Quisay v. People, G.R. No.

216920, 13 January 2016

Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Girlie M. Quisay
(petitioner) against the People of the Philippines (respondent). The case
revolves around the denial of petitioner's Motion to Quash before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 144.

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City
(OCP-Makati) issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner
for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." A corresponding Information was filed before the RTC on
January 11, 2013. Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information on
the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed it. Petitioner argued
that the Resolution and Information did not show any prior written authority
or approval from the City Prosecutor. The RTC denied petitioner's motion to
quash, finding that the Certification attached to the Information complied
with the requirement of prior written authority or approval. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's ruling.

Issue
The main issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly held that the
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to
quash.

Ruling
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that the filing of a
complaint or information requires prior written authority or approval from
the authorized officers. Without such authority, the complaint or information
is defective and subject to quashal. In this case, the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information filed before the RTC did not show any approval from the City
Prosecutor. The Certification attached to the Information, which the RTC
relied on, did not suffice as it did not specifically state that the City
Prosecutor approved the filing of the Information. Therefore, the RTC erred
in denying petitioner's motion to quash.
People v. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 107964-66, 1 February 1999

Facts:
This case involves three criminal informations filed against Imelda Marcos for
violation of Central Bank Circular 960, as amended in relation to Section 34
of Republic Act No. 265. The cases were consolidated with 21 other cases
pending before the RTC of Manila, which relate to a series of transactions
devised by then President Marcos and Imelda Marcos to hide their ill-gotten
wealth. The cases were assigned to respondent Judge Nitafan's sala. Without
any motion from Imelda Marcos, but after giving the prosecution the chance
to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed, respondent judge
dismissed the three cases. One of the grounds for dismissal was that the
subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law, and the other ground was that
the prosecution of Imelda Marcos was part of a sustained political vendetta
and a violation of her right against double jeopardy.

Issue:
The primary issue raised in this case is whether a judge can motu proprio
initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismiss a criminal information
without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the
alleged violation of their rights.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only
to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or
judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed
by the accused. Allowing a judge to initiate such motion would violate the
accused's right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.
The court also emphasized that the filing of a motion to quash is a right that
belongs to the accused and may be waived by inaction, but it is not an
authority for the court to assume. The court further explained that the only
grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash are
those stated in the motion and the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Other grounds that have not been pleaded in the motion
cannot be considered by the court.
Villareal v. Alga G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014

Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Dennis T.
Villareal against Consuelo C. Aliga. The Court of Appeals (CA) acquitted Aliga
from the offense charged and reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which found her guilty of qualified theft thru falsification of
commercial document.

On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against Aliga for the crime of
Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document. The information
alleged that Aliga, who was an accountant of Dentrade Inc., took and stole a
check from the company's office, falsified the amount, and encashed it for
her own benefit. During the trial, both the prosecution and defense
presented their witnesses and documentary evidence.

Issue
The main issues raised in the case are as follows:

1. Whether Aliga's admission of guilt before the NBI authorities is

admissible as evidence.
2. Whether the prosecution's evidence is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence.

Ruling
The ruling of the CA is that Aliga's admission of guilt is inadmissible as
evidence because she was not informed of her rights during the custodial
investigation. The CA also found that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to prove Aliga's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Bonsubre Jr. v. Yerro G.R. No. 205952, 11 February 2015

Facts
This case involves a criminal complaint for estafa filed by Atty. Segundo B.
Bonsubre, Jr. against Erwin Yerro, Erico Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro. During the
proceedings, the prosecution informed the court that there was an ongoing
settlement between the parties and that they would file the necessary
motion. However, the prosecution failed to submit the motion and the court
dismissed the case for failure to comply with the court's directive and to
prosecute the case.

After more than 2 years, Atty. Bonsubre filed a motion for reconsideration,
claiming that he only learned of the dismissal order recently and believed
that the case was merely archived due to the settlement. The court denied
the motion, stating that the dismissal had become final and executory. The
court also allowed Atty. Bonsubre to file an independent civil action to collect
the amount stipulated in the compromise agreement. Atty. Bonsubre filed a
notice of appeal, but the court denied due course to the appeal for the
criminal aspect of the case.

Atty. Bonsubre filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing that the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his
notice of appeal. The CA dismissed the petition, stating that the dismissal of
the criminal case had already attained finality and could not be subject to
review. The CA also noted that Atty. Bonsubre's own negligence and inaction
contributed to the dismissal of the case. Atty. Bonsubre filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

Issue
The main issue before the court is whether the CA erred in upholding the
RTC's ruling denying Atty. Bonsubre's notice of appeal.

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Atty. Bonsubre and granted the petition
for certiorari. The Court held that the CA erred in upholding the RTC's ruling
denying Atty. Bonsubre's notice of appeal.
Estrada v. People, G.R. No. 162371, 25 August 2005

Facts
The petitioner, Mary Helen Estrada, was charged with estafa and was found
guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) after she jumped bail. The RTC
sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of 12 to 24 years and
ordered her to pay back the amount defrauded.

Issue
The main issue raised in the case is whether the RTC decision violated the
petitioner's constitutional right to due process.

Ruling
The Court ruled that the RTC decision did not violate the petitioner's
constitutional right to due process.
People v. Dominguez y Santos G.R. No. 229420, 19 February 2018

Facts:
The case involves a petition for review filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) seeking to nullify the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) directing
the stricken off the records of the testimony of a deceased state witness.

The case stemmed from the abduction and killing of a car salesman named
Venson Evangelista. Alfred Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan voluntarily
surrendered to the police and implicated the respondents, Roger and
Raymond Dominguez, as the masterminds behind the killing. The accused
were charged with carnapping with homicide.

During the trial, Mendiola was discharged as a state witness and gave his
testimony. However, he was found dead before the trial proper. The RTC
then ordered the stricken off the records of Mendiola's testimony, stating
that it was only offered for the purpose of qualifying him as a state witness
and did not constitute evidence in chief. The court also cited the requirement
under the Rules of Court that Mendiola must testify again during trial proper
to secure his acquittal.

The CA affirmed the RTC's order, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The
OSG argues that the respondents forfeited their right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against them when they failed to avail themselves of
the opportunity during Mendiola's testimony.

Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the respondents forfeited their right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them when they failed to
avail themselves of the opportunity during Mendiola's testimony.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the OSG, stating that the death of the
state witness prior to trial proper does not automatically render his
testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. The court
emphasized that the testimony of the witness during the discharge
proceeding is admissible as evidence, as long as the motion for discharge is
approved. The court also clarified that the requirement for the state witness
to testify again during trial proper does not render his previous testimony
inadmissible. The court further explained that the purpose of the discharge
proceeding is to establish the qualifications of the state witness, including his
knowledge of the details of the crime.

Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 111502-04, 22 November 2001

acts
This case involves a petition filed by Reynaldo H. Jaylo, William Valenzona,
Antonio Habalo, and Edgardo Castro against the Sandiganbayan (First
Division). The petitioners, former members of the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police, were charged with murder for the shooting
deaths of Colonel Rolando de Guzman, Major Franco Calanog, and Avelino
Manguerra. The shooting incident occurred during a drug buy-bust operation
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Before the trial of the criminal cases, the petitioners filed a motion
requesting to take oral depositions of three Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents of the United States of America. These agents were involved in
planning and coordinating with the NBI regarding the drug buy-bust
operation. The petitioners claimed that the testimonies of these witnesses
and the evidence in their possession, such as videotapes and memoranda,
were crucial to their defense. However, the DEA agents refused to testify in
the Philippines for security reasons.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating that there were other
witnesses available in the Philippines to testify on the same facts and that
the petitioners failed to show that the video tapes could not be produced
except through the DEA agents. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was also denied.

Issue
The main issue raised in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan erred in
denying the petitioners' motion to take oral depositions of the DEA agents
and whether the refusal of the DEA agents to testify in the Philippines is a
valid ground for seeking an oral deposition.

Ruling
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan, stating that
there was no necessity for the conditional examination of the proposed
witnesses. The Court found that other witnesses were available to testify on
the same facts and that the petitioners failed to show that the video tapes
could not be produced except through the DEA agents. The Court also
rejected the petitioners' argument that the refusal of the DEA agents to
testify in the Philippines is a valid ground for seeking an oral deposition.

Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, 17 October 2005

Facts
This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Rodolfo G. Valencia against
the Sandiganbayan, challenging its order denying his motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence and setting the case for the presentation of evidence
for the prosecution. The case stems from a charge against Valencia for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: On February 10, 1999,
Valencia, who was then the governor of Oriental Mindoro, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for appointing Cresente Umbao as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Pola, Oriental Mindoro within the prohibitive
period of one year after an election. The prosecution alleged that this
appointment violated the Constitution and gave unwarranted benefits to
Umbao. Valencia pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On March 24, 2003, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts, which
stated that Valencia appointed Umbao to the position after a councilor died,
creating a vacancy. The prosecution argued that this appointment violated
the law, while Valencia maintained that it was made in good faith and in
accordance with the Local Government Code.

Issue
The main issues raised in the case are: (1) whether Valencia's motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence was premature, (2) whether the
prosecution should be allowed to present evidence after it orally manifested
its intention to rest its case, and (3) whether the petitioner's right to due
process and speedy trial was violated.

Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in
court and that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it ordered the reopening of the case to complete the testimony of a
prosecution witness. The Court also found that the prosecutor was remiss in
his duties and that the trial court should have called additional witnesses to
satisfy its mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the
case.

The Court further held that the petitioner cannot claim denial of due process
because he will have the opportunity to contest the evidence against him
and to prove his defenses after the prosecution concludes the presentation
of its evidence. The Court also emphasized that the State is entitled to due
process in criminal cases and that the right to a speedy trial cannot be
invoked if it would result in a denial of due process to the prosecution.

The Court dismissed the petitioner's claim that his right to speedy trial was
violated, stating that he failed to show any prejudice or harm resulting from
the delay in the disposition of the case.

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017

Facts
This case involves a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ophelia Hernan
against the Sandiganbayan. Hernan seeks to reverse and set aside the
Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan affirming her conviction for
the crime of malversation of public funds. Hernan worked as an accounting
clerk in the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) in
Baguio City. She was later promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal
Clerk and designated as cashier, disbursement, and collection officer. As part
of her duties, Hernan received cash and other collections from customers
and clients, which she deposited in the DOTC's bank account at the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in Baguio City. In December 1996, an auditor
from the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a cash examination of
Hernan's accounts and discovered irregularities in the deposit slips. It was
found that two deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the LBP and
were not machine validated. Further investigation revealed that the deposits
were not made by Hernan, and the LBP confirmed that it did not receive the
said deposits. As a result, Hernan was charged with malversation of public
funds. She pleaded not guilty and a trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented witnesses from the COA and LBP, while Hernan
testified in her defense. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
Hernan guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced her to imprisonment
and payment of a fine. Hernan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. The CA later set
aside its decision, stating that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue
The main issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan erred in affirming
Hernan's conviction for the crime of malversation of public funds.

Ruling
The Sandiganbayan did not err in affirming Hernan's conviction for the crime
of malversation of public funds.

Ratio
The Sandiganbayan based its decision on the following grounds:

1. The irregularities in the deposit slips, such as the absence of a stamp

of receipt by the LBP and lack of machine validation, indicate that the
deposits were not made by Hernan. The LBP also confirmed that it did
not receive the said deposits. These findings support the conclusion
that Hernan misappropriated the public funds entrusted to her.
2. Hernan's defense of denial and alibi were not credible. The prosecution
presented witnesses from the COA and LBP who testified on the
irregularities in the deposit slips and the absence of the deposited
funds in the LBP's records. Hernan, on the other hand, failed to
present any evidence to substantiate her defense.
3. The RTC's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is supported by the
evidence presented during the trial. The CA, in affirming Hernan's
conviction, also found no reversible error in the RTC's decision.
4. The Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials and employees charged with offenses
committed in relation to their office. Therefore, the CA erred in setting
aside its decision and stating that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the case.