Articles

"AndGodLaughed"
Indeterminacy,SelfReferenceandParadoxInLaw

ByGuntherTeubner

A.IndeterminacyandNonPredictability

The Talmud tells us how once during a heated halachic discussion, when no agreement
could be reached, Rabbi Eliezer, whose detailed, elegantly justified legal opinion was not
shared by the majority, said that if he were right, a carob tree outside would move to
proveit.Whenitdidmove,theotherrabbisremainedunimpressed.Eliezerclaimedthatif
he were right, a nearby stream would flow backwards and it did; he claimed that the
schoolhousewallswouldbendandtheydid.Buttherabbiswerenotimpressedbythese
wonderseither.Finallyhesaidheavenitselfwouldprovehimright.ThereuponaHeavenly
Voice confirmed Eliezer's position. Yet the rabbis disagreed even with this voice, saying:
"We pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the
TorahatMountSinai,afterthemajoritymustoneincline".AndGodlaughed,saying"My
1
sonshavedefeatedMe,MysonshavedefeatedMe."

Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology, Principal Investigator, Excellence Cluster "The Formation of
Normative Orders", GoetheUniversity Frankfurt/Main and Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of
Economics.AtpresentVisitingProfessorDenHaagandMaastricht.

Born1944,1970Dr.jur.Tuebingen,1974M.A.(lawandsociety)Berkeley,1977HabilitationTuebingen;197781
Professor University of Bremen, 19811992 European University Institute Florence, Italy, 19931998 Otto Kahn
FreundProfessorofComparativeLawandLegalTheoryLSELondon,19982009UniversityofFrankfurt,2007
PrincipalInvestigator,ExcellenceCluster"TheFormationofNormativeOrders".VisitingProfessorBerkeley,Ann
Arbor, Stanford, Leyden, Toronto, Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin. Honorary doctorates: Universities of Lucerne,
Napoli,Tiflis,Macerata,Lund.
Author:NetworksasConnectedContracts2008;RegimeKollisionen:ZurFragmentierungdesWeltrechts2006;La
cultura del diritto nellepoca della globalizzazione 2005; Il diritto possibile 2005; Diritto policontesturale 1999,
Droitetrflexivit1994,LawasanAutopoieticSystem1993(translatedin9languages),Organisationsdemokratie
undVerbandsverfassung1978,GegenseitigeVertragsuntreue1975,PublicFunctionsofPrivateAssociations1974,
StandardsundDirektiveninGeneralklauseln1971.
Editor and Coauthor: Contractual Networks 2008, Nach Jacques Derrida und Niklas Luhmann 2008, Paradoxes
and Inconsistencies in the Law 2006, Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 2004,
Rechtsverfassungsrecht2003,DieRckgabedeszwlftenKamels2000,GlobalLawWithoutAState1997.Email:
g.teubner@jur.unifrankfurt.de
1

BabaMezia,inBABYLONIANTALMUD,59b(1935)

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AndGodLaughed

377

Anoldstoryisperhapsthebestwayofgettingacrosstheatmosphereofanewtheory
autopoiesisinlaw."AndGodlaughed"isthenameofthisstory,whichJosephWeilertold
me when we discussed whether the concepts of selfreference and autopoiesis could be
madefruitfulforanewunderstandingoflaw.

This story reveals indeterminacy in its relation to selfreference and paradox, in law. As
with all good stories, several interpretations are possible. Starting with somewhat
superficial interpretations, indeterminacy manifests itself as nonsusceptibility to outside
control. This lack of an Archimedean point from which to consider law precludes the
possibilitiesofexternalinfluenceorprediction.ThelawasRabbiEliezerhadpainfullyto
findoutisdeterminednotbyexternalauthorities,northeauthorityoftexts,norworldly
power,northelawofnature,nordivinerevelation;lawdeterminesitselfselfreferentially,
relyingonthecontingencyofitsownpositivity.

Lawowesitsvaliditytothisveryselfreference:theapplicationoflegaloperationstothe
resultsoflegaloperations.Thus,validityoflawcannotbeimportedfromwithoutbutonly
2
producedfromwithinthelaw.AlongwithLuhmann,wemaysay, "thereisnolawoutside
the law, and therefore, in relation to the system's social environment, neither input nor
outputoflaw".Therabbis'discoursedecidesabouteverything,evenaboutthe"fiat"ofthe
legislativeordivinewill.Theirlegaldiscussiondecidesultimatelywhatisacceptablein
legalpractice.Thefirstinterpretation,then,is:positivelawisindeterminatebecauseitis
selfproducedlawnotonlyinthesenseoflawmadebyhumanhands,butinthesenseof
lawmadebylaw.

Asecondinterpretationwouldstresstheconnectionbetweenthelaw'sselfreferenceand
its lack of predictability, another indication of the lack of external control. The ideal of
certainty, and hence predictability, in law, comes to grief upon the law's selfreference,
regardless of whether predictability was to be achieved via broadbased sociological
research or narrower inquiries in the spirit of Legal Realism. Neither an accumulation of
nonlegal social data nor the judge's breakfast can serve as determinants of legal
development.ForEliezer,theabilitytoforeseetheresponsesofthenaturalandthedivine
worldsfailedtomakethelegalworldpredictable:therabbis'debatetookitsowncourse.

In this connection, von Frster would perhaps interpret Eliezer's legal dispute in the
3
followingway :Godlaughedbecausetherabbishadsetthesealonthepowerlessnessof
the Laplacian world spirit. For that spirit has power only over what von Frster calls
"trivial"machines,theoperationsofwhichlinkparticularinputswithparticularoutputsin
a fixed, regular way. "Trivial" machines are synthetically determined, analytically
2
3

LUHMANNNIKLAS,DIESOZIOLOGISCHEBEOBACHTUNGDESRECHTS,20(1986)

HeinzVonFrster,ErkenntnistheorienundSelbstorganisation,4DELFIN6,8(1984);HeinzvonFrster,Entdecken
oderErfinden.WielsstsichVerstehenverstehen?,inEINFHRUNGINDENKONSTRUKTIVISMUS,42(A.Mohlared.,1985)

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determinable,independentofthepast,andpredictable.Law,bycontrast,ifitisindeedthe
autonomouslawoftherabbis,wouldhavetobeunderstoodasaselfreproducingsystem,
which,sincetheoperationsoflawaredependentofitsinternalstates,wouldhavetobe
defined as a "nontrivial" machine. Law is certainly synthetically determined, but not
analytically determinable; it is dependent on the past, but not predictable. The
4
indeterminacy of law would then be directly connected with its autonomy. In fact, Hejl
finds the decisive characteristic of a system's autonomy in its indeterminacy, when he
defines autonomy as inputindependence of living systems, i.e. as indeterminacy of their
operationsinrelationtoaninputthatisidenticalfortheobserver.

B.CircularityandParadox

As was said, these would be two rather elementary interpretations of the law's self
reference.Fortheysaysomethingonlyaboutthelaw'snondeterminabilityfromoutside,
about its inscrutability. A third interpretation reveals a deeperlying problem of law. It
tracesacircularstructureinthestory.RabbiEliezersuccessfullymobilizesthewholeofa
hierarchy of norms; he successively ascends the stages of learned debate, the Talmudic
text,Rabbinicallaw,worldlypower,naturallawanddivinerevelation,andwhenhegetsto
the top he plummets right back down again to where he started, with his colleagues'
5
debate,completinga"strangeloop"."Tangledhierarchies"isthetermusedbyHofstadter
for the phenomenon where the highest level of a hierarchy "loops into" the lowest one:
what ultimately decides the validity of divine law is the triviality of procedural norms
("afterthemajoritymustoneincline").

6
Hofstadter himself makes it clear that even the hierarchy of legal sources is not spared
from the circular "looping together" of hierarchies: "The irony is that once you hit your
headagainsttheceilinglikethiswhereyouarepreventedfromjumpingoutofthesystem
to a yet higher authority, the only recourse is to forces which seem less well defined by
7
rules,butwhicharetheonlysourceofhigherlevelrulesanyway:thelowerlevelrules...".

ThestoryofthedissentingRabbiEliezerthereforelinkstotheineluctableselfreferenceof
law. This appears to us in the story in an already highly elaborated form: as a clearly
delineatedhierarchyofthelegalsources.Thereisonlyonesmallflaw:thehighestsourceis
4

PeterHejl,TowardsaTheoryofSocialSystems:SelfOrganizationandSelfMaintenance,SelfReferenceandSyn
Reference,inSELFORGANIZATIONANDMANAGEMENTOFSOCIALSYSTEMS,60,64(H.Ulrich&G.J.B.Probsteds.,1984)
5

DOUGLASR.HOFSTADTER,GDEL,ESCHER,BACH:ANETERNALGOLDENBRAID,64(1979)

Id.,692;DouglasHofstadter,Nomic:ASelfModifyingGameBasedonReflexivityinLaw,inMETAMAGICALTHEMAS:
QUESTINGFORTHEESSENCEOFMINDANDPATTERN,70.(1985)
7

Hofstadter,supra,note5,692

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AndGodLaughed

379

fed from the lowest one. This small flaw "makes any legal system which ranks its rules
9
hierarchicallyintoacompletelyreflexivehierarchy." Though,bysettingthehighestsource
oflawhighenough,thelegalworldcanliveverywellwiththiscircularity,evenifGoddoes
laughalittle.

Thingsbecomereallyserious,though,ifweinafourthinterpretationcomeupagainst
theoriginalselfreference,whichunderliesthe"tangledhierarchy"oftheTalmudiclaw.In
anelementaryform,andonethatisthreateningforlaw,immediateselfreferenceappears
when law assesses real world situations, using the simple distinction between right and
wrong.Whenthisdistinctionisappliednotonlyadhoc,butwithuniversalistclaimstothe
whole world, then at some time or another the right/wrong distinction falls into
temptationinfact,itsveryuniversalityclaimplacesitunderacompulsiontoapplyitself
10
toitself.And"theparadoxesofselfreference" emerge.Thehierarchyoflegalsourcesis,
asthedissentingRabbiEliezer'sdesperateattemptsshow,onlyaninadequateattemptto
avoid this originally given selfreference by piling up evernew metalevels; but the top
levelalwayscollapsesintoidentitywiththelowestone.

11
Many,likeSpencerBrown, wishtobansuch"selfindication"sinceitsappearanceseems
12
toeliminatetheoriginaldistinction;others,likeFrancescoVarela see"selfindication"as
the big opportunity for a new logical calculus. But these are already evaluations of an
operation that is potentially always available: application of a distinction to itself. This is
threateningbecausesuchselfapplicationeventuallyblocksdecision.Statementsthatare
false if true and true if false, are the result of some not all selfapplications of
distinctions. If the positive value of a distinction is applied to itself, the result is a
(harmless)tautology:"Itisrighttoapplythedistinctionbetweenrightandwrong".Things
gettough,however,withthenegativevalue."Itiswrongtoapplythedistinctionbetween
rightandwrong"landsusinanonresolvableparadox:rightwrongrightwrong...

Onceonehasbecomesensitized,onediscoversselfreferences,paradoxesandantinomies
13
14
inthelawonallsides. AsHofstadter says:"Infact,reflexivitydilemmas...cropupwith
8

MauritiusC.Escher,Wasserfall(1961)

PETERD.SUBER,THEPARADOXOFSELFAMENDMENT:ASTUDYOFLOGIC,LAW,OMNIPOTENCE,ANDCHANGE,21,30(1987)

10

Gregory Bateson, The Position of Humor in Human Communication, in CYBERNETICS (H. von Frster ed., 1953);
GREGORY BATESON, STEPSTOAN ECOLOGYOF MIND (1972);WormellC.P.,OntheParadoxesofSelfReference,67MIND
267(1958);QUINE WILLARD V., THE WAYSOF PARADOX(1976);vonFrster,supra,note3,(1984);KlausKrippendorff,
Paradox and Information, 5 PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 46 (1984); Michael Hutter, DIE PRODUKTION VON
RECHT.EINETHEORIEUNDDERFALLDESARZNEIMITTELPATENTRECHTS,66(1986);Suber,id
11

GEORGESPENCERBROWN,LAWSOFFORM,135(1972)

12

FranciscoJ.Valera,,ACalculusforSelfReference,2INTERNATIONALJOURNALOFGENERALSYSTEMS5(1975)

13

GeorgeP.Fletcher,ParadoxesinLegalThought,85COLUMBIALAWREVIEW1263,1268(1985);Suber(note9)

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astonishingregularityinthedowntoearthdisciplineoflaw".Familiarpointsarethemajor
paradoxes of the law's being put out of force by the right of resistance and by raison
15
16
d'tat ;theparadoxicalcreationoflawbytheviolenceofrevolution :"inogniviolenzavi
17
un carattere di creazione giuridica" ; the already mentioned paradox of the tangled
hierarchy of norms; the Mnchhausen trilemma of rulejustification: infinite regress,
18
circularityorarbitrarycessation.

These are known fundamental paradoxes in law. However, one may question their
19
practicalconsequences.Dotheyhaveexistentialforce? Dotheyhold"terrorsinourdaily
20
lives"?. Infact,moreconcretephenomenaoflegalselfreferenceleadingtoparadoxcan
21
befound:"Whowatchesthewatchmen"asaproblemofconstitutionallaw, thechange
22
ofconstitutionalnormsviaconstitutionalnormsandtheparadoxofselfamendment ;"tu
23
24
quoque"or"equitymustcomewithcleanhands" ;renvoiinlawofconflicts ;"ignorance
is no excuse"; the prohibition on bigamy; alterations of legal rulings that have future
25
effects: "prospective overruling" ; or the fiction theory of the legal person, according to
whichtheStateaslegalpersonhaslikeMnchhausentopullitselfoutoftheswampbyits
26
own topknot by fictionally fabricating itself. These are some paradoxical legal
phenomenathattroublenotonlylegaltheoristsbutpracticallawyersaswell.
14
15

Hofstadter,supra,note6,71

NiklasLuhmann,WiderstandsrechtundpolitischeGewalt,5ZEITSCHRIFTFRRECHTSSOZIOLOGIE36(1984).

16

WALTERBENJAMIN,GESAMMELTESCHRIFTENVOL.II,179(1977).

17

ELIGIO RESTA, L'AMBIGUO DIRITTO, 10 (1984); Eligio Resta, La struttura autopoietica del diritto moderno, 5
DEMOCRAZIAEDIRITTO59(1985)
18

HANSALBERT,TREATISEONCRITICALREASON(1985)

19

Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 462, 479
(1987)
20

SAULKRIPKE,WITTGENSTEINONRULESANDPRIVATELANGUAGE,87(1982)

21

Mauro Cappeletti, Who Watches the Watchmen! A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE,550(S.Shetreet&J.Descheneseds.,1985).
22

RossAlf,OnSelfReferenceasaPuzzleinConstitutionalLaw,78MIND1(1969);Suber,supra,note9

23

GUNTHERTEUBNER,GEGENSEITIGEVERTRAGSUNTREUE(1975)

24

GERHARDKEGEL,INTERNATIONALESPRIVATRECHT,240(6thed.,1987)

25

Fletcher,supra,note13,1268

26

HANS J. WOLFF, ORGANSCHAFT UND JURISTISCHE PERSON, 63 (1933); WERNER FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BRGERLICHEN
RECHTS, DIE JURISTISCHE PERSON, Vol. I, 13 (1983); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism. New Industrial Policy
and the 'Essence' of the Legal Person, 36 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 401, 417 (1988a); Gunther
Teubner,HypercycleinLawandOrganization,EUROPEANYEARBOOKINTHESOCIOLOGYOFLAW(1988)

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AndGodLaughed

381

C.HowtoDealwithParadoxes

Selfreference paradox indeterminacy everywhere! The real point, however, arises

afterthisrealization,atthenextstage,whenoneasks,howisonetohandletheparadox
27
inducedbyselfreference?Ifoneisnot,likeLderssen tomakethingseasyforoneselfby
dismissing"fiddlingwithselfreferentiality,whichisafterallunvarnishedlyclaimedtobe
circularity" as "an intellectual recreation to do with paradoxes", "that intellectual history
28
has continually had to deal with, and rightly rejected as fruitless", then there remain
29
threeintensivelydiscussedpossibilitiesofdealingwiththe"paradoxesofselfreference"
thatariseinlaw.

Radicalcriticismoflawisoneapproachtoselfreference,todaycultivatedbyprotagonists
30
of the "critical legal studies movement", mainly from the U.S. and U.K. These theorists
employ subtle analyses of legal doctrine in a peculiar technique of deconstruction. Legal
dogma's claims to consistency and its practical and moral premises are reduced to
absurdity by pointing out contradictions, antinomies and paradoxes within the dogma's
31
ownreasoning. Thismethodcommencedbydiscovering,inthedoctrineofcontractlaw,
contradictions between formality and materiality, and between individualism and
32
altruism ;withpointingoutthedisintegratingeffectsandinherentinstabilitiesof"policy
33
oriented"lawinthewelfarestate ;withderivingtheparadoxthat,foreveryruleonecan
34
findacounterrule andforeverypronouncementoflegaldogma,withtheassistanceof
35
36
thatdoctrinetheexactcontrarycouldalsobededuced. Trubek condensedthecritique
oflawunderlyingthesemovestotheformula:"indeterminacy,antiformality,contradiction
27

Klaus Lderssen, Wr' der Gedank' nicht so verwnscht gescheit, man wr' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu
nennen,5RECHTSHISTORISCHESJOURNAL343(1986)
28

Id.,349

29

Wormell,supra,note10;WILLARDV.QUINE,THEWAYSOFPARADOX(1976)

30

DAVID KAIRYS, ed., THE POLITICSOF LAW. A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE(1982);StanfordLawReview,CriticalLegalStudies

Symposium,36STANFORDLAWREVIEW1(1982a);JamesBoyle,ThePoliticsofReason:CriticalLegalTheoryandLocal
Social Thought, 133 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 685 (1985); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES(1987)
31

Foraconcisereview,seeRobertW.Gordon,CriticalLegalHistories,36STANFORDLAWREVIEW57,101(1984).

32

DuncanKennedy,FormandSubstanceinPrivateLaw,89HARVARDLAWREVIEW1685,1712(1976)

33

ROBERTOMANGABEIRAUNGER,LAWINMODERNSOCIETY,192(1976)

34

Kennedy,supra,note32,170

35

RobertoMangabeiraUnger,TheCriticalLegalStudiesMovement,96HARVARDLAWREVIEW563(1983)

36

David Trubek, Where the Legal Action Is, in CONTRACT AND ORGANIZATION, 68 (T. Daintith and G. Teubner eds.,
1986)

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37

andmarginality".Themethodquicklyspawnedadherents. Bynowthereisscarcelyafield
38
oflawthathasnotbeendeconstructedbytheprofessorialcriticalcadre.

Thecriticsvaryintheiranalysisoflegalindeterminacy.Theyascribeindeterminacyoflaw
toquitedifferentcomplexesofcauses:individualcasedecisions,legalinstitutions,thelogic
39
of legal argumentation, legal doctrine, social interests, or policies. However, the critics
themselvesassumestancesoflatentdeterminacy,dependingupontowhichevercomplex
theyattributethelargerphenomenonofindeterminacy,e.g.,context,institutionalsetting,
40
politicalideologies,"socialhegemony."

Giventhese"secret"pointsofdeterminacy,itmustbeasked,howradicalisthiscritiqueof
law actually? This is precisely the opposite of the usual objection against critical legal
studies, which assert that the indeterminacythesis is an exaggeration of the under
41
determinate character of law. Indeed, critical legal studies are not radical enough. It
seems to me that the rediscovery of indeterminacy, the demystification of legal dogma
throughideologicalcriticism,allofthe"debunking","trashing"and"demystifying",reach
only superstructural phenomena of legal selfdescription (doctrine), but fail to push
throughtothebasisofthefundamentalparadoxoflaw.IsnotSophocles'critiqueoflaw
muchmoreradicalwhenhehasAntigoneexpressheroppositiontoKreon'slawprohibiting
herfromburyingherbrother?

Kreon: "Andyetyoudaredtooversteptheselaws?"
Antigone:"Yes,...fornotZeusitwaswhoutteredthem.
NoryetdidShewhodwellswithgodsbeneath,
Justice,ordainsuchlawsastheseformen.
NordidIcountyouredictstrongenough
Foryoutooverride,andyouamortal,
Unwrittenlaw,unshakeable,ofHeaven.

37

Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1 (1984); Boyle,
supra,note30,685;GaryPeller,TheMetaphysicsofAmericanLaw,73CALIFORNIALAWREVIEW1151(1985)
38

For private law, see Jay M. Feinmann, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 678
(1984); Dalton Clare, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LAW JOURNAL 997 (1985); for
public law, see Kairys, supra, note 30, 140; Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 781 (1983); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of
BureaucracyinAmericanLaw,97HARVARDLAWREVIEW1276(1984).
39

Foracriticalreviewofthis,seeDavidKennedy,CriticalTheory,Structuralism,andContemporaryScholarship,21
NEWENGLANDLAWREVIEW209,1418(1985)
40

SeeDuncanKennedy,LegalEducationasTrainingforHierarchy,inTHE POLITICS OF LAW. A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE,

40,49(D.Kairysed.,1982);Singer,supra,note37,20
41

E.g.Solum,supra,note19,494.

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AndGodLaughed

383

Fornottoday,noryesterday,butalltime.
42
Doesthatlive,andnoneknowsfromwhenitcame".

We should not downplay Antigone's protest as recognition of a conflict between human

and divine law. Rather, she asserts an insoluble paradox, familiar to us from the earlier
discussionoftheselfapplicationofthelegaldistinction.Antigoneappliesthelegalcodeto
the legal code itself by claiming that Kreon's laying down of right and wrong is as such
wrong.

This claim supersedes that of the contemporary radical critique of law, which locates
modern law's paradoxical indeterminacy in politicallymanipulable legal doctrine and
externalizes the paradox to "secret" points of indeterminacy. For Antigone, paradox
inheres in the phenomenon of law itself; it is not merely a symptom of a particular
historicalconfigurationofdogma.TheradicalityoftheAntigoneancritiqueoflawreaches
a deeper level. It is not individual legal norms, principles or doctrines that lead to
antinomiesandparadoxes;thelawitselfisbasedonafundamentalparadox,whicheven
43
alternativevisionsofa"communallaw" cannotescape.

Thus,thedisclosureofcontradictionsandparadoxescannot,contrarytoallthehopesof
theEnlightenment,leadtoa"deconstruction"oflaw,butatmosttoa"reconstruction"of
itsfoundationsthatremainlatent.Thisachievesnottheeliminationofcontradictionand
paradoxbutinsteada"reconstruction"oftheconnectionamongselfreference,paradox,
indeterminacyandevolutionofthelaw.Itdoesnotsufficeforthecriticstoarguethatthe
revelation of contradictions and paradoxes to jurists irreversibly destroys the latent
paradox, thus achieving deconstruction by enlightenment. This argument underestimates
thedifferencebetweenthereflectiveawarenessofjuristsasindividualsandthatofthelaw
asasocialprocess.Theenlightenmentapproachherebyneglectstheoperativeclosureof
legalpractical discourse to the achievements of theoretical even legaltheoretical
44
discourse. Wiethlter regards it as "the dominating phenomenon of the last 10 to 15
years that the work of lawyers as socially oriented and exercised practice has remained
almost untouched by all the more fundamental challenges facing our legal system,
45
jurisprudence and legal doctrine ..."; and Heller supplies the post structuralist
explanation: "Law is essentially a cognitive and professional, rather than a normative,
discipline, referring to theory only in the liminal cases where the content of the settled
42

TranslatedbyIainFraser.

43

Unger,supra,note35

44

RudolfWietholter,SocialScienceModelsinEconomicLaw,inCONTRACTAND ORGANIZATION, 52(T.C.Daintithand

G.Teubnereds.,1986)
45

ThomasC.Heller,LegalDiscourseinthePositiveState:APostStructuralistAccount,inDILEMMASOF LAWINTHE
WELFARESTATE,173(G.Teubnered.,1985)

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practicecomesintocrisis".Thismakeshimrightlyskepticalastotheenlighteningeffectsof
alegalcritical"delegitimativeanalysis".

Jurists more acrobaticallyminded than the critical legal scholars practice a more civilized
46
wayofdealingwiththeselfreferentialnatureoflaw. Thesejuristsdefinetheproblemof
47
the law's selfreference as a problem of "paradoxes in legal thought." This definitional
restriction ofthe problem allowsthemto regardtheconnectionbetweenselfreference
48
and paradox as a "fallacy" of thought; thus, they can now set about restoring the
consistency of legal reasoning with lan, intuition and mental gymnastics. The entire
exercise reduces to a problem of insufficiently refined mental techniques, which, with
improvementwilleffectivelybeabletoremoveparadoxes:"...theprimarytechniquefor
49
resolving them is to elaborate distinctions." This technique finally refers to the famous
theoryoftypes,butthereareother"solutions"thateffectivelyavoidtheparadoxesofself
50
reference in law. In the face of unresolved paradoxes and antinomies, one can at least
preserveone'sattitude:"...itposesachallengetolegaltheorythatwecannotignore.Ifwe
arecommittedtotheconsistencyofourlegalprinciples,weshallsomedayhavetodevisea
51
constructoratheorythatwillresolvethisantinomy."

52
Letuspayatributetooptimism,andrespect"consistencyasanoverridinglegalvalue"!
Butwhoistoprotectthelegalmentalgymnastsfrombeingcaughtup,whileleapingfrom
level to metalevel and metametalevel, in some "tangled hierarchy", or from landing,
followingsomeboldmentalleapoutofthesystem,backwheretheywereagain,insome
sortof"strangeloop"?PerhapsFletchermakesittooeasyforhimselfdespiteallhismental
gymnasticeffortbecausehetakesparadoxesonlyasintellectualerrors.

Atanyrate,thedissentingRabbiEliezerinourstorycannotbehelpedbyanewdistinction
inordertoescapeanallegedfallacyinhisthinkingaboutlaw.Forhispenaltyforlosingthe
legalargumentwasexileafatemorerealthananerrorinthought.Hisproblemwasnot
merelyparadoxesinlegalthought,butparadoxesinlawitself.Thefrighteningexperience
is that the reality of law itself, and not, say, merely thinking about law, is paradoxically
46

E.g.,HerbertL.A.Hart,SelfreferringLawsinESSAYSIN JURISPRUDENCEAND PHILOSOPHY(H.L.A.Hart,1983);Ophules

Carl Friedrich, Ist der Rechtspositivismuslogisch mglich? 21 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1745 (1968); ROSS
(note22);FLETCHER(note13).
47
48

Fletcher,supra,note13,1263

Id.

49

Fletcher,supra,note13,1279.

50

Hart(note46);Ross(note22);foracriticaldiscussion,seeSuber(note9).

51

Fletcher(note13),1284.

52

Fletcher,supra,note13,1265

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AndGodLaughed

385

constituted. Eliezer was forced to recognize the Antigonean claim. And precisely this
recognition leads to the third way of dealing with the legal paradox induced by self
reference: rather than isolate the paradox in thought about law, shift it into the social
reality of law. This breaks a taboo in law: the taboo on circularity. Legal dogma, legal
theory and legal sociology are agreed in placing circularity under the ban of logical
inadmissibility. Circular arguments are banned in all three disciplines, as petitio principii.
Thistabooalsocharacterizestheeffortsofourlegalmentaxlgymnasts,whoseacrobatics
arepremiseduponthebanoncircularity.Thecriticaldemystifiers,aswell,silentlyaccept
thetabooofcircularity,andtheircritiqueofindeterminacywouldfadeawayintovacuityif
thebanwereraised.

Autopoiesis theory takes the Antigonean paradox as its starting point, but it does not
violate the taboo only to declare circular conclusions logically unobjectionable. Then the
outcomewouldinfactbeemptytautologiesorimpenetrableblocksonthought.Instead,
the theory dodges the taboo by declaring circularity to be a problem of legal practice,
rather than a problem of legal thought: the social reality of law consists in a number of
circular relationships. The components of the legal system actions, norms, processes,
53
identity, legal reality are cyclically linked with each other in multifarious ways. Self
reference,paradoxesandindeterminaciesarerealproblemsofsocialsystems,noterrors
inthementalreconstructionofthissocialreality.

This new way of handling selfreference is more than ambitious. It claims to treat
circularity,hithertoregardedinprincipleasaprohibitedmodeofthought,asafertileand
heuristically valuable model of social reality, and on this basis to revolutionize not only
54
55
legal theory, but thought about society. As Zolo has shown, the basis here is a
generalizationofthefollowing"circular"phenomena:

56
1.linguisticselfreferenceofcognitiveprocesses (W.V.O.Quine,O.Neurath),
2. theories of order through fluctuation and dissipative structures in the physics of
57
irreversibleprocesses (I.Prigogine),
53

Teubner,supra,note26

54

NiklasLuhmann,InsistenceonSystemsTheory:PerspectivesfromGermany,61SOCIAL FORCES987(1983);NIKLAS
LUHMANN,SOZIALE SYSTEME. GRUNDRISSEINERALLGEMEINEN THEORIE (1984);NiklasLuhmann,Society,Meaning,Religion
BasedonSelfReference,46SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS5(1985);NiklasLuhmann,TheAutopoiesisofSocialSystems,in
SOCIOCYBERNETIC PARADOXES: OBSERVATION, CONTROL AND EVOLUTION OF SELFSTEERING SYSTEMS (F. Geyer & J. van der
Zouweneds.,1986)
55

ZoloDanilo,TheEpistemologicalStatusoftheTheoryofAutopoiesisandItsApplicationtotheSocialSciences,in
STATE,LAWANDECONOMYASAUTOPOIETICSYSTEMS,4(G.Teubnered.,1988)
56
57

Quine,supra,notes10,26

IlyaPrigogine,OrderthroughFluctuation:SelfOrganizationandSocialSystem,inEVOLUTIONAND CONSCIOUSNESS:
HUMANSYSTEMSINTRANSITION,39(E.Jantsch&C.H.Waddingtoneds.,1976).

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3.logicalcircularityinmathematicalaxiomatizedstructures(K.Gdel),andmoregenerally,
paradoxes and contradictions in recurrence and in logical and linguistic selfinclusion (B.
Russell,K.Grelling,A.Tarski),
4. reflexivity of the mechanisms of homeostatic or self catalysing selfregulation in
58
molecularbiologyorneurophysiology (L.vonBertalanffy,M.Eigen,H.vonFrster),
5. recursive phenomena (feedback, reentry) in cybernetics 1and the cybernetics of
59
cybernetics(secondordercybernetics) (W.B.Ashby,H.vonFrster),
6.processesofspontaneousmorphogenesisandtheselforganizationofsocialgroups(F.A.
vonHayek),
60
7. the traditional concept of mental awareness in man and in the anthropoid apes (H.
Maturana,G.Pask,N.Luhmann)".

Thiswayofhandlingselfreferencederivesitsdynamicsandpotentialfruitfulnessfroma
jump to a bold epistemological position: "that reality has a circular structure,
61
independentlyofitscognition."

D.MorphogenesisThroughEigenvalues

Thisinsistenceon"realparadoxes",tocoinanexpressionlooselybasedonKarlMarx'sreal
contradictions, fertilizes theories of selfreference and autopoiesis, making them rich in
prospects.Fortheresearchstrategyistodiscoverblanksonthemapofsocialphenomena
byidentifyingcircularrelationshipsinlawandsocietyandtracingtheirinternaldynamics
and external interactions. Of course there are already efforts in this direction. The most
advanced remains legal hermeneutics, which studies the perplexities of the hermeneutic
62
63
circlein"preliminaryconceptionsandchoiceofmethods." Inlegaltheory,itwasHart
64
and Ross who analyzed selfreferential norm structures. Legal methodology and
argumentationtheory,bycontrast,saylittleaboutthecircularstructureintherelationship
58

MANFRED EIGEN & PETER SCHUSTER, THE HYPERCYCLE: A PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL SELFORGANISATION (1979); von Frster,
supra,note3
59

vonFrster,supra,note3

60

HUMBERTO R. MATURANA, ERKENNEN: DIE ORGANISATION UND VERKRPERUNG VON WIRKLICHKEIT. AUSGEWHLTE ARBEITEN

ZURBIOLOGISCHENEPISTEMOLOGIE(1982);G.Pask;Luhmann,supra,note54
61

Luhmann, supra, note 54 648; Niklas Luhmann, The Theory of Social Systems and Its Epistemology: Reply to
DaniloZolo'sCriticalComments,16PHILOSOPHYOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES129(1986)
62

Josef Esser, VORVERSTNDNIS UND METHODENWAHL IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG. RATIONALITTSGARANTIEN DER RICHTERLICHEN
ENTSCHEIDUNGSPRAXIS(1970)
63

Hart,supra,note46

64

Ross,supra,note22

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387

65

between legal norm and purpose in the teleological interpretation . And legal sociology
has so far permitted itself the luxury of circularity only in simple feedback relationships
66
betweenlawandsociety.

For an autopoietic view, these phenomena appear only as a few special cases in the
generallycircularrealityoflaw.Forthelegalsystem,likeotherautopoieticsystems,isseen
as nothing other than an "endless dance of internal correlations in a closed network of
interacting elements whose structure is continually modulated by numerous interwoven
67
domainsandmetadomainsofstructuralcoupling...".

This,then,wouldbethelastinterpretationofthestory"AndGodlaughed...":thereality
of law itself is circularly structured. Not only is the rabbis' reasoning about law self
referentiallyconstituted:soistheirverysubjectmatter.Themostimportantconsequence
of this shift from thought to practice is that one no longer need falter at the hurdle of
paradoxinducedbyselfreference.Afterall,therabbisdocontinuallyproducelaw,despite
68
any paradoxes. They follow the second alternative in Krippendorff's account of a
paradoxicalsituation:"Unlessoneisabletoescapeaparadoxicalsituationwhichiswhat
Whitehead and Russell achieved with the theory of logical types, paradoxes paralyze an
observerandmayleadeithertoacollapseoftheconstructionofhisorherworld,ortoa
growthincomplexityinhisorherrepresentationofthisworld.Itisthelattercasewhich
couldbecharacterizedasmorphogenesis".

Now, one can analyze how the morphogenesis of law copes with the block produced by
paradoxes and, despite extreme fluctuations, achieves stability. The practice of law
transformsindeterminacyintorelativedeterminacy.Autopoiesistheoryoffersananalysis
ofthepracticalsolutionstotheindeterminacyproblemviatheconjunctionofthefollowing
elements: selfreference paradox indeterminacy stability through eigenvalues. By
applyingitsdistinctionbetweenlegallyrightandwrong,thelegalsystemfoundsitselfupon
aselfreferentialcircle.Thisleadsinevitablytothesituationoftautologyandparadox,and
therefore into a fundamental indeterminacy of law. One need not, however, stop at this
indeterminacy,noryetflinchfromit.Forpracticalsolutionstotheindeterminacyproblem
induced by paradox do exist. The attitude of the rabbis in the synagogue toward the

65

ROBERTALEXY,THEORIEDERJURISTISCHENARGUMENTATION,289(1978)

66

E.g.,ManfredWeiss,DIE THEORIEDERRICHTERLICHEN ENTSCHEIDUNGSTTIGKEITINDEN VEREINIGTEN STAATENVON AMERIKA

(1971); Torstein Eckhoff, Feedback in Legal Reasoning and Rule Systems, 41 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 39, 41
(1978).
67

Maturana,supra,note60,28

68

Krippendorff,supra,note10,51

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paradox of selfreference seems to be: "If it hurts or is unfair, eliminate it or prevent its
69
applicationthroughadjudicatorydevices;otherwisesmileatthesweatinglogicians."

Butwhatistheprinciplethatjustifiesthisattitude?Thekeyliesinthe"deparadoxification
ofparadoxes",inthe"creativeuseofparadoxes,inthetransformationofinfiniteintofinite
information loads, in the translation of indeterminate complexity into determinate
70
complexity."

71
Onemay,withvonFrster ,embarkonafuiteenavantandrelyonselfreferenceitselfto
lead ultimately to stable solutions, by the emergence, from the continual recursive
applicationofanoperation,of"eigenvalues",stableinthemselves.Aclassicalexampleof
aneigenvaluefromautologicis:"Thissentencehas??letters".Thenumberthirtyoneis
oneeigenvalueofthissentence.Moregenerally,fromcontinualrecursive"computationof
computation",asystemlearnsthosemodesofoperationthatarevalidinitscopingwithan
environment which is inaccessible to the system. Or one may, like Boaventura de Sousa
72
Santos, inspired by poets who "overcome the anxiety of influence by misreading (or
distorting) poetic reality", interpret law as a continuous "misreading of reality".
73
Alternatively, one may, with Luhmann, beat about the bush, seeking social solutions to
selfreference by concealing paradox, belittling it, reinterpreting it as mere contradiction
andbyotherhistoricallyidentifiabletechniquesof"deparadoxification".Theconstruction
of the legal system on the basis of the legal code (right/wrong), which minimizes the
paradoxofselfreferenceintoa(prohibited)contradiction,andatthesametime,keepsit
latentwouldthenbeamajorculturalachievement.

E.TheNewIndeterminacy:ConflictingSocialWorlds

So far, our considerations indicate a need for a new direction in the critique of law.
Traditionally,thecritiqueoflawimpliesachallengetothestatusquoachallengefulfilled
by the unmasking of paradoxes and contradictions. If it is true, however, that the whole
legalsystemisbuiltupuponafundamentalparadox,thenitisnotworthwhiletoattempt
critiquinganapparentlegalorderbydiscoveringevernewparadoxesandcontradictions.A
69

Suber,supra,note9,21,10

70

Niklas Luhmann, Autopoiesis als soziologischer Begriff, in SINN, KOMMUNIKATION UND SOZIALE DIFFERENZIERUNG (H.
Haferkamp&M.Schmideds.,1987)
71

HEINZVONFRSTER,OBSERVINGSYSTEMS,274(1981);Frster,supra,note3,36

72

BoaventuradeSousaSantos,Law.AMapofMisreading.TowardaPostmodernConceptionofLaw,14JOURNAL

OFLAWANDSOCIETY279,281(1987)
73

Niklas Luhmann, Die Rckgabe des Zwlften Kamels, Conference Paper (1984); NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE

SOZIOLOGISCHEBEOBACHTUNGDESRECHTS,16(1986)

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389

more fundamental question intrudes: given the basis of an indeterminacyproducing

paradox,howislegalorderpossibleatall?Sinceindeterminacyoflawistheordinaryrule,
determinacy,orderandsystemaretheexceptionsthatrequireexplanation.

However, rather than merely critique the critique of law for failing to do justice to the
fundamentalityorpervasivenessofindeterminacy,Iwouldprefertocontinuethecritique
ofindeterminacybuttocarryitfurther.Itisimportanttoseethatthereareclassesoflegal
indeterminacythatdonotcomesimplyfromthefundamentallegalparadoxorthemere
difference between structure and event. These exist in every kind of law. The
contemporary critique of law rightly reacts to a new and disturbing quality of
indeterminacy in law, manifested today by the emergence of such phenomena as the
balancing of interests, the increased use of general clauses, the spread of sociological
74
jurisprudenceandlegaleconomics.

75
In Germany one immediately thinks of such "classics" as Franz Neumann and Max
76
77
Weber , or for the narrower area of private law, Justus Wilhelm Hedemann and Franz
78
79
Wieacker .Asiswellknown,FranzNeumann madethedevelopmentofcapitalisminto
monopoly capitalism responsible for this new indeterminacy. Capitalism no longer
demands a calculable formal legal order, requiring instead highly indeterminate
discretionarygovernmentinterventions,whicharenowfunctionallysufficienttounderpin
80
the selfcreated order of the economy. Max Weber picked out economic and social
intereststhatfavoredpenetrationoftheformalrationalityoflawbyutilitarian,ethicaland
political elements, sabotaging thelaw's determinacyandcalculability. Suchlegalscholars
81
as Hedemann were alarmed at the "escape into general clauses": were they not
82
"softeningofthebonesoflaw"?Wieacker'sattemptfinally toclarifytheindeterminacyof
generalclausesintheoreticaltermsbyrecoursetothetraditionofjudgemadelawhasnot
74

SeeINGEBORG MAUS,RECHTSTHEORIE UND POLITISCHE THEORIE IM INDUSTRIEKAPITALISMUS, 277 (1986);ChristianJoerges,

DieberarbeitungdesBGBSchuldrechts,dieSonderprivatrechteunddieUnbestimmtheitdesRechts,20KRITISCHE
JUSTIZ 166(1987);GuntherTeubner,Juridification.Concepts,Aspects,Limits,Solutions,inJURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL
SPHERES,3,15(G.Teubnered.,1987)
75
76

FranzNeumann(1937)

MAXWEBER,ECONOMYANDSOCIETY:ANOUTLINEOFINTERPRETIVESOCIOLOGY(1921,1978)

77

JUSTUSWILHELMHEDEMANN,DIEFLUCHTINDIEGENERALKLAUSELN.EINEGEFAHRFRRECHTUNDSTAAT(1933)

78

FranzWieacker,ZurrechtstheoretischenPrzisierungdes242BGB(1956)

79

FranzNeumann,47(1957)

80

Weber,supra,note76,882

81

Hedemann,supra,note76

82

Wieacker,supra,note78

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somuchsolvedtheproblemofthenewindeterminacyasmerelyshifteditontoadifferent
level.

Today,avarietyoftheoristshaveemergedfromthebackwardlookingviewthatperceives
a "logic of decay" in the uprise of the new indeterminacy. Rather, they interpret the
disquieting new indeterminacy of law as an index of a possible new rationality. I shall
83
mention only Wiethlter's new proceduralization of law , Ladeur's concept of an
84
85
"ecologicallaw" andBoaventuradeSantos'new"legalpluralism".

Ladeurhasbroughtthesedevelopmentstoacommondenominator.Thetransformationof
the"societyofindividuals"intoa"societyoforganizations"bringsaboutthereplacement
ofuniversalistlawbya"strategiclaw".Tounderstandthelatter,thethoughtpatternsof
86
"order from fluctuation" and "dissipative structures" (Prigogine, 1976) appear to be
appropriate.Ipreferdifferentemphases,interpretingthedominantemergenceofformal
organization as a partial aspect of a more general phenomenon, that of the closure of
social spheres among them formal organizations into selfreferentially operating
autopoietic systems. This yields a new kind of conflict situation: an irresoluble conflict
betweeninformationandinterference,thatis,betweenthesystems'ownconstructionsof
their environmental systems and the operative reality of those environmental systems,
whichtheycanreallyexperiencebutnotreproducewithintheirownoperations.Theresult
of this conflict is either disintegration of the system's specific construction of the
environment,orelseitshighsituationalindeterminacy.

Icannotherereconstructthewholetheoryofautopoieticsystems,butmerelyendeavorto
make its relevance for legal indeterminacy plausible. In this context, it is a problem of

83

RudolfWiethlter,EntwicklungdesRechtsbegriffs,inRECHTSFORMENDERVERFLECHTUNGVONSTAATUNDWIRTSCHAFT,
38(V.Gessner&G.Wintereds.,1982);WiethlterRudolf,WissenschaftskritischeAusbildungsreformAnspruch
undWirklichkeit,inEinstufigeJuristenausbildung,inBREMEN. ZEHN JAHRE BREMER MODELL,7(R.Francke,D.Hart,R.
Lautmann & P. Thoss eds., 1982); Rudolf Wiethlter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, 221 (G. Teubner ed., 1985); Wiethlter Rudolf, Sanierungskonkurs der
Juristenausbildung, 1 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 21 (1986);
Wiethlter,supra,note44
84

KarlH. Ladeur, Konsensstrategien statt Verfassungsinterpretation?, 29 DER STAAT 391 (1982); KARLH. LADEUR,
ABWGUNG EIN NEUES PARADIGMA DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS (1984); KarlH. Ladeur, Flexibilisierungsstrategien
Alternativenzum'Steuerungsstaat''ReflexivesRecht''Prozeduralisierung''kologischesRecht',inWORKSHOP
ZU KONZEPTEN DES POSTINTERVENTIONISTISCHEN RECHTS, 4, 311 (G. Brggemeier & Ch. Joerges eds., 1984); KarlH.
Ladeur, 'Prozedurale Rationalitt' Steigerung der Legitimationsfhigkeit oder der Leistungsfhigkeit des
Rechtssytems?, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 265 (1986); KarlH. Ladeur, Perspectives on a PostModern
TheoryofLaw,inAUTOPOIETICLAW:ANEWAPPROACHTOLEGALTHEORY(G.Teubnered.,1988)
85
86

DeSantos,supra,note75

Prigogine,supra,note57

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391

87

secondorder autopoiesis. The new indeterminacy arises only when, on the basis of
general social communication, certain communicative spheres become independent as
first order autopoietic systems (formal organizations, politics, law, economy, education
etc.). In the course of social evolution these communicative spheres selfreferentially
constitute their own components elements, structures, processes, relations with their
environment that differ from those of general social communication. When these
components in turn become linked hypercyclically, so that elements produce structures
88
andviceversa,theprocessreachesarelativeendpoint. Theeffectofthishypercyclical
closure is great efficacy of the systems in dealing with their environments. They have no
directcommunicativecontactwiththeirsocialenvironment,butconstructanenvironment
of their own, using their own operations. This results in radical openness to the
environment, based on radical operative closure. The consequence is increased
possibilities of action; but also increased demands in respect of precision, formalization,
internalconsistencyofdecisionmakinganddeterminacyofoperations.

Forexample,theeconomyconstructssocietyforitselfviathelanguageofprices;itdoes
nottreatlawasbindinginstructionsforconduct,butincludesitinitscalculationsasacost
factor(amountandlikelihoodofpenalties).Politicsconstructsits"public"foritselfviathe
languageofpower;lawconstructsits"legalreality"viathedistinctionbetweenrightand
wrong,etc.

The conflictual aspect of this seemingly "harmonious" interplay of social spheres is

89
interference. Functional subsystems coexist not in cleanly separated fashion, as it were
side by side in space, but interact in at least two possible points of friction:
communications appear simultaneously in several autopoietic circuits, and people act in
various system contexts. A third, and still not very clear, area of interference the
"overlap" between functional subsystem and society may provisionally be termed
structure or system interference. The consequence of such interferences is that outside
descriptionsofthesurroundingsystemsconflictwiththeirrealoperations.Letitbeclear
87

Jessop Bob, The Economy, the State and the Law: Theories of Relative Autonomy and Autopoietic Closure, in
STATE,LAW,ECONOMYASAUTOPOIETICSYSTEMS(G.Teubnered.,1988)
88
89

Teubner,supra,note26,takingupfromEigen&Schuster,supra,note58.

Onthis,seeStefanJensen,InterpenetrationZumVerhltnispersonalerundsozialerSysteme,7ZEITSCHRIFTFR
SOZIOLOGIE116(1978);MnchRichard,berParsonszuWeber:VonderTheoriederRationalisierungzurTheorie
der Interpenetration, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FR SOZIOLOGIE 18 (1980); RICHARD MNCH, THEORIE DES HANDELNS: ZUR
REKONSTRUKTION DER BEITRGE VON TALCOTT PARSONS, EMILE DURKHEIM UND MAX WEBER. (1982); Niklas Luhmann,
Interpenetration Zum Verhltnis personaler undsozialer Systeme, in 3 SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLRUNG. OPLADEN:
WESTDEUTSCHER VERLAG, 151 (1981); Luhmann, supra, note 54, 286; Niklas Luhmann, Closure and Openness: On
Reality in the World of Law, in: AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY, 338 (G. Teubner ed., 1988);
GuntherTeubner,SocialOrderfromLegislativeNoise?AutopoieticClosureasaProblemforLegalRegulation,in
STATE, LAW, ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, 191 (G. Teubner ed., 1988c); Helmut Willke, Societal Guidance
throughLaw,inSTATE,LAW,ECONOMYASAUTOPOIETICSYSTEMS(G.Teubnered.,1988).

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that this does not mean the "academic" conflict of different internal and external
descriptions(e.g.thequestionwhetherthelaw'simageoftheeconomycorrespondswith
theeconomy'simageofitself),buttheharderconflictbetweenthewaytheenvironmentis
construed within the system (the law's picture of the economy) and the operations that
actually take place in the surrounding systems which are in turn autopoietically closed
(actualeconomicprocesses).

Because of its own operative closure, the real operations of the other, surrounding
systems are not accessible to any single system. It produces (not receives!) only
informationaboutthesurroundingworldthatisinternaltothesystemandcontrolledby
its own code and its own programs. At the same time, however, via interference
phenomena, the system is exposed to the operations of surrounding systems also
functioning according to their own codes, which then become clearly perceptible as
interference, disturbance, noise. And no "order from noise" makes sense here. For since
theordercanalwaysonlybethesystem'sownorder,thesystemcontinuallyreactsinthe
same way, merely increasing the interference and noise, ultimately leading to mutual
amplificationofthetroubles.

The system has one possibility of avoiding a positive feedback catastrophe. It may
endeavor to vary its own observations, say by incorporating the environment system's
descriptionsofitselfintoitsowndescriptionofit.Butthisleadsinprincipleonlytoanew
and equally serious problem. Incorporation of an external code into the system's own
operations, if consistently carried out, means disintegration. It signals the end of its
90
operations based on its specific code. Therefore only one, unsatisfactory, compromise
escape remains: leave its code untouched but adapt its program to the other's self
descriptions, as long as they are compatible with the code. This presupposes a clear
91
separation between code and program. The cost of this solution is that the program
becomesextremelyindeterminate.Itmustontheonehandadapttotherealrequirements
ofthesocialenvironment,andontheotherremaincompatiblewiththesystem'scode.All
thatremainsisasituationaladjustmentwithoutpossibilitiesofuniversalization.

Applying this to law, one very quickly comes up against the economic and political
instrumentalization of modern formal law, which is the underlying source of the new
indeterminacyoflaw.Onthesideofthelaw,thereisMaxWeber.Incontemporaryterms,
modern formal law is an expression of the hypercyclical selfreferentiality of law. It is
distinguished not only by selfconstitutive legal acts as elements, "secondary norms" as
structures, reflexively normed legal procedures and an internally constructed "legal
reality", but by the cyclical linkage of these system components through reciprocal
90
91

Teubner,supra,note74,19

SeeNiklasLuhmann,CodingoftheLegalSystem,inSTATE,LAW,ECONOMYASAUTOPOIETICSYSTEMS(G.Teubnered.,
1988).

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393

production of elements and structures, identity and processes. Consequently heightened

claims press on the internal consistency of decisionmaking, on dogmatic treatment, on
legal determinacy certainty of decision etc. This pressure produces the motivation for a
critiqueoflegalindeterminacyinthefirstplace.

On the side of the law's environment, we meet with a systemically generalized Franz
Neumann: the reality constructions of formal law, produced in closed, selfreferential
fashion, enter into conflict with the actual operations of their surrounding systems. The
developments in the economic system (from early capitalism to monopoly capitalism)
addressed by Neumann would then be an illustrative sub phenomenon of the
environmental changes that induce uncertainty. The escape lies in the law's adoption of
politicalandeconomicselfdescriptions,inincreasedincorporationofpoliticalexpediency
and economic utility into legal calculations. If this is really taken seriously if the
right/wrongcodeisinfactreplacedbypoliticalexpediencyoreconomicutilityitentails
"cadi justice". Legal conflicts are decided in a fashion arbitrary from the legal system's
viewpoint, in accordance with criteria external to the system. "Efficient breach of
92
93
contract" orthecriterionof"optimalregulation"developedbyEasterbrookandFischel
exemplifyhowthelegalcodecanbedirectlyreplacedbyanothercode,asdoesthedirect
applicationofpolicyargumentstoindividualcases.

Usually, however, legal practice chooses a different technique for handling interference.
Thelegalcoderemainsintact;onlytheprogramchangessoastoadaptasfaraspossibleto
the selfdescription of the surrounding system. Policy issues and considerations of
consequencesarenot,therefore,reflectedattheleveloftheindividualcasebyhavingthe
validityofthefinaldecisiondependontheunfoldingconsequencesorthesuccessofthe
94
policy. Instead,aseparationoflevelsoccurs,aswithruleutilitarianism/actutilitarianism.
The program is partly determined by general considerations of consequences, policy
viewpointsandefficiencycriteria;butitisthensubjectedtothelegalcode,treatedasvalid
lawandconvertedintoadecisionaccordingtorightorwrong.Theresultofthisprecarious
compromiseisadramaticriseintheindeterminacyoflaw.Butlawmustpaythepriceof
indeterminacy to achieve any success whatsoever in handling interferences among
autonomoussocialspheres.

Thus, the altar of social responsiveness demands a painful sacrifice from formal law:
withdrawal of the claim to internal consistency. The new responsive law works out legal
92

Chapter2,inRICHARDPOSNER,ECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW(1977);DonaldR.Harris,&CentoG.Veljanovski,TheUse
ofEconomicstoElucidateLegalConcepts:TheLawofContract,inCONTRACTANDORGANISATION,114(T.C.Daintith&
G.Teubnereds.,1986)
93

FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,AntitrustSuitsbyTargetsofTenderOffers,80MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

1155,1177(1982)
94

NiklasLuhmann,TheUnityoftheLegalSystem,inAUTOPOIETICLAW,12,25(G.Teubnered.,1988)

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categories in confrontation with various social subspheres. By their very nature, these
categoriescannotmakeclaimstouniversallegalconsistency.Evenwithinthelegalsystem,
theprocessofinternaldifferentiationoflawparallelsthatoffunctionaldifferentiationof
society. Long ago law surpassed the traditional major subdivision into public law, private
lawandcriminallaw.Contemporary"privatelaw"embodiesamultiplicityofspecialprivate
95
laws, long without conceptual, dogmatic unity. The background of social differentiation
96
makes the recurring calls for reintegration appear hopelessly out of step with reality.
Contemporary decisionmaking practice reorganizes law, from a dogmatically controlled
legalunitytowardamultiplicityoffunctionallegalterritories.

F.Interlegality

DoesthisnotratherrecallPascal'scomplaint:"Afunnyjusticethatendsatariver!Truthon
97
thissideofthePyrenees,erroronthat"?. Couldnottodayasimilarcomplaintbemade
concerning the arbitrary lines drawn between areas of law, except that it would not be
rivers and mountains but symbolic media, codes and program that would mark the
boundaries?Infactnotonlyistheproblemsimilar;historicalexperienceofhandlingsuch
problems may also be made use of in our approach. There is a long history of the law's
experience with system conflicts of a specific type, with conflicts between different
national legal systems on a territorial basis, for which a highly developed doctrine for
98
conflicts of law has been formulated. Is it possible to learn from that history how to
transfer experience with conflict between territorial subsystems to conflicts between
functional subsystems? Does it make sense to develop principles and norms of an
"intersystemiclaw",alawofconflictbetweendifferentdiscoursesinsociety?

Indeed,thegrowthofworldwidefieldsofinteractioninscience,technology,theeconomy,
public communication and travel tends to weaken the significance of territorial frontiers
and increase that of frontiers between such functional spheres. Should the law then not
shiftitsfocustootherconflictzones:moreintersystemicratherthaninternationallawof
conflict? From the autopoiesis viewpoint it is entirely plausible to speak of a dominance

95

See Christian Joerges, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS RECHTSPROBLEM, 123 (1981); Christian Joerges, Der Schutz des
Verbrauchers und die Einheit des Zivilrechts, 28 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 75 (1983); Joerges, supra note 74, 166;
Christian Joerges, FranchiseVertrge und Europisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 151 ZEITSCHRIFT FR DAS GESAMTE
HANDELSUNDWIRTSCHAFTSRECHT195(1987)
96

E.g.,ErnstWolf,KeinAbschiedvomBGB,15ZEITSCHRIFTFUERRECHTSPOLITIK1(1982)

97

BLAISEPASCAL,PENSES,151(1964)

98

SeeKegel,supra,note24,98

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shiftinconflictfromthatbetweenterritorial,politicalandnationalunitstothatbetween
99
functionalsubsystemsofworldsociety.

100
SimilarobservationsstemfromBonaventuradeSousaSantos, whoseesin"interlegality"
adominantfeatureofanemerging"postmodernlaw":

"Legal pluralism is the key concept in a postmodern view of law. Not the
legal pluralism of traditional legal anthropology in which the different legal
orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political
space, but rather the conception of different legal spaces superposed,
interpenetrated and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions, in
occasionsofqualitativeleapsorsweepingcrisesinourlifetrajectoriesaswell
as in the dull routine of eventless everyday life. We live in a time of porous
legality or legal porosity of multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to
constant transitions and trespassings. Our legal life is constituted by an
intersectionofdifferentlegalorders,thatisbyinterlegality.Interlegalityisthe
phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism and that is why it is the
second key concept of a postmodern conception of law. Interlegality is a
highlydynamicprocessbecausethedifferentlegalspacesarenonsynchronic
andthusresultinunevenandunstablemixingoflegalcodes".

And, in Germany a number of interdisciplinarilyoriented sensitive observers of recent

101
102
103
104
developments in legal doctrine such as L. Raiser, Kbler, Wiethlter, Walz,
105
106
Joerges, Ladeur have begun to formulate a new law of conflict, which should be
generalizedinorderforfurtherdevelopment.

99

Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, in 2 SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLRUNG, 51 (1975b); Niklas Luhmann, The World
SocietyasaSocialSystem,8INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GENERAL SYSTEMS131(1982);HELMUT WILLKE, ENTZAUBERUNG
DESSTAATES.UBERLEGUNGENZUEINERSOZIETALENSTEUERUNGSTHEORIE,49(1983)
100

Boaventura,supra,note72,297

101

RAISERLUDWIG,DIEZUKUNFTDESPRIVATRRECHTS(1971)

102

KBLERFRIEDRICH,BERDIEPRAKTISCHENAUFGABENZEITGEMSSERPRIVATRECHTSTHEORIE(1975)

103

Wiethlter,supra,notes44,83

104

Walz(1980)

105

Joerges,supra,note95

106

Ladeur,supra,notes84,115

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[Vol.12No.01

FirstreferencemustbemadetoWiethlter. Hisconceptofproceduralizationevidences
108
akinshipwiththedevelopmentof"conflictnorms",andso,Wiethlter's "supportgoes
to...anunderstandingofproceduralizationasajustificatoryproblemof'rational'practical
actions under 'system' conditions (justification of collision rules in the exercise of
judgmental competences)". To work out the more recent problem situation, he adduces
theconceptualmachineryofclassicallawofconflict:

"InthefundamentallegalprincipleofproportionalityIhavesoughttodefine
themostinfluentialmachineryoftransformationfortheosmosis,translation,
for covariance of law and society, as the supreme and most general
productive principle of an admittedly silent, and absolutely unavoidable
justificationofconflictrulesforthedecisionofconflictingrights,interestsand
needs. Legal relationships are in fact (in Germany since the days of Savigny)
neitherpureobjectsofevaluationsnorpureevaluationsofobjects,buthave
alwaysbeenpremediatedgeneraldecisionsontheassignmentsoffactstoa
particular law by way of connection, the qualification of legal answers to
socialquestions".

But one thing remains remarkably vague: which units clash? Looking for an answer in
109
Wiethlter's texts, it remains unclear if they were conflicts of political interests,
ideologicalcamps,sociolegalmodels,generallegalprinciples,legalsubsystems,program
structures, social subsystems, subrationalities, or political strategies. Even from the
viewpoint of autopoiesis, the question of identifying the relevant units that collide is not
any easy one. As an attempt, I would propose the following differentiation: I. Conflicts
between autopoietic social systems; II. Conflicts between the quasilaws of semi
autonomoussocialfields;III.Conflictsbetweenfieldswithinthelaw.

I.Conflictsbetweenautopoieticsocialsystems

Law of conflicts must address clashes between different autopoietic social systems, be
they functional subsystems (politics, economy, family, religion, science, culture), formal
organizations or specialized interactions. Here the first major problem is whether a
translationoftheconflictintothelegalcodeisdesirableatall.Becauseofthewellknown
trend toward increasing legal cognition of social claims, we uncritically fail to ask this
question. But the most recent experience with the phenomenon of "juridification" ought

107

Wiethlter,supra,notes44,83

108
109

Wiethlter,supra,note83,247

EspeciallyWiethlter,supra,notes44,83

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110

tohavesensitizedustowhethersuchconflictnormsoughtnottobedeveloped. Nonet
andSelznick,forinstance,proposealegalevaluationofcivildisobediencebasednotupon
formal legal criteria, but upon a "political paradigm". Such a framework would treat
111
instances of civil disobedience as objects of political negotiation. "Forgiveness for rule
breaking is readily negotiated in the interest of reconstituting a framework within which
112
113
cooperation can go forward". Simitis and Zenz and Habermas similarly stress law's
paradoxicalcapacitytopreserveanonlegalisticresolutionofparticularconflictsinfamily
andschoolcontexts.

The open question is, when the rationalities of social spheres clash, can law develop
conflict norms which, through juridification, in fact work against juridification? Can law
abdicatetotheconflictsolvingpossibilitiesofothersocialcontexts?Canitdeveloplegally
114
codifiedrulesabouttheapplicationornonapplicationofitsowncode?

Thesecondmajorproblemiswhetherlawcancontentitselfwith"formal"rulesreferring
disputestotherationalityofoneorotheroftheconflictingspheres,orwhetheritmust,
because of the "transsystemic" nature of the conflicts, develop "substantive rules" of its
own.Thisisachoicewellknowntothelawofconflicts.Ladeur'sideasseemtopointmore
inthefirstdirection,whenhesays:"Thestrategicactingofthelegalsystemremainsbound
to the horizon of the production of actions orientations in other systems, but instead of
orientingitselfontheequilibriumparameterofbehaviorregulation,thelawsorientsitself
on the possibility of the (re)equilibrating and compatibilizing of values and action
115
perspectivesforcomplexactionnetworks." Myideasonthefunctionofgeneralclauses
("goodfaith"or"publicpolicy"clauses)pursuetheseconddirection.Fromtheveryprocess

110

RDIGER VOIGT ed., VERRECHTLICHUNG(1980);RDIGER VOIGT,ABSCHIEDVOM RECHT? (1984);RDIGER VOIGT, RECHTALS

INSTRUMENT DER POLITIK (1986); RDIGER VOIGT, Social Science Models in Economic Law, in CONTRACT AND
ORGANIZATION, 52 (T.C. Daintith & G. Teubner eds., 1986); FRIEDRICH KBLER ed. VERRECHTLICHUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT,
ARBEIT UND SOZIALER SOLIDARITT (1984); David Kettler, Legal Reconstitution of the Welfare State: A Latent Social
Democratic Legacy, 21 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 9 (1987); GUNTHER TEUBNER ed., JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES. A
COMPARATIVEANALYSISINTHEAREASOFLABOR,CORPORATE,ANTITRUSTANDSOCIALWELFARELAW(1987)
111

PHILIPPENONET&PHILIPSELZNICK,LAWANDSOCIETYINTRANSITION,92(1978)

112

SPIROSSIMITIS&GISELAZENZeds.,FAMILIEUNDFAMILIENRECHT,51(1975)

113

JrgenHabermas,LawasMediumandLawasInstitution,inDILEMMASOFLAWINTHEWELFARESTATE,203,217(G.
Teubnered.,1985)
114

Niklas Luhmann, Coding of the Legal System, in STATE, LAW, ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS (G. Teubner ed.,
1988)
115

Ladeur,supra,note84,270

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of reconciling different system rationalities substantive norms emerge in the legal

116
process.

Finally,thereistheintersystemicnegotiation.Thissuggestionbearsastrongresemblance
to international agreements for solving norm conflicts. In both cases conflicts of
expectations are resolved through negotiation rather than a referral to either side or a
substantive legal intrusion. The oft quoted "neocorporatist" negotiating systems are no
doubtatthemomentthemostspectacularcaseofhowintersystemconflictscanbedealt
with by recourse to ad hoc specialized formal organizations, with no recourse to legal
117
118
rules. Yetthistechniquedoesnottruly"bypasslaw", insteadcoexistingalongsideit.
Law comes in with a "secondary wave of juridification" of the selfregulatory processes
themselves: law focuses on procedural and organizational premises, rather than the
119
achievement of specific results . Solutions like this meet policy needs by gearing law
toward procedure and organization so as to adapt social selfregulation to systems' own
learningcapacity.

II.Conflictsbetweenthequasilawsofsemiautonomoussocialfields

The conflict between State law and the quasilaw of various social fields, or among the
120
latter, is a second problem area for a new law of conflict. Moore, Mnookin and
121
122
123
124
125
Kornhauser, Galanter, Cotterell ("juridicalpluralism"),Fitzpatrick, andGriffiths
116

Gunther Teubner, Die Gesellschaft des Brgerlichen Rechts. Kommentierung zu, in ALTERNATIVKOMMENTAR ZUM
BRGERLICHENRECHT,705(R.Wassermanned.,1979);GuntherTeubner,DieGeneralklauselvon'TreuundGlauben'.
Kommentierungdes242BGB,inALTERNATIVKOMMENTARZUMBRGERLICHENGESETZBUCH,32,44,84,(R.Wassermann
ed.,1980).
117

Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe Schmitter, Community, Market, State and Associations?, in PRIVATE INTEREST
GOVERNMENT:BEYONDMARKETANDSTATE,1,21(W.StreeckandP.Schmittereds.,1985);TraxlerFranz,andVobruba
Georg,SelbststeuerungalsfunktionalesquivalentzumRecht?ZurSteuerungskapazittvonneokorporatistischen
ArrangementsundreflexivemRecht,16ZEITSCHRIFTFRSOZIOLOGIE3(1987)
118

VolkerRongeed.,AMSTAATVORBEI(1980)

119

Simitis Spiros, Juridification of Labor Relations, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES, 113, 140 (G. Teubner ed.,
1987)
120

SallyF.Moore,LawandSocialChange:TheSemiAutonomousSocialFieldasanAppropriateObjectofStudy,in
7LAW&SOCIETYREVIEW719(1973)
121

RobertH.Mnookin,andLewisKornhauser,BargainingintheShadowoftheLaw.TheCaseofDivorce,88YALE
LAWJOURNAL950(1979)
122

MarkGalanter,JusticeinManyRooms,inACCESSTO JUSTICEANDTHE WELFARE STATE,147(MauroCappellettied.,

1983)
123

RogerCotterell,TheSociologicalConceptofLaw,10JOURNALOFLAWANDSOCIETY241(1983)

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399

have investigated the modern phenomena of an "indigenous law", indicating lines of

conflict.Incontrasttotheintersystemconflictsmentionedunder(1),inwhichfunctional
subsystems with differing codes, programmes, and rationalities collide, here conflicts
within the law itself arise though admittedly a law understood in "pluralist" terms.
Conflict resolution in economic enterprises, associations, cultural organizations or even
interorganizationalrelationshipshaveagenuinelegalcharacterifconflictsaredefinedas
conflictsofexpectationsanddecidedviathesinglingoutofbindingexpectations.Tothat
extenttheStatehasnomonopolyonlegalorder."Societiescontainamultitudeofpartially
selfregulatingspheresor sectors,organizedalong spatial, transactionalor ethnicfamilial
linesrangingfromprimarygroupsinwhichrelationsaredirect,immediateanddiffuseto
settings (e.g., business networks) in which relations are indirect, mediated and
126
specialized."

Whenmediatingbetweenthesesectors,courtsmustcontrolstandardizedtermsoftrade,
articles of association, and corporate bylaws. Early formal judicial techniques looked to
them to discern "meeting of the minds" instead attempted to develop conditions
necessary to manifest "subjection". Later, as courts recognized the asymmetric nature of
these agreements, judicial techniques took a substantive turn, considering and changing
thecontentofstandardizedagreements.Thequestioniswhatthecriteriaaretobe. Can
theideaofanintersystemiclawofconflictoffersomethingherewhichcangiveformulas
of "appropriateness", "fairness" etc. some signposts that go beyond situational
considerationsofequity?

The answer lies in a reformulation of the "balancing of interests". This peculiar judicial
technique can be detached from reference to individual or collective actors and cast in
termsofaconflictbetweencommunicativenetworks.Usually,interestjurisprudencefinds
reflected in legislation a balance between individuals and groups, and, using this as a
guide, does justice by reconstructing this balance on a casebycase basis. Converting
balancingofinterestsintermsofindividualsandgroupstonetworkthinkingwouldmean
thatcourtsengagedincontrollinggeneraltermsoftradeorcorporatebylawswouldhave
topickoutandbalancespecificregularities,functionalrequirementsandguidingprinciples
oftheconflictingsocialfieldsinvolved.

Thesearethelinesalongwhich,Ifeel,Joerges'sanalysesareaimed:theyhavetodowith
thelegalcontrolofprivatesystemsoforder(generaltermsoftrade,longtermcontracts).
Joerges suggests a conflictlaw viewpoint which can be understood in terms of balancing

124

PeterFitzpatrick,LawandSocieties,22OSGOODEHALLLAWJOURNAL115(1984)

125

J.Griffith,WhatisLegalPluralism?24JOURNALOFLEGALPLURALISM1(1986)

126

MarkGalanter,supra,note122,163

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competitionpoliciesandconsumeristpolicies. Iwouldraiseanumberofreservationsas
regardsJoerges'governmentalpolicyorientation.Doesjudicialcontroloverprivateorders
have to do only with political goal conflicts? Is this not rather the secondary conflict by
comparison with the basic conflict between the functional regularities of the market,
economicorganizationandthedemandsofprivatelife?Butthesearemerequibbles.The
decisive thing is to detach the balancing of interests from the superficial plausibility of
individual and group interests and bring it into the context of conflicts between social
spheres.

This kind of systemrelated viewpoint ought also to prevail when it comes to, not a
posteriori content control, but legal control over the constitutional conditions of quasi
legal suborders. Quite irrespective of whether it has to do with interest representation
within safetystandards committees, codes of conduct adopted by associations for
advertising, competition rules pursuant to the German Competition Restraints Act or the
disciplinaryproceduresinfirmsandassociations,judicialcontroloughttobesoexercised
so as to ensure that interests outside the system are taken into account by internal
proceduresandorganization.

III.Conflictsbetweenfieldswithinthelaw

Finally,afunctionallawofconflictoughttodealwithsystemconflictsinternaltolaw.As
previously explained fragmentation of law is nothing but the legal transcription of
functionaldifferentiationofsociety.Bothlegislaturesandcourtsseekreactivelyandadhoc
to arrive at a precarious compromise between functional requirements of social
subsystems,politicalcontrolobjectivesandrequirementsinternaltothelegalsystem.This
resultsinveryseparatelegalfields,administeredbyspecializedlegalexperts,whoidentify
withthecorrespondingsocialspheresatleastasstronglyaswiththelaw.Conceptualand
normativeconflictsbetweensuchlegalfieldsareunavoidableandareverymuchtheorder
oftheday.Considerablelegitimationproblemsensue.Althoughthediscrepancybetween
the meanings of contract in civil law and in antitrust law can be tolerated by relevant
experts,inothercasesevenexpertscannotjustifythecontradictorylogicsofdifferentlegal
fields. The taxdeductibility of bribes is a case in point. Despite such anomalies, the
128
demands for a restoration of the "unity of the legal system" have only rhetorical
character,orareraisedonlytacticallyonsuitableoccasions.

Amoreseriousstrategyistheopposingone,whichenhancesspecializationbyinsistingon
the purity of particularized principles in a given legal field. Thus, antitrust lawyers
executing general clauses in antitrust law refuse to take account of legal principles
127

Joerges,supra,notes74,95

128

Wolf,supra,note96

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recognized in other areas of law. Such legal isolationism fails to prevent intersystem
clashes. Instead, the handling of these is left to happenstance: individual cases address
contradictionsastheycropup,withnomeaningfulfootinginadoctrineofconflicts.

A principle that is realistic and at the same time normatively defensible would seem by
contrast to be "relative autonomy of legal fields". Although Walz developed this theory
basedontheexampleofconflictsbetweenprivatelawandtaxlaw,itcanbegeneralized.
Explicitly borrowing from thought patterns of law of conflicts, Walz recognizes a high
degreeofautonomyofspecializedlegalfields,restrictingitonlyincaseswhereproblems
of"ordrepublic"arise.Eachlegalfieldwilldevelopitsdoctrinalstructuresaccordingtothe
demands of the social segment involved, but in cases where problems of "ordre public"
arise, it must respect fundamental principles and policies of the other legal fields,
incorporatingthemasselfrestrictionsinitsowndoctrine.Thisseemstometobetheonly
realisticwayofreformulatingtheoldideaoftheunityofthelegalorder.Inalegalsystem
characterizedbyahighdegreeoffunctionaldifferentiation,integrationofthelawcannot
beachievedviavaluesorviaconcepts.Rather,integrationresultsfrommakingcompatible
theautonomyoflegalfields:themutualrecognitionofeachfield'sbasicprinciplesbuffers
thefurtherdevelopmentofprinciples,yieldinganoverallcoherence.

G.CollisionRulesinContract

A functional law of conflicts, thus requires internal mechanisms for solving disputes
between social subsystems; between the quasilaws of semiautonomous social entities;
and between fields within the law. A prominent example of such a mechanism are the
general clauses in contract law ("good faith", "public policy"). The high degree of
indeterminacyoftheseclausessuitsthemfordealingwithconflictsbetweenautonomous
social spheres, although this was not their original purpose. Indeed, the very
indeterminacyofgeneralclauses,andtheaccompanyingroomforjudicialinterpretation,
hasearnedsuchclausesareputationasaprimeexampleofthe"materializationofprivate
129
130
law." JosefEsser hasdescribedthisshiftintheirfunctionas"judicialinterventionism
run riot", in the process of which "observance of statute and contract" are replaced by
"regulatory,controllingandultimatelypatronizingjudicialpower".

Inonesense,thiscriticismistoonarrow,foritassumesonlyjudicialstateinterventionism
upon contractual arrangements. This unduly restricts the role of general clauses in
subsystemconflicts.Fromtheviewpointofanintersystemiclawofconflict,generalclauses
filter not only state interventionism affecting the contract, but also influences from all
129

Weber, supra, note 76, 882; ASSMANN HEINZM., BRGGEMEIER GERT, HART DIETER, & JOERGES CHRISTIAN,
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTALSKRITIKDESPRIVATRECHTS(1980)
130

JosefEsser,242BGBunddiePrivatautonomie,JURISTENZEITUNG,555,556(1956)

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other social subsystems. The ensuing materialization represents an attempt to use legal
means to achieve coordination trouble spots in highly functionally differentiated
societiesbetweenthecontradictorysocialdemandsnowplacedonthecontract.Inthis
sense, materialization means making the dependence of contractual expectations on
multifariousnonconsensualnormativestructuresincludinggovernmentalinterventionism,
visible,andcoordinatingthesewithinacontract.

To understand this view of materialization, requires a reformulation of the contractual

131
relationship in its entirety as an autopoietic system in a world of autopoietic systems.
Suchanunderstandingreplacestraditionalcontracttheory'ssimpleconsensusmodelofa
"meetingoftheminds"withthemoremodernconceptofthecontractasamultifaceted
socialrelationship.Classicalconceptsofthesystemasawholeconsistingofelementsand
relationshavelaidthegroundworkforthisreformulation.Theseconceptsinclude:defining
thecontractasan"institution",elucidatestheconnectionbetweenlegalnormsandsocial
132
133
structures ;conceptualizingthecontractasan"organism" ,providesamodelofaliving
whole whose parts collaborate cohesively; regarding the contract as "structure and
134
process", picks upon on two central system aspects ; finally, viewing the contract as a
135
"workedoutplan",stressesitspurposiveorganization.

136
Theoriesof"relationalcontract"havedevelopedasimilarview. Incontrasttothesimple
model of contractual consensus, "relational contract" focuses on "interaction and
cooperationamongtheparticipants,onresultingvaluesandneeds,oncontractasprocess,
on the marginality of formal contract law in relation to the actual behavior, on the
137
138
ambivalenceof'juridification'ofcontractvianumerousstateinterventions." Kndgen
describes "relational" thinking in contract law as "distancing from the dogma of the final
quasicodificatoryvalidityofcontractualconsensus".Itmeansa"'microscopic'analysisof

131

See HANSGEORG DEGGAU, DIE GESCHFTSGRUNDLAGE. EINE METHODISCHE IRRITATION DER ZIVILRECHTSDOGMATIK (1987);
HANSGEORGDEGGAU,VERSUCHBERDIEAUTOPOIESEDESVERTRAGES(1987).
132

Ludwig Raiser, Rechtsschutz und Institutionenschutz im Privatrecht, in SUMMUM IUS SUMMA INIURIA, 145, 147
(1963)
133

Siber,supra,1

134

KARLLARENZ,LEHRBUCHDESSCHULDRECHTS,25(14thed.,1987)

135

SeeEsser,supranotes62,130;EIKESCHMIDT,SCHULDRECHT.ALLGEMEINERTEIL(6thed.,1984).

136

McNeill (1980, 1983); JOHANNES KNDGEN, SELBSTBINDUNG OHNE VERTRAG (1981); WALTER SCHMID, ZUR SOZIALEN
WIRKLICHKEITDES VERTRAGES, 108 (1983);TerenceDaintith,TheDesignandPerformanceofLongTermContracts,in
CONTRACTANDORGANIZATION,164(T.C.DaintithandG.Teubnereds.,1986);Joerges,supra,note95,211
137

Joerges,id.

138

Kndgen,supra,note136,12,128

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expectations and perceptions of reciprocity of the parties and 'macroscopic' analysis of

changesinthegeneralexpectationsinthemodernsocialstate".

Such ideas, which evoke "the flexibility peculiar to the contract in dealing with social
139
reality," havebeendevelopedfurtherintoaconceptofcontractasasocialsystemopen
to the environment. Thus, a contract not only redeems the consensus of the parties it
has its own particular functional problems to solve in responding to outside influences
140
whilemaintainingitsboundaries. Thecontractisthendefinedasacomplexofactions,
whose internal ordering depends not only on consensus, but simultaneously on
141
requirements of very diverse social subspheres. This simultaneous dependency
prefigures the conflict issue, whereby the contract is faced with contradictory structural
requirements.

142
ContractasasocialsystemappearsrecentlyintheworksofJ.Schmidt .Schmidtrightly
rejectsapersonorientedconceptinwhichthepartiestothecontractappearaselements.
Instead,"elementsofthesystemarenolonger(empirical)peopleorrolesegmentsfrom
the set of roles of empirical people, but social interactions, i.e.: rationally ordered
complexes of action". This move highlights the environment of the contract: politics, the
economy, the law, in relation to which the contract develops its structures. This model,
however, still remains entirely within the theory of open systems (similar to the
143
"contingencytheoryoforganization"). Contractualstructuresemergeindependencyon
thesystem'senvironment.

In moving beyond open systems theory, an autopoietic reformulation would modify this
144
model in a constructivist direction, building in additional levels of observation. On this
view,thecontractis,inonesense,aselfreproductiveinteractionsystemthatdefinesits
own environment, and interacts with it accordingly (i.e. the environment is
communicatively constructed among the contractual parties). And, in another sense, the
contractisan"objectofobservation"forthelaw,partofitsselfdefinedenvironment(i.e.
thefocusofcertainlegalcommunications.)Mutualinterferencebetweenthecontractand
the law generates the dynamics of the contractual relationship: it is defined exclusively
139

JOACHIMGERNHUBER,BRGERLICHESRECHT,53(1976)

140

Talcott Parsons, and Neil J. Smelser, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. A STUDY IN THE INTEGRATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
THEORY,140,143(1956)
141

Teubner,supra,note116,45

142

JRGENSCHMIDT,VERTRAGSFREIHEITUNDSCHULDRECHTSREFORM,184(1985)

143

PAUL R. LAWRENCE & JAY W. LORSCH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT(1967);PAUL R. LAWRENCE & JAY W. LORSCH,
DEVELOPINGORGANIZATIONS:DIAGNOSISANDACTION(1969)
144

Frster,supra,note71

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neither by the terms of the consensus itself nor the dictates of the law nor any other
subsystemforwhichthecontractisobject.

145
The "nonconsensual elements of contract" are then nothing but the contractual
reconstruction and conversion of demands of diverse social spheres on the specific
contract. These demands surface on three levels, corresponding to different levels of
systemformation:(1)atthe"interactionlevel",thecontractreconstructstheexpectations
ofthecontractualpartners,constitutingtheirpersonalrelationship;(2)atthe"institutional
level",thecontracthastodealwiththedemandsofmarketandorganization,surpassing
theexpectationsoftheindividualpartiestotheagreement;(3)atthe"societallevel",the
contract has to cope with the requirements of the large functional subsystems such as
"politics","economy",and"law".Theselevelsdonotinterrelatehierarchically;inprinciple
they are distinguishable modes of system formation, yet they have the "contract" in
146
common because it interweaves with each (on the three levels of system formation.
Returning to our original quest for an internal mechanism for resolving intersystemic
disputes, the general clause can now be understood as a collision rule for intersystemic
conflicts.Itprovidesroomfordisputeresolutionwithineachlevel,and,inrecognizingthe
existenceofthedifferentlevels,allowsfortheirlegalsynchronization.

Thecurrentdebateover"materialized"generalclausesconvergesonexactlythisprocess:
the "compatibilization" of contradictory social requirements on the specific contractual
relationship. In this sense one may speak of a "socialization" of contract via general
147
clauses, of an eruption of "social situations" into contract law. The present task of
generalclausesconsistsinreducingtherandomnatureofthissocialization,transforming
itsadhoccharacterintoamoresystematictakingintoaccountofsocialrequirements.
Inmoredetail:

I.Interactionlevel

Legal sociology indicates that informal norms arise in dyadic contractual relationships
whichcompetewithformalizedcontractualexpectations.Mutualcoordinationofconduct
and its stabilization across time entrench informal norms in the dyadic contractual
relationship.Theseinformalnormsinfluencetheparties'conductnolessstronglythanthe
148
formalized declarations of the agreement . Clashes at the interaction level result from
145

EMILEDURKHEIM,THEDIVISIONOFLABORINSOCIETY(1933)

146

NiklasLuhmann,Interaktion,Organisation,Gesellschaft,in2SOZIOLOGISCHEAUFKLRUNG,9(N.Luhmann,1975)

147

GerhardStruck,UngleichzeitigkeitimZivilrecht,10DEMOKRATIEUNDRECHT259(1982)

148

Onthis,see Weber,supra,note76,754;THEODOR GEIGER, VORSTUDIENZUEINER SOZIOLOGIEDES RECHTS,46(1964);

Kndgen,supra,note136,167;NIKLASLUHMANN,ASOCIOLOGICALTHEORYOFLAW,25(1985).

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AndGodLaughed

405

disruptions of these norms, when the parties' informal norms collide with contractual
expectations. Via the general clause, judges can recognize those conflicts that arise from
thepersonalinteractionofthecontractingpartiesanddeveloplegalsolutions.Thenorms
generated by the personal interaction system itself reduce the indeterminacy of the
generalclause,which,inturn,validatessolutionaslegal.

II.Institutionlevel

Beyond personal expectations, a set of structural requirements on the contract emerge

due to its involvement in broader institutional contexts, like market and organization.
Contract law must acknowledge this contextualization of the contract, too. Thus, the
general clause assumes the task of coordinating the "external relationships" of the
contract,ensuringthatcontractualobligationssuitinstitutionalstructures.Forreductionof
indeterminacy, the judiciary relies on standards and understandings derived from
institutionalcontext:legallysanctioningsocialstandards;authorizingnormsaptforrolesas
determined by institutional context; redefining roles in response to the "distinctions
directives"oftheinstitution.

III.Societallevel

Inadifferentiatedsociety,thecontractisinterwoveninamultiplicityofsocialspheres(i.e.
"politics", "economy", "family", "culture", "religion"). With this arrangement comes
potential for conflict between the contract and other social spheres. As differentiation
increases, the autonomy of the social spheres increases, but so does their
interdependence;iftheseparateregularitiesofthesocialspheresbecomestronger,sodo
the frictions, contradictions and conflicts among them. Contracts serve to stabilize this
interdependenceacting,asitwere,asislandsofstabilityinaseaofturbulence.Theycan
do this, however, only with the aid of mediatory devices. As with the interactional and
institutionallevels,generalclausestakeoverthisrole.

H.JustitiaMediatrics

Themediatoryroleofgeneralclausesincontractlawenablesustoperceivewaysofcoping
with legal indeterminacy under modern conditions. Unlike in our original rabbis'
hierarchically ordered society, here indeterminacy cannot be put off by the extreme
elevation of the highest layer of authority because functional differentiation of society
means lateral interdependence, not hierarchical order. To deal with the new
indeterminacy, the law must use tools like the general clause to diagnose and address
failuresoftherationalityofdiversesocialdiscourses.Isitsufficientforthelawtoreferto
thesocialdiscourse'sownrationalityordoesafailureofsuchrationality(marketfailures,

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organizationfailures, regulationfailures etc.) necessitate a compensatory legal

formulation in order to take demands of their environment into account? Such a legal
programmewhichattemptstomediatebetweendiversespheresofsociallifeconstitutesa
challengeofthefirstordertothereflectivecapacityoflegaldoctrine.Islegaldoctrineina
positiontocombineconsistencyrequirementsofthelegaldiscoursewiththedemandsof
othersocialspheres?

ThisformulationtakesofffromLuhmann'sreformulationoftheconceptofjustice,relating
justice to the "twofold contingency of social requirements, upon legal stabilization of
conductoflifeontheonehand,andlevelofrequirementwithinthelegalsystemonthe
149
other." Theopenquestion,however,iswhetherlaw,asLuhmannclearlysupposes,can
takeaccountof"socialrequirements"onlyinanadhocway,fromcasetocase,evolving
blindly from one political scandal that sparks off legislation to another. Or is the legal
discourse capable of methodically developing legal criteria for the requirements of the
autopoieticsystemsthatsurroundit?Withanaffirmativeanswertothisquestion,justice
150
a contemporary version of iustitia mediatrix would no longer mediate "vertically"
between the positive and divine law of hierarchically structured societies. Instead, in
response to functional differentiation, it would "horizontally" balance the consistency
requirementsofpositivizedlawandthedemandsofamultiplicityofautopoieticallyclosed
socialspheres.

Yetbothtypesofmediation,bethey"vertical"or"horizontal",onlyreducetheimpactof
theoriginalparadoxoflaw,keepingitlatentandultimatelyfailingtoattaintheproclaimed
achievement of deparadoxification. Rabbi Eliezer's hierarchy of legal sources, topped by
the obscure twilight of natural or divine law had symbolized the latency of this paradox.
Anditsmodernequivalent,functionaldifferentiationofsocialsystems,likewiseservesasa
repressionmechanismmakinginvisiblethefundamentalparadox.Aswithanyrepression
mechanism the repressed paradox of law continually returns by a back door: "And God
laughed...".

149

Niklas Luhmann,Gerechtigkeit in den Rechtssystemendermodernen Gesellschaft, 4 RECHSTHEORIE 131 (1973);

NIKLASLUHMANN,RECHTSSYSTEMUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK(1974)
150

Placentinus,Quaestionesdeiurissubtilitatibus,inQUAESTIONESDEIURISSUBTILITATIBUSDESIRNERIUS,1192(Hermann
Fittinged.,1894)