Contents

Diaz vs IAC................................................................................................................. 1
Pascual vs Pascual Bautista..................................................................................... 7
Corpus vs Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco....................................................................13
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Suntay vs Suntay......................................18
Sandejas vs Lina...................................................................................................... 35
Calisterio vs Calisterio.............................................................................................. 47
Del Rosario vs Conanan............................................................................................ 52

Diaz vs IAC
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA
guardian
of
FEDERICO
SANTERO,
et
al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
FELISA
PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of
First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among
other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in

her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the

properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2)
that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976;
6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the
properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and
B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed

"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

her
13,
the
the

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision
of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1
and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to
interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February
17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession
of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line
3

(Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and

prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of
the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo
Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son
and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P.
Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative
of Simona Pamuti
Vda.
de
Santero
excludes
the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her
direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989
and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate
succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1
and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as
final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the
legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti
Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on
the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
4

the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art.
990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art.
992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
5

Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines
apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our
Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to
pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession
of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted,
in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume
4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
6

barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate

Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the
heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for
reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became
final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the
lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court,
after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution.
The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the
Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and
void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Pascual vs Pascual Bautista

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C.
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
7

WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.

PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUALMARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162,
RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CAG.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court
and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood
of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza
Manuel
Jose
Susana

C.
C.
C.
C.

Pascual-Bautista
Pascual
Pascual
Pascual-Bautista

Erlinda
C.
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

Pascual

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the

deceased, to wit:
Avelino
Pascual
Isoceles
Pascual
Loida
Pascual-Martinez
Virginia
Pascual-Ner
Nona
Pascual-Fernando
Octavio
Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of
the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia
S.
Hermes S. Pascual

Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood

of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga
M.
Pascual
Mamerta
P.
Fugoso
Abraham
S.
Sarmiento,
III
Regina
Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio
P.
Sarmiento
Domiga
P.
San
Diego
Nelia
P.
Marquez
Silvestre
M.
Pascual
Eleuterio
M.
Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental

Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an
affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie
the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.
(Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).

10

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration

(Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July
14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of
Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645
[1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is
not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in
Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children
(Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
11

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of
Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
12

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court

further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which
squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate
child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article
982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in
Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed
by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice

13

Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be
applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that
exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED
LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

14

Corpus vs Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS
CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.
Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS,
RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD
ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventyseven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of
probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73
Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives
were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the
wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L.
Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died
in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles,
the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco,
Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were
the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis
R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared
Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed
by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez

15

and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in
conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate.
should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que
declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios
y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same
un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de
quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of
partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to
conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death
but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o
desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a
Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded
"como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o
morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada
intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of
the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476).
Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and
31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed
to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of
Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus
signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The
estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the
resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14
and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt
dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the
Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full

16

of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge

Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the
settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court
approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was
pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's
estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed
share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the
dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation
rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed
according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the
grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of
Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in
Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the
testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated
January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court
because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos
(Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding
(1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been
duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and
laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether
Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas
Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by
de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir
of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's
supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
17

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The

trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz
appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural
Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R.
Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the
statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907,
that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural
children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus
and Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco,
Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as
found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends
that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section
69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W.
Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a
second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital
venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael
Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in
the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable.
The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are
presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place
between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is
disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a
child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed
and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and
cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
18

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was

illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus,
himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause
of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother,
Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a
legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing
the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado
no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del
padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al
legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code,
pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16
Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he
(Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the
distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds
of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged
natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall
succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they
shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants,
natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers
19

and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers
and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side,
who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of
intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
(Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs.
Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table
the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her
father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil.
128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente
vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs.
Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38
Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Suntay vs Suntay

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE G.R. No. 183053
ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDOSUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
Present:
Petitioner,

CARPIO, J.,

20

Chairperson,
- versus -

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately,
the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are
confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,
[4]
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. [5]

21

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),

married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only
son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and
Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different
women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of

he was a mere baby, nine months old,
and was an acknowledged natural
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
spouses Federico and Cristina.

Emilio III, he was reared ever since

by the spouses Federico and Cristina
child of Emilio I. Nenita is an
and was likewise brought up by the

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel

was annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and
Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately
from their father and paternal grandparents.

22

Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for

visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly,
initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.

Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on

September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita.[7]

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of

letters of administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:

[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of

the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the
[decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a
probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages
and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a
resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita
Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old,
legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at
the time of her death.[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent

Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among
others, that:
23

[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of

administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as
its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference
in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had
been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,]
namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated
to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before
the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who managed
their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate
as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that
Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of
usurpers is untrue.[9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the

proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999,
nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents
estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a
better right to the letters of administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in
his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate
of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own
qualifications that: [he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he
was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979
24

in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences

outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was
employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.
[10]

In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico

died.

After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and

evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court
rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner,
Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is

DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby

appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:

(1)
To make and return within three (3) months,
a true and complete inventory;

(2)
To administer the estate and to pay and
discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or
dividends thereon;

25

(3)
To render a true and just account within one
(1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and

(4)

To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of

Administration be issued in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision

dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court
to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked.
Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

26

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals
by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES;
and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER

WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE
INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE. [13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated,

thus:

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both

testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the
best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants
thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed
administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special
proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court,

[respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent are
apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this
court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum
to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of
27

the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and

bitter estrangement.

The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would

go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III]
from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child.
Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse
x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator.

As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter

is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a),
Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he
vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and
instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child.
Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should
not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after
the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect
to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the
viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its
claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be
one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the
demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent],
a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court
that when it comes to management of real estate and the
processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman
with an established track record as a manager has a decided
edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the
preservation of the estate.[14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an

illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his
28

deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent.
On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated
by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as
administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the
administrator of the decedents estate for the following reasons: [15]

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive

condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he
being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico
before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his
nomination of Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate

offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred,
being the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 [16] of the Civil
Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III,
who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred
over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the
decedent; and

4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as

Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses
none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1, [17] Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents
estate.
29

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III

in the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA
glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to

give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a
valid and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein
for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the

decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled

with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and

30

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in

the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding

Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos
adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent
to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA
even declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse,
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of
the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership. Thus,
we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative
by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in

the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If

no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
31

thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it

may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the

attendant facts and circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long
held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court.[20] In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the

trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the
decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In
the same vein, we declared inDelgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal

consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.

32

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other
putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the
two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated
conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article
992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where
facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a

lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the
Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was

admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of
his
father
and
mother.
The
Civil
Code
of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and
998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate
child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
33

illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue

of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate
child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which
case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would
be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the

deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and,
finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals,
always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done
so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or
affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his
property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and
thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis
of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina,
did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
34

peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for

petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code
that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to

refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue remains

good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,

although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially
opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance
is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If

there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

35

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as
proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject
estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sandejas vs Lina
[G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001]
Heirs

of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P.

SANDEJAS SR. -- ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R.
SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R.
SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS; and heirs of SIXTO S.
SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS,
and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by ROBERTO
R. SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA,respondent.

36

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to
probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir,
but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling
the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such
matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with
the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still
alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision
does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the application
for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under
administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the
probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated April 16, 1999 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 12, 2000, both promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads as follows:[3]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder of the
lower court dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of Earnest Money
With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-fifth
(3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share of [A]dministrator
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the property. The intervenor is hereby directed to
pay appellant the balance of the purchase price of the three-fifth (3/5)
portion of the property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this [O]rder
and x x x the administrator [is directed] to execute the necessary and
proper deeds of conveyance in favor of appellee within thirty (30) days
thereafter.

37

The assailed
disposition.

Resolution

denied

reconsideration

of

the

foregoing

The Facts

The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are as
follows:[4]
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his
wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1, 1981,
Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16). Likewise on the same date,
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator (Record,SP. Proc. No.
R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and
among the records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the case on February 9,
1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February 16, 1983,
the lower court in its [O]rder granted the said motion (Record, SP. Proc. No.
R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and
petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging among
others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro P.
Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their
entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the
late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21121, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13465;
38

2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13464;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, with TCT No. 13468;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS, more
or less, with TCT No. 13468;
The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to [B]uy
is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00, x
x x as additional earnest money for the following:
xxxxxxxxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of Rizal (Makati
Branch Office) in the name of SELLER ELIODORO SANDEJAS, Filipino Citizen,
of legal age, married to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas; and which
undersigned, as SELLER, binds and obligates himself, his heirs,
administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety (all
of the four (4) parcels of land above described, which are contiguous to each
other as to form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy
all of them, also binding on his heirs, administrators and assigns, for the
consideration of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
upon such reasonable terms of payment as may be agreed upon by

39

them. The parties have, however, agreed on the following terms and
conditions:
1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the P70,000.00 earnest
money already received by SELLER from BUYER, all of which shall form part
of, and shall be deducted from, the purchase price of P1,000,000.00, once
the deed of absolute [sale] shall be executed;
2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned
SELLER also acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company Check No. 319912 dated today and payable to SELLER for
P1,000.00;
3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already deceased
and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the settlement of her
estate (Spec. Proc. No. 138393, Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER was
appointed as administrator of said Estate, and as SELLER, in his capacity as
administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that he (SELLER) already
filed a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the above parcels of land
to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due to the burning of the
records of said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records are presently under
reconstitution, the parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from receipt of
the Order authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all THE
ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for
another period of ninety (90) days upon the request of either of the parties
upon the other), within which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering
all above parcels of land;
4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or not be
executed for causes either due to SELLERS fault, or for causes of which the
BUYER is innocent, SELLER binds himself to personally return to Mr. Alex A.
Lina the entire ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND ([P]170,000.00) PESOS
in earnest money received from said Mr. Lina by SELLER, plus fourteen
(14%) percentum interest per annum, all of which shall be considered as
liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the share therein of herein
SELLER;

40

5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions shall be

binding on the heirs, administrators, and assigns of both the SELLER
(undersigned MR. ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX A.
LINA). (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 52-54)
On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an [O]rder granting the
intervention of Alex A. Lina (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 167).
On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas
filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator, Mr.
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada and said
counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the
administrator. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim of
Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of
the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
220). On February 15, 1985, the lower court issued an [O]rder directing,
among others, that the counsel for the four (4) heirs and other heirs of
Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the appointment of [a] new administrator
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this [O]rder (Record, SP. Proc. No. R83-15601, p. 227). In the same manner, on November 4, 1985, the lower
court again issued an order, the content of which reads:
On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto, Antonio, Benjamin all
surnamed Sandejas were ordered to move for the appointment of [a] new
administrator. On October 16, 1985, the same heirs were given a period of
fifteen (15) days from said date within which to move for the appointment of
the new administrator. Compliance was set for October 30, 1985, no
appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The aforenamed heirs are hereby
ordered to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order
why this Petition for Settlement of Estate should not be dismissed for lack of
interest and failure to comply with a lawful order of this Court.
SO ORDERED. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 273)
On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for letters of
administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant case with SP. Proc. No. R-8315601 RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. Proc. No. 85-33707
entitled IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR., ALEX A.
41

LINA PETITIONER, [for letters of administration] (Record, SP. Proc. No. 8533707, pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila issued an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, with
SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-33707, p. 13). Likewise,
on December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued
an [O]rder stating that this Court has no objection to the consolidation of
Special Proceedings No. 85-331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI of
this Court, with the present proceedings now pending before this Branch
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 279).
On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his
appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
Sandejas on the following reasons:
5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any motion on the
part of the heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all surnamed
Sandejas, for the appointment of a new [a]dministrator in place of their
father, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the [p]etitioner is herein
Intervenor Alex A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in effect are
already consolidated, then the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as
[a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in instant
Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs and also to the
Intervenor;
5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to give way at
anytime to any [a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so long as such [a]dministrator is
qualified. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion of
Alex A. Lina as the new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 288290)
On August 28, 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all
surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for [R]econsideration
and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejas, in lieu of
42

[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others that it [was] only lately that
Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed his willingness to act as a new
administrator of the intestate estate of his mother, Remedios R. Sandejas
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2, 1986,
Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion
alleging that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as
[a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R.
Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No. 85-15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be also
appointed as administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father, Eliodoro
P. Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases have been
consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On March 30,
1987, the lower court granted the said [M]otion and substituted Alex Lina
with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said [P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc.
No. 85-33707, p.52). After the payment of the administrators bond (Record,
SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349) and approval thereof by the court
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361), Administrator Sixto Sandejas on
January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc.
No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was likewise issued Letters of Administration on
the same day (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to approve
the deed of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex
A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the
heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. thru their
administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of [I]ntervenor
Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of sale (Record, SP. Proc. No.
83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator filed a [M]otion to
[D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus motion on December 13,
1993 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 591-603).
On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order
granting intervenors [M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of Earnest
Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601,
pp. 652-654). x x x.
The Order of the intestate court[5] disposed as follows:

43

WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenors motion for the approval of the Receipt Of Earnest

Money With Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, 1982, is granted. The
[i]ntervenor is directed to pay the balance of the purchase price amounting
to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and the
Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the
necessary and proper deeds of conveyancing.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to
remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval of the
sale was obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a positive
suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which was not tantamount to a
breach. It was simply an event that prevented the obligation from maturing
or becoming effective. If the condition did not happen, the obligation would
not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89[7] of the Rules of Court was
inapplicable, because the lack of written notice to the other heirs showed the
lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this
reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoy a claim
arising from ones own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a
matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments
as an owner and heir. When he entered into the agreement with respondent,
he bound his conjugal and successional shares in the property.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our

resolution:
a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title
to the property referred to in the subject document which was found to be in
the nature of a contract to sell where the suspensive condition set forth
therein [i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
44

b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith despite the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the burden of
proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d] been filed in court;
c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the
subject property is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter
should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days from receipt
of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent; and
d) Whether or not the respondents petition-in-intervention was converted to
a money claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could
approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute [a] deed of
conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr.[9]
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in
modifying the trial courts Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of
the disputed properties to respondent, even if the suspensive condition had
not been fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral issues: (1) the
settlement courts jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenors standing to file an
application for the approval of the sale of realty in the settlement case, (3)
the decedents bad faith, and (4) the computation of the decedents share in
the realty under administration.
This Courts Ruling

The Petition is partially meritorious.

Main Issue:

Obligation With a Suspensive Condition

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the

disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the
suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the
Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy (also referred to as
the Receipt). Instead, they assert that because this condition had not been
satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was
converted into a money claim.

45

We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased

Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell. Not exactly. In a
contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition. The vendors obligation to convey the title does not become
effective in case of failure to pay.[10]
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent
is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a court approval,
not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the
agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were
supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do
upon the courts approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract
was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the
CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or
effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens or is
fulfilled.[11] Thus, the intestate courts grant of the Motion for Approval of the
sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners obligation to execute the
Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been
satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to
fulfill what they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedents estate per
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however,
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their
own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. [12] In other
words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property
under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect
the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It
merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only
with the courts permission. [13] It would seem that the suspensive condition in
the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners argument that the obligation
was converted into a mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the
Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a situation wherein the sale has
not materialized. In such a case, the seller is bound to return to the buyer

46

the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per annum. But the
sale was approved by the intestate court; hence, the proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in
the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to
the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate
courts ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction.
First Collateral Issue:

Jurisdiction of Settlement Court

Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a)

jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but
to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an
intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or
administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of
the property under administration.
Citing Gil v. Cancio[14] and Acebedo v. Abesamis,[15] petitioners contend
that the CA erred in clothing the settlement court with the jurisdiction to
approve the sale and to compel petitioners to execute the Deed of
Sale. They allege factual differences between these cases and the instant
case, as follows: in Gil, the sale of the realty in administration was a clear
and an unequivocal agreement for the support of the widow and the adopted
child of the decedent; and in Acebedo, a clear sale had been made, and all
the heirs consented to the disposition of their shares in the realty in
administration.
We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this
action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no
bearing on the intestate courts jurisdiction over the approval of the subject
conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the
settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 7577) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of
administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate courts recognized
powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle
47

the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such
settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
[16]

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the
decedents obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under
the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a
separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro
Sr.s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement
of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between
Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was not a definite, clear and
absolute document of sale, as contended by petitioners. Upon the
occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties. [17] That Acebedo also
involved a conditional sale of real property[18] proves that the existence of
the suspensive condition did not remove that property from the jurisdiction
of the intestate court.
Second Collateral Issue: Intervenors Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or
administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty under
administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining
and granting respondents Motion for Approval.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased
contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed.Where the deceased was in his
lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for
that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such
property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are
agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is
to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the
court shall execute the deed. x x x.
48

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same

Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file the
application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate
for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2); [19] or for
authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or
legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not
necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).
[20]
Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of
realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While
this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason
that the proper party must be one who is to be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit. [21]
Third Collateral Issue: Bad Faith

Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he
informed respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the sale of
the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as
his own properties to which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact that
he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically
imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose
of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because his
being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue: Computation of Eliodoros Share

Petitioners aver that the CAs computation of Eliodoro Sr.s share in the
disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of
Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the
remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoros
share should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection
to this computation.[22]
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional
sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro
plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the
decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration. [23]
49

Petitioners computation is correct. The CA computed Eliodoros share as

an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be
based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share. [24]
The proper determination of the seller-heirs shares requires further
explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedents
entire estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be
divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other
half to the heirs of the deceased. [25] After the settlement of the debts and
obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this preliminary
determination of the decedents estate has already been taken into account
by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoros
share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed
Decision
and
Resolution
are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share
equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots.
SO ORDERED.

Calisterio vs Calisterio
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA
ARMAS
Y
CALISTERIO, respondent.

CALISTERIO, petitioner,

vs. MARIETTA

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels
of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by
his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm

50

Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico
and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without
bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated
to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of
the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, formulating that51

"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy
arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated
at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not
a legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of
administration should be granted solely in favor of oppositorappellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring
as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as
of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's
sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the
other half; Msesm
52

"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of

Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's
estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be
appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the
deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the
administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner
asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage
between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn,
would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article
256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to
cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83
of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
53

absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives
exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in
the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must
have done so in good faith. [6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
[7]
The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there
is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,
[10]
of the Family Code. Mesm
54

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first

husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains
to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going
to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled
to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other
hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation
by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to
succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of
the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of
the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise
entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which,
it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate
pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

55

Del Rosario vs Conanan

G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
GERTRUDES
L.
DEL
ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Dante P. Mercado for petitioner
Laig, Ruiz & Associates for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21,
1973, dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said
petition, subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del
Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal
(Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged
between the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a joint
stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the
late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL
ROSARIO is the. legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO.

56

PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally

adopted child of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA
DEL ROSARIO CONANAN
THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO
died last September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.
That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L.
DEL ROSARIO are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O.
CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.
Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be
determined by the court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
that on the basis of the facts stipulated, the Court declare the
heirs of the deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent
portions of which read:
A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed
under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which reads as follows:
Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and
that fact is made to appear to the Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the
petition of an interested person and upon hearing,
which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor
more than three (3) months from the date of the last
publication of a notice which shall be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, and
after such other notice to interested persons as the
court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
57

without the appointment of an executor or

administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if any there is, to determine
who are the persons legally entitled to participate in
the estate, and to apportion and divide it among
them after the payment of such debts of the estate
as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age
and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall
thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded
to them respectively. The court shall make such
order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgment made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in
the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in
the proper registrar's office.
While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is
allowed under the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same
rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of
which does not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition,
however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties
alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to
P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above-the value of the
estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the
petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate
proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same
has not been complied with. Based on the foregoing observation
alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.
But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition
as an exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining
and declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the,
aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate
succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the

58

surviving spouse of the adopter

ascendants from succession, ...

excludes

the

legitimate

The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in

the instant case finds no basis for 'the said article is applicable in
cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of the
adopted child. ...
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being
included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered
as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to
be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69 in
re action to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such
action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court hereby
DISMISSES THE PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO
COSTS (pp, 10-12, rec.).
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and
appeal bond (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.).
I
WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case
of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed in Asuncion
and Castro vs, De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910)
andGutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE
uniformly held that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for
summary settlement of estate under the rules, the requirement that the
amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10,000,00 (P6,000.00
under the old rules) is jurisdictional.
In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty
left by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount of
P33,000.00 which, as the court a quo correctly found, is obviously "over and
above the value allowed under the rules."
59

II
However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the
court a quo in the sense that once wholly sustained, said holding would
preclude petitioner from re-filing the proper action a consequence which,
on the ground of equity and fair play, We cannot allow to befall on petitioner
We deemed it essential, for the guidance of the parties especially herein,
petitioner, to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict.
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343
on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New
Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case:
A
The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil Code
gername to the instant case:
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopted;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted;
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending
direct line.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the
parents and the other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

60

WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343
of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which
directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or
ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have
more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341
which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as
though he were a legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the
inheritance in facor of an adopted person (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is
only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are
naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent
of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where
legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the
deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which
states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves
legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to
onefourth (only) of the hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted
child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the law
is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.

61

It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant
with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the
New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged
natural child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children".
Consequently , the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant and
adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and
illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to
onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so
that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate,
the illegitimate children the other fourth.
B
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973,
emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the material data
rule in that
It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond
were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirment of
Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on
appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time.
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule,
whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant.
The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28,
1973 (53 SCRA 228) andVillanueva vs. Court of Appeal (No. L-29719,
Novemner 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point.
In Villanueva, WE held:

62

The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in the case

of Government of the Philippines vs. Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization that after all
what is of vital importance in the requirement fo Section 6, Rule
41 of the Rules of court is that the Record on Appeal shall show
that the appeal was really perfected within the reglementary
period. If it could ascertained from the record of the case that
the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period,
although such fact did not evidently appear on the face of the
record on appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.
If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected
on time, it should not throw out but assume jurisdiction over it.
After all, that procedural requirement is only intended to enable
the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its
jurisdiction and nothing more (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,
68 SCRA 220, emphasis supplied).
From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of
notice of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the
expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is December
14, 1973. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal on July 10, 1973 or still very much within the reglementary period
to perfect an appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the record on
appeal. And although this is not mentioned in the record on appeal, it is,
nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity of which this COURT does not
doubt.
Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the
Rules of Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.
The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends
of substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimental,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64
SCRA 475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et
al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna
vs. Court of Appeals, Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30 1975, 67 SCRA
503, 506.

63

WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT

PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IS A
COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

64