cf. Cicero, pro Rabirio Perdue/lion is Reo 30: ex hominum uita ... demigrasse;
Salust, lugurtha 13.7: ut ex maxima inuidia in gratiam ... ueniret; Gaius,
Institutiones 4.164: antequam ex iure exeat; Plautus, Amphitruo III: utrimque
est grauida, et ex uiro et ex summo Ioue; M. Terentius Varro, de Lingua
Latina 5.28: ex ambitu causam dicit; Tacitus, Annates 16.23: rerum ex
proconsulatu Asiae.
84.
For Augustine's use of the formula creatio ex nihi/o, cf. De Vera Religione
xvii,34-xviii,36; De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 78; De Fide
et Symbolo 1,2(2). For Augustine's use of the formula creatio de nihi/o, cf.
De Ciuitate Dei XII,5; De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,6(10); 1,7(11).
85.
Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 485c-486b.
86.
Cf. Lucretius I, 159: si de nilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus omne genus nasci
posset; Vergil, Georgica 3.13: templum de marmore ponam; Albius Tibullus
2.1.59: uemo ... de flore coronam fecit; Ovid, Fasti 3.184: adspice de canna
straminibusque domum; Juvenal 5.165: signum de paupere !oro; Cn. Gellius
2. 26.11: fuluus . . . de rufo atque uiridi mixtus.
87.
De Natura Boni 1(2-6): CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855: cetera omnia bona nonnisi
ab illo sunt, set non de illo. de illo enim quod est, hoc quod ipse est; ab illo
autem quae facta sunt, non sunt quod ipse. ac per hoc si solus ipse
incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt.
88.
De fide et Symbolo 4(5): PL xl,184: Quantamcumque enim creaturam dicant,

si creatura est, condita et facta est. Nam idem est condere, quod creare:
quanquam in latinae linguae consuetudine dicatur aliquando creare, pro eo
quod est gignere; sed graeca discernit. Hoc enim dicimus creaturam, quod illi
Kl:L<Jlln vel K"tL<HV vocant: et cum sine ambiguitate loqui volumus, non dicimus,
creare, sed, condere.
89.
Contra Aduersarium Legis et Prophetarum 1,23(48): CC xlix,80: Si autem

quomodo scripturae sanctae, quibus iste insidiatur, loqui soleant, perscrutemur,
aut hoc est facere quod creare, a quo tamen distinguitur gignere, et uariandi
uerbi causa, non ad aliquam rerum differentiam dici potuit: Faciens bona et
132

creans mala, cum dici etiam posset, creans bona et faciens mala; aut si ullam
uoluisset propheticus spiritus hie esse distantiam, multo accommodatius sic
acciperentur haec uerba, ut intellegeremus id fieri, quod si non fieret, omnino
non esset, creari autem ex eo quod erat condi aliquid atque constitui, sicut
diximus creari magistratus atque urbes. Nam et illi ex his, qui iam homines
erant, constituuntur in honoribus, cum magistratus creantur; et ligna et Iapides,
quibus construuntur urbes, utique iam erant, sed nondum in illam rerum faciem,
quam uidemus in urbibus, quodam ordine et compositione uenerant, quod
cum fit creari urbes dicuntur. Quod enim Graeci appellant ktizein, hoc nostri
aliquando creare, aliquando constituere, aliquando condere interpretantur, quod
saepissime idem significat in illis litteris, quod est facere.
90.
Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum 1,23(48): CC xlix,80-81: Nam

et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei et deus creauit hominem
inexterminabilem, legimus; et si aliquando cum aliqua differentia dicitur, hoc
rectius potest interesse quod dixi, ut facere sit quod omnino non erat, creare
autem ex eo quod iam erat ordinando aliquid constituere.
91.
De moribus Manichaeorum 11,7(9): PL xxxii,1349: Creare namque dicitur

condere et ordinare. Facere enim est, quod omnino non erat; condere autem,
ordinare quod utcumque jam erat, ut melius magisque sit. Ea namque condit
Deus, id est ordipat, cum dicit, Condo mala, quae deficiunt, id est non esse
tendunt; non ea quae ad id quo tendunt, pervenerunt.
92.
A. Anthony Moon, The De Natura Boni of Saint Augustine. A Translation

with an Introduction and Commentary. Dissertation. The Catholic University
of America Patristic Studies, Vol. LXXXVlll. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 181. On the basis of Augustine's remarks in such works as the Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum
(1,23,48), the De fide et Symbo/o (4,5), and the De moribus II, 7, 9), Moon
(181) makes the following observation:
. . . it would seem that with respect to creation Augustine employs
these terms with the following meanings: Facere, to make out of nothing; condere, creare, ordinare, to improve something . . . either by
determining it to a form, thereby assigning it its position in the universal
divine order, or by supplying a deficiency of order in the case of anything which requires it.
Nonetheless, Augustine does not strictly adhere to this approach. As Moon

further observes (182):
. . . Augustine is not consistent in his use of these terms. In one sentence condere is used both in the sense given above and in the meaning
"to make from nothing". Again, fa cere appears in one sentence meaning both to make out of nothing and to determine to a form, while
creare is employed in the sense "to make out of nothing". It is clear that
in Augustine the precise meaning of the terms: facere, creare, condere,
and ordinare must be determined in each case from the context.
133
For an instance of Augustine's use of condere to describe both an act of

ordering and creation from nothing, see Confessiones V11,5(7): CC xxvii,97:
'Non enim esset omnipotens, si condere non posset aliquid boni, nisi ea,
quam ipse non condiderat, adiuuaretur materia.'
For Augustine's use of facere to describe both creation from nothing and
the shaping of a form, see De Genesi ad litteram V,5(13): PL xxxiv,326: Non
itaque temporali, sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque
materies, et spiritualis et corporalis, de qua fieret quod faciendum esset, cum
et ipsa priusquam instituta est, non fuisset.
For Augustine's use of creare to designate creatio ex nihilo, see
Confessiones V,10(20): CC xxviii,68: Hinc enim et mali substantiam quandam
credebam esse talem et habere suam molem tetram et deformem siue crassam,
quam terram dicebant, siue tenuem atque subtilem, sicuti est aeris corpus:
quam malignam mentem per illam terram repentem imaginantur. Et quia deum
bonum nullam malam naturam creasse qualiscumque me pietas credere cogebat,
constituebam ex aduerso sibi duas moles, utramque infinitam, sed malam
angustius, bonam grandius, et ex hoc initio pestilentioso me cetera sacrilegia
sequebantur.
93.
De Vera Religione xvii,34-xviii,36: CCXXXII, 208-209: ita diuina prouidentia,

cum sit ipsa omnino incommutabilis, mutabili tamen creaturae uarie subuenit
et pro diuersitate morborum alias alia iubet aut uetat, ut a uitio, uncle mors
incipit, et ab ipsa morte ad naturam suam et essentiam ea quae deficiunt, id
est ad nihilum tendunt, reducat et firmet.
Sed dicis mihi: Quare deficiunt? Quia mutabilia sunt. Quare mutabilia sunt?
Quia non summe sunt. Quare non summe sunt? Quia inferiora sunt eo, a quo
facta sunt. Quis ea fecit? Qui summe est. Quis hie est? Deus incommutabilis
trinitas, quoniam et per summam sapientiam ea fecit et summa benignitate
conseruat. Cur ea fecit? Vt essent. lpsum enim quantumcumque esse bonum
est, quia summum bonum est summe esse. Vnde fecit? Ex nihilo. ld igitur est,
uncle fecit deus omnia, quod nullam speciem habet nullamque formam, quod
nihil est aliud quam nihil. Quapropter etiam si de aliqua informi materia factus
est mundus, haec ipsa facta est de omnino nihilo.
94.
De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, quaestio 78: CC xliv (A), 223:

ars ilia summa omnipotentis dei, per quam ex nihilo facta sunt omnia, quae
etiam sapientia eius dicitur, ipsa operatur etiam per artifices, ut pulchra et
congruentia faciant, quamuis non de nihilo, sed de aliqua materia operentur,
uelut ligno aut marmore aut ebore et si quod aliud materiae genus manibus
artificis subditur. Sed ideo non possunt isti de nihilo aliquid fabricare . . .
95.
De Civitate Dei XII,5: PL 41, 353: Quae cum ita sint, Deus qui summe est,
atque ob hoc ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est (quia
neque illi aequalis esse deberet, quae de nihilo facta esset); neque ullo modo
esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset . . .
96.
De Fide et Symbolol,2(2): PL 40, 181: Cum enim dicunt esse naturam quam
Deus omnipotens non creaverit, de qua tamen istum mundum fabricaverit,
quem pulchre ordinatum esse concedunt; ita omnipotentem Deum negant, ut
134

non eum credant mundum potuisse facere, nisi ad eum fabricandum alia natura,
quae iam fuerat, et quam ipse non fecerat, uteretur . . . Aut si omnipotentem
Deum fabricatorem mundi esse concedunt, fateantur necesse est ex nihilo
eum fecisse quae fecit.
97.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251;1,9(16): PL xxxiv,3/1, 252.
98.
De Genesi ad litteram IV,16(27): PL xxxiv,3/1, 306-307: Porro alia res bona

praeter ipsum nulla est, quam ipse non fecit; ac per nullo praeter se alio bono
eget, qui bono quod fecit non eget.
99.

Cf. Athanasius, De Incarnatione 3, which attributes the motive for creation to God's goodness. Accordingly, the creation of everything from nothing (through the Word) is an expression of Divine goodness. The notion that
the emergence of reality is the outgrowth of Divine goodness is also prominent in Neoplatonism. For Plotinus, the diffusiveness of the One (and the
subsequent generation of being other than the One) is the result of the One's
absolute goodness. For Plotinus, that which is perfect and good must give of
itself (Enneads V.4(7).1; V.1(10).6).
100. De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,2(4): PL xxxiv,3/1, 175: Si ergo isti dixerint,
Quid placuit Deo facere coelum et terram? Causas enim voluntatis Dei scire
quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet
causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas
est credere. Qui ergo dicit, Quare fecit Deus coelum et terram? respondendum est ei, Quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est coeli et terrae, et ideo
major est voluntas Dei quam coelum et terra. Qui autem dicit, Quare voluit
facere coelum et terram? majus aliquid quaerit quam est voluntas Dei: nihil
autem majus inveniri potest.
cf. Confessiones XI.l0(12): CC xxvii, 200.
Chapter 3
Augustine's Refutation of
the Manichaean Cosmogony
Augustine's most thoroughgoing rejection of the Manichaean cosmogony is found in his Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant
fundamenti liber unus, written around the year A.D. 397, shortly
after his consecration as Bishop of Hippo. 1 The Fundamental Epistle
(or Foundation Letter) to which the title refers seems to have constituted a compendium of basic Manichaean teachings that might have
served as an introductory manual or catechism for the use of initiates
into the sect. 2 By means of extensive quotations, Augustine provides
a valuable source regarding the contents of this important document.
His own familiarity with the Fundamental Epistle was probably the
result of his early experience as an auditor in Mani's religion.
At the outset, Augustine prays to God for that state of mind which
will enable him to secure the Manichaeans' recovery. 3 Accordingly, he
seeks to correct their errors by kindly consolation, friendly exhortation, and quiet discussion, rather than contention, strife, and persecutions. 4 This is clearly the attitude of one with a intimate acquaintance
with Manichaeism and an awareness of its power to attract even the
most intellectually astute individuals as devoted followers. 5 But while
Augustine exhibits compassion toward his former associates, he is not
reluctant to proclaim the truth he has found in the Catholic Church.
This truth, he stresses, was not acquired on the basis of any elaborate
myth, but by Divine assistance and the testimony of Sacred
Scripture. 6
Nonetheless, Augustine avows to suspend judgment, and approach
the Manichaeans as "a stranger now for the first time hearing you, for
the first time examining your doctrines." 7 In this vein, he goes so far
as to express a willingness to join them in their prayers and meetings,
136
Augustine's Refutation of Manichaean Cosmogony
and even to adopt the title of "Manichaean" if they can provide a clear
explanation of everything regarding salvation. 8 In view of what the
Catholic Church now offers him, however, the prospect of truth is the
only thing that could still attract him to Manichaeism. 9
Opposition to Manichaean Claims of Authority

Augustine first addresses Mani's bold claim to be an apostle of Jesus
Christ, along with the appellation of "Paraclete" attributed to Mani by
his followers. 1 From Augustine's standpoint, the Manichaeans fail to
provide any certitude for these contentions for two reasons: either
they proceed from a distortion of Scriptural teachings, or lack the
very rational justification that they profess to offer their adherents. 11
Augustine, on the contrary, prefers to ground his belief in genuine
Scriptural teachings which provide an indisputable claim to the truth
and a sufficient basis of belief. 12
Once he disposes of the claims of Mani's apostleship with Christ
(and union with the Paraclete), Augustine examines the Fundamental
Epistle itself, the avowed means to enlightenment among Mani's followers. On the surface, the Fundamental Epistle offers its readers
exactly what Augustine wishes-solid, incontestable evidence for the
truth which will dispel any further uncertainty. In view of the rewards
which Mani holds out to him, then, Augustine has no recourse but to
consider his words with great care. "Let us hear," he invites, "what he
has to state." 13 Mani's initial assertion, however, is rather difficult to
accept:
For he is to be judged truly blessed who has been instructed in this divine
knowledge, by which he is made free and shall abide in everlasting life. 14
In these words, Augustine perceives the mere promise of truth, rather

than its issuance. Indeed, the very claim to a possession of "divine
knowledge" on Mani's part can only lay a trap for the unwary. 15
Augustine's ensuing discussion focuses upon the Epistle's claim to
provide a clear knowledge of truth which will free its recipients of
degeneration and mortality.
As we have seen, the hallmark of Manichaeism was a thoroughgoing dualism that viewed the universe as the setting for a struggle between Light and Darkness (Good and Evil, respectively). According to
the Manichaean myth, the emergence of the visible world was precipitated by a primordial conflict between these competing regions. This
13 7
conflict gave rise to the present age, when Light first became intermingled with Darkness. In the primordial age (when the regions were
distinct), the Father remained completely aloof from the influence of
Evil. But this innocence only opened the luminous region to the incursion of sinister powers. In contrast to Light (which exhibited an essentially passive character), Darkness was active, hostile, and belligerent.
Motivated by a concupiscence, Darkness invaded the region of Light.
Augustine's refutation of Manichaean dualism centers upon the very
notion of such a conflict between the principles of Good and Evil.
The Primordial Conflict
Augustine recounts Mani's teaching on this topic in these terms:

Accordingly . . . hear first, if you please, what happened before the constitution of the world, and how the battle was carried on, that you may be able to
distinguish the nature of light from that of darkness. 16
Augustine's ensuing critique of this tenet presupposes the traditional theory of knowledge as "justified true belief." 17 In this connection, he observes that credibility alone is no guarantee of knowledge. 18
For example, an assertion that the Persians and Scythians once fought
might indeed be credible. But in the absence of a means to independent verification on our own, we accept this statement as true on the
basis of our reliance upon some source. But since it lacks sufficient
justification (either of a rational or empirical nature), such an uncritical
belief (even regarding a true statement) can never meet Augustine's
rigid criteria for genuine knowledge.
On the basis of Augustine's epistemological presuppositions, then,
the Manichaean teaching regarding a primordial battle before the
world's making cannot compel even the slightest assent. "Who can
believe," he queries, "that any battle was fought before the constitution of the world?" 19 And even if it were credible, it could never be
demonstrated as a fact of experience or truth of the understanding.
Augustine simply will not accept statements which are not only uncertain, but wholly incredible. 20
The Fundamental Epistle's teaching regarding the original separation of the substances of Light and Darkness is the focus of a similar
epistemological analysis. In this account, God the Father governed the
region of Light, and joined an infinite number of worlds to himself. 21
Augustine again questions the justification for Mani's teaching, now
138
addressing the authority of the Fundamental Epistle as a source of

truth. 22 In response to the Manichaeans' claim to provide indubitable
rational truth, Augustine demands nothing less than certitude. Even if
his opponents resort to revelatory claims of a divine enlightenment,
such "knowledge" amounts to a private intuition accessible only to
Mani. 23 The very inability of Mani's teaching to compel wide intellectual assent renders his religion no more than the private gnosis of its
founder. The Manichaean following, then, must be composed exclusively of passive believers who accept Mani's words without sufficient
evidence or proof. "Such were we," Augustine admits, "when in our
inexperienced youth we were deceived." 24 In contrast, he now encourages a belief in teachings which rest upon the authority of Sacred
Scripture, and thereby, enjoy a wide-spread renown among the learned
and unlearned alike.25
The Two Bordering Regions
But the incredible character of Mani's doctrines is not the only object
of Augustine's polemic. He also attacks their blatant falsehood. This
falsehood is evident in the contention that the region of Darkness
(and its five separate natures of darkness, murky waters, winds, fire,
and smoke) borders on the glorious region of Light.26 Augustine's
rebuttal of this claim proceeds from a broader discussion of the character of immaterial reality, specifically as it pertains to wisdom, truth,
and the nature of the human soul.
To speak of God as an aerial or even as an ethereal body is absurd in the view
of all who, with a clear mind, possessing some measure of discernment, can
perceive the nature of wisdom and truth as not extended or scattered in space,
but as great, and imparting greatness without material size, nor confined . . .
in any direction, but throughout co-extensive with the Father of all, nor having one thing here and another there, but everywhere perfect, everywhere
present. 27
In essence, Augustine's argument runs as follows: if the soul has no

spatial limits or extension, then wisdom and truth must transcend
these restrictions as well, since wisdom and truth surpass the soul in
excellence. This argument presupposes that whatever consists of matter
must be divisible into different parts, and that any bodily substance
(whether of a celestial or terrestrial nature) must be less in respect to
its parts than in relation to the whole substance. 28 All the parts of
139
individual bodies are distinct, so that no part can assume the place or
spatial extension of any other part of that same substance. 29 But in a
spiritual nature like the soul, the whole must be present everywhere.
Because the soul has no spatial extension, it remains "all present in
each separate part of its body when it is all present in any sensation."30 When the finger is touched, Augustine contends, the whole
mind feels it, despite the fact that only one part of the body is affected. 31 Since the mind is completely present in the sensations which
proceed from individual bodily parts, then, Augustine concludes that
the mind is not confined to space.
An additional argument focuses upon the nature of the soul or mind
itself: since the mind is capable of retaining or forming images of
things which far exceed the body in size, it cannot be subject to the
limitations of spatial extension. "Who can conceive," Augustine queries, "where these images are contained ... kept, orformed ... ? "32
He concludes that the mind is neither diffused through space, nor
contained in images. Rather, it contains them. 33
The foregoing deliberations have a direct applicability to Augustine's
Manichaean opponents. For just as we have the power to conjure up
images, we can also perceive truth and distinguish truth from falsehood. In this sense, the Manichaean teaching regarding the boundless
land of Light and the five dens of Darkness is clearly a product of the
imagination with absolutely no truth-value. 34 In opposition to this teaching, Augustine affirms God's freedom from any spatial confines. But
since God is greater than spiritual natures (which have no material
extension), He must be immune to material extension as well. 35
The full recognition of God's freedom from material or spatial limitations had been slow in coming to Augustine. As the previous chapter has shown, his initial difficulties with the Old Testament (especially
its teachings regarding God and His role as Creator) proceeded from
certain materialistic presuppositions that dominated his outlook for
much of his youth. This is not to say that he was content with such a
materialistic approach to theology. As he relates in Book VII of the
Confessiones, he simply could not accept that God could have a human form (at least from the time he had committed himself to the
philosophical way of life at the age of nineteen). 36 Paradoxically, however, he found that his conception of God (as well as everything else)
still depended upon phantasms (i.e., sense images produced by the
mind).
140
Although I did not think of you as being in the shape of a human body, I was
forced to think of you as something corporeal, existent in space and place,
either infused into the world or even diffused outside the world through infinite spaceY
At this point (around the age of thirty-one), Augustine clearly viewed

spatiality as a criterion of the really real. From this standpoint, whatever lacked spatial dimensions could not be said to exist.
For if a body is removed from a place, and the place remains empty of any
body whatsoever, whether earthly, watery, airy, or celestial, yet there remains
that empty space, as it were a spacious nothing. 38
At this juncture, then, Augustine's conception of God was grounded

exclusively upon corporeal and spatial images. Although he acknowledged the infinite character of God's nature, he interpreted Divine
infinity in terms of an immense corporeal substance diffused through
space. 39 Creation, in turn, was understood as a single mass encircled
on every side and penetrated thoroughly by the infinite Godhead.
It was as if there was a sea ... that was everywhere and on all sides infinite
over boundless reaches. It held within itself a sort of sponge, huge indeed, but yet
finite, and this sponge was filled in every part by that boundless sea. Thus did
I conjecture that your finite creation was filled by you, the infinite. 40
While Manichaeism clearly fostered such a mentality in Augustine,

this way of conceptualizing the Godhead was also a prominent feature
of early Greek cosmology and the general intellectual milieu in which
he came of age. In the Pre-Socratic period, Anaximander had characterized the ultimate principle of reality as the unlimited (apeiron), an
eternal, indestructible, and quantitatively inexhaustible body. 41 In the
materialistic pantheism of Stoicism (a tradition which shaped
Augustine's early theological presuppositions through the agency of
Clement, Origen, Tertullian, and Lactantius), God was linked with mind
and matter, and like everything else, subjected to the effects of cosmic
process. On the basis of his reading of The Ten Categories of Aristotle,
Augustine assumed that whatever exists must be understood in terms
of substance and its nine predicates (i.e., quantity, quality, passion,
action, time, place, relation, habit, and posture). In short, he believed
that God's greatness and beauty were in Him "as in a subject, just as
they are in bodies." 42
In Manichaeism, then, Augustine merely found a more simplistic
(albeit outlandish) version of a materialistic strain of thought deeply
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embedded in natural science, philosophy, and popular culture. Once

in the grip of materialism, however, he was also open to the fantastic
dualism espoused by the Manichaeans. For, if evil exists and impinges
upon human existence, it must have a substantiality of its own which
places it in direct opposition to God.
I believed that evil is some such substance and that it possesses its own foul
and hideous mass, either gross, which they styled the earth, or thin and
subtle, as is the body of the air, which they imagine to be a malignant mind
stealing through the earth. 43
From this standpoint, even a part of God is finite, at least that part
which must confront the substance of Evil. For Augustine, however,
such a drastic challenge to the supremacy and inviolability of the Divine nature was still preferable to depicting God in the form of a human body, or imputing to Him the cause of evil. 44
While Augustine abhorred his reliance upon "vain images," he lacked
any viable alternative. His personal reflections on this dilemma provide us with some of the most poignant passages in the Confessiones.
"If I were only able to conceive a spiritual substance," he lamented,
"then forthwith all those strategems would be . . . cast out of my
mind. "45 Even after his disaffection from Manichaeism, he was still still
shackled to a corporeal and spatial understanding of reality that decisively shaped his view of the Divine nature and creation as a whole.
Clearly, a whole new perspective was needed if he was to surmount
this obstacle. In addition to his exposure to Ambrose's sermons, the
crucial breakthough came with his reading of the libri platonicorum. 46
By means of these Neoplatonic writings, he found a radically different
way of coming to terms with the Divine nature and the relation between God and creation.
At that time, after reading those books of the Platonists and being instructed
by them to search for incorporeal truth, I clearly saw your invisible things
which 'are understood by the things that are made.' I was made certain that
you exist, that you are infinite, although not diffused throughout spaces, with
finite or infinite, that you are truly he who is always the same, with no varied
parts and changing movements, and that all other things are from you, as is
known by . . . the fact that they exist. 47
In effect, Augustine's conception of the Divine nature was now freed

from sense images and the narrow confines of spatiality. "I awoke in
you," he relates, "and I saw that you are infinite, although in a different way, and this vision was not derived from the flesh. "48 From this
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new vantage point, he saw that the infinity of God lay neither in spatial magnitude, nor in physical extension, nor in numerical quantity,
but rather, in an unbounded power transcending all ontological determinants. But this understanding of the infinite presupposes the spirituality and immutability of the Divine nature.
Only a God that is absolutely infinite, wholly incorporeal, and completely unchanging can be present to creation in its entirety without
any subjection to finite limitations, spatial confinement, or the negative effects of natural process. 49 Conversely, finite things stand in a
relation of utter dependence to the infinite Godhead for their very
existence.
I looked back over other things, and I saw that they owe their being to you,
and that all finite things are in you. They are there, not as though in a place,
but in a different fashion, because you contain all things in your hand by your
truth. 50
Through the conceptual lens which he derived from Neoplatonism,

Augustine could now view creation as a great tapestry of finite realities which are all good (both in an individual and a collective sense),
but in varying degrees of excellence.
It was made manifest to me that you have made all things good, and that
there are no substances whatsoever that you have not made. Since you have
not made all things equal, it follows that all things, taken one by one, are
good, and that all things, taken together, are very good. 51
The distinction between spiritual and corporeal reality was the vital
component in Augustine's critique of Manichaean materialism in the
Contra epistulam Manichaei. In this respect, he addresses his opponents as those "unfit to turn from the consideration of material things
to the study of an immaterial and spiritual nature . . . "52 But this failing
carries an added drawback: such individuals are also "unable to reflect
upon their own power of reflection," and thereby, unable to recognize
that the mind can form a judgment about material extension even if it
is not spatially extended. 53
On the basis of this criticism, Augustine poses the following question: in what direction was the region of Darkness and on what border
of the region of Light did it stand? In this context, he underscores the
fact that the very notion of "bordering" connotes spatial limits. 54 Thus,
a further question must be raised: what bounded the region of Light
on the sides that were not bordered by the region of Darkness? The
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Manichaeans, of course, would respond that the region of light is

infinite on those other sides which extend through boundless space.
But in that case, Augustine observes, there could be no other "sides",
since "sides" only exist where something is bounded. 55 Even if the
region of Light is bounded only on one side (like the region of Darkness), it must be material. Both regions, for that matter, must be material (1) if they are capable of being joined, and (2) if they exhibit
boundaries. Accordingly, Augustine assesses the scope and extent of
the "boundaries" of the region of Darkness.
Was the region of Darkness bounded on one side (like the region of
light), but boundless in its other directions? The Manichaeans did, in
fact, depict the region of Darkness as boundless in depth and length,
and situated it below an infinite range of empty space. Obviously, this
complex arrangement requires some illustration. Augustine proposes
the following example: consider a piece of bread that is divided into
four squares (three white and one black); the three white squares (representing the region of light) are infinite upward, downward, and backward, and are joined as one; the black square (representing the region
of Darkness) is infinite downward and backward, with an infinite emptiness above. In this case, Augustine concludes, the region of Darkness would be touched on two sides by the region of Light. But if it is
touched on two sides, it must also touch its counterpart on two sides.
Thus, there is a point of mutual contact between the regions. In
Augustine's reckoning, this configuration can only be defective, for
"though there may be no commixture of Darkness with light, there is
certainly penetration." 56
The foregoing critique discloses three weaknesses inherent in
Manichaean dualism: first, the Manichaeans must acknowledge that
both the region of Darkness and the region of Light are material in
nature, and thus, spatially bounded; secondly, they must admit that
the realm of light is debased and undermined by the incursion of the
region of Darkness at its critical point of contact; third, the region of
Light is subordinated in dignity and excellence to the realm of Darkness by virtue of the latter's incursion. "He is unconfined above in His
own nature," Augustine contends, "but encroached on below by a
hostile nature. "57 In this respect, Augustine views the theological anthropomorphism of carnal-minded Catholics as better than the
Manichaean conception of a violated and corrupted Godhead. While
such naive Catholic believers are at least capable of cultivating a spiritual understanding of God, the Manichaeans must remain content with
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Mani's teachings in their most literal terms, regardless of their fanciful

character. 58
Augustine now proposes a question that has a direct bearing on
the nature of God in the Manichaean scheme: were the Father and His
kingdoms (founded on the happy and shining region) of the same nature and substance as the region of Light? By means of an extended
series of related questions, Augustine demonstrates the lack of clarity
inherent in the Manichaean account. For the sake of simplification, let
us consider the mainlines of this inquiry (and its accompanying demonstration) in terms of Augustine's own order of presentation.
1. Do the Manichaeans say that the Father, the kingdoms and the
region of Light has its own particular nature?
2. Or, do they maintain that the Father and the kingdom have one
nature, and the region of Light another nature?
3. If the natures are distinct, in what sense does the region of Light
belong to God?
(a) If the region of Light has its own nature, it is possible that
God did not make or generate it.
(b) But, if it belongs to God because of its proximity to Him,
then the region of Darkness must be part of God as well,
by virtue of its penetration into the region of Light.
4. If God generated the region of Light, then it must have been
part of His nature, since whatever God generates is Divine. In
this case, however, the Manichaeans are led back to the blasphemy of believing that the region of Darkness violates the Divine nature itself.
5. If, on the other hand, God made the region of Light of what did
He make it?
(a) If He made it of His own nature, then this act would amount
to a generation of His nature.
(b) If He made it of a nature other than Himself, it must be
questioned whether the nature was good or evil.
(i) If the nature was a good one, then something good
must have existed in addition to God.
(ii) If the nature was an evil one, then there was an evil
nature that existed alongside the region of Darkness.
(c) Conversely, God might have taken the evil region and turned
it into the region of Light. But in that case, no evil nature
would have remained. 59
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On the basis of this rather prolonged (and somewhat tortuous) line of

reasoning, Augustine issues the Manichaeans a severe challenge.
If God ... did not make the region of Light of a substance distinct from His
own, He must have made it out of nothing. 60
Creatio de nihilo Affirmed

From Augustine's standpoint, the Manichaeans must confront an inescapable dilemma which necessitates their acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of creation. Once again, Augustine's argument can be
reduced to a more simplified form.
1. The Manichaeans cannot make the region of Light to be what
God is, without making the region of Darkness intrude upon the
Divine nature.
2. Similarly, they cannot say that the region of Light was generated
by God without reaching the same conclusion.
3. The Manich~eans cannot say that the region of Light was distinct from God, since they would be compelled to acknowledge
that God established His kingdom in an alien realm.
4. Nor can they hold that God made the region of Light of a distinct substance, without positing something other than God as
good or something other than the region of Darkness as evil. 61
Augustine concludes that God made the region of Light out of nothing.
If ... you are now convinced that God is able to create some good thing out
of nothing, come into the Catholic Church, and learn that all the natures
which God has created and founded in their order of excellence from the
highest to the lowest are good, and some better than others; and that they
were made of nothing, though God, their Maker, made use of His own wisdom . . . togivebeingtowhatwas not ... 62
The Manichaeans' refusal to accept this doctrine is correlative with

their radical dualism of opposing substances. Because they posit a
dichotomy between the regions of Light and Darkness, they could
never acknowledge that all things are created good. By the same token, they are completely unable to recognize an ordered hierarchy of
created realities extending from highest to lowest on the scale of being
and goodness. 63 But even an alternative configuration would not per-
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mit the Manichaeans to avoid the scandal of introducing such violent

upheaval into the region of Light. For whatever scheme they might
adopt, they must still come to terms with what Mani explicitly stated
in the Fundamental Epistle. 64
The Five Natures of the Region of Darkness
Augustine next examines the Manichaean notion of the region of

Darkness, focusing specifically upon the teaching that "there dwelt in
that region fiery bodies, destructive races. "65 Augustine seizes upon
the reference to "dwelling" and reasons that this term signifies that
the bodies in question were animated and living. According to Mani
(as quoted by Augustine at Contra epistulam XV.l9), there were five
bodies or natures that inhabited the region of Darkness: first, a boundless darkness and its products; secondly, muddy waters, along with
their inhabitants; third, violent winds, as well as their prince and progenitors; fourth, a fiery region of destruction, with its chiefs and
peoples; fifth, smoke, the abode of the mind and source of the many
princes which surround him. The entire scheme consists of five concentric circles, whereby each succeeding nature is contained in its predecessor: darkness constitutes the outermost circle; inside of darkness lie the muddy waters; inside of the muddy waters lie the winds;
inside of the winds lies fire; inside of fire lies smoke. While the natures
in question have inhabitants that are unique and proper to each, they
are really part of the dark, pestiferous region-a single nature in
itself. 66
In the face of this cosmogenic "no-man's land", Augustine adopts
an extremely optimistic stance: by acknowledging God as supreme
Creator of all things, he opens the possibility that even the region of
Darkness can contain some good. This possibility, in fact, is suggested
by the Manichaeans themselves. According to the Fundamental
Epistle, the region of Darkness has borders, sides, and natures characterized by distinctions, classifications, number, qualities, and suitable inhabitants. All of these features possess identifiable forms, appropriate dwellings, and life. But since such things are good, they
must ultimately be derived from God, the source of all goodness. 67
Augustine further deflates the Manichaeans' pessimism by highlighting the difference between the region of Darkness and the classical Hellenic notion of chaos (anoLOv)-a shapeless void wholly deprived of form, order, and intelligibility. 68 In contrast to such chaos,
the region of Darkness reveals a mixture of both good and evil. What
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the Manichaeans designate as extreme Evil, then, can reasonably be

viewed as at least partially good. For this reason, it clearly merits
some approval, along with our disdain. For Augustine's opponents,
the option is clear: if he joins them in condemning what is threatening
in this region, they must join him in praising what is beneficial. Indeed, such things certainly could not be produced or sustained without some salutary influence. 69 The chief characteristic of the region of
Darkness provides an excellent case in point: darkness is merely the
absence of light, rather than an independent substance per se. But
while darkness possesses no creative efficacy of its own, there is no
reason why an organized region of Darkness could not produce some
positive effects. Such productivity implies a beneficent adaptation of
substances, a symmetrical arrangement, and a unification of the parts
of the things that arise in this realm. 70
For Augustine, the region of Darkness reveals just such a "beneficent adaptation of substances" (along with form, order, and other
rational traits). From this standpoint, the Manichaean error lies in too
narrow a focus. Indeed, the traits of the dark region are deemed blameworthy only when compared with higher things. Likewise, they are
designated as evil only because they are defective versions of these
higher things. 71 But instead of preoccupying themselves with the deficiency inherent in the region of Darkness, the Manichaeans should
recognize the praiseworthy things it encompasses. One could, for
example, condemn water because it is muddy. But one could also praise
it for exhibiting the form of water, and the positive qualities that water
naturally possesses. 72 Augustine applies the same argumentation to
the other natures attributed to the region of Darkness: the winds are
indeed frightening, but they also provide breath and nourishment; fire
is certainly destructive, but it is likewise conducive to productivity;
smoke is dense and gloomy, but it can at least be admired for the unity
and harmony of its own nature. Each of the things which the
Manichaeans designate as "natures" in this context, then, are part of
the visible world and familiar to us in everyday experience. 73
The Goodness of the Whole
Augustine's various criticisms cluster around one key truth of Catholic

doctrine: God is the author of all natures. 74 While Augustine can find
a common ground with the Manichaeans in his condemnation of everything that they associate with their region of Darkness {i.e., destruction, blindness, murkiness, violence, corruption, and ferocity),
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he also urges them to join him in praising the good present in these
things. 75 In this way, the Manichaeans must acknowledge that the region of Darkness exhibits a commingling of both good and evil.
Augustine now demonstrates the fallacy of positing evil in an absolute sense, as an independent reality in its own right.
. . . if the evil mentioned were taken away, the good things will remain,
without anything to detract from the condemnation given to them; whereas, if
the good things are taken away, no nature is left. From this every one sees
. . . that every nature, as far as it is nature, is good; since in one and the same
thing in which I found something to praise, and he found something to blame,
if the good things were taken away, no nature will remain; but if the disagreeable things are taken away, the nature will remain unimpaired. 76
Such a position rests upon the presupposition of the ontological primacy {and logical priority) of good over evil: things can only be designated as evil in relation to existent things. Because God is the author
of anything which exists, anything which exists is fundamentally good.
But the Manichaeans might well respond that certain evils cannot
be removed from the natures in question, and therefore, must be considered as natural evils. 77 For Augustine, the crucial consideration is
not what can or cannot be removed from things. Rather, it lies in the
fact that if these natures were totally evil, they could neither exist, nor
even be conceptualized. Once conceptualized, however, we can also
think of them without any evil characteristics. As Augustine observes,
the Manichaeans themselves acknowledge that all good things come
from the supremely good God. When Mani placed good things in the
region of Darkness, however, he gave the deceptive impression that
evil exists on its own. 78
Evil as a Corruption of the Good
But what is the origin of evil? This question is highly significant in the
present context, since it touches upon the Manichaean teaching that
evil exists as an independent principle that impinges upon the Divine
nature. Before he addresses this issue, however, Augustine confronts
the more fundamental question concerning the definition of evil itself.
In this way, he wishes to avoid Mani's error of inquiring into the origin
of evil without an adequate understanding of its nature. This mistake,
he maintains, is the beginning of all the "foolish fancies" that constitute Mani's elaborate cosmogenic myth. 79
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In a very real sense, Augustine's refutation of the errors inherent in

Manichaean materialism and dualism provides the basis for the definition of evil which he now proposes. If God is truly infinite, incorporeal, and immutable, then He must be incorruptible as well. In the face
of this recognition of Divine incorruptibility, the materialist/dualist
response to the problem of evil no longer suffices. Indeed, if God is
God, He is immune to any corruption whatsoever. But by positing an
independent principle of substantial Evil, the Manichaeans severely
compromised the integrity of the Divine nature. As Augustine succinctly puts it in the Confessiones, "He is God . . . and He himself
is . . . good, whereas to be corrupted is not good." 8 Corruptibility,
then, is found only in finite realities. But if every finite nature is fundamentally good (since they depend upon God for their being), evil must
entail a corruption of the nature in which it is perceived. 81 At this
point, I confine my discussion to the implications of this definition of
evil and prescind from any investigation of its sources, or the process
whereby Augustine formulated it. These issues will be addressed in
some detail in the next chapter, where I focus on Augustine's most
highly developed response to the problem of evil, in the De Natura
Boni Manichaeos.
By means of this broad definition of evil as a corruption of nature,
Augustine avoids the impossible task of enumerating every instance of
evil and corruption encountered in the world. 82 But what constitutes
the corruption of a thing? Since every nature is good, whatever undergoes corruption is really deprived of a good which it already possessed. Even when corruption increases, the good is still present, but
only in a diminished way. Because corruption entails an undermining
or displacement of a natural state or condition, then, it is not identified with any specific nature. 83 Augustine's argument against the
Manichaean notion of absolute Evil can be framed in these terms:
The natures in the region of Darkness were either corruptible or

incorruptible.
(a} If they were incorruptible, they were in possession of a good
greater than any other good.
(b) If they were corruptible, they were corrupted or not corrupted.
(i} If they were not corrupted, they were incorrupt.
(ii} If they were corrupted, they were deprived of the great
good of incorruption which they previously possessed.
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(iii) If they possessed this good, they were not the essence
of evil.
Therefore, the Manichaean account of evil is false. 84
Now that Augustine has formulated a definition of evil, he is prepared to consider its origin. "Whence is this corruption," he asks,
"which we find to be the common evil of good things which are not
incorruptible?" 85 This question is motivated by two desires on
Augustine's part: first, he wishes to free God from any association
with corruptibility; secondly, he wishes to link corruptibility exclusively with non-being. Accordingly, corruptible natures were made by
God from nothing. 86 Here, Augustine makes a key distinction which
assumes a prominent role in the extended theodicy of the De Natura
Boni Manichaeos: what is born of God (i.e., the Divine Word) refers
to what is generated out of the Divine nature and possesses a perfect
and incorruptible good like God Himself; what is made by God out of
nothing pertains to contingent, mutable creatures which are distinct
from the Divine nature. 87
But while creatures are made out of nothing, they still share in the
Divine nature by virtue of their causal relation to their Creator. The
denial of their goodness, then, would be a grave error. Indeed, we
should not expect creatures to enjoy a complete parity with God (either in ontological or moral terms). As Augustine argues, it is impious
to call something defective simply because it is not what God is, or to
deny its goodness because it is inferior to God. 88 Such a valuation
would be tantamount to rejecting the natural order in which God rules
over all things, including the rational soul; while God governs the
soul, the soul in turn enjoys a privileged status as an image of God
that can govern all other good things in the hierarchy of creation. 89
From Augustine's standpoint, the mere fact that a creature is subordinate to God or even to other creatures does not render the creature
evil per se.
In general terms, then, the corruption of natures and their tendency toward decay and destruction proceeds from their creation out
of nothing. An added penalty justly accrues to rational natures (i.e.,
angels and human beings) as a result of sin. 90 This penal corruption
(which proceeds from the sin that Adam freely chose to commit) augments the corruption that attaches to created beings by virtue of their
finite, mutable character. On both levels, we perceive a movement
toward non-existence and a diminishing of the form proper to a nature. In this respect, corruption is the very antithesis of God. 91
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But in view of the preeminence of God in the realm of being, no

substantial nature can be contrary to God. If the Manichaeans acknowledge that God is the "supreme existence," they must also admit
that only non-existence is contrary to God. As Augustine's analysis
has demonstrated, corruption neither exists, nor possesses any efficacy of its own. When corruption diminishes things, it only does so to
the extent that God allows, in accordance with the dictates of a righteous, well-ordered judgment. 92 But we must still distinguish true corruption from the mere imperfections we encounter in the visible world.
Such imperfections do not mar the excellence of God's creation. On
the contrary, they provide the necessary contrasts which enable us to
grasp the beauty, order, and proportion of things. This is why Augustine cautions against confining our investigation exclusively to the visible world, as did the Manichaeans. 93 Only by broadening our cognitive vision to include immaterial reality can we overcome the heresy
which depicts the Divine nature in spatial, carnal terms, and conversely,
posits evil as an existent reality in its own right. 94
Salient Features of Augustine's Refutation
of the Manichaean Cosmogony
Initially, Augustine's reaction against the Manichaean cosmogony focuses upon the fact that it imposes boundaries on the Divine nature.
According to Augustine's critique, the Manichaeans reduce God to
the status of a corporeal substance, confining Him to the spatial extension which characterizes such reality. By recognizing the existence
of immaterial reality, Augustine can affirm the immunity of such things
as the soul, wisdom, and truth to quantitative determination. Since
God is greater than all of these spiritual realities, He must enjoy this
immunity as well. As Augustine knew from personal experience, it
was the Manichaeans' inability to conceive reality that transcends the
carnal or material level which accounted for their fantastic cosmogony.
In consequence of this limitation, they impart an efficacy to the principle of Evil, and conversely, place the principle of Good under the
hostile influence of Darkness. While the Manichaeans hold that only
the region of Darkness is material, they falsify this contention when
they make the region of Light contiguous with Darkness and subject
Light to the encroachment of Evil.
In the face of such faulty reasoning, but one position is acceptable:
we must maintain that God made the region of Light out of absolutely
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nothing. Only by upholding the creation of all good things out of

nothing can we free the Divine nature from any limitations or hostile
incursions. The Manichaeans, however, could never endorse this position: once they accepted that God could make a great good out of
nothing, they would also have to admit that God could produce a
hierarchy of goods exhibiting form and stability.
In Augustinian terms, created realities are good by virtue of their
participation in the Divine nature-their ultimate standard of goodness and being. In this context, however, "participation" does not
point to an equality of substance, but a relationship of dependence,
whereby things derive their goodness (and in broader metaphysical
terms, their very being) from God. Such dependence is absolute, since
creatures are brought into being by God out of utter non-being. But
while creatures participate in God's nature as His effects, they cannot
be perfect goods, precisely because they are finite.
In response to the extremist outlook of the Manichaeans, Augustine posits a graded hierarchy of created things that allows for a mixing
of good and evil. But an important qualification is required here: for
Augustine, evil cannot have an independent ontological status. Thus,
if the evil were removed from created things, any good they possess
would remain intact. Conversely, if created things were completely
devoid of good, they would cease to exist altogether.
In contrast to the Manichaeans, Augustine views goodness as correlative with being. For this reason, evil can only be discussed in terms
of its subordinate relation to an existent good. But how does Augustine define evil? In its broadest sense, evil is nothing else than a corruption of what exists. Since corruption stands in opposition to nature, its harmfulness lies in a displacement of a thing's natural state.
Once he has defined evil in such negative terms, Augustine addresses
the question of its origin. If everything God creates is good, how can
creatures be corruptible, and suffer under the negative effects of evil?
In a very real sense, Augustine answered this question when he affirmed that God created all good things from nothing. In Augustinian
terms, whatever is created from nothing is contingent, mutable, and
oriented toward non-being.
When viewed against the background of Augustine's sophisticated
analysis of the nature and origin of evil, the Manichaean cosmogony
appears naive and simplistic indeed. Overall, the Manichaeans adopted
an uncompromising, exclusivistic stance: things are either good or
evil in an absolute sense. In contrast, Augustine formulates a highly
153
inclusive approach: things can be both good and evil, natural and
corruptible, existent but tending toward non-being.
This position reflects a hierarchical vision of reality that admits a
broad spectrum of realities extending from God (as the highest exemplar of being and goodness), to creatures which are spiritual and immaterial (but nonetheless mutable), to mutable corporeal natures. As
Augustine will affirm in the De Civitate Dei, God gives existence in
varying degrees to natures which He arranges on an ontological scale.
In contrast to God (the source of all existence), the only contrary can
be non-existence (i.e., that which is simply nothing and not any essence). 95 When Augustine says that non-existence is contrary to God,
he does not mean that it represents a reality in its own right. No
reality can stand in opposition to God on equal terms, precisely because God brings all reality into existence from nothing.
Conclusion
In the Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, the

doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (or more precisely, creatio de nihilo)
provides the basis for Augustine's critique of three key features of
Manichaean dualism. First, the doctrine allows him to counter the
notion of a radical tension between opposing natures of Good and
Evil, Light and Darkness, respectively. God makes all things, everything which exists is good, and therefore, evil cannot exist as a substance or nature that impinges upon the good. Secondly, the doctrine
allows Augustine to free God from any imputation of evil. On the one
hand, creatures are susceptible to corruption and the effects of evil by
virtue of their mutability and the fact that they are brought into being
from nothing. On the other hand, corruption and evil plague us as a
result of sin, the voluntary choice of inferior things over God. 96 Third,
the doctrine permits Augustine to find good even in the humblest of
realities, or even in the most trying existential circumstances. All things
are fundamentally good because they proceed from God. But created
reality admits both good and evil. From Augustine's perspective, however, evil can only manifest itself in relation to good things, and not
vice versa. Evil cannot, as the Manichaeans maintain, assume an ontological priority which enables it to dominate and shape what God
creates.
For Augustine, that which is created out of nothing cannot exist on
the same ontological or moral level as its Creator. As the author of
154
existence, God remains wholly inviolate and completely unaffected by

the destructive movements of the will which gives rise to sin. Although
Augustine recognizes a blending of good and evil in created things, he
draws a sharp distinction between God as Creator and what He creates. This ontological distinction is a key component in his theodicy
and its attempt to resolve the problem of evil.
Notes
1.
The sweeping nature of Augustine's critique of the Manichaean world-view is

borne out in Retractationes: 11,28: CC LVII, 91: Liber contra epistulam
Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti (I) principia eius sola redarguit; sed in
ceteris illius partibus adnotationes ubi uidebatur adfixae sunt, quibus tota
subuertitur et quibus commonerer, si quando contra totam scribere uacuisset.
Hie liber sic incipit: Vnum uerum deum omnipotentem.
It should be noted that the term principia used in the above passage has a
certain ambiguity of meaning, designating both the initial stage of something
(in this case, the "beginning" of the foundational letter), or the first principles
of the Foundation Letter (if principia is construed as the plural form of
principium).
2.
Mary Inez Bogan, translation of Augustine's The Retractations in Fathers of

the Church 60 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1968),
122, n. 1; 123 (notes following translation of Retractationes 11,28). While
the Foundation Letter is no longer extant, it can be partially reconstructed
on the basis of Augustine's extensive quotes.
3.
Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vacant fundamenti liber unus (Hereafter referred to as "Contra epistulamj 1(1): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 193: Unum
uerum deum omnipotentem, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia,
et rogaui rogo, ut in refellenda et reuincenda haeresi uestra . . . det mihi
mentem pacatam atque tranquillam et magis de uestra correctione quam de
subuersione cogitantem.
4.
Contra epistulam 1(1): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 194: nostrum igitur fuit eligere et
optare meliora, ut ad uestram correctionem aditum haberemus, non in
contentione et aemulatione et persecutionibus, sed mansuete consolando,
beniuole cohortando, leniter disputando . . .
5.
Contra epistulam 11(2): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 194.
6.
Contra epistulam III(3): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 195.
7.
Contra epistulam 111(4): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 195: aut si hoc a uobis inpetrare
non possum, saltern illud concedite, ut uos tamquam incognitos nunc primum
audiam, nunc primum discutiam.
Clearly, there is a touch of irony in Augustine's remarks. As a result of his
nine-year association with the religion, he already had an intimate understanding of Manichaeism. Although he now professes to confront the Epistle
as a complete "stranger," he could never completely empty himself of his
knowledge of the sect (and his accompanying critical presuppositions about
its tenets). Despite his claims of a suspension of judgment, then, Augustine's
conclusion is obvious from the outset: Scriptural authority will triumph over
the fanciful (and erroneous) teachings of Mani.
156
8.
Contra epistulam IIJ(4): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 196.
9.
Contra epistulam IV(5): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 196-197.
10.
Contra epistulam V(6): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 197.

The validity of Augustine's contention that the Manichaeans attempted to
cast Mani's role in a trinitarian context (i.e., by linking him directly with the
Holy Spirit) is seriously called into question by Ludwig Koenen in an important monograph ("Augustine and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani
Codex," Illinois Classical Studies 3(1978): 154-195). Koenen argues (p.168)
that "Augustine did not understand or did not want to understand what the
Manichaeans meant by Mani's apostleship." In this connection, he points out
that for the Manichaeans, Mani was the apostle of "Jesus the Splendor,"
rather than the apostle of the historical Jesus (as Augustine apparently believed).
11.
Contra epistulam X(11): CSEL XXV (VI ,I), 206: quare aut omnes libros auferte
de medio et disputando pandite ueritatem, de qua dubitare non possim, aut
tales proferte libros, quibus non mihi cum adrogantia inponatur, quod credam,
sed exhibeatur sine fraude, quod discam.
12.
Contra epistulam IX(10): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 205.
13.
Contra epistulam XII(14): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 208.
14.
Contra epistulam Xl(12): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 206: nam profecto beatus est
iudicandus, qui hac diuina instructus cognitione fuerit, per quam liberatus in
sempiterna uita permanebit.
15.
Contra epistulam Xl(12): CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 206.
16.
Contra epistulam XII(15): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 208: Uncle si tibi uidetur .
ausculta prius, quae fuerint ante constitutionem mundi et quo pacto proelium
sit agitatum, ut possis luminis seiungere naturam ac tenebrarum.
17.
According to this formula, three conditions must be satisfied. First, one must
genuinely believe the claim in question. This condition pertains to a state of
mind that involves an assent on the part of the believer to a proposition which
does not necessarily possess any truth value. For example, I might strongly
believe that "water is capable of spontaneous combustion." In this case, we
obviously find a marked disparity between belief and truth. This consideration points us to the second condition: our belief must also be true. In this
sense, the proposition which I believe also happens to be the case. But the
fulfillment of the first two conditions would yield no more than a true belief
that does not quite qualify as an act of knowing. A third condition must be
met: we must be able to justify our true belief. In this respect, we are required
to muster sufficient, compelling evidence for a given assertion. Thus, in order
to know with any degree of certainty, I must (1) believe something, (2) believe
something that is true, and (3) believe something that is true with an ability to
justify or substantiate my true belief.
Plato provides the classic delineation of the difference between belief and
knowledge in the Meno, where he stresses the importance of formulating the
15 7
explanation (logos) which supports a contention (although he concedes that

true belief may be tantamount to knowledge in a practical situation). In this
context, true belief and true knowledge are distinguished on the basis of a
case where one merely guesses the correct solution to a problem, as opposed
to knowing why it is the case.
18.
Contra epistulam XII(15): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 208-209.
19.
Contra epistulam XII(15): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 208: quis enim credat ante
constitutionem mundi ullum proelium fuisse commissum?
20.
Contra epistulam XII(15): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 209.
21.
Contra epistulam Xlll(16): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 209.
22.
Contra epistulam Xlll(17): CSEL XXV (VI, I), 210: Haec mihi unde probaturus
est, aut haec ipse unde cognouit? noli me terrere paracleti nomine. primo
quia non credere incognita, sed certa cognoscere accessi a uobis ipsis factus
timidior. uos enim nostis, temere credentibus quam uehementer insultare
soleatis, praesertim cum ipse, qui iam coepit incerta narrare, plenam ac firmam
scientiam paulo ante promiserit.
23.
Contra epistulam XIV(18): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 211.
24.
Contra epistulam XIV(18): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 211: quales nos inperitos
adulescentulos aliquando decepit.
25.
Contra epistulam XIV(18): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 211.
26.
Contra epistulam XV(19): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 212.
27.
Contra epistulam XV(20): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 212-213: Si aerium uel etiam
aetherium corpus diceret esse naturam dei, profecto inrideretur ab omnibus,
qui sapientiae ueritatisque naturam per nulla spatia locorum distentam atque
diffusam sine ulla mole magnam et magnificam nee in parte minorem et in
parte maiorem, sed per omnia aequalem summo patri, nee aliud habentem
hie et aliud alibi, sed ubique integram, ubique praesentem qualicumque acie
iam serenioris mentis intueri ualent.
28.
Contra epistulam XVI(20): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 218.
29.
30.
Contra epistulam XVI(20): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 213-214: nam singulis sui corporis particulis tota praesto est, cum tota sentit in singulis
31.

cf. De Quantitate Animae 5(7); 23(41-44).
A similar contention is found in Gregory of Nyssa's De hominis opificio,
in the context of his refutation of materialistic theories of human nature. According to Gregory (De hominis opificio XII.1-8; Xlll.3), the faculty of mind
cannot be limited to any particular place in the body (as the materialists would
hold), but passes over the whole instrument and touches each of the parts in
its entirety.
158
32.
Contra epistulam XVII(20): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 214: quis digne cogitet, ubi
capiantur istae imagines, ubi gestentur uel ubi formentur?
cf. De Quantitate Ani mae 5(8), where Augustine queries how the soul can
see things that are physically immense when it does not extend beyond the
confines of the body.
33.
Contra epistulam XVII(20): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 215.
34.
Contra epistulam XVIII(20): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 215. In this connection, it

should be noted that Mani demanded that his followers accept his foundational myth in literal terms.
35.
Contra epistulam XIX(21): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 216.

cf. De libero arbitrio 11,15(39): CC xxix, 263-264 (where Augustine argues for God's existence on the basis of His preeminence over everything
which exists): concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem,
deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam
concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim est
aliquid excellentius, ille potius deus est; si autem non est, iam ipsa ueritas
deus est. Siue ergo illud sit siue non sit, deum tamen esse negare non
poteris ...
36.
Confessiones VII,1{1): CC xxvii, 92.
37.
Confessiones VI1,1(1): CC xxvii, 92: ut quamuis non forma humani corporis,

corporeum tamen aliquid cogitare cogerer per spatia locorum siue infusum
mundo siue etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum ...
38.
Confessiones VII,1(1): CC xxvii, 92: tamquam si corpus auferatur loco et

maneat locus omni corpore uacuatus et terreno et humido et aerio et caelesti,
sed tamen sit locus inanis tamquam spatiosum nihil.
Cf. Confessiones VI1,1(2): CC xxvii, 92-93.
39.
Confessiones VII,1(2): CC xxvii, 93.
40.
Confessiones VII,5(7): CC xxvii, 96: tamquam si mare esset ubique et undique

per immensa infinitum solum mare et haberet intra se spongiam quamlibet
magnam, sed finitam tamen, plena esset utique spongia ilia ex omni sua parte
ex immense mari: sic creaturam tuam finitam te infinite plenam putabam.
41.
Anaximander, Fragments 1-3 in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to The PreSocratic Philosophers. A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels,
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1971), p. 19.
42.
Confessiones IV,16(29): CC xxvii, 54.
43.
Confessiones V,10(20): CC xxvii, 68: Hinc enim et mali substantiam quandam

credebam esse talem et habere suam molem tetram et deformem siue crassam,
quam terram dicebant, siue tenuem atque subtilem, sicuti est aeris corpus:
quam malignam mentem per illam terram repentem imaginantur.
159
44.
Confessiones V,10(20): CC xxvii, 69.
45.
Confessiones V,14(25): CC xxvii, 71: Quod si possem spiritalem substantiam

cogitare, statim machinamenta ilia omnia soluerentur et abicerentur ex animo
meo.
46.
Confessiones VI1,9(13): CC xxvii, 101.
47.
Confessiones VII,20(26): CC xxvii, 109: Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum illis

libris posteaquam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream ueritatem inuisibilia
tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi et repussus sensi, quid per
tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te et infinitum
esse nee tamen per locos finites infinitosue diffundi et uere te esse, qui semper idem ipse esses, ex nulla parte nulloque motu alter aut aliter, cetera uero
ex te esse omnia, hoc solo firmissimo documento, quia sunt ...
48.
Confessiones VII,14(20): CC xxvii, 106: et euigilaui in teet uidi te infinitum

aliter, et uisus iste non a carne trahebatur.
49.
Robert J. O'Connell made a persuasive case in support of the contention that

the Neoplatonic inspiration for such an understanding of the Divine nature
was Plotinus's twin treatises on Omnipresence (Enneads VI, 4-5). For
O'Connell's insightful discussion of Augustine's dependence upon these writings, along with a detailed treatment of the scholarly debate surrounding this
issue, an assessment of the rival Porphyrian hypothesis, and the evidence
that the Sententia constitute a paraphrase of this extended treatise, see his
St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391, Part I, Chapter 1 ("God
and the Soul"), pp. 31-64. In Enneads VI,4-5, O'Connell (p. 47) perceived
the means whereby Augustine was conducted "to a right notion of God's
nature and relation to the world, a notion commanded by the Plotinian
doctrine of participation and omnipresence."
The notion of omnipresence assumed a highly significant role in Plotinus's
metaphysics. On the highest level of the Plotinian universe, omnipresence
pertains to the relationship between the One and its effects. By virtue of its
emanation or self-diffusiveness, the One gives rise to all subsequent instances
of reality, without diminishing in the process (Enneads Vl.4(22). 7-8; 12;
Vl.5(23).10; cf. Enneads III.8(30).10; V.1(10).6; V.3(49).12; V.8(31). 9). In
this respect, the One is present to all things, but is neither confined to any of
these things, nor limited by the categories of being.
The notion of omnipresence is also evident on the level of the hypostasis
Soul. For Plotinus, the lower aspects of Soul (i.e., the World Soul and individual souls) participate or share in the totality of Soul. While Soul is present
in every participant, it is not contained in any participant (as liquid is contained in a vessel), but remains present throughout each participant in its
entirety (cf. Enneads IV.3(27).4; V.5(32).9).
50.
Confessiones VII, 15(21): CC xxvii, 106: Et respexi alia et uidi tibi debere quia
sunt et in te cuncta finita, sed aliter, non quasi in loco, sed quia tu es omnitenens
manu ueritate.
160
51.
Confessiones VI1,12(18): CC xxvii, 105: manifestatum est mihi, quia omnia

bona tu fecisti et prorsus nullae substantiae sunt, quas tu non fecisti. Et quoniam
non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia, quia singula bona sunt et simul
omnia ualde bona, quoniam fecit deus noster omnia bona ualde.
52.
Contra epistu/am XX(22): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 216: Verumtamen cum carnalibus
animis fortasse non sic agendum sit, sed descendendum est potius ad eorum
cogitationes, qui naturam incorpoream et spiritalem cogitando persequi uel
non audent uel nondum ualent ...
53.
Contra epistulam XX(22): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 216: ita ut nee ipsam cogitationem
suam eadem cogitatione considerent et inueniant earn nullo locorum spatio
de ipsis locorum spatiis iudicantem.
54.
Contra epistulam XX(22): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 217.
55.
Contra epistu/am XX(22): CSEL XXV (VJ,I), 217.
56.
Contra epistulam XXII(24): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 219: tali enim figura etsi
conmixtam negant, penetratam tamen negare non possunt.
Cf. Severus of Antioch (Homily 123 in Kugener and Cumont, Recherches
sur le manicheisme II, 96), who positions the regions on a geographical
basis: Light lies to the North, East, and West; Darkness is confined to the
South (referred to by A. Anthony Moon, The De Natura Boni of Saint Augustine. A Translation with an Introduction and Commentary. A Dissertation. The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies Vol. LXXXVIII (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 19).
57.
Contra epistulam XXIII(25): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 220: apertum superius natura
propria, intratum inferius aliena.
58.
Contra epistulam XXIII(25): CSEL XXV (VI,!). 220-221. Augustine recounts

the difficulties prompted by the materialistic outlook of the Manichaeans. This
circumscribed vision, which confined them exclusively to carnal reality, gave
rise to great confusion in dealing with Scriptural teachings (especially those
concerning the Divine nature).
Cf. Confessiones III,7(12): CC xxvii, 33.
59.
Contra epistulam XXIV(26): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 221-223.
60.
Contra epistulam XXIV(26): CSEL XXV (VJ,I), 223: quodsi non de aliena
substantia fecit terram lucis, restat, ut earn de nihilo fecerit.
61.
Contra epistulam XXV(27): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 223-224.
62.
Contra epistulam XXV(27): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 223: Quare si uobis iam
persuadetur posse aliquid boni omnipotentem deum de nihilo facere, uenite
in catholicam et discite omnes naturas, quas fecit et condidit deus, excellentiae
gradibus ordinatas a summis usque ad infimas, omnes bonas, sed alias aliis
esse potiores, easque factas esse de nihilo, cum deus artifex per sapientiam
suam ... ut posset esse, quod non erat . . .
161
63.
Contra epistulam XXV(27): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 223-224.
64.
Contra epistulam XXV(28): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 224.

In Contra epistu/am XXVI(28)-XXVII(30), Augustine provides an extended
treatment regarding the intersection of Light and Darkness, and an assessment of the possible models of juncture between the respective regions. He
proposes that the joining of the regions might have been by a straight line, a
curved one, or a tortuous one. From Augustine's standpoint, neither a tortuous line nor a curved line would suffice. If the line were tortuous, the side of
the region of Light would have to be tortuous along with the tortuous side of
the region of Darkness. If, on the other hand, the side of the region of Light
were straight (but joined to a tortuous side), then there would be gaps of
infinite depth between the regions. If the line were curved, then the region of
Light would have to be curved along with the region of Darkness. If one region had a curved line and the other region had a straight one, then the
regions could not border each other at all points. The only acceptable line of
juncture, then, would be a straight one, so as to allow a perfect conjoining
without gaps or fissures that exhibits beauty and harmony. But Augustine
stresses that a determination of evil cannot be based upon the kind of juncture between the regions (whether it be curved, crooked, or straight). While
the juncture may diminish the beauty of the regions (as in the case of the
curved or crooked line of juncture), there is no loss of substance. Accordingly,
Augustine reasons that substance (even the substance of the region of Darkness) is not evil per se. So also, a straight line of juncture could not be evil. In
this respect, the region of Darkness can be said to have possessed some good
in its having a straight side. But if it does possess a good, then this good must
have been derived from God. Augustine concludes, then, that the region of
Darkness cannot be an absolute evil.
65.
Contra epistulam XXVIII(31): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 228.
66.
Contra epistulam XXVIII(31): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 229.

The distribution of inhabitants in the region of Darkness is as follows:
darkness contained serpents; waters contained fish and other swimming creatures; the winds contained flying creatures; the fire contained four-footed animals; the smoke contained bipeds.
67.
Contra epistulam XXIX(32): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 230: haec tanta bona
enumerare et ab auctore omnium bonorum deo aliena esse dicere, hoc est
nee in rebus agnoscere tan tum ordinis bonum nee in se tantum erroris malum.
68.
Contra epistulam XXIX(32): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 229.

The Greek term to which Augustine refers here (i.e., an:owv) seems to be
a variant of anow~. meaning that which is without quality or attribute.
Cf. Zeno Citieus Stoicus 1.24.
69.
Contra epistulam XXX(33): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 230: uitupero ibi tecum pestem,
lauda ibi mecum salutem; non enim genera ilia uel gigni uel mutiri uel inhabitare
illam terram sine aliqua salute potuissent.
162
70.
Contra epistu/am XXX(33): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 230-231.
71.
Contra epistulam XXXI(34): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 233.
72.
Contra epistu/am XXX(33): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 231.
73.
Contra epistu/am XXXII(35): CSEL XXV (VI ,I), 236.

Augustine also charges that Mani derived his theory regarding the inhabitants of the various natures from aspects of the visible world (Contra epistulam
XXXII(35): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 236-237): serpents (by virtue of the character
of their natural origins) are said to inhabit darkness; swimming creatures are
naturally associated with water; flying creatures are naturally associated with
wind and air. The analysis breaks down in regard to fire and smoke. In respect
to fire, Augustine professes some confusion as to why Mani connected this
nature with quadrupeds. The reason usually given, he informs us, is that quadrupeds are voracious and salacious. (But what connection these traits have
with fire is still rather unclear.) Smoke was apparently connected with humans
because of their pride: in this sense, the rising of smoke into the air is symbolic of the inflated, swelling egos of the proud and conceited.
74.
Contra epistu/am XXXIII(36): CSEL XXV (VI,I}, 236.
75.
Contra epistu/am XXXIII(36): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 236-237.
76.
Contra epistu/am XXXIII(36): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 236-237: si tollantur ilia,

quae mala enumerata sunt, bona ilia, quae laudata sunt, sine ulla uituperatione
remanere; si autem bona ipsa tollantur, nullam remanere naturam. ex quo iam
uidet, qui potest uidere, omnem naturam, in quantum natura est, bonum esse,
quia ex una eademque re, in qua et ego, quod laudarem, et ille, quod
uituperaret, inuenit, si tollantur ea, quae bona sunt, natura nulla erit: si autem
tollantur ea, quae displicent, incorrupta natura remanebit.
77.
Contra epistu/am XXXIV(37): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 237.
78.
Contra epistu/am XXXIV(37): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 237-238.
79.
Contra epistulam XXXVI(41): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 241.
80.
Confessiones Vll,4(6): CC xxvii, 95: quoniam ipse est deus et ipse est idem
bonum; corrumpi autem non est bonum.
81.
Contra epistulam XXXV(39): CSEL XXV(VI,l), 239.
82.
Contra epistulam XXXV(39): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 240: longum est et difficile
et harum rerum, quas commemoraui, et aliarum innumerabilium omnes
corruptiones nominatim enuntiare, cum etiam multae, quae dicuntur in corpore, possint et in anima dici et innumerabilia sint, in quibus propria uocabula
corruptio teneat.
83.
Contra epistulam XXXV(39): CSEL XXV (VI,!), 240: quodsi non inuenitur in
rebus malum nisi corruptio et corruptio non est natura, nulla utique natura
malum est.
163
84.
Contra epistulam XXXV(40): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 240-241.
85.
Contra epistu/am XXXVI(41): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 241: uncle est ista corruptio,
quod quasi generale malum rerum bonarum, sed tamen corruptibilium esse
conperimus?
86.
Contra epistulam XXXVI(41): CSEL XXV (VI,J), 241.
87.
Contra epistulam XXXVII(43): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 242.

In this context, we must also include the Holy Spirit when speaking of that
which is generated out of the Divine nature.
88.
Contra epistulam XXXVII(43): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 242: iniuriam putare non
hoc esse, quod deus est, et ideo nolle esse aliquod bonum, quoniam ei
praeponitur deus.
89.
Contra epistulam XXXVII(43): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 242-243.

From Augustine's standpoint, when lesser things are a source of vexation
or misery for us, it is not because they are evil in themselves, but because
they are designed as a just punishment, or as a means of teaching us our own
subordination to God.
90.
Contra epistulam XXXVIII(44): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 244.
91.
Contra epistulam XL(46): CSEL XXV (VI,J), 246.
92.
Contra epistulam XLI(47): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 247: ibi autem permittit, ubi
ordinatissimum et iustissimum iudicat pro rerum gradibus et pro meritis
animarum.
93.
Contra epistulam XLII(48): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 247.
94.
Contra epistulam XLIII(49): CSEL XXV (VI,I), 248.
95.
De Ciuitate Dei XIJ(2): CC xlviii (2), 357: ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe
est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae
non est. Ei quippe, quod est, non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id
est summae essentiae et auctori omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia
nulla contraria est.
96.
cf. De libero arbitrio III,9(26).
Chapter 4
Augustine's Theodicy
As the preceding chapter has shown, a major component of Augustine's

refutation of the Manichaean cosmogony (and its radical dualism) was
his definition of evil as a corruption of the good. By means of this
definition, Augustine overturned the Manichaean conception of evil
as a substantial reality which violates the Divine nature. For Augustine, the corruptibility of created things is rooted in the fact that they
were brought into being from nothing by God. In contrast to God,
creatures are inextricably bound up with non-being by virtue of their
origins from nothing,. and the turning of the highest creatures (that is,
rational spirits) from their Summum Bonum through sin. In the De
Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos (written c. A.D. 397, at roughly the
same time as the composition of the Contra epistulam Manichaei
quam vocant fundamenti) Augustine refined his analysis of the nature and sources of evil.
The De Natura Boni has been characterized as "an epitome of its
author's anti-Manichaean polemic." 1 In this compact work, we have a
veritable compendium of Augustine's principal arguments against the
Manichaean response to the problem of evil. On the one hand, the De
Natura Boni demonstrates Augustine's powerful dialectical skills. On
the other hand, his arguments are firmly grounded upon Scriptural
teachings. From Augustine's standpoint, such Scriptural support has
two benefits: first, it affords those unable to grasp these truths on an
intellectual level a solid foundation of belief based on Divine authority;
secondly, it enables those who can understand them to see that these
truths are not derived from reason alone. 2 This latter point is clearly
directed at the Manichaeans' claim to offer their adherents a rational
approach to truth. In making this claim, they arrogantly derided those
who invested their faith in Scriptural teaching in an uncritical manner.
This charge, of course, was directed against those "simple believers"
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among the Catholica (Augustine's "weak and little ones") who could
easily fall prey to the snares of their pseudo-arguments.
In its broadest terms, the De Natura Boni confronts a key difficulty
posed by the Catholic understanding of creation. By virtue of God's
role as Creator, a causal relationship is established between God and
all other reality. But this causal relation raises a serious question: as
supreme Creator, is God to be held responsible for the evil that we
perceive in the world, as well as for the good? In actuality, the very
notion of creation drawn from Scripture sows the seeds for the problem of evil. It is precisely because the Creator of all things is also
infinitely good that the evil in our world is so unsettling and inexplicable. Indeed, if God's goodness were questionable, evil would not
pose a theological or philosophical problem for Christians. But the
very belief in the unlimited goodness of God gives rise to the expectation that what God creates must reflect the majesty of its Creator.
In the Old Testament, in the Patristic era, and throughout the subsequent centuries, the question has been framed in a similar manner:
how can a perfect and benevolent God have created a world which
admits so much suffering, misery, and apparent injustice? This was
basically the same question posed by the Manichaeans in their rejection of Judaism and its depiction of God as supreme Creator. The
response they formulated was consistent with the dualistic outlooks of
Gnosticism and Zoroastrianism: if there is an independent principle of
Evil operative in the universe, then God (the principle of Goodness) is
absolved from any responsibility for the evil in the world. But this
seeming "solution" carried a serious implication. By imparting an efficacy to Evil, the Manichaeans subjected God to the hostile incursion
of the region of Darkness and its corrupting effects. Thus, the
Manichaeans alleviated God of responsibility for evil at the expense of
His perfection and incorruptibility.
By his own admission, Augustine had fallen into the same trap.
Like the Manichaeans, he found a seemingly viable way of separating
the cause of evil from God by means of dualism. Ironically, however,
Augustine was led into this error from the highest religious motives
and the best of intentions.
Because some sort of reverence forced me to believe that a good God would
create no evil nature, I postulated two masses opposed to one another, each
of them infinite, but the evil one on a narrower scale, the good one larger. 3
But Augustine's later espousal of the radical dualism of Manichaeism

was by no means the result of some rash decision on his part. In point
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of fact, a dualist mentality was deeply ingrained in Augustine well before his gravitation to that sect. In this respect, his own North African
background might well have contributed to the momentous religious
decision that would drastically alter his spiritual course.
As we saw in Chapter II, the extreme conservatism of North African Christianity had exerted a profound influence on Augustine's early
attitude toward the Bible. But by the same token, this "African temperament" (to borrow Peter Brown's phrase) would decisively shape
his early attitude to the problem of evil as well. 4 Indeed, the religious
environment in which Augustine was raised was highly conducive to a
dualistic outlook, or at the very least, a vision of reality in rather stark,
uncompromising terms. In a rigorist tradition which continually stressed
the wide gulf separating the "pure" and "impure," the "elect" and the
"damned," and the "saint" and the "sinner," one could easily perceive
a sharp dichotomy between absolute goodness and absolute evil. While
the Manichaean brand of dualism was more extreme than what he
encountered among the Catholica of his native region, it is not unreasonable to assume that he would have been at ease with (and even
receptive to) the Manichaean belief in the substantiality of evil. As
already observed, such a theory provided a convenient means (at least
on the surface) of absolving God for any culpability for the fact of evil
in human existence.
On a more personal level, however, such a theory found ready support in Augustine's own experience of self and the world around him.
For someone with such a deep sense of the goodness of his Creator,
the human attraction to evil and the reality of sin were continual sources
of distress.
Unfathomable seducer of the mind, greed to do harm for fun and sport, desire for another's injury, arising not from vengeance, but merely when, someone says 'Let's go! Let's do it!' and it is shameful not to be shameless! Who
can untie this most twisted and intricate mass of knots? It is a filthy thing: I
do not wish to think about it; I do not wish to look upon it. 5
Accordingly, the question "Whence is evil?" became the dominant

concern in Augustine's early spiritual struggle. It was in this troubled
frame of mind that he drifted toward the teachings of Mani.
There is no health in them to whom any part of your creation is displeasing
nor was there health in me, when many of the things that you had made
displeased me. Since my soul did not dare to be displeased at my God, it
would not admit that anything displeasing to it was your work. From there it
turned to the theory of two substances, but it found no rest in it, and uttered
the errors of other men. 6
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In actuality, Augustine's early problem with the origin and status of

evil was closely aligned with his difficulties in approaching the Divine
nature (as discussed in Chapter III, above). In both cases, he was
weighed down by that carnal-minded conception of reality which dictated that all things must be defined exclusively in materialistic terms.
For I did not know that other being, that which truly is, and I was as it were
subtly moved to agree with those dull deceivers when they put their questions
to me: 'Whence is evil?' 'Is God confined within a corporeal form?' Ignorant
in such matters, I was disturbed by these questions, and while actually receding from the truth, I thought I was moving towards it. The reason was that I
did not know that evil is only the privation of the good, even to the point of
complete nonentity. How could I see this, when with eyes I could see only
bodies, and with my soul only phantasms? I did not know that God is a spirit,
in whom there are no members having length and breadth and in whom there
is no mass. 7
Just as Neoplatonism provided Augustine with the dialectical tools

which he required in order to appreciate the omnipresence and spirituality of the Divine nature, it also refined his understanding of evil in
purely negative terms. In the process, he would arrive at two conclusions which became crucial elements of his theodicy: first, that God
admits no contrary principle of any kind; secondly, that evil has no
substantiality of its own, but merely represents a corruption, lack, or
deficiency of the goodness of created natures. Before assessing the
significance and implications of this view of evil, let us follow the
development of Augustine's arguments in the De Natura Boni. Accordingly, I begin with a consideration of his discussion of the Divine
nature, and the relation between creatures and God.
The Divine Nature
At the outset, Augustine restates the position that assumes such a

prominent role in the Contra epistulam: everything other than God
is created from God, not of Him. 8 According to this distinction, what
is of God is the Divine nature itself (the highest Good}, while what is
from God encompasses the totality of created being. The immutability of the Divine nature underscores the division between these two
levels of reality: that which is Divine (i.e., what is of God) is wholly
immutable; creation (i.e., what is from God) is continually subject to
change. The failure to observe this distinction, Augustine alleges, leads
to the sacrilege of equating God with nothingness, or more precisely,
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holding that "what God has begotten is identical with that which He
has made out of nothing." 9
God's immutability is the mark of His preeminent Being. Augustine
finds support for this teaching in Exodus (iii.l4) and the appellation
of God as I am that I am (or, alternately, He Who is). His rationale for
this interpretation runs as follows:
. . . He truly is because He is immutable; for every change renders nonexistent that which was. To Him . . . Who exists in the highest degree there
can be no contrary except that which does not exist. 10
While immutability provides the chief criterion of Divine Being, Augustine links the mutability of creatures directly with their creation
from nothing .
. . . if He alone is immutable, all the things which He has made, inasmuch
as He has made them out of nothing, are mutable. For He is so almighty, that
even out of nothing, that is, out of that which is utterly non-existent, He can
make goods both great and small, both celestial and terrestrial, both spiritual
and corporeal. 11
The dictates of Divine justice necessitate that whatever God begets

from Himself could not be on equal terms with what He has created
from nothing. But even those things which are not perfectly good are
still deemed good because they are related to God as effects to their
ultimate Cause. 12 In Augustinian terms, then, every nature (whether
spiritual or corporeal) is good, because every nature exists from God.
But created natures exist within a hierarchy in which God (an immutable spirit) makes both mutable spirits (i.e., angelic natures and rational human souls) and mutable corporeal natures. In this respect, the
universe of being exhibits varying degrees of mutability and corruptibility that reflects the diversity of created natures.
Corruption Redefined
Augustine now indicts the Manichaeans as those who are motivated

by an "iniquitous spirit" and the "mortality of body." 13 These charges
focus directly upon their carnal orientation and their introduction of a
nature of "wicked spirit and mortal body" which God did not create. 14
But despite the obvious disparity of theological viewpoints, Augustine
finds an important common ground with his opponents which opens
the possibility of correcting their errors. For, the Manichaeans also
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admit that "every good can have existence only from the supreme and
true God . . ." 15 On the basis of this mutual recognition of the creation of all things by God, Augustine analyzes the metaphysical status
of goodness by means of three transcendental criteria of created being: measure (modus), form (species), and order (ordo). 16 In Augustinian terms, "measure" pertains to the limit, end, or unity of things;
"form" refers to their general appearance or distinctive features; and
"order" points to their position in the hierarchy of creation, along
with their natural end. 17
As the supreme Creator of everything which exists, God creates
the measure, form, and order that serve to perfect or complete created things. Consequently, God is efficaciously superior to every measure, form, and order that creatures possess. 18 Spme things are better
than others to the extent that they are better measured, formed, and
ordered. When these transcendentals are present to a great degree,
the natures in question are great; when such goods are present to a
lesser degree, they are small; when they are completely absent, nothing can exist. This position represents a variation of a recurrent theme
in Augustine's analysis of evil: just as a thing would cease to exist if
completely evil (at least in ontological terms), it would be rendered
non-existent if completely deprived of the foundations of its own goodness. From either standpoint, goodness is correlative with being, and
being with goodness. A corruption that is so thoroughgoing that it
destroys the measure, form, or order appropriate to every nature would
result in the displacement of the nature itself. 19
Augustine's interpretation of evil as corruption now assumes greater
clarity as the corruption of the measure, form, and order proper to
existent natures. 20 This interpretation presupposes a hierarchical understanding of reality, and the superiority of spiritual natures over
corporeal ones. From this perspective, even a corrupt spiritual nature
would be better than an incorrupt corporeal one, just as impure gold
is better than pure silver, and impure silver is better than pure lead. 21
But an important qualification is in order here: rational spirits (the
highest among created natures) can only undergo corruption if they
will to be corrupted through a voluntary disobedience to Divine law. 22
Since such corruption is consistent with the gravity of one's turning
away from God (and a choice for what is perishable and oriented toward non-being), Augustine depicts it as a just punishment for sin. 23
1 71
The Order of Creation
Augustine's assessment of things inferior to the rational soul opens

the way to a discussion of God's providential ordering of creation.
Despite the subjection of lower corporeal things to higher spiritual
natures, creation exhibits an arrangement wherein the parts or components contribute to the goodness of the whole. Creation, then, constitutes an ordered whole in which terrestrial things are harmonized
with the celestial realities that surpass them in dignity. 24 In
eudaimonistic terms, things less than rational natures are neither happy
nor miserable, but so ordered that the weak are subject to the stronger. 25 Even those things which undergo decay or cease to exist do not
compromise the beauty of the temporal order. One of Augustine's
most detailed statements regarding this teaching is found in the De
Musica (c. A.D. 391). While this work was completed sometime before the writing of the De Natura Boni, its insights are well worth
considering in the present context:
. . . terrestrial things are subject to celestial, and their time circuits join
together in harmonious succession for a poem of the universe. And so many
of these things seem to us disordered and perturbed, because we have been
sewn into their order according to our merits, not knowing what a beautiful
thing Divine Providence purposes for us. For, if someone should be put as a
statue in an angle of the most spacious and beautiful building, he could not
perceive the beauty of the building he himself is a part of. Nor can the soldier
in the front line of battle get the order of the whole army. And in a poem, if
syllables should live and perceive only so long as they sound, the harmony
and beauty of the connected work would in no way please them. For they
could not see or approve the whole, since it would be fashioned and perfected
by the very passing away of these singulars. 26
The image of the poem is an apt one. For Augustine the rhetorician, such language provides the ideal illustration of the subtle relationship between an orderly arrangement of parts and the goodness
of the whole. The De Natura Boni proceeds in a similar vein:
. . . the constant passing and succession of things give rise to a unique
terrestrial beauty, with the result that even those things which die or which
cease to be what they have been do not disturb and disfigure the limit and
form and order of the created universe, just as a well-composed discourse is
certainly beautiful, even though its syllables, and in fact all its cadences, succeed one another as if in alternate birth and death. 27
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As the Confessiones reveal, the mature Augustine's ability to view

reality in terms of a graded but harmonious hierarchy of diverse realities allowed him to appreciate the goodness of things as a totality.
No more did I long for better things, because I thought of all things, and with
a sounder judgment I held that the higher things are indeed better than the
lower, but that all things together are better than the higher things alone. 28
By affirming the goodness of creation as a whole, Augustine reduces

our experience of evil to a matter of perspective. What is probably his
clearest statement on this topic is found in the early De Ordine. In this
Cassiciacum dialogue, Augustine attributes the evil we perceive in the
world to the limitations of human comprehension, rather than to the
nature of things:
Thus it happens that whoever narrow-mindedly considers this life by itself
alone is repelled by its enormous foulness, and turns away in sheer disgust.
But, if he raises the eyes of the mind and broadens his field of vision and
surveys all things as a whole, then he will find nothing unarranged, unclassed,
or unassigned to its own place. 29
In the De Natura Boni, Augustine discusses this narrowness of

vision in terms of aesthetic valuations. The natural beauty of the ape,
for example, is designated as ugliness or deformity when compared
with the greater beauty of the human form. 30 On the surface, such a
valuation suggests that the body of the ape is evil, while that of the
human is good. According to Augustine, this error in judgment is
rooted in a certain linguistic convention: when inferior goods are compared to superior ones, the inferior goods are designated by contrary
names. In this sense, the ape must be described in disparaging terms
when it is judged against the excellence of a rational creature. Rather
than judging the ape's body on its own terms (and the excellence
which it possesses by virtue of its natural constitution, symmetry, and
capacity for survival), we denigrate it by setting it against a higher
nature.
As we have seen, the Manichaeans succumbed to the same fallacy.
By assessing goodness exclusively in terms of the highest Good (that
is, God), they overlooked the good things that were present (at least to
a limited degree) even in the region of Darkness. Augustine's response
here is similar to what we encounter in the Contra epistulam
fundamenti: in order to designate something as "corrupt," there must
be a standard of excellence against which we measure and judge this
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deterioration. 31 In other words, whatever undergoes corruption already

possesses some good. 32 In this context, Augustine distinguishes the
mere deficiency of a good from its complete absence in a reality or
state of affairs. Once again, Augustine resorts to linguistic analysis for
purposes of illustration:
. . . slow is contrary to fast, yet one who does not move at all cannot even
be called slow. Likewise we say that a low sound is opposed to a high one, a
raucous one to a melodious; but if you completely remove every kind of sound,
you have silence, in which there is no sound. Yet silence ... is commonly
regarded as the contrary to sound. In the same way bright and dim are spoken
of as two contraries. Yet even dim things have some light; but if they were to
lack it completely, there would be darkness on account of the absence of light,
just as silence exists on account of the absence of sound. 33
Yet, even the deficiencies of things have their role in creation, by

providing the necessary contrasts which highlight the goodness of
positive reality. Indeed, such deficiencies are ordered by God for the
goodness of the whole. 34
Evil Defined
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that no nature (insofar as it
is a nature created by God) is evil in itself. What, then, constitutes
evil? As we have seen, Augustine defines evil as a displacement of a
nature resulting in the corruption of its appropriate measure, form,
and order. In broader terms, however, he now defines evil as a diminishing of the good of a given nature. As stated in its classic Augustinian formulation, "evil is a privation of the good" (malum est privatio
boni). 35 It is something of a commonplace in contemporary scholarship to assume that Augustine derived this formulation from
Neoplatonic writings, or more precisely, from the writings of Plotinus. 36
But this claim must be qualified. While there is a highly plausible hypothesis that Augustine was indebted to Plotinus for this theory
of evil, the differences between Plotinus and Augustine on this issue
must also be addressed. 37 Accordingly, let us briefly examine the
Plotinian conception of evil and compare it with what we encounter in
Augustine.
Plotinus's theory of evil is closely associated with his discussions of
matter (u/..'1']), the pure potentiality for formation and intelligibility.
Because Plotinus equates matter with ontological and moral deficiency,
he does not include evil in the realm of being or what transcends
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being (i.e., the One). 38 If evil were encompassed by the categories of

being or the power of the One, then evil would assume the status of a
good. Instead, evil is bound up with non-being. Plotinus, however,
does not designate evil as absolute non-being, but as "something other
than being . . . like an image of being or something still more nonexistent."39 To a certain extent, then, Plotinus exhibits a dualistic mentality when he attributes at least some ontological status to the evil of
non-being. In Plotinian terms, the existence of evil follows logically
from any affirmation of its presence in existent things. 40 In effect,
Plotinus imparts a substantiality to evil which enables it to underlie
figures, form, shapes, measures, and limits .
. . . decked out with an adornment which belongs to something else, having
no good of its own, only a shadow in comparison with real being, is the
substance of evil (if there really can be a substance of evil); this is what our
argument discovers to be the primal evil, absolute evil. 41
The substantiality which Plotinus attaches to evil is a direct outgrowth of his metaphysics. In a very real sense, evil assumes a necessity in Plotinus's system, providing the terminus of an ontological continuum extending from the One to matter. From this standpoint, the
existence of evil is as necessary for the completion of Plotinus's metaphysical scheme as the role of the One. 42 In contrast to Plotinus, however, Augustine denies any substantiality to evil. As Gerald Bonner
points out, "Piotinus, while firmly relegating Evil to the realm of NonBeing, never arrives at Augustine's position of Evil as simply a privation of the Good." 43 In this respect, Augustine might well have appropriated the mainlines of Plotinus's conception of evil. But he clearly
enriched it by means of the Christian understanding of creation.
In effect, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo decisively shaped
Augustine's adaptation of Plotinus in this context. Because matter
(like all finite reality) depends upon God for its existence, it could
never be inherently evil. By linking evil with matter, however, Plotinus
imparted a substantiality and necessity to evil that was wholly unacceptable from Augustine's Christian perspective. In this regard,
Augustine's metaphysics of evil represents a departure from Plotinus
on two levels. On the one hand, Augustine completely separated evil
from matter. But in so doing, he imparted a more thoroughgoing negativity to evil as an absence (in varying degrees) of being itself.
For Augustine, evil can never be substantial, precisely because no
nature can stand in opposition to God. Likewise, evil can never be
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necessary, since everything created by a supremely good God is also

good. In strict Augustinian terms, then, evil can only manifest itself in
relation to created natures as a corruption, diminishing, or misuse of
their good. In this sense, what is completely deprived of any good
must also be deprived of existence. Thus, Augustine's classic definition of evil as a privatio boni is tantamount to the claim that evil
entails a deficiency, or more radically, a complete lack of being.
If things are deprived of all good whatsoever, they will not exist at all. If they
continue to be, and still continue incapable of suffering corruption, they will
be better than before, because they will remain forever incorruptible.
What is more monstrous than to claim that things become better by losing
all their good? Therefore, if they are deprived of all good, they will be absolutely nothing. Hence, as long as they exist, they are good. 44
Diverse Senses of Evil

In the De Natura Boni, Augustine discusses evil in several different
but closely related senses. 45 A clarification of these diverse senses of
evil is necessary in order to appreciate the full implications of
Augustine's critique of Manichaean dualism and the theodicy it encompassed. In Augustinian terms, the corruption of natures (and accompanying privation of the good) is a direct outgrowth of the creation of things from nothing. Things created from nothing are bound
up with mutability and all of the deterioration prompted by change.
Created things, therefore, exhibit a negativity that coincides with their
finitude and contingency. Such negativity might best be characterized
as "metaphysical" evil. In this context, however, the term "metaphysical" should not be construed as imparting any substantiality to evil.
Rather, it merely affirms that negation is present in the very constitution of creatures. 46 Negativity in this metaphysical sense does not constitute a privation, but only the absence of a perfection greater than
what a creature should possess by nature. 47 A susceptibility to physical injury and pain, for example, are negative features of human existence stemming from the mutability of bodies. Such a limitation is not
evil per se, any more than darkness (the absence of light), or silence
(the absence of sound) could be viewed as evil per se.
But evil in a metaphysical sense (that is, the negativity bound up
with finite, created being) must be distinguished from evil in moral
terms. In this connection, moral evil proceeds from the defective use
of the will, and conversely, the misuse of created goods. But moral
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evil always presupposes the choices of free and rational agents, and
by implication, the assumption of culpability. In the defective use of
free will (that is, sin or iniquitas), Augustine found the real solution to
the problem of evil. Any corruption, deficiency, or privation of the
good is ultimately rooted in those erroneous choices whereby creatures are preferred to the Creator, and inferior goods held in greater
esteem than the highest ones. 48 In this respect, tnoral evil does not
relate to existent realities as something substantial in its own right,
but rather, entails an undermining or diminishing of their rectitude
(that is, what they should be by their very nature). 49 By linking moral
evil with the operation of free will, then, Augustine completely dissociated it from the nature of created reality.
I asked 'What is iniquity' and I found that it is not a substance. It is perversity
of will, twisted away from the supreme substance, yourself, 0 God, and towards lower things. 50
As we have seen, dualism provided a convenient means of absolving God from any responsibility for evil. But for those who espouse it,
the dualistic response carries an added benefit: by imputing the cause
to a substantial reality beyond the self, each individual is also absolved
from personal moral responsibility. As Augustine said of the
Manichaeans, they preferred to subject God's own substance to evil,
rather than acknowledge their own accountability for evil. 51 But even
as a Manichaean, Augustine found little credibility in such a position.
Try as he might, he could not evade the harsh truth that he alone was
morally responsibile for his own actions.
I was absolutely certain that when I willed a thing or refused to will it that it
was I alone who willed or refused to will. Already I was beginning to see that
therein lay the cause of my sin. 52
In Augustinian terms, moral evil provides the point of departure for

all the vicissitudes and trials of human existence. According to
Augustine's reckoning, the far-reaching effects of moral evil are directly traceable to the sin of Adam, that initial "perversity of will"
which plunged humanity into this massa peccata. "No man is clean of
sin," he bemoans, "not even the infant who has lived but a day upon
earth." 53 By virtue of Adam's sin, mankind was deprived of the gifts
(e.g. physical immortality) which God had freely and graciously bestowed upon rational creatures. 54
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From Augustine's standpoint, the deprivation of those perfections

which a creature should possess by nature results in what we experience as physical evil (that is, the pain and suffering that people undergo through no fault of their own). As radically fallen, the present
order of nature stands in sharp contrast to the order created by God. 55
In consequence of the fall, creation was severely disordered and humankind deprived of its natural goods. This deprivation carries a stinging penal character that puts us at odds with our surrounding environment, with each other, and indeed, with our very selves. 56 For
Augustine, the clearest indication of self-alienation is found in the
phenomenon of the divided will, and the continual struggles that we
experience between the dictates of reason and the influence of the
passions. 57
Ignorance, it must be remembered, was designated by Augustine as
one of the chief effects of Original Sin. Among its other drawbacks,
this penal ignorance diminishes our ability to grasp the goodness of
the whole. Before Adam's fall, the natural limitations inherent in creation could be appreciated in this broad context. In the post-lapsarian
condition, however, people no longer perceive themselves as components of a magnificent carmen universitatis, but rather, as fallen beings under a harsh sentence. From Augustine's perspective, human
suffering is always consistent with the dictates of Divine justice, no
matter how unfair it may seem from our limited vision of things. 58
But how does physical evil differ from the negativity which naturally enters into human existence? In addressing this question, it should
be observed that there is a rather fine line between evil in a purely
metaphysical sense and physical evils such as death and suffering. It is
apparent that the very negativity bound up with the existence of creatures can manifest physical effects, and these effects (e.g., the infirmities attending old age) can certainly be experienced as evils. This distinction, in fact, is a rather nebulous one that simply does not admit
any clear-cut assessment, at least not on the basis of what Augustine
has to say in the De Natura Boni.
Creation and the 'Nihil'
Augustine's response to the Manichaean theodicy hinges upon the

position that no nature can be evil per se. For Augustine, evil is always relative to a nature that suffers a diminution of the good. In the
De Natura Boni, Augustine's critique next focuses upon the
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Manichaeans' attempt to hypostatize matter (Hyle), and elevate it to

the status of a second God responsible for the fashioning of bodies.
As we have already seen, Augustine viewed matter as an amorphous
substrate of intelligible reality standing in need of formation. 59 But matter
cannot be designated as evil merely because it is devoid of recognizable qualities. The very fact that matter possesses the potential or
capacity for form insures its goodness. 60
On the basis of his recognition of God as supreme Creator, Augustine posits a causal chain extending from the Divine Being to the good
natures which God creates. God's preeminence as supreme Being and
supreme Creator cancels out any possibility of a contrary principle of
Evil. 61 Augustine's affirmation that God creates all natures from nothing finds Scriptural support in John's Gospel (1:1-3} and its teaching
that all things were made through the Word, and without the Word
"nothing was made." 62 Augustine explicitly challenges those who would
interpret the reference to "nothing" in this passage in terms of an
a/iquid, that is, as something which exists. 63 Once again, he boils
Manichaean error down to a misuse of language and a distortion of
meaning:
Now we must not heed the raving of individuals who think that "nothing" in
this passage is to be taken as "something," and who think that they can
compel assent to this sort of nonsense on the ground that nothing is put at
the end of the sentence. "Therefore," they say, "it . . . was made; and since
it was made, nothing is itself something." They have lost their reason through
their eagerness to contradict and cannot see that there is no difference between the expressions "without Him was made nothing" and "without Him
nothing was made," for even if it had been expressed in the order, "without
Him nothing was made," they could still say that "nothing" itself is "something," because it was made. 64
For Augustine, it makes no difference how this truth is expressed,

since "nothing" has no referent in the order of reality. By failing to
observe the difference between the two expressions, the Manichaeans
treat the nihil as if it were the object of the Word's creative activity. 65
Once again, Augustine's rebuttal of Manichaean teaching presupposes the key distinction (presented at the outset of the De Natura
Bani} between what is begotten out of God and what God makes
from nothing. 66 In this way, he underscores the difference between an
act of creation involving (1) the production of a distinct substance by
a cause; and (2} the derivation of something from a substance. In the
second instance, the effect is really consubstantial with its cause. As
179
an illustration of creation in this latter sense, Augustine proposes the

following case:
... if a man were to beget a son and to build a house, the son would be
from him, the house would be from him; but the son would be (made) out of
him, the house (made) out of clay and woodY
Unlike humans, however, God does not require any material that He
has not created. 68 But the ontological distance between Creator and
creatures has an important moral implication. While there is a causal
connection between God and what He creates (and conversely, a participation of created being in Divine Being), God remains wholly inviolate as a result of the wrongdoing of rational creatures. This inviolability is a direct consequence of God's immunity to corruption and
change. 69
Thus, Augustine imputes the cause of all natures to God, but denies that sin (as the distortion or vitiation of nature) is from God.
Rather, sin derives its existence "from the will of the sinner." 70 This
position has a direct applicability to Augustine's critique of Manichaean
dualism. In this respect, sin does not entail a search for evil natures
but an abandonment of higher ones. 71 Here, we find a hint of
Augustine's mature understanding of evil in terms of a misuse or perversion of free will. Indeed, rational creatures cannot be corrupted if
they do not will to disobey God. If they had not disobeyed, they would
have continued to participate in the incorruptibility of the Divine nature. 72
Conclusion
In the De Natura Boni, Augustine's treatment of the doctrine of creatio

ex nihilo emerges in the context of his deliberations on the problem
of evil against the flawed theodicy of the Manichaeans. In this particular work, the chief significance of the doctrine lies in what it reveals
about the ontological character of creatures. Created being (that is,
being created from nothing) is characterized by mutability and an openness to corruption, both in metaphysical and moral terms. This fact
sets creaturely natures apart from the Divine nature in a decisive manner: as the supreme Creator of mutable things, God must be wholly
immutable. By virtue of their origins, then, creatures exhibit a tendency toward nothingness.
180
But the recognition of such "metaphysical" evil does not commit

Augustine to the thesis that evil must exist. It merely underscores the
fact that created being is different from Divine Being. Accordingly, the
natural tendency toward nothingness inherent in mutable reality must
be distinguished from the corruption of created natures that is initiated and intensified by sin. Herein lies the source of evil: when sin
entered the created order, the metaphysical evil that characterizes
mutable beings (that is, the limit or negation bound up with created
being) gives way to a moral and physical evil that permeates the whole
of creation.
The sophisticated theodicy that Augustine develops in the De Natura
Boni Contra Manichaeos rests upon this definition of evil as a corruption or privation of created natures. In moral terms, corruption
accrues to rational natures capable of sinning through the exercise of
free will. Such a misuse of the will entails a preference for the creature
over the Creator, or a choice of lesser goods over superior ones in the
hierarchy of being. Yet, the very ability to sin presupposes mutability,
and hence, creation from nothing. In broader ontological terms, then,
the corruption of created natures is only possible because these natures have been created from nothing.
Augustine firmly maintains that what God creates from nothing is
from God and not of God. This phraseology indicates the proper
relationship between God and His created effects in two ways. First, it
demonstrates that what God creates is not the same nature as God.
Secondly, it shows that God's creative role does not compromise the
supreme perfection and dignity of His Nature. The causal connection
between God and creatures establishes the goodness of all things.
Every nature which God creates is good, and every nature possesses
an appropriate measure, form, and order. Corruption diminishes these
perfections. If corruption were complete and thoroughgoing, however, the nature would cease to exist altogether.
Because evil cannot exist on its own, it is nothing whatsoever. This
position clearly places Augustine at odds with the dualism of the
Manichaeans and their understanding of Hyle as the principle of Evil.
But it also distanced him from the Neoplatonism that shaped his conception of evil in negative terms. For Plotinus, evil must exist as a
necessary stage in the emanation and return of being to its source.
For Augustine, however, evil need not exist; only the good must exist,
since God is supremely good, and everything which God creates is
good. 73 Likewise, matter cannot be evil per se, since it always pos-
181
sesses the capacity for formation and intelligibility. In this respect,

Augustine reacts against the Manichaeans' interpretation of the Scriptural teaching that "nothing was made" without the efficacy of the
Word. This teaching cannot mean that "nothing" is an existent thing,
since God depends upon nothing in order to create. Accordingly, God
can properly be said to create all things from nothing, the utter privation of being.
Notes
1.
A. Anthony Moon, The De Natura Boni of Saint Augustine. A Translation

with an Introduction and Commentary. A Dissertation. The Catholic University of America Patristic Studies Vol. LXXXVIII (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1955), 3. (Hereafter referred to as "Moon".)
Moon's detailed commentary on the De Natura Boni provides many illuminating insights and references. I have relied exclusively upon his translation
of the Latin text. In addition to Moon's study, I have profited from the analyses of Augustine's theodicy found in several other works: Gerald Bonner, St.
Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controuersies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press,
1986), Chapter 5, 193-236 ("Augustine's Polemic Against the Manichees");
Regis Jolivet, Le probleme du mal d'apres saint Augustin (Paris, 1936);
Etienne Gilson, Introduction d /'Etude de Saint Augustin (Paris: Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1943); G.R. Evans, Augustine on Euil (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
2.
De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos 24: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 865-866. (Hereafter referred to as "DNB" .) The importance which Augustine attaches to
Scriptural authority is brought to the fore by Karl-Heinrich Liltcke ('Auctoritas'
Bei Augustin (Stuttgart; Berlin; Koln; Mainz: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968),
128):
lm Gesamtwerk Augustins ist die Bibel die wichtigste auctoritas. Sie zu

preisen, ihre unfehlbare Wahrheit, der sich jeder widerspruchslos und
ohne Zogern zu unterwerfen hat, zu betonen, wird Augustin nicht mi.ide.
Die Bibelkritik besonders der Manichaer, der Streit mit Hieronymous,
die rationalistische Haltung Julians geben ihm immer wieder Gelegenheit,
fur diese Autoritat einzutreten.
The truths to which Augustine refers in this context (i.e., those truths which
are accessible to human understanding, but which also allow for acceptance
on the basis of faith in Scriptural teaching) seem to coincide with what St.
Thomas Aquinas would later characterize (Summa Theological, Q.2, art.3)
as "truths of reason." For St. Thomas, the existence of God or the immortality of the human soul would constitute truths that can be demonstrated on a
rational, scientific basis (in addition to accepting them through faith in the
Bible). Such truths provide "preambles" to the "articles of faith" (e.g. the
Trinity) which do not allow for rational discovery or demonstration on our
part, and thus, necessitate belief.
3.
Confessiones V,10(20): CC xxvii, 68: Et quia deum bonum nullam malam

naturam creasse qualiscumque me pietas credere cogebat, constituebam ex
aduerso sibi duas moles, utramque infinitam, sed malam angustius, bonam
grandius.
183
4.
Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of

California Press, 1969), 33.
5.
Confessiones 11,9(17)-10(18): CC xxvii, 26: 0 nimis inimica amicitia, seductio

mentis inuestigabilis, ex ludo et ioco nocendi auiditas, et alieni damni appetitus,
nulla lucri mei, nulla ulciscendi libidine, sed cum dicitur: 'Eamus, faciamus' et
pudet non esse impudentem. Quis exaperit istam tortuosissimam et
implicatissimam nodositatem? Foeda est; nolo in earn intendere, nolo earn
uidere.
6.
Confessiones VII,14(20): CC xxvii, 106: Non est sanitas eis, quibus displicet
aliquid creaturae tuae, sicut mihi non erat, cum displicerent multa, quae fecisti.
Et quia non audebat anima mea, ut ei displiceret deus meus, nolebat esse
tuum quidquid ei displicebat. Et inde ierat in opinionem duarum substantiarum
et non requiescebat et aliena loquebatur.
7.
Confessiones IJI,7(12): CC xxvii, 33: Nesciebam enim aliud, uere quod est, et
quasi acutule mouebar, ut suffragarer stultis deceptoribus, cum a me quaererent,
uncle malum et utrum forma corporea deus finiretur et haberet capillos et
ungues et utrum iusti existimandi essent qui haberent uxores multas simul et
occiderent homines et sacrificarent de animalibus. Quibus rerum ignarus
perturbabar et recedensa ueritate ire in earn mihi uidebar, quia non noueram
malum non esse nisi priuationem boni usque ad quod omnino non est. Quod
uncle uiderem, cuius uidere usque ad corpus erat oculis et animo usque ad
phantasma? Et non noueram deum esse spiritum, non cui membra essent per
longum et latum nee cui esse moles esset.
8.
DNB 1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855.
9.
DNB 10: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 859: sacrilega enim audacia coaequantur nihil et
deus, si quale est illud, quod de deo natum est, tale uelimus esse illud, quod
ab eo de nihilo factum est.
10.
DNB 19: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 863: uere enim ipse est, quia incommutabilis est;
omnis enim mutatio facit non esse quod erat. uere ergo ille est, qui
incommutabilis est: cetera, quae ab illo facta sunt, ab illo pro modo suo esse
acceperunt. ei ergo, qui summe est, non potest esse contrarium nisi quod non
est; cf. Psalms 101,27-28; Wisdom 7,27; I Timothy 1,17; James 1,17;
John 10,30.
The significance which Augustine attached to Divine immutability is delineated by Bernard J. Cooke, S.J. ("The Mutability-Immutability Principle in St.
Augustine's Metaphysics," The Modern Schoolman XXIV, #!(November,
1946): 39-40:
Because God is absolutely immutable he alone truly is. One of the most
striking confirmations of the intimate link between fullness of being and
immutability in St. Augustine's thought is the way in which he uses the
text of Exodus' I am who am. The text occurs quite frequently, and
almost invariably St. Augustine will interpret the words of Scripture as
184
meaning that God is absolutely immutable. This . . . would have been
the one (occasion) for St. Augustine to assert the supremacy of existence as a transcendental, as the actuation of all other perfections, and
so to anticipate the great insight of St. Thomas Aquinas. Instead, St.
Augustine treats existence and immutability as if they were parallel perfections and even seems to make immutability more fundamental.
11.
DNB 1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855: ac per hoc si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt. tam enim omnipotens est,
ut possit etiam de nihilo, id est ex eo, quod omnino non est, bona facere, et
magna et parua, et caelestia et terrena, et spiritalia et corporalia.
cf. Etienne Gilson, Introduction d /'Etude de Saint Augustin, 185:
Dieu est par definition, et en vertu meme des preuves qui etablissent
son existence, le souverain bien. Etant le bien supreme, il n'y a aucun
bien au-dessus ni en dehors de lui. Dieu ne peut done changer puisque,
n'ayant aucun bien a acquerir, i1 n'a rien a perdre ni a gagner. C'est ce
que l'on exprime en disant que Dieu est immutable et eternel. Les
creatures, au contraire, n'existent que par lui, mais elles ne sont pas de
lui. Si elles etaient de lui, elles seraient identiques a lui, c'est-a-dire
qu'elles ne seraient plus des creatures. Leur origine, nous le savons, est
tout autre. Crees, elles ont ete tirees par lui du neant."
12.
13.
DNB 2: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 856: mouentur spiritus iniquitate et corporis

mortalitate . . .
14.
DNB 2: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 856: ... aliam naturam maligni spiritus et mortalis
corporis, quam deus non feceri t . . .
15.
DNB 2: CSEL XXV (V1,2), 856: fatentur enim omne bonum non esse posse
nisi a summo et uero de o . . .
16

For an in-depth analysis of the metaphysical implications of this triad, see
W.J. Roche, "Measure, Number, and Weight in St. Augustine," The New Scholasticism XV (1941): 350-376. Roche (pp. 350-351) describes modus, species, and ordo in these terms:
. . . the principles ... applicable to all things, spiritual and corporeal . . . are here declared to be those qualities of beings in which all
creatures resemble their Creator, and the principles in accordance with
which He created them. Moreover, since they are the common endowment of all creatures in virtue of their procession from God, they
are . . . the conditions on which creation is possible. In other words,
they are the most general metaphysical principles of being, valid by
analogy even in God.
It should be noted that the terms of this triadic formula vary somewhat in
different writings of Augustine. Roche (p. 352) provides a convenient over-
185
view of this terminological variety as evidenced in a number of works. Despite the use of alternate triads (e.g. measure, number, and order; unity, number, and order; unity, species, and order), Roche takes measure, form, and
order as the fundamental one.
17.
Cf. De vera religione 7,13; De Civitate Dei XIX.13; De Moribus Ecc/esiae

Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum 11,6,(8).
For a delineation of the meaning which these terms assume in Augustine,
see Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine's View of Reality (Villanova, Pa.: Villanova
University Press, 1964), 19-23. Bourke further outlines the key Augustinian
texts which employ such triads (pp. 46-53; 66-75; 84-87; 92-95; 108109).
18.
19.
In DNB 21-22, Augustine focuses more specifically upon the notion of limit
(modus). In the absence of limit, a thing would be rendered totally non-existent. In this respect, Augustine observes (DNB 21) that small things are described as having a "limited size" (modica) because they have some limit
(modus). Conversely, that which exceeds its appropriate modus is downgraded
because of its excess. According to Augustine (DNB 22), even God is not
without limit, not because He is finite, but because He provides the modus
that regulates all created reality. In this context, Augustine finds the best name
of God in the appellations "Supreme Limit" or "Supreme Good."
20.
21.

In the De libero arbitrio III,5(15), Augustine provides a similar valuative
judgment regarding the will: just as a stray horse is better than a stone that
follows its natural course downward (but without any self-animation or perception), a being that uses free will wrongly is better than one that is sinless,
but without free will.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
De Musica VI, 11(29)-11(30): PL XXXII, 1179-1180: Ita coelestibus terrena

subjecta, orbes temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carmini universitatis associant. In quibus multa nobis videntur inordinata et perturbata,
quia eorum ordini pro nostris meritis assuti sumus, nescientes quid de nobis
divina providentia pulchrum gerat. Quoniam si quis, verbi gratia, in
amplissimarum pulcherrimarumque aedium uno aliquo angulo tanquam statua
collocetur, pulchritudinem illius fabricae sentire non poterit, cujus et ipse pars
erit. Nee universi exercitus ordinem miles in acie valet intueri. Et in quolibet
poemate si quanto spatio syllabae sonant, tanto viverent atque sentirent, nullo
186
modo illa numerositas et contexti operis pulchritude eis placeret, quam totam
perspicere atque approbare non possunt, cum de ipsis singulis praetereuntibus
fabricata esset atque perfecta.
Moon perceives a certain evolution in Augustine's thought on this topic.
Proceeding from De Ordine I, 7(18), he observes (p. 34):
In the anti-Manichaean polemic, Augustine no longer strives, as he had
done earlier, to show that evils (privations) are necessary for the beauty
of the universe, but rather to prove that the natural order of itself does
not admit of evil. Hence to explain the existence of an evil contrary to
nature, he introduces the concept of sin.
27.
DNB 8: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 858: fit autem decedentibus et succedentibus rebus temporalis quaedam in suo genere pulchritude, ut nee ipsa, quae moriuntur
uel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent ac turbent modum et speciem et ordinem
uniuersae creaturae: sicut sermo bene compositus utique pulcher est, quamuis
in eo syllabae atque omnes soni tamquam nascendo et moriendo transcurrant.
cf. Gilson (Introduction d /'Etude de Saint Augustin, 188):
L.:univers est le theatre de destructions continuelles qui, dans le cas des
~tres vivants et de l'homme en particulier, s'accompagnent de
souffrances, d'angoisses et des deuils les plus cruels. II ne faut cependant
pas oublier que chacun des ~tres qui se remplacent ainsi les uns les
autres est en soi un bien reel et que ce sont done toujours des biens qui
se succedent perpetuellement sur le theatre de l'univers. De plus, il y a
une beaute et une perfection dans leur succession meme et l'on peut
trouver une raison satisfaisante de Ia destruction violente de beaucoup
d'entre elles.
28.
Confessiones V11,13(19): CC xxvii, 105: non iam desiderabam meliora, quia

omnia cogitabam, et meliora quidem superiora quam inferiora, sed meliora
omnia quam sola superiora iudicio saniore pendebam.
Among the parts of creation, we find rational beings possessing a free will
and the capacity to sin. In this regard, the created universe not only reveals
God's goodness, but His justice as well. As a result of Adam's disobedience,
the corruption of rational natures follows as a just punishment. Even the degree of suffering which we experience is regulated in a manner consistent
with Divine justice. On the one hand, God endows us with the power which
enables wrongdoers to inflict harm on others; on the other hand, any good
which God provides (even if it allows us to sin) must ultimately be directed
toward the realization of good ends.
cf. DNB 9: CSEL XXV (Vl,2), 858-859: Qualis autem et quanta poena
cuique culpae debeatur, diuini iudicii est, non humani: quae utique et cum
conuersis remittitur, magna est bonitas apud deum. et cum debita redditur,
nulla est iniquitas apud deum, quia melius ordinatur natura, ut iuste doleat in
supplicio quam ut inpune gaudeat in peccato.
In DNB 20, Augustine provides a discussion of human suffering and its
relation to the goodness of the whole of creation. Like other evils, pain (whether
in mind or body) can only exist in a good nature. According to Augustine,
187
moral evil is worse when not accompanied by pain: just as a painful bodily
wound is better than putrefaction without pain (and a destruction of the body
as a whole), it is worse to enjoy a wicked state than to suffer under the effects
of corruption.
cf. DNB 11: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 859; Proverbs 8,15-16; Job 1,12; Romans 13,1.
29.
De Ordine 11,4(11): CC XXIX,l13: Ita fit, ut angusto animo ipsam solam

quisque considerans ueluti magna repercussus foeditate auersetur. Si autem
mentis oculos erigens atque diffundens simul uniuersa conlustret, nihil non
ordinatum suisque semper ueluti sedibus distinctum dispositumque reperiet.
cf. De Moribus Manichaeorum 11,8(2), where Augustine localizes the evil
of the scorpion's venom only in its effect upon the victim (PL XXXlll,1350).
30.
DNB 14: CSEL XXV (Vl,2), 860.
31.
32.
33.
DNB 15: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 861: sic et tardum dicimus ueloci contrarium; sed
tamen qui se omnino non mouet, nee tardus dici potest. sic acutae uoci
contrarium uocem dicimus grauem uel canorae asperam; sed si omnem speciem
uocis penitus adimas, silentium est, ubi uox nulla est: quod tamen silentium
eo ipso, quod uox nulla est, tamquam contrarium uoci solet obponi. sic et
Iucida et obscura tamquam duo contraria dicuntur; habent tamen et obscura
aliquid lucis, quod si penitus careant, ita sunt tenebrae lucis absentia sicut
silentium uocis absentia.
34.
DNB 16: CSEL: XXV (VI,2), 861.
35.
Enchiridion iii,ll; Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum l,v,7; De

Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum ll,v,7.
36.
Pierre Courcelle (Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin (Paris:

E. De Boccard, Editeur, 1950), 124-125) offers compelling support for the
contention that Augustine first derived his understanding of evil as a privation
from Ambrose's sermons. For an assessment of the impact of Neoplatonism
upon Augustine (and Augustine's reciprocal transformation of Neoplatonism)
see Jolivet, Le probleme du mal d'apres saint Augustin {Paris, 1936), 136137. In this connection, Ennead 1.8(51) provides a highly plausible referent
for Augustine's understanding of evil in negative terms.
37.
Gerald Bonner provides a lucid exposition of Plotinus's conception of evil

and its divergence from the Augustinian theory of evil in St. Augustine of
Hippo. Life and Controversies(Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1986), 201204. As Bonner cautions {201):
Augustine owed to the Neoplatonists the discovery that evil is a privation of good, but it is important not to over-emphasize his debt to them
for, on this issue, there is a great gulf fixed between Neo-Platonism and
188
Christian doctrine, a gulf determined by the basic opposition between

the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing and the dualism which
seems to be inherent, if not in the writings of Plato himself, at least in
the thought of his later followers.
For the classic delineation of the differences between Augustine's interpretation of evil as a privation of the good and the Neoplatonic understanding
of evil, see R. Jolivet, Le probleme du mal d'apres saint Augustin, 131162.
38.
39.
Ennead 1.8(51).5.
Ennead 1.8(51).3 (Armstrong translation):
M~ ov bE oi'm
!!~ ov w~ KLVlJOL~ Kat O'tclOL~ ~ l'tEpt 'tO OV,

~ Kat
En
a.n
1:0
l'taV'tEA.~
w~ ELKWV 'tOU OV'tO~
~.tciHov 1.1.~ ov.
40.
Ennead 1.8(51).3.
41.
Ennead 1.8(51).3(Armstrong): T~v b' lJl'tOKEL!.lEVlJV ox~l.laOL Kat EMEOL

KaL !!OPai~ Kat ~.tE'tpOL~ Kat l'tEpaOL KaL aHo'tpL<p KOO!.l(fl
KOO!.lOUI.lEVlJV, !.llJbEv l'tap' aim1~ ayaeov xouoav, ELbwA.ov bE ill~
!tpo~ 'tel OV'ta, KaKOU b~ ouo(av, EL n~ Kat. buva'taL KaKOU ouo(a
ELVUL, 'taU'tlJV aveup(oKEL 0 A.Oyo~ KaKOV ELVUL l'tpW'tOV KaL Kae'
au 'to KaK6v.
42.
Ennead 1.8(51).7.
43.
Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controversies, 201.

cf. Regis Jolivet, Le Probleme du Mal d'apres Saint Augustin, 148-149:
Saint Augustin . . . eleve contre cette conception une revendication
qui n'est pas seulement celle de Ia raison, mais, comme ille fait remarquer
lui-meme, celle de Ia foi chretienne: quod alienum esse a veritate, ipsa
veritas docet, en fondant l'intelligibilite de l'univers sur Ia doctrine de Ia
creation. La matiere et tout l'etre sensible, comme tousles etres spirituels,
sont !'oeuvre d'une Volonte libre et d'une Puissance infinie, et, comme
tels, ils sont intelligibles. Mais, de plus, le mal peut recevoir une explication rationnelle, car il est possible de montrer comment, le mal etant
non pas un etre, mais un manque d'etre, Ia creature en est capable. Au
contraire, dans un systeme comme celui de Plotin, \e mal est un
irremediable scandale: si l'etre sensible et Ia matiere procedent de Dieu
par emanation naturelle ou par generation, le ~ien essentiel se trouve
etre \'auteur du Mal essentiel. Car, on \'a vu, il ne s'agit pas Ia seulement
de cette simple negation de bien qui definit, au sens propre de ce mot,
le degre d'un etre dans Ia hierarchie des etres. II s'agit du Mal en soi: 'Le
mal ne consiste pas en un defaut partie!, mais en un defaut complet de
bien'. Une telle conception, pour saint Augustin, ajoute le blaspheme a
l'absurdite. Mais, dans ce cas, on avouera qu'on ne pourrait, sur le
chapitre du mal, le dire plotinien qu'a Ia faveur d'une assez forte
equivoque.
189
44.
Con/essiones Vll,12(18): CC xxvii, 104: Si autem omni bono priuabuntur,

omnino non erunt. Si enim erunt et corrumpi iam non poterunt, meliora erunt,
quia incorruptibiliter permanebunt. Et quid monstrosius quam ea dicere omni
bono amisso facta meliora? Ergo si omni bono priuabuntur, omnino nulla
erunt: ergo quandiu sunt, bona sunt.
45.
Rudolf Schneider (Das Wandelbare Sein. Das Hauptthemen der Ontologie

Augustins, Philosophische Abhandlungen, Band VIII (Frankfurt Am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1938), 48-49) provides a helpful delineation of the
various terms which Augustine uses to designate different expressions of evil:
Ftir malum gebraucht Augustin die Ausdrticke: defectus, peccatum,
corruptio, nocere, deprauere, minuere, auersio, peruersio, uitiari,
dec/inatio, contra naturam esse. Delectus ist das technische Wort fOr
das moralische Obel, das Bose. Es ist damit der willentliche Abfall von
Gott gemeint. Peccatum ist ebenfalls das moralische Obel, das Bose,
der Abfall. Die Aufhebung des defectus im profectus ist das Streben
von schlechteren (minus esse) zum besseren Seinzustand (magis esse).
Der Abfall als Bewegung zum Nichts (ad nihilum tendere) hat seinen
Grund in der mutabilitas, diese hat ihren Grund im Geschaffensein des
Geschopfes aus dem Nichts. Auersio, peruersio, dec/inatio bedeuten
ebenfalls Abfall bzw. Verkehrung der Richtung des Willens. Aus der
Abkehr von Got~ folgt die Hinkehr zur Welt (inclinatio). Corruptio hat
einen weiteren begrifflichen Umfang; sie bedeutet: Zerstorung der
Seinsvollkommenheit. Ebenso nocere und minuere.
46.
Rudolf Schneider, Das Wandelbare Sein. Das Hauptthemen der Ontologie

Augustins, 47-48:
Das malum als Gegensatz des bonum ist kein Sein, keine Vollkommenheit.
Es ist Verneinung des Seins und der Vollkommenheit. Das malum ist
nicht Verneinung allen Seins wie das Nichts. Auch ist nicht jede
Verneinung ein malum; dann waren die parva bona-Tiere und Pflanzenmala; dann ware das Nicht-Grund-sein des Menschen hinsichtlich seines
Einsseins, Wahrseins, Gutseins ein malum. Das bedeutet: die negative
oder kreattirliche Unvollkommenheit ist kein malum, sonst waren aile
endlichen Dinge mala. Nichts kann vollkommener sein als es seiner Natur
und Moglichkeit nach (in genere suo) sein kein. Wenn aber ein Wesen
die Vollkommenheit, die es in genere suo haben sollte, nicht hat, so
nennt man es schlecht. Das malum ist also eine privative
Unvollkommenheit.
47.
Cf., Moon's assessment of this issue, 33-34:

In saying that evils are not natural, St. Augustine excludes from his
concept of evil the limitation which is necessary for all creatures, viz.
metaphysical evil. Such limitation is not a privation, but rather a negation, the absence of a perfection which is greater than that to which a
given creature is entitled by nature. Were it truly an evil, all creatures
190
would be evil by the mere fact of their being creatures. Again, in saying
that evils are not natural, Augustine does not imply that man in a hypothetical state of pure nature would be immune to suffering. A sentient
being is naturally subject to pain, so that its physical suffering is natural
and consequently not the Evil.
Gilson (Introduction d /'Etude de Saint Augustin, 185-186) also provides an insightful interpretation of the Augustinian rationale for evil in this
metaphysical sense:
... ce qui vient du neant ne participe pas seulement de l'etre, mais du
non etre. II y a done dans Ia creature une sorte de manque originel, qui
engendre a son tour le besoin d'acquerir et par consequent aussi de
changer. Telle est l'origine metaphysique de leur mutabilite. C'est ce
que voulait exprimer Ia philosophie de Platon, en disant que les choses
ne peuvent etre dites absolument ni etre, ni ne pas etre: nee omnino
esse nee omnino non esse; le difficile est de preciser Ia relation de l'etre
au non etre dans chaque cas particulier.
48.
49.
Jolivet, Le Probleme du Mal d'apres Saint Augustin, 39-40:

Le mal moral, c'est l'iniquite, qui consiste en Ia volonte de retenir ou
d'acquerir ce que Ia justice defend et dont on peut librement s'abstenir.
Comme le mal physique, il est une qualite ou un accident d'une substance bonne en elle-meme. Le peche est un defaut de rectitude morale,
refus volontaire et libre de conformer !'action humaine a Ia regie de Ia
moralite, et, par Ia, privation d'un bien qui convient a Ia creature
raisonnable.
50.
Confessiones VI1,16(22): CC xxvii, 106: Et quaesiui, quid esset iniquitas, et

non inueni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te cleo, detortae in infima
uoluntatis peruersitatem proicientis intima sua et tumescentis foras.
51.
52.
Confessiones VII,3(5): CC xxvii, 94-95: ltaque cum aliquid uellem aut nollem,
non alium quam me uelle ac nolle certissimus eram et ibi esse causa peccati
mei iam iamque animaduertebam.
53.
Confessiones 1,7(11): CC xxvii, 6: quoniam nemo mundus a peccato

nee infans, cuius est unius diei uita super terram . . .
54.
De Civitate Dei XIII,19: CC xlviii,402: primos homines ita fuisse conditos,

ut, si non peccassent, nulla morte a suis corporibus soluerentur, sed pro merit is
oboedientiae custoditae immortalitate donati cum eis uiuerent in aeternum; et
talia sanctos in resurrectione habituros ea ipsa, in quibus hie laboraueru n t . . .
55.
This phase of the discussion relies largely upon Moon's interpretation (who in
turn relied upon Jolivet's Le Probleme du mal d'apres saint Augustin, 40-
191
41; 65-66) in dealing with this rather problematic component of Augustine's

theory of evil. Because the De Natura Boni does not make explicit distinctions between these various expressions of evil, the topic is one which invites
some speculation on the part of commentators. I have used the Jolivet/Moon
approach because it offers a reasoned attempt to fathom this aspect of the
Augustinian theodicy. In this connection, Moon writes (35):
Physical evil is suffered by man not merely because of this natural limitation as a creature, but as a consequence of the sin of Adam, whereby
man was deprived of the preternatural gifts which, in conformity with
his nature, had been gratuitously conferred upon him by the Creator.
Consequently man's vulnerability to suffering and death originates not
from a simple negation, but from the privation of a good belonging to
the integrity of his nature, and is thus truly an evil for him.
56.
De Civitate Dei Xlll,14: CC xlviii,395-396.

Augustine's depiction of the disorder and upheaval following the Fall must
be clarified. In actuality, he would attribute the pain and suffering experienced
on all levels (by rational and non-rational creatures alike) not only to the sin of
Adam, but to the fall of the angels as well. As Bonner observes (St. Augustine
of Hippo, 211):
Augustine repeatedly refers to the fact that, even, before the sin of Adam,
there had been a fall among angelic natures, and it is possible to look
for the cause of suffering in the lower orders of creation to the activities
of the devil who is permitted, for a season, to trouble the earth.
57.
Confessiones Vlll,9(21): CC xxvii, 126-127.
58.
De libero arbitrio 1,1(1): CC xxix, 211.
59.
60.
61.
DNB 19: CSEl XXV (VI,2), 863.
62.
DNB 24: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 866: hoc erat in principio apud deum. omnia per
ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil. id est non est factum sine ipso
aliquid.
63.
64.
DNB 25: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 866-86 7: Neque enim audienda sunt deliramenta
hominum, qui nihil hoc loco aliquid intellegendum putant et ad huiusmodi
uanitatem propterea putant cogi posse aliquem, quia ipsum nihil in fine sententiae positum est. ergo, inquiunt, factum est et ideo, quia factum est, ipsum
nihil aliquid est; sensum enim perdiderunt studio contradicendi nee intellegunt
nihil interesse, utrum dicatur 'sine illo factum est nihil,' an 'sine illo nihil
factum est,' quia etsi illo ordine diceretur 'sine illo nihil factum est,' possent
nihilominus dicere ipsum nihil aliquid esse, quia factum est.
192
65.

cf. John 1,1-3; II Maccabees 7,28; Psalm 148,5.
66.
67.
DNB 27: CSEL XXV (Vl,2), 868: sicut aliquis homo si gignat filium et faciat
domum, ex ipso filius, ex ipso domus, sed filius de ipso, domus de terra et de
ligna. sed hoc quia homo est, qui non potest aliquid etiam de nihilo facere;
68.
DNB 27: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 868: deus autem, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia, non opus habebat aliqua materia, quam ipse non fecerat,
adiuuari omnipotentiam suam.
69.
70.

cf. De Iibera arbitrio 11,6(18).
71.
72.
73.
For a somewhat different interpretation of this aspect of Augustine's theodicy,

see James F. Anderson, St. Augustine and Being (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1965). Anderson's remarks (pp. 24-25), I think, must be approached
with some caution, since they seem to lend at least a degree of inevitability to
evil in Augustine's metaphysical outlook:
It is true that a created thing neither wholly is nor wholly is not
Augustine affirms no identification of evil and non-being. Still less is
evil a being, as the Manichaeans supposed. The fact remains that evil is
a kind of non-being. For although evil cannot be created . . . the very
act of creation renders its existence inevitable . . . and that which
comes from non-being is mutable in the most radical sense. Of course,
there can be no evils without the goods wherein they reside. Still, can
there be created goods without evils? Clearly there can be none such
without natural evils: the world is the theatre of continual destructions;
else life would be impossible. Nor can there be such goods without the
real capacity for moral (voluntary) evil; man's having the power of free
choice necessarily entails the ability to misuse it. Nevertheless, all evil
contributes to the good of the universe-not qua evil ... but as rooted
in and as conducive to good. So it is that the relative non-being which
constitutes the essence of evil, and which accompanies all createdness,
is the sine qua non of goodness outside God.
Chapter 5
A Defense of Monotheism
The dualism and materialism inherent in Mani's cosmogony sowed the

seeds for his response to the problem of evil. This response relied
upon a theory of evil as a substantial reality in its own right. The
Manichaeans ultimately rooted evil on any level in the principle of
Darkness, the principle of Evil which stands in radical opposition to
God. The vision of reality which shaped this outlook had two important theological implications. First, the Manichaeans seriously challenged monotheism, by virtue of their belief in two coeternal and competing principles. Secondly, their notion of a primordial conflict
between Light and Darkness undermined the integrity and inviolability of God. In broader terms, these teachings decisively shaped the
Manichaeans' understanding of creation. For them, the origin of the
visible universe was the direct outgrowth of the struggle between Good
and Evil. At the consummation of that struggle, the celestial and terrestrial regions were crafted from the skins of the defeated Archons,
the Sons of Darkness.
In this fanciful account, we find the mythical underpinning of a
fundamental tenet of Manichaean belief: matter and bodily existence
were depicted in wholly negative terms. At best, the universe provided
a remedial measure which would abet the eventual release of the luminous particles entrapped in corporeal substance. In this context, however, God was not viewed as Creator of the universe. Rather, the universe (along with plant and animal life, and subsequently, humans)
proceeded from a series of Evocations initiated by the Father of Light
for the defeat and subjugation of the hostile forces of Darkness. These
Evocations, however, were not the result of a free, spontaneous act;
instead, the Father was compelled to respond to the onslaught of his
opponents.
194
The Manichaeans, then, not only denied the unicity and omnipotence of God, but His exclusivity as supreme Creator as well. Accordingly, Augustine's refutation of Manichaeism demanded that he address these ramifications of its cosmogony. In this phase of Augustine's
polemic, he focuses specifically upon a defense of monotheism against
the dualism and polytheism of Manichaean theology. Once again, the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo provides a vital component of his deliberations. Augustine's most elaborate defense of monotheism against
Manichaean claims is found !n the Contra Faustum Manichaeum,
the final work in his extended anti-Manichaean program.
The Contra Faustum Manichaeum:
Salient Features of Faustus's Critique of Catholic Teaching
In its broadest terms, the Contra Faustum Manichaeum (c. A.D. 397400) constitutes an apology in support of the Old and New Testaments. This exercise unfolds in the form of a debate between Augustine and Faustus, the Manichaean bishop and theologian. 1 In the
Retractationes, Augustine defines the goals that motivated him to
compose this treatise:
In reply to Faustus, the Manichaean, who, in blasphemous fashion, was attacking the Law and the Prophets, and their Lord, and the Incarnation of
Christ, and who was also saying that the writings of the New Testament, by
which one refutes them, are false, I wrote a lengthy work in which I give my
replies to those words of his which I cite. 2
A more immediate reason for writing the Contra Faustum

Manichaeum, however, was a request from Augustine's brethren at
Hippo for a rebuttal to Faustus's attack on Catholic teaching. In undertaking this task, he provides liberal quotations from Faustus's own
words, and thereby, reconstructs substantial portions of this important Manichaean document. 3
Among Augustine's anti-Manichaean writings, the Contra Faustum
Manichaeum assumes the most personal tone. Augustine had known
Faustus on a first-hand basis when he was a Manichaean auditor. This
association is poignantly described in the fifth book of the
Confessiones.
I speak out in the sight of my God of the twenty-ninth year of my age. There
had come to Carthage at that time a certain bishop of the Manichees, Faustus
by name, a great snare of the devil, and in that snare many were entangled by
195
the lure of his smooth language. Although I praised this latter, yet I was able
to distinguish it from the truth of the things I was avid to learn about. I was
concerned not with what vessel of discourse but with what knowledge this
Faustus, so renowned among them, would put before me to eat. Report had
sent me beforehand the story that he was most highly instructed in all genuine studies and especially skilled in the liberal arts. 4
Augustine's desire to meet Faustus was prompted by a growing

uneasiness with the Manichaean religion and the superficiality of its
doctrines. In his prolonged search for truth, Augustine perceived a
tremendous gulf between the teachings propounded by Mani and the
teachings of natural science and mainstream philosophy. On the one
hand, Augustine saw a great disparity between Mani's fantastic (and
wholly unfounded) cosmogony and the mathematical and empirical
support proffered by astronomers for such phenomena as solstices,
equinoxes, and eclipses. 5 On the other hand, Augustine viewed the
teachings of the philosophers as far more convincing than the fabulous claims of the Manichaeans (despite the fact that the philosophers
were ignorant of Christ and the Gospel). 6 In the midst of this increasing doubt about the credibility of Manichaeism, Augustine eagerly
anticipated the opportunity to converse with Faustus, a man who had
been depicted as the most astute of the Manichaean Elect. Faustus, he
reasoned, could surely answer the many questions which others had
failed to answer to his satisfaction.
For almost nine years, during which my errant mind had hearkened to those
men, I awaited with intense longing the coming of this Faustus. Others among
them whom I chanced to meet failed to answer my questions and objections
on these subjects, but they promised me that when he came . . . these
problems, and even harder ones I might present, would be easily and clearly
settled. 7
Rather than satisfying Augustine's hunger for knowledge, however,

Faustus contributed greatly to his eventual severance from
Manichaeism. 8 In effect, Faustus embodied the same flaw common
among the Elect whom Augustine had already encountered: while they
could be formidable critics of Catholic Christianity, their apologetic
skills in defense of their own religion were extremely weak. 9 For Augustine, Faustus's only saving graces were his passing familiarity
with Cicero, Seneca, and the poets, his honesty regarding his own
intellectual limitations, and a certain eloquence of speech and manner.10 But it was Faustus's inability to resolve the problems which
troubled Augustine that spelled the beginning of the end of Augustine's
196
allegiance to Manichaeism. While Augustine would remain a nominal

Manichaean, he was clearly ripe for a new avenue to truth.
As a result, the zeal with which I set out on the study of Mani's books was
much dulled, and I despaired all the more of learning anything from the rest
of their teachers, since as regards the many problems that troubled me the
famous Faustus appeared in this light. But all my efforts . . . to advance in
that sect collapsed utterly as I came to know that man. 11
It is against this background that the Contra Faustum Manichaeum

must be approached. In this particular work, we find Augustine's formal rebuttal of the very individual who indirectly helped "loosen the
snare" in which he had been caught for some nine years. 12
In keeping with the dialectical format that he has adopted in his
rebuttal of Manichaean teaching, the Contra Faustum proposes to
present "the opinions of Faustus as if stated by himself, and mine as if
in reply to him." 13 The thrust of Faustus's indictment of Catholic teaching is revealed in the initial charge that Augustine recounts:
Faustus said: As the learned Adimantus, the only teacher since
Manichaeus deserving of our attention, has ... exposed and . . . refuted
the errors of Judaism and of semi-Christianity, I think it not amiss that
you ... be supplied in writing with brief and pointed replies to the . . .
objections of our adversaries, that ... you may be prepared to give intelligent answers. 14
For Augustine, however, the "semi-Christianity" to which Faustus refers is a lesser evil than the "pseudo-Christianity" which the
Manichaeans espouse. Such "semi-Christianity" may well be imperfect without falling into falsehood. 15
Once again, Augustine shows how the "false doctrine" of the
Manichaeans proceeds from their erroneous intepretations of Sacred
Scripture. While Manichaean criticism extended to the Bible as a whole,
the primary focus of their invective was the Jewish Old Testament.
The principal reason for the Manichaean rejection of the Old Testament lay in a disdain of its precepts. This disdain, Faustus contends, is
shared with Catholic Christians. 16 But Faustus' rejection of the religious observances of the Jews is only one aspect of his criticism. In
addition, he condemns the Old Testament portrayal of the scandalous
conduct of the Patriarchs. In this context, however, he shifts responsibility to Catholic Christians for demeaning these Old Testament figures and the LawY For Faustus, this negative view of the Patriarchs
was a direct outgrowth of the intepretation of God presented in the
197
Old Testament. "We are told," he suggests, "that he existed from eternity in darkness ... admired the light when he saw it . . . and
was so ignorant of the future that he gave Adam a command, not
foreseeing that it would be broken." 18
Augustine meets Faustus' attack on Old Testament practices by
means of a counter-charge: Faustus fails to appreciate the difference
between moral and symbolic precepts. 19 In effect, the ceremonial observances required in Old Testament times prefigured future revelations. Faustus' indictment of the Patriarchs receives a similar response
from Augustine.
You understand neither the symbols of the law nor the acts of the prophets,
because you do not know what holiness or righteousness means. We have
repeatedly shown at great length, that the precepts and symbols of the Old
Testament contained both what was to be fulfilled in obedience through the
grace bestowed in the New Testament, and what was to be set aside as a
proof of its having been fulfilled in the truth now made manifest. 20
The foregoing remarks provide the basis of Augustine's response

to Faustus' critique of the Scriptural depiction of God. This response
focuses upon the charge that Scripture teaches that God "existed from
eternity in darkness, and admired the light when he saw it." For Augustine, such an interpretation clearly proceeds from the limitations
of the Manichaean outlook. In this respect, Faustus' attack on the
biblical understanding of God reflects a major presupposition that the
Manichaeans shared with other dualistic sects of late antiquity. Like
the Marcionites and Gnostics, they disparaged Yahweh as an evil being and depicted the Creator of the material world as wholly inferior to
the Father of Greatness who resisted the encroachments of Hyle and
the race of Darkness.
In more technical terms, Faustus' depiction of the God of Scripture
reflects the radical dualism inherent in the Manichaean cosmogony.
According to this mentality, "darkness" is not merely a privation of
light, but something which exists as an independent reality. Faustus'
critique also reveals the drawbacks of Manichaean materialism, and its
identification of God with the created light that we perceive by means
of the senses.
From their not distinguishing between the light which is God, and the light
which God made, they imagine that God must have been in darkness before
He made light, because darkness was over the deep before God said, Let
there be light, and there was light. 21
198
But in the long run, such errors of interpretation were by-products

of a naive literalism. In consequence of this restrictive exegesis, they
were unable to recognize God's role as the supreme Creator of everything which exists. In the ensuing discussion, Augustine embarks upon
an elaborate defense of monotheism, and by implication, the integrity
of God as supreme Creator.
Monotheism vs. Polytheism

In Contra Faustum Manichaeum XX, Augustine upholds Christian
monotheism by means of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: if God is
the supreme reality, then nothing can exist without His creative efficacy. The claim that Christians worship one God is closely aligned
with the recognition that the God they worship is the supreme Creator of all things. In confronting this unequivocal affirmation of monotheism, the Manichaeans must come to terms with a nettling feature
of their belief system. While Catholics do not designate them as pagans, they still resemble pagans in worshipping more than one God.
In actuality, however, the Manichaeans are even worse, since pagans
at least worship features of the universe which exist. 22 For the
Manichaeans, the error lies in a misplaced allegiance, whereby finite
things are worshipped instead of the Creator. For this sort of error,
Catholics recommend the worship of the true God Who is both invisible and unchangeable. 23 But the Manichaeans pose a more serious
challenge, precisely because they worship purely fictitious realities. 24
Accordingly, Faustus must respond to the following question: why
do the Manichaeans worship the sun, if they are not pagans or a
Gentile schism? 25 In reply, he contends that they worship one deity,
but under the diverse names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In this
scheme, the Father occupies the supreme Light, the Son inhabits the
visible light (with His power localized in the sun and His wisdom in the
moon), and the Holy Spirit resides in the atmospheric circuit. By
virtue of the Holy Spirit's presence, the earth produces the Suffering
Jesus, "hanging on every tree" as the life and salvation of humanity." 26
In this flawed trinitarian doctrine, we see the limitations of a materialistic metaphysics that rendered the Manichaeans unable to conceive anything not accessible through the senses. Because he endorsed
a metaphysics that admitted spiritual reality, Augustine could affirm
the existence of an incorporeal light which provides the necessary
condition for human understanding. In this respect, he distinguishes
the physical light which enables us to see on a visual basis from the
199
light which illumines the human understanding, and thereby, enables

us to understand the very essences of things. 27 On the basis of this
distinction, he embarks upon an epistemological analysis regarding
the operation of the mind and the various levels of human knowing.
Augustine first addresses acts of the mind that are directed to things
of an observable nature. We might, for example, think of something
tangible which does not exist at all (e.g. the Manichaean region of
Light), or something which does exist, but which we have never seen,
or something with which we are already familiar. 28 But these intellectual acts (whose objects have some basis in the empirical order) are
markedly different from intellectual acts which are directed toward the
knowledge of such universal truths as justice, charity, faith, love, and
goodness. Such universal truths can only be understood by means of
the "intellectual light" of the mind. 29 Because this light is created, it
differs completely from the light that we associate with God, the supreme Creator of everything which exists. In contrast to the mutability of created light, this Divine light is wholly immutable.
. . . the intellect changes from dislike to desire, from ignorance to knowledge, from forgetfulness to recollection; whereas God remains the same in
will, in truth, and in eternity. From God we derive the beginning of existence,
the principle of knowledge, the law of affection. From God all animals, rational and irrational, derive the nature of their life, the capacity of sensation, the
faculty of emotion. From God all bodies derive their subsistence in extension,
their beauty in number, and their order in weight. This light is one divine
being, in an inseparable triune existence. 30
In the face of Catholic teaching (and its affirmation of the unity of

the Godhead), the Manichaeans are guilty of two errors: first, they
divide the Divine substance into separate parts; secondly, they localize the Trinity in four distinct places. As we have already seen, the
Manichaeans reserve the highest light for the Father; the sun and moon
are linked with the Son; and the atmospheric circuit is associated with
the Holy Spirit. 31 This approach is wholly in keeping with their materialistic presuppositions. As Augustine observes, "only material things
can be assigned to separate places. "32 But when one considers the
Manichaean portrayal of the Trinity, a compelling question with important christological implications presents itself: how can different
places be assigned to a unified substance?
This execrable absurdity would divide Christ between the sun and the
moon ... His power in one, and His wisdom in the other; so that He
would be incomplete in both, lacking wisdom in the sun, and power in the
moon . . . 33
200
Augustine reiterates his earlier contention: the Manichaeans resemble the pagans in their worship of many gods, but are still inferior
to them by worshipping things which do not even exist. If these things
were real, then God would be subjected to change, corruption, and
contamination. This, Augustine stresses, is a supposition "as blasphemous as it is irrational." 34 Instead of recognizing God as supreme Creator of all natures, they impart a creative efficacy to the evil principle
of Hyle, and confine the formative mind of Hyle to the body. 35 In
effect, the Manichaeans only denigrate God by designating the soul a
"particle" of the divine substance that is imprisoned in matter. 36
Monotheism vs. Dualism

In Contra Faustum Manichaeum XXI, Augustine aligns the polytheism of the Manichaeans with their radical dualism. In response to the
charge that his brethren uphold a dualism of two competing gods,
Faustus contends that they believe in but one supreme principle, that
is, in God alone. 37 According to Faustus, the claim that the Manichaeans
believe in two gods is comparable to the assertion that health and
sickness are two expressions of health, that good and evil are two
species of good, or that wealth and poverty are two types of wealth. 38
"Do you think," he queries, "that we must call them both gods because we attribute . . . all the power of evil to Hy/e, and all the
power of good to God?" 39 For Faustus, the fact that God and Hy/e are
both efficacious (albeit in opposing ways) does not mean that both
principles must be Divine. But in the face of this accusation, he grudgingly acknowledges that the Manichaeans sometimes do call Hy/e
"God"-not because they view it as God, but because this appellation
is generally accepted by those who erroneously worship this nature. 40
In rebuttal, Augustine refers to Manichaean teachings which confirm their belief in two gods. 41 This criticism focuses upon the fact
that the Manichaeans impart a creative role to Hyle which results in
the formation of bodies. Augustine finds two errors in this particular
doctrine: first, it ascribes the creative role of God to a being they are
ashamed to call God, despite the fact that this being does things only
God can do; secondly, it ascribes the good things done by God to an
evil being and designates them as bad. 42 From a Christian standpoint,
only the one, true God could assume such a creative efficacy. 43
In contrast to the Manichaean attempt to dichotomize reality (and
thereby, to make a rigid distinction between good and evil things),
201
Augustine offers a more unified vision in a created scheme that finds

its origin in a supremely good Creator. From Augustine's Catholic
Christian perspective, the scope and extent of creation is immense,
encompassing both spiritual and corporeal realities.
You must know that the true God ... made both the snake along with the
lower creatures, and the sun along with other exalted creatures. Moreover,
among still more exalted creatures, not heavenly bodies, but spiritual beings,
He has made what far surpasses the light of the sun, and what no carnal man
can perceive, much less you, who, in your condemnation of flesh, condemn
the very principle by which you determine good and evil. For your only idea
of evil is from the disagreeableness of some things to the fleshly sense; and
your only idea of good is from sensual gratification. 44
As in the De Natura Boni, Augustine emphasizes the goodness

and harmony of the whole of reality. But this optimistic viewpoint is
now more explicitly expressed in terms of a hierarchical scheme in
which all created things are allocated their appropriate places. For
Augustine, the mag~ificence of creation reflects the supreme perfection of its Creator. 45 From this standpoint, the greatness of God is just
as evident in the lowest things as it is in the highest.
Each of these realities contributes the measure appointed through
the goodness of the Creator for the completion of the whole. The
foregoing statement, of course, presupposes a theory of universal
participation, whereby what is lower on the scale of creation shares in
the goodness that higher realities possess to an even greater degree. 46
Augustine provides some illustrations which underscore the harmony
between parts and whole on both individual and cosmic levels. In
biological terms, such a relationship is evident in the drive for selfpreservation among animals, and in their governance of "a little universe of their own." 47 It is likewise apparent in the means whereby
rational beings regulate their passions, so as to maintain the natural
subordination of the body to the soul, and to facilitate the attainment
of wisdom. 48 In neither of these cases do we find an abhorrence of the
flesh. Indeed, both animals and rational beings reveal a love of their
bodies. For Augustine, then, the very law of nature falsifies Manichaean
teaching. The Manichaeans, in fact, refute themselves when they love
and care for their own flesh in the normal course of their lives. 49
Augustine's exaltation of the body and the flesh is consistent with
his understanding of creation as a whole. The flesh displays the same
symmetry and harmony in the operations of limbs and organs that we
observe in higher created realities. 50 As Augustine has already affirmed,
202
God's efficacy encompasses all things, whether spiritual or corporeal

in nature. Accordingly, he can address his opponent in these clear-cut
terms:
If your heart was not hardened and corrupted by falsehood, you would understand the invisible things of God from the things which He had made, even in
these feeble creatures of flesh. 51
Augustine finds Scriptural support for this position in I Corinthians

(xii, 1-26) and Paul's teaching that this flesh is the handiwork of
God. In Pauline terms, the organic unity of the members of the human body provides an analogue for the unity of the membership of
the universal Body of Christ. 52 On the basis of this Scriptural support,
Augustine finds some justification to depart momentarily from his
rational criticism of Faustus. Here, only outright condemnation will
suffice.
Whoever ... denies that our body and its members, which the apostle so
approves and extols, are the handiwork of God, you see whom he contradicts, preaching contrary to what you have received. So, instead of refuting
his opinions, I may leave him to be accursed of all Christians. The apostle
says, God tempered the body. Faustus says, Not God, but Hy/e. Anathemas
are more suitable than arguments to such contradictions. You cannot say that
God is here called the God of this worldY
In the final analysis, such doctrinal errors are explicable on the

basis of a methodological flaw in the Manichaeans' reasoning. As
Augustine skillfully shows, Faustus compiles long lists of diametrically
opposed things, states of existence, and characteristics attributable to
existent realities. 54 For Augustine, the crux of Faustus' error lies in his
inability to recognize that depending upon one's perspective, either
term of these opposites can be designated as good. The exclusivity
implicit in Faustus' valuation is simply inconsistent with the dictates of
practical experience.
It might look like reviling if I were to take up separately white and black, hot
and cold, sweet and bitter, health and sickness. For if white and sweet are
both good, and black and bitter evil, how is it that most grapes and all olives
become black as they become sweet, and so get good by getting evil? And if
heat and health are both good, and cold and sickness evil, why do bodies
become sick when heated? Is it healthy to have fever? 55
Augustine concedes that these instances might have been offered

merely as examples of opposition, rather than as strict examples of
203
good and bad. But other illustrations confirm the conclusion (also drawn
in the Contra epistulam fundamenti) that much of the region of
Darkness is good, albeit less good than the region of Light.
Instead of one good and one evil principle, you seem to make both good or
both evil, or rather two good and two evil; for they are good in themselves,
and evil to one another. We may see afterwards which is the better or the
worse; but meanwhile we may think of them as both good in themselves.
Thus God reigned in one region, while Hy/e reigned in the other. There was
health in both kingdoms, and rich produce in both; both had a numerous
progeny, and both tasted the sweetness of pleasures suitable to their respective natures. But the race of darkness, say the Manichaeans, excepting the
part which was evil to the light which it bordered on, was also evil to itself.
As, however, I have already pointed out many good things in it, if you can
point out its evils, there will still be two good kingdoms, though the one
where there are no evils will be the better of the two. 56
On the basis of the Manichaeans' own pronouncements, then, Augustine shows that there is no great difference between their Principle of Light and Hyle, at least in terms of the traits they exhibitY
The very corruptibility of the Manichaean God indicates a defect in
his nature. 58 Augustine offers his opponents the following option: either their God must have been immune to injury, or, if he was corruptible, then he cannot be on a par with the incorruptible God to which
Paul refers (I Tim. i.l7). 59
Augustine further questions the inviolability of the Manichaean God:
either he lacked foreknowledge, or if he could foresee the future, he
was in continual fear at the prospect of impending corruption. 60 In
this way, Augustine presents Faustus with an inescapable dilemna: if
the Manichaeans designate both Light and Darkness as evil, either
one may be worse than the other; if they make them both good, then
the better one is still open to question. 61 Indeed, the principle of Light
could easily be viewed as inferior to the principle of Darkness. Hyle, it
appears, shows no desire to destroy its opponent, but only a desire to
possess it. The Manichaean God, however, dooms his enemies to
eternal devastation and his own cohorts to eternal punishment. 62
In effect, the triumph of Light over Darkness was a pyrrhic victory.
Even if this mixing made provision for the eventual liberation of Light,
it only brought a prolonged penal sentence to the Divine members.
But whether God sent these souls willingly or unwillingly, He is guilty
of a gross injustice. Augustine bases this conclusion upon teachings
derived from the Fundamental Epistle:
204
. Manichaeus, in his Fundamental Epistle, says that these souls deserved

to be thus punished, because they allowed themselves to be led away from
their original brightness, and became enemies of holy light; whereas it was
God himself that sent them to lose themselves in the region of darkness, that
light might be opposed to light: which was unjust, if he forced them against
their will; while, if they went willingly, he is ungrateful in punishing them. 63
Such teaching seriously undermines the force of Faustus' comparison

of Hyle to a poison and God to the antidote. 64 Indeed, in this case,
the supposed "antidote" appears more malicious than the "poison,"
and any remedial measures taken by the Father of Light only compromised His integrity. 65
Conclusion
Faustus' criticism of the Old Testament God reveals his own theological presuppositions regarding the Divine nature. A major component
of Faustus' rejection of Yahweh was the contention that He "existed
from eternity in darkness, and admired the light when He saw it" (Contra Faustum XXII.4). Augustine makes rather short work of this charge:
God could not have existed in darkness, simply because darkness does
not have any existence of its own; by the same token, light could not
have existed as something independent of the creative action of God.
While Faustus professes that the Manichaeans uphold monotheism,
he still endorses a dualism that is based upon a belief in two opposing
principles. 66 In this regard, Faustus wished to dissociate Manichaeism
from those pagans who would attribute good and evil things alike to a
single principle. Augustine, on the other hand, views the Manichaean
religion as no more than a polytheistic expression of paganism. 67 But
in contrast to pagan polytheists (whose gods are based upon existent
realities), the Manichaeans worship a being which is wholly non-existent (i.e., Hyle), as well as the fantastic inhabitants of the region of
Darkness.
In contrast to the Manichaeans (who limited their understanding of
light to a material nature), Augustine affirmed the existence of an incorporeal light on both a human and a Divine level. But this incorporeal light depends upon the existence of a higher light which Augustine identifies with God Himself, that is, "one divine being, in an
inseparable triune existence" (Contra Faustum XX. 7). While God is
ultimately responsible for any good which creatures possess, He also
provides the cause of their primary perfection-existence or being.
205
Indeed, our ability to know and to love presupposes that we exist.

God, then, is the supreme Creator from Whom "we derive the beginning of existence, the principle of knowledge, the Jaw of affection."
But this understanding of creation presupposes an ontological distinction between God and what He creates. Augustine's refutation of
the Manichaean notion of the coeternity and coequality of Hyle with
God is based upon an understanding of matter derived from the Greek
philosophical tradition. In its classical sense, Hy/erepresents that which
stands in need of formation. Augustine criticizes the Manichaeans for
imparting a formative power to Hyle, and thereby, making it the giver
of forms, rather than their recipient. While Augustine has no difficulty
in distinguishing God from Hyle, he posits a causal connection between these principles. God is the Creator of Hyle and ultimately,
everything associated with the material world. In this sense, Hyle cannot be evil. Because it was created by God, it must be fundamentally
good, like all other created reality.
But as portrayed by the Manichaeans themselves, Hy/e possesses
nothing less than a divine character. Augustine proffers two reasons
in support of this contention: first, Hyle does what God does (that is,
it forms bodies); secondly, even this evil "god" encompasses much
that is good and does much good, by virtue of its formative power.
But if Hyle constitutes a god in its own right, then the Manichaeans
are not the monotheists Faustus claims them to be, but radical
dualists.
In opposition to this rigidly bifurcated world-view, Augustine presents a refined vision of reality as a whole. This vision unfolds against
the background of a metaphysics of universal participation which provides for a harmonious arrangement of all things. In this hierarchical
scheme, corporeal things are subordinated to spiritual realities, which
in turn are subordinated to God as the supreme Creator of everything
which exists. No nature is so humble or base as to be excluded from
participation in the good. In Augustinian terms, then, the universe
constitutes a cosmos or ordered system in which the parts share in
and contribute to the goodness of the whole. Because Augustine's
cosmos encompasses both spiritual and corporeal realities, the flesh
is viewed as a valuable component of the created order. In the final
analysis, all things admit some goodness, regardless of their metaphysical status.
On the basis of this positive vision of reality, Augustine shows that
the opposition between good and evil found in the Manichaean cos-
206
mogony does not mark Hyle as evil per se. Indeed, he convincingly
demonstrates that the entire region of Darkness contains many good
features. By the same token, the Manichaean depiction of the Father
of Light as the principle of goodness is highly suspect. The very fact
that the Manichaean God was susceptible to the onslaught of the contingents of Darkness (and forced to take punitive measures for selfpreservation) seriously calls into question his inviolability and incorruptibility.
While Augustine emphasizes the dependence of everything upon
God for its very existence, we do not find an explicit use of the formula of "creatio ex nihilo" (or alternatively, "creatio de nihilo") in
Contra Faustum Manichaeum XX-XXI. This formula, however, is
implicit throughout Augustine's refutation of Faustus in those books.
When he states that "we derive the beginning of existence" from God
(Contra Faustum Manichaeum XX.7) and that "all natures . . . all
forms . . . and all weights" can only come from the triune God (Contra Faustum Manichaeum XX.14), his meaning is apparent: without
the creative action of God, nothing could exist. The teaching that
everything depends upon God for its existence is correlative with the
teaching that God created all things from nothing. Augustine's affirmation of the causal dependence of all things upon God for their very
existence, then, clearly indicates creatio ex nihilo.
For explicit pronouncements of creation from nothing, we must
look elsewhere. In Contra Faustum Manichaeum XXII (69), the doctrine is articulated in connection with a refutation of Faustus' criticism
of Moses. According to Augustine, Moses is not to be judged on the
basis of Faustus' "malicious representations," but rather, on the basis
of what God Himself says. 68 The morality of Moses (along with the
Law) stems from the supremacy of the God Who sent him.
. . . this Moses, the servant of the living, the true, the most high God, that
made heaven and earth, not of a foreign substance, but of nothing-not from
the pressure of necessity, but from plenitude of goodness-not by the suffering of His members, but by the power of His word . . . 69
In the foregoing quotation, we find a concise but penetrating response to the whole of Manichaean cosmogony. First, Augustine challenges Manichaean dualism (and its accompanying commitment to the
notion of the eternal existence of matter) by affirming that God created heaven and earth from nothing. Secondly, Augustine challenges
the Manichaean belief that the world originated as a result of the re-
207
medial measures taken by the Father of Greatness against the encroachments of the race of Darkness. From the Manichaean standpoint, the world emerged as the result of necessity (a notion shared by
pagan thinkers). In opposition to this position, Augustine affirms a
free creation that is consistent with the goodness of the Divine nature.
Lastly, Augustine challenges the Manichaean belief that the Divine
nature was corruptible, as evidenced by the subjugation of the luminous particles (the "members" of God) to the forces of Darkness. In
opposition to the Manichaean attempt to undermine the integrity of
the Divine nature, Augustine stresses the inviolability of God, Who
created through the agency of His Word.
Notes
1.
At the very outset of the treatise, Augustine informs us that Faustus was "an
African by race, a citizen of Milevum" who was "eloquent and clever," but
who had "adopted the shocking tenets of the Manichaean heresy."
Contra Faustum Manichaeum (Hereafter referred to as "CFM") 1(1): CSEL
XXV (VI,l), 251: Faustus quidam fuit gente Afer, ciuitate Mileuitanus, eloquio
suauis, ingenio callidus, secta Manichaeus ac per hoc nefando errore peruersus.
2.
Retractationes 11,33(1): CC lvii, 95: Contra Faustum Manicheum blasphemantem legem et prophetas et eorum deum et incarnationem Christi,
scripturas autem noui testamenti, quibus conuincitur, falsatas esse dicentem
scripsi grande opus, uerbis eius propositis reddens responsiones meas.
3.
CFM 1(1): CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 251.
4.
Confessiones V.3(3): CC xxvii, 58: Proloquar in conspectu dei mei annum

ilium undetricensimum aetatis meae. lam uenerat Carthaginem quidam
manichaeorum episcopus, Faustus nomine, magnus laqueus diaboli, et multi
implicabantur in eo per inlecebram suauiloquentiae. Quam ego iam tametsi
laudabam, discernebam tamen a ueritate rerum, quarum discendarum auidus
eram, nee quali uasculo sermonis, sed quid mihi scientiae comedendum
apponeret nominatus apud eos ille Faustus intuebar. Fama enim de illo
praelocuta mihi erat, quod esset honestarum omnium doctrinarum peritissimus
et apprime disciplinis liberalibus eruditus.
5.
Confessiones V.3(6): CC xxvii, 59-60.
6.
Confessiones V.3(3): CC xxvii, 58.
7.
Confessiones V.6(10): CC xxvii, 61: Et per annos ferme ipsos nouem, quibus
eos animo uagabundus audiui, nimis extento desiderio uenturum expectabam
istum Faustum. Ceteri enim eorum, in quos forte incurrissem, qui talium rerum quaestionibus a me obiectis deficiebant, ilium mihi promittebant, cuius
aduentu conlatoque conloquio facillime mihi haec et si qua forte maiora
quaererem enodatissime expedirentur.
8.
Confessiones V. 7(13): CC xxvii, 63-64.
9.
De utilitate credendi 1(2): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 4-5.
10.
Confessiones V.6(11): CC xxvii, 62.
11.
Confessiones V. 7(13): CC xxvii, 63: Refracto itaque studio, quod intenderam

in Manichaei lit teras, magisque desperans de ceteris eorum doctoribus, quando
in multis, quae me mouebant, ita ille nominatus apparuit . . . Ceterum
conatus omnis meus, pro proficere in ilia secta statueram, illo homine cognito
prorsus intercidit.
209
12.
Confessiones V. 7(13): CC xxvii, 64: Ita ille Faustus, qui multis laqueus mortis
extitit, meum quo captus eram relaxare iam coeperat nee uolens nee sciens.
13.
CFM 1(1): CSEl XXV (VI,l), 251: commodum autem arbitror sub eius nomine
uerba eius ponere et sub meo responsionem meam.
For a thoroughgoing study of the debates in which Augustine engaged his
Manichaean adversaries (i.e., Fortunatus, Felix, and Faustus), see Franc;:ois
Decret, Aspects du Manichei"sme dans /'Afrique Romaine. Les controuerses
de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix auec Saint Augustin (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1970). For sections which deal specifically with Faustus, see pp. 5170;97-103; 133-143; 161-162; 177-181; 197-200;212-213;225-230;
244; 278-289; 327.
For an attempted reconstruction of Faustus' Capitula, see Paul Monceaux,
Le Manicheen Faustus de Mileu. Restitution de ses Capitula. Academie
des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Memoires de l'Institut National de France,
Paris, 1933, 1-112. But Decret (pp. 66-6 7) offers the following observations
regarding the limitations of such reconstructions:
P. Monceaux a tente une 'restitution' de ces capitula-dans un ordre
qui differe de celui ou ils se suivent dans le Contra Faustum-en essayant
de grouper dans une succession logique les controverses qui traitent de
sujets de meme ordre ou concernant des themes voisins. Cette construction a fait !'objet d'une critique qui propose un nouveau schema. II
est bien evident que toute 'restitution' demeure conjecturale-il faudrait
d'abord etre certain que le uolumen parvenu a Augustin contenait bien
tousles capitula de l'eveque manicheen-mais il est tout aussi evident
que l'ordre primitif de Faustus a ete bouleverse.
14.
CFM 1(2): CSEL XXV (VI,1), 251-252: Faustus dixit: Satis superque in lucem
iam traductis erroribus ac ludaicae superstitionis simul et semichristianorum
abunde detecta fallacia a doctissimo scilicet et solo nobis post beatum patrem
nostrum Manichaeum studendo Adimanto non ab re uisum est, fratres carissimi,
haec quoque breuia uobis et concinna responsa propter callidas et astutas
conferentium nobiscum propositiones scribere ... et ipsi ad respondendum uigilanter eis sitis instructi.
Decret (Aspects du Manichei"sme dans /'Afrique Romaine, 149) holds
that the criterion whereby Faustus distinguishes genuine Christianity from
"semi-Christianity" lies in the acceptance or rejection of Scripture: " . . . il
n' est pas inutile de rappeler que si Faustus, a Ia suite du 'tres docte Adimantus',
a apporte un tel acharnement a s'attaquer a !'Ancien Testament-qu'il avait
pris soin d'etudier-c'est que, a ses yeux, )'acceptation ou le refus de ces
Ecritures est le critere decisif qui permet de distinguer le manicheYsme du
catholicisme, c'est-a-dire, pour l'eveque manicheen, le chretien authentique
du 'semi-chretien' ou, pour reprendre ses propres paroles, 'des heresies
chretiennes, parmi lesquelles d'abord les catholiques'.
15.
CFM 1(3): CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 252-253: itaque nos reuera catholicos nondum
perfectos, sed quodam modo, ut dixisti, semichristianos, quos fallatis et
210
seducatis uestra peruersitate, insectamini. sed si qui adhuc etiam tales sunt, si
uos pseudochristianos esse intellexerint, quamuis captiosis quaestionum
uestrarum propositionibus propter id, quod eorum fidei deest, respondere
non possint, non tamen sequendos, sed deuitandos uos esse cognoscunt, sicut
ergo uestra intentio est semichristianos, quos decipiatis, inquirere, sic nostra
intentio est pseudochristianos uos ostendere, ut non solum christiani peritiores
uos conuincendo prodant, sed et inperitiores uos cauendo proficiant.
16.
CFM Vl(1): CSEL XXV (VI,1), 285: quod ergo obicis, tibi mecum commune
est, siue crimen putandum seu recte factum; uterque enim nostrum uetus respuit
testamentum. ergo si quid intersit inter meam fidem quaeris et tuam, hoc,
quia tibi mentiri tibet et inliberaliter agere, ut quod mente oderis, uerbo
conlaudes, ego fallere non didici; quod sentio, loquor, tam turpium odisse me
fateor praeceptores quam ipsa praecepta.
cf. Fran<;ois Decret (Aspects du Manichei"sme dans /'Afrique Romaine ,
129), delineates Faustus' polemical goals in these terms:
C'est dans !'oeuvre de Faustus que nous allons trouver Ia veritable machine montee contre !'Ancien Testament. Nous avons vu plus haut que,
sur les trente-trois capitula etudies par Augustin, quatorze etaient
consacres plus specialement a saper Ia Loi et les Prophetes.
17.
CFM XXJI(1): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 591.

Faustus provides the following argument in support of his denial that the
Manichaeans blaspheme the prophets and patriarchs (CFM XXJI(3): CSEL
XXV (VI, 1), 593): the charge would find some justification if the Manichaeans
had authored these accounts; since the Jews (or their companions) wrote
these accounts, the Manichaeans should not be blamed; if these accounts are
fictions, then their authors should be punished, the books condemned, and
the good name of the prophets and patriarchs restored.
18.
CFM XXII(4): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 593: Et sane fieri potuit, ut quemadmodum
de cleo inpudenter idem tanta finxerunt, nunc eum in tenebris ex aeterno
uersatum dicentes et postea miratum cum uidisset lucem, nunc ignarum futuri,
ut praeceptum illud, quod non esset seruaturus Adam, ei mandaret, nunc et
inprouidum . . .
19.
CFM Vl(2): CSEL XXV (VJ,l), 285.

The distinction which Augustine makes between moral and symbolic precepts was derived from Ambrose of Milan.
cf. Confessiones V1,3(4).
20.
CFM XXII(6): CSEL XXV (VJ,l), 595-596: Nee sacramenta legis intellegitis
nee facta prophetarum, quia neque sanctitatem neque iustitiam cogitare nostis.
sed de praeceptis et sacrament is ueteris testamenti saepe ac multa iam diximus,
ut intellegeretur aliud ibi fuisse, quod per gratiam noui testamenti faciendo
donaretur inplendum, aliud, quod per ueritatem patefactam remouendo
demonstraretur inpletum . . .
211
21.
CFM XXII(8): CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 596-597: sed quia non distingunt inter lucem,
quod est ipse deus, et lucem, quam fecit deus, ideo putant esse consequens,
ut in tenebris ipse fuerit, antequam faceret lucem, cum tenebrae essent super
abyssum, antequam diceret: fiat lux, et facta est lux.
22.
CFM XX.5: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 539.
23.
24.
CFM XX.5: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 539-540.

cf. CFM XX.9: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 544; CFM XX.15: CSEL XXV (VI,1),
555.
25.
CFM XX.1: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 535-536.
26.
CFM XX.2: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 536: cuius ex uiribus ac spiritali profusione
terram quoque concipientem gignere patibilem lesum, qui est uita ac salus
hominum, omni suspensus ex ligno.
For the Manichaeans, the "Suffering Jesus" provides the fruit which is the
food of humanity. This notion is the Manichaean counterpart of Catholic
teaching regarding the Divine humanity of Christ.
cf. CFM XXXII. 7 (CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 766), where Faustus refers to Jesus'
"mysticam fixionem, qua nostrae animae passionis monstrantur uulnera ... "
27.
CFM XX.7: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 541: quando enim discreuistis lucem, qua
cernimus, ab ea luce, qua intellegimus, cum aliud nihil umquam putaueritis
esse intellegere ueritatem nisi formas corporeas cogitare, siue finitas siue ex
aliquibus partibus infinitas . . .
Augustine's distinction between these two "lights" touches upon his theory
of Divine Illumination, the basis of his entire epistemology. In this connection, Etienne Gilson delineates the metaphor of "illumination" in terms of
three presuppositions (The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans.
L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), 77): first, that the act
whereby the mind knows truth is comparable to the act whereby the eye sees
bodies; secondly, that scientific truths must be made intelligible by a kind of
light before they can be understood, just as objects must be made intelligible
by light before they can be seen; thirdly, that God is the source of truth for
our minds just as the sun is the source of perceivable light.
For a discussion of Augustine's theory of Divine Illumination specifically
within the context of the Contra Faustum Manichaeum XX.7, see Ronald
H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge
(Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 107-108.
cf. De Ordine 11,3(10); Soliloquia 1,6(12).
28.

cf. De Trinitate IX,6(10): CC 1 (XVI,l), 302.
29.
21 2
30.
CFM XX.7: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 541-542: et tamen etiam hoc lumen non est
lumen illud, quod deus est; hoc enim creatura est, creator est ille; hoc factum,
ille qui fecit; hoc denique mutabile, dum vult, quod nolebat, et scit, quod
nesciebat, et reminiscitur, quod oblitum erat, illud autem incommutabili
uoluntate, ueritate, aeternitate persistit, et inde nobis est initium existendi,
ratio cognoscendi, lex amandi; inde omnibus et inrationalibus animantibus
natura, qua uiuunt, uigor, quo sentiunt, motus, quo adpetunt; inde etiam
omnibus corporibus mensura, ut subsistant, numerus, ut ornentur, pondus, ut
ordinentur. itaque lumen illud trinitas inseparabilis, unus deus est . . .
31.
As we have already seen, the Manichaeans reserved the highest light for the
Father; the sun and moon were linked with the Son and the atmospheric
circuit was associated with the Holy Spirit (CFM XX.7: CSEL XXV, Vl,l, 542).
32.
CFM XX.8: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 542: cum per huiusmodi locos nisi corpora
diuidi separarique non possint ...
33.
CFM XX.8: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 543-544: itane uero, detestanda et

anathemanda stultitia, Christus per solem lunamque distentus hie uirtute
habitans, hie sapientia nee hie perfectus et plenus nee in sole sapiens nee in
luna praepotens . . .
34.
CFM XX. 9: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 546: si ista uera sunt, dei substantia
commutabilis est, corruptibilis, coinquinabilis. hoc autem credere plenum est
sacrilegae insaniae.
35.
CFM XX.15: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 555.
36.
CFM XX.l7: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 556-557.
37.
CFM XXI.l: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 568.
38.
39.
CFM XXI.l: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 568: an quia uim omnem maleficam hyle
adsignamus et beneficam deo, ut congruit, idcirco nihil interesse putas, an
utrumque eorum uocemus deum?
40.
CFM XXI.l: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 569.
41.
42.
CFM XXI.4: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 573.
43.
CFM XXI.4: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 573.
44.
CFM XXI.4: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 573: deus autem uerus, in quem nondum a
uobis credi nimium doleo, et colubrum fecit inter alia inferiora et solem inter
alia superiora et adhuc in sublimioribus non corporalibus caelestibus, sed iam
in spiritalibus multa ista luce Ionge meliora, quae carnalis homo quilibet non
percipit, quanto magis uos, qui cum carnem detestamini, nihil aliud quam
uestram regulam detestamini, qua bona et mala metimini! neque enim potest
213
in uobis esse cogitatio uel malorum, nisi qualibus carnalis sensus offenditur,
uel bonorum, nisi qualibus carnalis acies oblectatur.
45.
CFM XXI.7: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 576.
46.
47.
CFM XXI.5: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 574: et quodammodo administret pro sui
generis exiguitate quoddam uniuersum suum ad incolumitatem tuendam sibi
conciliatum.
cf. CFM XX1.7: CSEI XXV (VI,1), 575: uidete quemadmodum in omne
animal sibi ad salutem conciliatum portendat naturae ista communio, ut diligat
carnem suam . . .
48.
CFM XXI.5: CSEL XXV (VJ,l), 575-576.
49.
CFM XXI.5: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 574-575: postremo uos ipsi quamuis carnali
errore carnem detestemini, non potestis nisi diligere carnem uestram eiusque
saluti et incolumitati consulere, omnes ictus et casus et intemperiem, qua
Iaeditur, deuitare, munimenta uero et salubritatem, qua conseruatur, adpetere:
ita ostenditis praeualere naturae legem contra erroris uestri opinionem.
50.
51.
CFM XXI.6: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 575: si ergo cor non peruersumatque corruptum
uanis fabulis haberetis, inuisibilia enim eius etiam per ista, quae in hac infima
et carnali creatura facta sunt, intellecta conspiceretis.
52.
CFM XXI.8: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 577 (quoting I Cor. xii. 1-26).
Paul provides a detailed analysis of the organic relationship between the
various parts of the body: every member of the body is related to the whole,
and no one member functions on an independent, autonomous basis.
53.
CFM XXI.9: CSEL XXV (Vl,1), 578: Horum ergo membrorum et corporis
nostri, quae sic commendat, sic laudat apostolus, quisquis artificem deum negat,
uidetis, cui contradicat adnuntians nobis praeter id, quod accepimus. quid
igitur opus est, ut a me redarguatur potius quam ab omnibus christianis
anathemetur? dicit apostolus: deus temperauit corpus, et dicit iste: 'hyle, non
deus.' quid apertius his inimicitiis ante anathemandis quam refellendis? numquid
et hie apostolus, cum diceret: deus, addidit: huius saeculi?
Augustine also comments upon Paul's assertion that God tempered the
body (CFM XXI. 9: CSEL XXV, VI, 1, 580). Faustus, however, ascribes the
process whereby God arranges the members of the body into a harmonious
unity to the evil principle of Hyle (CFM XXI.lO: CSEL XXV, VJ,1, 581). For
Augustine, this position is wholly untenable (CFM XXI.lO: CSEL XXV, VJ,1,
580-581): how can the Manichaeans suppose that even the lowest corporeal
natures which exhibit harmonious action, animation, sense perception, growth,
reproduction, and the general tendency toward self-preservation could have
been produced by a principle of evil? What Faustus views as the work of
Hyle, then, can be ascribed to God alone.
214
54.
CFM XX1.11: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 582.
55.
CFM XXI.11: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 582-583: ego autem ne homini calumniari
puter, nihil obicio de albo et nigra, calido et frigido, de dulci et amaro et
sanitatem atque infirmitatem praescribam. si enim album et dulce duo bona
sunt, nigrum autem et amarum duo mala, quomodo plurima uua omnisque
oliua nigrescendo dulcescit, id est mali amplius habendo fit melior? item si
duo bona sunt calor et sanitas, duo uero mala frigus et infirmitas, cur calescendo
corpora aegrescunt? an forte sana febriunt?
56.
CFM XXI.14: CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 585: Cur non ergo haec aut duo bona dicitis
aut duo mala, uel magis et duo bona et duo mala, duo bona apud se, duo mala
in alterutrum? postea, si opus fuerit, quaeremus, quid horum sit melius aut
peius. interim quia duo bona erant apud se, ita consideratur. regnabat deus in
terra sua, regnabat et hyle in sua; sanitas regnantium et ibi et hie; copia fructuum
et ibi et hie; fecunditas prolis utrobique; suauitas propriarum uoluptatum apud
utrosque. sed ilia gens, inquiunt, excepto eo, quod uicinae luci mala erat, et
apud se ipsam mala erat. interim bona eius multa iam dixi; si et uos mala eius
potueritis ostendere, erunt duo regna bona, sed illud melius, ubi nullum erat
malum.
Augustine further points out that the Manichaeans must acknowledge that
the race of Darkness could only have proliferated if it enjoyed some peace and
tranquility. But the very fact that such goods can be detected in the region of
Darkness demonstrates that it could not be completely evil.
57.
CFM XXI.14: CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 586-587.
58.
cf. De Natura Boni 42-43, where Augustine discusses the reasons for the
attachment of the luminous particles to the region of Darkness. For Augustine, the very fact that the region of Light found it necessary to engage in a
struggle with the forces of Darkness indicates a certain weakness and susceptibility to evil in the nature of Light (even before any mixing actually occurred).
59.
CFM XXI.l4: CSEL XXV (Vl,l), 587.

cf. Confesslones VII,2(3), where Augustine refers to Nebridius's challenge
to the Manichaeans:
He asked: 'What would that unknown nation of darkness, which the
Manichaeans are wont to postulate as a hostile mass, have done to you
if you had refused to contend with it?' If it was answered that it would do
you some injury, then you would be violable and corruptible. If it were
said that it could not injure you, no reason would be offered for your
fighting with it, fighting too, in such wise that some portion and member of your being, or some offspring of your very substance, would be
mingled with those opposing powers and natures which were not created by you. Thus it would be so far corrupted and changed for the
worse, as to be turned from happiness to misery, and as to need some
assistance by which it could be rescued and cleansed.
60.
CFM XXI.15: CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 587.
215
Augustine applies the same line of criticism to Manichaean teaching concerning the souls that were confined to the "clod" or bolos of Darkness (CFM
XXI.16: CSEL XXV, VJ,l, 588).
61.
CFM XXI.16: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 588: concedimus uobis, si duo mala dixeritis,
ut quod uolueritis horum peius dicatis; si autem duo bona, quodlibet horum
dicite melius . . .
62.

Augustine's use of the term pars should be noted here. The translator
renders pars as "principle." But "part" or "portion" would appear to be more
effective renderings for pars here. Augustine's use of pars in this context is
revealing: he wishes to stress that there are not two separate principles, but
rather, two parts of the same principle.
cf. De Natura Boni 42, where Augustine contends that the region of Darkness is less culpable than the region of Light. According to Augustine, the
God of Light condemns his enemies to destruction and his own members to
punishment.
63.
CFM XXI.16: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 589-590: dicit enim Manichaeus in epistula
Fundamenti ideo dignas illas animas fieri tali subplicio, quod errare se a priore
Iucida sua natura passae sunt et inimicae lumini sancto exstiterunt, cum eas in
ilium errorem, quo ita tenebrarentur, ut inimica luci lux fieret, ipse miserit: si
inuitas, iniustus, ut cogeret; si uolentes, ingratus, ut damnet.
64.
CFM XXI.16: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 589: numquid hyle tam horrendo globe in
aeternum uel deum includeret uel sua uiscera adfigeret? et quod sceleratius
est, calumniatur eisdem reliquiis, ne defecisse uideatur, quod eas purgare non
potuit.
65.
CFM XXI.16: CSEL XXV (VI,1), 589: nempe recordamini uerba Fausti de
deo tamquam de antidote et hyle tamquam ueneno: ecce plus nocet uestrum
antidotum quam uenenum.
66.
In this connection, however, Bonner contends (St. Augustine of Hippo, Life

and Controversies, 197) that because the Manichaeans were at heart Christians (albeit heretical ones), they "were unable to remain pure Dualists, but
were, in the last resort, Monarchians, recognizing that the Father of Greatness is, in a certain sense, the supreme ruler against whom the powers of
Darkness are rebels rather than equal and independent enemies."
cf. Steven Runciman's distinction (in The Medieval Manichee. A Study of
the Christian Dualist Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969),
174-175) between pure Dualism and Monarchianism, specifically as it developed in the orthodox Christian tradition:
We must seek for the origin of "Christian" Dualism in the same place
and time as that in which orthodox Christianity was born. The ancestry
of the former was more mixed and its theology less accurate, but it was
inspired at the start by the same religious feeling. As time went on the
differences became definite. The turning-point was probably Marcion's
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organization of a separate Gnostic Church. From that there could be no
retreat. Soon after, when orthodox Christianity triumphed with the
aid of Imperial Rome, the Gnostic churches lost touch, and divided into
two main streams. The one, the more strictly Dualist or, if you will, the
more Manichaean, lingered in Armenia and travelled with Armenian
colonists to the Balkans. The other, the Monarchian stream, remained
to a greater extent the repository of Gnostic tales and Early Christian
usages, and, revitalized by an evangelical movement known as
Messalianism, itself largely inspired by Montanism, came also to Thrace
and to the Balkans. There the two branches joined up again, though
each retained its fundamental doctrine, and jointly they swept over
Europe.
67.
For purposes of this anti-Manichaean polemic, Augustine identifies

Manichaeism with paganism. However, in the De haeresibus (PL xlii, 34-38),
he characterizes Manichaeism as a Christian heresy.
68.
CFM XXII.69: CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 666.
69.
CFM XXII.69: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 665: hunc ergo Moysen famulum dei uiui,
dei ueri, dei summi, fabricatoris caeli et terrae, non de alieno, sed de nihilo,
non premente necessitate, sed adfluente bonitate, non per sui membri poenam,
sed per sui uerbi potentia m . . .
cf. CFM XXVI. 7: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 735, where Augustine affirms the creation of all things from nothing in connection with a discussion of the power
of the Word to make everything (including the human body), from nothing.
Chapter 6
Creatio ex nihilo in
Augustine's Anti-Manichaean Polemic:
A Brief Recapitulation
In its most general terms, Augustine's interpretation of the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo presupposes two key teachings: first, the omnipotence of God as the ultimate Cause of everything which exists, but not
in the fullest sense as does God; secondly, the complete dependence
of everything upon God for its very being. 1 In contrast to human
artists or craftsmen, God relies upon nothing in creating. Accordingly, it can be said that God creates from nothing whatsoever. 2 Since
God is wholly omnipotent, He neither creates under constraint or compulsion from any external source; nor in response to the dictates of
his own nature (as does the Godhead depicted in Neoplatonic systems). Rather, God creates simply because He loves what He freely
wills to create. 3 For Augustine, this fact provides the final word in
discussions regarding God's motive as Creator: any attempt to determine what prompted Divine love to create would lead to an infinite
regress of preceding motives which would seriously call into question
God's absolute self-sufficiency.
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was operative in Augustine's refutation of the fundamental tenets of Manichaeism. On a metaphysical
and epistemological level, it was operative in his critique of the materialism inherent in the Manichaeans' cosmogony and exegesis of Scripture. The very affirmation of God's creation of all things from nothing
indicates that not all reality is material and that there is an ultimate
reality which is immune to the effects of change. God, then, must be
ontologically distinct from what He creates.
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was also a prominent feature of
Augustine's refutation of Manichaean dualism. If God is the ultimate
218
Augustine's Anti-Manichaean Polemic
Creator of everything which exists, and God is supremely good, then

no principle (or principles) can be co-equal with God in perfection
and efficacy. In this respect, the doctrine rules out the existence of
anything which stands in radical opposition to God by its very nature
(that is, in metaphysical terms). This position was a pivotal element in
Augustine's refutation of the Manichaean theory of the substantiality
of evil. If God created all things from nothing, and everything is causally dependent upon God for its existence, then nothing can be evil by
its very nature. In Augustinian terms, absolute evil is correlative with
utter non-being and non-being provides the only counterpoint of God's
creative act. In effect, God requires nothing in order to create.
Let us now recapitulate Augustine's uses of the doctrine of creatio
ex nihi/o in his anti-Manichaean polemic in more precise terms. In
keeping with the methodological principles articulated at the outset of
this study, this summary of key themes and arguments will address
two significant aspects of Augustine's thought in this context. First, it
is important to take into account the personal dimension of his deliberations. As observed throughout the preceding four chapters,
Augustine's own life frequently provided the impetus to his critical
response to Manichaean teaching and its implications for a Christian
understanding of creation. The second aspect which merits our scrutiny is closely related to the first. In this connection, Augustine's use
of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo must be assessed in terms of his
own maturation as a thinker and as a Christian, along with the development of insights over the period of time in which these writings
emerged.
The Exegetical Background of Augustine's
Anti-Manichaean Polemic
Augustine's commentaries on Genesis provide the very foundation of

his anti-Manichaean polemic. Since the Old Testament was the principal focus of Manichaean attacks upon the Catholic faith, a defense of
Sacred Scripture was crucial, especially in regard to the creation account of Genesis. Indeed, the affirmation of God's creative efficacy is
the sine qua non of any viable response to the doctrinal challenges
posed by Manichaean dualism. Augustine's extended commentary on
Genesis, however, unfolded over a broad time-frame in which two key
developments are discernible.
First, we observe a development in regard to Augustine's exegesis
itself. In the interests of simple believers (those "weak and little ones"
219
among the Catholica), he wished to demonstrate that a literal interpretation of Genesis need not commit one to the simplistic understanding of the text which the Manichaeans endorsed, and in their
turn, attributed to Catholic Christians. But Augustine's conception as
to what constitutes a literal interpretation underwent some significant
changes by the time that he completed the De Genesi ad litteram.
The sharp distinction between the literal and allegorical interpretations in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos became increasingly blurred
in his subsequent commentaries on Genesis. The rather restrictive
understanding of the literal sense (that is, "exactly as the letter sounds")
which dominated his earliest exegetical efforts gave way to a more
refined approach that was fully attuned to the different layers of meaning of a given passage. While Augustine understood the literal meaning as that which was intended by the writer, he believed that this
seminal meaning admitted a plurality of interpretations which reveal
the deeper metaphysical truths hidden in the text. From this standpoint, the literal meaning not only encompasses what the author explicitly stated, but the whole range of meanings that can be derived
from the text (so long as one's interpretation is consistent with Christian faith and the teachings of the Church).
Augustine's increasingly sophisticated exegesis of Genesis reflects
two vital influences which were instrumental in his conversion to Christianity. On the one hand, the preaching of Ambrose showed him a
way of seriously rethinking his understanding of the Bible, and in
broader terms, his attitude toward the Catholic faith. On the other
hand, Augustine's reading of the libri platonicorum (coupled with his
acquaintance with exponents of a Neoplatonic brand of Christianity in
Milan) enabled him to cultivate an appreciation of a spiritual level of
reality which transcends a changing world of sense experience. In this
way, he was able to overcome the exclusively "carnal-minded" outlook
which shaped his view of Scripture both before and after his alliance
with the Manichaeans. This intellectual transformation had a decisive
impact upon his conception of the Divine nature and the relation between God and created reality.
The second major development in Augustine's exegesis of Genesis
pertains to his explication of the act of creation. In the De Genesi
contra Manichaeos (c. A.D. 388), Augustine interpreted the teaching
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth ... and
the Spirit of God was stirring above the waters (Genesis 1:1-2)
chiefly in terms of the creative activity of the Father (that is, Deus). In
keeping with the Neoplatonic presuppositions that permeate his early
220
writings, this initial commentary on Genesis stresses the unity and

sovereignty of the Godhead as supreme Creator of everything which
exists. In this context, Augustine depicts the act of creation in terms
of two simultaneous (but logically distinct) phases. First, God brings
amorphous matter into being as the ultimate irreducible substrate of
created reality. Indeed, if matter was created from nothing, then everything comprised of matter (that is, spiritual and corporeal reality)
can be said to have been created from nothing as well. Matter, however, stands in need of formation. In this respect, formless matter
constitutes but a potential state of existence pertaining to what will
be, rather than to what actually exists. 4 While formless matter enjoys
an existence (or more precisely, a quasi-existence), it is still nothing
specific. A second phase of creation is required, then, whereby indeterminate matter is unified and transformed into specific realities. 5
Some five years later (with the composition of the incomplete De
Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus in A.D. 393), Augustine
adjusted his exegesis of Genesis 1: 1-2 in a manner wholly consistent
with Nicene doctrine regarding the consubstantility and coeternity of
the Divine Persons. In this text, he now perceived a reference to the
creation of all reality by God the Father through the agency of His
Word and the operation of the Holy Spirit. By the time that he wrote
the first book of the De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim (beginning around A.D. 405), Augustine had developed a thoroughgoing
trinitarian theology of creation in terms of the making and forming of
all things by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the conversion
whereby things are "reformed" by imitating the triune Godhead's perfection and goodness. 6 For Augustine, such a conversion on the part
of creatures is analogous to the eternal union which holds between the
Word and the Father. 7
Augustine's Response to Mani's Cosmogony

The theory of creation that Augustine forged in his commentaries on
Genesis provided him with the doctrinal basis for his refutation of the
dualistic vision of reality inherent in Mani's cosmogony. By affirming
God's status as supreme Creator, Augustine countered Manichaean
teaching regarding the conflict between opposing principles of Good
and Evil (that is, Light and Darkness, respectively). Such an outlook
rules out the possibility of an ordered hierarchy of created realities,
wherein some things are deemed better and some worse than others,
221
according to an ultimate standard of metaphysical and moral excellence. The recognition that God is the Cause of all being eliminates
the possibility that anything can be evil in itself, or that anything can
be co-equal with God in power. While matter is bound up with finitude, mutability, and corruptibility, it is still fundamentally good. The
deficiency of matter and created things in general does not proceed
from the fact that they are evil by nature, but from the fact that they
were created from nothing. Accordingly, the ultimate cause is neither
material, nor mutable, nor susceptible to corruptibility of any kind.
The recognition of the vast ontological difference between God and
creatures was a vital stage in Augustine's refutation of Manichaean
dualism. Despite his abhorrence of anthropomorphic depictions of
God, Augustine's early theological presuppositions had been grounded
solely upon images derived from sense experience. From this standpoint, he viewed God as an infinite but corporeal substance diffused
throughout space, and thus, subject to finite limitations. This materialistic conception of the Godhead was reinforced by the teachings which
Augustine encountered among the Manichaeans. For them, God was
supremely good, but still vulnerable to the hostile invasion of Evil (at
least at that point where the Divine nature is "bounded" by the region
of Darkness).
Only after Augustine had cultivated an understanding of the Divine
nature as spiritual and infinite in the most absolute sense (through the
influence of Neoplatonism) could he begin to grasp how God can be
present to the whole of creation, yet completely immune to change
and corruptibility. The crucial separation of God from His created
effects is underscored by means of Augustine's distinction between
what is begotten by God and what is made by God. In this respect,
what is begotten by God is part of the Divine nature and cannot be
corrupted; what is made by God, on the other hand, participates in
the Divine nature as a causally dependent creature. The things which
God creates are subject to corruption because they were created from
nothing, and thereby, bound up with mutability and a general tendency toward non-being.
Augustine's formal refutation of Manichaean dualism rests upon a
critique of Mani's teaching regarding the origin of the principles of
Light and Darkness. While the Manichaeans agreed that anything good
depends upon God for its existence, they were unable to explain how
God stands in relation to their region of Light, the realm of all good
things. In effect, Augustine confronted his opponents with an ines-
222
capable dilemna. If Light was a part of the Divine nature, then God
was really subject to the hostile incursion of Darkness. If, on the other
hand, Light was different from God in nature, then it is either good or
evil; in the former case, something other than God was designated as
absolutely good; in the latter case, something other than Darkness
was designated as the basis of absolute Evil (that is, a part of the
Divine nature itself). 8
If the Manichaeans were to avoid the blasphemy of compromising
the supremacy of the Divine nature, or opening God to the possibility
of corruption, they must admit that the region of Light was made by
God from nothing whatsoever. 9 By extension, however, the region of
Darkness cannot be substantially evil, precisely because it contains
many features that are good and even praiseworthy (as depicted by
the Manichaeans themselves). 10 Because the region of Darkness exhibits a mixture of good and evil things, then, it can be designated as
at least partially good. Indeed, the very fact that the Manichaeans
impart existence to Darkness implies that it possesses something more
than formlessness, and that it cannot be utter chaos. Indeed, if its evil
features were removed, any good it possesses would remain intact.
Augustine, however, vehemently denies that Darkness possesses any
creative efficacy of its own. Such power is reserved only for God, the
Author of all creaturely existence. 11
Once he demonstrates the inherent goodness of the region of Darkness, Augustine formulates his main argument against Manichaean
dualism. This argument proceeds from his adaptation and refinement
of the Neoplatonic understanding of evil in negative terms. From this
standpoint, what is called evil is not an active principle in its own
right, but the deficiency of what is good in its broadest sense. 12 From
this standpoint, nothing can be absolutely evil. This position reveals a
key metaphysical presupposition for Augustine: every nature, insofar
as it is a nature, is good. 13 Moreover, if corruption is the only evil, and
corruption is not a nature, then no nature can be evil in and of itself. 14
Consequently, things can only be viewed as evil in relation to what is
existent, and thus, fundamentally good. The logical priority of positive reality over corruption points to an ontological priority: corruption can only exist in a subordinate relation to an existent thing.
In contrast to Augustine, the Manichaeans assumed an extremely
pessimistic attitude toward the corruptibility exhibited by creatures.
From their perspective, the mere fact that creatures are susceptible to
corruption indicates that they are inherently evil. For Augustine, how-
223
ever, corruptibility is never synonymous with a complete lack of goodness. God did not make corrupt natures, but rather, good natures
capable of undergoing corruption. In this respect, Augustine viewed
corruption and corruptibility in terms of a negativity attaching to creatures as a result of their creation from nothing, along with the penalty
that rational creatures justly merit as punishment for sin.
In opposition to the Manichaeans, then, Augustine affirmed the
substantiality of goodness, not evil. In this way, he countered the
Manichaean notion that good and evil are mutually exclusive principles. The preeminence of God's being and goodness rules out the
possibility that any nature can be His metaphysical or moral contrary.
But since created things can never be as good as their Creator, Augustine posits a hierarchical scheme of reality, extending from God (as
Summum Bonum) to corporeal realities. Spiritual natures (including
human beings) occupy an intermediate position in this scheme. While
all creatures participate in the being and goodness of the Divine nature, Augustine draws a clear metaphysical distinction between God
and what He creates.
The Problem of Evil
A key feature of Augustine's refutation of Manichaean dualism in the

Contra Epistulam was his theory of evil as a corruption of the good.
This interpretation (with some important refinements) assumed a central role in the De Natura Boni Manichaeum (a work roughly contemporaneous with the Contra Epistulam), Augustine's classic statement on the problem of evil. In this connection, Augustine adapted
the Plotinian formulation of evil as a privation of the good in the
interests of Christian teaching. His rejection of the Manichaean theory
of the substantiality of evil was fully operative in his appropriation of
Neoplatonic teaching. For Plotinus, evil was inextricably bound up
with the ontological deficiency of matter, the terminus of the One's
diffusiveness. For Augustine, however, matter cannot be evil, precisely
because it depends upon God for its existence. In this respect, Augustine defined evil not merely as a privation of the good, but of being
itself.
Clearly, the solution of the problem of evil (as far as it is possible to
resolve this problem) was a crucial aspect of Augustine's antiManichaean polemic. On a purely personal level, however, Augustine
had a special interest in this particular issue. For him, the difficulty
224
was rooted in the apparent disparity between the experience of evil

and a belief in a supremely good and benevolent God. In a very real
sense, however, the biblical understanding of creation sowed the seeds
for this perennial stumbling block in his early spiritual journey. If God
is the ultimate Cause of everything which exists, then He might be
held responsible for the good as well as the evil in the world. The
Manichaeans responded to this problem by imparting an independent
existence to evil. The drawback of this response is readily obvious: if
evil exists in its own right, then the supreme perfection of God must
be severely undermined.
In the De Natura Boni, Augustine's response to the problem of
evil proceeds from an important qualification regarding the act of creation itself. As Augustine shows, the failure to distinguish what is created by God from what is created of God (that is, out of the Divine
nature) leads to the error of equating God with the very things that He
has brought into being from nothing. 15 In Augustinian terms, God
constitutes the fullness of being. But God exists in the fullest sense
because He is wholly immutable, and therefore, admits of no contraries. 16 Creatures, on the other hand, are characterized by a mutability
that is rooted (along with their corruptibility) in their very creation
from nothing. 17
While the fact of creatio ex nihilo defines the limitations of creatures, it also insures their fundamental goodness. 18 In the De Natura
Boni, Augustine delineates the goodness of creatures in terms of three
essential attributes: measure (modus), form (forma), and order (ordo). 19
If goodness is correlative with the being of a thing, these attributes
are correlative with its very nature as well. In their absence, no nature
would exist. 20 But while God is creatively responsible for these transcendental properties, He also transcends every measure, form, and
order that creatures possess. 21 In this respect, God Himself is not
subject to the transcendentals which He creates, but provides the ultimate exemplar of the measure, form, and order of existent things.
Augustine's discussion of the transcendentals of created being provides the context for a more refined theory of evil. In keeping with his
transcendental analysis, evil is defined as a displacement of nature
proceeding from a corruption of the measure, form, and order appropriate to a given thing. 22 This type of corruption, however, pertains specifically to moral evil, that is, the evil that we freely choose to
commit through sin. The misuse of the will in this fashion results in
physical evil, a privation of those perfections which a thing should
naturally possess. Such gifts (e.g., immortality, rationality, or free will)
225
are bestowed upon us by God gratuitously. In this respect, however,

physical evil (the justly merited punishment for sin) must be distinguished from the negativity coinciding with the finitude of creatures,
by virtue of their creation from nothing. As defined by Augustine,
such "metaphysical" evil is present in the very constitution of created
being. 23 In contrast to physical evil, such a deficiency entails no real
deprivation, but merely the absence of a perfection over and above
what things should naturally possess.
The One, True God
Augustine's critique of Manichaean dualism and the theory of the substantiality of evil presupposes an unequivocal affirmation of monotheism. By positing an independent principle of Evil, the Manichaeans
not only called into question the sovereignty of God, but committed
themselves to a de facto polytheism as well. As Faustus argued, "if we
are accused of making two gods, I reply that it cannot be shown that
we ever said anything of the kind." 24 For all practical purposes, however, Evil or Hyle constituted an opposing principle to the Father of
Light that acted as a kind of competing god. This issue takes center
stage in the Contra Faustum Manichaeum, Augustine's rebuttal of
the Manichaeans' critique of Catholic teaching, as represented by its
prime spokesman. For Augustine, Faustus exemplified all of the flaws
inherent in Manichaean theology. Overall, his response to Faustus rests
upon two key presuppositions: first, that God is wholly distinct from
creation; secondly, that God is the supreme Creator of all things. In
this connection, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is operative in his
refutation of Faustus's claims regarding the relationship between God
and the principles of Light and Darkness, respectively.
For the Manichaeans, Yahweh (the God of the Jewish Old Testament) was an evil being. For this reason, they could only view the
maker of the material world as inferior to the Father of Light that
opposed Hyle. In this context, the Manichaeans contended that Scripture teaches that God "existed from eternity in darkness, and admired
the light when he saw it." 25 But according to their interpretation, Darkness exists independently of God and Light is part of the Divine nature. Augustine's response to this interpretation demonstrates four
things: first, that Darkness could not have co-existed with God; secondly, that Light was not part of the Divine nature; third, that Darkness is not a reality in its own right; and fourth, that Light was created
by God (along with the entire visible universe which it illumines). From
226
this standpoint, created light encompasses both visible light and the
incorporeal light that enlightens the human understanding. In opposition to the belief that visible light is part of God's own nature, Augustine affirms the immutability and simplicity of God as the Divine Light
itself. 26 In contrast to the visible light perceived by the senses (the only
kind of light that the Manichaeans could recognize), this immutable
Light is one Divine Being, a triune existence of the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit.
In contrast to this bifurcation of reality into radically distinct and
opposing principles, Augustine developed an organic vision of reality
that harmonizes the diverse parts of creation into a unified whole. For
him, the order of creation constitutes a well-ordered hierarchy of things
both great and small in dignity, and both spiritual and corporeal in
nature. From this standpoint, God's creative efficacy is apparent in
the highest creatures (i.e., angelic and human natures), as well as the
lowest corporeal natures. 27 As Augustine shows, the Manichaeans tacitly
acknowledge this fact when they include many good elements in their
region of Darkness, the realm of Hyle. 28 Indeed, nature itself discloses
(through the drive for self-preservation, nourishment, and growth) that
the flesh is loved and exalted, rather than despised and rejected. Accordingly, the Manichaeans must admit that even the inhabitants of
the region of Darkness are fundamentally good, and thus, created by
God alone.
But in affirming the unicity of the Divine nature (and its indivisibility), Augustine also upholds God's status as supreme Creator. In this
respect, the worship of one God is correlative with the worship of
one Creator, the beginning of all existence. God, then, must be the
Creator of Hyle as well. For the Manichaeans, however, God is the
principle of good things alone, while Hyle is designated as the principle of everything evil. 29 By imparting a creative efficacy to Hyle in
this way, the Manichaeans clearly deviated from the traditional understanding of matter as the recipient of forms and the pure potential for
formation. 30 Despite Faustus's claims to the contrary (or even the absence of explicit polytheistic teaching in Mani's writings), Hyle assumed the proportions of a second god in the Manichaean cosmogony.
Concluding Assessment
In the context of his anti-Manichaean polemic, Augustine's use of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo reveals his role as a Christian philoso-
227
pher in the classic Gilsonian sense of one searching for an understanding of the contents of faith. In this respect, his deliberations on
creation in opposition to Manichaean doctrine reflect a reliance upon
Scriptural teaching and insights derived from secular philosophy. Like
his predecessors and contemporaries in the patristic tradition, Augustine made no sharp distinction between theology and philosophy (or
the truths of faith and natural reason) in the manner of Aquinas and
his successors. Augustine simply took it for granted that faith in Revelation and the attempt to understand its teachings constitute highly
complementary and mutually enriching approaches to Christian
wisdom.
First and foremost, Augustine based his theology of creation upon
the Bible. The initial phase of his anti-Manichaean polemic, in fact,
grew out of his explication of the opening verses of Genesis, in the
face of the erroneous exegesis of his opponents. From the outset of
his exegetical efforts, however, Augustine interpreted the text by means
of ideas which originated in Graeco-Roman philosophy and underwent refinement in patristic writing. But one point cannot be stressed
enough: Augustine did not merely appropriate this vast conceptual
and doctrinal legacy. Rather, he adapted it for his own purposes in an
original manner, forging a highly sophisticated theology of creation in
the process.
Scholars generally view Augustine's introduction to the libri
platonicorum and subsequent endorsement of Neoplatonic philosophy as the real watershed in his intellectual development. But this
allegiance to the Neoplatonic world-view must always be considered in
conjunction with his commitment to a Christian vision of reality. The
same individual who acknowledged the tremendous impact of the writings of the later Platonists upon his outlook also recognized their inadequacy from a spiritual standpoint.
Their pages do not have this face of piety, the tears of compassion, your
sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a contrite and a humbled heart, the salvation of
your people, the city that is like a bride, the pledge of the spirit, the cup of our
redemption. 31
Indeed, the greatest lacuna in these writings for Augustine was the
absence of any reference to the Incarnation. 32 Only in the Gospel did
he encounter a personal God whose "Word was made flesh and dwelt
among us" (John 1: 13,14). But the same God who redeemed fallen
humanity by entering fully into human existence also brought all things
228
into being from nothing out of sheer love. From a Christian perspective, humans assume a special dignity and supernatural destiny by
virtue of their creation in God's own image and likeness.
But the fact that all creatures were ultimately made from nothing
defines their being as finite, mutable, morally corruptible, and (in the
case of corporeal natures) physically corruptible. On the basis of this
metaphysical presupposition, Augustine would explicate the motive
of sin, the urgency of redemption, the need for grace, and the justness
of predestination. In effect, the recognition of God's creation of all
things from nothing provides the raison d'etre for affirming our susceptibility to moral error and our ongoing reliance upon God for all
good things. Let us now address the broader implications of creatio
ex nihi/o, both in the context of Augustine's later doctrinal controversies, and in regard to his theology as a whole.
Notes
1.
De Vera Religione xvii,34-xviii,36: CC xxxii, 208-209.
2.
De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, quaestio 78: CC xliv(A), 223.
3.
De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv, 3/1, 251. 4. De Genesi contra

Manichaeos I, 7(11): PL xxxiv,3/1, 178.
5.
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,12(18): PL xxxiv,3/1, 181-182.
6.
7.
8.
Contra epistulam XXIV(26): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 223.
9.
Contra epistu/am XXIV(26): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 223.
10.
Contra epistulam XXX(33): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 230-231.
11.
Contra epistulam XXXIII(36): CSEL XXV (VI, 1), 236.
12.
Contra epistulam XXXV(39): CSEL XXV (VI,1), 239.
13.
Contra epistulam XXXIII(36): CSEL XXV (VI,1), 236-237.
14.
Contra epistulam XXXV(39): CSEL XXV (VI,l), 240.
15.
De Natura Bani 1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 855; De Natura Bani 10: CSEL XXV
(VI,2), 859.
16.
De Natura Bani 19: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 863.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
De Natura Bani 3: CSEL XXV (VI,2),856.
22.
De Natura Boni 4: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 857.
23.
24.
Contra Faustum XXI,1: CSEL XXV (VI,2), 568-569.
25.
Contra Faustum XXII.4: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 593.
26.
Contra Faustum XX.7: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 541-542.
27.
Contra Faustum XXI.6: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 575.
230
28.
Contra Faustum XXI.lO: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 580-581.
29.
Contra Faustum XX.3: CSEL XXV (VI,l), 537.
30.
Contra Faustum XXV (VI,l), 554.
31.
Confessiones VII,21(27): CC xxvii, 111.
32.
Chapter 7
Broader Theological Implications

of the Doctrine
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the doctrine of creatio

ex nihilo was a pervasive feature of Augustine's defense of orthodoxy
against Manichaeism. But the relevance of this teaching for Augustine
was extremely wide-ranging. In actuality, it exerted an continuing influence upon his work in the turbulent decades that followed. For this
reason, the doctrine offers a useful starting point for investigating
Augustine's theology in what at least approximates a systematic manner-even if that theology does not allow for a complete systematization or any neat categorization of its themes. In a very real sense, the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo established the general framework in
which the fundamental aspects of Augustine's theology emerged. By
virtue of its implications regarding the relationship between God and
the universe of created being, the doctrine provides the nexus of a
cluster of closely related topics that permeate Augustine's thought.
This concluding chapter focuses upon five topics which are intimately connected with the fundamental Christian teaching that God
created all things from nothing: first, the Divine nature and the act of
creation; secondly, the finitude of creatures; third, human nature,
free will, and sin; fourth, redemption and grace; and fifth, Divine
sovereignty and predestination. To a great extent, Augustine's understanding of these topics remained relatively stable throughout his long
career. But despite this constancy, we also must be alert to his refinement of certain key teachings over the course of his life.
In the discussion which follows, I draw upon a range of texts which
reflect both the continuity and the evolution of Augustine's thought.
In no way, however, does this assessment aim at an exhaustive or
comprehensive survey of Augustine's immense body of works. Rather,
232
Broader Theological Implications of the Doctrine
I confine myself to writings which, in my estimation, are representative of the mainlines of Augustine's theological outlook. Accordingly,
I attempt to provide something of a window through which we might
view the ebb and flow of Augustine's theological development. In this
respect, my treatment is guided by one key question: how did the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo shape or inspire Augustine's fundamental theological presuppositions?
The Divine Nature and the Act of Creation
On its most basic level, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo establishes
the dependence of creatures upon God for their very existence. But
Augustine's affirmation of the ontological contingency of creatures
says something significant about his understanding of the Divine nature. As the supreme Creator of everything which exists, God must be
wholly distinct from His creation. If God were the same as creatures,
He would be subject to all of the limitations and deficiencies that we
observe in created realities. Conversely, God's supremacy over all things
rules out the possibili~y that creatures could be on a par with their
Creator. From the Cassiciacum dialogues onward, Augustine maintained the utter transcendence of the Divine nature. This position
comes to the fore in the early Soliloquia, where his depiction of the
Godhead is wholly consistent with the apophaticism of the Neoplatonic
tradition.
. . . the one God, the one, eternal, true substance in whom there is no
strife, no disorder, no change, no need, no death, where there is supreme
harmony, supreme clarity, supreme permanence, supreme fullness, supreme
life; where there is no deficiency and no excess; where the One begetting and
the One begotten is One. 1
In this respect, God alone deserves the title of esse (i.e., Being itself).
By means of this appellation, Augustine designates the triune God
and supreme Creator of everything which exists.
We ought, then, to love God the Trinity in unity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,
and this cannot be called anything other than Being Itself. For it is truly and
above all else God, from whom and through whom and unto whom are all
things (Rom 11.36).2
In Augustinian terms, the supremacy of God's Being coincides with

His immutability. Only that which exists supremely and immutably
could create all things in the most absolute sense (that is, from noth-
233
ing whatsoever). Augustine's emphasis on the unchangeable character

of the Divine nature (specifically in connection with the doctrine of
creatio ex nihilo) was a fixed feature of his thought from its earliest to
its final stages of development. In the late De Civitate Dei (c. A.D.
413-426), we find the same emphasis on God's immutability that
emerges in his initial writings:
For since, God is the highest existence (essentia), that is, He supremely exists, and is unchangeable, the things that He made from nothing, He gave
being, but not the highest Being, as He Himself is. 3
In effect, God is the supreme existence responsible for imparting being to creatures. Augustine offers an etymological justification for defining God in these terms:
Now 'existence' (essentia) is derived from the verb 'to be' or 'to exist' (esse)
in the same way as 'wisdom' (sapientia) from the verb 'to be wise' (sapere).
It is a new word, not employed by ancient Latin writers, but it has come into
general use in modern times to supply the need for a Latin word to express
what the Greeks call ousia, of which essentia is a literal translation. 4
It should be noted that Augustine's use of essentia exhibits a certain ambiguity of meaning. In its broadest sense, essentia points to
the substance or nature of a thing. More specifically, however, the
term refers to the Being of God. In this connection, essentia is synonymous with the Divine esse, that is, Being itself or Being in the
highest degree. In Scripture, the ontological preeminence of God is
most fully articulated in Exodus (3:14), where God identifies Himself
to Moses as I am Who am (or alternatively, He Who is). 5 Properly
speaking, then, the essentia of God does not designate a substance;
in that case, He would be the subject of His own perfections, and His
perfections would exist apart from Himself. 6
Stated in other terms, God is a simple nature. For Augustine, a
nature is called "simple" when it "cannot lose any attribute it possesses," and when "there is no difference between what it is and what
it has." 7 In this sense, God is the simple, immutable Good Who provides the source of everything that is called good.
By this Good all good things were created; but they are not simple, and for
that reason they are changeable. They are, I say, created, that is to say, they
are made, not begotten. For what is begotten by the simple Good is itself
equally simple, identical in nature with its begetter . . .8
234
Because of His ontological supremacy, God admits of no contrary

except non-being. God, then, exists in the truest sense, that is, "always in the same way." 9 By virtue of this permanence and stability,
the Divine nature differs drastically from the ever changing character
of created things.
In the truth which abides I do not find past and future, but only the present
and what is without corruption-something which does not exist in a created
being. Analyze changes in things; you will find, it was and it will be. Think
about God; you will find he is, where he was and he will be cannot be. 10
Despite the exclusivity of the Divine nature, the God of Scripture is

not some detached "Self-thinking Thought," utterly removed from our
changing world. In this respect, the act of creation establishes a profound relationship between God and finite reality, as a cause stands in
relation to its effects, and reciprocally, as effects depend upon their
ultimate cause. But as we have seen, Augustine's affirmation of God's
role as supreme Creator underwent considerable refinement. By the
time that he wrote the De Genesis ad litteram, in fact, he had defined
the act of creation in clear trinitarian terms.
The notion of the creative Trinity assumes a prominent place in the
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus, in connection with Augustine's
exegesis of John 8:25-27 and Christ's identification of Himself as
"the beginning." 11 From Augustine's standpoint, it would be absurd
to designate the Son by means of this title, without applying it to the
Father and Holy Spirit as well.
If the Father is the beginning and the Son is the beginning, how are there not
two beginnings? As we say the Father is God and the Son is God and yet we
do not say that there are two Gods. It is sacrilege to say there are two Gods;
it is sacrilege to say there are three Gods . . . although if someone asks
about them individually, we must admit about whichever one we are questioned that he is God. 12
But just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be viewed as three
distinct beginnings, they cannot be viewed as three distinct Creators. 13
Accordingly, any reference to God as Creator encompasses each member of the Trinity, since "the Trinity is one God." 14
This trinitarian understanding of creatio ex nihi/o was a salient
feature of arguments supporting the consubstantiality of the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit that emerged in Augustine's refutation of Arian
teachings. 15 According to the Homoian Arianism that Augustine op-
23 5
posed in the final decade of his life, the Son assumed the role of
Creator, but merely as a secondary God that is subordinate and inferior to the Father. In this respect, the later Arians taught that the Son
was sent to create and redeem the world at the Father's will and command.16 For Augustine, however, the Son's very designation as Creator of all things rules out the possibility that He differs from the
Father in substance. From this standpoint, the Son cannot be both
Creator and creature: if the Son acts as Creator, then the Son must be
God in the fullest sense.
If He was not made, then He is not a creature; but if He is not a creature, then
He is of the same substance with the Father, since every substance that is not
God is a creature, and that is not a creature is God. And if the Son is not of
the same substance as the Father He is a made substance; if He is a made
substance then not all things were made through him. But all things were
made through him; therefore He is of one and the same substance as the
Father. 17
In response to the Arian attempt to separate the act of creation from

the true God, then, Augustine affirmed but one Creator, that is, the
triune Godhead from whom and through whom and in whom are all
things.
In the same marvelous and divine manner, the works of all are done by all,
and the works of each one are done by all. Thus the heaven, the earth, and all
creation are the works of all of them. 18
The Finitude of Creatures
As we have seen, Augustine's criterion of true being lies in immutability. In Augustinian terms, immutability is synonymous with what is
eternal, and thereby, immune to any temporal designations of "past,"
"present," or "future." In contrast to the Divine nature, creatures are
bound up with mutability and an accompanying gravitation toward
non-being. Unlike God (Who possesses no accidental properties}, created reality "ceases to be what it was and begins to be what it was
not." 19 This susceptibility to change and its degenerative effects (on
both a physical and a moral level) is ultimately rooted in the fact that
finite natures were created from nothing. And, whatever is created
from nothing is at least theoretically capable of utter annihilation.
Before coming to be, temporal things do not exist; while existing, they are
already passing away; once having passed away, they exist no longer. Hence,
236
while belonging to the future, they do not yet exist, and once they have passed
away, they no longer exist. 20
But how do creatures "exist" in Augustine's understanding of reality? Creatures occupy a mid-rank which situates them between the
plenitude of Being found in God and absolute negation. By virtue of
this mid-rank status, created things are a mixture of being and nonbeing.
I beheld other things below you, and I saw that they are not altogether existent nor altogether non-existent: they are, because they are from you; they
are not, since they are .not what you are. For that truly exists which endures
unchangeably. 21
But a distinction must be made here between created spiritual natures

and created corporeal ones: spiritual natures (i.e., rational spirits) stand
between God and corporeal natures (the lowest things in the hierarchy of creation).
In this vast participation scheme, God endowed creatures with existence in varying degrees, and thereby, arranged natures according
to a scale of being. 22 Creatures exist insofar as they were brought into
being by God, and tend toward non-being insofar as they differ from
their Creator. Likewise, God imparted goodness to creatures, but only
in a manner consistent with their limited capacity to share in His perfection. For Augustine, then, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo not
only establishes the ultimate cause of reality; it also defines the character of created reality as good, orderly, and harmonious.
Human Nature, Free Will, and Sin
As we have seen, whatever is mutable exhibits a tendency toward corruption. But this broad metaphysical characterization pertains to finite being in general. While corporeal realities undergo a physical
corruption and dissolution, rational beings are susceptible to corruption of a moral nature. Despite their potential for moral corruptibility,
however, they can never perish completely like corporeal realities. In
this respect, rational beings possess souls that are both mutable and
immortal. But wherein lies the mutability of such exalted creatures?
Through the faculty of free will, rational beings can deviate from their
true good by means of choices for lesser goods.
But the fact that sin involves a choice between competing goods
prompts a question: how can one sin by choosing a good? In Augus-
23 7
tinian terms, sin lies in a misplaced allegiance, whereby the will loves
something other than God in an inordinate manner, elevating the
creature over the Creator in its range of affections. From this standpoint, moral wrongdoing does not proceed from the object of the
will's love, but rather, the manner in which it loves the goods created
by God. For Augustine, neither the goods sought by sinners, nor free
will itself is evil. 23 Because the human will can cling to the immutable
Good common to all or pursue mutable goods proper to itself alone, it
constitutes an "intermediate good." 24
Although free will is endowed as an unmerited gift by God, then, a
paradoxical implication of this gift is the power to sin. 25 This ability (or
tendency) to choose defectively gives rise to a troublesome aspect of
the problem of evil. Indeed, the faculty of free choice places us on
extremely hazardous moral ground: while humans are fully capable of
choosing the good, the opportunity for moral error is always present.
Despite this danger, Augustine extolled the excellence of free beings,
even if they remain open to the possibility of sinfulness.
Just as a stray horse is better than the stone that does not go astray through
a lack of self-movement and sense perception, so a creature which sins by its
free will is more excellent than one that does not sin because it is without free
wi11.26
The crucial consideration, however, is not our ability to choose, but

the fact that we are capable of making erroneous moral choices (and
do so regularly). How could rational beings created by a supremely
good Creator ever fall into sin? Ultimately, the proclivity to moral evil
which humans continually exhibit is the outgrowth of their metaphysical constitution as finite and mutable creatures. Indeed, the very fact
that the soul can alter its moral course and choose wrongly reveals the
character of its ontological origins, that is, as created ex nihilo.
Only a nature created out of nothing could have been distorted by a fault.
Consequently, although the will derives its existence, as a nature, from its
creation by God, its falling away from its true being is due to its creation out
of nothing. 27
Rational beings, of course, do not sin of necessity by virtue of their

free will. But their creation from nothing carries a certain propensity
for sin which reflects their mutability and corruptibility as creatures.
As Augustine would assert in the Opus lmperfectum contra Julianum,
238
"everyone that is able to sin, is made from nothing, but not everyone
made from nothing is able to sin." 28
But the inherent tendency toward non-being rooted in the soul's
creation from nothing was only intensified by Original Sin and its negative effects on human nature. Augustine stresses that the legacy of
Adam's sin was far-reaching, reducing humankind as a whole to a
massa damnata.
The more intimate the first man's enjoyment of God, the greater his impiety
in abandoning God. By so doing he merited eternal evil, in that he destroyed
in himself a good that might have been eternal. In consequence, the whole of
mankind is a 'condemned lump'; for he who committed the first sin was punished, and along with him all the stock which had its roots in him. 29
From a Christian perspective, fallen humanity requires a redeemer if it

is to be rescued from the penal condition justly incurred by Original
Sin. Christ is the sinless one Who resuscitates human nature by means
of the real sacrifice offered by His own death. 30
The Necessity of Redemption and Grace
In view of the wide-ranging character of Augustine's theory of redemption (and the great significance which he imparts to Christ in the
redemptive process), I confine my analysis to a passage from the
Enchiridion which provides an illuminating resume of Augustine's
entire soteriology.
. . . we could not be redeemed, even through the one Mediator between
God and man, Man himself, Christ Jesus, if He were not also God. For
when Adam was made-being made an upright man-there was no need for a
mediator. Once sin, however, had widely separated the human race from God,
it was necessary for a mediator, who alone was born, lived, and was put to
death without sin, to reconcile us to God, and provide even for our bodies a
resurrection to life eternal-and all this in order that man's pride might be
exposed and healed through God's humility. Thus it might be shown man
how far he had departed from God, when by the incarnate God he is recalled
to God; that man in his contumacy might be furnished an example of obedience by the God-Man; that the fount of grace might be opened up; that even
the resurrection of the body ... might be previewed in the resurrection of
the Redeemer himself; that the devil might be vanquished by that very nature
he was rejoicing over having deceived-all this, however, without giving man
ground for glory in himself, lest pride spring up anewY
In the foregoing quotation, several key teachings are discernible.

Augustine establishes the fact that human redemption required a Di-
239
vine mediator, since only God could bridge the great chasm of sin
separating the human race from its Creator. As Divine, this mediator
provided the perfect exemplar of humility and obedience for human
beings in the grip of pride. Accordingly, Christ's redemptive act provided the necessary source of grace for fallen humanity. Further, Christ's
resurrection offered the promise of the resurrection of the human
body after death. The evil one was thereby conquered by one assuming the very human nature that had been lured from God. In this
context, Augustine's deliberations on the necessity of grace require
further attention.
From an Augustinian perspective, Divine grace is required on both
an ontological and a salvific level. In ontological terms, creation itself
constitutes a grace or unmerited gift of an existence that we do not
deserve. In salvific terms, grace provides a means of healing human
nature from its rightful punishment.
Before we were created we didn't deserve any good, and that's why it's a
grace by which we were created-because we didn't deserve any good. So if
it's a great grace when we don't deserve any good, how great a grace it must
be when we deserve so much bad! Someone who didn't yet exist didn't deserve well; the sinner actually deserved ill. The one who was created didn't
exist before. He didn't exist, but neither had he offended. He didn't exist, and
he was made; he offended, and he was saved. He didn't yet exist, so he had
no hopes, and he was made. When he fell he had damnation to look forward
to, and he was delivered. This is grace through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom.
7: 25). 32
Augustine's affirmation of the necessity of grace (both before and after redemption) touches upon the Pelagian controversy that dominated
his later years. At this point, a brief consideration of the chief features
of Pelagianism and Augustine's response to its tenets is in order.
The beginning of the Pelagian controversy can be traced to the
years between A.D. 384 and 409. During that period, Pelagius (a
British monachus) formulated teachings that stood in direct opposition to Augustine's theories of human nature and grace. The real conflict between Pelagius and Augustine began, however, when Pelagius
(along with his disciple Celestius) sojourned at Carthage (after departing from the Italian mainland in A.D. 409 before Alfaric's invasion)
and began to disseminate his teachings in North Africa. 33 The ensuing
controversy centered upon the question as to whether human beings
have the power to do what they freely choose. The key issue here is
not freedom of the will (which is not called into question), but rather,
liberty, that is, the power to use our will for the good.
240
Both Pelagius and Augustine would agree that sin constitutes the
evil use of free will. But for Pelagius, sin weakens neither the will's
liberty nor its goodness. Since Pelagius denied the fact of Original
Sin, he held that we enjoy the same liberty as Adam when he was
created in God's image and likeness. 34 Closely related to this denial of
Original Sin and its debilitating effects was his denial of the necessity
of grace as a Divine aid in doing good and avoiding evil.
Human beings can be free from sin and keep the commandments of God, if
they want. For God gave them this ability. We did not, however, say that
there is anyone who never sinned from infancy to old age, but that those who
have turned away from sin can by their own effort and by the grace of God be
without sin. But that does not mean that they cannot return to sin in the
future. 35
For Pelagius, grace was identified with a human nature created with
free will, along with the guidance provided by the law and the forgiveness of sins derived from Baptism. 36 While he viewed the ability to do
good as a gift of God, he believed that the will to be righteous (and the
accompanying action) proceeds from our own power.
He claims that . . . the will and action are ours in such a way that they only
come from ourselves. Moreover, he holds that God's grace does not help
those two elements which he claims are entirely ours, that is, the will and the
action, but that it helps the ability which is not in our power and comes to us
from God. 37
Instead of upholding the necessity of grace, Pelagius insisted on the

necessity of nature, and the human ability (flowing from this Godgiven nature) to remain free from sin. But if Pelagius was correct in
rejecting the need for God's assisting grace, then Augustine's long
spiritual struggle was a meaningless exercise. As the Confessiones
disclose, Augustine repeatedly found himself powerless to do what
was right, even after his intellectual conversion to Christianity. As he
readily admitted, "I believed that continence lay within a man's own
powers, and such powers I was not conscious of within myself." 38 For
Augustine, grace can never be earned on the basis of our own efforts,
but only comes as an unmerited gift freely given by God.
Augustine's affirmation of the necessity of grace, however, preceded his actual conflict with Pelagianism by a number of years. Early
in his career (i.e., A.D. 386-388, the period extending from the composition of the Cassiciacum dialogues to the completion of the first
241
book of the De Iibera arbitrio), Augustine's moral theory exhibited a

marked Stoic influence. At that juncture, he viewed the sage as the
very paradigm of virtue: only the wise man bases his happiness upon
what is true and certain, while remaining free of excessive attachments to transitory goods. Accordingly, the early Augustine defined
virtue largely in terms of correct reasoning and a mental tranquility
before the vicissitudes of life. These sentiments are reflected in the De
Immortalite Animae, where Augustine identifies God with perfect
reason, the basis of our rationality and being.
The mind cannot turn away from reason-in doing so it falls into foolishnesswithout suffering a defect; for, just as the mind enjoys a more perfect being
when turned toward reason . . . and adhering to it-because it adheres to
something unchangeable which is the truth that is in the highest degree and
primordial-so, when turned away from reason . . . the mind has a less
perfect being-and this means a defect. 39
Augustine came to reject the intellectualism of Stoic ethics and its

notion of the morally autonomous, self-sufficient will. As early as the
De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum (c.
A.D. 388), in fact, he began to redefine virtue in terms of a rightly
ordered love of God, the true source and goal of human happiness. 40
On the basis of his own moral struggles and pastoral experience, he
would grow in his conviction regarding the scope and extent of human contingency. As the Confessiones continually show, only Christ
allows us to accomplish what we could never achieve on our own. 41
The crucial turning point in Augustine's writings is found in the De
diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum (a response to eight questions proposed by Simplicianus of Milan, composed in A.D. 397). In
this particular work, he leaves no doubt as to his position: in the face
of Original Sin, only God enables humans to use their faculty of free
will for good purposes.
Free will is most important. It exists, indeed, but of what value is it in those
who are under sin? If those things delight us which serve our advancement
towards God, that is due not to our own whim or industry or meritorious
works, but to the inspiration of God and to the grace which He bestows. He
freely bestows upon us voluntary assent, earnest effort, and the power to
perform works of fervent charity. 42
For all practical purposes, Augustine had formulated the sum and
substance of his response to Pelagius by the end of the fourth century.
Thus, he could rightly assert that "we spoke as though we were a!-
242
ready speaking against them" long before Pelagianism even manifested

itself as a serious theological concern. 43
Augustine's assessment of the condition of fallen humanity yielded
two key conclusions: first, that the human will is now impeded by the
effects of Adam's sin; secondly, that Divine grace is required if human
nature is to choose the good and refrain from evil with any resolve.
Let human beings hear that there is a certain necessity of sinning due to the
defects of nature, not to the way nature was created. With the help of grace
through Our Lord, Jesus Christ, the evil necessity will be removed, and full
freedom will be given us. 44
In view of the debilitation incurred by sin, humanity stands in continual need of healing by the Divine physician. 45 The essence of libertas
lies in the ability to make correct moral choices in a consistent
manner.
By this grace of God there is caused in us ... not only to be able to do
what we will, but even to will to do what we are able. 46
In the absence of grace, the human will would be susceptible to a

prolonged series of erroneous choices. Grace thus liberates us from a
ceaseless striving after elusive mutable goods, so as to focus exclusively upon God, the immutable Good that can never be lost against
our willY On the surface, however, it would appear that the influence
of grace annuls the will's freedom. But from Augustine's standpoint,
no such conflict arises. Indeed, Augustinian grace presupposes a free
response on the part of its recipients.
God is said to be our helper, and we cannot be helped unless we try to do
something ourselves, because God does not produce our salvation in us as if
we were mindless rocks or beings in whose nature He did not create reason
and will. 48
In effect, grace supplants a delight in the commission of evil deeds

with a delight in the performance of good ones. 49 In this respect, the
operation of grace is the requisite of genuine freedom.
We do not say that by the sin of Adam free will perished out of the nature of
men . . . while it is not of avail for good and pious living, unless the will
itself ... should be made free by God's grace, and assisted to every good
movement of action, of speech, of thought. 50
243
For Augustine, then, true freedom consists in the quality of our moral
choices, rather than in the mere ability to exercise our volition. For
this reason, he holds that the final and greatest liberty of the will lies
in the inability to sin. 51
But while Augustine contends that grace poses no threat to the
integrity of free will, a question still arises regarding the extent of
Divine omnipotence. 52 If God is all-powerful, to what extent is the
human will powerless before the dictates of God's will? A passage like
the following indicates that Augustine clearly placed the human will in
a subordinate position to the will of God:
. . . those wills of men which remain creatures of this world are so subject to
God's power that He can bend them wherever and whenever He pleases,
whether by bestowing benefits upon some or by inflicting punishment upon
others, according as He Himself ordains by His decrees, hidden of course
from us, but perfectly just beyond all doubt. 53
Such a statement does not necessarily pose a challenge to human

freedom. For Augustine, grace always has free will as its referent, and
God works through the agency of human volition. But while he steadfastly remained the champion of human freedom, he never denied the
sovereignty of Divine will in leading us to the good. As he unequivocally affirms, God can turn the evil wills of humans "as he wills, when
he wills, and where he wills toward the good." 54
Divine Sovereignty and Predestination
To a great extent, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo can be said to have
shaped Augustine's theory of grace and his subsequent response to
Pelagian teaching. For, the will's inability to do good on its own can
be ultimately traced to its finitude and mutability. Thus, ontological
contingency implies a moral contingency: humans cannot hope to do
good without God's assistance, any more than they could have come
into existence without God's creative efficacy. In this connection,
Augustine's interpretations of Original Sin, grace, and predestination
find a crucial point of intersection in the theology of creation.
For Augustine, the dependence of humans upon God which began
with the act of creation extends to an unrealized, conditional future as
well. In this respect, his understanding of Divine sovereignty encompasses the controversial teaching that salvation is not reserved for
everyone, but only for those that God wills to save. 55 Like grace, elec-
244
tion is neither attained through our own initiative, nor won on the
basis of our merits.
Let us, then, understand the calling whereby they become elected . . . not
those who are elected because they have believed, but who are elected that
they may believe. For the Lord Himself also sufficiently explains this calling
when He says, You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. 56
But in the final analysis, the rationale and scope of such predestination remain impenetrable mysteries. 57 Even those predestined for salvation must remain ignorant of their election.
For who of the multitude of believers can presume, so long as he is living in
this mortal state, that he is in the number of the predestined? Because it is
necessary that in this condition that should be kept hidden; since here we
have to beware so much of pride . . .58
But predestination is not necessarily synonymous with predetermination. While predestination implies God's foreknowledge of future events, Augustine sees no incompatibility between Divine foreknowledge and human freedom. According to the De libero arbitrio
(the locus classicus of his discussion of this problem), Divine foreknowledge never infringes upon human freedom:
. . . we do not deny God's foreknowledge of all things future, and yet we do
will what we will. Since God has foreknowledge of our will, its future will be
such as He foreknows it. It will be a will precisely because He foreknows it as
a will, and it could not be a will if it were not in our power. Hence God also
has foreknowledge of our power over it. The power, then, is not taken from
me because of His foreknowledge, since this power will be mine all the more
certainly because of the infallible foreknowledge of Him who foreknew that I
would have it. 59
From this standpoint, what God foreknows about human actions (and
wills for us) runs parallel to human volition. Accordingly, our future
(for good or ill) is predestined, but only insofar as God anticipates
how we will freely choose in an indubitable manner. 60
But like his theology of grace, Augustine's notion of predestination
raises a significant question regarding the extent of Divine omnipotence: to what degree can God do as He pleases with our lives? Clearly,
an affirmation of Divine omnipotence implies that God's will cannot
be resisted or challenged in any way. 61 Still, Augustine stresses that
predestination is wholly consistent with Divine mercy and justice. In-
245
deed, if God granted salvation to everyone on an equal basis, His

compassion and equity would be wholly undermined. 62 In actuality,
however, the present world is but one of a multiplicity of possible
worlds that God could have created. Each of these worlds, in turn,
would contain a vast range of further possibilities and conditions capable of shaping human choices. Indeed, God might have made us
unable to sin at all, if He so desired. 63
This feature of Augustine's theology presents a potential problem
for coming to terms with the motive of creation. On the one hand,
Augustine readily affirms that God created out of love. But his emphasis upon Divine omnipotence (especially in his later anti-Pelagian writings) frequently overrides considerations of Divine benevolence. While
the creation of all things from nothing requires a supremely powerful
God, only a supremely loving God could give His Son for the redemption of fallen humanity. In this respect, Augustine's doctrine of Divine
sovereignty (and its portrayal of God as the harsh, exacting judge in
certain contexts) should never obscure the importance of the Incarnation in his theology and his emphasis upon the unqualified redemption of humanity as a whole.
Conclusion: A Summary of Key Themes
For Augustine, the Being of God is distinguished from the being of

creatures on the basis of immutability (De Civitate Dei X11,2). Because God exists "always in the same way," He alone can be designated as Being Itself or esse (De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de
Moribus Manichaeorum I,14,24; In lohannis Evangelium tractatus
XXX.10). As the fullest expression of Being, God is responsible for
the existence of everything which does not exist as only He exists (De
Civitate Dei XII,2; Soliloquia 1,1,3; Enchiridion IV, 12). But this
ontological distinction does not establish some impassable gulf between immutable and mutable reality. God posits a causal relationship
with finite being by means of the act of creation.
In contrast to the unchangeable nature of God, the existence of
creatures is characterized by change and its negative effects. This
mutability points to a negativity in created natures ultimately rooted in
the fact of creatio ex nihilo (De Natura Boni 1). But such a "metaphysical" evil does not proceed from sin. Rather, it pertains to the
lack of perfections greater than those perfections which a thing should
naturally possess. Although creatures participate in Being (in a man-
246
ner consistent with their capacity to share in it), they tend to corruption and non-being by virtue of their very creation from nothing
(Confessiones VII, 11, 17). While corporeal natures are open to physical corruption, created rational spirits (immortal but mutable) undergo
a moral corruption through a defective use of free will.
In Augustinian terms, sin or moral evil is rooted in a voluntary
movement from God (Confessiones VII,16,22; De Iibera arbitrio
11,20,54; De Doctrina Christiana I,3,3). But why does such a destructive movement occur at all? Augustine finds his response to this
question in the ontological origins of finite beings: "everyone that is
able to sin," he holds, "is made from nothing" (Opus lmperfectum
contra Julianum V,39). In this respect, the finitude and mutability of
rational creatures carries a certain susceptibility to sinful choices (although they do not sin of necessity). This tendency to moral evil is
abetted by the catastrophic effects of Original Sin. As a result of the
Fall, creation experienced a general disordering, and human nature
was deprived of the gratuitous gifts of God (De Ciuitate Dei XXI,12;
XXII,24).
This tragic state of affairs could only be rectified by a Divine mediator: Christ's perfect sacrifice redeemed humanity from its just penal
condition and restored it to fellowship with its Creator (De Ciuitate
Dei XX,6). But the persistence of the effects of Original Sin (i.e.,
ignorance and moral weakness) necessitates a continual assistance
and healing by Divine grace (De Perfectionis Justitiae Hominis ii,3).
In effect, such helping grace prompts a delight in the performance of
good acts, without any vitiation of free will (De gratia et Iibera arbitrio
ad Valentinum XX,41).
Augustine's emphasis upon the necessity of grace came fully to the
fore in his controversy with Pelagius. From his standpoint, the mere
fact that the will is free in no way insures that it will consistently
choose the good and avoid evil. In this connection, the moral contingency of humans points directly to their ontological contingency. Because they were created from nothing, such finite and mutable beings
possess an inherent tendency to sinfulness. For Augustine, the paradigm example of this tendency is found in Adam. The fact that a creature endowed with such a range of gifts could have fallen into sin only
underscores the susceptibility to moral evil deeply rooted in the human will.
But for Augustine, such moral contingency extends to the unrealized, conditional future as well. Because no one is saved unless God
247
wills it (Enchiridion XXVII,103), the salvation of each individual depends upon the inscrutable commands of the Divine will (De
correptione et gratia ad Valentinum XIII,40). From this standpoint,
our salvation can be viewed as predestined, but only to the extent that
God foresees whether we will freely accept or reject His efficacious
graces (De libero arbitrio 111,3,8; De Civitate Dei V,9). But despite
Augustine's desire to reconcile human freedom with Divine omnipotence and providence, he strongly affirmed God's absolute sovereignty.
Indeed, human wills are subject to God's power to the extent that "He
can bend them wherever and whenever He pleases ... as He Himself ordains by His decrees" (De gratia et libero arbitrio ad
Valentinum XX,41). Thus, our reliance upon God's favor for personal salvation is wholly consistent with our reliance upon His graces
for our redemption, our moral liberty, and in metaphysical terms, our
creation.
Notes
1.
Soliloquia 1,1(4): PL xxxii,871: unus Deus tu, tu veni mihi in auxilium; una
aeterna vera substantia, ubi nulla discrepantia, nulla confusio, nulla transitio,
nulla indigentia, nulla mars. Ubi summa concordia, summa evidentia, summa
constantia, summa plenitude, summa vita. Ubi nihil deest, nihil redundat. Ubi
qui gignit, et quem gignit unum est.
2.
De Moribus Ecclesiae Catho/icae et de Moribus Manichaeorum 1,14(24):

PL xxxii, 1321: Deum ergo diligere debemus trinam quamdam unitatem, Patrem
et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, quod nihil aliud dicam esse, nisi idipsum esse.
Est enim vere summeque Deus, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo
omnia . . .
3.
De Ciuitate Dei XII.2: CC xlviii, 357: Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit,
hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex nihilo creauit, esse
dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse . . .
Cf. Soliloquia 1,1{3): PL xxxii,870: Deus vera et summa vita, in quo eta
quo et per quem vivunt, quae vere summeque vivunt omnia.
4.
De Ciuitate Dei XII.2: CC xlviii,357: sicut enim ab eo, quod est sapere, uocatur
sapientia, sic ab eo, quod est esse, uocatur essentia, nouo quidem nomine,
quo usi ueteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus
usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant ouo(av; hoc
enim uerbum e uerbo expressum est, ut diceretur essenti a . . .
I have modified the translator's rendering of contra ria natura non est, nisi
quae non est somewhat in the interests of clarity. Bettenson translates the
clause as "the only contrary nature is the non-existent."
Cf. De Trinitate V,2{3): CC I, 207-208: Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia uel si melius hoc appellatur essentia, quam graeci ouo(av uocant.
Sicut enim ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta
est essentia.
5.
Cf., De Trinitate V,2{3): CCI, 207-208: Et quis magis est quam ille qui dixit
famulo suo: Ego sum qui sum, et: Dices filiis Israhel: Qui est misit me ad
uos?
6.
De Trinitate VII,5{10): CCI, 260-261: Vnde manifestum est deum abusiue

substantiam uocari ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia, quod uere ac
proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim
uere solus quia incommutabilis est ...
7.
De Ciuitate Dei XI.IO: CC xlviii,330: Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod uel possit amittere; uel aliud sit habens,
aliud quod habet ...
249
8.
De Civitate Dei Xl.10: CC xlviii,330: Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona,
sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non
genita. Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est
quod illud de quo genitum est . . .
9.
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xxx.10 (John 8:21-25): CC xxxvi,343:

mens capiat uere esse; est enim semper eodem modo esse.
Cf. De Civitate Dei XII.2: CC xlviii, 357.
10.
In lohannis Evangelium tractatus xxx.10 (John 8:21-25): CC xxxvi, 343344: in ueritate quae manet, praeteritum et futurum non inuenio, sed solum
praesens, et hoc incorruptibiliter, quod in creatura non est. Discute rerum
mutationes, inuenies fuit et erit; cogita Deum, inuenies est, ubi fuit et erit
esse non possit.
11.
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xxxviii.11-xxxix. 7.

The translation of John 8:25 is problematic. In this regard, the crucial
portion of the Greek text is "o tL KUL AUAW UJlLV 1:TJV apxf]v." In a manner
consistent with Patristic exegesis (cf., Ambrose, Expositio Evangelii Secundam
Lucam 10.112), Augustine interpreted the Latin rendering of "<i]v apxf]v"
(i.e., principium) as a substantive (i.e., "the Beginning"). The majority of
contemporary translations, however, treat "<i]v apxf]v" as an adverbial accusative construction.
12.
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xxxix.2: CC xxxvi, 345-346: si et Pater

principium et Filius principium, quomodo dicimus Patrem Deum et Filium
Deum, nee tamen dicimus duos deos. Nefas est enim tres deos ... quamuis
de singulis si quaeratur, necesse est de quocumque interrogati fuerimus, Deum
esse fateamur.
13.
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xxxix.4(2): CC xxxvi, 347.
14.
In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xxxix.3(2): CC xxxvi, 346.
15.
In Confessiones IX, 7(15), Augustine recounts how Arianism and the upheavals it generated touched his own life during Easter week of A.D. 386, when
troops stormed a church in Milan.
While St. Augustine is not usually identified as an anti-Arian polemicist,
some of his most important works at least partially address Arian teaching.
Cf. De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, nos. 16, 23, 37, 50, 60, 69; In
Iohannis Evangelium tractatus xviii; xx, xxvi, lxxi; De Trinitate; Sermones
117, 126, 135, 139, 140, 183, 229N, 330, 341.
Augustine's explicit anti-Arian statements are found in three documents
spanning the period between A.D. 419 and approximately 428: the Answer
to the 'Arian Sermon' (Contra Sermonem Arianorum), the Debate with
Maximinus the Arian (Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum Episcopo), and
the Answer to Maximinus the Arian (Contra Maximinum Arianum).
Augustine's first direct refutation of Arian teaching was the Contra Sermonem
Arianorum (A.D. 419), a refutation of the Latin Homoian Arianism taught by
250

Ulfila (apostle of the Goths), expounded by Palladius of Ratiara and Maximinus,
and canonized by the Council of Ariminum (A.D. 359). This particular work
consists of a series of replies to the thirty-four propositions comprising an
anonymous Arian discourse. Nearly a decade later (A.D. 427 /28), Augustine
entered into a public debate at Hippo with a bishop who had only recently
arrived in North Africa. Bishop Maximinus had accompanied Count Sigiswulf,
a Goth who led a Roman force against an uprising and encouraged this meeting in order to secure peace between Arians and Catholics in the region. The
Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum Episcopo constitutes the actual transcript of the debate. Shortly thereafter, Augustine composed his Contra
Maximinum Arianum, a detailed refutation of those aspects of Maximinus's
teaching which he could not develop satisfactorily on the day of the debate.
16.
Sermo Arianorum 4: PL xlii, 679.

In contrast to the Nee-Arianism of Aetius and Eunomius (which taught that
the Son was created from nothing), Homoian Arianism depicted the Son as
the "only-Begotten God" (but still, a God inferior to God the Father). In Arian
terms, the fact that Scripture teaches that the Son was sent by the Father, that
He obeyed the Father (even unto death), and that He prayed to the Father
were construed as indications of His inferiority.
17.
De Trinitate 1.6(9): CCI, 38: Et si factus non est, creatura non est; si autem
creatura non est, eiusdem cum patre substantiae est. Omnis enim substantia quae deus non est creatura est, et quae creatura non est deus est. Et si non
est filius eiusdem substantiae cuius pater, ergo facta substantia est; si facta
substantia est, non omnia per ipsum facta sunt; at si omnia per ipsum facta
sunt, unius igitur eiusdemque cum patre substantiae est.
18.
Contra Sermonem Arianorum XV.

Cf. Contra Maximinum Arianum 11,5: "Call the Father the author, because the Son is from him, though he is not from the Son and because the
Holy Spirit proceeds from him and from the Son. By giving birth to the Son,
he gave it to him that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him as well. Call the Son
the Creator in such a way that you do not deny that the Father and the Holy
Spirit are the Creator. Finally, say that the Holy Spirit is teacher, guide,
enlightener, and sanctifier so that you do not dare to deprive the Father and
the Son of those works."
19.
De Trinitate V,2(3): CCI, 207-208; Sermo 7,7: CC xli,75: Omnia enim quae
mutantur disinunt esse quod erant et incipiunt esse quod non erant.
20.
De /ibero arbitrio III,7(21): CC xxix, 287: quae temporalia et antequam sint

non sunt, et cum sunt fugiunt, et cum fugerint non erunt. ltaque cum futura
sunt, nondum sunt, cum autem praeterita sunt, iam non sunt.
21.
Confessiones V11,11(17): CC xxvii,104: Et inspexi cetera infra teet uidi nee

omnino esse nee omnino non esse: esse quidem, quoniam abs te sunt, non
esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt. ld enim uere est, quod
incommutabiliter manet.
251
22.
De Civitate Dei Xll,2: CC xlviii,357.
23.
De libero arbitrio 11,19(53): CC xxix,272.
24.
De /ibero arbitrio 11,19(53): CC xxix,272.
25.
De Continentia Vl,l6: PL xl,359.

In this section, I confine my discussion exclusively to the sin and fall of
human beings. However, angelic natures are also designated as rational creatures by Augustine. Like humans beings, angelic natures possess a free will
that enables them to sin. In this respect, the fall of Adam (and the penal
condition which it precipitated) was preceded by the fall of the angels (which
prompted a general upheaval in the order of creation).
Cf., the remarks of Gerald Bonner (quoted in Chapter 5, n. 51, above), in
St. Augustine of Hippo, Life and Controversies, p. 211.
26.
De /ibero arbitrio III,5(15): CC xxix,284: Sicut enim melior est uel aberrans
equus quam lapis propterea non aberrans quia proprio motu et sensu caret,
ita est excellentior creatura quae Iibera uoluntate peccat quam quae propterea
non peccat quia non habet liberam uoluntatem.
27.
De Civitate Dei XIV, 13: CC lxviii, 434: Sed uitio deprauari nisi ex nihilo
facta natura non posset. Ac per hoc ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo
facta est; ut aute~ ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est.
Cf., Contra Secundinum Manichaeum VIII: CSEL XXV (VI,2),916:
Quapropter cum abs te quaere, uncle facta sit uniuersa creatura quamuis in
suo genere bona, creatore tamen inferior atque illo incommutabili permanente
ipsa mutabilis, non inuenies quid respondeas, nisi de nihilo factum esse fatearis.
et ideo potest uergere ad nihilum, quando peccat ilia creatura, et portio, quae
potest peccare, non ut nihil sit, sed ut minus uigeat minusque firma sit. nam
minus uigere et minus ualere, si animo perducas ad ultimum, remanet nihil.
28.
Opus lmperfectum contra Julianum V,39: PL xlv,1475-1476: Omne quod

peccare potest, ex nihilo factum est; omne ergo quod ex nihilo factum est,
potest peccare, non dico ...
29.
De Civitate Dei XXI,l2: CC xlviii,778: Quante enim magis homo fruebatur

Deo, tanto maiore impietate dereliquit Deum et factus est malo dignus aeterno,
qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum. Hinc est uniuersa
generis humani massa damnata; quoniam, qui hoc primus admisit, cum ea
quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus est . . .
Gerald Bonner (St. Augustine of Hippo, Life and Controversies, 371) explicates the relation between Adam and his descendants in Augustine's theology in these terms:
Augustine's theory is that of the seminal identity of the human race
with Adam. Since all future generations were, in one sense, present in
our progenitor's loins at the time of the Fall, so all mankind participated, in some mysterious fashion, in the sin, and drew upon itself condign punishment.
252

For Augustine, God's goodness is fully evident even in humanity's fallen
state. Among God's gratuitous blessings, Augustine includes a residue of the
rationality with which we were created.
Cf. De Civitate Dei XXII.24: CC xlviii,847: non in eo tamen penitus extincta
est quaedam uelut scintilla rationis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei.
For a detailed statement regarding the gifts that humanity enjoyed prior to
the Fall, see De Ciuitate Dei XIV,26. These gifts included a freedom from
want (with a ready availability of food and drink), freedom from old age, debilitation, and bodily deterioration of all kinds (including susceptibility to illness and disease), and a tranquility of soul (with a complete freedom from all
desires or emotions that impede the good use of the will).
30.
De Civitate Dei XX,6: CC xlviii,707; XXII.24: CC xlviii,849; De Trinitate

IV,13(17): CC 1,183; De Perfectionis Justitiae Hominis ii,3: PL xliv,294.
31.
Enchiridion XXVIII,108: CC xlvi,107-108: Nam neque per ipsum liberaremur

unum mediatorem dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum, nisi esset et
deus. Sed cum factus est Adam, homo scilicet rectus, mediatore non opus
erat. Cum uero genus humanum peccata Ionge separauerunt a deo, per
mediatorem qui solus sine peccato natus est, uixit, occisus est, reconciliari nos
oportebat deo usque ad carnis resurrectionem in uitam aeternam; ut humana
superbia per humilitatem dei argueretur ac sanaretur, et demonstraretur homini
quam Ionge a deo recesserat, cum per incarnatum deum reuocaretur, et
exemplum oboedientiae per hominem deum contumaci homini praeberetur,
et unigenito suscipiente formam serui quae nihil ante meruerat fons gratiae
panderetur, et carnis etiam resurrectio . . . redemptore praemonstraretur,
et per eandem naturam quam se decipisse laetabatur diabolus uinceretur, nee
tamen homo gloriatur, ne iterum superbia nasceretur .
32.
Sermo XXVI.12: CC xli,356-357: Antequam conditi essemus, nihil boni

merebamur, et ideo gratia, qua conditi sumus, cum boni nihil mereremur. Si
ergo magna est gratia, quando nihil boni merebamur, quanta gratia est, quando
tantum mali merebamur? Qui nondum erat, bene non merebatur; peccator et
male merebatur. Nondum erat qui factus est. Nondum erat, sed nee offenderat.
Nondum erat, et factus est; offendit, et saluus est. Qui nondum erat, nihil
sperabat, factus est. Lapsus autem damnationem expectabat, et liberatus est.
Haec est gratia per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.
33.
Pelagius remained at Carthage only a short time before travelling to Jerusalem; Celestius settled at Carthage. Pelagius' work On Nature formed the basis of Augustine's attack on his doctrine.
34.
De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum II, 26(17):

PL xliv, 167.
35.
De Gestis Pelagii 16(6): PL xliv, 329: Posse quidem hominem sine peccato
esse, et Dei mandata custodire, si velit, diximus: hanc enim possibilitatem
Deus illi dedit. Non autem diximus quod inveniatur aliquis, ab infantia usque
ad senectam, qui numquam peccaverit: sed quoniam a peccatus conversus,
253
proprio Iabore et Dei gratia possit esse sine peccato; nee per hoc tamen in
posterum inconversibilis.
36.
De Gestis Pelagii 4 7(23): PL xliv, 34 7.
37.
De Gratia Christi, et de Peccato Originali 1,4: PL xliv, 362: voluntatem et

actionem nostra esse asserit, atque ita nobis tribuit, ut nonnisi a nobis esse
contendat. Denique gratia Dei, non ista duo, quae nostra omnino vult esse, id
est, voluntatem et actionem; sed illam quae in potestate nostra non est, et
nobis ex Deo est.
38.
Confessiones VI, 11(20): CC xxvii, 87: propriarum uirium credebam esse

continentiam, quarum mihi non eram conscius ...
39.
De Immortalitate Animae 7(12): PL xxxii,1027: At enim aversio ipsa a ratione per quam stultitia contingit animo, sine defectu ejus fieri non potest: si
enim magis est ad rationem conversus eique inhaerens, ideo quod inhaeret
incommutabili rei quae est veritas, quae et maxime et primitus est; cum ab ea
est aversus, idipsum esse minus habet, quod est deficere.
Cf. De Ordine 11,8(25); 11,9(27); De Beata Vita IV,25(33); De Quantitate
Ani mae 17 ,30.
40.
De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum 1.3(4-5);

1.8(13); 1.15(25).
41.
Confessiones VII, 21(27): CC xxvii,110-112.
42.
De dioersis quaestionibus ad Simp/icianum 1.2(21):PL xl, 126-127: Liberum

voluntatis arbitrium plurimum volet; imo vero est quidem, sed in venumdatis
sub peccato quid volet? Cum ergo nos ea delectant quibus proficiamus ad
Deum, inspiratur hoc et praebetur gratia Dei, non nutu nostro et industria aut
operum meritis comparatur; quia ut sit natus voluntatis, ut sit industria studii,
ut sint opera charitate ferventia, ille tribuit, ille largitur.
43.
Retractationes 1,8(6): CC lvii, 28: Ecce tam Ionge antequam Pelagiana heresis
extitisset, sic disputauimus, uelut iam contra illos disputaremus.
Augustine's explicit anti-Pelagian polemic spans the period between A.D.
411 and 428/29. In actuality, this polemic can be divided into three separate
phases: first, that group of works which address the teachings of Pelagius
and his immediate followers (A.D. 411-415); second, that group of writings
composed after Pelagius's excommunication and the expulsion of the Pelagian
leaders from Rome (A.D. 417-429/30), which explicitly addresses the teaching of Julian of Eclanum; third, the group of writings directed against the socalled "Semi-Pelagians" (A.D. 426-429). The polemic comprises the following works (in addition to a number of sermons and letters on this topic): De
Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvu/orum (A.D. 411);
De Spiritu et Littera (A.D. 412); De Natura et Gratia (A.D. 415); De
Perfectione Justiciae Hominis (A.D. 415); De Gestis Pelagii (A.D. 417); De
Gratia Christi, et de Peccato Originali (A.D. 418); De Nuptiis et
Concupiscentia (A.D. 419/20); De Anima et ejus Origine (A.D. 419); Con-
254

tra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum (A.D. 420); Contra Ju/ianum (A.D. 421);
De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (A.D. 426/27); De Correptione et Gratia (A.D.
426/27); De Praedestinatione Sanctorum (A.D. 428/29); De Dono
Perseuerantiae (A.D. 428/29); Contra Ju/ianum opus lmperfectum (429/
30).
44.
De Natura et Gratia 66.79: PL xliv, 286: Quod autem ex vitiis naturae, non
ex conditione naturae, sit quaedam peccandi necessitas, audiat homo ...
ac per hoc opitulante gratia per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, et mala
necessitas removebitur, et libertas plena tribuetur.
45.
De Natura et Gratia 3.3: PL xliv, 249.
46.
De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Paruulorum II,5(5):

PL xliv, 935: Fit quippe in nobis per hanc Dei gratiam in bono recipiendo et
perseveranter tenendo, non solum posse quod volumus, verum etiam velle
quod possumus.
47.
De libero arbitrio II, 13(37)-14(37): CC ccxxix, 262-263.
48.
De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Paruulorum II,5(6):

PL xliv, 154-155: Adjutorenim noster Deus dicitur (Psa/.lxi, 9), nee adjuvari
potest, nisi qui etiam aliquid sponte conatur. Quia non sicut in lapidibus
insensatis, aut sicut in eis in quorum natura rationem voluntatemque non
condidit, salutem nostram Deus operatur in nobis.
49.
De Spiritu et Littera 3.5: PL xliv, 203.
50.
Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum II,9: PL xliv, 577: Peccato Adae

arbitrium liberum de hominum natura periise non dicimus: ad bene autem
pieque vivendum non valere, nisi ipsa voluntas hominis Dei gratia fuerit liberata,
et ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis, cogitationis adjuta.
51.
De Correptione et Gratia XII, 33: PL xliv, 936.
52.
De gratia et /ibero arbitrioXX,41: PL xliv,905: voluntas humana non tollitur,

sed ex mala mutatur in bonam, et cum bona fuerit adjuvatur . . .
53.
De gratia et libero arbitrio XX,41: PL xliv,906: verum etiam illas quae

conservant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in Dei potestate, ut eas quo voluerit,
quando voluerit, faciat inclinari, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, vel
ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse judicat, occultissimo quidem judicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione justissimo.
54.
Enchiridion XXV.98: CC xlvi,100-101: Quis porro tam impie desipiat ut

dicat deum malas hominum uoluntates, quas uoluerit quando uoluerit ubi
uoluerit, in bonum non posse conuertere?
55.
Enchiridion XXVII.103: CC xlvi,104: Ac per hoc cum audimus et in sacris

litteris legimus quod uelit omnes homines saluos fieri, quamuis certum sit
nobis non omnes homines saluos fieri, non tamen ideo debemus omnipotentis
dei uoluntati aliquid derogare, sed ita intellegere quod scriptum est . . .
255
tanquam diceretur nullum hominem fieri saluum nisi quem fieri ipse uoluerit;
non quod nullus sit hominum nisi quem saluum fieri uelit, sed quod nullus fiat
nisi quem uelit, et ideo sit rogandus ut uelit, quia necesse est fieri si uoluerit.
56.
De Praedestinatione Sanctorum XVII,34: PL xliv,985: lntelligamus ergo

vocationem qua fiunt electi: non qui eliguntur quia crediderunt, sed qui eliguntur
ut credant. Hanc enim et Dominus ipse satis aperit, ubi dicit: Non uos me
elegistis, sed ego elegi uos (Joan. xv,16).
In this context, a question might arise regarding the possible tension between Augustine's teaching that Christ died for all and the teaching that only
the Elect are saved. But as Eugene Portalie points out (A Guide to the Thought
of Saint Augustine, translated by Ralph J. Bastian (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1960), 167), Augustine's contention that the effects of the redemption are restricted to the Elect "has to be understood as speaking of efficacious graces which are not given to all." Such an interpretation allows for the
preservation of free will: in that case, humans can freely accept or reject the
influence of Divine grace.
57.
De dono Perseverantiae XIV,35: PL xlv,1014.

On the basis of this reference, one might easily interpret the God of
Augustine's theology as an extremely stern judge, Who metes out a wholly
arbitrary condemnation on the vast majority of mankind. This issue, in fact,
has prompted much debate. John W. Rettig (in his translation of Augustine's
Tractates on the Gospel of John, 28-54 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1993), 230-231, n. 12) views God (at least as
He is depicted in Augustine's theology) as enacting a harsh judgment on those
not numbered among the Elect:
That God foreknows that some are condemned poses a theological problem in view of the orthodox teaching that Christ died for all and by his
death and resurrection redeemed all. As in all matters touching predestination, Augustine's view is complex, difficult, and somewhat obscure.
It would appear that he holds that God does will the salvation of all men
and in a general sense he does so by providing all with the power and
the means for salvation. But he also, for his own reasons, gives men the
freedom to choose or refuse salvation and then he foreknows that some
will choose salvation and some damnation. He could intervene, but
wills not to do so; were he to intervene freedom of will would be meaningless. Since he foreknows that some will refuse redemption and does
not intervene, then in an absolute sense he wills the damnation of some.
Why he chooses this kind of world over the many possible dispositions
of creation is a mystery. But the situation is probably more complex
than this, as all men's acts are the results of freely given, unmerited
graces. Why are some not given graces to enable their perseverance?
Augustine, then, would seem to take a rather rigid view of predestination: that God, for his own reasons, in fact wills the damnation of some.
In contrast to the type of interpretation that Rettig presents, Bonner (St.
Augustine of Hippo, Life and Controversies, 388) cautions against an ex-
256

tremely negative assessment of Augustine's theory of predestination (and the
image of God which emerges therein):
Inasmuch as all humanity has perished in Adam it is possible (in a certain sense) to say that the reprobate are predestined to perdition; but
this does not mean an arbitrary decree which deliberately creates certain vessels of wrath, who are to be damned simply to the greater glory
of God. In view of Augustine's repeated insistence that the lost are justly
condemned, such an interpretation seems preferable to a literal acceptance of his words.
58.
De correptione et gratia ad Valentinum Xlll,40: PL xliv, 940-941: Quis

enim ex multitudine fidelium, quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, in numero
praedestinatorum se esse praesumat? Quia id occultari opus est in hoc loco,
ubi si cavenda est elati o . . .
59.
De libero arbitrio 111,3(8): CC xxix,280: Ita fit ut et deum non negemus esse
praescium omnium futurorum et nos tamen uelimus quod uolumus. Cum enim
sit praescius uoluntatis nostrae, cuius est praescius ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo
erit, quia uoluntatis est praescius. Nee uoluntas esse poterit si in potestate
non erit. Ergo et potestatis est praescius. Non igitur per eius praescientiam
mihi potestas adimitur; quae propterea mihi certior aderit, quia ille cuius
praescientia non Iallitur adfuturam mihi esse praesciuit.
cf. De Ciuitate Dei V,9: CC xlvii,138: Deus dicimus omnia scire antequam
fiant, et uoluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis non nisi uolentibus fieri sentimus
et nouimus.
60.
De Ciuitate Dei V,9: CC xlvii,l40: Quapropter et uoluntates nostrae tantum

ualent, quantum Deus eas ualere uoluit atque praesciuit; et ideo quidquid ualent,
certissime ualent, et quod facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt, quia
ualituras atque facturas ille praesciuit, cuius praescientia falli non potest.
For a detailed survey of the issues surrounding Augustine's theory of predestination, see Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, 213-229.
61.
De correptione et gratia ad Valentinum XIV,45: PL xliv, 913.
62.
De Ciuitate Dei XXI,12: CC xlviii, 778: si omnes remanerent in poenis iustae

damnationis, in nullo appareret misericors gratia; rursus si omnes a tenebris
transferrentur in lucem, in nullo appareret ueritas ultionis. In qua propterea
multo plures quam in ilia sunt, ut sic ostendatur quid omnibus deberetur.
cf. Enchiridion XXV.98: CC xlvi,lOl: Sed cum facit, per misericordiam
facit; cum autem non facit, per iudicium non facit . . .
63.
De Continentia Vl,16: PL xl,359 (quoted at note 26, above).
Epilogue
Creation, Contingency, and

Augustine's Theology
In the final analysis, what does Augustine's use of the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo tell us about him as a theologian? On the one hand,
his writing continually conveys a spirit of humility in the face of his
own finitude and the awesome majesty of his Creator. In comparison
to God, everything that Augustine encountered in this world was characterized by a transitory and fleeting nature. But while he might have
perceived the world as a spiritually and ontologically impoverished
realm, he could never view it as evil in itself. This fact points to a
second trait: Augustine was imbued was an unshakeable belief in the
inherent goodness of the totality of creation. He was not, of course,
oblivious to the presence of evil in the world and its apparent pervasiveness in human existence. But on the basis of his reading of Genesis (1:31), he could confidently proclaim that everything made by
God was very good. This fundamental conviction (coupled with a
metaphysics which recognized the existence of spiritual reality) provided the very core of Augustine's theodicy and his rejection of the
substantiality of evil.
Both characteristics of Augustine the theologian (and by implication, of his theology) presuppose a deep and abiding sense of contingency. 1 On a personal level, Augustine could find ready confirmation
for the contingency of creation on the basis of his own inner journey
and its accompanying struggles. The Confessiones, in fact, begin with
an attestation to his utter reliance upon God. When he declared that
"our heart is restless until it rests in you," he not only acknowledged
God as his final end, but also recognized himself as a thoroughly dependent creature. In the extended commentary on Genesis that concludes this great spiritual autobiography (Bks. XI-XIII), he proclaims
258
Creation, Contingency, and Augustine's Theology
that "before I was, you were, and I was nothing to which you could
grant being." 2 Thus, Augustine's belief in God as his highest Good
was inextricably connected with his understanding of God as the ultimate Cause of everything which exists.
For Augustine, the finite things comprising the created order provided the strongest testimony to the existence of a reality which transcends the limitations and defects of becoming, change, and process.
He underscores this point in his unforgettable dialogue with the whole
of creation:
I asked the earth, and it said, 'I am not he!' And all things in it confessed the
same. I asked the sea and the deeps, and among living animals the things
that creep, and they answered, 'We are not your God! Seek you higher than
us!' I asked the winds that blow: and all the air, with the dwellers therein,
said ... I am not God!' I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, and the
stars: 'We are not the God whom you seek,' said they. To all the things that
stand around the doors of my flesh I said, Tell me of my God! Although you
are not he, tell me something of him!' With a mighty voice they cried out, 'He
made us!' I asked the whole fabric of the world about my God, and it answered me, 'I am not he, but he has made me!' 3
The fact that such finite things exist at all affirms the existence of
something wholly other than anything we encounter in our range of
experiences. For, these realities can neither account for nor sustain
their own existence without a necessary Being which must exist by its
very nature. "What exists for any reason," Augustine therefore asks,
"except that you exist?" 4
On the basis of his reading of Exodus 3:14, and its identification of
God as I am Who am, Augustine (like other thinkers in the Christian
intellectual tradition) depicted the Divine nature in terms of a coincidence of essence and existence. From this standpoint, only God exists
in the truest sense and fullest sense, that is, as eternal and immutable
Being. Everything else (including humans) exhibit a mixture of being
and non-being, and thus, a tendency toward nothingness embedded
in the mutability of their finite natures. In light of such metaphysical
presuppositions, we are left with the sobering thought that our very
existence (as in the case of all finite reality) can only be rendered intelligible by reference to the unsurpassable goodness and love of God. In
the absence of God's gratuitous generation of being, we would not
now exist; in the absence of his ongoing conservation of being, we
would cease to exist altogether.
Creation, Contingency, and Augustine's Theology
259
Augustine can be approached from a variety of perspectives (e.g.,

historical, philosophical, or psychological}, any one of which can offer
illuminating insights into his development as a theologian. His theology itself can be analyzed in terms of its various branches (e.g. theological anthropology, moral theology, or soteriology), each of which
might be viewed as a crucial point of departure in grasping his thought.
But as we have seen, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo provides that
pivotal theme which serves as a means of unifying these diverse
branches of Augustine's theology into something of a systematic whole.
In a very real sense, this doctrine provides nothing less than the metaphysical underpinning or raison d'etre for affirming our contingency
from the origins to the consummation of our existence.
For Augustine, the great surd in a created order exhibiting such
order, form, and beauty was not just the fact of evil, but more so, the
human capacity for sin. How could such exalted creatures made in the
image and likeness of a supremely good Creator willingly defect from
their Summum Bonum? Ultimately, such a movement toward nothingness could only admit of a metaphysical explanation. Accordingly,
the radical ontological contingency of humans encompasses a moral
contingency proceeding from their continual susceptibility to moral
error. The tragedy of sin thus necessitates a redemptive process and
the ongoing assistance provided by Divine grace. Just as we depend
upon God for our very existence, we also rely upon His gratuitous love
for universal redemption, for our moral rectitude, and finally, for a
personal salvation achieved only by a predestination to this end. For
Augustine, everything (from the act of creation to Divine election) is
subject to the operation of the Divine will.
Augustine was by no means the first Christian thinker to grapple
with the meaning and implications of the act of creation. But in view
of the prominence and pervasiveness which the doctrine of creatio ex
nihilo assumed in his speculation, he can rightfully be characterized
as one of the founders (if not the father) of a full-blown theology of
creation in its own right. In this respect, the theology of creation
which he initially formulated in response to the challenges posed by
Manichaeism would enable him to respond to issues extending far
beyond that doctrinal controversy. Ultimately, the impact of Augustine's
theology of creation would extend beyond his own life and thought,
and exert its influence upon all subsequent Christian critiques of dualistic interpretations of reality.
Notes
1.
In broad metaphysical terms, contingency constitutes one of the four classical

modes of being (along with necessity, possibility, and impossibility). According to this classification, necessary being cannot not-be; contingent beings
can be or not-be; possible beings can be; and impossible beings cannot be.
2.
Confessiones XIII, 1(1): CC xxvii, 242.
3.
Confessiones X, 6(9): CC xxvii, 159.
4.
Confessiones XI, 5(7): CC xxvii, 198.
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A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
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Name Index
Adam, 197; 240; 246; 251, n. 25;
n. 29
Aedesius, 28
Aetius, 250, n. 16
Albinus, 24; 25; 26; 28; 30; 31
Alfaric, P., 79; 80; 239
Ambrose, St., 17; 19; 20; 21; 34;
35; 36; 38; 50, n. 87 (for
dating of the Hexameron);

141; 187, n. 36; 210, n.
19; 219
Anaximenes, 82, n. 1
Anaximander, 82, n. 1; 140
an-Nadim, Ibn Abi Ja'kub, 67; 69;
70; 73
Apuleius, 24; 26; 28; 30; 31
Aquinas, St. Thomas, xxi, n. 7; 56,

n. 128; 182, n. 2
Aristotle, 23; 33; 40, n. 6; 111; 140
Arius Didymus, 28
Armstrong, A H., 129, n. 75
Athenagoras of Athens, 6; 8; 9; 11;
12; 20; 32
Atticus, 25; 26; 31; 33

Bahram I, 66
bar Khoni, Theodore, 67; 70; 71; 73
Bardesanes, 13
Basil of Caesarea, 18; 19; 21; 33;
Calvenus Taurus, 23; 24; 25; 30

Celestius, 239; 252, n. 33
Cicero, xvii; 34; 36; 61-62, n. 169
(for influence on Augustine);
97; 195
Clement of Alexandria, 140

Crantor, 23
De Beausobre, I., 79
de Margerie, Bertrand, 105
Deus, 219
Diogenes Laertius, 28
Du Roy, Olivier, xxiv, n. 21; xxv, n.
24
Eudorus of Alexandria, 23; 58, n.
154
Eunomius, 250, n. 16
Faustus of Milevus, 80; 194; 195;
196; 197; 198; 200; 202;

204; 205; 206; 209, n. 13;
225; 226
Frend, W.H.C., 67
Felix, 209, n. 13
Fortunatus, 209, n. 13
Bonner, Gerald, xx, n. 2; xxiv, n. 22;
Galen, 34
Giet, Stanislas, 33
Gregory Nazianzus, 17
Gregory of Nyssa, 17; 157, n. 31
Brown, Peter, 167
Hardon, John A., xxi, n. 5
34; 35; 38
174
276
Name Index
Hermogenes, 14
Hippolytus, 35
Hormizd, 66
Ignatius of Antioch, 5
lamblichus, 28
lrenaeus, 14
Jerome, 17
Julian the Apostate, 28
Justin the Martyr, 6; 8; 9; 11; 12;
19; 21; 32
Lactantius, 140
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, xxii,
n. 9
Madec, Goulven, xxv, n. 24

Maher, John P. (O.S.A.), 79; 80
Mani, 65; 66; 80; 81; 136 (and
appellation of Paraclete);
136, 156, n. 10 (apostleship with Christ)
Marcion, 13
Marius Victorinus, xvii
Maximus of Tyre, 28
Maximinus (Arian bishop), 250, n. 15
Moses, 8; 12; 17; 19; 206
Nebridius, 214, n. 59
O'Connell, Robert J. (S.J.), xxiv, n.
24; 130-131, n. 80
O'Daly, G.J.P., xxv, n. 24
O'Meara, J.J., xxv, n. 26
Origen, xvii; 15; 16; 17; 22; 32; 33;
34; 35; 38; 98; 140
Palladius of Ratiara, 250, n. 15
Parmenides, 112
Patik, 66
Pelagius, 239; 240; 241
Philo Judaeus, 27; 31; 32; 33; 34
Philoponus, John, 24
Plato, 8; 12; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 33;

58; 155 (theory of preexistent matter); 112
Plotinus, xvii; 36; 37; 111; 173-174
(theory of evil); 180; 187,
n. 37; 223
Plutarch, 25; 26; 31; 33
Porphyry, xvii; xxv, n. 26
Proclus, 25; 26; 36
Puech, Henri-Charles, 66
Romulus, 109
Sallustius, 27; 28; 29; 30
Seneca, 195
Severus of Antioch, 160, n. 56
Sigiswulf, 250, n. 15
Simplicianus of Milan, 241
Tatian of Syria, 6; 9; 11; 12; 32; 34;
44, n. 37 (on material
spirits)
Tertullian, xvii; 14; 99; 140
TeSelle, Eugene, ix; x, n. 1
Teske, Roland (S.J.), 105
Thales, 82, n. 1
Theiler, W., xxv, n. 26
Theophilus of Antioch, 6; 10; 11; 12;
13; 22; 32; 98
8EO~, 10; 11
Torchia, N. Joseph, xxv, n. 25
Ulfila, 250, n. 15
Valentinus, 13
Van Fleteren, Frederick, xxv, n. 24;
n. 26
Verbeke, Gerard, 36
Virgil, 34
Wolfson, H., 34
Xenocrates, 23
Yahweh, 197; 204; 225
Subject Index
ayEVVlJto;, 7
apeiron, 140
<'icp9apto;, 7
anOLOV, 146; 161, n. 68
Apologists, 6; 32
apophaticism, 232
Arianism, 249, n. 15
Aristotelianism, 26; 37; 40, n. 6
(cosmology)
articles of faith, 182, n. 2
baptism, 240
bora, 3
bolos, 215, n. 60
Buddhism, 66
n. 27
10
Divine Illumination, 211, n. 27
Divine immutability, 168; 169; 183,
n. 10; 232; 233; 235; 245
Divine Justice, 169; 186, n. 28
Divine Nature, 232-235
Divine omnipotence, 244; 245; 247
Divine Sovereignty, 243-245
dualism, 68; 69; 75; 78; 136; 137;
145; 166; 197; 206; 217;
218; 221-222; 225
~lJ~LoupyEw,42,
~L<if<:pLOL;,
e~ a~6pcpou UATJ;, 31; 32;42,
n. 27; 101
OUK OVtWV, 2
emanationism, 36; 37
EVEPYEW, 18
esse, 232
essentia, 233
evil (as privation), 173-175
evil (as a substantial reality), 149;
165-167; 193
ex nihi/o fecit, 114
E~
carmen universitatis, 177

Cassiciacum dialogues, 232
condere, 114
constituere, 114
contingency, 246; 257-259; 260,
n. 1
conuersio, 107; 125, n. 53
conversion, 220
corporeal natures, 236
corruption (of the good), 148-151;
170; 246
cosmogony, 65; 82, n. 1
cosmology, 65; 82, n. 1
cosmos, 205
creare, 114; 115
Council of Ariminum, 250, n. 15
facere, 114; 115

First Vatican Council (1869-70), xxi,
n. 8; xxii, n. 12
forma, 224
formatio, 107; 109; 125, n. 53
Fourth Lateran Council (1215), xxi,
Demiurgos, 5; 6
freedom of the will, 236-238
n. 6
278
Subject Index
yeyovev, 23; 24; 27

genetos, 24; 25; 30
yyvo~tm, 42, n. 27
gnosis, 14; 69
Gnosticism, 13; 37; 46, n. 54; 66;
68; 166; 197
goodness of the whole, 147-148;
171-172; 201
grace, 238-243; 246
Homoian Arianism, 234; 235; 249,
n. 15; 250, n. 16
Hyle, 78; 113; 178; 180; 200; 203;
205; 206; 225; 226
imitatio, 107
immaterial reality, 138
incorporeal light, 199,ff
iniquitas, 176
knowledge (as justified true belief),
156, n. 17
ktizein, 114
libertas, 242
liberty, 239; 240
libri platonicorum, x; xvii; xviii; 36;
37; 38; 141; 219; 227
literal interpretation (of Genesis),
121, n. 30
Logos, 9; 10
Maleficient Soul, 25
Mandaeans, 66
Manichaeism, 37; 65; 66; 67; 68;
77; 97
Manichaeism (claims to truth), 138
Manichaeism (cosmogony): Abel (74);
Adam (73; 76); Archons
(71; 72; 74; 75; 78); Ban
(70; 72); Cain (73; 74);
Daughter of Avarice (74);
Daughter of Corruption
(74); Daughters of Darkness
(73); Elect (76; 195); Eve
(73; 74); Evocations (193);
Farjad (74); Father of
Greatness (69); Former

Time (75); Future Time (75;
76; 77); Glories (69); Jesus
the Luminous (73; 76); King
of Darkness (69); King of
Glory (71); King of the
Region of Light (71); Light
Ships (71; 72); Living Spirit
(71); Messenger (72; 73);
Mother of Life (70; 71; 73;
75); Nous (76); Present
Time (75); Primal Man (70;
71; 74; 75; 78); primordial
age (137); primordial conflict (137; 138); Principle of
Darkness (68); Principle of
Light (68); Principles of
Light and Darkness (75; 76;
78); Pur-Farjad (74); region
of Darkness (142; 143;
146; 147; 148); Schatil
(74); Sindid (74); Sons of
Darkness (70; 72; 75); Suffering Jesus (198; 211,
n. 26); Three Moments (7477); Three Seals (77); Two
Bordering Regions (138145); Wheels (71; 72); Wise
of the Ages (73)
Manichaeism (and Gnosticism), 84,
n. 7
Marcionism, 197
massa damnata, 238
massa peccata, 176
materia, 111
materia corpora/is, 101
matter, 43, n. 31 (as indeterminate);
109-111 (as amorphous);
220
!1EPL0!10~,45, n. 39
metaphysical evil, 175; 180; 225;
245
Middle Platonism, 22; 30,ff. (influence on Patristic theories of
creation); 37; 44, n. 35
mid-rank position of soul, 112
modica, 185, n. 19
Subject Index
279
modus, 170; 224

Monad, 31
Monarchianism, 215, n. 66
monotheism, 198, ff.
moral evil, 175; 176; 180; 246
mutability of creatures, 236
principium, 249, n. 11
problem of evil, 166; 223-225
providence, 31; 55, n. 127 (in Philo)
natural evil, 148

Neoplatonism, 36; 37; 100; 168;
180; 187,n. 36; 221; 227;
232
nihil, 111-115; 178
non-being, 113
North African Christianity, 167
Receptacle, 23
redemption, 238-243
Omnipresence, 159, n. 49
ordo, 170; 224
Original Sin, 176; 177; 191, n. 56;
238; 240; 241; 243; 246
pars, 215, n. 62
participation, 201; 236
Patriarchs, 196; 197
Pelagianism, 239-243; 253, n. 43
Pergamum, 28
physical evil, 177; 180; 191, n. 55;
224; 225
:n:OLEW, 18; 42, n. 27
polytheism, 200, ff.
predestination, 243-245
predetermination, 244
preexistent matter (in Patristic
tradition), 60, n. 165
principia, 155, n. 1
rationes, 108
rationes seminales, 36; 105; 119,
n. 9
senses of evil (in Augustine), 175177

Septuagint, 15; 32
Shahpuhr I, 66
species, 121, n. 25; 170
spiritual natures, 236
Stoicism, 22 (and Aristotelianism); 22
(and Middle Platonism); 26
(and Philo); 33; 36 (and
Augustine); 37; 41, n. 13
(influence on I Clement);
99; 140; 241
Timaeus (debate concerning), 22, ff.
transcendentals, 170; 184, n. 16;
224
trinitarian creation, 103; 106; 107;
220
Trinity, 103; 106; 115; 234
truths of reason, 182, n. 2
Zoroastrianism, 66; 166
This study proceeds from an investigation of the significance of

the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in some of the key
components of St. Augustine's extended anti-Manichaean
polemic. Tci a great extent, his devastating critique of the
Manichaeans' world view, their conception of evil, and their most
fundamental theological presuppositions relied heavily upon the
affirmation that God ultimately created everything that exists
from nothing. In broader terms, the study demonstrates how the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo provided Augustine with an effective
means of defining the character of created being as finite and
mutable, and drawing a crucial ontological distinction between
the Divine Nature and that which God creates. Such teachings
were operative in some of the key themes of Augustine's theology.
N. Joseph Torchia, 0 . P., is a native

Philadelphian. After undergraduate
studies at St. Joseph's University and a
period of graduate research at the
University of St. Andrews in Scotland, he
received his M.A. from Villanova
University and Ph.D. from Fordham
University in Philosophy. He was
subsequently awarded an Andrew W.
Mellon Fellowship for graduate studies at
the Catholic University of America, where
he completed a second doctorate in Early
Christian Studies. Dr. Torchia has
taught Philosophy at Fordham University and Mount St. Mary's
College, and Theology at Villanova University. He has presented
papers at scholarly gatherings in the United States, Great Britain,
and Italy. His writings have appeared in Augustinus, Augustinian
Studies, ColLectanea Augustiniana, The Journal of Early Christian
Studies, The Modern Schoolman, Studia Patristica, and Augustine
Encyclopedia. He is also the author of Plotinus, Tolma, and the
Descent of Being: An Exposition and Analysis (Peter Lang, 1993).
He entered the Dominican Eastern Province of St. Joseph (U .S.A.)

in 1996 and is currently assigned to the Immaculate Conception
Priory in Washington, D.C.

(American University Studies VII_Theology &amp; Religion_ Vol.205) N. Joseph Torchia-_Creatio Ex Nihilo_ and the Theology of St. Augustine_ the Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond-Peter Lang Publishing (19

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Creatio ex nihilo and

the Theology of St. Augustine

and the Theology

American University Studies

New York Washington, D.C./Baltimore Boston

Creatio ex nihilo and the

Theology of St. Augustine

ISBN 978-1-4539-1077-1 (eBook)

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 3 Augustine's Refutation of the

Chapter 5 A Defense of Monotheism

Despite the seeming inexhaustiveness of investigations into the life

that enables us to discern certain salient features on the Augustinian

terms, Divine Providence presupposes a personal God Who lovingly

In the De vera religione (composed by A.D. 390), Augustine presents

In the foregoing statement, we find two correlative teachings which

As the supremely existent reality, God is the Author of every being

According to Augustine, the act of creation is the very expression

By way of introduction, I trace the emergence of the doctrine of creatio

a textual exposition and analysis of a key anti-Manichaean writing

Any assessment of Augustine's theology must be attuned to the deep

Manichaeism. The same considerations apply to the assessment of his

It is clear that Augustine's thought exhibits the influence of a wide

gustine to a uniquely Plotinian vision of reality. 24 In keeping with this

This statement demands some qualification. As indicated in this study (and in

Strictly speaking, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo refers to the creation of

This statement requires some comment. The Christian doctrine of creatio ex

cf., St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram V,20,40: PL xxxiv, 3/1,335: nunc

cf., the statement of the First Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on

De Vera Religione xvii,34-xviii,36: CCXXXII, 208-209: ita diuina prouidentia,

incipit, et ab ipsa morte ad naturam suam et essentiam ea quae deficiunt, id

De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, quaestio 78: CC xliv (A), 223:

De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251; 1,9(16): PL xxxiv,3/1,

De Genesi ad litteram IV,16(27): PL xxxiv,3/1, 306-307: Porro alia res bona

De Genesi ad litteram 1,7(13): PL xxxiv,3/1, 251.

De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1,2(4): PL xxxiv,3/1, 175: Si ergo isti dixerint,

Olivier Du Roy (Intelligence de Ia Foi en Ia Trinite Selon Saint Augustine

For an illuminating discussion of the debate surrounding the question of the

The investigation of this question can be traced to the nineteenth century.

The writings of Robert J. O'Connell, S.J. provide compelling evidence m

Press, 1978); "Pre-Existence in the Early Augustine," Revue des Etudes

For a more detailed application of this methodology, seeN. Joseph Torchia,

In support of the thesis that Porphyry provided the Neoplatonic inspiration

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The Scriptural, Patristic, and

By the fourth century, A.D., the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o had

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

Creatio Ex Nihilo in Scripture

It should be observed that a number of modern writers question whether

But in the absence of such technical language, are we justified in

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

Of course, this passage could also be construed as implying that God

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

then we could certainly hold that Genesis upholds creatio ex nihi /o in

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

their teachings. On the other hand, Christian intellectuals raised new

In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, discussions of the theological

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

only God can be unbegotten (aytvvl]tO~) and incorruptible

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

Technically speaking, then, a theory of creatio ex nihilo can be

In one sense, this statement is consistent with what Athenagoras holds

... Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo

(American University Studies VII_Theology & Religion_ Vol.205) N. Joseph Torchia-_Creatio Ex Nihilo_ and the Theology of St. Augustine_ the Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond-Peter Lang Publishing (19

(American University Studies VII_Theology & Religion_ Vol.205) N. Joseph Torchia-_Creatio Ex Nihilo_ and the Theology of St. Augustine_ the Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond-Peter Lang Publishing (19