Innovation, Vol. 12, No.

4, 1999

461

Collective Identities, Friends, Enemies

PHIUP SCHLESINGER

ABSTRACT
This essay explores the inherent issues, questions and complexities that surround the
notion of the European cultural identities. The article points out that, quite apart from the economic
entities that constitute the European continent, Europe is also a problematic sodo-cultural and
socio-political entity. The sodo-cultural and geo-political legacy of the Cold War as well as the perceived
cultural threat west of the Atlantic, have seriously questioned what the term 'European identity' means.
The issue of European and national identity, with all its political connotations, however, will play a
central role in the changes of the European cultural and political space in the years to come. This essay
provides both theoretical and historical reflections on how these factors will shape the developments of the
future.

In view of the numerou.s current discussions about the topic, it has become unavoidable
to think about 'friends' and 'enemies' in Europe. The way we think about this subject
matter is closely connected to the notion of national, supranational, and other forms of
collective identity.
In this article I would like to focus on two aspects that, in my opinion, clearly illustrate
the geopohtical topography of the Cold War which have determined the European
experience the first few years after the Second World War. They are: the division of
Europe, and the competition between the two differing social systemsin short: allies,
enemies, and neutral countries. The two examples I have chosen are perhaps contrary;
they are, however, connected in respect of being symptoms of the advent of a
disintegration of a reliable and planned European order of things, whereby the order of
things is being replaced by another at a breakneck pace.
My first example is the 'Cold War' through which we have all lived. There were in
fact two Cold Wars (Halliday, 1983). The second Cold War started in 1979 and has
experienced, since the Reykjavik summit, an about-face of extraordinary speed which led
to an accelerated detente.
This event carries within it certain necessary effects on Western culture and ideology
and challenges the conventional perception concerning the behaviour of 'friends' and
'enemies'. These changes allow the consequences of differing power structures between
groups of nations to develop.
The second controversy also concerns the cultural effects of changing powr alliances,
this time, however, within the West; it concerns the cultural resistance of Europe, which
has, hesitatingly, and uncertain in its opposing America, developed itself. European
bureaucrats like citing the observations that Jean Monnet made: 'With the newly
founded European Community we should start with culture'. The European cultural
1351-1610/99/040461-09 1999 Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences

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Philip Schksinger

industry, of which TV programming is a clear example, makes up the core of this

intellectual endeavour.
Yet, economic logic enjoys dressing itself in wording about choice over unity in
plurality, so that the sale of (West) European culture actually contains within it a serious
resolution of reformthe design of a type of European identity, with which existing
national and regional identides should interact dialectically. Provided that such an intent
of reform is realizable.

n
Before continuing, the question of national idendty and its conceptualization should be
addressed. It concerns a fundamental aspect of the discussion involved. Independent of
one's own posidon concerning this question, the nation has been, since the nineteenth
century, the determining place of collective loyalty and identity (Breuilly, 1985), The
nation is a mechanism to warrant equalit)', namely for, what Emst Gellner called,
centrally educated and culturally homogeneous groups (Gellner, 1983, p. 35). The
establishment of similarity, however, simultaneously causes variance. The concept of
national unity, in extreme cases, contains the classification of friends and foes, or at least
a differentiadon of 'them' and 'us', though it merely concerns certain characteristics of
classification practices that forcibly emerge from all notions of collective membership.
Enemies may be found outside national boundaries or also within; namely in the form
of traitorsas a notorious British notion which, following the end of the Cold War,
enjoyed an immense impetus. Friends can also be found outside the borders of nations:
allies are those who are as we are and with whom we are affiliated through equality and
fraternity.
Expressed in anthropological terms, we are talking about classification relationships. In
his reflections on nationalism, Bennedict Anderson noted that nationalism concerns 'a
conceived political community', independent of 'factual inequalities and exploitation',
which must be understood as a 'deep seated, horizontal camaraderie'. Today, separatism
as well as nationalism lay claim to this camaraderie (Anderson, 1983, p, 15r.).
Within the scope of this paper there is neither the place nor the time for the dry
exercise of definition. Yet, it seems important to note that one feature of the idea of the
'national identity' is its conceptuzil vagueness; despite its frequent useand in view of the
current political constellationsincreasingly so. One barely finds any attempt to define
the notion in any scientific literature (Schlesinger, 1987).
Without wanting to address the problem more closely, I would like, at this point, to
suggest some points of reference. They are quite abstract but their usefulness will emerge
in the course of the analysis.
National identity is, first of all, bound up with a form of collective identity. This
implies a decision making process of inclusion and, respectively, exclusion, concerning
the levels of social organization. At this point 'friends' and others enter the stage;
because, taking collective emotions into consideration, the notion of the enemy in
opposition ineluctably and often tragically presents itself. Aside from the fact that
national ideology may want us to believe in them, these identities essentially present no
identifiable characterisdcs. No lasting aspects of inherited attitudes continue linearly.
Identities are, rather, in the words of Anthony P, Cohen (1985), to be conceived as
symbolic constructions, which are independent of time and space, continually being
formed.
Concerning time, the relationship between the past and the present condition of

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463

national identity is of the utmost importance. These relationships are partially to be

understood as imagined, related through selectively rehashed arguments espousing
traditions and mechanisms of social consciousness.
Space, in the current context, refers to a world-vkide system of nation-states that
represent territorial, judicial and political concurrent circumstances, thus the relevant
limitations related to national identity and the reproduction thereof. National borders
can, however, be newly drawn, and systems of alliance, as symbolic boundary agreements and collective identities, may be shifted. In addition, alliances are beginning to
show signs of disintegration.
And this leads to dealing with the first of the two themes addressed by this essay.

m
One of the most profound cultural consequences of the Cold War has been the way in
which the main notion of Europe as a social-cultural space has been divided in two. We
are used to viewing these divisions as separate, contrasting political and economic
competitive systems. Here, however, another understanding is involved. The notion of a
break with the idea of an ideal 'European Consciousness', one without a common
culture, community or civilization, one that could overcome the present partition. Such
an understanding, such a symbolic crossing of frontiers, would create new identities that
would challenge the current conceptual organization of space in national alliances and
competing social systems. One is, nevertheless, immediately confronted with the fact that
such a conceptual design, on the basis of the aforementioned processes of exclusion and
unification, ends up being problematic.
On the one hand, as Barker has it, a southern conception of Europe exists, its origin
being ancient Greece; one that has the Mediterranean area as its centre, i.e. 'a sea that
is enclosed by its shores and its hinterland'. On the other hand, there is a northern,
viewed as modem, point of view seeing Europe as 'a long horizontal peninsula, stretching
from west to east (depending on one's point of view from east to west) which is physically
perceived of as an appendix ofthe huge Asian landmass' (Barker, 1954, p. 296). Even the
concepts of geography fail to commit the physical space known as Europe to any viable
notion.
For the current discussion, Europe is seen 'also as a cultural and moral concepdon,
that, at least in the last centuries, and at least in the minds of an educated minority has
contained its own mysticism and will continue to do so' (Seton-Watson 1985, p. 158). It
is in these spheres of morality' and culture that the questions of friendship, enmity and
neutrality emerge. Seton-Watson claims that, for the intellectual elite, the secular
conception of Europe replaces that which was lost after the disintegration of Christianity.
The European dichotomy of the post-war period is thus merely the latest chaUenge
facing such a unified secular conception. It is debatable whether the argumentation for
such a common civilization is plausible or not. Be that as it may, even if this conception
contains not the slightest plausibility, the fact still remains that in current political
discourse it is implicidy taiken as a point of reference.

IV
The initiatives token by the Soviet Union of President Gorbachev in the area of arms
control and inner reform have put on the agenda a new reasoning ofthe existing concept
of a 'European Consciousness'. On the level of ideological argument it is not possible

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to disregard the fact that the doubdess consequences of friendship and enmity as well as
views of enclosed social spaces can be ignored in the future. Such consequences are
unevenly spread and by no means irreversible; they do, however, exist.
I wish to illustrate my argument by referring to a study done a while back. I am referring
to the study of communism, seen as a cultural category, done by the late Philip Elliot and
me (Elliot and Schlesinger, 1979, 1980). The opportunity to do this research presented
itself from the observation that a short-lived phenomenon known as 'euro-communism'
began to challenge the Cold War way of thinking.
In view of clear losses at the voting booths, which the large communist parties have
had to put up with, it is currently difficult, perhaps, to remind oneself of the fact that 10
years ago they had gained so dramatically, especially in France, Italy, and Spain; in the
chancelleries, in the respective foreign office planning groups as well as the media, the
alarm was sounded.
The anti-communists on the right had coined the term 'euro-communism' in order to
warn that the Western, liberal-democratic, capitalist order was being threatened from
within. The theory of the totalitarian state shaped the predominant explanatory frame
to classify eastern Europe. In academic circles, a more rigorous dealing with the conception
of the totalitarian state has taken place for quite some time, which will not be addressed
at this time (see Friedrich et al., 1969; Curtis, 1979). In order to give a short account, the
following main defining characteristics were differentiated: national leadership by a single
political party, an omnipresent state security, adjustment by terrorizing the population,
as well as a state monopoly of social, political, cultural, and economic life.
The actual meaning of this model of the totalitarian state lies in the fact that it is not
only the analytic approach it presentsno matter how questionable it may bebut also
a politically and culturally common category.
For the Western alliance, totalitarianism still contains the key concept in order to
understand the 'other', that is, the foe. The scholastic efforts at the beginning of President
Reagan's first term of office revealed, in a drastic way, that these concepts formed a pivotal
issueone wanted to merely classify brutal rightist dictatorships as authoritarian in order
to scare the left. The latter were classified as real-authoritarian (Herman, 1982). It does
not, however, involve a mere kind of idle preoccupation for happy intellectuals who are
immune to this type of opium (Aron, 1995; Jean-Francois Revel, 1977).
Let us, instead, speak of a way of thinking which, through continuing work done by
the media, has found a broad base in the West and which, doubtless, has a great deal
of support. In this respect, an interpretation of communism has formed, that of an opposing
enemy, a part of which is bound up with what Pierre Bourdieu (1971) has named the
'main patterns' of our culture.
On the basis of a qualitative analysis of news coverage in the media as well as of social
theory, Phillip Elliot and I came to the conclusion that at the core of the perception of
the Cold War there were themes which had dominated the propaganda against the enemy:
differences, threats and irrationality were part of the key categories that were used. This
would be extended into the interpretation of national and international terrorism as well
(Schlesinger et al., 1983).
The assessment of 'euro-communism' reads as follows: that on more than one level,
for different interests, a threat is constituted. On a national level, as emphasized in the
sceptical argumentation, it is considered an aberration of the norm as well as of its foreign
connections, independent of whether it involves 'la terza via' in Italy or the 'socialism aux
couleurs de la France' in France. Because national communism involves a foreign
confession of faith, in whatever guise it may have presented itself, it has never really been
able to possess a true national character.

Collective Identities, Friends, Enemies 465

There is a narrowing form of perception which has, to date, contributed to these
parties being excluded. The reaction on an international level was more interesting,
however. Within the Western alliance there where essentially two differing interpretations. The main interpretation followed along the lines of the totalitarian theory.
It took the basic assumption that communism was unchangeable, in spite of the
manifestations of the Western communist parties, whereby they would want to discontinue the democratic centralism and then the pluralism as well as acknowledge the Nato
after which the Soviet Union would no longer be recognized as the beacon of socialism.
All of this would change nothing in the nature of communism that contained aggressive,
repressive, and expansionist intentions.
Aside from this, there was a further position, which one could describe as the 'theory
of containment', and which was limited especially to groups of educated experts in
foreign policy. Their central premise read that new developments should not be
dismissed a priori. Moreover, this social-democratically tamed form of communism could
be integrated in the capitalist order of things.
In their analysis, the containment theorists pointed to the fact that euro-communism
could destabilize the Soviet model. After all, the terza via owed much to the Polish
October as did the Prague Spring. Furthermore, clear echoes were heard among the
'reform-communists' in the East. The predominant analysis in the West and the official
reaction in Moscow and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries agree that euro-communism meant a threat to the symbolic frontiers of these alliances. One did not, of course,
share the Western point of view in Moscow, that euro-communism was a mask covering
an unchanged Leninism; in Moscow one, on no account, viewed it as a hidden
expression of true faith, but as heresy, as a revisionism that had to be damned.
Because of the problems faced by its alleged representatives at the voting booths,
euro-communism rapidly disappeared as a term in political culture. Even the parties that
supposedly characterized the term never really fully accepted it. When euro-communism
assumed its positive connotationwhen it acquired its aura of dignity from liberal
democracyit was used for the purpose of polemic arguments. On other occasions,
though, it seemed appropriate to emphasize the nationalistic character of the singular
party and to distance itself from the term 'euro'.
In my view, this narrative clearly illustrates the state's control over ideological frontiers
and, as far as the West is concerned, the resistance against their enemies from within and
against new definition of friends. As far as the East is concerned, there was a negative
official reaction against the spectrum of a renewal of reform-communism which, this
time, in the guise of a 'European Consciousness' questioned the trenches between the
East and the West.

With the rise of Gorbachev to power, the state of affairs changed. One of the most
interesting aspects of Gorbachev's experiment involved the Western press' creative drive
of lexical enhancement, whereby the words glasnost and perestjoika headed the list. Even
though at the time it was unclear whether reforms would be carried out or not, the
propaganda effect was indisputable; through a relative liberalization in the cultural
domain, the Gorbachev experiment has reached its objective because of its support by
members of the Western intellectual community.
In present-day Great Britain of the late eighties, ironic counterpoints to glasrwst could

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be observed; ones that could not be overlooked. At the time when steps were taken to
face up to the history of Stahnism, a considerable interest in historical content taught in
schools unfolded itself in British government. According to Sir Keith Joseph, the
one-time conservative minister of education, history should be the priority means in
order to spread the 'common values and outstanding characteristics of its culture' (Kaye,
1987, p. 13); a formula diat raise more questions than it answered.
The meaning of these proceedings can scarcely be overlooked, especially when one is
reminded of the polemics between Habermas and Nolte concerning the interpretation of
die Third Reich in the autumn of 1986 (Habermas, 1986; Rusconi, 1986; Pulzer, 1987),
or when one thinks of Waldheim's presidency in Austria, or the discussion with regards
to the problem of the 'Anschluss'.
A further counterpoint originating in Great Britain: in January of 1987 the offices of
the BBC were searched by the secret service and unviewed film material of a series, that
presented controversial questions concerning national security, was confiscated. Afterwards, a former agent of the secret service claimed that a conspiracy to destabilize the
democratically elected government led by the Labour Party had taken place in the 1970s.
He recounted further that a quite normal infiltration of the secret service by soviet agents
at the highest levels had taken place. With intense activities of the justice department,
Mrs Thatcher ensured that the press was hushed up.
Who are the friends, who are the friends from within? The magazine The Economist,
which can hardly be reproached for its leftist slant, published an issue within which a
white page announced that it was prohibited from commenting on the 'Spycatcher' case
(25 July 1987, p. 77).
There seems to be something wrong. In this case it is the British politicians who
condemn the police state methods in their own country. Precisely as is done in an east
European state; so they say. And they can remember well when they found similar white
pages in the Polish press when they visited that country during the time of martial law.
Now, one should not misunderstand that I wish to presume that freedom of speech in
Great Britain is less than that exercised in the Soviet Union of the late eighties; I would
like to show, however, how a tendency to liberalize from within a leading regime in the
East confronted by an authoritarian tendency in a mid-sized country in the West allows
us to see the Manichaean viewpoint as fragile.
There is a furtJier consequence of the current changes in the Soviet Union, one which
is a pet subject of the east European intellectuals as well as those of Germany and
Austria. In recent years, especially since the early 1980s, there have been extensive
discussions around the notion of central Europe.
As different commentators have realized, authors of the former Czechoslovakia, of
Poland, and Hungary have begun to renew their conceptualization of central Europe,
whereby they base their notions in cultural pluralism. With this, a type of moral
programme has emerged that is juxtaposed against an existing eastern Europe (Ascherson, 1987). It is unavoidable, though, that such an enterprise will clash with its historical
enmities and patterns of co-existence as well. As Jacques Rupnik has pointed out, all
revived conceptions of a central Europe necessarily involve a definition containing the
relationships to Germany as well as Russia: 'In the eyes of Slav nations in the eastern
part of central Europe, Russia has frequendy formed a counterbalance to the German
push to the East; its inverse means a re-discovery of central Europe and is a connected
conception of the German question, that is, as polarity to a process of Soviet influence
(Rupnik, 1986, p. 338).
Others pointed to the implications of a changed order of things in Europe, especially
in respect of a possible reunification of Germany (in the meantime completed) as a

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467

consequence of the peace pact between the East and the West. Let me cite Peter Glotz,
the late general secretary of the SPD: 'There is always a risk that "central-Europe" will
be perceived of as a German hegemony or an Austro-German hegemony over Hungary,
Czechoslovakia as well as all other small states in central- and eastern-Europe, This is not
our intention,' Instead, he suggests, the concept contains a 'zone of disarmament',
'scientific relationships', and 'reciprocal exchange of our closely connected cultures'. For
our purposes here it is revealing as to what Mr Glotz had to say about Gorbachev's
initiatives concerning limitations of armament, namely that: 'our understanding of
enmity will change', whereas Brezhnev 'maintained the traditional conception of the
enemy' (Glotz/Hobsbawm, 1987, p, 14f.).

VI
Let us now address the second example. In the official western Europe, in the Europe
of the European Community, there exists a dire need to establish a collective identity.
Why? Because from overseas a threat, in the form of American TV programming, is
proceeding towards us.
This description can, in reality, be appreciated as a type of compact form of a
deep-seated dismay about the general question of the flow of culture and information in
the broadest sense. As I have already explained, subject to consideration is an economic
logic that results out of concern for European competitiveness in the capitalist world
market. However, it does not mean that it can withhold itself from the consequences,
resulting from such logic, on the cultural level or the corresponding assumptions which,
for that reason, will be collectively employed.
Concerning this question, official thought advocates a simple theory of cultural
imperialism, based on the fear that an extensive reception of programmes from other
countries (especially from the US with its strong culture or its variations of cultures) and
those of Europe would, in time, erode values as well as appropriate pride in one's own
traditions. An additional disquietude exists that excessive use of audio-visual materials
from the US could have similar negative effects on society and its identity; that, seen as
a whole, in Europe, already exists in significant proportion, and 'according to intentions
of European institutions, should be increased'. (Pragnell, 1985, p. 5)
While America is no enemy, it is still a rival whose cultural presence on European soil
should be restricted. We are doubdessly dealing with a partial interpretation of the
principle of limitation that has, in no way, a need to be effective in order to be of
sociological interest.
Herewith, three remarks that immediately come to mind. First, it is, on the one hand,
assumed that a collective culture exists, that already helps Europeans find a collective
identityin so far as they live in one of the member states of the EC. In a fortunate
opposition to this, one assumes, on the other hand, that culture must be the means by
which such an identity is achieved.
In opposidon to this simple model of the effect of the media, that demonstrably is
pleasing in Brussels, we must, secondly, adopt a much more complex supply of cultural
variety and allow for an analytic process of selective interpretation; as we should also
develop syncretic abilities of cultures.
Third, is the conception of a European identity, which lies at the foundation of this
enterprise, and is extremely and blatanUy vague. In official documentation it is said that:
under the superficial differences of languages, tastes, and artistic styles, there are
similarities, a congeniality, a European dimension or identity, founded on a common

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Philip Schlesinger

heritage. In the course of the centuries, differing contributions, individuals, ideas, styles,
and values have created a common civilization' (Commission of the European Community, 1985, p. 3).
Formulated in a different way: we are more than just friends; we are, at our innermost,
a family. Can we accept one interpretation of European history that is so flattering that
it has already entered the realm of hypocrisy? It is exactly the vagueness of this formula
that is proof of the problems that we have in getting a grasp of our real history.
WTiat about the centuries where the old continent was characterized by war? What
about the global imperialist expansion, that was, inter alia, an effort to export culture?
Have we not induced our current situation?The places at which oflicial history is silent
are symptomatic; the suggested common identity is based on a common disregard of our
appalling past, especially the destrtiction resulting from the Second World War.
We can say that such 'eurocratic' vagueness is excusable. At a new beginning, there
is a need for a new founding myth, but history is not silent.
As we experienced in the late eighties, during the Waldheim affair and during the
Barbie trials, as well as the beginnings of the confrontation with the heritage of Stalin,
there must be, as long as there are conflicting recollections, an ongoing re-examination
of the past. It is unavoidable that national consciousness necessitates a process of
selection as well as dealing with its subject matter; what can be accepted as a truth and
what can be sanctioned as collective identity.
This is also valid, and even more complex, when a supranational structure, such as the
EU, is involved, because it lays claim to loyalties, that, in their rudimentary structures of
sentiment, may run contrary to people who are rooted in their countries, ethnic
groupings and states.
These considerations seem far removed from the practical necessities that emerge,
when one wants to forge unified political guidelines for the cultural industry. In reality,
each of the proposals for a coherent construction of a European cultural identity, or
rather identities, have been rejected.
They have, for this reason, a grave influence upon how we perceive our friends and
others.

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