Case Digests in Crim2

BASA, Michelle Yvonne L.
Case Digests
ARBITRARY DETENTION
(1) ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, WenefredoManiscan, Renato Militante,
CrisantoPelias, SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Kr. and SPO1 RufoCapoquian, members of DENR Regional
Operations Group, were sent to Western Samar to conduct possible illegal logging activities.
Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Benito Astorga was found to be the owner of two (2)
boats. A heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten armed men
arrived in the scene. The offended parties were then brought to Mayor Astogas house where
they had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian further admitted that it was
raining during the time of their detention.
Mayor Astorga was convicted of arbitrary detention by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.
Held:
No. The
1. That
2. That
3. That
elements of arbitrary detention are as follows:

the offender is a public officer or employee.
he detains a person.
the detention is without legal ground.
The determinative factor in arbitrary detention is fear. The Court found no proof that Astorga
instilled fear in the minds of the offended parties. There was also no actual restraint imposed on
the offended parties. The events that transpired created reasonable doubt and are capable of
other interpretations. Mayor Astorga could have extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the offended parties. He could have advised them to stay in the island inasmuch as sea
travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. Astorga even ate and served alcoholic drinks
during dinner. The guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty. Astorga was
acquitted.
(2) CAYAO vs. DEL MUNDO

Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Fernando Cayao with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging Judge Justianiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority. Cayao, a bus driver
overtook another bus. As a consequence, Cayao almost collided head-on with an oncoming
owner-type jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was brought by the policemen in the
sala of Judge Del Mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to choose from 3 alternative
punishments: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b)revocation of his drivers
license; or (c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose confinement
for 3 days and was forced to sign a waiver of detention by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was
released after 3 days.
Issue:
Professor: Fiscal Nelson Salva
Criminal Law 2 | Page 1
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Whether Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary detention.
Held:
Cayao was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. When Judge Del
Mundo insisted on punishing him without a chance to air his side, Cayao was deprived from the
presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and
public trial. Judge Del Mundo used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the
complainant as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his excesses.
Justice Del Mundo was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued
leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS

(1) PEOPLE vs. GARCIA
Facts:
Senior Inspector Oliver Enmodias and SPO3 Jose Panganiban arrested Garcia on the ground of
illegal possession of 5 kilos of marijuana. Thereafter, Garcia was taken to the CIS office for
further investigation. Garcia was charged with the crime of illegal possession of 5 kilos of
marijuana and was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death. Garcia claims that the
uncorroborated testimony of Enmodias was insufficient to establish his guilt. Furthermore, Judge
de Guzman, Jr. has filed an application for disability retirement on April 12, 1996. Judge de
Guzmans retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996. Hence, the decision in Garcias
case dated February 20, 1996 was said to be void and has no binding effect.
Issues:
- Whether the police officers were liable for arbitrary detention.
- Whether the decision convicting Garcia was not validly promulgated as the promulgation was
made 4 days after the retirement of the judge who penned the decision.
- Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecution witness (Enmodias) was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
(1)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who shall
detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for 36
hours for crimes punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. The record bears that Garcia was
in possession of 5 kilos of marijuana, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. (2)A
decision promulgated after the retirement of the judge who signed it is null and void. To be
precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally instituted
and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified
and actually acting either de jure or de facto. (3) The court found the testimony of Enmodias
credible to sustain a judgment of conviction.

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The SC affirmed Garcias conviction but reduced his penalty to reclusion perpetua for lack of
aggravating circumstance. Additional penalty of P10M was likewise imposed.
(2) AGBAY vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN

Facts:
Jasper Agbay and Sherwin Jugalbot was arrested and detained for an alleged violation of RA
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act. A case was filed before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court. However, Jugalbot was
released while Agbay was detained in the police station. Counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of
Police to demand release of Agbay for failure to deliver Agbay to the proper judicial authority
within 36 hours. By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated October 10,
1995, of the Office of the Ombudsman, the case for delay in the delivery filed by Agbay before
the Deputy Ombudsman was transferred to the Deputy Ombudman for the Military for proper
disposition. Agbay contended that the proper judicial authority is the Regional Trial Court, not
the MCTC.
Issues:
- Whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate civilian
personnel of the government.
- Whether there is delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper authority.
Held:
It is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct
preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind
Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for
and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has
been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.
The Court dismissed Agbays petition for reconsideration.
REBELLION
(1) PEOPLE vs. OLIVA
Facts:
Appellants Oscar Oliva, Edgar Manlapaz, BocoySeachon, MetchelIbaya, Joel Cinco, Amy Inopia,
Ka Nelly, John Doe And Peter Doe, KaYoli, KaGerson, NoliSalcedo, BogoyManlapaz,
VirgilioPanguilinan, KaRiza, Ka Liza who represented themselves as NPA were charged with
kidnapping with murder committed against Jacinto Magbojos. No eyewitness saw the actual
killings of the victim, but appellants were convicted of murder on the basis of several
circumstantial evidence deduced from the testimonies of three (3) prosecution witnesses.

Issues:
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- Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution evidence and convicting
appellants for the crime of murder instead of rebellion.
- Whether there are no sufficient circumstances to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Oliva
took part in the commission of the crime
- Whether the killing is qualified by treachery.
Held:
The settled rule is that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. In the case at bar, although the fact of
death and the identity of the victim and the identity of the perpetrators were established, there
is no proof at all on how the killing was done. Thus, absent any particulars as to the manner in
which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.
Since no qualifying circumstance was proved in this case, the crime committed is only homicide,
not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is
only reclusion temporal. Appellants Oscar Oliva and NoliSalcedo are hereby found GUILTY of
HOMICIDE.
(2) PEOPLE vs. LOVEDIORO

Facts:
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was shot several times by Elias Lovedioro y Castro and three others.
Lovedioro was identified by Nestor Armenta as one of the persons who shot SPO3 Lucilo. Lucilo
died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the
chest, and other parts of the body.Lovedioro was charged with murder under Article 248 of the
RPC. Lovedioro contends that he should not be charged with murder but rebellion since he is a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA).
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in finding Lovedioro guilty of murder and not rebellion.
Held:
Rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds.In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion,
not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in
furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose
and overt acts are essential components of the crime.If no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. Treachery
was adequately proved in the trial court. The killing having been qualified by treachery, the
crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.
DIRECT ASSAULT
Case Digests
(1) PEOPLE vs. ABALOS

Facts:
Police Major Cecilio Abalos, father of Tiburcio Abalos, was scolding an employee for turning in
PhP200 only for their transportation business. Tiburcio Abalos, aked his father to stop scolding
them and just let them attend barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder and and caused a
heated argument between the two. Pfc. Sofronia Labine appeared on the scene and asked Cecilio
Abalos if everything was all right, Tiburcio got a piece of wood and struck Labine on the right
side of his head. Labine collapsed and later died due to sever skull fracture. In Tiburcios
testimony, he admitted striking Labine with the erroneous belief that Labine was a member of
the NPA.
Issues:
- Whether Tiburcio ABalos is liable for Murder
- Whether Tiburcio Abalos is liable for direct assault.
Held:
Decision of the Lower Court: The Regional Trial Court charge Tiburcio ABalos guilty of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder . He was sentenced to life imprisonment with
accessories of the law, he was toindemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of PhP30,000,
actual and compensatory damages of Php2663, with PhP15,000 as moral damagaes and to pay
the cost.
Decision of the Appellate Court: The appellate court affirmed the decision that it is a complex
crime of direct assault with murder. Labine was a person in authority and was performing his
duty when Tiburcio struck him. The crime falls under the 2 nd mode of direct assault without
public uprising. The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver
offense to be imposed in the maximum period. In this case, murder is the more serious crime, it
carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Death should be the penalty but since,there
is existing proscription for the penalty of death, the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The indemnity payable to the heirs is PhP 50,000. The decision affirmed with modifications to
sentence. Cost against the accused-appellant.
(2) PEOPLE vs. TAC-AN

Facts:
Renato Tac-an and Francis Ernest Escano III were classmates in 3rd yr highschool at Divine
World College at Tagbilaran City. They are members of the same gang. They had a falling out
when Escano decided to leave the gang.
On Dec 14, 1984, 2pm, during the English class of Mrs Baluma, a fistfight occurred between
Renato and Francis. Mrs Baluma and Mr Pasilbas intervened. They shook hands and seat

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themselves for class. While classes were ongoing, Renato left the room. During Math class under
Mr Pasilbas at 3pm, Renato burst inside the room and shouted for Francis. Upon sighting, Renato
fired at Francis. The class rushed outside the door. Renato fired at Francis for the fourth time,
hitting Francis on the head. He fell to floor and bled profusely. Renato left the room. Renato was
approached by Mr Baluma, who did not know that Renato was the one who gunned Francis. Mr
Baluma asked Renato for help to save Francis as he is still breathing. Renato went back to the
room and shot Francis, hitting his back.
Issues:
- Whether Tac-an is liable for direct assault for taking the teachers as hostage.
- Whether direct assault may be used as an aggravating circumstance for the crime committed.
- Whether the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
Held:
Decision of the Lower Court: The Regional Trial Court found Tac-an guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions qualified with murder under sec 1 par 1
and 2 of PD1866 and sentenced him to suffer death.
Decision of the Appellate Court: While a teacher or a professor may be categorized as person in
authority in Art 152, this is only for the purpose of application to Art 148(direct assault upon
person in authority). A penal statute cannot be given a broader scope to the disadvantage of an
accused. In the case at bar, aggravating circumstance of having acted with contempt of or insult
to public authorities was deleted and not taken into account. The decision of the trial court was
affirmed with modifications.
FALSIFICATION
(1) GARCIA vs. CA
Facts:
On or about January, 1991 in Pasay City, petitioner Abella Garcia, being then in possession of a
receipt for P5,000 dated January 21, 1991, issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial payment
of the sale of a house and lot situated at No. 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by
Quijada to Garcia, Garcia with intent to defraud and damage Quijada Jr made alterations and
wrote words , figures and phrases to the original receipt which completely changed its meaning
by making appear thereon that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of P55, 000
when in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount P5,000.
Abella appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA modified the penalty by lowering it, but
affirmed the conviction. The CA was unconvinced by Abellas explanations regarding the
circumstances under which the alterations were made.
Issue:

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Whether Abella Garcia committed the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Held:
The Court held that the findings of the trial court which was affirmed by the appellate court are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, for it is not the function of this Court to analyze
and weigh the parties evidence all over again, except when there is serious ground to believe a
possible miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Given the admissions of Abella that she
altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of
private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, Abellas conviction. The Court now considers that the correct
modification of penalty was imposed by the Court of Appeals taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Abella Garcias conviction in Criminal Case No.
92-0250 isAFFIRMED along with her sentence to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000) and the costs.
(2) RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin,
petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her agricultural land with
an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol
mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute
a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of
Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol. Recebido refused to
allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property because she had sold her property to him in 1979.
Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property
was a mortgage.
Issues:
- Whether the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed?
- Whether the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of discretion in sustaining the conviction
of the petitioner?
- Whether the Court of Appeals committed grievous error in affirming the decision of the trial
court for the petitioner to vacate the land in question owned by the offended party?
Held:
On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only during the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there was no waiver of the
defense.
On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court. The petitioner admits that

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the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and
appellate court.
On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without jurisdiction to order
petitioner to vacate the land in question considering that the crime for which he is charged is
falsification.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000.
ACCORDINGLY, is instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PERJURY
(1) BURGOS vs. AQUINO
Facts:
In this administrative matter, the complainant Virginia Burgos charged the respondent of
immorality for maintaining illicit relations with complainants husband which eventually begot
them a child, named Jocelyn Burgos. The respondent in her comment admitted that she had an
illicit relation with complainants husband but the illicit relation allegedly happened prior to her
employment in the judiciary. She claimed that that the affair occurred in 1979 and their love
child was born on March 1980 and that she joined the judiciary only on 1981. She further
claimed that she had severed her relation with Atty. Burgos arising from their disagreement over
support. In the complainants reply, she claimed that the respondents and her husbands
relationship still continues.
Issues:
- Whether the respondent should be suspended for immorality; and
- Whether the defense of the respondent is truthful or makes her liable for perjury
Held:
Respondent Josefina Aquino was suspended for six months for immorality and was found guilty
of perjury. The office of the Court Administrator found that indeed the respondent committed an
immoral act while in the government service regardless of whether it was committed when
employed in the judiciary. Whether the immoral relation still subsists is no longer material. The
Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OCA, further the evidence proved that on some
pleadings by Atty, Burgos and typed by the respondent; bear the initials of both Atty.Burgos and
the respondent. The defense of the respondent that their relationship has ended was not proved
due to these circumstances. The records also reveled that in some of the documents submitted
by the respondent; she did not revealed about her child. Under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before
a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Her
deliberate omission to disclose her child without a valid justification makes her liable for perjury.
(2) DIAZ vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
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Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document before
the Court of first Instance of Pampanga. He was found guilty as charged. On appeal, the court
modified its decision increasing the penalty of the accused. Hence this petition. The facts of the
case are as follows:
Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School in San Fernando Pampanga.
He sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I, and as one of the requirements to
said appointment, he filled up Civil Service Form 212 and swore to the truth and veracity of the
date and information therein that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.
(Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges. On that basis, he
was appointed to the position. But contrary to the claim of petitioner, he was never enrolled at
the Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardian
Colleges, certified by the schools president. The name of the petitioner was not also included in
all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools.
Issues:
-
Whether the accused is guilty of falsification; and

Whether the evidence presented falls within the crime defined as falsification
Held:
The court held that the crime committed was not falsification but Perjury, which is the willful and
corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a
material matter. The elements of which are; a) the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter, ; b) that the statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; c.) that the statement or
affidavit, the accused made a deliberate assertion of a falsehood; d.) that the sworn statement
or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the elements enumerated therein are present in the case at bar, thus the accused is guilty of
perjury. The decision of Court of Appeals was modified, finding the accused guilty of perjury,
imposing the corresponding penalty therein and not of falsification.
MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS

(1) OUANO vs. CA
Facts:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square
meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, Identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1 It was covered
by Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation 'Finance
Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are
lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J.
Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the conflicting claims over this lot by the vendee
thereof, Echavez, and Ouano.

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Two material facts, however, about which Ouano and Echavez are in agreement, render these
questions of academic interest only, said facts being determinative of this dispute on an
altogether different ground. These facts are:
1) that they bad both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding
called by the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to
their adjoining properties; and
2) that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other party
known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to withdraw from the
sale, paying said group P2, 000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 29
Issue:
Did Ouano commit the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article
185 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals was thus
correct, being plainly in accord with the Civil Code provisions just referred to. 31 Article 1411
also dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of
the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as mandated by the
provisions of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the
Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes
"applicable to the things or the price of the contract."
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED, so that in addition to
affirming the Trial Court's judgment dismissing Ouano's complaint and Echavez's counterclaim in
Civil Case No. R-8011, Lot No. 3-A-1 subject of said case is ordered FORFEITED in its entirety in
favor of the Government of the Philippines. No pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this
Decision be furnished the Solicitor General.
IMMORAL DOCTRINES
(1) FERNANDO vs. CA
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 21, 2003 and the
Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25796, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
99-176582. The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969,
and sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit.
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine
National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNPCIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial

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Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.
The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon Blvd., corner
Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners conviction for violation of Art. 201
of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair,
named after petitioner Fernando.33 The mayors permit was under his name. Even his bail bond
shows that Hhe lives in the same place.34 Moreover, the mayors permit dated August 8, 1996,
shows that he is the owner/operator of the store.35 While the mayors permit had already
expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and operated the establishment. It
would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit and illegal operation a shield
from prosecution of an unlawful act. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary
evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and
exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the
PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom the
search warrant was served. Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against Estorninos and
we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. Lastly, this Court
accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in their findings. In our view,
no reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding the
herein petitioners guilty as charged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2003,
of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are hereby AFFIRMED.
(2) IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA

Facts:

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This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a
duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative
studies with other religions.
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28,
1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It
succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly
telecast.
Issues:
- First, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo," and
- Second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of petitioner's religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that
they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs.
Held:
It is opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention
overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their
speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether
its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.
To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether courts
alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. The issue involves
highly arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is
affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's
TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained
the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and
121. No costs.
KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT

(1) DIEGO vs. CASTILLO
Facts:
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Before the court is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:
1. On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple was both
Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia
Escoto, with a civil status of single;
2. In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the
bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio
are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a
Divorce."
3. Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with
herein complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente
T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the
accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single.
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the evidence.
Issue:
Should the respondent Judge be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law (defined under Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code)?
Held:
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more severe
penalty in the future. The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took
place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the offense with a
fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000. Applying the rule as then prevailing,
and in line with applicable jurisprudence,[18] the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine
in the amount of P10,000. WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby
FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
(2) DE VERA vs. PELAYO

Facts:

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The case is a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the Evaluation Report of the
Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, dated October 2, 1998 referring
petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court and its Memorandum, dated January 4, 1999,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing
some awareness of legal principles and procedures, he represents himself in this petition.
Issue:
- Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against an RTC
judge in connection with the cases he is handling before the court.
Held:
This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge Pelayo to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Evaluation
Report of the Evaluation and Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman dated October 2,
1998 and its memorandum, dated January 4, 1999, in toto. No costs.
UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

(1) LAYOLA vs. GABO
Facts:
Complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy of the Ombudsman
for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2 Tomasito H. Gagui, members of the
Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria, Bulacan, with homicide for the death of complainant's
son.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be held
in the custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans
any legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for
murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Layola initiated a complaint charging Presiding Judge
Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation
of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of
the law.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge issued an unjust interlocutory order by granting the petition of the
Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2 German.
Held:
The Office of the Court Administrator found the charge to be unfounded. Knowingly rendering an
unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: (1) that the offender is a judge and (2) that
he performs any of the following acts: (a) he knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or

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decree, or (b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance.
There was no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order knowing it to be
unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
DIRECT BRIBERY
(1) MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002, decision and the
January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner averred that said money was not
for him but as reward money for the police asset who demanded that he be given 350 pesos
per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of the police
asset and that he already gave an advance of 1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the
balance of 4,800.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery, with an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 6 months, and 5 days of prision correccional
medium and maximum periods as the minimum and 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of prision
mayor minimum and medium periods as the maximum and a fine of 3000 pesos. He shall also
suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. With the motion for reconsideration
having been denied, he filed this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
- Is the act of petitionerreceipt of the sums of money for delivery to his assetconstitute an
offense defined and penalized under 2nd paragraph of Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
- Did the Sandiganbayan err in convicting the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct bribery?
Held:
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and
malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his
daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave 1000 pesos to
his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not
corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that petitioner attempted to
give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that he
was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he been engaged in a legitimate
deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the
violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His solicitous and overly
eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty, betrays
an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary
benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the monetary
reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about the 1000 pesos that he
supposedly received earlier.
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Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and credence to their version of the
events. Petitioner's conviction must be affirmed. The act of receiving money was connected with
his duty as a police officer. With regard to the fine, the amount of the fine is erroneous.
Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides
that if the act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less than 3 times the value of the
amount received. Evidence shows that petitioner received an aggregate amount of 5800 pesos.
He should, therefore, be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times its value, which is a fine of
18000 pesos.
(2) AGUIRRE vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
On or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, the accused Liwanag Aguirre, being then
an Acting Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC was charged of having willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
demanded and obtained from Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of the business firm
Guardsman Security Agency, the sum of 50 pesos, as a consideration for the said accused
refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately implementing a Writ of Execution of a final
judgment of the NLRC Regional Branch XI against said security agency.
The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as principal of the crime charged. Petitioner assailed
that the judgment of conviction upon the ground that the evidence presented failed to prove his
guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving
weight to the uncorroborated testimony of the lone prosecution witness.
Issue:
Whether the accused Aguirre be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery,
wherein the conviction was anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of a single prosecution
witness.
Held:
In this case, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness that do not inspire belief. It
appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from him, a mere employee of
the security agency, without authority to accept any writ or legal paper and without money.
Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in this situation where it could have been quite easy
to catch the petitioner red handed with the bribe money.There is a nagging doubt as to whether
the testimony of Hanginon, the sole witness for the prosecution, proves the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court finds that the judgment of conviction under review must yield to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
INDIRECT BRIBERY
(1) FORMILLEZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:

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On December 31, 1983, the appointment of a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia, an employee of the
NIA, was terminated. But she continued working for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions
of the regional director of the NIA. While having her appointment renewed, she was advised to
see the Leonor Formilleza who was to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted.
However, the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given
some money. Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in
the province.
An entrapment was planned. During the operation, Mutia gave the 100 pesos marked bill under
the table to Formilleza in the canteen, with 2 other employees in the said table with them. Upon
receipt of the money, she was arrested.
Issue:
Whether the facts and circumstances of the case substantial to convict the accused guilty of
indirect bribery defined under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the
public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on,
such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance, or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient
to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold
otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting
within their physical custody some gift, money, or other property.
Because the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for
ultraviolet powder. It is possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may
have had no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but this court is not certain.
Without certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

(1) CHUA vs. NUESTRO
Facts:
Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the respondent for allegedly
delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting from
her the sum of 1500 pesos.
On September 12, 1988, when the court issued a writ of execution, Chua and counsel asked
respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce the writ of execution
against the defendant, and for the purpose, they agreed to give 1000 pesos to the respondent.
Respondent received the amount of 1000 pesos on September 12, 1988; however, the next day,
they saw the respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitant
in proceeding to carry out the writ of execution. Respondent even asked for an additional
amount of P500.00; consequently, in the afternoon of the same day, respondent went to the

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premises in question and when he arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to proceed
because a supersedeas bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and at the
insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the premises.
Later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment of the
supersedeas bond and so he discontinued the execution proceedings.
Issue:
Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave to the
respondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of execution.
Held:
It is clear that the amount of 1500 pesos from the complainant and her lawyer as a
consideration for the performance of his work was not for the purpose of sheriff's fee and
expenses of execution.
It is recommended that appropriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after
preliminary investigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., with
corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code.
MALVERSATION
(1) DAVALOS vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the Provincial Engineer
of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of 18000 pesos for the
procurement of working tools for a certain NALGO project. Petitioner's receipt of the amount is
evidenced by his signature appearing in Disbursement Voucher No. 103-880-08.
Two demand letters were received by the petitioner from the Provincial Treasurer to submit a
liquidation of the 18000 pesos cash advance. The petitioner failed to do so.
Issues:
- Whether the petitioner be held guilty of malversation of public funds; and
- Whether the return of the misappropriated amount extinguish the criminal liability of the
offender.
Held:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. There can be no dispute about the
presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying the position of a
supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In that capacity, he receives
money or property belonging to the provincial government for which he is bound to account.
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In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds

misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of
the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability and be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
(2) PEOPLE vs. TING LAN UY

Facts:
Sometime in July 1990, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the
Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), and Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both
public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division and
Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, of NAPOCOR; and accused Raul Gutierrez, a private
individual being a foreign exchange trader, falsify or cause to be falsified the NAPOCOR's
application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank in the total amount of
183 805 291.25 pesos, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters
Bank, by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in
fact that the Payment Instructions when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the
account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial
documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the said amount from
NAPOCOR, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate, and convert to their own
personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the NAPOCOR.
Gamus, Uy, and Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Gutierrez remained at large. During pretrial, it was
found that Gamus does not have any custody to public funds. However, because of
preponderance of evidence, he is civilly liable for the damages.
Issue:
Whether Ochoa be held guilty of malversation thru falsification of commercial document without
violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him,
when the information alleged willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of,
whereas the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation thru falsification of commercial document and that, on the ground of
reasonable doubt, accused Ting Lan Uy, Jr., was acquitted of Malversation of public funds thru
falsification of commercial document.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds
or property or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. The felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty.
Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of
the offense.
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ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS
(1) TETANGCO v. OMBUDSMAN

Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order, of public respondent
Ombudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner AmandoTetangco against private
respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January
26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash financial assistance to the
chairman and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5,
2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the financial assistance from the
City of Manila when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case
and the same case had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint
had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintained that the
expenses were legal and justified, the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and
these had passed prior audit and accounting.
The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and
merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Ombudsman committed grave abused of discretion when it dismissed
the criminal charge against respondent Mayor Atienza for violation of Art 220 of the RPC despite
the existence of a prima facie case and probable cause to indict him for the crime charged or, at
the very least for violation of sec 3 (E) of R.A no 3019 Anti Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
Held:
In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause.
Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 11 Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the
disbursement for financial assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful
expense. Complainant did not cite any law or ordinance that provided for an original
appropriation of the amount used for the financial assistance cited and that it was diverted from
the appropriation it was intended for. The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of
public funds.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine
from 5 to 50 percent of the sum misapplied. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it
is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that

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provided for by law or ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds
from the purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Patently,
the third element is not present in this case. DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
(2) ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public
funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly
known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition
for review under Rule 45. On or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused: Norma Abdulla and Nenita P. Aguil, both public officers, being then the President and
cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and
duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of
their functions, conspiring and confederating with Mahmud I. DAarkis, also a public officer, being
then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of
P40,000.00, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service
.Appellants co-accused, NenitaAguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant
was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the temporary
special disqualification imposed upon her.
Issues:
- Whether there was unlawful intent on the appellants part.
- Whether the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
Held:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of
laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority
which laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources. Settled is the
rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary
school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical
malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is
therefore absent. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

(1) PEOPLE vs. AYUMAN
Facts:
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This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Brach 19, Cagayan de Oro
City where the accused, Conrado Ayuman, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000. On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman,
the wife of the accused, rushed her five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center. When a nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he
was dead on arrival.
Ermita's statement was noted in the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to the dead
body of Sugar Ray. On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. The accused was nowhere to be
found. Neither did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. During the burial, Ermita
cried and shouted, "Dong, forgive your father. Dong, don't leave us." Afterwards, she went to the
precinct and gave a testimony to SPO1 Catulong against her husband for killing their son. At that
time, his son was already buried. The couple then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to "tell
the truth."
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide.
Held:
The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification and the accused was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse; The key element here is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the
basis of circumstantial evidence. And also, the circumstances cited by the trial court, when
viewed in their entirety, were as convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate the
innocence of the accused. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of
doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that accused committed the crime of parricide. Here is a
father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the hospital, although on
the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and
is extremely contrary to human nature. Every father is expected to love his children and shower
them with acts of affection and tenderness.
(2) PEOPLE vs. PUEDAN

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Malaybalay City, finding
the accused guilty of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the sum of P50,000. According to the
Prosecution, in the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson,
Reymark, went to the house of Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar
for pounding palay near his house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno
that he wanted to buy a piglet from him. Accused suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five
times, with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed,
Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents house

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and told his mother, Erlinda, what transpired. Erlinda ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio
was already dead, bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the rice paddy. The body
remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later that day. On the part of the
Defense, the wife of the accused, Leah testified, admitted having an illicit relationship with the
deceased. Their relationship had been going on for two years and was known in their barangay,
except her Roger. In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she
was breastfeeding her child, and was looking for her husband.
Issue:
Whether the Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder instead of
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
The Decision of the Trial Court was affirmed. By raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as
his defense, accused admitted that he killed the victim. By invoking this defense, he waived his
right to the constitutional presumption of innocence and bears the burden of proving [1] That a
legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age
and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; [2] That
he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical
injury in the act or immediately thereafter; [3] That he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse; To satisfy this burden, accused must prove that he actually surprised his wife and
Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. What
is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing
accounts of Prosecution Witnesses. Further eroding the defense of the accused is the fact that he
immediately fled right after the stabbing incident. He hid for about three years until he was
arrested.
MURDER/ HOMICIDE
(1) PEOPLE vs. WHISENHUNT
Facts:
In the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused whisenhunt did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one Elsa "Elsie" Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with
a bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse
by then and there chopping off her head and different parts of her body.

Issue:
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Should the accused-appellant be convicted of the crime of murder?

Held:
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution
without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants
condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it
was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo
collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants
bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San
Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road
going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later
identified as Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed;
that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities
with hair taken from Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants
bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type. Even if treachery
was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of the dismemberment of
the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the
Revised Penal Code is "outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse" of the victim. There is no
question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the
cutting off of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs
and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung around
Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously described as "pulutan."
The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by
outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse.This circumstance was both alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the penalty for murder
was reclusion temporal maximum to death.No aggravating or mitigating circumstance was
alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.Therefore, the trial
courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.
(2) PEOPLE vs. ENGUITO

Facts:
Felipe Requerme was driving a motorela, together with his wife Rosita and another passenger,
Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre, who is the deceased. The deceased was picked up by them on their
way home and requested them to bring him to his house. While on their way, a white vehicle,
which was later on identified as a Ceres Kia automobile bearing Plate No. 722, intentionally hit
and pushed the motorela that they were riding and violently kept pushing it causing it to turn
around facing the direction from where it came from and fell on its right side. Rosita testified
that while she was struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle went up the
elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the railing
(barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove away without even caring to see
what happened to them. The spouses/victims were brought to the police station while the

Case Digests
Achumbre was brought to the hospital that was declared dead on arrival. The accused went to
the Supreme Court imputing error on the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the
declaration of the crime of Murder against him on the ground that he did not intentionally choose
the motor vehicle he was driving as a means of committing the offense, and that at most, the
vehicle was the only available means to stop the deceased from escaping. He argued that it was
his intention to apprehend and surrender the deceased to the police for his previous act
of mauling him but in the process, he killed the deceased.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellant committed the complex crime of murder with less serious physical
injuries.
Held:
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The
use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means
thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the
victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there
was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could have easily sought the
assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accusedappellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued
his pursuit. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping
and pushing the motorela which was in front of him. Clearly, accused-appellant's state of mind
after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to
act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he
chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries
of the spouses Requerme. Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the
police. Appellant himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped
but admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". The foregoing notwithstanding,
the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the
penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by
accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries. Under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum
period of the penalty for the most serious crime.
DEATH CAUSED IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY

(1) PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA
Facts:
ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias Lapad" was charged and subsequently convicted by the
court a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P100,000.00
as
moral
damages,P50,000.00
as
temperate
damages,
and
another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.In the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together
with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St., Magasawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that
evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal
necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought two
(2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Case Digests
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve
him. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving
himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him
at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him
with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was
petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
Issues:
Whether the testimony of prosecution witness was credible; and
Whether the lower court is right in convicting the accused of murder qualified by treachery and
not death in a tumultuous affray.
Held:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prision mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The
deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the
accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the
side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was completely without
warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense. The
penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the court a quo, is
reclusion perpetua.
(2) PEOPLE vs. MARAMARA alias "Cresing"

Facts:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate convicting the
accused CresencianoMaramara of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victims heirs the amount of P10,000 as medical and funeral expenses
and P50,000 as moral damages. The accused challenged the findings of the trial court in order to
secure an acquittal or, at the least, being held liable only for the death of MiguelitoDonato in a
tumultuous affray as defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information
Barangay Calpi,
treachery and
MiguelitoDonato
death.
against the accused alleged that in the evening of November 18, 1991, in
Claveria, Masbate, the accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
taking advantage of nighttime, assaulted and shot with a handgun
and hit the latter on the chest, thereby inflicted the wound which caused his

Issue:
Case Digests
Whether accused is guilty of death caused in tumultuous affray instead of murder.

Held:
There was no merit in accuseds position that he should be held liable only for death caused in
tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that
accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when
Miguelito attacked him causing four stab wounds in different parts of his body. Assuming that a
rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Code
cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and RegarderDonato positively identified
the accused as Miguelitos killer. While the accused himself suffered multiple stab wounds, which
at first, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble has ensued and that Miguelito inflicted upon
him these wounds, the evidence was inadequate to consider them as mitigating circumstance
because defenses version stood discredited in light of the more credible version of the
prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death. However, the Supreme Court
did not subscribe to trial courts appreciation of treachery, which was discussed only in the
dispositive portion of the decision and which was based solely on the fact that the accused used
a firearm in killing the victim Miguelito. In the absence of any convincing proof that the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure
its execution, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in favor of the accused. And since treachery
was not adequately proved, the accused was convicted of homicide only. The Supreme Court
modified the judgment appealed from and found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of
MiguelitoDonato without the attendance of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Court
sentenced the accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen years, and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all its
accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Migueltio in the amount of P10,000 as actual
damages and P50,000 as death indemnity.
DISCHARGE OF FIREARM
(1) DADO vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide. The
information charged both Dado and Eraso with murder allegedly committed by said the accused,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and shot
Silvestre Balinas thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instant
death.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were as
follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed
three teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The Team composed of the petitioner SPO4

Case Digests
Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, AflredoBalinas and Rufo Alga waited
behind a large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite
rifles, were positioned between the petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and
accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At around 11:00 of that same
evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he was about 5
meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was making some
movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flashlight, Eraso fired
his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner fired a single
shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim turned out to be Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, the
nephew of Alfredo Balinas. Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas to show his repentance for his deed.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal discharge of firearm only.
Held:
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner Dado and
accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who
caused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement
must nonetheless be convincingly shown. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos
seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather
than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that
the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of a .45 caliber
bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. Hence, the Supreme Court
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime
of homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt. A new decision was entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
(1) PEOPLE vs. GENOVES
Facts:
Crispin Genoves and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining cane fields. Rivera
claimed that the yoke of the plow which the accused was repairing belonged to her and tried to
take it by force. The accused struck her with his fist causing her to fall to the ground. She got up
and returned to the quarrel where she received another fist blow on the left cheek causing her to
fall again to the ground. Immediately after the incident, the deceased proceeded to the
municipal building, she complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen as she was
pregnant at the time. For a few days, the deceased suffered from hemorrhage and pain which
resulted in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way
carrying, but the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.Genoves was convicted
in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with
abortion. An appeal was made by the accused.

Issue:
Case Digests
Should the accused be held guilty for the death of the victim and her unborn child?
Held:
It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a
complete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be held responsible
for the natural consequences of his act.However, the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and provocation are present, as the offended party by
force induced the accused to use force on his part.The abortion in this case is unintentional
abortion denounced by Article 257 of the Revised Penal Code. On the whole case, the period of
confinement is fixed at twelve years and one day to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporalandthe indemnity is fixed at P1,000.
(2) PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANIA
Facts:
Before the court is information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion, committed that on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974,
in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the
lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon
her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; the accused likewise did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the child while still in its maternalwomb,
thereby committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said woman and child in the amount as the Honorable Court shall
assess.
Issue:
Should Filomeno Salufrania be held liable for for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion?
Held:
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused
the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon
his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her
husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with
the foetus in her womb.

Case Digests
WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30, 000.00 in line with the
recent decisions of the Court.
With costs against the appellant.
MUTILATION
(1) AGUIRRE vs. SECRETARY OF DOJ
Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, Gloria
Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) sought the reversal of the decision and the resolution, both of
the Court of Appeals entitled Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice,
Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. JuvidoAgatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and
John and Jane Does."The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin resolutions, which
affirmed the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP).
The antecedents of the present petition were: Laureano (Larry) Aguirre was adopted from an
orphanage by Pedro Aguirre and Loudes Aguirre. Developmental milestones were noted to be
delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio
de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant learning difficulties that he had to repeat
1st and 4th grades. Neurological findings and EEG results done when he was 11 years old were
not normal and he was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological
evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special education training was advised
and thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and
secondary education in the said school. He was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don
Bosco which he was unable to continue. His adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood Disorder andused
to physically maltreat him.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charged respondents with falsification of a private document for
conspiring with one another in concealing the foregoing vasectomy from Larry as well as for
falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
Gloria Aguirre, moreover, contended that the bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's
brother, Larry Aguirre caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of
generation or conception and that it was performed intentionally and deliberately to deprive
Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate, thus, it amounted to
mutilation.In their defense, the respondents disputed the allegations of facts stated in the
complaint.
Issue:
Whether respondents are guilty of mutilation.
Held:
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., "the vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)

Case Digests
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." In the male
sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens, through which
the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the
seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied. That part, which is
cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a
limb or essential part (of the body), with the operative expression being "deprivation." In the
same manner, the word "castration" is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries. Such
being the case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have
amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of
the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and
affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

(1) LI vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
In the early morning of April 19, 1993, a street brawl resulted to the death caused by multiple
stab wounds of Christopher Arugay (Arugay) and injury by hack wounds on the head of his
neighbor Kingstone Li (Li). Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati with the
crime of Homicide by reason of conspiracy with Eduardo Sangalan (Sangalan).His conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, an appeal was made to the Supreme Court.
The factual findings of the RTC differed from those of the Court of Appeals. While both courts
argue that Li was guilty of homicide, their respective rationales were different. Neither court
disputed that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the stab wounds he received.
Issue:
Should the accused be held liable for homicide instead of slight physical injuries only?
Held:
The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeals formulation was wrong since the converse is
the correct rule: with the existence of conspiracy, it is no longer necessary to determine who
among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow; whereas in the absence of conspiracy, each of
the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. Thus, it was necessary to
determine whether a conspiracy existed between Li and Sangalang, and if there was none, to
ascertain the particular acts performed by Li. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Tan
and DelaCamara, to the effect that they saw Li stab Arugay at the left portion of the body were
not given full credence as they were not wholly neutral or disinterested witnesses given their
relationship to the deceased and his family. Moreover, the respective testimonies of delaCamara
and Tan are inconsistent with each other with respect to material points. More importantly, the
testimonies of delaCamara and Tan both contradict the physical evidence. The primacy of
physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony of witnesses was upheld by the
Court. As Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, it was highly improbable in his condition that
he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay. Moreover, it could not be
established that Li was ever armed with a knife. Thus, Sanggalang alone had stabbed Arugay.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and Li was acquitted of the charge of

Case Digests
Homicide for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, he was found guilty of Slight
Physical Injuries and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arrestomenor in the medium
period of ten to twenty days. Considering that Li had been imprisoned beyond the period of
penalty imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons was ordered to immediately release Li.
RAPE
(1) ORDINARIO vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
The case before the Supreme Court relates to an affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the joint
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City convicting Geronimo Ordinario on
twelve (12) counts, of having committed punishable acts under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. The charges, under the twelve (12) separate informations filed involved the
commission of acts of sexual assault by Ordinario against Jayson Ramos, a ten (10) year old
male, by inserting his penis into the complainants mouth. The accused plead not guilty to all the
charges. Complainant Jayson Ramos and the accused were student and teacher, respectively, at
Nicanor Garcia Elementary School during the time the alleged crime was perpetrated.
The accused vehemently denied the accusations against him and claimed that his class schedule
at the school starts in the morning and ends at 1:00 P.M. so it would have been impossible for
him to have molested the child at 6:00 in the evening. However, he occasionally went back to
the school late in the afternoon to feed the chicken as part of his duty as overseer of the schools
poultry project. In addition, witnesses were presented by the defense who claimed that they did
not notice any change in the attitude or appearance of the complainant, that nothing unusual
was noted during the moments of the alleged molestations, etc.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of rape.
Held:
Alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but it also does not
on its face demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the place and
time of the commission of the offense. Appellant himself has admitted that while his class would
end at one oclock in the afternoon, he occasionally would still go back to school late in the
afternoon to oversee the schools poultry project. The appellate court was correct in holding that
the exact date of the commission of the offense of rape is not an element of the crime. The
definition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, to include not only "rape by sexual
intercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual assault." The Supreme Court observed that both
the trial court and the appellate court failed to provide civil liability ex delicto, an indemnity
authorized by prevailing judicial policy to be an equivalent of actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. The award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 moral damages adjudged by
the trial court for each count of sexual assault were excessive and were reduced to P25,000.00
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages for each count. The award of exemplary damages
was deleted for lack of legal basis. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed
therefrom and convicted Geronimo Ordinario of rape by sexual assault on twelve (12) counts.
Case Digests
(2) PEOPLE vs. DELA TORRE

Facts:
On or about the 2 nd week of September at Barangay Tumarbong, in the Municipality of Roxas,
Palawan, the accused Butchoy Dela Torre in conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe Dela
Torre, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Baby Jane Dagot, a girl of 16 years of age against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. Nine criminal cases were consolidated and
joint trial conducted before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Prinsesa City. On
March 1995, the appellants were found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each
count. They were also ordered to indemnify the complainant the sum of Php 5000.00 as actual
damages and Php 90000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
Issue:
Is the accused guilty in conspiracy and confederating with his wife to have caused Baby Jane
Dagot damage and prejudice?
Held:
The credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their testimony
and the surrounding circumstances. The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and
conclusions reached by the lower court, owing to the courts unique position to see, hear and
observe the witnesses testify. The judgment of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The appellants are
found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
offended party the sum of Php 50000.00 as civil indemnity, 50000.00 as moral damages and
25000.00 as exemplary damages. With the respect to cases 11313 11320, the appellants are
acquitted for failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
KIDNAPPING/ SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION

(1) PEOPLE vs. SURRIAGA
Facts:
On February 22, 1995, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court charging Ruben
Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention committed as follows: That on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Surriaga and Rosita
Dela Cruz, conspiring together, kidnapped and took away Nicole Ramos, a 2-year old female
child, without the consent of her parents, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the latter,
and thereafter, detained her and deprived her of her freedom and liberty up to and until 4:30
oclock in the afternoon of the following day. Joel Isidera, having learned of the kidnapping and
without having participated therein as principal or accomplice, took part by assisting the
principal accused to profit by the effects of the crime by accompanying and driving for accused
Ruben Suriaga to the place where the pay-off was made and receiving the ransom money in the
amount of P100,000.

Issue:
Case Digests
Whether Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.

Held:
The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child,
the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the
child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to
deprive the mother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom
have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1)
appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from
her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived,
without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of
her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and, 4) he
demanded a ransom of P100,000 through telephone calls and gave instructions on where and
how it should be delivered. Under the provision, the imposition of death penalty is mandatory if
the victim is a minor. In this case, the minority of Nicole Ramos was alleged in the information
and was never disputed. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting Ruben Suriaga of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
(2) PEOPLE vs. SILONGAN

Facts:
For automatic review is the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103, convicting appellants
AbdilaSilongan, MacapagalSilongan, AkmadAwal, RollyLamalan, SacariaAlon, Jumbrah Manap
and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention and
sentencing them to suffer death penalty.
Appellants, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap ALEXANDER SALDANA, AMERICO REJUSO, JR., ERVIN
TORMIS and VICTOR CINCO for the purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of
P12,000,000.00, detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty.
Issue:
Whether the guilt of the appellants has been proven by credible evidence beyond reasonable
doubt that kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Held:
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in
Article 267 69 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled
with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus
essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. 70 But if the

Case Digests
kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer
necessary.
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was committed
"for the purpose of extorting ransom" from Alexander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom
must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law
requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom.
SC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR

(1) PASTRANA vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
The RTC of Manila Br.18 convicted Pastrana of violation of A-270 or the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor and imposed Reclusion Perpetua.In 1997 she was entrusted with the
care of Willy, a nine year old boy by the mother Erma who works as OFW in Canada.For the
failure of Erma to fulfill the demands for financial support for Pastrana's water pump and for
processing of papers for work in Singapore,the latter brohgt the boy to her apartment in
Tondo.He was declared missing by the relatives and Erma had to come to the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether Pastrana violated Article 270.
Held:
Dispositive Portion: "A-270 or kidnapping and failure to return a minor requires that 1) the
offender is entrusted with custody of minor and 2) the offender fails to restore the minor to his
parents or guardians.Rubirosa Pastrana used the boy as pawn when demand for money was
refused by Erma.Failure to return the boy consummated the crime. Wherefore, R.Pastrana's
conviction is AFFIRMED with penalty of reclusion perpetua with modification and reduction of
moral and nominal damages in the sum of 150,000 pesos with 6% interest per annum.
(2) PEOPLE vs. TY

Facts:
Accused -Appellants Ty owns,administers and manages St.John's Clinic inCaloocan.In 1987.A
sick baby Arabella was confined by her mother Johanna but since she had no money and no one
to leave the child at home,an agrrement between the owners of the hospital to keep the baby in
the extension building as a boarder for 50 pesos a day.The baby was visited only once in 5 years
by the mother and the father .The baby was put up for guardianship to a relative of the
Ty's.After five years,Johanna came back to claim the child.The guardians meantime had the child
baptized and named Cristine Neri and would not return the child to the mother.It so happened
that there were many babies left behind that time and the attending Pediatrician had in that five
years relocated abroad.A complaint was filed for kidnapping and failure to return a minor to her
parents.The Ty's were convicted by the RTC and subsequently appealed.
Case Digests
Issue:
Was an abandoned child by mother still be claimed as being kidnapped as in Art 270 RPC?
Held:
Dispositive Portion:"The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in
finding the child (among the many they took care of and put up for guardianship)clearly negate
the alleged deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother.It is
noteworthy that they were motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child
and high regard for her welfare and well-being.The child turned out to be not the same child as
claimed by Johanna to be hers. From the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set
aside.The accused-appellants Vicente and Carmen Ty are hereby acquitted.
ROBBERY
(1) PEOPLE VS. BASAO
Facts:
On the testimony of Gilbert Basao, in the afternoon of April 14, 1994, the accused-appellant
Pepe Iligan shot Lt. Joerlick Faburada and wife, Dra. Arlyn Faburada who was four months
pregnant, with an armalite rifle as the spouses were riding a motorcycle. When Dra. Faburada
attempted to reach her husbands firearm, she was again shot by the accused-appellant.
Afterwards, Iligan took away Lt. Joerlick Faburadas PNPA gold ring, one .45 caliber pistol and
the latters radio handset.
On April 19, 1994, Basao and accused-appellant went to the apartment of one Reynaldo Angeles
in Butuan City. Iligan asked Angeles to pawn a ring. He acceded to the request.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant has committed robbery with murder.
Held:
No. The accused-appellant did not commit robbery with murder. The ruling in People vs. Salazar
is doctrinal. If the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery but robbery
follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal act
should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex crime. Robbery
with homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between the
robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to the
robbery.
In the instant case, it is apparent that the taking of the personal properties from the victim was
an afterthought. The personal properties were taken after accused-appellant has already
successfully carried out his primary criminal intent of killing Lt Faburada and the taking did not
necessitate the use of violence or force upon the person of the victim. Thus the crime is theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, viz.: Wherefore, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Case Digests
(2) PEOPLE vs. APOLINARIO

Facts:
On October 9, 1989, at around 2am, Restituta and Simon Hibaler were awakened by the
appellants Romeo Apolinario, Antonio Rivera and Mario Sion, who intruded their house. Upon
recognition of these men, they attacked Simon with their bolos. Restituta was also strucked on
the face and lost her consciousness. When she regained her senses, she saw Romeo Apolinario
taking clothes while the other two (2) were ransacking a trunk. Afterwards, she saw the
appellants went down and drunk coffee. When the intruders left, Restituta called out for her son,
Pedro Hibaler and Ernesto Biboso. Ernesto found Simon bleeding. He asked him what had
happened. Simon told Ernesto that the appellants had attacked him. When Pedro arrived, Simon
died. Simons body was brought to the municipal hall for autopsy. Consequently, Pedro together
with the three (3) barangay councilors reported the incident to the police station. Only Apolinario
and Rivera were arraigned because Mario was at large.
Issue:
Whether appellants are guilty of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Held:
Yes. The appellants are guilty of special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the
homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. In the case at bar, all the
elements of robbery were present. To wit, these are (a) personal property belonging to another;
(b) was unlawfully taken; (c) with intent to gain; and (d) with the use of force upon things.
WHEREFORE, the decision by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity for the death of Simon Hibaler shall be increased from P30, 000 to P50, 000.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

(1) PEOPLE vs. HIPONA
Facts:
On or about June 12, 2000 at 1: 00 am in Cagayan de Oro, appellant Michael Hipona together
with Romulo Seva, Jr. and one John Doe conspired and feloniously had a carnal knowledge with
the offended party AAA who is the aunt of accused Michael Hipona. On occasion of the said rape,
accused, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and dwelling,
choked and strangulated the victim. The victims brown bag worth P3,800; cash money in the
amount of no less than P5,000; and gold necklace were stolen by all the accused but the gold
necklace were later on recovered and confiscated in the person of accused Michael Hipona.
For failure to prove the guilt of accused Romulo Seva, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he is duly
acquitted.
Issue:
Whether appellant is liable of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Case Digests
Held:
Yes. Robbery was the main intent of appellant. AAAs death resulted by reason of or on occasion
thereof. Following Article 294 (1) and Article 62 (1)1 of RPC, rape should have been appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance instead. Wherefore, the decision of CA is affirmed with
modification. Michael Hipona is guilty of robbery with homicide.
(2) PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts:
Catapang and Hernandez dragged 72 year-old Natividad Mendoza, in the direction of a forested
area. The accused-appellants took the money and jewelry of Natividad while she was lying on
the ground. Thereafter, Catapang and Hernandez strangled Natividad to death with the use of a
white rope made of buri/vine string.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellants have committed robbery with homicide.
Held:
The Court held that appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The court further held that, in
robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence.
ROBBERY WITH RAPE

(1) PEOPLE cs. VERCELES
Facts:
On October 19, 1996, in the morning, in barangay Malibong in Pangasinan, the accused, Mario
Verceles, Felix Corpus, Mamerto Soriano, Pablo Ramos and Jerry Soriano, entered the house of
Mrs. Rosita Quilates by forcibly destroying the grills of the window which they used as an ingress
and once inside, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully cart away the following personal
properties: 1 colored TV, 1 VHS, assorted jewelries, 1 alarm clock and 1 radio cassette, all
valued at P60,000.00, and that on the same occassion, the said accused feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Maribeth Bolito against her will to the damage of the said victims.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
Held:

Case Digests
On the matter of whether rape was committed, the SC agree with the trial court's ruling that the
healed lacerations on the vagina of the victim nor the absence of spermatozoa negates rape.The
victim's delaration of her sexual ordeal given in a convincing manner, shows no other intention
than to obtain justice for the wrong done to her. Wherefore, the court finds the accusedappellants guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape and punished to suffer penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, and to award damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the rape victim.
(2) PEOPLE vs. TAMAYO

Facts:
On March 29, 1998, Mary Ann Guazon, a 24-year old sewer, was alone in her home in Tatalon,
Quezon City, her husband at work in Baliwag, Bulacan, while her children are with her aunt in
Fairview Quezon City,. At 1 in the morning, she was suddenly roused from her sleep by a man,
who simulteneously covered her mouth and poked a knife to at the side of her neck. She was
told not to move or she would b killed. The light on her house has been turned off, but she
recognized the man as accused-appellant Nelson Tamayo, because of the light coming from the
market outside.Despite the fierce resistance Mary Ann showed, the accused succeeded in raping
her. After he had finished, she sensed that the accused was going to kill her. She thus pretended
that she enjoyed the encounter and pleaded with him to spare her. Accused relented and warned
her not to report the incident or else she will be killed. He told her to get dressed and handed
over her clothes. It was then that she discovered that the P500.00 she earned from doing
laundry that day, which she kept in her shorts' pocket, was gone.
Issue:
Whether the the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with rape, despite his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable ground.
Held:
Yes. That the accused is the person who raped complainant and stole the P500.00 is beyond
doubt. The court finds his identification as the pepetrator of the crime to be positive and certain.
It was sufficiently explaines that the light coming from the market was bright enough to enable
complainant to identify him as the one who raped her.She also took note of specific details that
would ascertain the identity of the rapist. The contention of fabrication must be rejected as the
complainant has no ill motive to falsely implicate him in the commission of the offense. Also, her
conducts after the crime, strenghtened her account and fortified her credibility. No decent and
sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt
unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
THEFT
(1) LAUREL vs. ABROGAR
Facts:

Case Digests
On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, the accused, conspiring and
confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the international long
distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a
method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of
the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its
facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the
said amount.
Issue:
Whether international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to theft.
Held:
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner
is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities
constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order
issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which denied the
Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment) for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is
remanded to the trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to
amend the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services
and business of the private offended party.
(2) LUCAS vs. CA

Facts:
Herminigildo Lucas was charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
together with Wilfredo Navarro and Enrique Lovena. The Information alleged that on or about 8
June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stole and carried away one stereo
component, a 14-inch colored TV, an electric fan, twenty-three (23) pieces of cassette tapes, one
(1) box of car toys, four (4) pieces of Pyrex crystal bowls, cash of P20,000.00 and jewelry worth
P10,000.00, valued at P100,000.00 all belonging to Luisito Tuazon.Petitioner Herminigildo Lucas
and his co-accused Wilfredo Navarro pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Enrique Lovena
remains at large.
Issues:
- Whether the trial court erred to prove the conspiracy between the accused;
- Whether the trial court erred in proving the credibility of the witnesses; and
- Whether the trial court erred in imposing the penalties therein of the accused-appellant
Case Digests
Held:
The court ruled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to
commit the crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused, indubitably
demonstrating their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime. Thus, it is
not required that the accused were acquainted with one another or that there was an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.
Wherefore, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner, Herminigildo
Lucas, guilty of the crime of theft is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the imposed penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum is REDUCED to imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor
as maximum. Petitioner is likewise ordered to return to private complainant Luisito Tuazon the
amount of P30, 000.00 representing the money and the value of the jewelry stolen from him. No
costs.
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY

(1) QUINAO vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
A petition was filed for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA finding
Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime Usurpation of Real Property. Both
accused and complainant are claiming ownership over the land in question. The land was already
litigated and awarded to the parents of the complainant in a decided Civil Case. Complainant's
witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o'clock in the
morning while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with
complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused together with their other close relatives suddenly
appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped and took
possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants
and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra.
Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened
that if he will try to return to the land in question, something will happen to him.
Issue:
Whether accused-petitioner who claims to be the owner of the land in question could be held
liable of usurpation of her own property.
Held:
As ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the issue of ownership over the land in
question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516 in favor of the complainant in 1949, the
same will not be disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of the court. The Court fully
agreed with the findings on the issue of the ownership of the lot involved in this case. The
evidence on record sufficiently refuted petitioner's claim of ownership. In order to sustain a
conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property
occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that
the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the

Case Digests
person ousted of possession of the property. The trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative
based on the testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte. The petition was denied for
lack of merit, and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
ESTAFA
(1) RAMOS-ANDAN vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner and Potenciana Nieto approached Elizabeth Calderon and offered to buy the latters
diamond ring, to which she agreed to sell the ring. In turn, Potenciana gave her three postdated
checks, as evidenced by the signed receipts as full payment of the said jewelry. When Calderon
deposited the checks upon maturity, they bounced for the reason Account Closed. She then
sent Potenciana a demand letter but she refused.
The petitioner maintained that she signed the receipt and the checks merely as witness to the
transaction between Elizabeth and Potenciana. The trial court found the petitioner guilty and held
that while Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was petitioner who induced
Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same, thus, she cannot escape liability.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, not being the drawer of the checks, can be held criminally liable.
Held:
Potenciana was the drawer of the checks. However, it was petitioner who directly and personally
negotiated the same. It was she who signed the receipt evidencing the sale and handed the
checks to Elizabeth and endorsed them as payment for the ring. It is thus clear that petitioner
and Potenciana acted in concert for the purpose of inducing and defrauding Elizabeth to part with
her jewelry. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision.
(2) CHUA vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
On November 25, 1982, petitioner Anita Chua issued to Araceli Estigoy, complainant, five
postdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank in payment of imported items. Petitioner went
again to Estigoys house to purchase some imported items and issued eight postdated checks
drawn against the same bank. On their due dates, complainant deposited the checks but the
same were dishonored. She then notified the petitioner and demanded payment, to which the
petitioner failed to redeem or pay the amounts of the checks.
Appellant admitted using the checks but interposed the defense that she issued the checks as
collateral and by way of accommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks.
Issue:

Case Digests
Whether issuance of unfunded checks as collateral or security for the goods does not constitute
estafa under Art 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Held:
All the elements of estafa are present in the case. Petitioners defense is not worthy of credence.
Trial court correctly found and affirmed by CA clearly showed that they were intended as
payments for the items she obtained from complainant. Complainant would not have parted with
his goods in exchange of bum checks. It is likewise contrary to ordinary human experience and
to sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded checks as collateral or by
way of accommodation. As an experienced businesswoman, petitioner could not have been so
nave as not to know that she could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks. The
Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
OTHER DECEITS
(1) GUINHAWA vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
The case at bar deals with a petition for review on certiorari on his conviction for the crime of
Other Deceits which the trial court and appellate court affirmed his conviction. The facts of the
case circulates on a purchase of a particular van wherein the buyers spouses Silo were made to
believe that they are purchasing a brand new van wherein in fact the van had defects in its
state. The accused undoubtedly made false pretenses and misrepresentations with regards to
the selling of the van. The accused was well known that he is engaged in selling brand new vans
thus his act of concealment regarding the vans true condition is tantamount to deceit.
Therefore, with the inferior courts affirming his conviction of the said crime, the accused filed
this particular petition asserting that he is not liable for the crime because the representation
was made by his general manager.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty for the crime of Other Deceits.
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the petition stating that the petitioner had every opportunity to
reveal to the private complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their
silence, to the prejudice of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had
no special knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she
relied on her belief that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the
petitioners fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment. The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability
for his fraudulent omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their
collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever the doing of a
certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided
to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to, carry
with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized. Therefore the petitioner is hereby
sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Case Digests
ARSON
(1) PEOPLE vs. OLIVA
Facts:
On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino and his family were
sleeping in their house. Avelino went out to urinate. He saw the accused-appellant set roof of
their house on fire with a lighted match. One of the neighbors, Benjamin, went to the nearby
river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by the
accused. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Information for arson and for murder
was filed separately against the accused and the other three co-accused.
Issues:
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of arson.
Held:
Whether the victim was shot while he was on the street or when he was pouring water on the
burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. The two witnesses on that aspect are not necessarily
inconsistent. The Court agrees with the solicitor general that Benjamin could have been on the
street while pouring water on the burning roof. There is no need to prove that the accused had
actual knowledge that the was burned is inhabited. There was treachery where the victim, while
he was merely acting as good neighbor, innocently helping out the fire, when shot, unaware of
the fatal attack on him.
(2) PEOPLE vs. MURCIA

Facts:
The premise of the petition at hand is the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals affirming
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which found appellant Jessie Villegas
Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of arson and frustrated homicide. The
above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by one
Felicidad M. Quilates burning and killing said Felicidad M. Quilates as well as burning and
damaging nine other neighboring houses in the process wherein the charge is qualified by the
resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. However as the case proceeded, appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide,
hence the review is limited to the crime of arson but appellant maintains his innocence of the
charge of arson and challenges the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him.
Issue:

Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of arson.
Case Digests
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals further stating that the
testimony of the witnesses having withstood the scrutiny of the lower courts is deemed credible.
The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are
actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on
the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage
caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential
Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
ADULTERY/ CONCUBINAGE
(1) BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner and wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. On February 7, 1997, after
twenty-four years of marriage, petitioner filed for nullify of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In the answer of Charmaine, he alleged that petitioner abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman. She filed a criminal complaint for concubinage.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The RTC denied his
motion as well as his motion for reconsideration. Thus, the petitioner filed an instant petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of criminal case for concubinage.
Held:
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullify of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void does not acquit him from the crime of
concubinage. He who cohabits with a woman other than his wife before the judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
(2) VERA-NERI vs. PEOPLE
Case Digests
Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and
witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they
dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then
proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in
the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the
door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where
accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's
request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two
accused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could
already come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium.
(Court of Appeals Decision.)
Issues:
- Whether Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his
credibility;
- Whether Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been violated;
- Whether Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint
on the ground of pari delicto; and
- Whether Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting of a new trial.
Held:
Deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, the Court believes that
petitioner Arroyo has failed to show any ground that would warrant the Court reversing its
Resolution dated 24 April 1991; and on the Petition for Review docketed as G.R. No. 96715, the
Court considers that petitioner Ruby Vera Neri has failed to show reversible error on the part of
the Court of Appeals in issuing its Decision dated 21 May 1990 and its Resolution, dated 18
December 1990. Petitioner Arroyo did not convince this Court in G.R. No. 96602 to dismiss the
criminal case on the basis of Dr. Neri's pardon.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and this denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby similarly
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
(1) PEOPLE vs. MONTERON
Facts:
On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home from
Wangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded portion of
the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where the stone came
from; she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious. When Mary Ann came to, she
found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked.
She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her. He placed his penis on
top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and
pushed it away from her.

Issue:
Case Digests
Whether accused is guilty of consummated rape.

Held:
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the
negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly deserves more credence and
entitled to greater evidentiary weight. In the case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positively identified
accused-appellant as her molester. Mary Anns testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the
author of th crime is corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat. Accused-appellant has commenced
the commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the victim
and lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the
case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which prevented the insertion of accusedappellants penis in her vagina. The foregoing conclusion is supported by the medical findings of
Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no laceration.
(2) PEOPLE vs. GIANAN

Facts:
In November 1995, and some occasions prior and/ or subsequent thereto, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own
12 year old daughter, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and felonious lay, have repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. gianan, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of multiple rape and that the information against him is
void.
Held:
It is settled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element thereof, as the crime is
define in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court convicted accussed of multiple
rape with out stating the number of counts. However, with regard to incident in December 1992
during which accused kissed complainant in various parts of her body in the bathroom, the crime
committed was acts of lasciviousness. The elements of the crime are: (1) that the offender
commits any acts of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done using force or intimidation or
when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the offended
party is under 12 years of age and that is another person of either sex. In some other incidents,
the accused is guilty of five counts of simple rape.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION

(1) PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA
Case Digests
Facts:
Accused-appellant Dante Manansala y Lumibao, is the father of herein complainant Jennifer
Manansala. He was a taho vendor. He lived in the taho factory located at Tondo, Manila,
after separating from Jennifers mother with whom he had lived in common law relation.
Complainant Jennifer, lodge a complaint before the RTC Manila for several counts of rape against
her father from November 1-8, 1991.
Per complainants direct testimony, she averred that her father called for her through a niece
named Josephine. When she came, she was taken by her father to the taho factory in
Tondo, where she was ordered to proceed to a room on the upper floor of the factory. Accusedappellant undressed himself, spat at her vagina, took out his penis and put it inside her private
part and then proceeded to do the sexual act. As Jennifer described the incident, Dinuraan po
niya ang harap ko at pinilit niya pong ipasok ang kanya sa akin. Minumura niya ako. She saw a
white sticky substance coming out of her fathers sexual organ as the latter pulled it from her
vagina. After her ordeal, she said she was sent home. on November 2, 3, 4 6, 7 and 8 she was
summoned again by her father and was also repeatedly subjected to the same sexual torture on
said dates, brought her to said taho factory. She reported the incident to her mother several
times but was told that she was taking time before taking action against him.
However, on her cross examination, Jennifer changed her statement as to the place of the
alleged rape, only the November 1 transpired at taho factory in Tondo and the rest in
Tarlac. She reasoned that such change was due to jurisdictional issue. She was just afraid her
complaints might be dismissed for improper venue. She further mentioned that her father gave
her money every time they had sexual intercourse. Medico-legal officer also testified that
Jennifer was no longer a virgin at the time of the examination and that it was possible for her to
have been raped.. Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He interposed that the
complaint was merely orchestrated by his wife due to an ulterior motive against him. However,
trial court found him guilty of having raped his daughter in the taho factory in Tondo on
November 1, 1991. The rest of the rapes allegedly committed in Tarlac were all dismissed by
the court for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellants conviction for rape be sustained.
Held:
No, accused-appellants conviction for rape cannot be sustained.The prosecution must stand or
fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions,
it is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot
understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him
until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience at
the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed
with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991 showed that
she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that she
had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape but, quite
possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the time of the
crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by her father every

Case Digests
time they had an intercourse. But, considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in
this case was committed by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant
cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offending his constitutional rights to
due process to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include qualified
seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape. Hence accused-appellants ACQUITTAL
on the ground of reasonable doubt is in order.
(2) PEOPLE vs. SUBINGSUBING

Facts:
Complainant Mary Jane Espilan, 16 years old, was living with her grandmother. She was then a
high school student while the accused, Napoleon Subingsubing, is her uncle, the brother of her
mother and the son of her grandmother. Said accused was then living also with her grandmother,
hence, he and her were then living under the same roof.
On Nov. 25, 1989, at 1:00 P.M., Mary Jane and Napoleon were alone in the house, the
grandmother having gone to the fields. When Mary Jane was about to go to school, Napoleon
forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the grandmother, pointed his Garand rifle at her, then
punched her in the stomach rendering her unconscious. After regaining senses, she noticed her
vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private parts and is quite certain she was raped. The
accused who was then standing outside the room warned her not to tell anybody what happened
or else he will kill her. Hence Mary Jane did not report the incident to anybody.
Issue:
Whether accuseds guilt for two counts of Rape be sustained.
Held:
NO, accuseds guilt cannot be sustained. Complainants testimony discloses contradictions and
inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story. By his
admission that of having sexual intercourse with complainant when the latter was only 16 years
of age, living with him in the same house and his niece, Qualified Seduction was undoubtedly
committed by him. It is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years
of age and committed by any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic,
guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education and
custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the
offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic". It
pertains to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and
constituting, in the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant whereby a
person serving another on a salary is designated. Hence, conviction for Qualified Seduction is
proper since complainant established that the accused, her uncle, who was living with her in the
same house, had sexual intercourse with her, took advantage of his moral ascendancy if not
dominance over her, presumably, she was a virgin and the accused was a domestic in relation to
her within the meaning of Art. 337 of the RPC. Hence, accused is convicted of the crime of
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION instead of RAPE.
Case Digests
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
(1) PEOPLE vs. PASCUA

Facts:
Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins born on July 12,
1983. Appellant was their neighbor in Calvo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. Liza and Anna
considered appellant as their grandfather although he was not related to them. On August 6,
1995, private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when the latter called
Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she returned from the
store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the floor. Appellant then
removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but appellant threatened to kill her. After
the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned her not to reveal the incident to
her mother. Liza then went home but did not tell her mother what happened for fear that her
mother would punish her. Four (4) counts of Rape were filed against appellant. Trial ensued;
appellant interposed a defense that he is not guilty of rape because private complainants
voluntarily submitted to his sexual desires.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellants guilt for four counts of rape be sustained.
Held:
YES, accused-appellant guilt must be sustained. Appellants defense that the victims consented
to his lascivious desires is simply too preposterous to deserve serious consideration. The same is
not only revolting but goes against established norms. No young child in her right mind will
consent to have sexual intercourse with a 65-year-old man, especially one whom she considers
her grandfather. The record shows that, other than his self-serving assertions, the appellant had
nothing to support his claim that private complainants were teenagers of loose morals and that
the repeated acts of sexual intercourse were consensual.
Equally untenable is appellants argument that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be
for simple seduction. However, aside from his bare testimony, the appellant presented no proof
that private complainants consent was secured by means of such promise. As aptly opined by
the trial court, the money given by the appellant to private complainants was not intended to
lure them to have sex with him. Rather, it was for the purpose of buying their silence to ensure
that nobody discovered his dastardly acts. Thus, appellant is guilty of the four counts of Rape
and not of Simple Seduction.
(2) PEOPLE vs.TEODOSIO

Facts:
That on or about December 19, 1985, in the City of Manila, complainant Elaine Cesar, more than
12 years of age, while inside the room at the Champion Lodge Inn, located at Sta. Cruz, Manila,
was made to drink the drugged soft drink upon persuasion of accused-appellant Fernado
Teodosio, which rendered her dizzy and unconscious. While unconscious, accused-appellant had

Case Digests
carnal knowledge of her. Upon gaining consciousness Elaine found blood on her private part or
vagina and she felt pain in her body; when she asked the accused what happened, the accused
lied by saying that nothing happened, she felt pain on her private. She relates to her mother
such incident in the motel. Irked by it, her mother wasted no time in bringing her police station
to lodge a complaint and thereafter, she was subjected to medical examination which revealed
fresh hymenal lacerations. Hence, accused-appellant was charged of the crime of rape before the
RTC. He interposed a sweetheart defense and that he and complainant was lovers and that their
going to the hotel was consensual act. Nonetheless, the court still convicted him of the crime
charged.
Issue:
Whether accused-appellants guilt for the crime of rape be sustained.
Held:
NO, it cannot be sustained. The focal question is whether the account of Elaine in that she was
only forced to go to the motel and that she was made to drink the soft drink so that she lost
consciousness is true and supported by the evidence. Elaine admitted that she knew appellant
some three months before the alleged incident took place because they were neighbors.
Apparently, they fell in love with each other for Elaine gave appellant her photograph with her
handwritten dedication. Because of this memento, he kissed her out of joy. They went out three
times to see a movie. They were together always, going from one place to the other, until they
slept together in the lodging house. There was no force or compulsion involved. It was a day of
joy for the two young lovers. Appellant did not drug Elaine to lay with her. The only elements of
the offense alleged in the sworn complaint of the offended party are that she is over 12 years of
age when appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted even for
simple seduction either. Thus, accused-appellant is ACQUITTED from the rape charge.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
(1) PEOPLE VS. LINING
Facts:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1997, at 1am, more or less, in Sitio Buho, Barangay
Mabuslot, municipality of Pinamalayan Oriental Mindoro, the accused Gerry Lining and Lian
Salvacion, conspiring, confederating and acting in common accord, with lewd and unchaste
design, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with threat and intimidation
with use of a deadly weapon, forcibly abduct one Emelina Ornor, 15-year-old girl, towards an
unoccupied house and thereat and pursuant to their criminal conspiracy and motivated with
lustful desire, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and had carnal knowledge one after
the other of said victim against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter. In the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, use of
deadly weapon and abuse of superior strength are attendant.
Issues:
- Whether the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the trial court erred in imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.

Held:
Case Digests
Time and again, the straightforward and candid testimony of the Emelina Ornos, who was crying
as she recalled her ordeal before the trial court, is certainly more credible than the testimonies
of the defense witness. Furthermore, alibi is weak in face of positive identification by the victim
of the perpetrator of the offence. A corroborative testimony is not absolutely necessary. Even
women of loose morals could still be a victim of rape, for the essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent. When the rape is committed by
two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death, however
where there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser should be imposed.
Wherefore, accused appellant Gerry Lining is found guilty for two counts of rape and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he is likewise ordered to indemnify Emelina Ornos,
the sum of 50000.00 as civil indemnity and 50000.00 as moral damages.
(2) PEOPLE vs. ESPIRITU

Facts:
Accused Rolando Espiritu denied the allegations that he forcibly abducted and raped Aharan. He
claimed that Aharan was his girlfriend. According to him, on October 5, 1992, his friend Norman
Alvarez introduced Aharan to him. From that time on, he and Aharan dated five times, on
October 6, 8, 9, 23, and 25, 1992, the date of the supposed abduction and rape. The medical
report indicates fresh lacerations and the presence of spermatozoa in the victims vagina. She
had swollen lids caused by trauma. This is in contrast to the accused testimony that he did not
have sexual intercourse with Aharan
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
Held:
Forcible abduction, as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, is the
taking of a woman against her will and with lewd designs, or of a girl below 12 years of age.
When the accused forcibly took away the victim, for the purpose of raping her, as in fact he did
rape her, lewd and unchaste designs existed since the commencement of the crime.
Consequently, when accused raped Aharan, he committed the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

(1) PEOPLE vs. TIPAY
Facts:

Case Digests
That sometime February or March of 1995 at Bgy. Inandaw, Ragay, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
the above-named accused, who is the step-father of the private offended party, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse for several times with one Susan Pelaez y Dequio, 15 years of age, against the
latter's will, to her damage and prejudice.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of rape.
Held:
The Court has laid down certain guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove the charge; (b)
considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons are usually involved in the crime
of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution, and (c) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The Court is morally convinced that
the accused ROMEO TIPAY y NUITE, is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, as
defined and penalized under Article 335(2)(3) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
7659, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. He is directed to
indemnify the offended party the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to acknowledge
his offspring Marissa, with the offended party.
(2) ALONTE vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion.
It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who
was then the mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and
the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change
of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on
with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The
case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and
had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Issue:
Whether Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
Held:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The

Case Digests
standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality
by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the
lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
BIGAMY
(1) Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
- Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete contracted marriage on August 30, 1990.
- On January 17, 1992, the Ontario Court granted the petition for divorce to Lucia.
- On October 4, 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
- On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
- On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed with the RTC
- Lucio moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
- RTC convicted Lucio for the crime of Bigamy on the ground that it discounted the claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
- Case was appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC's decision.
Issue:
Whether a 1st marriage that lacks marriage ceremony is considered no marriage at all that will
acquit Lucio Morigo of the crime of Bigamy
Held:
There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. What only transpired is a mere signing of a marriage contract without the presence of a
solemnizing officer making it void ab initio, in accordance with Art 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
There was no marriage to begin with, under the eyes of the law, never married.
1st element of Bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married but
in this case, legally speaking, Lucio was not married to Lucia. The contract of marriage with
Lucia is null hence he was not married to anyone the time he contracted marriage to Maria
Jececha. It bears stressing though that in Mercado vs Tan, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly
issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Lucio Morigo is acquitted.
(2) ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Case Digests
- On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceo

- On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a Zenaida Bias
- On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.
- On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
- Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 and has four children
with her prior to their separation in 1966.
- Salvador was convicted in the RTC for Bigamy.
- Case was appealed to CA claiming that his petition for annulment poses a prejudicial question
that should suspend the criminal case until there has been a decision for the civil case.
- CA still affirmed conviction of Salvador for bigamy.
Issue:
Whether pending annulment case would suspend the criminal case of Bigamy
Held:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The court cannot allow
that. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
LIBEL
(1) LAO vs. CA
FACTS:
While having their conversation that night in the sidewalk near the house of Eduardo, a fast
approaching Toyota Harabas jeep was seen coming toward the direction where Eduardo, his wife
and children together with Mrs. Miranda and her daughter was situated. At that instance,
Eduardo was violently bumped or hit on both his calves by the bumper of the said jeep driven by
George Felipe, Jr. He sought the assistance of barangay councilman Frank Deuna who had
accompanied Eduardo later to the hospital for medical treatment. Meanwhile, Frank and police
authorities went to see George who was nowhere to be found. Consequently, they seized the
subject jeep which hit Eduardo with the knowledge of Zenaida, Georges mother and petitioner
Rosario Laos aunt. The information was allegedly relayed by Zenaida to the petitioner and to the
latters neighbor Teofila.
Issue:
- Whether there was malicious intent in the filing of carnapping case by petitioner against Frank
and Eduardo.
- Whether Frank was guilty of malicious prosecution.

Case Digests
- Whether privileged communication is relevant or pertinent to a damage suit for malicious
prosecution.
Held:
It was noted in the case at bar that the absence of probable cause for the filing of the same led
to its dismissal.
The Supreme Court also noted that reliance on the rule of privileged communication in a suit for
malicious prosecution is misplaced, such defense being peculiar to actions for libel.
Decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED. Petition was DENIED.
(2) VICARIO vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Roque M. Vicario was charged with libel with Judge Proceso Sidro as the complaining
witness for allegedly distributing and circulating photocopies of an article dated 20 March 1992
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer relative to a graft charge filed by the Ombudsman
against
Judge
Sidro
in
the
Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
- Whether the act of merely distributing a photocopy of an article in a newspaper reporting of a
graft charge filed against a judge constitutes libel; and
- Whether Vicarios act was proven beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. The elements of libel are: a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; b)
publication of the imputation; c) identity of the person defamed; and d) existence of malice.
It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the dissemination of the article alleged to
be libelous must attend the distribution itself. The prosecution failed to establish express malice
on the part of petitioner by positive proof. Hence, petitioner was not proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner was ACQUITTED of the crime of libel.
ORAL DEFAMATION
(1) VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner was a municipal councilor who brought his application for monetized leave before the
office of the complainant who was then the vice-mayor of the town. The latter refused, without

Case Digests
valid justification, to approve the said monetization of accrued leave credits of the petitioner.
From the complainants version, petitioner while at her office allegedly got a yellow pad and
swings it at her face, but was able to evade the same and then said I will lift you from there
and I will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I will go to jail. Petitioner was also
allegedly
pointed
a
dirty
finger
before
leaving
the
complainants
office.
Issues:
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner for grave oral
defamation; and
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of the petitioner for serious
slander by deed.
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation.
Instead, the petitioner is only guilty of slight oral defamation. The Court of Appeals also erred in
sustaining the conviction of the petitioner for serious slander by deed. Instead, the petitioner is
only guilty of simple slander by deed. Considering that the petitioner and complainant belong to
warring political camps, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike are among the
hazards of the job. In this case, the Court emphasized that courtesy begets courtesy and he
who comes to court must have clean hands.
(2) CAAL vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio L. Caal, Sr. was charged with Grave Oral Defamation before the municipal
trial court for uttering words and expressions against Daylinda P. Caal, to wit: Ayaw mo
kahadlok sa testigos ni Daylinda kay walay banca-agan, nahadlok kaw kang Daylinda, nabuhi
iton sa pangawat, nabuhi iton sa pangawat (You afraid to the witness of Daylinda who had no
how, why you afraid to Daylinda, she lives from stealing, she is a long time thieves). After
hearing those offensive remarks in the presence of a number of persons outside the courtroom,
and being embarrassed and downright humiliated therein, Daylinda went inside the courtroom
and simply cried her heart out.
Issue:
Whether the words and expressions uttered by the accused against Daylinda constitute grave
oral defamation.
Held:
To say that Daylinda is a thief is irrefragably grave oral defamation. This imputes to her a crime
that is dishonorable or contemptuous.
The Court stressed that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Indeed, calling Daylinda a thief is defamation against her character and reputation sufficient to
cause her embarrassment and social humiliation. Daylinda testified to the feelings of shame and
humiliation she suffered as a result of the incident complained of.
Case Digests
Decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED with modification as to the straight penalty of six
(6) months and deleting compensatory damages.
ANTI-FENCING LAW
(1) TAN vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others. That sometime in February
1991, after one Manuelito Mendez left the company, she discovered that some of the
manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February 19, 1991, an inventory was
conducted and it was found that some welding rods and propellers, among others, worth
P48,000.00 were missing. Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who recommended
Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in Manila,
admitted to his having stolen the missing spare parts which were sold then to Ramon Tan. She
then talked to Mr. Tan about said spare parts, who denied having bought the same.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against
petitioner.
Held:
No. The Court set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows (Dizon-Pamintuan
vs. People of the Philippines):
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Consequently, "the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence
of all the elements of the crime charged.
There was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold him. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. The court chose the
one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Case Digests
The prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

(1) PEOPLE vs. TEMPORADA
Facts:
Accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and
appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC),
recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi Jr,
Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano. After complainants had submitted
all the requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances
and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and received
from them placement fees in various amounts. As none of them was able to leave nor recover
the amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused
and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto
Mangalindan, Jr. filed 6 Informations against the accused and appellant, one for Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for
5 counts of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issues:
- Whether the Appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa; and
- Whether the imposition of indeterminate penalties were properly applied.
Held:
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, 3 elements must concur:
(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and,
(c) the offender committed the same against 3 or more persons, individually or as a group.
In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her coaccused, misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business to obtain overseas
employment upon payment of a placement fee which was duly collected from complainants.
Thus the Decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with respect to the indeterminate penalties
imposed on appellant for the 5 counts of estafa. The accused is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and
21 days of prisin mayor as maximum for the estafa committed against Legaspi. The accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as maximum for each of the
three estafa cases committed against Dimaano, Atte and Minkay. The accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional as minimum, to 12 years,

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8 months and 21 days of reclusin temporal as maximum for the estafa committed against
Estacio.
(2) PEOPLE vs. ENRIQUEZ

Facts:
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were convicted of kidnapping by the RTC, and each
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as maximum.
Andico, Pugay, Saquilayan, and Pureza were conversing in front of the Barangay Hall of Silangan,
Rosario, Cavite. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., alias Bonggo,, dressed in military fatigue pants,
camouflage jacket, brown hat, and wearing dark glasses, arrived on board a tricycle driven by
appellant Emiliano Enriquez, alias Emil Tate. After Bonggo alighted, Emil parked the tricycle
about 10 meters away from the group. Bonggo then pulled out a .38 caliber revolver from his
jacket and warned the group, Huwag kayong tatakbo, awtoridad ako. He singled out Pureza,
poked his gun at him and ordered him, Sama ka sa kin. He dragged Pureza to the tricycle, and
forced him to board the same. The tricycle sped off. Pureza was never seen again or heard from
since then.
Issue:
Whether the proper penalty was imposed.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. RA No. 7659 which classified kidnapping as a heinous crime
punishable by death took effect on December 31, 1993. The crime at bar was committed in
1985.
This court have ruled that RA No. 7659 cannot be applied to a crime that transpired prior to its
effectivity under the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws which are unfavorable to the
accused. Consequently, reclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed against the
appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be applied in the case of appellants considering the
proscription in Sec. 2 thereof providing that such shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment. The Court in effect equated the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and ruled that the latter law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punishable with the said penalty.
PROBATION LAW
(1) Vicoy vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:

Case Digests
On August 24, 1995, MTCC of Tagbilaran promulgated a judgment of conviction against Vicoy for
violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling fish outside the Agora Public Market and of the
crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedience To Agents Of A Person In Authority.
Petitioner then filed an application for probation on the same day. On September 18, 1995,
however, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw her application for probation and simultaneously
filed a notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the RTC on the ground of petitioners
failure to comply with its Order dated August 2, 1996.
Held:
The RTC's dismissal of petitioners special civil action was valid.
The trial court categorically directed petitioner, in its August 2, 1996 Order, to furnish the City
Prosecutors Office with a copy of her memorandum and of the assailed judgment. Petitioners
counsel did not comply, prompting the court to dismiss the petition for certiorari.
Even assuming that the Regional Trial Court did not order the said dismissal, petitioners special
civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of appeal, would still fail. Petitioner filed an
application for probation. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that
a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is
totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as
amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her
right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for probation.
(2) PABLO vs. CASTILLO

Fact:
Petitioner Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for issuing three bad checks to
complainant Mandap. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D and 94-00199D, respectively, the three cases were not consolidated. The first two were raffled and assigned to
Branch 43 while the third case to Branch 41 of the RTC in Dagupan City.
Issue:
Whether the denial of petitioners application for probation valid.
Held:
Section 9 paragraph (c) of the Probation Law, P.D. 968 provides that those who have previously
been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos cannot avail of the benefits
of probation. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not
only that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that

Case Digests
the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of
the law.
In the present case of petitioner, when she applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9400197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D,
which thereby disqualified her from the benefits of probation.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

(1) PEOPLE vs. BONDAD
Facts:
Elpidio Bondad, Jr was caught in a buy-bust operation selling shabu. The illegal drugs were
inside a Vicks container. PO2 Dano placed the markings EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04 on the
substance-filled sachet sold to him, and EBB-ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04 on the sachets that
remained inside the Vicks container. Bondad was brought to the station and was asked for a
drug test. The drugs were sent to the laboratory and was confirmed as shabu. Bondads claims
that he was forced to come with PO2 Brubio. When Brubio saw his son inside the billiard hall, he
was made to board a police car. The RTC found appellant guilty of violating Sec. 5 Art II of
RA9165. He then filed a petition and subsequently affirmed the RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
The found out that the police violated Sec. 21 of RA 9165. The police did not take photographs
of the illegal drugs on the scene and there was no representative from the media or a public
officer to sign the copy of the inventory of the seized items.
The Court reasoned that what is important is the integrity of the illegal drugs, if it was the same
drugs from the start.
Hence, the RTCs decision was reversed and petitioner was acquitted.
(2) PEOPLE vs. SANCHEZ

Facts:
Salvador Sanchez was senteced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), meriting
him the penalty of life imprisonment by the RTC. The decision of the RTC was brought to the
Court of Appeals through a petition. Sanchez held that the police violated Sec. 21 Art. II of RA
9165. The Court reasoned that the corpus delicti was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the
essential elements of sale of illegal drugs was present.
Case Digests
Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
The Court pointed three mistakes by the authorities. First is their non-observance of the
requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. There was no
photograph of the seized items during the buy-bust operation and no representative of the
media or public officer to sign the inventory of the seized items. The non-observance of the rule
creates doubt on the integrity of the seized items whether real or framed. The marking of Sevilla
was not essential as he could have done it anytime after the arrest was made.
Second, the chain of custody over the confiscated items was not proven. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed. In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal for
the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the
same one allegedly seized from the accused. There was doubt on the authenticity of the items
on who handled it between the arrest and the court hearing. The testimony of Sevilla showed
that the handler of the items were unknown.
Hence, the decision of the CA was reversed and the petitioner was acquitted.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

(1) BUSTILLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner Anuncio Bustillo, then incumbent mayor
of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and his daughter Rowena Bustillo in the Sandiganbayan with
Falsification of Official Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it
appear that municipal funds were expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber
when, in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased from
Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo. In view of the
criminal charges against the petitioner, Sandiganbayan then suspended the petitioner from office
for 90 days.
The petitioner argues that Sandiganbayan has no basis to suspend him because he contends
that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid because it failed to allege the
element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or that the "integrity of
the [falsified] document was tarnished.
Issue:

Case Digests
Whether the Information charged against the accused was valid to justify the Sandiganbayans
resolution of suspending the accused.
Held:
The information is valid. The allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the
falsification, or tarnishing of a documents integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for
falsification of official documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the Information fall
under any of the modes of committing falsification under Article 171.
Suspension from office is mandatory whenever a valid Information charges an incumbent public
officer with (1) violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC; (3) any offense
involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving fraud upon public funds or
property. While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed against him and his coaccused does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the RPC, it nevertheless
involves "fraud upon government or public funds or property.
(2) CHANG vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Roberto Chang, the Municipal Treasurer of Makati and Pacifico San Mateo, the Chief of
Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office found out
that GDI has a tax deficiency of P494,000. The Office of the Treasurer then issued an
Assessment notice to GDI to pay the unpayed taxes. GDI asked for a validation of the
assessment and petitioners asked for a meeting with GDI representatives. On that meeting,
petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay P125,000, the tax would be settled. Thinking that
it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners made it clear that
it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners P125,000 or pay the
Municipality P494,000. GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an
entrapment operation.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were indeed guilty of corrupt practices by illiciting bribe to fix tax deficits.
Held:
Yes. The fact that petitioners willingness to meet with GDI representatives despite the receipt of
the latter of deficiency assessments notices to settle tax deficiencies, refusal to accept of the
initial payment of P125,000 for the municipality, and the petitioners' handing over to GDI
representatives the Certificate of Examination on which was annotated "NO TAX LIABILITY
INVOLVED" establishes that the criminal intent originated from the minds of petitioners to illicit
bribes.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS/ EXPLOSIVES LAW

(1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y
AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, and RODOLFO QUIMSON Y NAVA (At large),
accused-appellants.

Facts:
Case Digests
The accused Rodolfo Dela Rosa, Antonio Dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson were
members of the New Peoples Army recruited by Benjamin Nano, a.k.a. Kumander Tamang. in
the morning of December 9, 1986, the four accused surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of
Sitio Kadampat, Bolo, Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to lead a new life. They informed
him that Benjamin Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, a member of the New People's Army (NPA),
was shot by one of them.
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives under
the provisions of R.A. No. 1866.
Held:
The Court could not see how appellant dela Rosa could be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms based on the above reasoning. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 punishes any
person who shall ". . . unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearms,
part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." Broken down into its salient elements, illegal
possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof:(i) possesses a firearm; and(ii)
lacks the authority or license to possess it. the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866
is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same. It is not enough that the firearm was found in the
person of the accused who held the same temporarily and casually or for the purpose of
surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on
into the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and
coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to
his possession. Dela Rosa and his companions had surrendered the ammunitions to Kagawad
Rigor even before the police arrived. As always, mere speculations and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code which are
mala in se or in crimes which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. The Court found
that such quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case.
Accused was acquitted.
(2) PEOPLE vs. MACAGALING

Facts:
In connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, a coronation ball
was held in the evening of May 2, 1991 at the public plaza. Present on said occasion, among
others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro, Concepcion, Romblon; Anita
Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling; Pfc. Roque Fesalbon, investigator of the
local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of Teotimo Fameronag. At about 10:00 P.M.,
the aforesaid Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis Macagaling, was
watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling point and then fire a
gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but wounded Teotimo
Fameronag on the right chest causing the latter to collapse in front of Dennis. Dennis, on his
part, tried to escape from Leonito by running away from the scene. At this juncture, Anita saw

Case Digests
that her son Dennis was running in a wobbly manner and she embraced him to prevent him from
falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his head, pulling the latter away from his
mother. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito," but the latter pointed the gun at the
temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down ("sumubasob") on the cement floor.
Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times successively on the neck, uttering the
expletive "Putang ina mo," and then tried to leave the vicinity.
Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives.
Held:
The Court held that Leonitos version of the incident appeared to be too good to be true. In a
long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself. As the burden of proof is shifted to him, he must
consequently rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing under such
circumstances, is whether the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support him claim of
self-defense. appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and negated
precisely by the number of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof.
Appellant maintains that while both he and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the
same accidentally fired, hitting the latter.
The Court said that Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the
offense is basically the fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it
was so possessed with animus possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text
of said decree, the crime may be denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from
the aggravated form wherein such firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. In
fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun only on that
occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be
concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for the offense charged. The
Court affirmed the trial courts decision convicting the accused for homicide on two criminal
cases but reversed the decision as to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW

(1) PEOPLE vs. PASCUAL
Facts:
At 9:30 in the evening of January 16, 1992, Henry de la Paz, a resident of Purok Maligaya,
Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal, noticed a taxicab parked near the dead-end portion of the road near
his house. Moments later, the taxicab moved backwards and hit the wall of a nearby handicraft
shop. Two men alighted from the vehicle, followed by the driver, Arnold Nuarin, who cried out,
"Tulungan po ninyo ako, sinaksak ako." The two men sprinted away. Henry left to call for help.
Andro Paglinawan, together with a team of barangay watchmen patrolling the area, heard
Arnolds cry for help. They found Arnolds lifeless body sprawled on the ground about four posts
away from the taxicab. They saw two men fleeing and ran after them. Meanwhile, PO3 Amando
Alfonso and PO3 Hidalgo Gomez of the Antipolo police received a report about the incident and

Case Digests
proceeded to the scene. They found several persons chasing two men towards the squatters
area. The two police officers joined in the chase. They caught up and apprehended accusedappellant Olegario Pascual, whose clothes were stained with blood. His companion, identified as
alias "Johnny Bonglay," escaped. PO3 Alfonso searched accused-appellant and found a bloodied
fan knife, measuring eight to ten inches in length, in his back pocket. Further investigation
disclosed that the victim had been robbed of his earnings.
Issues:
- Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of violation of the Anti-Highway Robbery as defined
under Section 3 (b) of P.D. 532;
- Whether the trial court erred in its reliance on circumstantial evidence during the trial.
Held:
As to the second issue, the Court held that it is a well-settled rule that direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not only the matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. In the absence of an eyewitness, reliance on circumstantial evidence
becomes inevitable. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Such
evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Doubtless, it
is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged.
All told, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and selfserving evidence undeserving of any weight in law. In comparison with the clear and
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the defenses of denial and alibi, which
accused-appellant relies upon, are discredited and shopworn. The Court however, held that the
trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of highway robbery with homicide. To be
sure, the crime accused-appellant committed was robbery with homicide, not highway robbery
as defined in P.D. 532. Conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were
organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. Absent is such in this case.
Consequently, accused-appellant should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, when homicide is committed by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstance, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court with modification as to the crime committed.
(2) PEOPLE vs. RIANZARES

Facts:
Spouses Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their
store and left for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passengertype jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it was parked two
(2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia immediately asked them where
they were going and they answered that they were bound for the town proper. When Lilia
informed them that they were not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2) said they
would just get off at the nearest intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the

Case Digests
hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's
neck and ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later
identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as
the vehicle stopped, the accused and his companion/approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then
pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the vehicle.
Issue:
- Whether the accused is guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532.
Held:
The Courts shares the view of the trial court that the defense of alibi by the accused is
untenable. In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To
prove this, he presented his father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite
quantum to establish his alibi. While his father testified that the accused borrowed money from
him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a daughter, he could not say whether the accused
actually went to Bicol. The Court said that indeed, the accused is guilty, but that the accused
was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous. As held in a number
of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were organized for
the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. Consequently, the accused should be held liable for
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659 as the allegation in the Information are enough to convict him therefor. In
the interpretation of an Information, what controls is the description of the offense charged and
not merely its designation. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with
modification since the accused was held guilty of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW
(1) PEOPLE vs. BUSTINERA
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business
of his father, hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer
with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to
11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee
in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25, 1996, Luisito Bustinera admittedly reported
for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the
taxi was not returned. Arriving at Bustineras house, he did not find the taxi there, Bustinerass
wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived. Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went
to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing. On January
9, 1997, Bustineras wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City. Cipriano lost no time in repairing to
Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi. An information was filed against Bustinera
charging him of the crime of Qualified Theft. The accused entered a plea of not guilty. Bustinera,
however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the
boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996), Cipriano was already demanding the
return of the taxi. Bustinera maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and
signed the record book, which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and

Case Digests
gave his employer P2,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee covering the period from
December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Issues:
- Whether the accused was guilty of Qualified Theft.
- Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the appellant had intent to gain when he failed
to return the taxi to its garage.
Held:
The Court resolved to correct the errors found in the judgment even thought they were not
specifically assigned. The Court expounded that Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of
a motorized vehicle,and the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping are the
same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo
sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as
the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
As to the second issue raised, the Court ruled that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the
taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a
taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is
contrary to company practice and against the owners consent transformed the character of the
possession into an unlawful one. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owners consent constitutes gain. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court
and entered another judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of carnapping under
Republic Act No. 6539.
(2) PEOPLE vs. GARCIA

Facts:
On December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was
approached by Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand
new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van
was unavailable. Instead, Cortez got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a
brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days. Four
days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehicle
he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao,
Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and asked where her husband was.
The Tamaraw FX, as well as Garcia and Bernabe were seen in Nueva Ecija. When they failed to
produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police
Station for investigation.
Issue:
Whether the elements of the crime of Carnapping as defined in R.A. 6539 are present to warrant
the conviction of the accused.
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Held:
The Court held that all the elements of the crime of carnapping are present in this case. It
expounded that Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things." More specifically, the elements of the crime are as
follows: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain
from the taking of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; and 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellants possession of the
Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the
purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an
unlawful one. The Court was convinced that while there may be no direct evidence of the
commission of the crime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant
Garcias and Bernabes conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain
a conviction were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances indeed form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia were
the perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may
surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. The Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court and modified the award for damages.
ANTI-FENCING LAW
(1) Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
Facts:
Jovita Rodriguez, engaged in business as a general contractor under the business name J.C.
Rodriguez Contractors. Macario Linghon was one of her workers. Jovita acquired several pieces
of jewelry which were placed inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita
hired Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister sometime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the
room periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the employ of the Rodriguez family. Sometime
on October and November 1991, respectively, contacted Macario and asked him to sell pieces of
jewelry. Macario then went to the shop of Ernesto Erning Francisco who is engaged in
purchasing gold and other jewelry. Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was shocked upon
learning that the locked cabinet containing her several jewelry was open and found that the box
was empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was not broken. She suspected that it was
Pacita who stole her jewelry . On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against
Pacita and her mother Adoracion Linghon. On august 23, 1992, Pacita gave sworn statement to
PO1 Roldan, admitting that she sold onepair of heart-shaped diamond ring, and ring with big and
small stones to mang Erning of Maycuayan Bulacan for a total price of 50,000. Php. Pacita
together with police officers and proceeded on the place of Ernesto Francisco who was upon
arrival thereat positively pointed the latter as the Mang Erning who had purchased the jewelry
from her. According to Pacita, she found the jewelry belongings to Jovita while she was cleaning
the room in the house, and that she brought the jewelry at home.

Issue:
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Whether petitioner Ernesto Francisco perform all the elements of the crime of fencing under PD
1612 which will prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article,
item, objector anything of value which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
The prosecution cannot validly argue that the petitioner should have known which pieces of
jewelry were stolen, considering that Macario was selling the same for 50,000.00 php when the
said pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be worth 655,000.00 php. This is so because the
prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the said stolen
articles. It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and
circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purpose: (a) to prove one of
the elements of the crime of fencing; and (b) to enable the trial court to determine the
imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property. In view
of the foregoing, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is Acquitted of the crime of violating PD
1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) TAN vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers of spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees
working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company.
Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boats spare parts, such
as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory
and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at 48,000.00 php, more or less, were missing.
Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez of the loss. Subsequently,
Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion
Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze
and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and
who paid the amount of 13,000.00 php in cash to Mendez and Dayop. On relation of complainant
Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila Branch 19,
an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612
(Anti-Fencing Law).
Issue:

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Whether the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing against petitioner.
Held:
Fencing as defined in Section 2 PD 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not
complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her
former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the
warehouse of the complaint and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict
without evidence of corpus delicti. Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he
can not be guilty of fencing. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential
elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
Wherefore, the Court Reverses and Set Aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
20059 and hereby Acquits petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of
the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
ANTI-BOUNCING CHECKS LAW

(1) Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
Facts:
In eight (8) separate informations filed with RTC of Angeles City, thereat docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233, petitioner was charged with violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law. All containing identical allegations as to the elements of the offense charged and
differing only as regards the respective amounts and due dates of the check involved in each
case, the eight (8) informations uniformly alleged That on or about the 1 st week of April 1991,
in the City of Angeles City Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue to
the complainant Mr. Elmer Avangelista a Traders Royal Bank Check well knowing and without
informing the complainant that she has no sufficient funds with the drawee bank, which check
when deposited for payment was dishonored for reason of Account Closed and demand
notwithstanding for more than five (5) days from notice of dishonor, the accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to redeem the said check to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant Elmer Evangelista. The RTC, in a decision dated March 16, 1998, adjudged
petitioner guilty as charged in each information and accordingly sentenced her to suffer
imprisonment and pay fin and to indemnify private complainant.
Issue:
Whether petitioner violated BP 22 by mere act of issuing checks which were dishonored by the
drawee bank.
Held:
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check
that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law
was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of

Case Digests
issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check,
is covered by BP 22. It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The effect of the issuance of a
worthless check transcends the private interest of the parties. The mischief it creates is not only
a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valuables commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with Modification.
(2) RUIZ vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Sonia Ruiz contracted several loans from Norberta Mendoza amounting to 184,000.00 php. On
july 4, 1997, Ruiz issued United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check dated June 30, 1997. The
check for 184,000.00 php was drawn against Account No 320-000534-5. Mendoza deposited the
check in her account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Goa, Camarines Sur. However,
the drawee bank dishonored the check, as the account against which it was drawn was already
closed.PNMB notified Mendoza of the dishonor of the check. In a letter dated September 22,
1997, Mendoza, through counsel, informed Ruiz that the check had been dishonored for the
reason that her account with the drawee bank was already closed. Mendoza also demanded the
payment of the amount of the check plus interest thereon. Ruiz received the letter on
DSeptember 24, 1997 and promised Mendoza that she would pay the amount of the check.
However, Ruiz reneged and failed to pay. Ruiz was charged with violation of BP 22 in the MTC of
Goa, Camarines Sur which she was found guilty.
Issue:
Whether a closed account from the drawee bank could make the petitioner not liable for violation
of BP 22.
Held:
To give merit to petitioners argument would be to defeat the primary purpose of BP 22. For, BP
22 was enacted to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from
becoming useless scraps of paper, and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. Accordingly, the ownership of the
check should not be material in the determination of liability for violation of BP 22. Otherwise,
unscrupulous people may just start drawing or issuing checks of other people with insufficient or
no funds at all knowing that they will incur no criminal liability by employing such a scheme.
When the petitioner issued the subject check to complainant, she did so in the capacity of a
drawer and upon her representation that she will make good said check. BP 22 covers any check
which bounces. It does not matter then that the subject check belongs to the accused or another
person. Therefore, petitioners deliberate act of drawing a worthless check is the very act which
BP 22 punishes.
In light of all the foregoing, the petition is Denied. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is
Affirmed.
Case Digests
ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT
(1) NAVARRO vs. CA

Facts:
It appears that, at around 8:40 in evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique
Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one
Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated and ordered beer, a dancer appeared on stage and began to perform
a strip act. As the dancer removed her bra, Jalbuena took a picture.
The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded why he took picture. Jalbuena replied: wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.
When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out followed by his
companions.
Jalbuena and his companion went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the
policemen on duty including Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station and they
asked Jalbuena to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Anonuevo, to
report the incident. Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.
Issue:
Whether the tape recorder recorded by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence in view of R.A. No.
4200 which prohibits wire tapping?
Held:
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be asked
whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The
answer is in the affirmative. The law provides: x x x Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established : (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against
him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
(2) GAANAN vs. IAC

Facts:
It appears that in the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainants residence discussing the terms for the

Case Digests
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After
they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office and
advised him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer is on a
business trip. Appellant went to the said office.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault.
Issue:
Whether an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under R.A.
4200.
Held:
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictograph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as tapping the wire or cable of telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favour of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether an extension telephone is
included in the phrase device or arrangement, the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use
of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that
an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- Wiretapping Act.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FALSE TREASURY/ BANK NOTES

(1) TECSON vs. CA
Before the court on appeal by certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.
11744 promulgated on August 31, 1993, and its Resolution dated December 23, 1993, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This case stemmed from a charge of illegal possession
and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised

Case Digests
That on or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control, with intent to use and pass, as in fact he did use and pass ten (10) pieces of 100US dollar notes of the Federal Reserve Note, or a sum of $1,000.00 (US Dollar) to Pedro C.
Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central Bank of the Philippines, which bills were in the
resemblance and similitude of the dollar bills issued by the United States Government, the said
accused knowing, as he did, that the said US dollar bills were forged and falsified. Contrary to
law. Upon being arraigned on July 20, 1990, the petitioner entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the
charge.
Issue:
Is Alejandro Tecson guilty of illegal possession of false treasury and bank notes willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly?
Held:
When the arrest of the petitioner was made, Labita did not have to rely on the prearranged
signal of the informer inasmuch as he (Labita) had unhindered view and appreciation of what
was then taking place right before his eyes. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes
are admissible in evidence for the reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by
the prosecution witnesses during the said buy-bust operation. In other words, this is a case of a
legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the crime.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's allegation that he was framed-up by the Central Bank
agents does not deserve any consideration. This hackneyed defense of alleged frame-up of the
accused caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation has been viewed with disdain by
the courts for it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove. 24 Besides, there is a legal presumption
that public officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. 25 That legal
presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary.
In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
QUALIFIED THEFT
(1) PEOPLE vs. BUSTINERA
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business
of his father, hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer
with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to
11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee
in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25, 1996, Luisito Bustinera admittedly reported
for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the
taxi was not returned. Arriving at Bustineras house, he did not find the taxi there, Bustinerass
wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived. Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went
to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing. On January
9, 1997, Bustineras wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had
been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City. Cipriano lost no time in repairing to

Case Digests
Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi. An information was filed against Bustinera
charging him of the crime of Qualified Theft.
Issues:
- Whether the accused was guilty of Qualified Theft?
- Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the appellant had intent to gain when he failed
to return the taxi to its garage.
Held:
The Court resolved to correct the errors found in the judgment even thought they were not
specifically assigned. The Court expounded that Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of
a motorized vehicle,and the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping are the
same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo
sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as
the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
As to the second issue raised, the Court ruled that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the
taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a
taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is
contrary to company practice and against the owners consent transformed the character of the
possession into an unlawful one. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners
consent constitutes gain. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and entered another
judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539.
(2) SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of
Quezon City. The case was assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant
City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded 4000 pesos from Tan as
the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. The entrapment succeeded, and an information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan, accusing Soriano, for violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of
Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal
in the Information, for violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019. A motion
to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the accused cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do
so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Held:
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It was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted the accused of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019. However, the information clearly makes out a case of bribery so the petitioner cannot
claim deprivation of the right to be informed; thus, he can be convicted of bribery under the
Revised Penal Code.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

(1) PEOPLE vs. LLAGUNO
On February 5, 1987 at 8:30 oclock in the morning, the appellant Judy Reyes, chief security and
rattan controller at GF International Export Inc., Cebu City, informed Tomas Banzon, the
company duty guard, that he caught a thief on February 4, 1987 (TSN, November 24, 1987, p.
26). Appellant then took Banzon to his room where a person named Bienvenido Mercado was
found tied to a wooden post in the room. Appellant told Banzon that Mercado was the thief he
caught (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 28).
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987, Dr. Jovita Ceniza, manager of the company,
called up Banzon by phone inquiring if there was any unusual incident. Banzon replied that he
would give a report after two (2) hours, and when appellant learned of this, he warned Banzon
to keep quiet about Mercados detention or be killed (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31).
Appellant at the time was armed with a .45 caliber pistol (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31).
When Dr. Ceniza went to the companys office later in the afternoon, she met the appellant who
told her it was all finished and that he was going to Santo Nio to confess as he had killed
someone (TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28).
Issue:
Is the accused-appellant liable only for slight illegal detention and not for murder or kidnapping
with murder?
Held:
The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly
established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. Banzon
testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellants room. Banzons
testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained
multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called
her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home because there was
a man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International. Dr. Cenizas testimony
was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was
deprived of his liberty by appellant.
At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding
that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the
victims detention did not exceed five days. The court a quo, however, found that appellant
illegally detained the victim for at least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal
detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a
qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof

Case Digests
beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove
culpability for slight illegal detention.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant Judy Reyes is hereby
CONVICTED of slight illegal detention and SENTENCED to the indeterminate penalty of ten years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. He is acquitted of murder. No costs.
(2) PEOPLE vs. ROLUNA

Facts:
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were
Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico
Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the use of firearms
and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place unknown up (to) this time
whereat said victim was killed.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7) accused
remain at large.
Issues:
- Whether the circumstances proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish the death of
Anatalio Moronia, and;
- If in the affirmative, whether accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable
therefor
Held:
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping
with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia
was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three (3) armed malefactors
acted together in its commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band
attended the commission of the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as
minimum should be imposed on accused-appellant.
IN
VIEW
WHEREOF,
the
appealed
decision
is
hereby
MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is meted an
indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Costs against accused-appellant.
Case Digests
UNJUST VEXATION
(1) ONG CHIU KWAN vs. CA

Facts:
Before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction
of accused Ong Chiu Kwan for unjust vexation.
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for
cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a business
establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to
relocate the telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet, because said lines posed as a
disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities
allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of
unjust vexation, and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days. The court also ordered
him to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric,
water pipe and telephone lines of Crazy Feet caused the interruption of its business operations
during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded
exemplary damages to complainant as a deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in the
future and to pay attorneys fees.
Issue:
Can the petitioner be charged with with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water
pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a business establishment owned and operated by
Mildred Ong?
Held:
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the
constitutional requirement of contents of a decision. However, considering that this case has
been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the evidence and
decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of
complainants business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed,
however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the
lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours
of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioners act unjustly annoyed or vexed
the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to
be without basis. Moral damages may be recovered if they were the proximate result of
defendants wrongful act or omission. An award of exemplary damages is justified if the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There is no evidence to support

Case Digests
such award. Hence, we delete the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award
of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees is hereby deleted.
(2) BALEROS vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
In this Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner-movant Renato Baleros, Jr., through counsel,
seeks reconsideration of our Decision of February 22, 2006, acquitting him of the crime of
attempted rape, thereby reversing an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, but adjudging him
guilty of light coercion and sentencing him to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of
P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
It is petitioners submission that his conviction for light coercion under Information for attempted
rape, runs counter to the en banc ruling of the Court in People v. Contreras where the Court
held: The Solicitor General contends that accused-appellant should be held liable for unjust
vexation under Art. 287(2) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the elements of unjust vexation
do not form part of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
the circumstances stated in the information do not constitute the elements of the said crime.
Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation.
Issue:
Whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed, which is a paramount question in a prosecution for
unjust vexation?
Held:
For being a mere rehash of those already passed upon and found to be without merit in the
Decision sought to be reconsidered, the other grounds relied upon by the petitioner in his Motion
for Partial Reconsideration in support of his plea for a complete acquittal need not be belabored
anew.
WHEREFORE, the motion under consideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
GRAVE COERCION
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS
Facts:
It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from the malady of selective amnesia.
The case is a tale of one unfortunate creditor who might have sought to rouse her absentminded debtor from the haze of forgetfulness.

Case Digests
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Pea was at home in
Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine Lovely
Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently dressed men stepped down from
the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was attired in a business suit, introduced
himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the Criminal Investigation Service
("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida
answered that she had already paid the debt before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments
later, another vehicle, a brown colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the
barangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males
and one unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him that
Josephine had sent the CIS agents to demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine
who should instead be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the two women, the
barangay captain decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best for both of them to just
amicably settle their differences.
Issue:
Is the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of grave coercion?
Held:
The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave
coercion carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding P6, 000.00. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
term. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that can be imposed is anywhere
from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is MODIFIED. Appellants Josephine
Santos and Manny Baltazar are ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping; instead, said appellants
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,
000.00. Costs de oficio.
(2) PEOPLE vs. ASTORGA

Facts:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not
adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present
case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place
only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted
only of grave coercion.
The Case

Case Digests
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga
challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting
him of kidnapping.
In an Information 2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant
Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her
liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Issues:
- Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions;
- Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was
not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty;
- Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no
motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya; and
- Should the accused-appellant be convicted of grave coercion?
Held:
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move.
They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at
the Luponlupon Bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At
that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but
appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the
group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but
Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which
is the primary element of kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against
her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because
Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain
Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a
place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of
Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code.
Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his
or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and

Case Digests
liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE

(1) LONEY vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14
March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against
petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14
March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed
out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons
of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
Issues:
- Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand; and
- Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
Held:
The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the
terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the
second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general
rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set
of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts.
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single
act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as
the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by
four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if

Case Digests
ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution
for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
(2) CRUZ vs. CA

Facts:
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in
simplest terms is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In this jurisdiction, however,
such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, and in some instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code with
which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. It is via the latter type of action that
the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner have alleged imprudence and
negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death.
Issue:
Whether petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising
from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.
Held:
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of
evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the
reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has
been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The
heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time and this
Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can
suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

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BASA, Michelle Yvonne L.

(1) ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE

elements of arbitrary detention are as follows:

(2) CAYAO vs. DEL MUNDO

Criminal Law 2 | Page 1

BASA, Michelle Yvonne L.

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Whether the accused is guilty of falsification; and

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KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT

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