CASE 1

Dimatulac v Villon

FACTS:
SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas,
Masantol,Pampanga. A complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino
David,Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato
Mallari,Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye,
Vladimir Yumul, a certain Danny, and a certain Koyang/Arding.
Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, issued warrantsfor
the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested; while
onlyYambao submitted his counter affidavit. After the prelim investigation, the judge found
reasonable ground to believe that Murder has been committed and the accused are probably the
perpetrators thereof. He recommended the issuance of warrants of arrests and provided no bail
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. It is not
clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of
privaterespondents.

The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were inconspiracy with
one another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by treachery were absent. She also
recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the Yabuts were not under the custody of the law)Before
the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on the resolution
of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly that
Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicide despite
the glaring presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70- NPSRules
on Appeal in Syllabus.

Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alfonso
Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for Homicidewhich the Prov.
Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and certified

Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e.
arraignment) before the RTC in view of his clients pending appeal with the SOJ

YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that thependency of the

appeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignmentand they had a right to a speedy trial
[invoked the case of Crespo v. Mogul.RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment.

RTC Judge set the arraignment. Private prosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a
petition for prohibition to enjoin the judge fromproceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge
voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case wastransferred to herein respondent Judge
Villion.Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending before
the SOJand the prohibition case before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment
. Yabutsentered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail.
SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up with a resolution of the appeal.
He directed the Provincial Appeals form Resolutions of prosecutors to the Sec. of DOJ Prosec. To amend
the info against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to Provincial Prosec. Again
and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder,considering the appeal
was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallarimust be included.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied.
CA also dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari /Prohibition
and Mandamus to reverse theorder of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment; set aside arraignmentof private respondents; order that no further action be taken
by any court in criminal case until thispetition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the
prosecutors concerned to amend theinformation from homicide to murder.

ISUE:
S
1. WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged fromMurder
to Homicide [YES]2. WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of
the accused and denyingmotion to set aside arraignment [YES]3. WON SOJ erred in reversing
himself and his order to amend the information fromHomicide to Murder [YES]

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding/Arraignment and
denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
arraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the
order of SOJ is SET ASIDE and his initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the RTC the amended information for Murder.

Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime chargedfrom
Murder to Homicide

[YES]There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation or downgrading of the Offense fromMurder to
Homicide.
Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or surrendered
and never brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. ProvProsec. Conduct a
reinvestigation then lower the crime from murder to Homicide? (Notethat they re-appeared after
crime was downgraded).She should have also waited for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but
instead entertained the motion for reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits and recommended
bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into the custody of the law. Petitioners had the
right to appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112 of theRules of Court and DOJ Order No.
223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of both offendedparties and the accused to appeal from
resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations.
The sec. speaks of dismissing criminal complaintpetitioners hereinwere not barred from
appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide wascommitted, considering that their
complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicidewas committed, the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed"the complaint for murder. Appeal to the
Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of the Yabuts arraignment.
The bar on Sec 4 does not apply! The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of authority
of the SOJ to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite aninformation
already having been filed in court. The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of theprosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. There was clear and indecenthaste on the part of the public prosec.
In the filing of the information for homicidedepriving the State and offended parties of due
processs.

Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused
anddenying motion to set aside arraignment
[YES] Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon
receiving therecords of the case from the former RTC Judge. He should have gone over the case
andnoticed the multiple motions, manifestations and utter vehemence of the petitioners tohear
their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any dispositionrested on his
discretion + was not bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal.But he committed grave abuse
of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs onthe assailed information for homicide
denying due process.

Actions: nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings,the
denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs andtheir plea of
not guilty

Issue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the informationfrom
Homicide to Murder [YES]
DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor andthe
Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter'sinappropriate
conduct even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conductprejudicial to the
best interest of the service.The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside
arraignment and, in theexercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have
directed thepublic prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
takenagainst them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 2
GUEVARRA VS SSDI

FACTS:
On or about 1989 and for a period subsequent thereto, a public officer
ISSUE:
W/O Court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the 13 crim cases on the basis of
the motion for recon filed by the pros. Beyond 15 days.
HELD:
Dismissal is null and void.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CASE 3
CO vs CA

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later,
the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino
Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the
crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some
four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21,
1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice
of the accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while
our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This
is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not
be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who
relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the
scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 4
PEOPLE vs GENOSA

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he
would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted
medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the
victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to
another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information
for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn
child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of
death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of
the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and
Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as
constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with
the battered woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation,
she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced
in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual,
not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of
self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by
the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted
in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her
will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have

naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively
as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse,
in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and
put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her
to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is
eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
 NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law
provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.xxx"

2.
Story: The Battered Woman Syndrome

The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years. She was 8 months
pregnant when, one evening, her husband came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting
that his wife "might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her
towards a drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to open the drawer because it was
locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a
pipe and escape into another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband had
been inflicting on her, and thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted
the drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband, who was by then asleep on the bed. She was
tried and convicted for parricide, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day
to 40 years) to death. On appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-
defense. (For Full Case, just click here.

FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her
husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The
Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five
(5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found
guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked
while asleep.

ISSUES:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be
held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant
has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient
time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression

does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced
from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose
a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in
her favor.
HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical
assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can
satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 5
MALLILLIN vs PEOPLE

ISSUE: W/O the search done and the seizure evidence be admissible in court.

In Mallillin v. People, we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient
compliance with this rule:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.

We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia, People v. Gum-Oyen, People v. Denoman and People
v. Coreche where we recognized the following links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

(a) The first link in the chain of custody

We observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled
immediately after the accused-appellants arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez
testified that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-appellant, he never
disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its
seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they
reached the police station.
SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who
made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the
accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.
(b) The second link in the chain of custody

We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation
failed to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The
records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before whom SPO2
Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002. Thus, a
big gap exists on who had custody and possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately
after the police investigation, and how the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded
from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by the forensic laboratory.

(c) The third link in the chain of custody

The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by
the prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002 of Police Superintendent
Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug Enforcement Group and the
Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the
forensic chemist.
These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings ES-1-
161002 and ES-2-161002 were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown
envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received
this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to
qualitative examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the
seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who
received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October 17,
2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it
was presented in court. Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the
seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its presentation in court.
(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody

The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecutions evidence in this
case. Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered
testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of
October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October
12, 2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:
FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the one
who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case containing with
white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30
grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced findings after the examination
conducted.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 6
DELA TORRE vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground
cited by the COMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section
provides that those sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
 sentence are disqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by the
COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law. It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him
because he was granted probation by the MTC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.

Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property
received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which already declared
as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in
Section 40(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

2.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the
ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and
hence, the execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

ISSUE:
WON Dela Torre is disqu alified to run for public office.

HELD:
Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence
Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking public office.
With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of
probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.

Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the
accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application
for probation.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 7
PEOPLE vs OPTANA

4 information for the violation of the sec. 5 RA7610 (Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse) and 4 informations for rape were filed against the accused.
HELD:
The SC affirms the decision of the trial court convicting the accused for one incident of rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and one charge violating RA7610, sentencing him to suffer
8yrs and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 17 yrs. and 4mos of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The other informations failed to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise,
charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date
against the same victim is erroneous and illegal except where the law itself so allows. This is not
allowed by RA7610. It specifically provides that in instances where the victim is under 12, the
case should fall under art. 335 of the RPC, thus only cases where the victim is over 12 but under
18 can fall under this law. In the case at bar, where the accused was charged for several
occasions of rape and abuse the conviction or acquittal on the informations was based on the age
of the child, the concept of non-multiplicity of suits, and the evidence presented. Thus, only one
rape case prospered (incident when the child was below 12) and one violation of RA7610 (when
the child was above 12 but below 18).
People vs. Optana G.R. No. 133922. February 12, 2001 (Case for RA 7610 - Special Protection
of Filipino Children Act)Upon a sworn complaint filed by Maria Rizalina Onciano on November
28, 1995, four (4) Informations for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7 610, or known
as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse and four (4)Informations for Rape
were filed against herein accused-appellant Deolito Optana.Mindful of the well-settled rule that
findings of facts of the trial court are accorded great respect co nsidering that thetrial judge has
observed the demeanor of the witnesses, the Court does not find any cogent reason to depart
fromsuch rule.The trial judge had these observations about the witness:Rizalina was already 14
years old when she testified in Court. At the time she testified she was succinct in her declaration
and appeared to the Court to be truthful. She had no reason to fabricate a story against the
accused whosupported her in her daily needs and spent for her education until she finished Grade
6. Ingratitude is not a traitcommon to a provincial child still innocent of the vicissitudes of life. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent is acredible witness. Since the trial court found Maria Rizalinas testimony to
be credible and trustworthy, it was more than sufficient to sustain the accused-appellants
conviction. The fact that the accused-appellant had carnalknowledge with the young victim is
corroborated by the findings of Dr. Laila Patricio, who upon examination onNovember, 1995
found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months pregnant already. Maria Rizalina confided to her that
her stepfather raped her. This accusation was repeated when she was investigated by SPO3 Cesar
Antolin at the SubicPolice Station, Subic, Zambales, and when she was interviewed by Social
Welfare Officer II, Ana Ecle of the DSWD,Iba, Zambales.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 8
PEOPLE V. VELASCO
GR 128089; Feb13,2001
The accused was indicted for parricide under art 246 of the RPC for the killing of his wife.
HELD:
The accused is guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Parricide is
committed when 1) a person is killed; 2)the deceased is killed by the accused; 3)the deceased is
theor the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element is the relation of the offender to
the victim. In case of a marital relationship the best evidence is the marriage certificate. The own
testimony of the accused as married to the victim may also be taken as an admission against
penal interest. The case was proved through circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishing the
malefactor, destroying the presumption of innocence, and fulfilling the standard of moral
certainty. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence of eyewitnesses and is
sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which that
inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction based on such can be
upheld if the circumstances established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.
2.
FACTS:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila
was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully
selling shabu, in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and
(o) of Article 1 of The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. 6425).
Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco
was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five
more decks were found in her pockets.
Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against
her since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly,
appellant questions the RTCs jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in
her possession.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired
through a warrantless arrest.
2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest
when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to
be arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be
justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the
buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they
entrapped her.

2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425,
agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of
shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty
is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be
taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months.
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However,
R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached
the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as
having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts
prior to its effectivity. RTCs jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by the new legislation.
At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the
trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force
(R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the
commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691
reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to
stress, prospective in nature
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 9
LIANG vs PEOPLE

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration
was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with
regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
( 2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in official capacity.
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE 10
PEOPLE vs DELIM

FACTS:
Murder of Modesto by Marlon, Robert and Ronald. Leon and Manuel as look-out.

ISSUE:
Conspiracy and treachery present in this case?

HELD:
There is conspiracy, but no treachery.