48. Art. 3. Sec.1 - Soriano vs. Judge Angeles and Ruel Garcia GR No.

109920

Facts: Private respondent Ruel Garcia, a policeman, was being accused by Barangay Captain Ceferino
Soriano of direct assault. However, Judge Angeles dismissed the case. Petitioner Soriano filed a petition
for certiorari, claiming that Judge Soriano excluded his testimonies and his witnesses ‘ testimonies in
making decision of dismissing the case.

Issue: W/N the decision of Judge Angeles is void.

Ruling: No, the decision is not void. The Judge excluded his testimonies and the testimonies of the
witnesses (who were his barangay tanods) because it was quite hard for the judge to believe their
testimonies that there was no resistance during the attack and the 4 tanod witnesses just stood there
without helping the barangay captain.

46. Art. 3. Sec.1 - People vs. Cabiles and Delos Reyes GR No. 112035

Facts: Cabiles and Delos Reyes were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, attempted
homicide, illegal possession of firearms and robbery. Accordingly there was error in the decision, that
there was grave abuse of discretion because the decision was biased and the testimonies of the 3
witness ( wife and sons of the victim) were not given weight in the decision (Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt).

The testimonies were not consistent and the wife of the victim was not able to identify the accused in
the 1st instance because his hairdo was different (during attack- hair down; in the police station – hair
up).

Issue: W/N the decision was void.

Ruling: Yes. The decision was reversed. The court failed to consider the testimonies of the witnesses in
making its decision of guilty beyond reasonable doubt because the witness was not able to identify the
accused at the 1st instance and there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the 2 sons of the victim.

47. Art. 3. Sec.1 - Gozun vs Judge Liangco AM NO. MTJ-97-1136

Facts: This case involves administrative complaint for dismissal filed against Judge Daniel Liangco for
serious misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun was forced to evacuate
his home because it was demolished by the agents of LGU.

Gozun was is possession of the subject land for more than 30 years. After which, the municipality of San
Luis Pampanga claimed to own the lot and issued a resolution stating its ownership and the squatting of
Gozun. The Vice-Mayor filed a petition for declaratory relief to Judge Liangco’s court to rule on the
validity of the resolution made. On the same day, the judge issued a resolution siding with the
municipality and stated the validity of the resolution, the use of reasonable force through the PNP in
removing Gozun from their home. Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition
for declaratory relief.

Issue: W/N Judge Liangco committed serious misconduct by not giving notice to Gozun?

Ruling: Yes, the essence of due process is simple the opportunity to be heard. In the case, Gozun was
not given the right to actual notice and opportunity to defend one’s right.

The Judge’s action of not notifying the complainant not only acted without jurisdiction but also acted
blatantly the basic rules of fair play. The purpose of notice is t afford the parties a chance to be heard –
which was not given to Gozun that led to the demolition of his house.

118. Art. 3. Sec.1 - Go vs. Comelec GR No. 147741

Facts: Ma. Catalina Go filed for candidacy for both Governor and Mayor of Leyte. However, she filed for
withdrawal of her candidacy 28 minutes late after the deadline thru fax machine. Private respondents
filed separate petitions to deny Catalina due course and to cancel the certificates of candidacy of
Catalina. The case was then referred to the Law department of Comelec which gave due course to the
private respondent’s petitions without giving Catalina the opportunity to be heard or submit responsive
pleadings. Based on the report of law department of Comelec, Catalina was disqualified to run for both
positions.

Issue: W/N Catalina was denied procedural due process of law?

Ruling: Yes, Comelec Law department conducted an ex-parte study of the case without giving Catalina
an opportunity to be heard, or requiring her to submit comment or opposition or setting the case for
hearing. So the Comelec en banc deprived her of due process of law in approving the report and
recommendation of the law department.

119. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Mollaneda vs Umacob GR No. 140128

Facts: Umacob was a public school teacher. She went to the office of Mr. Rolando Suase to follow up her
transfer to a different district, but Mr. Arnold Mollaneda , the school superintendent, was the one who
entertained her. After entertaining her, he was molested by Mollaneda.

She reported it to the Police and filed a complaint with the MTC. She also filed a complaint with the CSC
and gave copy of the affidavit to DECS.

The case was heard before the CSC, both parties attended together with their counsel. CSC found him
guilty and was dismissed from service. Mollaneda was claiming that he was denied due process.
Issue: W/N Mollaneda was denied due process?

Ruling: No, he was not denied due process because he even attended the hearing with CSC.

A person who was given the opportunity to be heard has been given due process.

120. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Cruz vs. CSC GR No. 144464

Facts: Gilda Cruz took the CSC exam for Zenaida Patim. A fact finding investigation was conducted by
CSC, they took the seat plan with pictures and compared it with prior years. They found that a prima
facie case exist for dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Cruz filed for answer denying all the allegations. Eventually, she raised that she was deprived of due
process because CSC was the complainant as well as the judge.

Issue: W/N Cruz’s right to due process was violated because CSC was the judge as well as the
complainant?

Ruling: No, her rights were not violated because CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction and CSC is
mandated to hear and decide administrative cases.

198. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Cordenillo vs ES

Facts: Private respondent Jose Bolivar was granted lease by BFAR 16 ha. of fish pond. Cordenillo also
filed with the Bureau of Lands for lease of 134 ha. which covers the 16 ha. fish pond granted to Bolivar.
However, his lease was released and Bolivar was given preference. Cordenillo filed for reconsideration
claiming that he already invested and fully developed the fish pond. His motion was denied. So
Cordenillo filed petition claiming that he was denied due process.

Issue: W/N there Cordenillo’s right to due process was violated.

Ruling: No, Where a party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured.

199. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Chua v CA GR No. 116835

Facts: Roberto Chua and Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock for 11 years, they begot 2 illegitimate
children. Florita filed petition for guardianship, heirship and acts of administration. Then Antonietta
Vda. De Chua filed a motion claiming that she was the true wife of Roberto. However she was not able
to produce documents such as marriage certificate, so the court denied her motion.

Issue: W/N Antonietta was denied due process and opportunity to be heard?
Ruling: No, Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not an actual hearing should
always and indispensably be held. The essence of due process is simple an opportunity to be heard.
Denial of due process cannot be invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.

200. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Dela Cruz vs. Abille GR No. 130196

Facts: Herminio Abille filed a Petition for Exemption under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his
landholdings alleging that he had been deprived of his constitutional right to due process since DAR did
not notify him or his representatives of the OLT coverage of his lot.

DAR did not grant Abille’s petition for exemption, he was merely granted a right of retention of not
more than 7 ha. Meanwhile, Petitioners filed with DAR a petition for issuance of Emancipation patent.
Abille prayed for the dismissal by reason of DAR’s order in his petition. Regional Director denied the
petition. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration because they were denied due process of law
which was treated as an appeal and elevated to the Secretary of DAR who rendered a decision
dismissing the instant motion for lack of merit. Petitioners filed for review with the CA which was also
dismissed by CA.

Issue: W/N the petitioners were denied due process?

Ruling: No, although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard when RD issued his
order denying the petition, in the motion for reconsideration, petitioners were given the opportunity
and their motion was treated as an appeal by the Sec of DAR.

The essence of due process is simple an opportunity to be heard. Denial of due process cannot be
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
272. Art. 3. Sec.1 – Aguinaldo v Comelec

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of BP Blg 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
Section 67. Accordingly, it is violative of the equal protection clause because the classification is not
based on substantial distinction because it gives re-electionist undue advantage since they are able to
use the prestige and influence of their position.

Issue: W/N Section 67 of the Omnibus election code is violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No. Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional pronouncement
that public office is a public trust. The Intention of the law is to allow the re-electionist to continue
serving their constituents and avoid disruption in the delivery of essential services.

273. Art. 3. Sec.1 – De Guzman vs Comelec

Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters registration act.
The act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular municipality for more than 4 years.
The Petitioners claim that the act violates the equal protection clause because not all election officals
were covered by the prohibition.

Issue: W/N Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act violates the equal protection clause?

Ruling: No. It does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of
election officers by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration act as it seeks to ensure the
integrity of the registration process by providing guideline of reassignment of election officers.

274. Art. 3. Sec.1 – People vs Mercado

Facts: The accused kidnap Richard Buama who sustained mortal wounds which directly led to his death.
The accused were found guilty and were sentenced with death penalty as provided by RA 7659
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law. The accused alleged that consequence of death penalty is
unconstitutional as it denies equality since it is against the poor.

Issue: W/N the Death Penalty Law violates the equal protection clause of the law.

Ruling: No. Death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons – whether rich or poor.
Death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment. It is an exercise of the state’s
power to secure society against the threatened and actual evil.
44. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Microsoft v Maxicorp.

Facts: Armed with search warrants, NBI conducted a search of Maxi Corp’s premises and seized property
fitting the description stated in the search warrant.

MaxiCorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for
their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of “general warrants”. Accordingly the warrants are
defective because it only states “items with the Microsoft logo”. RTC denied the motion and at the same
time denied their motion for reconsideration.

Issue: W/N the search warrant is lacking in particularity?

Ruling: Yes, the search warrant lacks particularity. The court ordered the some of the seized items to be
returned. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant.

45. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Burgos v Chief of Staff

Facts: 2 search warrants were issued against the petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mall” and “We Forum”. Newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
be issued for the return of the seized articles and that the respondents be enjoined using the articles
seized as evidence against the petitioner.

The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the 2 warrants issued
indicated only one (1) and the same address.

Issue: W/N the 2 warrants were valid to justify the seizure of the items.

Ruling: Yes, the defect in the indication of the same address in the 2 warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the same place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search 2 distinct premises was evident
in the issuance of the 2 warrant.

46. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Frank Uy v BIR

Facts: Frank Uy, the manager of Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC), was engaged in activities
constituting violations of the NIRC. The BIR requested and successfully secured a search warrant for
violation of Section 253. On the same day, a second warrant was issued with contents almost identical
to the 1st one, but consisted only of 1 page. 3 rd warrant was issued the same day for violation of Section
238. Agents of BIR, with the PNP, searched the premises. They seized the items listed on the said
warrant. According to the petitioners, the warrant was inconsistent and defective.

Issue: W/N the search warrant issued was valid.

Ruling: Yes. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and comprehensively discussed each and
every defect alleged by petitioners.

A search warrant must conform strictly with the requirements of the constitutional provision. One of
which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched or the persons or
things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched, the
court ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community.

118. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – People v Solayao

Facts: SPO3 Jose Nio conducted an intelligence patrol as required to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The team met the group of accused Nilo
Solayao. The police tea m became suspicious when they observed the group of Solayao drunk and
wearing camouflage uniform. Upon seeing the government agents, the group fled.

Confiscated from Solayao is a homemade firearm called Latong. He admitted that he had no permission
to possess the firearm. Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to the court against the admissibility
of the evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.

Issue: W/N there was an unlawful warrantless search?

Ruling: No. There was justifiable cause to “stop and frisk” the accused when his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion also arouse when the group was spotted dressed in
camouflage.

119. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Malacat v CA

Facts: in response to bomb threats reported 7 days earlier, Police were on foot patrol. They met 2
groups of Muslim looking men, where each group consisted of 3 to 4 men, posted at opposite side of the
corner of Quezon blvd. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. The police
then approached the group after 30 minutes,, then they fled in different directions. Upon searching
Malacat, the police found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s front waist line. A .38
Caliber revolver from his companion was also recovered. The police did not issue any receipt for the
grenade and calibre allegedly recovered.

Issue: W/N the searched made is valid pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.

Ruling: Yes. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search
of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to
a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”

120. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Manalili v CA

Police operatives based on the information that drug addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a
man who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided
them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the man held out his
wallet and allowed police officers to examine it, who found what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves.
The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section and was confirmed
as mj.

Issue: W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

It did not, however abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.