PKGP (2013) Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units PDF

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster
Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems
Deutsche Gesellschaft
fur Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
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in achieving its objectives in the field of international cooperation
for sustainable development.
Published by:
Support to Good Governance in Pakistan Programme
funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
and implemented through Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
Administrative Reform Component
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Responsible:
Catherine Isabel Froehling, Head of Governance Programme
Dr. Detlef Barth, Principal Advisor, Administrative Reform Component
Author:
Syed Harir Shah, Technical Consultant
Technical Advisor:
Muhammad Khaliq, Advisor Local Governance, Administrative Reform Component
Layout:
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Place and date of publication:
Peshawar, Revised Version September, 2013
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Acknowledgement
Many sincere thanks to all the participants, who shared their valuable information and opinion during the
comparative survey, Focus Group Discssions (FGDs) and interviews for this study. I am particularly thankful
to the DDMOs of Swat and Mansehra for their facilitation and coordination.
The author is indebted to the GIZ for entrusting the responsibility of conducting this comparative study
and is deeply grateful to all the agencies, institutions and individuals who extended their valuable support,
cooperation, knowledge and experience towards the development of this report.
I am extremely thankful to Mr. Muhammad Khaliq, Advisor Local Governance Administrative Reform
Component, Governance Programme GIZ, who guided and supported me at every stage of developing this
reference handbook.
At last but not the least, I wish to express sincere thanks and gratitude to Mr. Qazi Kabir Ahmed for his
professional assistance and tireless efforts in the collection, consolidation and organisation of the information
as well as for compiling, designing and presenting it in this shape. I am also thankful to Ms. Aliya Harir for her
proofreading and editing services.
Syed Harir Shah

Disaster Risk Management Consultant
Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat
Preface
Realising the significance and implication of having
a comprehensive system in place for disaster
management, the Provincial Government of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa stood up to the challenge of initiating
disaster risk reduction and management (DRR and
DRM) processes.
The bilateral and multilateral partners also followed
suit by offering technical and financial assistance to
the government at provincial and local levels in this
regard. An agreement was formally reached through
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed
between the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(then North-West Frontier Province) and Deutsche
Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) (former GTZ) in 2007.
The technical cooperation partners formally agreed
on jointly working towards launching pilots under
the Disaster Preparedness and Management Project
(DPMP) in two districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
i.e. Peshawar and Mansehra. Preceding the launch
of DPMP, GIZ (then GTZ) had already been
working in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since 2006,
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
across a project to support disaster preventive
reconstruction.
The DPMP focused on supporting institutional
development of disaster management authorities at
provincial and district levels (PDMA and DDMUs)
to improve capacities and procedures for disaster
emergency response and disaster risk management.
The key purpose of this comparative study has been
to evaluate disaster preparedness and management
strategies, operational plans and subsequent activities
to generate a real time response system during the
pre- and post-flooding phases in 2010 across two
geographic vicinities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
multi-stakeholders, contingency planning, flood

forecasting, early warning prediction mechanism,
real time activation and deactivation of the overall
response system for dissemination of information,
warning for evacuation, collective and spontaneous
response to flood emergency and post-flood
recovery process to mitigate the impact of flood
damages in 2010.
Comparison of the roles played by the two
functioning DDMUs in Mansehra and Swat, during
the 2010 floods, brought several significant issues to
the forefront for further deliberation by the policy
maker, disaster management practitioners and
research specialists. One of the key questions for
further research and development is to get into the
dynamics of how one entity played a distinguished
role in comparison with other DDMUs during the
major floods of 2010?
Similarly, it merits an interesting analysis as to what
were the elements which evidently supported and
supplemented the efforts of District Government
Mansehra in differentiating its role towards
improved DRM.
This study is a step forward to help find crucial
answers to some of the underlying questions in
DRM process and implementation, which can be
a breakthrough in the scaling up process of DRM
Model Mansehra across other districts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
Dr. Detlef Barth

Principal Advisor,
Support to Good Governance in Pakistan
Programme
It presents a brief comparison of roles played and

the contributions made by the District Disaster
Management Units (DDMUs) Mansehra and
Swat, in terms of their pre-flood preparedness and
planning. The roles of these DDMUs have been
studied in detail encompassing coordination with
ii
Executive Summary
The primary purpose of this assessment is to
study and compare the disaster preparedness and
management strategies, operational plans and
activities to generate a real time response system
in pre- and post-flooding of 2010 in the two
similar entities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
It presents a brief comparison of roles played
and the contributions made by District Disaster
Management Units, Mansehra and Swat, in terms
of their pre-flood preparedness/planning. Their
roles included coordination with multi-stakeholders,
contingency planning, flood forecasting, prediction,
early warning mechanism, real time activation and
deactivation of the overall response system for
dissemination of early warning information, warning
for evacuation, collective and spontaneous response
to flood emergency, and post-flood recovery process
to mitigate the impact of flood damages in 2010.
It also illustrates the roles played by DDMUs to
pool and mobilise local resources, including that of
district/local government agencies, NGOs and the
communities for a comprehensive and integrated
response. Not only does it recognise the importance
of involving local people to build on their existing
strengths to prepare for flood prevention, mitigation
and response, but it also epitomises the practical
learning, experiences, challenges and opportunities
for identifying high-risk groups (including children,
young people, women, older people, and those with
disabilities) in order to work collectively with meagre
local resources.
Comparison of the roles played by the two
functioning DDMUs, i.e. Mansehra and Swat,
during the flooding 2010, raised many questions
for further study by researchers and policy/decision
makers, both. For instance, how one entity played
unmatchable and eminent role as compared with
the other DDMU during the flooding 2010? What
elements and components evidently supported/
supplemented the efforts of district government
and distinguished their role in DRM.
Documenting and reviewing the processes, lessons
learnt, and achievements of the DDMU Mansehra,
and the role played collectively by all actors during the
flooding 2010 is a successful case study. This study
aims to increase our understanding, reorganisation
and importance of the role local governments could
play in dealing with risk reduction/management and
building disaster resilient communities. The results

thus generated would be helpful in scaling up and
rolling out the DRM Model in other districts of KP.
The comparative assessment of two approaches, in
two districts of the same administrative structure
of the KP Government, elucidated dissimilar
effects of flooding on the overall eco-system and
the humanity in the similar districts in KP. It also
evidently identified and demonstrated what actually
happened to both the districts; what role DDMUs
played to mitigate the effects of flooding; why one
response was more effective compared to another;
how the local resources were wisely and effectively
used by one district compared to another; how the
comparison will improve the practice of disaster
management as it permits us to learn from the
mistakes and success of others. The comparative
study of two entities i.e. District Disaster
Management Units (Mansehra & Swat) in terms
of their preparedness and approaches for overall
disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness in
the districts also highlights that DDMU Mansehra
was supported by GIZs DPMP project during
2008-2010, while DDMU Swat was conventionally
working on disaster risk reduction/management.
Hence the better functioning of DDMU Mansehra
can be understood as a positive impact of the GIZs
DPMP project.
The study demonstrates and distinguishes gaps
between the preparedness and response capacity of
DDMU Mansehra and Swat. It shows that the efforts
have been successful to a great extent, but a lot more
needs to be done. In locations where the project has
been present for a short time of two years, there
is a greater impact which suggests the need for
continuous promotion of multi-hazards resilience
communities with a strong disaster management
system. The district and local governments and
other stakeholders in Mansehra have done much in
the past two years to support this process, and have
proved that authorities and the inhabitants should
adopt the key concept and principles of integrated
and comprehensive risk management.
This specific flood disaster-related comparison
data is mainly related to the hydrological and flood
disaster impact. The highly riverine and flood-prone
districts of Mansehra and Swat were considered
for comparative study. The results suggest that the
iii
economic growth is prevailing in each district at a

relative pace. The level of disaster preparedness
has also been noticeably improved by the respective
governments, but the capacity of communities to
cope with such extreme events is weakening because
of lack of social capacity and increased severity of
floods.
Consultative meetings with representatives of line
agencies and stakeholders, district administration and
Tehsil Municipal Administrations (TMAs) generated
valuable baseline qualitative information. Focused
group discussions, carried out with communities
and line agencies, also identified worthwhile
areas of comparison highlighting similarities and
differences with lessons and suggestions. To further
support the qualitative findings, a small scale
sample based quantities data collection exercise
was also undertaken. A close-ended questionnaire
was served to the officials of Non-Governmental
Organization (NGOs) and government agencies as
well as to the community members of the affected
areas. Following is a presentation of qualitative

comparison followed by a quantitative analysis of
the field findings.
It is very much clear that the services and inputs
rendered by the DPMP project in harmonising,
integrating and strengthening the DRM system in
Mansehra resulted in significant physical and human
support to the district and the community of district
Mansehra. It is also evident that only the provision
of resources, governmental notifications, and law
and regulation cannot yield efficient institutions, it is
the continuous technical and moral support and will
of the actors that are explicit from the Mansehra
DRM Model. The GIZ played a vital role through
its DPMP project in materialising the true essence
of community based disaster management concepts
in Mansehra. Although a DDMU was established to
work with its stereotyped pace in Swat, it did not
prove to be fruitful at the time of need and distress
which emerged through floods 2010.
Respond to six indicators by 100 participants each from the two districts
95%
95%
95%
96%
96%
95%
Mansehra
Early Warning System was inplace?
Contingency plans were prepared with participatory approach
Search and Rescue Team and incident command system was functional
Early response and action system worked well?
General understanding about DRM practices clear?
iv
Respond to six indicators by 100 participants each from the two districts
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
4%
SWAT
Early Warning System was inplace?
Contingency plans were prepared with participatory approach
Search and Rescue Team and incident command system was functional
Early response and action system worked well?
General understanding about DRM practices clear?
The data and findings presented below are in

response of calculation and comparison the research
team gathered through individual interviews of
local respondents in each district. There is a huge
difference in the mechanism, effectiveness, service
delivery, capacities, and functioning of the two
DDMUs present in almost the same geographic
characteristics and with the same mandate and
resources.
Almost 80% of the respondents identified that there
was no proper and updated contingency planning,
functional and effective DDMU, and any scientific
or community based DRM system in Swat, whereas
100% of respondents appreciated the contingency
planning and DRM system in Mansehra.
There is a dire and immediate need to strengthen

local DRR and DRM systems at the grassroot level.
Community based DRM practices call for a well
coordinated and voluntary effort on the part of
government functionaries and social organisations
and institutions. The earthquake 2005 brought
with it a bulk of technical and financial resources
to Mansehra, whereas continuous insurgency and
terrorism restrained Swat to enjoy latest and state of
the art DRM capacities. The Mansehra Model needs
to be replicated with a more improved and updated
approach not only in Swat but in the whole province
of KP as an immediate priority. Projects like DPMP
are seriously needed to be implemented across the
province.
Contents
Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................................................................
Preface......................................................................................................................................................................................... ii
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................................................. iii
List of Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................................... viii
Chapter 1: Introduction...................................................................................................................................................... 01
1.1 National Strategy for Disaster Management......................................................................... 01
1.2 Background to the Assessment..................................................................................................... 01
1.3 Floods 2010 in Pakistan ................................................................................................................... 03
1.4 Flood Impact & Damages in Mansehra & Swat.................................................................... 05
1.5 Brief Background Description about the two Districts................................................... 06
1.6 DRM Gaps Identified by NDMA/PDMA after Floods 2010............................................... 09
1.7 Effectiveness & Achievements of DRM Model Mansehra in Floods 2010............ 11
Chapter 2: Methodology of the Assessment and Comparison..................................................................... 16
2.1 Purpose and Objectives...................................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Research Tools and Techniques..................................................................................................... 16
2.3 Sampling and Universe....................................................................................................................... 16
2.4 Data Analysis and Comparison..................................................................................................... 16
2.5 Constraints and Limitations............................................................................................................. 16
Chapter 3: Findings............................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Broad Comparison of 2010 Flood Disaster Risk Management
in Mansehra and Swat....................................................................................................................... 18
Chapter 4: Conclusion & Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 35
4.1 Everyone and no-one in Control.................................................................................................... 35
4.2 Parallel Structures and Overlapping Mandates................................................................... 35
4.3 Multiple Legal Frameworks Challenges................................................................................... 36
4.4 Missing Links between Disaster Management Authorities
and Local Communities..................................................................................................................... 36
4.5 Disaster Preparedness Post-Devolution................................................................................... 36
4.6 A well-resourced, integrated and fully functional Disaster
Management System............................................................................................................................ 36
4.7 Increased and sustained funding for Disaster Management....................................... 36
4.8 Strategic Donor Commitment for DRR in the long term................................................. 37
4.9 Make Early Warning System less complex and more effective................................. 37
4.10 Adapt to the changing Climate................................................................................................... 37
4.11 Study-based Suggestions............................................................................................................. 37
4.11 Forward looking Approach........................................................................................................... 39
Summary..................................................................................................................................................................................... 40
vii
List of Abbreviations
viii
ACO
Assistant Coordination Officer
BGR
Federal Institute for Geoscience and Natural Resources (Germany)
CBO
Community Based Organisation
CSSR
Collapse Structure Search & Rescue
DCO
District Coordination Officer
DDMO
District Disaster Management Officer
DDMA
District Disaster Management Authority
DDMU
District Disaster Management Unit
DEOC
District Emergency Operation Centre
DPMP
Disaster Preparedness and Management Project
DDPRC
District Disaster Preparedness and Response Centre
DRM
Disaster Risk Management
DRR
Disaster Risk Reduction
DRU
Disaster Reconstruction Unit
EDO
Executive District Officer
ERS
Emergency Response System
ERRA
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority
EWS
Early Warning System
ERT
Emergency Response Team
FATA
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FFD
Flood Forecasting Division
FF
Fire fighting
FR
Flood Rescue
GANP
Geological-Hazards Assessment in Northern Pakistan
GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GSP
Geological Survey of Pakistan
HM
Hazard Mapping.
HVCA
Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
HFA
Hyogo Framework for Action
IDP
Internally Displaced Persons
IO
International Organisations
INGO
International non-governmental organisations
LFA
Logical framework analyses.
LGE&RDD
Local Government, Elections and Rural Development Department
MFR
Medical First Response
MGCM
Monthly General Coordination Meeting
MOVs
Means of Verifications
MR
Mountain Rescue
NDMA
National Disaster Management Authority
NDMO
National Disaster Management Ordinance
NDRMF
National Disaster Risk Management Framework
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
PaRRSA
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority
PCNA
Post-Crisis Needs Assessment
PDMA
Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PMD
Pakistan Meteorological Department
PHD
Public Health Department
RA
Road Accident
S&R
Search and Rescue
SoG
Standard Operating Guidelines
SoP
Standard Operating Procedure
SSI
Semi Structured Interview
TMA
Tehsil Municipal Administration
TMO
Tehsil Municipal Officers
TOR
Terms of Reference
TWG
Technical Working Group
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
and strategies on disaster management. The
new system envisages a devolved and decentralised mechanism for disaster management.
Accordingly, Provincial Disaster Management
Commissions (PDMCs) and Authorities
(PDMAs) have been established, while similar
arrangements had been arranged in AJ&K
and Gilgit-Baltistan. The District Disaster
Management Authorities (DDMUs) have been
notified across the country. The DDMUs are
going to be the linchpin of the whole system and
would play the role of the first line of defence
in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness
and response, in the event of a disaster.
1.1 National Strategy for Disaster Management
Pakistan is highly vulnerable to disaster risks from

a range of hazards including floods, droughts,
earthquakes, cyclones/storms, epidemics,
avalanches, glacial lake outbursts, landslides, pest
attacks, river erosions and tsunamis. Humaninduced hazards that threaten the country
include transport, industrial, oil spills, urban and
forest fires, civil conflicts, terrorism and internal
displacements of communities due to multiple
factors. High priority hazards in terms of their
frequency and scale of impact are: flooding,
earthquakes, droughts, wind storms, landslides,
terrorism and geopolitical hazards that have
caused widespread damages and losses in the
past.
Pakistan having a reactive, emergency response
approach has maintained the predominant way
of dealing with disasters till now. The Calamity
Act of 1958 was mainly concerned with
organising emergency response. A system of
relief commissionrate at the provincial level was
established. An Emergency Relief Cell (ERC)
in the Cabinet Secretariat was responsible for
organising disaster response by the federal
government. The awareness of policymakers,
media, civil society, NGOs, UN agencies and
other stakeholders remained low about disaster
risk management and they were not familiar
with the above mentioned system; the country
as a whole lacked a systematic approach towards
disaster risk management.
The National Disaster Risk Management

Framework has been formulated to guide the
work of the entire system in the area of disaster
risk management. The framework identifies
national strategies and policies for disaster
management. Nine priority areas have been
identified within this framework to establish and
strengthen policies, institutions and capacities in
the country.
1.2 Background to the Assessment
In the backdrop of the October 2005 earthquake,

the Government of Pakistan realised the
need for establishing appropriate policy and
institutional arrangements to reduce losses
from disasters in future. The need for strong
institutional and policy arrangements has been
fulfilled with the promulgation of the National
Disaster Management Ordinance, 2006. In the
light of the Ordinance, the National Disaster
Management Commission (NDMC) has been
established under the Chairmanship of the
Prime Minister as the highest policy making
body in the field of disaster management. As
an executive arm of the NDMC, the National
Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
has been made operational to coordinate and
monitor implementation of national policies
Pakistan has suffered a cumulative financial loss of

US $30 billion during the past 60 years. During the
period from 1950 to 2009, there was a total financial
loss of US $20 billion; some 8,887 people lost their
lives, 109,822 villages were reportedly damaged/
destroyed and an overall area of 407,132 Sq.km was
affected. In comparison, the 2010 flood alone resulted in
a cumulative financial loss of US $10 billion, life loss
of about 2,000 people, 17,553 village were reportedly
damaged/ destroyed and a total area of 160,000 sq km
was affected. (Flood Forecasting Commission Pakistan
2010)
In the past 63 years, Pakistan has never
experienced such ferocious floods as it saw
during August 2010. The impact on the life,
property and livestock has been devastating.
The damages caused have put the country in a
state that may take years to recoup. Hundreds
of villages have been swept away in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Balochistan, while
Sindh which had little in its waterways for
a number of years is now bracing itself for a
major deluge. Standing crops, animal farms and
infrastructures have also been damaged badly.
Livestock, one of the major sources of income
01
02
for rural families, has been affected. Millions

of people are seeking refuge in tents made of
plastic sheets. The Government of Pakistan
has termed the scale of the disaster worse than
Haitis earthquake, the 2004 tsunami, and the
2005 Pakistan earthquake.
model to be followed and learnt from? The

DRM Model Mansehra not only answers these
questions but the good practices and lessons
learned from it can help the governments and
practitioners at the local level in devising their
strategies for disaster management.
The alluvial plains of the Indus river system

have been traditionally vulnerable to recurring
floods. The last floods causing considerable
damage to life and property occurred in 1992.
However, this is one hazard against which an
effective protection network of dykes and flood
water regulatory infrastructure has been built
over the years. Contingency plans and early
warning mechanisms have been developed and
are being refined every year; however, these
mechanisms have not been seriously tested over
the recent past. Concomitant with the riverine
floods during the summer monsoons, flash
floods and landslide hazards occur frequently in
the mountainous north along watersheds. Flash
floods also occur in upper plains adjacent to
river catchment areas. The rising incidence of
loss of life and property indicates relative unpreparedness for such hazards.
Government is unmatched in its reach, presence,
and resources to respond to disasters. All other
agencies normally route their inputs through the
government structures. It has systems in place to
handle disasters which though need capacity upgradation and policy realignment. This explains
the primary focus of the newly created National
Disaster Management Authority in making the
multi-tiered governance system more capable
of holistic disaster management.
Provincial and local governments committed

to initiate the DRM process in their respective
jurisdictions. To supplement the efforts of the
Government of Pakistan, multi and bilateral cooperations and INGOs offered their support to
the Government at different levels. Accordingly,
in 2007 a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was signed between the Provincial
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the
then NWFP, and German International
Cooperation, the then Deutsche Gesellschaft
fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
for undertaking pilot projects on Disaster
Preparedness and Management (DPMP) in two
districts of KP i.e. Peshawar and Mansehra.
The GIZ has already been operating in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa since the spring of 2006, on behalf
of the German Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
in a project to support disaster preventive
reconstruction. The Disaster Preparedness and
Management Project focused particularly on
supporting the institutional development of
disaster management authorities at provincial
and district levels, and generally in improving
disaster risk management and disaster response.
This was designed to prevent future disasters
wherever possible and to enable the local
authorities and the population to respond to any
disaster that might occur.
District government assumes the centrality in

disaster response in a local setting; however,
Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 in a
bid to devolve governance has rendered it weak
for articulating a disaster response. Though
National Disaster Management Authority
(NDMA) framework proposes a cohesive
response structure of the district government,
but can it make the devolved governance
culture response to a crisis situation? Are
newly established DDMUs capable enough to
cope with disasters? Or is there any workable
District government, local community and

NGOs are the major three key entities in
articulating disastrous impact on the lives,
livelihoods and environment of the region.
Recent experiences have adequately highlighted
their striking limitations. In the district situation,
it is the near absence of warning and planning
instruments and a feeble outreach, while the
communities are weak in social organisation
and disaster coping mechanisms. An integrated
intervention is, therefore, needed for building
their disaster management capacities by drawing
synergies. The Mansehra DRM Model was

implemented by Disaster Preparedness and
Management Project during 2008-2010 for the
purpose to improve the ability of communities,
district/local governments and civil society
organisations. It also aimed at enabling the
community to proactively plan and implement
actions for reducing vulnerability to natural
disasters and for creating greater economic
resilience when disasters do occur.
The massive humanitarian needs challenged the

existing capacities of international and national
response organisations, posing considerable
constraints to strong response to humanitarian
needs in an integrated and coordinated manner.
Pakistan has several large river basins - Indus,
Kabul, Jhelum, Sutlej, and Bias. Each year during
the monsoon rainy season occurring between
June and September, the levels of these major
rivers rise sharply, sometimes creating severe
flood disasters. Pakistan regularly experiences
several kinds of floods: Riverine floods which
are caused by heavy rains or snowmelt, creating
a quantity of water exceeding the capacity of
riverbeds, as well as flash floods caused by
large-scale rainfall. The economical cost of the
flooding 2010 was over $10 billion with a loss of
about 2000 lives.
1.3 Floods 2010 in Pakistan
Many questions emerged from the recent

floods in Pakistan, ranging from attempts to
understand the atmospheric phenomena behind
the downpours to the search for where ultimate
responsibility lies in order to ensue human
calamity. This short essay investigates some of
those questions.
The 2010 monsoon seasons flooding created
an unprecedented humanitarian disaster, which
the Secretary-General called the worst in the
United Nations (UN) 65 years history. Heavy
rainfall created a moving body of water equal
in dimension to the land mass of the United
Kingdom, affecting more than 20 million people
across 84 of the 121 districts in Pakistan.
Gilgit-Baltistan
Chilas
Ind
us
Mingora
Peshawar
Islamabad
Jhelam
nab
Che
Qetta
Punjab
Multan
Satluj
s
ndu
Balochistan
Gwadar
Karachi
Haiderabad
Tatta
Sindh
Pakistan Flood Affected Districts
03
This is where human intervention in terms

of water resource planning and infrastructure
development played an important role in the
floods.
A pinch of geography is necessary to explain

why Pakistan received such an extraordinary
amount of rain during this rainy season. The
Indian monsoon can be understood as a
giant sea-breeze, with ocean moisture sucked
in by rising hot air over the South Asian
plains. It is influenced by large scale weather
patterns such as the jet stream in the northern
hemisphere, which this year has come to a halt
as a consequence of Rossby Waves, powerful
spinning wind currents created by the earths
rotation. Such unusual occurrences called
blocking events have taken place in the
past, and have resulted in unusual weather
phenomena. This year, as the jet stream became
stationary, unusually hot summers led to the
breakout of wildfires in Western Russia, and
unprecedented rains poured down the slopes
of the Western Himalayas. The blocking event
coincided with the summer monsoon, which
brought unusually heavy amounts of rain on
the mountains that girdle the north of Pakistan.
The intensity of the localised rainfall was
fantastic four months worth of rainfall had
fallen in just a couple of days. Some areas in
Northern Pakistan received more than three
times their annual rainfall in a matter of 36
hours. Gushing quickly down the tributaries
into the River Indus, the rain waters gave rise to
floods of catastrophic proportions. Given the
immensity of the downpours, some flooding
was inevitable as rivers are essentially channels
to drain out water. Being one of the largest
rivers of the world, the Indus should have been
able to carry out the excess waters into the
Arabian Sea which it joins near Karachi. Why
could the river not flush out the excess waters?
04
The human interference into a natural river

system has its consequence; when excessive
amounts of water are drawn out of its channel,
a river channel becomes less efficient and loses
its ability to quickly move the water. When
levees are built along the banks, the sediments
get deposited on the river bed, which gradually
rises above the surrounding plains. Not only
does this enhance the flood risk, but the levees
standing as walls also make it difficult for the
flood water to return back into the channel
once it has spilled over.
In the last few decades, water and irrigation
infrastructure within the Indus system has
increased in size and number. Indeed, over two
thirds of the Indus flow is now diverted for
irrigation. A number of tributaries also join the
Indus from the west. These are fast-flowing hill
torrents that bring down huge quantities of silt
during the monsoons.
In addition to many natural phenomena,
most of the anthropogenic action, including
degradation of the environment, encroachment
of spillways of rivers and careless planning of
water resources are also causes of bringing
down of silt. Engineers and water planners have
given insufficient consideration to the sediment
load that gets carried within the banks of the
river channel, and through the interventions of
their infrastructure they exacerbated this years
flood. They created a false sense of security
amongst the rural peasants, whose lives and

livelihoods were washed away in the floods.
1.4 Flood Impact & Damages in Mansehra and

Swat
Since July 21, 2010 Pakistan has been affected

by some of the worst floods it has experienced
in
decades. The worst affected areas in
Pakistan are the province of the KP, which
alone recorded 1,036 deaths (NDMA report
August 11, 2010). Within the KP province,
Swat and Dir are some of the worst-affected
districts.
If something good can at all come out of

the enormous human tragedy that Pakistan
has been confronted with, it should be a
rethinking of river development and planning
at a technical level, and change of attitude and
behaviour at policy/decision making and the
community level. No-one could have possibly
predicted or prevented the floods. One can,
however, certainly ensure that the magnitude
of its aftereffects was within human ability
to deal with. Unfortunately the Pakistani
government is poorly equipped to deal with
the human aftermath. This is where all of us as
individuals can play a role. We still have the time
to help the flood-affected people and change
our thinking for building resilient communities
to flood disasters.
The floods of 2010 are among the worst

disasters that have yet hit Pakistan in recent
history. The Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
already recovering from the consequences
of militancy and resulting IDPs crisis, was
the most affected. The deadly water surge
started from the mountainous north while the
peculiar terrain of the province gave this surge
an enormous force which ultimately resulted
in total destruction of whatever stood in its
path. Following table and figure show a brief
comparison of flood damages in Mansehra and
Swat districts.
Description
Mansehra
Swat
Casualties
36*
95
Household affected
3267
90665
People isolated
350,000
Villages affected
12
42
Houses destoryed
4092
14,460
Livestock damages
89,232
34,470
Source: PDMA KP contingency plan 2011

*This includes 25 casualties in Kala Dakha,
which was under the administrative control
of district Mansehra, but the DPMP DRM
preparedness project was not extended there.
The rest of the casualties reported were also
the indirect effect of post-flood.
58 questions on six aspects of disaster

preparedness, functioning of DDMUs,
coordination,
response,
action
and
understanding of the participants about general
awareness of disaster management were asked
from 100 participants from each district.
Answers to 58 questions against six indicators mentioned above
Mansehra
Swat
The percentage of yes to six indicators
95%
3%
The percentage of dont know to six indicators
3%
11%
No to six indicators
2%
86%
05
The table above shows comparative damages

of the two districts. Swat District had already
been heavily affected in 2008-2009 by a
conflict, resulting in massive displacement of
the population and increased constraints on
food security and livelihoods. This, along with
recent floods, is compounded by the underlying
vulnerability that already characterised the
remote mountain areas prior to the crisis.
1.5 Brief Background Description about the Two

Districts
District Swat
District Swat is one of the 25 districts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The district comprises
seven Tehsils: Kabal, Matta, Bahrain, Charbagh,
Babozai, Barikot and Khawazakhela. The area
of Swat is 4000 sq. miles with a population
of about 1,995,706. Its height varies from
2500 ft to 7500 ft above sea level. The average
maximum temperature (in July) is 38C and
the minimum (during January) is 1C. Annual
rainfall is recorded as 1366 mm. Floods,
conflicts, hailstorms, snowfall and earthquakes
are major hazards of Swat. Floods are the most
frequent and damaging natural hazards and
they occur almost every year during monsoon
season. Heavy monsoon/torrential rains,
particularly occurring in July to September,
cause floods in the rivers, nallahs and streams,
thus resulting in considerable damages/losses to
both agricultural land and residential property.
According to field investigations, a total of
1,363,250 individuals of 154,915 households
were affected due to the 2010 floods in 36
Hazard
Tehsils
Flood
union councils of the district. Review of

literature, stakeholder consultations and field
investigations revealed that hailstorm affected
1,515,569 individuals in 48 union councils;
(Hazard Livelihood and Vulnerability it is a
baseline and contingency plan, prepared by
Food Agriculture Organisation, October, 2012).
Swat is one of the areas which have been
affected by armed conflict between Pakistan
army and the Taliban which reached its highest
degree back in 2009. The armed conflict caused
displacement of 2 million people from Swat.
A total of 1,258,569 individuals were affected
due to conflict in which men were 647,081
and women were 6,11,488, living in 1,43,019
households; Due to the armed conflict, the total
loss to the farming sector ranged from Rs19
billion to Rs.22 billion. (Research report Fazale-Moula Zahid, Impact of War in Swat Valley
on Farming Sector, Published by AIRRA).
The history, quantum of damages and
placement of Swat in Zone III in seismic
earthquake zone map and ranked as High
indicates that an earthquake is a potential hazard
in the district. The snow based hazards were
rated as the fifth major hazard and they usually
occur in the winter season mainly affecting the
Kalam, Utror, Balakot, Mankiyal, Bahrain and
Beshigram UCs. In case of heavy snowfall, the
burden on families increases for protecting their
houses and removing excessive snow from the
rooftops. The food and feed stocks that may be
sufficient till the end of February/March could
be finished if not properly managed.
Conflict
Hail Strom
Snow Fall
Earthquake
36
40
48
30
Projected Population
1363252
1257877
1515569
161296
935015
Households
154,915
142,941
172,224
18,329
106,252
129
40
13
43
Union Councils
Indicative cost of Livelihood

Support (USD Million)
Source: PDMA KP contingency plan 2011
06
Key Hazards and Exposure of District Swat

The local government is primarily responsible
for pre and post disaster management. The
Provincial Disaster Management Authority
(PDMA)
has established DDMU Swat;
however, this entity/institution itself is at a
stage of infancy and needs to grow in terms of
capacity and resources.
evacuation, safe routes and safe storage sites

at the state department and community level.
There is no organised structure equipped with
sirens and other equipment for towns and mozas
(cluster of villages) to facilitate early warning
information sharing to avoid heavy colossal
loss. Mock drills at community level and similar
arrangements can bring better results whereas
for state agencies proper trainings are required.
Progression of DRR/DRM in SWAT

A multi-stakeholders analysis undertaken by the
District Government Swat during 2011-2012
revealed that there is no setup of any formal
support by Government at UC level except
union council secretaries in rural areas.
In order to save lives, it is imperative that the

district, union council and village communities
understand the hazard; be able to identify
the warning signs; and make timely as well as
informed decision to save lives. Individuals,
groups and communities follow their traditional
and indigenous knowledge and, at some points,
communities coordinate with the government
departments. However, community is not always
prepared for a sudden hazard. Communities
suffer a lot due to the lack of proper training,
tool kits and coordination, disaster risk
reduction measures, pre-disaster preparations
(preparedness), poor communication and
community interaction with each other. Transfer
of knowledge varies from area to area, it is poor
among men and women; women normally are
less aware, organised, trained and prepared
for any hazard. Likewise vulnerable families,
disabled individuals and poor people are least
prepared and involved in all such preparations
and events.
The district disaster management unit is mainly

operating at Saidu Sharif and subdivision
administration is almost with minimum
capacity and resources to handle any disaster
and emergencies. The organised groups or
structures for disaster risk management at union
council level are still at embryonic stage.
Very few village organisations have the concept
of disaster risk management. There are no
tools and drills with village community at large;
very few community organisations have some
tools provided by NGOs. Community-based
disaster risk management has been accepted as
the best tool of the ultimate way forward for
multi-hazards resiliency of the Swat community.
Except Mingora City, almost all urban and rural
areas state agencies are untrained in search,
rescue and relief. A similar situation is in village
communities where hundreds and thousands
of people living in the different hazards prone
union councils are untrained and un-organised.
There have been no mock drills or other
exercises at the state level to inform and prepare
the communities about any of the potential
hazards.
Community safety nets and safer areas at the

place of origin are least focused by the state
agencies and other stakeholders.
The district disaster management unit is in the

process of organisation yet. Proper trainings,
tool kits and the vibrant coordination needed
for effective disaster risk reduction measures are
part of pre-disaster preparedness in the scenic
district. No training has been given for secure
District Mansehra
Mansehra district is located in Hazara division
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan. The total
area of the district is 4,579 square kilometers,
while the district houses a total population
of 1,152,839 (61,376 urban and 1,091,463
rural: following the 1998 census). The average
annual growth rate is 2.4 percent and districts
population density is 252 persons per square
kilometer. For every 100 women there are 98
men in the district. Average household size
in the district is 6.7 persons. Oghi, Balakot
and Mansehra are three tehsils of the district
07
whereas there are 59 union councils and 1,160

villages in the district. The literacy ratio in the
district accounts for 36.3 percent (males 50.9
percent as against 22.7 percent for females).
There are 1042 health institutions established in
the district. For every 8,362 people there is one
doctor available in the district , while for 33,447
population there is one nurse. There is an acute
problem of accessibility to road infrastructure.
About 49.1 percent housing units have an
electrical facility while 94 percent households
use wood as a source of cooking fuel. The
access of common people to basic civic facilities
and amenities in the district is quite ironical and
the quality of these services is well below the

acceptable standards.
Mansehra District was the worst affected district
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the earthquake
in terms of human losses and destruction of
physical infrastructure. According to district
governments statistics, 15,997 persons died
while 9,903 were injured due to earthquake;
besides the loss of precious human lives, the
number of housing units destroyed due to
disaster was also implacably higher. As many
as 108,283 housing units were completely
destroyed and 34,001 were partially damaged.
Ind
us
Kohistan
Naran
ar
nh
Ku
Batagram
Kaghan
Jadori
Balakot
Oghi
Shinkiari
Indus
Baffa
Distrcit Mansehra
Sir
an
Mansehra
Abbottabad
Haripur
Balakot city, which is part of the Mansehra

District located on the fault line, has been
declared Red Zone and plan is made to relocate
it to a new place called Bakriyal.
Education sector faced very heavy damages in
terms of buildings. Besides the loss of the lives
of the students and teachers, 935 institutions
08
were recorded as fully damaged and some 624

were partially damaged in the earthquake.
The enormity of earthquake was very complex,
as it generated multiple negative effects and
thousands of people lost their lives and
sustained serious injuries. Thousands of people
became shelter less and lost their life time
earnings. The local leadership and the people

of Mansehra acquired rich experience from
national and international organisations that
worked in Mansehra for reconstruction and
rehabilitation programme. These programmes
opened new avenues for learning and practices.
This unfortunate event also generated multipositive effect on empirical knowledge and
learning for all stakeholders, development
practitioners, planners and managers, academic
institutions and international community. One
such an event led to the development of the
Mansehra Model of Disaster Risk Management
that has been implemented and practiced by
local leadership despite of the hardest challenges
the people of the district suffered due to serious
socioeconomic and cultural vulnerabilities of
the earthquake 2005.
Training of urban and rural communities,

provision of early warning information and
equipment as well as coordination among all
stakeholders is the kingpin for secure and
safer communities
1.6 DRM Gaps Identified by NDMA/PDMA

after Flood 2010
Over 80 national and international organisations

contributed to re-building and recovery of the
destroyed district. The District Administration,
Local Government agencies, line departments,
Pakistan Army, law and order maintaining
organisations, national organisations and
international organisations contributed in
physical and nonphysical mitigation of the
district. The knowledge and expertise acquired
by the local leadership and the community also
contributed to the development of this model.
A series of strategies, for ensuring the broader
application of DRM instruments by the
District and local governments, was developed.
These strategies include: advocating and
raising awareness in district decision-making,
assessing local governments specific DRM
needs, adapting existing DRM instruments
to specific contexts and needs, strengthening
DRM training and capacity-building for local
governments, NGOs, community organisations;
and establishing monitoring and evaluation
systems for DRM at the local government level.
Before doing this, the existing DRM system in
the district was reviewed in the light of legal
and institutional arrangement in the country
under NDMO and NDRMF, to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of the present DRM
system in the district and to comprehend how
this could be promoted.
In the Moonsoon Contingency Plan KP 2011,

the PDMA identified following shortfalls in the
2010 flood response:
Inadequate Flood Protection Arrangements

Except for protection arrangements to protect
DI Khan City along the Indus, the protective
arrangements across KP and FATA were not
adequate in terms of extending safeguards
to vulnerable populations against the flood
hazards.
Inadequate
Flood
Early
Warning
Arrangements
Owing to non-deployment of floods early
warning radars, the existing arrangements rely
on flood gauging through WAPDAs telemetry
system and the basic system of gauges deployed
by the KP Irrigation Department. According
to Irrigation department, it can provide 24
48 hours warning along the River Swat, 5-7
hours along Kabul and 3648 hours along the
Indus at DI Khan. Such forecasting, however,
did not result in the evacuation of vulnerable
communities to safer locations during the
2010 Floods. There are no arrangements in
place to forewarn vulnerable communities of
flash flooding across the mountainous regions.
Moreover, Community EW mechanisms
remained largely ineffective during the Flood
2010 due to temporary suspension of cell and
line communication.
Encroachments
Most of the losses (life and property)
occurred during the 2010 floods as a result of
encroachments and intrusion of population
along Swat and Kabul rivers, partly along
the Indus and the flood prone hill torrents
in the north. Moreover, blocked and heavily
encroached drainage systems of settlements,
especially in the Peshawar Valley, played a major
role in inundation and consequent destruction.
09
Lack of Monsoon Preparations and

Coordination (Provincial Departments and
Districts)
The resource inadequacies, coupled with not
putting in place requisite monsoon preparedness
and coordination mechanism, tested the nerves
and response capacities of provincial and district
administration from July 28, 2010 onwards. The
reactive response strategies at the district and
provincial levels did manifest into life saving
and consolation of the flood affectees; however,
glaringly pre-monsoon preparedness and
coordination mechanism was lacking in 2010.
Non Observance of Early Warning by
General Public
An important aspect witnessed especially
in Charsadda, Nowshera and Peshawar
was the lack of seriousness to observe the
flood early warning(s) by the general public.
People had tendered to stay till flood water
completely overwhelmed and marooned them.
Consequently, scarce rescue resources (boats
and helicopters) were overburdened by salvage
missions.
Reduced Water Storage and Regulation
Capacity
The storage capacities (water storage facilities)
in KP have reduced to a varying range i.e. from
30-70%, mainly due to silting, thus reducing
their flood impact mitigation capacities. In
addition, the regulatory facilities i.e. Munda and
Amandara on River Swat sustained damages in
2010 Floods and have yet to be rehabilitated.
Monsoon Hazards in KP
Upper regions of the Province along with
adjoining regions of Afghanistan and GilgitBaltistan constitute the catchment area of River
Indus, the main river of the province. Indus
along its course is joined by its tributaries. The
districts of Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera and
Mardan, falling in Peshawar valley, are primarily
affected by floods in the tributaries of Kabul
and Swat rivers. River Indus, after receiving
water from these two rivers, causes flooding in
the district of D I Khan in the southern part of
the province.
10
Monsoon Risks & Risk Enhancing Factors

KPs peculiar physical configuration makes it
vulnerable to a diverse range of summer and
monsoon hazards. Heavily populated districts
constitute catchment areas of major rivers
where their tributaries proliferate, thus creating
flash flood vulnerability. Therefore, depending
on the intensity of monsoon precipitation and
ice melt, KP is vulnerable to both sudden and
expected hydro-meteorological disasters which
require integrated surge and quick response.
Spatial Shift in Monsoon Impact
Studies conducted by the Sustainable
Development Policy Institute - SDPI indicate
that with a doubling of CO2, average rainfall
in South Asia would increase between 17-59
percent. This can be associated with a doubling
in the frequency of high rainfall events and
variable monsoons. Over the last 8-10 years, the
Monsoon Impact has shifted nearly 100 KMs
westwards: from the lower Kashmir regions
to the Swat, Kabul and Indus catchments. In
KP, therefore, flooding in terms of severity of
impact occurs in Kabul, Swat and Indus river
systems and across the mountainous regions of
Hazara Division.
Changes in the River Morphology
The unprecedented nature of the 2010 Floods
caused the occurrence of unregulated river flow
patterns resulting in widening spans and erosions
in places most pronounced along the lower Swat
River which flows through populated areas.
Depleted Performance of Water Regulatory
Infrastructure
The unprecedented floods of 2010, in addition
to their colossal humanitarian impacts,
exposed the water regulatory infrastructure to
tremendous pressures.
Remaining Effects of 2010 Floods
Physical vulnerability of communities at large
is compounded by the remaining effects of
last years floods. Weak or weakened structures,
placement of houses especially that are less
resistant to flood waters, particularly in the
low lying areas in the form of encroachments,
and intrusion in floodwater plains has further
enhanced the vulnerabilities of the people across

the province. Possession of wealth and assets
gives an individual, households or community
a wider range of options in times of crisis, and
speeds their recovery from disasters.
1.7 Effectiveness and Achievements of DRM

Model Mansehra in Flood 2010
Comprehensive preparedness and response

system was developed and operationalised.
1.7.1 Updated Monsoon Flood Contingency
Plans were in Place
The DDMU Mansehra is having a
pioneering Monsoon Flood Contingency
plan that was prepared during 2009. This
plan was highly appreciated by the Chief
Minister of KP. He directed other districts
to replicate Mansehra Model plans in their
respective districts. The Monsoon flood
Contingency Plan 2009 was reviewed
and updated by DDMU Mansehra and
a more comprehensive and integrated
response plan was developed, tested and
shared with all stakeholders at the level of
provincial Governments to the grassroots
of the community. Hazards specific plans
including winter contingency plan, Hunza
Lake outburst evacuation plan, response
plan to cope with the above situation were
made jointly by all actors.
1.7.2.1 Incident Command System (ICS)

Established and Operationalised
In complex emergencies, changing
dynamics of hazards, advancement of
scientific institutions and institutional
knowledge, the work of responders
are becoming more challenging. At
times of emergencies, many agencies
will have to work with each other, but
these organisations and their staff are
not used to with each others command
system, behaviour, technology and
terminologies. Working in one location,
with a diversified team of rescuers, skills,
knowledge, and competencies under one
command system, is a common challenge.
To overcome this challenge, a universally
accepted system has been adopted, called
the Incident Command System (ICS).
This system, with necessary changes, was
adopted, made functional/operational
and was tested in few real time situations
including the flooding of 2010 .
1.7.2 The Monsoon Contingency Plan was

Tested, Updated and Shared
Contingency plans prepared by all actors
were tested through different scenario
based drills/simulations conducted jointly
by district/local government agencies,
NGOs and the community volunteers. The
gaps and weaknesses in the response plans
were updated. The role and responsibilities
of multi-stakeholders were clearly oriented
to all concerned; the monsoon contingency
plan was shared with them for actions. The
monsoon contingency plan was circulated
to volunteer networks, line departments,
local government agencies, NGOs, lawenforcement agencies, Pakistan Army,
Divisional and Provincial Governments.
1.7.3 DECO
was
Activated
and
Operationalised
The District Emergency Operation
Center (DEOC) was established and
operationalised on July 27, 2010 on 24/7
hour basis, headed by District Disaster
Management Officer (DDMO). The
Assistant Coordination Officer acted as an
Incident Commander. Scenario/category
C based situation plan was activated for
action. The ICS organisation was activated
and all Sections Chiefs were mobilised.
Incident action plan (IAP) was prepared
and all Section Chiefs were put at high
alert. Search and Rescue Team, under the
command of Operation Section chief,
was mobilised to the District Emergency
Operation Centre for emergency
deployment. The DDMU volunteers
network was also mobilised and made fully
functional for dissemination of weather
prediction and information sharing.
The Pakistan Metrological, Flood
Forecasting and Hydrological Departments
updated DDMU about the weather and
11
rivers situation. The technical reports

were thoroughly analysed at a DDMU
level in the light of monsoon plans. The
community volunteer network, line and
local government departments/agencies
and NGOs were updated on hourly
basis. Based on the increased level of
river flows and continuous rainfall, flood
prediction was issued to the people of the
flood plains of Siran, Kunar and Indus
river basins. A high alert notice was issued
to local communities by announcement in
mosques and mobile loudspeakers used
by TMA officials. In the morning of 28th
July, 2010 all plans activated including
early warning, evacuation of people at
threats, vacation of critical facilities, and
deployment of Search and Rescue Teams
and community volunteer networks.
and recovery coordination mechanism

and action plans. Control room, already
equipped with Emergency Helpline 1122
toll free number available to the public
for all emergencies, was also linked with
the District Police Control Room and
communication network of the police
department for all emergency information
from different police stations. Community
communication network, sub control
rooms in different locations and NGOs
were diverted to a central command
centre.
Flood information evaluated at DEOC

and was disseminated to municipal
authorities, police department, and
community network. Police control room
and wireless networks, linked with DEOC,
worked well and the information reached
the people on time; thus, timely action
was taken to reduce the gap time between
events and reaction.
A two-way communication system was

established and was made functional for
receiving information of flood forecasting
from technical institutions, meteorological,
hydrological departments, community
volunteers network, line departments,
local
government
agencies;
and
information regarding emerging weather,
flooding and landsliding in the district,
especially in the low-lying and landslide
areas and river beds can be drawn from
NGOs. Event information tracking and
management system was established and
operationalised for thorough evaluation
by all sectional chiefs of ICS command
structure. Early Warning and evacuation
was ordered by the Planning Section chief
and the Incident Commander. Early in
the morning of 28th July, early warning
was issued through Police Department,
municipal agencies, concerned line
departments as well as community
volunteers network to stop timber and
wood collection from the flooding rivers.
Responding to monsoon flooding from

multiple local emergency management
and response agencies, effective crossjurisdictional
coordination
using
common processes and systems was the
beauty of the system. The ICS provided
a standardised core mechanism for
coordinated and collaborative flood
management by different organisations
within the jurisdiction.
1.7.4 Control Room and Early Warning
System:
Control room or District Emergency
Operation Centre was made fully
functional and operational at DDMU
office where decision makers came
together on July 27, 2010 to discuss
anticipating Monsoon flooding response
12
District control room was also facilitated

by Pakistan Army, and two officials
were deployed to control room to share
information from both sides; this was
another model of collaboration.
Communication and Works Department

Engineer Mr. Tariq Yousf, who was
deployed to Khaghan/Narran up-hills
in the mountain to evaluate the flooding
situation at the sources of rivers,

informed the control room that very high
intensity flooding is burgeoning up-hills
in the mountain with huge velocity and
magnitude.
Final warning and evacuation orders
were issued to the people living in lowlying areas in Balakot, Gari Habibullah;
accordingly, 700-800 houses were vacated
and over 6,000 people along with their
critical assets were evacuated to predesigned safe location of agency workers
and community volunteers. Within the
lead time of 3 hours, by 10 pm in the night
on July 28, 2010, flood reached Balakot.
The high velocity flood destroyed Tehsil
Headquarter Hospital and Police Station
Balakot which had already been vacated
and all essential equipment/tools were
shifted ahead of time. Over 700 houses
swept away with the large scale flooding at
10.30 pm on the same night. 3,000-4,000
people could perish, if timely warning and
evacuation had not been made.
1.7.5 Volunteers Mobilised to Respond to
Emergencies
Over 500 volunteers in Balakot Tehsil and
about 700 volunteers in Siran and Oghi
were mobilised through mobile phone
data maintained by DDMU Mansehra.
The volunteers were in regular contact
with DDMU about the flooding situation
in their respective areas; they were
provided guidance on regular intervals
about the proposed action to be taken.
TMOs and concerned police stations were
also updated about the flood prediction
action to be taken including evacuation
etc. and community volunteers network
was also activated to support concerned
police stations and TMAs.
1.7.6 The Role Played by Line Departments,
Local Government Agencies, Police
Departments and Pakistan Army
Concerned Officials of Line departments,
local government agencies, Police
Department, Pakistan Army Unit in
Mansehra and Search and Rescue Team
reported
to DEOC, Mansehra and
updated DDMU about the flood situation.
Local resources including official vehicles
were pooled up with DDMU for
deployment of the rescue team and for
supporting the volunteer movement.
Concerned Officials rushed to DECO,
according to their SoPs, to provide
technical and expert support to DDMU
for rapid response. Assistant Coordination
Officer, the incident commander was in
close contact with DCO, Commissioner
Hazara Division regarding flood updates
and action taken by the combined team
of of officials, volunteers and district
administration to cope with the situation.
Liaison officer of DDMU, Mansehra
coordinated with NGOs/INGOs RCRC
movements in Mansehra for technical
and relief support. The collective efforts
reduced flood threats in term of rapid
response to emergencies.
a. Pakistan Army
Pakistan Army stationed in Mansehra
extended full support to DDMU and
deployed two officials at Control room
Mansehra for coordination of response
and relief activities in a comprehensive
manner. Disaster related information
was shared amongst all partners for all
purposes and joint action.
b. Police Department
During the flooding police communication
network was linked with DDMU and
was used for receiving information and
dissemination of Alert/Early Warning
(EW) to the population at threats. Police
Officers and Station House Officers in
Balakot and Siren proactively participated
in the early warning dissemination and
evacuation of the people.
c. Health Department:
Health department was made proactive
in establishing 17 emergency operation
centres as planned and incorporated in
Monsoon Contingency Plan 2010. All
centres were found fully operational
13
during the flooding. Doctors and

paramedics were available in almost all the
centres. On July 28, a team of doctors and
paramedics reached Mahandri on foot to
attend the trapped tourists. The health
department was found fully equipped
with human resources and medicines.
The people appreciated rapid and timely
response of the departments with the
support of the community volunteers.
d. Communication
and
Works
Department:
Mr. Tariq Yousuf of Communication
and Works Department was deployed
to Khaghan/Narran to monitor the
flood situation and to coordinate with
DDMU. On his information, evacuations
in Balakot and Garhi Habibullah and
other low-lying areas were carried out.
He remained in touch with control room
after every half an hour to update about
the flooding in up-hill areas. On the same
day (i.e. on July 28), heavy machinery was
moved to a different disaster location for
opening roads.
e. Municipal Authorities:
Fully geared up their resources and
extended full support to community
volunteers for dissemination of early
warning to communities and for
mobilisation of vulnerable communities
to safer places. They also worked closely
with the police and volunteers network
for rescue and evacuation of people.
f. Social Welfare Department:
The department played a crucial role and
established liaison with NGOs and other
partners for support. In post-flooding, it
undertook social vulnerability assessment
about the impact of flooding.
1.7.7 DDMU Search and Rescue and
Community Emergency Response
Teams
i. On the basis of information received
from community volunteers from Jacha
Mandagucha and Siren, helicopter request
14
from NDMA was quickly channelised

through PDMA to rescue 12 trapped
people in Jacha Mandagucha; Siren valley
which could not approached due to bad
weather. All these people were rescued by
community volunteers with the support
of DDMU Search and Rescue Team
Mansehra, also reported in the local
newspaper.
ii. Upon receipt of information from
community volunteers at the control room
1122 from Ichrian, DDMU Search and
Rescue Teams were deployed to incident
side, where Mr. Yasser Shahzad and his
brother were trapped in Rehmat Abad
village, Ichrian 40 km from Mansehra,
and were safely rescued by DDMU Search
and Rescue Team.
iii. Dr. Munir, Mr. Nazar, Mazhar, and
Mr. Khurshid were the team leaders of
RDSO, and Al-Khyer Rescue Team and
International Volunteers Network. They
rescued four people who were trapped in
flood near Ghari Habibullah and Karnol
during collecting timber.
iv. Those rescued from the roaring flooding
in the vicinity of Ghari Habibullah and
Kernol Union Councils, reported by ERTs
and local press, included Mohammad
Zia, Abdul Hammed, Moazam, and
Mohammad Sadiqq.
1.7.8 Role and Contribution of Community
Emergency
Response
Teams
(volunteers) and Secretaries Union
Councils
Trained, equipped, organised, and
committed volunteer teams in the
community are incredible assets of the
district, generated by ERRA/DRM project
in particular and other NGOs in general.
The risk sensitised, well aware and skillful
manpower at local level were found to be
real instruments to cope with any localised
emergency. The changed Paradigm in
disaster management from top down
to bottom up (reactive to pro-active)
approaches are the contribution made by
the transformation of this attitudinal

change in the community. The services
delivered by the community volunteers in
pre, during and post monsoon flooding
are as under:
Early Warning issued by district
administration was widely disseminated to
community people at threats of flooding
by using a megaphone and making an
announcement in mosques.
10 wounded people in different locations

were shifted to health facilities by
volunteers.
8 dead bodies were evacuated from
river beds and from under the debris of
landsliding.
Secretaries of UCs were fully kept
onboard and they fully participated in
both response and recovery process.
People were kept out from collecting

timbers and woods from roaring rivers.
Full support to ERTs was extended for

mobilisation and provision of stockpile.
Crowds, travellers, and spectators were

controlled and restricted from moving
into danger zones like roaring streams,
bridges, roads and the landsliding area.
Community volunteers, NGOs, line

departments, local government agencies
and police departments worked in close
collaboration, coordination, and mutual
understanding.
Critical infrastructures were vacated and

precious assets/equipment and people
were shifted to safer places.
18 trapped people were rescued from
different locations in flood zones with the
support of DDMUs Search and Rescue
Team.
Stronger linkages were established by
government agencies and other partner
organisations.
Over 100 people were administered firstaid in different locations of the district.
The district administration had been

supported in relief distribution and
detailed damage and needs assessment.
A collaborative working environment
was created among all partners, district
administration/DDMU, LGAs, Line
departments,
NGOs,
Community
volunteers, Police Department and
Pakistan Army. There are unique success
stories of the Mansehra model, which
could be helpful for replication of similar
model in other parts of the country.
15
Chapter 2
Methodology of the Assessment and Comparison
2.1 Purpose and Objectives
The primary purpose of this assessment was to

study disaster preparedness and management
strategies of the two similar entities (DDMUs
of Mansehra & Swat) and their response
system during the flooding of 2010. It presents
a brief comparison of the role played and
the contributions made by District Disaster
Management Units, Mansehra and Swat,
in terms of their pre-flood preparedness,
activation and spontaneous response during
flooding, and post-flood recovery process to
mitigate the impact of flood damages of 2010.
It also illustrates the roles played by DDMUs
to coordinate with other stakeholders in
contingency planning, flood prediction and
early warning dissemination. It also took into
consideration the collective involvement of all
stakeholders in post-flood recovery efforts to
mitigate the impact of flooding. Documenting
and review of the process, lessons learnt
and achievements of the DDMU Mansehra
during the flooding 2010 is a successful case
study to increase our understanding regarding
the importance of disaster risk reduction/
management at local level; the results thus
generated are helpful in scaling up and rolling
out the DRM Model in other districts of KP.
2.2 Research Tools and Techniques
Participatory focus group discussions were

held with the key stakeholders from local
government and TMAs and communities. Indepth consultative meetings were held with
NGOs and line departments. A semi-structured
interview (SSI) schedule was developed and
administered to target respondents from both
districts. Observation and transact walks were
also made a key part of the data collection
tools and strategies. About 200 Government
officials, NGOs representatives, community
volunteers, Search and Rescue Team members
from both the districts participated in the
discussion, formal interview and responded to
questionnaires, briefly discussed in this study
paper below, developed for this purpose, and
the participants voluntarily responded to all
questions.
This report is based on the study undertaken for
this purpose and response of the stakeholders.
16
Reports, web links and documents for secondary

data sources were also used. Photography was
also used where ever possible.
2.3 Sampling and Universe
Participatory risk assessment, focus group

discussion based comparative study of district
Swat and Mansehra districts was carried out,
with specific reference to the 2010 flood.
Meetings were held with both DDMUs in
Swat and Mansehra; secondary data were
collected from official documents and reports
of PDMA, DPMP-GIZ and NGOs. The FGDs
were conducted with affected community
members and observations were recorded
for assessment and comparison. Fifty eight
SSIs were administered to 100 individual
respondents in each district. Individual
respondents included community members,
DDMU staff, line department officials, NGO
and civil society representatives. A total of 116
SSIs was completed and analysed. This sample
was selected using simple random sampling
technique.
2.4 Data Analysis and Comparison
Data collected through primary and secondary

sources were cleaned, classified and analysed
using a comparison matrix and an MS Excel
worksheet to generate graphical and tabular
presentations.
2.5 Constraints and Limitations
Access to information was a major constraint. No

proper data and documentation was available at
the district level. Time and budget shortage, with
fragile security and environmental conditions,
confined the field exploration further. Secondly,
as the assessment was not a comprehensive
survey but a short term rapid assessment based
on consultative meetings and FGDs; therefore,
it cannot be considered as a particular research
based analysis. People, representing concerned
groups of the stakeholders in both the districts,
participated in the overall process of this
documentation.
Two hundred individuals from both districts
were interviewed and were served with a closeended questionnaire to identify the general
opinion, information and understanding of
the DRR and DRM as well as the 2010 floods,

specific strengths and weaknesses among the
stakeholders and general public of the two
districts i.e. Swat and Mansehra.
17
Chapter 3
Findings
The findings presented in this chapter are the

outcome of comprehensive dialogues and meetings
with line agencies and NGOs present in the area.
These dialogues and meetings had focused group
discussions with stakeholders, observations and
analysis of available secondary data and a short
sample-based primary data collected through an SSI
schedule.
3.1 Broad Comparison of 2010 Flood Disaster

Risk Management in Mansehra and Swat
In-depth
consultative
meetings
with
representatives of line agencies and stakeholders,
district administration and TMAs generated
valuable baseline qualitative information.
Focused group discussions carried out with
communities and line agencies also identified
worthwhile areas of comparison highlighting
similarities and differences with lessons and
suggestions. To further support the qualitative

findings in a small scale sample based quantitative
data collection exercise was also undertaken. A
close-ended questionnaire was served to the
officials of NGOs and government agencies
as well as community members of the affected
areas. Following is a presentation of qualitative
comparison followed by a quantitative analysis
of the field findings.
3.1.1 Qualitative Comparison
To compare the functions, capacities,
impacts and effectiveness of the DDMUs in
Mansehra and Swat, a matrix approach was
used. The following matrix presents a brief
comparison in terms of different elements
and stages of disaster management cycle
and level of effectiveness and performance
of the respective DDMUs.
DRM Comparison Matrix

No.
1
1.1
DRM Elements
Functional DDMU
with Contingency
Planning
Availability of
Technical Monsoon
Contingency
Planning?
Status in Mansehra
Status in Swat
Government of Pakistan, after the experience of the 1992 floods, started

Monsoon contingency planning. The traditional contingency plans are in
practice by the provincial and local district governments.
A monsoon contingency plan was prepared
with participation of all actors.
Contingency plan of DDMU Mansehra was
highly appreciated by Chief Minister KP.
The Chief Minister directed other flood
-prone districts to follow the Mansehra
model of contingency plan.
The plan was combination of indigenous
and scientific findings.
Clear risk assessment and division of
responsibilities with detailed SoPs and
ToRs determined.
Drills and simulation were carried out
during peace time.
Monsoon
contingency plans
were traditional
and conventional
without the
participation of
stakeholders.
The plan was not
catering the present
needs of flooding.
Elements at risk
were not identified.
SOPs and ToRs of
other partners were
not available.
Drills and
simulation were not
carried out during
peace time.
18
1.2
Updating of
Contingency Plans
The first scientific contingency plan was

prepared in 2009 and was updated in 2010
incorporating the gaps and lessons learned
from 2009.
No updating; just
a traditional and
stereotyped table plan.
1.3
Identification of
Evacuation Routes
Contingency plans, identified elements at risks

and evacuation routes.
Elements at risk neither

were identified nor
were evacuation routes
determined.
1.4
Was DDMU
functional?
DDMU was fully functional.

DEOC was active.
ICS was in place and functional.
ToRs and SOPs were fully understood by all
partners.
The incident command system was
operational and led by incident
commander, sectional heads lead
their area of responsibilities; planning,
coordination, logistic arrangement and
tactical operation.
All partners/actors were well aware about
their role and responsibilities.
DEOC was activated.
Search and Rescue Team was deployed to
people at risk.
Emergency stockpiles were pre-positioned
at different Union Council level.
59 Union Councils with over 3000
volunteers were trained in emergency
response and were made available at
the Database of DDMU on a single call.
Volunteers were activated and deployed to
flood prone area.
End to End EWS/EWM was in place and
functional.
Community people were aware of emerging
flood threats.
Community people remained involved in
simulation and drills in peace time.
The modus operandi of emergency response
was in place.
DDMU was
established. DEOC
was not in place.
Traditional and
conventional
response systems
were in place.
No scientific and
technical ICS
system was in
place.
No pre-defined
incident commander
was available
for planning,
coordination and
tactical operation.
EWS/EWM was
neither in place nor
EWS dissemination
mechanism was
available.
No trained
volunteers for
emergency response
were available at
community level
and no mechanism
for community
participation was
available.
Community people
were not aware
of emerging flood
threats.
No such exercises
were even carried
out.
The modus operandi
of emergency was
not available.
19
1.5
Identification of
Vulnerable Areas
47 low lying flood prone villages identified

by Irrigation Department were incorporated
in contingency plan for possible
evacuation.
People at risk were

not identified and
incorporated in the
contingency plan.
Close coordination with Flood Forecasting

Department for the Early warning was
effective and alert mechanism to inform
communities/volunteers was in place.
Close coordination
with concerned
department for EWS
and dissemination
EW was not in
place.
Identified flood prone villages, were

incorporated in contingency plans for
evacuation, if required.
1.6
Implementation
Strategy for
Emergency
Response
1.7
Coordination
between line
departments,
local Government
agencies, NGOs,
and community
networks.
A strategy, developed by DDMU Mansehra

regarding emergency response, was practiced
by all stakeholders; the modus operandi was
well understood by all actors.
Multi-stakeholder regular monthly

coordination meetings on DRM held.
20 meetings, with an average participation
of 50 representatives of Government
agencies/IGNOs/NGOs, fully oriented.
No comprehensive and
scientific emergency
response strategy was
prepared by DDMU Swat;
the modus operandi was
neither discussed with
other stakeholders nor
understood by them.
No such system and
mechanism were in
place.
All actors participated in different

simulation and drills conducted by
DDMU/ERTs who were well aware about
emergency response mechanism.
Excellent coordination in peace time was
present among different line departments
and the district government.
20
1.8
Functioning of the
system
Multi-hazard emergency response system was

No system and
in place in Mansehra which functioned well and mechanism were in
presented an exemplary model.
place in Swat.
1.9
Were ToRs/SoPs
available for line
departments, NGOs
and CBOs?
The role and responsibilities of all concerned

agencies were available, clear, understood and
practiced by all partners agencies in peace
time.
The role and

responsibilities of
concerned agencies
neither were clear nor
were ToRs or SoPs
made.
1.10
Were the building

bylaws and
regulations
available and in
practice?
Building bylaws and regulations are available

with standards set by ERRA and PaRSA.
TMA Mansehra developed building bylaws and
regulation to be implemented in Mansehra.
Conventional Bylaws
were practiced.
1.11
Were building
To ensure proper land use management
codes in use & had planning, TMAs of Mansehra, Balakot, and
zonation been done? Oghi adapted guidelines from ERRA/PARSA
for implementation of construction safety
measures. They also took the lead to implement
building regulation and zonation in district
Mansehra.
The conventional
and traditional NOC
system was and is in
place in Swat without
considering appropriate
land use management
plan.
DRR/DRM Planning
The study analyses DRR/DRM planning process and preparedness, specific

to flood preparedness in both districts of Mansehra and Swat.
2.1
Departmental DRR
plans
Trained focal person was available from

Departmental DRR and
each line department and local government
contingency plans were
agencies. Technical and scientific as well as
prepared traditionally.
departmental and sectoral DRR and contingency
plans were available.
2.2
Alignments with
national and global
DRR Policies
DRR plans and policies were developed in

alignment with national and global DDR polices
i.e. HFA
2.3
Updating DDR Plans Updated departmental and village plans were

available.
No such plans were

available at different
levels.
2.4
Identification of
Safe Places for
IDPs
In case of evacuation of people due to flooding,

safe places for IDPs were identified in the
monsoon contingency plans, prepared by the
District Mansehra.
No safe places
were identified in
the conventional
contingency plans
prepared by District
Government Swat.
2.5
DRM Planning by
NGOs
NGOs also prepared DRM plans for their

respective targeted area of the project and
incorporated those plans in the Districts DRM
plan.
NGOs developed their

sectoral plans in
isolation.
2.6
Conducting Disaster High prone disaster threat area in the district

Risk Assessment
was identified and indigenous/participatory
risk assessment of those areas was
undertaken.
No such exercises were

conducted by DDMU/
district government.
District Emergency
Operation Centres
The conventional
control room was made
available in district
Swat, but it neither
was linked with the
DDMU nor was the staff
trained. DEOC was not
made available and
could not be made
functional.
24/7 basis emergency control room was

made fully functional in Mansehra; DEOC
was activated by an incident commander on
prediction of flood emergency on 27th July,
2010 at Mansehra.
Developed on formats
and templates in
alignment with national
policies only.
21
22
3.1
Availability and
Functionality
of Emergency
Information Contact
Number
Toll-free dedicated emergency information

number - 1122 - was activated for the first
time in the province by district government
Mansehra and was made fully functional on
24/7 basis to the public.
No dedicated
emergency number was
available to public in
Swat for emergency
contact.
3.2
Was the emergency

information number
known by the
Frontline disaster
agencies and
communities?
Flood forecasting agencies i.e. flood forecasting

division of PMD and hydrological department
were in regular communication with emergency
control room on 1122.
The District Government was disseminating
flood prediction to communities and concerned
agencies through 1122.
Early warning was disseminated to concerned
agencies and ERT volunteers for early action
(evacuation).
Communities were well aware about 1122
and were updated by the district government
regarding flood information in their respective
jurisdiction.
No communication
system was in place
regarding flood
prediction, warning
dissemination and
receiving information
from communities.
Was the Early

Warning System in
place?
Prediction received from PMD/ hydrological

department/ communities were analysed by
planning section of ICS system and EW. EA was
disseminated to concerned Frontline agencies/
ERTs volunteers for early action.
No such system was

in place and no early
warning was issued to
communities.
4.1
Dissemination of
Early warning.
Based on predictions from concerned agencies/

communities and on the basis of flood
contingency plan scenarios determined in the
plans, early warning was issued for early
action.
No such actions were

made.
4.2
Was EW information
dissemination
to at high risk
communities timely
and effectively?
The EW information was communicated to

No action was taken
communities through volunteer network of ERTs for EW information
and local government agencies well in time. The dissemination.
peoples response to EW was positive.
4.3
Was TMAs
involvement in
EWS dissemination
effective?
TMAs took active part in dissemination of early

warnings to the communities with the support
of Police/ERT volunteers. Peoples response to
EW and evacuation were found very effective
and efficient. TMAs also provided critical
services to communities during evacuation and
camping.
No such practices were

made.
4.4
How Line
Departments
Responded to EWS
dissemination and
early action?
Line departments extended full support to

disseminate EW to communities and deployed
their staff for early action according to
the terms of reference and responsibilities
determined in the contingency plan.
No such action planning

was made in advance
and no EWS were in
place.
4.5
Was community
Response to EWS
positive?
The community was already oriented and

NA
trained in responding to EWS by the system and
their response to EW was very positive. ERTs
involvement in EW dissemination and early
action was very effective and efficient.
4.6
The role played

by Community
Volunteers in EW
dissemination,
Early Action, and in
coordination with
state agencies and
contributions.
Trained and recognised volunteer involvement in NA

EW dissemination and early action/evacuation
worked well. Local people trusted the local
volunteers/local government agencies.
Coordination of volunteers with the state was
excellent.
Community volunteers provided food and
shelter to over 5000 tourists in Kaghan/Naran
valley, who got trapped on the way back to
Balakot due to flooding and landsliding.
Temporary bridges were constructed by
volunteers and the people trapped were
evacuated with their cars/vehicle.
Over 500 Volunteers physically took part
and supported National Highway Authority
in opening a Kaghan/Naran road, which was
destroyed/damaged and blocked due to flooding
and landsliding. Volunteers played vital role in
disseminating EW and over 500 families were
evacuated just a few hours before inundation
and destruction of their houses.
4.7
Role of Police
Department & Civil
Defense in EWS
Police and civil defence departments played

important role in the dissemination of early
warning and in supporting the communities for
security, safe evacuation and the provision of
critical services.
NA
Resource
Mobilisation at
DDMUs level
Proper resource mobilisation planning and

mechanisms were available.
No resource mobilisation
plans were there.
5.1
Availability of
dedicated funds
Dedicated funds were not available to DDMUs

throughout Pakistan.
Dedicated funds were

not available to DDMUs
throughout Pakistan.
5.2
Availability
of human and
technical resources
to DDMUs
Local resource mapping ( both technical and

human) was conducted by DDMU Mansehra.
The large number of human resources was
made available to DDMU Mansehra with sound
technical competencies.
No such exercise was

conducted by district
Swat and human
resources were not
made available for
DDMU operations.
5.3
Pooling up of
local Resources
for emergency
management?
Over 3000 technical/professional and trained

volunteers were identified and registered with
DDMU for disaster risk management planning
and for emergency response on a single call.
State institutions vehicles were pooled
and provided to volunteers for emergency
evacuation and relief.

conducted in Swat that
is why it resulted in
poor resource based
DDMU.
23
24
5.4
Availability
of stockpiles
with District
Government and
the communities at
local level.
Emergency stockpile/gears and kits were

available with DDMU Mansehra, provided by
stakeholders for disaster preparedness; proper
storage facilities were also available with
district government.
All 59 Union Councils of the district were
equipped with emergency stockpile/gears/tools.
Proper stockpile management training had been
provided to community leaders and Secretary
Union Councils. TORs for use and maintenance
of stockpile were prepared and oriented. The
Stock was used by communities/UCs during
flooding 2010 according to utilisation plan.
A small level
of conventional
emergency stock was
available with revenue
department. Having no
proper management and
utilisation plan, it could
not be properly used
during flood 2010.
5.5
Profiles of
Machinery and
Equipment
Profiles of heavy machineries with government

agencies and contact numbers of local
suppliers were available.
Line departments entered into contact with
the suppliers for emergency deployment of
heavy Machineries on an agreed cost. Budget
provisions based on disaster scenarios cost
were made in contingency plans and were
submitted to provincial government for
allocation of funding.

conducted; neither
information/database
of heavy machinery was
available with district
government Swat, nor
proper funding provision
was made in the
contingency plans.
Multi Stakeholder
Coordination and
Integrated services
An effective coordinated system was in place in NA

the district.
6.1
Tripartite
partnership of
NGOs, government,
and community
Under an informal tripartite partnership

between District Government, NGOs and
community, it was agreed upon to work
collectively with shared responsibilities without
duplication and overlapping. This arrangement,
at major stakeholders level, determined
responsibilities at the equity level of
contribution. Coordination among stakeholders
was excellent for disaster preparedness,
response and recovery process.
6.2
Were NGOs closely

working with
DDMUs?
NGOs representation in decision making,

No clear coordination
planning and response contributed to the
mechanism was in place
knowledge management/enhancement of the
in Swat.
overall system.
They supported DDMUs technically and
financially by building their capacity and
capability.
They were involved in all spectrums of DRM
and the operational matters of DDMU Mansehra.
6.3
Were the
stakeholders taken
into confidence for
DRR/DRM related
policies/plans?
All stakeholders centered disaster risk

reduction and management process was
functional in district Mansehra.
No such system was

in place in Swat and
stakeholders were
not aware about their
shared responsibilities
and coordinated efforts.
All decisions were taken

in isolation by district
government.
6.4
Were Contingency
A monsoon Contingency plan was prepared
Plans prepared in
in collaboration and coordination with multicoordination with
stakeholders in Mansehra.
multi-stakeholders?
A monsoon contingency
plan was prepared in
isolation by district
government.
6.5
Coordination
between
scientific and
Frontline disaster
management
organisations.
The coordination gap between scientific and

Frontline agencies in disaster management was
reduced to carry out interdependent activities
in disaster risk management. DDMU and
flood forecasting department were in regular
contact. Flood prediction was disseminated
to DDMU by flood forecasting department. The
flood prediction warning was analysed in a
local prospective and was compared to the
information received from local communities
about the intensity of rain and flooding and
regarding rising levels of flooding in the rivers.
Hydrological department information was
linked with prediction of rain and the velocity
of flooding. Early warning was issued to TMA/
Police and ERTs volunteers for evacuation of
community in danger.
Traditional information
sharing system
between flood
forecasting department
through provincial/
Divisional and
District Governments
delayed information
dissemination to the
people at risk and
there was no integrated
system in place, nor
were they aware of
EW to communities of
threats.
Availability of
trained volunteers
and community
organisations
59 community organisations, a volunteer force

of about 3000, were trained and were made
available in the database of DDMU Mansehra;
they had been activated by DDMU for flood
prediction, EW dissemination and evacuation.
Network of volunteers was found to be most
fundamental instruments in risk prediction/EW
dissemination and early activities.
No formal or organised
system was in place in
Swat and no activation
and deployment were
done by DDMU Swat.
7.1
ERTs linkage with

DDMU and they
participated in
disaster response/
disaster needs
assessment/relief
distribution.
All emergency response teams (ERTs) were

registered with DDMU and their databases were
made available for contact and coordination.
ERTS were contacted and were activated by
DDMU Mansehra.
Volunteers participated in EW dissemination,
rescue of the trapped people, evacuation of at
risk people to safer places, provided critical
support to IDPs, conducted disaster needs
assessment, and distributed relief to affected
communities.
No formal structure was

in place and no formal
volunteer network was
available.
7.2
Training of
volunteers
according to
the Minimum
Preparedness
Standards.
DDMU Mansehra developed minimum standards

for preparedness by the community
volunteers; accordingly, the volunteers were
trained and equipped with stockpile/emergency
kits and gears to cope with emergencies.
Volunteers in Swat were

neither trained nor any
standards were in place.
25
26
7.3
Drills and
simulations were
conducted in each
Union Councils
for mobilisation
and coping with
emergencies.
Simulation and drills were in built components

of Community Based Disaster Risk Management
trainings conducted by organisations in 59
Union councils. Simulation/mock drills were
organised by DDMU and ERTS volunteers in
different Union Councils to test their capacity
and capability to cope with anticipating
disasters.
No such practices were

in place in Swat.
Were Search and

Rescue Team
available in
districts?
30 members fully trained Search and Rescue

Team, equipped with state of the Art rescue
gears/rescue vehicle, was available on 24/7
basis in Mansehra.
No professional and
trained team was
available in Swat.
8.1
Mobility and
response of Search
and Rescue Team to
flood emergency.
Search and Rescue Team Mansehra was

activated and deployed for flood response. The
team supported the community, rescued flood
trapped people, and evacuated 18 people who
were caught by the flood.
No team was available

and no mobilisation was
made.
8.2
Training and
Equipment of
Search and Rescue
Team to respond to
flooding.
The Mansehra rescue team was fully trained

NA
and equipped for CSSR and was also basically
trained in flood response. The team was not
fully equipped with gears/kits for roaring flood
response; however, with the basic training the
community volunteers supported saving 18 lives
which was an exceptional action on the part
of Search and Rescue Team and community
volunteers.
Incident Command
System was
in place and
operationalised
during flooding.
Pre-flood incident command system, called

ICS system, was in place in the districts.
9.1
Unified Command
System
The first of its kind in Pakistan, a functional

incident command system with clear ToRs/
SoPs with common terminologies, well oriented
human resources and well structured system
was in place in Mansehra.
No such concept was

there in Swat.
9.2
In placement and
functionality of the
incident command
system.
Assistant Coordination Officer/ DDMO was

incident commander with clear organisational
structure and SOPs. He activated DECO and
commanded all sectional chief i.e. planning,
tactical operation, logistics, and finance and
administration sections on 24/7 basis.
NA
9.3
Availability of
Incident Commander
for guidance and
support.
Incident Commander was personally supervising NA

all planning and tactical operations. He
remained in touch with PMD, Hydrological
Department, TMAs/Police Department/Pak
Army, ERTs and updated DCO on hourly basis.
The DCO was in contact with the Provincial/
Divisional Governments, PDMA and other
concerned authorities.
ERTs had clear ToRs and operational guidelines.
They understood common terminologies and
were well linked with DDMU.
10
Monitoring System
A proper Monitoring System for DRR/DRM

activities was in place and functional. Roles
and responsibilities were clearly defined and
delegated to concerned officials/organisations.
They were fully oriented in peace time and
they demonstrated, skills/knowledge and
competencies through drills and simulation
conducted from time to time.
10.1
The Monitoring
System was in
place at planning
and preparedness
level
The disaster management was taken on about

NA
the overall development agenda of the district
government.
Plan of actions of NGOs working in the district
were mapped and linked with concerned
line department to avoid duplication and
overlapping.
The sector specific cluster system was
introduced at district level. The NGOs working
in specific sector linked with concerned
department. Monthly planned activities of NGOs
were shared with DDMU and concerned line
agencies.
Regular monthly meetings were conducted by
Cluster head and were reported to DDMU for
the agenda of next months general coordination
meeting to be chaired by DCO/ACO.
Head of clusters had to present their monthly
progress report on implementation of planned
activities.
The DDMU Chairman/DCO and all heads of
line departments/NGOs reviewed the progress
and issued guidelines and instruction for next
month plan of action. Head of line departments
and NGOs were made responsible for the
implementation of planned activities. Regular
minutes of the meetings were shared with
stakeholders and the decisions made at the
General Coordination Meetings of stakeholders
were treated as District Government policies on
DRR/DRM for future action planning.
This Monitoring System not only improved and
promoted DRM process, but it also improved
good governance system.
No defined Monitoring
System was in place in
Swat.
27
Awareness, preparedness and response questions answers from two districts about the sixth
indicators based on the 58 questions asked 100 participants from each district
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Mansehra
Swat
Yes to indicators
Dont know to
indicators
It is very much clear that the services and inputs

rendered by the DPMP project in harmonising,
integrating and strengthening the DRM system in
Mansehra resulted in significant physical, human
and emotional difference among the intervention
and non-intervention districts. It is also evident
that the only provision of resources, governmental
notifications, and law and regulation cannot yield
No to indicators
efficient institutions, rather it is the continuous

technical and moral support and will of the actors
that is explicit from the Mansehra DRM Model. The
GIZ played a vital role through its DPM project
in materialising the true essence of community
based disaster management concepts in Mansehra.
Although a DDMU was established and working
in its stereotyped pace in Swat; however, it did not
Comparative damages due to flooding 2010

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Mansehra
Swat
Casualties HH effected
People
effected
prove to be fruitful in the time of need and distress

that emerged through the 2010 floods. The data
and findings presented here below are the response
calculations the comparison research team gathered
through individual interviews of local respondents
28
Village
effected
Houses
effected
Livestock
effected
from each district. There is a huge difference in the

mechanism, effectiveness, service delivery, capacities
and functioning of the two DDMUs present in
regions with almost same geographic characteristics,
mandate, and resources.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Mansehra
Swat
Yes to indicators
Mansehra
Swat
Dont know about
Mansehra
Swat
No to indicators
DDMU was functional?

Early Warning System was available and functional
Scientific and participatory contingency plan available
Search & Rescue team and incident command system was available
Early response and actions system was functional
General awarness of public about DRR/DRM was available
Almost 80% of the respondents identified that

there was no proper and updated contingency plan
in Swat whereas 100% respondents appreciated the
contingency planning at Mansehra.
The majority of the respondents in Swat claimed
that there is no process of updating the monsoon
contingency planning, while in Mansehra 100%
respondents admired that regular updating of
monsoon contingency plans is carried out.
Since there was no evidence of updated monsoon
contingency plans in Swat, high risk and floodprone areas in the contingency plans couldnt be
identified. The majority said that there was proper
identification of flood prone areas in contingency
plan at Mansehra but least in Swat.
DDMU has to establish a district emergency

operation centre (DEOC) within the premises
of district/local government to coordinate
and harmonise the services and to serve vital
information. Following graph shows that majority
respondents denied any kind of DEOC presence
in Swat during floods while majority respondents
in Mansehra identified that DEOC was functioning
during the 2010 flood.
Provision of emergency contact number and its
activation is a primary responsibility of the DDMU;
particularly in the situation of disasters, members of
the community must be informed and they should
have the access to this emergency contact number.
From the following figures we can compare that
there was no or less information about this in Swat
as compared to Mansehra.
29
Awareness about Early Warning system and inter-operatability of

EWS during flooding 2010
Mansehra
Swat
It is clearly evident from the following six tables

that there was a large difference in DRM capacities,
processes, system and mechanism between the two
districts. Responses mentioned in the tables show
a high frequency for Yes regarding Mansehra

and same high frequency of No regarding Swat
against key DRM indicators under six categories.
Table 1: DDMUs Functional Position

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
30
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
DDMU was playing a leading role in the 2010.
6%
14%
80%
92%
6%
2%
Volunteers (ERTs) respected the appeal of DDMU.
0%
2%
98%
96%
4%
0%
Dedicated DDMU staff was available.
4%
20%
76%
84%
8%
8%
Funding for emergencies was available with

DDMU.
4%
12%
84%
98%
2%
0%
ERTs were linked with DDMU for spontaneous

response.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
NGOs and INGOs were closely working with

DDMU during the 2010 flooding.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Resource mapping of organisations and their

strength was available with DDMU.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
A triangular partnership of government, NGOs

and community were in place.
2%
12%
86%
96%
4%
0%
Volunteers profiles were available with DDMU.
0%
8%
92%
100%
0%
0%
Table 2: Early Warning System Availability

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
EW disseminated to the people at high risk.
4%
20%
76%
84%
8%
8%
TMAs were involved in dissemination of EWS.
4%
12%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Line Departments responded to EWS.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
The community responded to EWS.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Community volunteers played role in EW dissemination.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Police/Civil Defence Departments played role in

EW dissemination.
2%
12%
86%
96%
4%
0%
Pre-flood coordination and interaction with ERTs

was available.
0%
8%
92%
100%
0%
0%
Table 3: Contingency Planning and Participation of Stakeholders

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
A contingency plan was prepared in collaboration

with the district government, NGOs and community organisations/volunteers.
4%
20%
76%
84%
8%
8%
Evacuation routes were identified in contingency

plans by district or community/NGOs.
4%
12%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Flood-prone areas were identified in contingency

plans.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
Activation/mobilisation of resources was comprehensive.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Local resources were pooled for emergency

response.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Multi-stakeholders coordination system was in

place to avoid duplication and lapses in emergency response.
2%
12%
86%
96%
4%
0%
Stakeholders were taken into confidence before

time.
6%
14%
80%
92%
6%
2%
31
Ready campaign included multi-stakeholders

response who were trained and informed about
the flood scenario.
0%
2%
98%
96%
4%
0%
Disaster assessment was undertaken by multistakeholders.
4%
20%
76%
84%
8%
8%
Profile of heavy machineries was available with

multi-stakeholders.
4%
12%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Departmental disaster and contingency plans

were available.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
Implementation strategy for emergency response

was in place.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Local government agencies have developed

departmental and sectoral plans.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
NGOs working in the district have developed sectoral DRM plan integrated into the sector specific
departmental planning.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Table 4: Search, Rescue and Unified Command System

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
32
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
S & R Team was trained and equipped with emergency equipment.
0%
2%
98%
98%
2%
0%
Coordination/linkages with EWS organisation

was there.
4%
20%
76%
98%
2%
0%
A volunteers network, communication system for

EWM was available with DDMU.
4%
12%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Unified Command System (Incident Command

System) was in place.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
The ICS sections were working well.
6%
10%
84%
96%
4%
0%
Incident Commander was nominated and was

made functional.
2%
14%
84%
92%
6%
2%
The system functioned well.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Table 5: Early Response, Evacuation and Relief

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Households were evacuated from flood-prone

zones.
0%
2%
98%
98%
2%
0%
Safe places for IDPs were identified.
4%
20%
76%
98%
2%
0%
Lives were saved.
4%
12%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Assets/property losses were mitigated.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
ERTs were functional and were registered with

DDMU.
6%
10%
84%
96%
4%
0%
The volunteers were trained in emergency response.
2%
14%
84%
92%
6%
2%
The ERTs were equipped with Emergency Kits.
6%
10%
84%
96%
4%
0%
ERTs were available in each union council.
0%
2%
98%
84%
8%
8%
Relief distribution and recovery process was undertaken by ERTs in collaboration with development agencies/NGOs.
2%
2%
96%
98%
2%
0%
Minimum preparedness standards for ERTs response were in place.
6%
10%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Stockpiles were available with District Government and ERTs.
2%
14%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Table 6: General Understanding and Practice of DRM

Disrict Comparison
Swat
Indicators
Mansehra
Yes
Dont
Know
No
Yes
Dont
Know
No
DRM terminologies and meanings were commonly

understood by all stakeholders.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
The district disaster management plan was

available and updated.
2%
12%
86%
96%
2%
2%
Multi-stakeholders were well trained and wellprepared.
6%
14%
80%
98%
2%
0%
Building bylaws and regulations were available.
0%
2%
98%
96%
4%
0%
33
34
Building code and zonation are in practice.
4%
20%
76%
92%
6%
2%
The disaster preparedness monitoring system is

in place.
4%
12%
84%
96%
4%
0%
Technical and professional DRM support was

available from PDMA/others.
2%
2%
96%
84%
8%
8%
Alignments of local DRR plans/policies with

national and global DRR policies.
6%
10%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Multi-stakeholders, comprehension to Global DRR

commitments.
2%
14%
84%
98%
2%
0%
Comprehension of national DRR/DRM strategies

and arrangements by stakeholders.
6%
10%
84%
96%
2%
2%
Chapter 4
Conclusion & Recommendations
The primary purpose of this assessment was to study

disaster preparedness and management strategies of
the two similar entities (DDMUs of Mansehra &
Swat), and their response system during the flooding
of 2010. It presents a brief comparison of the role
played and the contributions made by District
Disaster Management Units, Mansehra and Swat,
in terms of their pre-flood preparedness, activation
and spontaneous response during flooding, and
post-flood recovery process to mitigate the impact
of flood damages of 2010. It also illustrates the
roles played by DDMUs to coordinate with other
stakeholders in contingency planning, flood
prediction, early warning dissemination. It further
takes into account the collective involvement of
all stakeholders in post-flood recovery efforts to
mitigate the impact of flooding. Documenting
and review of the process, lessons learnt, and
achievements of the DDMU Mansehra during the
flooding 2010 is a successful case study to increase
our understanding regarding the importance of
disaster risk reduction/management at local level;
and the results thus generated are helpful in scaling
up and rolling out the DRM Model in other districts
of KP.
donor agencies.
4.1 Everyone and No-one in Control:
Despite the efforts of many hardworking

communities, the government and aid agency
personnel, the response to the 2010 floods was
weakly coordinated and poorly prioritised. This
was due to the grossly under funding and lack
of capacity of national, provincial, and districtlevel disaster management institutions. The
response was further undermined by different
disaster relief bodies working in parallel, often
with overlapping mandates. The absence of
a functioning local government system also
contributed to a muddled response, with no
single body in charge and little accountability to
communities. While these structural problems
remain unaddressed, the prospect of betterresourced, well coordinated, and timely
responses in future emergencies seems distant.
4.2 Parallel Structures

Mandates:
In-depth consultative meetings with representatives

of line agencies and stakeholders, district
administration and TMAs generated valuable
baseline qualitative information. Focused group
discussions carried out with communities and
line agencies also identified worthwhile areas of
comparison highlighting similarities and differences,
with lessons and suggestions. To further support
the qualitative findings in a small scale sample
based quantitative data collection exercise was also
undertaken. A close-ended questionnaire was served
to the officials of NGOs and government agencies
as well as community members of the affected areas.
The consultants deeper knowledge of prevention,
preparedness and mitigation of disaster risk
management at community, local/provincial/
national, INGOs and international organisations,
and first hands experience to respond to major/
localised disasters learning are supplementing this
study.
Based on the findings and comparison, the following
suggestions and recommendations are worth
consideration by government, civil society and the
and
Overlapping
The National Disaster Management Act 2010

gives renewed legislative commitment to the
national disaster management framework
reaching down to village level through federal,
provincial, and district management authorities.
This disaster management framework, brought
into existence in 2007, was meant to be fully
functional by 2010, involving provincial relief
cells and emergency relief cells at the federal
level. A number of government departments
have responsibilities that impact disaster
management and work in parallel, with
overlapping mandates and varying degrees of
coordination. This confusion is exacerbated
further by the devolution of powers to the
provinces under the 18th Amendment.
At the moment, there is a lack of clarity among
even Federal Flood Commission (FFC) officials
about the commissions responsibilities in
vetting public sector development programmes.
The FFCs coordination with provincial
irrigation departments seems weak and needs to
be reinforced. Meanwhile, the Emergency Relief
Cell (ERC), housed in the Cabinet Division,
continues to exist despite its role being taken
over by the NDMA. The recommendations
of the Cabinet Committee, given in 2009,
35
to absorb the ERC into the NDMA should

be implemented without any delay in order
to improve the performance of the disaster
relief machinery, to save money and to prevent
disasters.
4.3 Multiple Legal Frameworks Challenges:
This time of change also provides a unique

opportunity to review and harmonise the
multiple legal frameworks governing disaster
management in Pakistan. Current legislation
includes, for example:
The 18th Amendment and the 7th National

Finance Commission (NFC) Award together will
ensure an increased transfer of federal funds to
the provinces, giving them considerable financial
leeway to strengthen and fund DRM measures
at provincial and district levels. Considerable
lobbying efforts should be mounted by civil
society and the media to encourage provincial
governments to fund and strengthen their
disaster management authorities.
At the moment, there are no specific allocations
for DDMUs in district budgets, as they are
not separate entities but rather consist of
representatives from each of the relevant
departments of the district government. Many
humanitarian actors and government officials
themselves are concerned by this. Current
proposals include a minimum of two per cent of
the district budget to be allocated to DDMUs to
be set up independently with permanent staffs.
ERRA Act, March 2011

National Disaster Management Act 2010
Punjab Emergencies Service Act 2006
Local Government Ordinance 2001
National Calamities Act 1958
Civil Defense Act 1952
4.4 Missing Links Between Disaster Management

Authorities and Local Communities:
Local governments, the immediate public

service provider and the first interface between
the state and citizens, should be at the heart of
DRR strategies. During the 2010 floods, the
absence of elected local government machinery
slowed down relief efforts and posed challenges
for local ownership of reconstruction. As a
result, District Coordination Officers (DCOs)
and the present Deputy Commissioners, who
are subject to rotation and often not from
the local area, were tasked with leading and
cocoordinating the disaster response as an
additional responsibility on top of managing
day-to-day administrative affairs of the district.
There are some exceptions where DCs have
shown great leadership and have saved lives; for
example, in Mansehra where GIZ has worked
with partner organisations on making DDMU
functional for last two years. It is important that
with the PDMAs support, district governments
come up with clear and concise district-level
plans and administrative arrangement that
ensure all levels of participation.
36
4.5 Disaster Preparedness Post-Devolution:
4.6 A Well-resourced, Integrated and Fully

Functional Disaster Management System:
Better-funded civilian disaster management

authorities, equipped with permanent, trained
staff having clearly delineated roles, would go a
long way towards improving the system. Clarity
on the impact of the ongoing constitutional
changes as they relate to disaster management,
reconstruction and future humanitarian
responses is urgently required. This includes
recognition of the need for inter-provincial,
national and regional cooperation on large-scale
disasters. Different approaches in each province
are possible, but every province should outline
how to alter decisions or streamline relief
agencies to fit within the National Disaster
Management Framework.
4.7 Increased and Sustained Funding for

Disaster Management:
The provinces should invest now to save

lives. The government has recognised the
limitations of providing relief by signing up
to reducing underlying risk factors through
the HFA and global targets to allocate one
per cent of all development funding to

DRR. In general, public investment dwarfs
humanitarian aid and can have a major impact
in reducing the risk if spent well. Disaster risk
reduction principles should be incorporated
into public administration and investments to
ensure that cost-effective measures to reduce
risks are included in all projects. Preparation
pays, protecting development investments by
donor governments and minimising impacts
on livelihoods, businesses and the economy
generally.
Disaster management authorities at federal,
provincial, and district levels should be
provided with adequate, sustained funding and
dedicated staff. Steps are needed to be taken to
analyse the existing parallel bodies and propose
assimilation, technical assistance, and hardware
support for disaster management bodies in the
most vulnerable districts and long-term flood
risk mapping.
4.9 Make early Warning Systems Less Complex

and More Effective:
A well coordinated but less complex early

warning system for floods (including flood
forecasting and monitoring and dissemination
of information to communities) is essential.
The current flood management system only
meets requirements for the Indus River
flood plains in Punjab and Sindh. No system
exists in KP or Balochistan for forecasting or
monitoring the flash floods that have become
more frequent in these provinces and in South
Punjab. These upstream areas are highly fragile
and degraded, and require urgent attention in
terms of rehabilitation. The national flood risk
management strategy must address these gaps.
Mapping out breaching points in embankments
for safe release of floodwater and designating
them with a legal status would also provide
predictability and accountability.
4.10 Adapt to the Changing Climate:
Both Pakistani government officials and

the UN have stated that climate change was
one of the major contributing factors to
the devastation caused by the 2010 floods.
Sustainability concerns must be mainstreamed
within the reconstruction and development
plans. Better understanding among local
communities of the interdependence of local
ecosystems, livelihood practices, and the risk
thresholds that they face is also required.
The Ministry of Environment recommends
Pakistan to take immediate action on ecological
degradation including tackling the massive
levels of deforestation, improving early
warning systems, building disaster-resistant
infrastructure and providing leadership to
other departments in this regard.
4.8 Strategic Donor Commitment for DRR in the

Long Term:
Aid does not just help to rebuild lives after

floods and earthquakes it helps to stop
needless deaths before disasters strike.
International aid is needed to help local people
protect themselves from natural disasters.
The international community needs to assist
the GOP to extend its disaster management
reach and coordination. Its financial assistance
package must be informed by the principle
of enhancing civilian capacities at national,
provincial, and district levels.
The donor group on DRR should ensure the
establishment of clear national and international
financial commitments to DRR. The purpose
should be to allocate a minimum of 10 percent
of all humanitarian reconstruction and recovery
funding and at least one per cent of development
funding to risk reduction measures, and at
least 30 percent of climate change adaptation
funding to DRR.
4.11 Study-based Suggestions:
There is a dire and immediate need to

strengthen local DRR and DRM systems
at the grassroots. Community-based DRM
practices call for a well coordinated and
voluntary effort on the part of government
functionaries, social organisations and
institutions. The earthquake of 2005
37
brought with it a bulk of technical and

financial resources to Mansehra, followed by
DPMP contribution; however, sustainability
remained a question.
Continuous insurgency and terrorism
restrained Swat from taking effective
measures to avoid such happening in the
district and other parts of the country.
The mandates, roles, and responsibilities
of government bodies responsible for
preparedness,
disaster
management,
and DRR at the federal, provincial and
district levels must be defined. Effective
coordination between Government of
Pakistan institutions and with international
actors throughout the process of
preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery
and reconstruction phases must be ensured.
Update the National Floods Management
Plan, simplify and improve early warning
systems area and location specific, designate
safe breaching locations and mitigate risks by
repairing flood protection systems urgently.
Another important area is operatibility of
EWS dissemination from generation to end
users.
Reduce vulnerability to crises. The
Government of Pakistan should urgently
coordinate a pro-poor reconstruction and
a transparent and accountable development
plan that includes reforms necessary to
address underlying vulnerabilities of women,
landless people, hard-to-reach communities
and minorities. This must be based on DRR
and climate change adaptation principles.
Listen to the concerns of the Pakistani
people by ensuring that affected communities
and civil society, particularly women, are
consulted on preparedness, response and
longer-term reconstruction.
Provincial governments should demonstrate
commitment to disaster management and
reconstruction by championing the new
roles and responsibilities of Provincial
Disaster
Management
Authorities
(PDMAs). Provincial governments should
invest resources to provide permanent
38
staff who are well trained and clear on

their roles and responsibilities. Prioritising
disaster preparedness, ensuring that realistic
contingency plans are in place and that key
flood protection infrastructure is adequately
repaired and maintained.
Lessons learnt from Mansehra and success
stories about the DRM practices need to be
disseminated to a wider audience in KP and
other parts of the country.
For promotion of DRR/DRM, perhaps
more incentives for climate change
adaptation and safety culture should be
given to the community. For this purpose,
more inclusive and people-centered DRR/
DRM approaches need to be adopted.
Awareness raising, knowledge and capacity
enhancement training on DRR and every
day disaster risk reduction knowledge/
skills should be given to the community.
Local government leaders, who are primarily
responsible for the safety and protection of
the people of Pakistan, are adept at creating
innovative platforms for larger groups to
inspire discourse and instigate discussion for
change in risk perception.
The change is already occurring. It is only a
matter of time for the government to adopt
such strategy that will ensure resiliency of
the people of the district.
DRM needs to be channeled through the
concerned Commissioner office, which is
administratively more effective and efficient
for implementation of DRM. Unfortunately,
in the NDM Act 2010, there is no such
administrative and functional arrangement.
However, the Provincial Government could
lead to incorporate this provision in the
Provincial Disaster Management Act.
The importance of community-based
disaster risk reduction adaptation and
measures must be incorporated in sectoral
and district level disaster management
planning. Scientific findings must be
compared with indigenous knowledge and
people-centred DRR perceptions promoted
to find out workable solutions.
It also has to be realised that an innovative

knowledge-based disaster risk reduction
can only be achieved by cultivating,
nurturing and retaining the top talent in
the bureaucracy, civil society organisations
and the community youth/volunteers. This
includes the youth, scientists, engineers,
designers, writers, businessmen and women
who serve as a source of risk reduction and
sustainable development and a knowledgebased economy. Their capacity in DRM
needs to be enhanced sustainability.
4.12 Forward Looking Approach
Mindsets at all levels (bureaucracy, NGOs,

politicians and the community) have to be
changed from a reactive to a preventative mode
for all types of natural disasters including
natural and human made. More emphasis
should be on domestic response preparedness
and localised sustainable risk reduction
measures in line with the principles laid out in
the National Disaster Management Framework
and the HFA. Some achievements have been

made with the establishment of the NDMA
and the PDMAs. National and regional media,
together with civil society, have a crucial role to
play in terms of awareness raising, filling gaps
in information dissemination and monitoring
DRM structures at all levels.
Recognise the impact of every day disasters
on lives, livelihood and assets of the local
people in future plan.
Prioritise the most at risk, poorest and
marginalised people.
Make arrangements for tackling the
underlying causes of peoples, vulnerabilities
Mobilise
political
commitment
by
focusing on rights, responsibilities and
accountabilities.
Promote public-private partnership for
making communities resilient to multihazards.
39
Summary
The effects of the 2010 floods will haunt Pakistan for
a long time to come. Many development gains made
in recent decades were wiped out and communities
were ravaged. The Government of Pakistan and
the international community mounted their largest
ever humanitarian response, which delivered vital
assistance to millions.
Many of these investments stand to be lost in the
2011 monsoon season, due to inadequate funding
and coordination of repairs to flood protection
systems. Communities stand to lose everything
again. Pakistan is highly disaster-prone, with four
major disasters in the past five years. Excellent
management policies exist to minimise the impact
of disasters, but they are not being implemented
on the ground; during the floods huge gaps became
apparent.
40
This is not good enough, and it undermines efforts

to help the economy grow, to minimise food
insecurity and to improve social and political stability.
Investments in civilian disaster management at
national, provincial and district levels will reap real
benefits.
The people-centered decision making processes will
be crucial in ensuring sustainability. Hazards may
be inevitable in Pakistan and they will get worse
due to climate change, rapid population growth,
poor urban management, bad governance and
corruption. Despite these facts, the DRM Model is
the best practice in Pakistan to be presented and to
ensure that with a will a lot can be done.
Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
6-D (4), Park Avenue, University Town,
Peshawar, Pakistan
T (+92 91) 585 2532
F (+92 91) 585 2531
I www.giz.de/pakistan

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Comparative Assessment of District Disaster

Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

Syed Harir Shah

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

multi-stakeholders, contingency planning, flood

Dr. Detlef Barth

It presents a brief comparison of roles played and

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

building disaster resilient communities. The results

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

economic growth is prevailing in each district at a

areas. Following is a presentation of qualitative

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

The data and findings presented below are in

There is a dire and immediate need to strengthen

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

Assistant Coordination Officer

Federal Institute for Geoscience and Natural Resources (Germany)

Community Based Organisation

Collapse Structure Search & Rescue

District Coordination Officer

District Disaster Management Officer

District Disaster Management Authority

District Disaster Management Unit

District Emergency Operation Centre

Disaster Preparedness and Management Project

District Disaster Preparedness and Response Centre

Disaster Risk Management

Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster Reconstruction Unit

Executive District Officer

Emergency Response System

Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority

Early Warning System

Emergency Response Team

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Flood Forecasting Division

Geological-Hazards Assessment in Northern Pakistan

Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit

Geological Survey of Pakistan

Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment

Hyogo Framework for Action

Comparative Assessment of District Disaster Management Units in Mansehra and Swat

An Analysis of Disaster Risk Management Systems

Internally Displaced Persons

International non-governmental organisations

Logical framework analyses.

Local Government, Elections and Rural Development Department

Medical First Response

Monthly General Coordination Meeting

National Disaster Management Authority

National Disaster Management Ordinance

National Disaster Risk Management Framework

Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority

Post-Crisis Needs Assessment

Provincial Disaster Management Authority