Malvar vs.

Baleros
A.C. No. 11346, 08 March 2017

Facts: Dr. Malvar claimed that Atty. Baleros, by notarizing an assailed “Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land”, made it appear that he executed the
same when in truth, he never went to the office of the latter since he was in Manila at
the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.
Accordingly, Dr. Malvar filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Baleros for acts
amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of public documents. On the
other hand, Atty. Baleros argued that the charges filed against her were all part of Dr.
Malvar’s scheme to avoid his obligations to the buyer of his lot.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Baleros should be held administratively liable.

Decision: Yes. Atty. Baleros shall be made liable not only as a notary public who failed
to discharge her duties but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the
integrity and dignity he owed to the legal profession. Atty. Baleros is ordered:
1. Suspended for six (6) months;
2. Revoked notarial commission;
3. Disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years;
4. Warned that repetition would be dealt with more severely

A.C. No. 11346, March 08, 2017

DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. CORA JANE P.

BALEROS, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. Basilio
Malvar (complainant) against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for acts
amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of public document, violation
of Administrative Matter No. 02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Antecedent Facts

The complainant is the owner of a parcel of land located,in Barangay Pagudpud, San
Fernando City, La Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale3 in favor of Leah Mallari (Mallari) over the said lot for the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). This transaction was acknowledged by the
children of the complainant through a document denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4

The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal
tussle between the parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was made
between him and Mallari wherein he undertook to facilitate the steps in order to have
the title of the lot transferred under Mallari's name.5 However, without his knowledge
and consent, Mallari who was not able to withstand the delay in the delivery of the title
of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and titling of the same
before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using the
complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil case for collection of sum
of money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La
Union seeking reimbursement tor the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer
and titling of the property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged
between the parties which failed because two out of the four checks issued by the
complainant were unfunded.10 This prompted Mallari to file a criminal case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law, against
the complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La Union.11

Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was filed
before the Office of the Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1.12 The complainant alleged that
it was through the conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent that the crime charged was
consummated.13

Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence

presented was insufficient to establish conspiracy between Mallari and the respondent,
thereby dropping the latter's name from the indictment, the complainant remained
unfazed and thus, initiated the present petition for disbarment seeking the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against the respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the
respondent, by notarizing the assailed Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land, made it appear that he executed the same when the truth of the
matter was he never went to the office of the respondent for he was in Manila at the
time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a doctor.15

On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference16 requiring both parties
to appear before it on November 18, 2014. However, the scheduled mandatory
conference was reset to December 2, 201417 here the complainant personally appeared
while the respondent was represented by her attorney-in-fact and counsel.18

The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent consummated the
crime of falsification of public document as delineated under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and thus, the presumption of regularity in the notarization of the contested
document has been overthrown and cannot work in her favor.19 He recapped that he
never appeared before the respondent to have the subject document notarized.20 The
complainant stressed that the respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by
notarizing the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in his
absence.

In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by narrating
that Benny Telles, the complainant and his sons came to her office to have the subject
document notarized and that she is certain as to the identity of the
complainant.22 Moreover, she argued that the charges filed against her were all part of
the complainant's scheme to avoid his obligations to Mallari as the buyer of his lot.23

Ruling of the IBP

On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found
that the respondent was negligent in the performance of her duties as a notary public
and violated the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending disciplinary imposition against
her. The pertinent portion of the Report and Recommendation24 reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's

commission as a notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary
public for two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Esquivel's report and recommendation with modification, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of
Respondent to observe due diligence in the performance of her duties and obligations
as a Notary Public specifically Rule VI, Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the
respondent's] notarial commission, if presently commissioned, is
immediately  REVOKED. Furthermore, [she] is  DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues

Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the

following acts alleged to have been committed by her:

1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;

2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and

3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.

Ruling of the Court

After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall not
inquire into the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC
and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel correctly declined to resolve
the falsification case pending resolution before the regular court to which jurisdiction
properly pertains. Though disbarment proceedings are sui generis as they belong to a
class of their own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for
an administrative body like IBP-CBD not to pre-empt the course of action of the regular
courts in order to avert contradictory findings.28

The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent
violated several provisions of the Notarial Rules. The complainant insists that the
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land was notarized sans his
presence. An affidavit requiring a jurat which the respondent admittedly signed and
notarized on August 18, 2010 forms part of the subject document. The jurat is that end
part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before
her, thus, making the notarial certification essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the
respondent that the complainant appeared before her and signed the contested
document in her presence cannot prevail over the evidence supplied by the complainant
pointing that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to appear before the
respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized. The
complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court
patients' record cards showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18,
2010 in De Los Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30

A jurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements of

the physical presence of the affiant as well as his act of signing the document before
the notary public.31 The respondent indeed transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the
Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the
affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land
in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant.
The thrust of the said provision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.

xxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -

(1)
is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2)
is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the
notary public under the law to determine whether the former's signature was
voluntarily affixed.32 Aside from forbidding notarization without the personal presence of
the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands the submission of competent evidence of
identity such as an identification card with photograph and signature which requirement
can be dispensed with provided that the notary public personally knows the affiant.
Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules is
defined as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:

a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or
b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of the
notarization of the contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent remained
unjustified in not requiring him to show a competent proof of his identification. She
could have escaped administrative liability on this score if she was able to demonstrate
that she personally knows the complainant. On the basis of the very definition of
a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the Notarial Rules, case law echoes that the non-
presentation of the affiant's competent proof of identification is permitted if the notary
public personally knows the former.33 A 'jurat' refers to an act in which an individual on
a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c)
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.34

Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the non observance of the
obligations imposed upon her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.

(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the
time of notarization the following:

(1)
the entry number and page number;
(2)
the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3)
the type of notarial act;
(4)
the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5)
the name and address of each principal;
(6)
the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;
(7)
the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's
identity;
(8)
the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9)
the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of
business; and
(10)
any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.

xxx

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed,

sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of
his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries.

x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct documents.
In an order of the MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of document was
pending, Clerk of Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-Andres (Atty. Estigoy-Andres) was directed
to transmit the original document of the Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land which was notarized by the respondent.35 A similar order was issued by
the MTCC requiring the DENR for the production of the impugned document.36 The
DENR issued a certification that despite diligent efforts they could not locate the said
document but which they were certain was received by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon
Atty. Estigoy-Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that as per the respondent's
notarial register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No. 288, Page
No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated
as Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia Flores.
Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The respondent
further exposed herself to administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain
oversight as an excuse for the non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial
register and by stating that it is her office staff who usually fills it up.

To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but based from the foregoing, she
indubitably failed to record the assailed document in her notarial book. It is axiomatic
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is through the act of
notarization that a private document is converted into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due
execution.40 "If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and
there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was
not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim
made based on this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial function of
recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the
explicit provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and
not somebody else. This likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which provides
that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the respondent
failed to retain an original copy in her records and to submit the duplicate copy of the
document to the Clerk of Court. However, in a previous case, the Court ruled that the
requirement stated under Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules applies only to
an instrument acknowledged before the notary public and not to the present document
which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment."43 It is
that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that before him or her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor; while an acknowledgment is
the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed.44 Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the
respondent relative to such ground.

The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the
circumstances, the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who
failed to discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard
to the integrity and dignity owing to the legal profession. The acts committed by the
respondent go beyond being mere lapses in the fulfilment of her duties under the
Notarial Rules, they comprehend a parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule
9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" and the Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the
undertaking to do no falsehood and adhere to laws and the legal system being one of
their primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary value accorded to
notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in her
notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was
notarized when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be overemphasized that notaries public
are urged to observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds will be undermined.46

In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their duties
as notaries public to disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's
notarial register, notarizing a document without the personal presence of the affiants
and the failure to properly identify the person who signed the questioned document
constitute dereliction of a notary public's duties which warrants the revocation of a
lawyer's commission as a notary public.47 Upholding the role of notaries public in
deterring illegal or immoral arrangements, the Court in the case of Dizon v. Atty.
Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period of two (2) years from being
commissioned as a notary public for notanzmg a compromise agreement without the
presence of all the parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome v. Atty.
Christopher A. Basilio,49 which factual milieu is similar to the present case, the Court
meted out against therein respondent the penalty of revocation of notarial commission
and disqualification for two (2) years from being appointed as a notary public and
suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law due to various infringement of
the Notarial Rules such as failure to record a notarized document in his notarial register
and notarizing a document without the physical presence of the affiant.

Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their

solemn duties which are imbued with public interest are not to be taken lightly, the
Court deems it proper to revoke the notarial register of the respondent if still existing
and to disqualify her from appointment as a notary public for two (2) years. She is also
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Contrary to the complainant's
proposition to have the respondent disbarred, the Court is of the belief that her acts do
not merit such a grave penalty and the sanctions so imposed suffice. The Court held in
an array of cases that "removal from the Bar should not really be decreed when any
punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish
the end desired."50

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and she is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2)
years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

COQUIA v. LAFORTEZA
Flordeliza E. Coquia Vs. Atty. Emmanuel Laforteza
A.C. No. 9364
February 8, 2017

FACTS:
Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of the RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
having assumed office in November 17, 2004 until January 31, 2011.

On February 1, 2011, Atty. Laforteza transferred to the Department of Justice.

On February 6, 2012, this Flordeliza E. Coquia filed a petition for disbarment against
Atty. Laforteza, for Conduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the unauthorized
notarization of documents. C

Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized to administer oath
on documents not related to his functions and duties as Clerk of Court of RTC. Thus,
the instant complaint for disbarment for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the complaint to Atty.
Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to comment on the
complaint against him. In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his Comment where
he denied the allegations in the complaint. Atty. Laforteza recalled that on January 7,
2009, while attending to his work, fellow court employee, Luzviminda Solis, wife of
Clemente, with other persons, came to him. He claimed that Luzviminda introduced
said persons to him as the same parties to the subject documents.

Luzviminda requested him to subscribe the subject documents as proof of their

transaction considering that they are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza claimed that he
hesitated at first and even directed them to seek the services of a notary public but they
insisted for his assistance and accommodation. Thus, in response to the exigency of the
situation and thinking in all good faith that it would also serve the parties' interest
having arrived at a settlement, Atty. Laforteza opted to perform the subscription of the
jurat. He, however, insisted that at that time of subscription, after propounding some
questions, he was actually convinced that the persons who came to him are the same
parties to the said subject documents.

Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or connivance between him
and the Solis. He pointed out that other than the subject documents and Coquia's bare
allegation of conspiracy, no evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Atty.
Laforteza lamented that he was also a victim of the circumstances with his reliance to
the representations made before him.
 
In a Joint-Affidavit of Clemente and Luzviminda, both denied to have connived or
conspired with Atty. Laforteza in the preparation and execution of the subject
documents. 

On October 11, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation dated
December 18, 2013, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

However, in a Notice of Resolution, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to reverse and

set aside the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead reprimanded
and cautioned Atty. Laforteza to be careful in performing his duties as subscribing
officer.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Laforteza acted in abuse of his authority in committing an
unauthorized notarial act.

Whether or not Atty. Laforteza violated is in violation of the notarial law of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.

HELD:
We concur with the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors, except as to the penalty.

In the instant case, we find that Coquia failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence to show that Atty. Laforteza had direct and instrumental participation, or was
in connivance with the Solis' in the preparation of the subject documents. The Court
does not thus give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.

Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the
competency of regular notaries public under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is now
more of an exception rather than a general rule.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and administered
oaths in documents that had no relation to his official function. The subject documents
are both private documents which are unrelated to Atty. Laforteza's official functions.
The civil case from where the subject documents originated is not even raffled in Branch
68 where Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza serve as notary public ex
officio and, thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not in his ex
officio capacity take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all
to his official functions.

It is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with the rules of notarial law. 

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by virtue of his position as
clerk of court then, it did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and
obligations imposed upon other commissioned notaries public. However, this Court can
no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over Atty. Laforteza for the purpose of
imposing disciplinary sanctions over erring court employees since the instant complaint
against him was filed after he has ceased to be a court employee.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza's notarial

commission, if there is any, is REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 9364

[Formerly CBD Case No.13-3696]

FLORDELIZA E. COQUIA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL E. LAFORTEZA, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated February 6, 4012 filed by Flordeliza E.

Coquia  (Coquia) against respondent Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza (Atty. Laforteza), docketed as
1

A.C. No. 9364, for Conduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the unauthorized notarization of
documents relative to Civil Case No. 18943. 2

Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, having assumed office in November 17, 2004 until January 31, 2011.  On February 1,
3

2011, Atty. Laforteza transferred to the Department of Justice.4

In her Complaint, Coquia alleged that on January 7, 2009, while in office as clerk of court, Atty.
Laforteza conspired with Clemente Solis (Clemente) to falsify two (2) documents, to wit: (1) an
Agreement between Clemente Solis and Flordeliza Coquia,  and the (2) Payment Agreement
5

executed by Flordeliza Coquia, and subsequently notarized the said documents. Coquia claimed
that the documents were forged to make it appear that on the said date, she subscribed and sworn
to the said documents before Atty. Laforteza when in truth and in fact on the said date and time, she
was attending to her classes at the Centro Escolar University in Manila as evidenced by the certified
true copy of the Centro Escolar University Faculty Daily Time Record for the period of December 16,
2008 to January 14, 2009. 6

Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized to administer oath on
documents not related to his functions and duties as Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the complaint to Atty. Cristina B.
Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
7
On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to comment on the complaint
against him.8

In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his Comment  dated July 2, 2012 where he denied the
9

allegations in the complaint. Atty. Laforteza recalled that on January 7, 2009, while attending to· his
work, fellow court employee, Luzviminda Solis (Luzviminda), wife of Clemente, with other persons,
came to him. He claimed that Luzviminda introduced said persons to him as the same parties to the
subject documents. Luzviminda requested him to subscribe the subject documents as proof of their
transaction considering that they are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza claimed that he hesitated at first
and even directed them to seek the services of a notary public but they insisted for his assistance
and accommodation. Thus, in response to the exigency of the situation and thinking in all good faith
that it would also serve the parties' interest having arrived at a settlement, Atty. Laforteza opted to
perform the subscription of the jurat. He, however, insisted that at that time of subscription, after
propounding some questions, he was actually convinced that the persons who came to him are the
same parties to the said subject documents. 10

Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or connivance between him and the Solis'.
He pointed out that other than the subject documents and Coquia's bare allegation of conspiracy, no
evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Atty. Laforteza lamented that he was also a victim
of the circumstances with his reliance to the representations made before him. He invoked the
presumption of regularity and extended his apology to this Court should his act as a subscribing
officer be deemed improper. 11

In a Joint-Affidavit  dated July 2, 2012 of Clemente and Luzviminda, both denied to have connived
12

or conspired with Atty. Laforteza in the preparation and execution of the subject documents. They
narrated that Atty. Laforteza in fact initially refused to grant their request to notarize the subject
documents but they were able to convince him to assist them in the interest of justice. Clemente
insisted that he was one of the signatories in the said documents and that he has personal
knowledge that the signature of Coquia inscribed in the same documents are her true signatures
having seen her affixed her signatures. 13

On October 11, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 14

During the mandatory conference, both parties agreed that Atty. Laforteza is authorized to
administer oaths.  However, as to the requirement to establish the identity of the parties, Atty.
1âwphi1

Laforteza admitted that he does not personally know both Coquia and Clemente, and he merely
relied on Luzviminda and Loma Viray, who are known to him as fellow court employees, to establish
the identities of the parties. He likewise admitted that Coquia did not sign the documents in his
presence and that someone present on the said date allegedly owned the signature of Coquia as
hers.15

In its Report and Recommendation  dated December 18, 2013, the IBP-Commission on Bar
16

Discipline (CED) recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of sufficient

evidence.

However, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-818 dated October 11, 2014, the IBP-Board of
Governors resolved to reversed and set aside the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD,
and instead reprimanded and cautioned Atty. Laforteza to be careful in performing his duties as
subscribing officer. 17

We concur with the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors, except as to the penalty.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required
is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.  In the 18

absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
19

In the instant case, We find that Coquia failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show
that Atty. Laforteza had direct and instrumental participation, or was in connivance with the Solis' in
the preparation of the subject documents. While it may be assumed that Atty. Laforteza had a hand
in the preparation of the subject documents, We cannot give evidentiary weight to such a
supposition in the absence of any evidence to support it. The Court does not thus give credence to
charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. 20

As to the allegation of unauthorized notarization:

As early as the case of Borre v. Moya,  this Court had already clarified that the power of ex
21

officio notaries public have been limited to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official
functions and duties.

Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the competency
of regular notaries public - such as acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature
witnessing, copy certifications, and other acts authorized under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice -
is now more of an exception rather than a general rule. They may perform notarial acts on such
documents that bear no relation to their official functions and duties only if (1) a certification is
included in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary public in the
municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged will be for the account of the government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer. No compliance with these two requirements are present in
this case.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and administered oaths in
documents that had no relation to his official function. The subject documents, to wit: (1) an
Agreement between Clemente Solis and Flordeliza Coquia, 22 and the (2) Payment Agreement
executed by Flordeliza Coquia, are both private documents which are unrelated to Atty. Laforteza's
official functions. The civil case from where the subject documents originated is not even raffled in
Branch 68 where Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza serve as notary public ex
officio and, thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not in his ex
officio capacity take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to his official
functions.

Under the provisions of Section 41  (as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No. 6733 ) and Section
23 24

242  of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to Sections G,  M  and N,  Chapter VIII of the
25 26 27 28

Manual for Clerks of Court, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus notarize
documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official
functions.  In Exec. Judge Astorga v. Solas,  the Court ruled that clerks of court should not, in
29 30

their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to
their official functions. Notarization of documents that have no relation to the performance of their
official functions is now considered to be beyond the scope of their authority as notaries public ex
officio. Any one of them who does so would be committing an unauthorized notarial act, which
amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and abuse of authority.

As to the Violation of Notarial Law:

We likewise agree and adopt the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors which found Atty. Laforteza
to have violated the Notarial Law. 1âwphi1

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with the rules of notarial law. He
admitted that he notarized a pre-signed subject document presented to him. He also admitted his
failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject documents
and who, as he claimed, appeared before him on January 7, 2009 as he merely relied upon the
assurance of Luzviminda that her companions are the actual signatories to the said documents. In
ascertaining the identities of the parties, Atty. Laforteza contented himself after propounding several
questions only despite the Rules' clear requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity
such as an identification card with photograph and signature. Such failure to verify the identities of
the parties was further shown by the fact that the pertinent identification details of the parties to the
subject documents, as proof of their identity, were lacking in the subject documents'
acknowledgment portion. Atty. Laforteza even affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. From the foregoing, it can be clearly concluded that there was a failure on the part of Atty.
Laforteza to exercise the due diligence required of him as a notary public ex-officio.

Notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. Notarization of a

private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified
or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.31

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free act and deed. 32

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance
before the notary public Rule II, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.-"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete
instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed
the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 2(b) further states:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document –

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Thus, a document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very
same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to
attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness
of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In
fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their
presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.  For this reason, notaries
33

public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. 34

PENALTY

While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by virtue of his position as clerk of court
then, it did not relieve him of compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon
other commissioned notaries public.  However, this Court can no longer acquire administrative
35

jurisdiction over Atty. Laforteza for the purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions over erring court
employees since the instant complaint against him was filed after he has ceased to be a court
employee.

In Talisic vs. Atty. Rinen,  respondent, as ex-officio notary public, failed to verify the identity of all the
36

parties to the document. Thus, the Court ordered his notarial commission revoked and disqualified
him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one year. We deem it proper to
impose the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Atty. Emmanuel E. Laforteza's notarial commission, if there

is any, is REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of one (1) year. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Laforteza's personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ARNALDO R. BORRE, complainant,
vs.
CFI JUDGE FELIX L. MOYA of Tagum, Davao del Norte and CITY JUDGE GUMERSINDO
ARCILLA, Branch III, Davao City, respondents.
A.M. No. 1765-CFI October 17, 1980

AQUINO, J.:

Arnaldo R. Borre in his verified complaint of November 27, 1977 charged with serious misconduct
and grave abuse of discretion Judge Felix L. Moya of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Tagum Branch IX and Judge Gumersindo Arcilla of the city court of Davao City, both Bicolanos and
alleged to be cronies.

Borre specifically charged Judge Arcilla, his second cousin, with having engaged in business and
having collected P1,400 as professional and notarial fees while acting as ex officio notary.

A referral of this case to an investigator is not necessary because the ultimate facts, on which the
decision can be based, may be gleaned from the complaint and respondents' comments.

Judge Moya's case. — On September 8, 1977, Calvin R. Borre filed with the Court of First Instance
at Tagum, Davao del Norte a complaint against his brother Arnaldo, Inapsa Obon Prieto (an illiterate
member of a cultural minority) and the Register of Deeds of Davao (Civil Case No. 886).

In that complaint, Calvin prayed that a certain deed of sale covering a parcel of land, which deed
was executed by Mrs. Prieto in favor of Arnaldo, be declared void (because the land had previously
been sold to Calvin) and that the registration of that deed of sale be enjoined. Calvin asked for a writ
of preliminary injunction or a restraining order (pp. 88-95, Rollo).

On that same day, September 8, 1977, when the complaint was filed, Executive Judge Felix R.
Moya, without raffling the case, issued an order wherein he (1) directed the service of summons, (2)
set on September 16, 1977 the hearing on the preliminary injunction and (3) issued a restraining
order which reads:

Instead of granting a writ (of preliminary injunction) ex parte, said defendants

are restrained from performing the acts sought to be enjoined in the complaint, while
the motion for preliminary injunction is pending unresolved (p. 106, Rollo).

The next day, September 9, 1977, the case was allegedly assigned to Judge Moya who was
presiding over Branch IX. The only other Judge, assigned to Branch VIII, was Judge Alejandro C.
Silapan.

After hearing, Judge Moya issued an order of injunction dated November 2, 1977. The writ was
issued on November 28, 1977. The next day, November 29, Judge Moya inhibited himself from the
case in order that "the court should be above suspicion". The case was re-assigned to Judge
Silapan who, on February 2, 1978, rendered a decision approving the compromise settlement
between the brothers Calvin and Arnaldo. Hence, the case was terminated.

Arnaldo's charge against Judge Moya is that by issuing before the raffle, the said order of
September 8, 1977, he violated Circular No. 7 of the Supreme Court dated September 23, 1974
which prohibits an Executive Judge from acting on any incidental or interlocutory matter in any case
not yet assigned to any branch by raffle. The pertinent provisions of the circular read (paragraphing
supplied):

IV. IN CASE OF URGENT OR INTER

 LOCUTORY MATTERS

Whenever an incidental or interlocutory matter in a case is of such urgent nature that

it may not wait for the regular raffle, the interested party may request the Executive
Judge in writing for a special raffle.

If the request is granted and the special raffle is conducted, the case shall
immediately be referred to the branch to which it corresponds.

The Executive Judge shall have no authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory
matter in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle.

Judge Moya's repeated disclaimer that he did not issue a restoring order but merely ordered the
preservation of the status quo and that he did not violate the circular is belied by his own order.

His pretension that he thought that the case was raffled to him because it was placed on is table by
his clerk does not justify his negligence in not ascertaining, as he could have easily ascertained,
from the expediente itself that the case was not yet raffled to him.

His pretext that, to avoid irreparable injury, he had to order the preservation of the status quo so as
to prevent Arnaldo R. Borre from registering the questioned deed of sale, is not an excuse for not
holding a special raffle before acting on the case. He could not be mistaken as to the fact that the
case was new and that under the circular he could not act on it, even as Executive Judge, without
first holding a special raffle.

He could have known that the alleged irreparable injury could be prevented by Calvin R. Borre
through the simple expedient of registering a notice of list pendens which would render futile any
registration to be made by Arnaldo R. Borre.

Arnaldo R. Borre also charged that it was not by coincidence that the case was assigned to Judge
Moya and that, because there were no stenographic notes of the raffle and the expediente of the
case did not bear the signature of the Executive Judge, the requirements of Circular No. 7 were not
complied with. The circular provides (paragraphing supplied):

III. MANNER OF RAFFLING

... The raffle proceedings should be stenographically recorded, and minutes thereof
shall be prepared and signed by the Judges (or their representatives) and the Clerk
of Court in attendance.

Immediately after the raffle on any particular day the Executive Judge shall indicate
the particular branch to which the case is assigned, the same to be written in words
and in figures on the cover of the Rollo and on the first page of the original complaint
or information and initialed by the Executive Judge and the other two officers who
attended said raffle.

Judge Moya admits that no stenographic notes were taken of the raffle and that he did not initial the
assignment of that case to his sala.

His explanation was that his failure to comply with those requirements was due to the oversight of
his clerk who did not follow his instructions.
We are not satisfied with Judge Moya's artful and disingenuous comment on the charges, which
comment does not do him honor nor enhance his image as a presumably honest, competent and
diligent Judge.

He should be censured for his failure to comply with the circular and required to pay a fine equivalent
to his compensation for ten (10) days.

Case of judge Arcilla. — Arnaldo R. Borre alleged that Judge Arcilla notarized the deed of sale
executed by Mrs. Prieto in favor of Calvin R. Borre covering a parcel of land which Mrs. Prieto
already sold to Arnaldo and of which prior sale Judge Arcilia was cognizant.

Arnaldo alleged that Judge Arcilla wanted to have a share in the water project which he (Arnaldo)
had established on the land and that, as previously stated, the judge collected Pl,400 for his legal
and notarial services and as treasurer of the Mindanao Water Spring Supplier Corporation (Annex H,
p. 26, Rollo). He was an incorporator of the Mindanao Spring Water Supplier, Inc. (p. 22, Rollo.)

On the other hand, Judge Arcilla in his comment pointed out that Arnaldo's administrative complaint
was induced by the fact that an assistant fiscal of Davao City gave due course to the charges of
estafa and falsification filed against Arnaldo by his brother Calvin in connection with the disputed
land and that on November 29, 1977, informations for estafa and falsification were filed in court
against Arnaldo.

Judge Arcilla said that Arnaldo's suspicion that the judge sided with Calvin was baseless. He (Judge
Arcilia) endeavored to effect an amicable settlement between the two brothers but his efforts were
fruitless. He even wrote to the father of the brothers in Catanduanes to go to Davao to make them
come to terms but the father was not able to patch up their controversy.

Judge Arcilla revealed that he was the legal adviser of his cousins, Arnaldo and Calvin. He gave
them advice free of charge. He prepared and notarized several documents for Arnaldo. He denied
having received Pl,400 from Arnaldo.

He said that the Borre brothers did not honor their written commitment to pay him five percent of the
net income from their water supply business. He admitted that he was later given a 2.5% equity in
the corporation organized by the Borre brothers and Mariano Nasser for supplying water.

Judge Arcilla said that there is no law prohibiting him from involving himself as legal consultant and
notary in the business of the Borre brothers operated outside the limits of Davao City.

He denied that he was close to Judge Moya and that in behalf of Calvin he talked with the Judge
regarding Civil Case No. 886. His impression was that Arnaldo wanted to use the instant
administrative complaint to bring about the dismissal of Civil Case No. 886 and the criminal cases
against him.

Judge Arcilla concluded that Arnaldo's complaint against him, made after he had gratuitously
rendered legal and notarial services to Arnaldo for more than ten years, is an illustration of the
saying that "ingratitude is stronger than a traitor's arm".

In a letter dated January 27, 1978 or after respondents' comments were submitted, which letter was
under oath, Arnaldo requested that his complaint against Judge Arcilla be considered withdrawn or
dropped because it was spawned by a misunderstanding. He said that he was no longer willing to
testify against Judge Arcilla.
He reiterated the same request in his letter, also under oath, dated July 15, 1980 wherein he said
that his complaint had become moot because the parties in Civil Case No. 886 had entered into
compromise which, as already noted, was approved by Judge Silapan in his decision of February 2,
1978. Arnaldo did not withdraw his complaint against Judge Moya.

Arnaldo's desistance implies that he has no proofs to substantiate his charge that Judge Arcilla
committed a serious misconduct by exerting pressure on Judge Moya to favor Calvin. (See Maravilla
vs. Arcilla, Adm. Matter No. 401-CJ, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 485)

Judge Arcilla listed in his comment twenty-three documents which he notarized at the behest of
Arnaldo during the period from June 4, 1968 to January 30, 1977.

Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea believes that Judge Arcilla's engaging in private
business and acting as legal consultant of the Borre brothers are prejudicial to the public service
because he (Judge Arcilla) should devote his full time to the performance of his official duties.

We hold that respondent city judge was not empowered to act as notary public ex officio. A city
judge is not among the ex officio notaries enumerated in section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Neither the charter of Davao City (Republic Act No. 4354) nor the Judiciary Law allows a city
judge to act as notary ex officio.

In contrast, there is statutory authorization for a justice of the peace, now municipal judge, to act as
notary ex officio (Sec. 76, Judiciary Law and sec, 235, Revised Administrative Code). It should be
noted that the fees collected by a municipal judge acting as ex officio notary accrue to the
government funds.

A notary ex officio should notarize only documents connected with the exercise of his official duties.
That is the reason why he is designated as a notary ex officio. He should not compete with private
law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private
transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-
Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction
between a regular notary and a notary ex officio.

As to engaging in business as a sideline, there is no compelling reason for a city judge to engage in
private business, considering that under Letter of Implementation No. 93, dated August 9, 1979, a
city judge of Davao City is entitled to receive P43,332 as annual compensation excluding
allowances. Indeed, the public expects him to devote full time to his judicial work.

Moreover, as a Civil Service employee he cannot engage in private business without the written
permission of this Court (See Par. 5, Rule XIII, Civil Service Rules found in Executive Order No. 5,
dated January 9, 1909 in relation to Executive Order No. 103, Series of 1913, quoted in the Tenure
of Civil Service Officers, by Abelardo Subido, pp. 164-165; See Disciplinary Rules and Procedures in
the Philippine Civil Service by Commissioner Abelardo Subido, 1976, pp. 235-236).

It is noteworthy that one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a Civil Service employee is the
"pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service
rules and regulations" (Par. 24, Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, P.D. No. 807 dated
October 6, 1975).
However, before this decision can be promulgated, Providence terminated this case against Judge
Arcilla. He died on August 29, 1980.

WHEREFORE, Judge Moya is censured and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary for ten
(10) days for having violated Circular No. 7 of this Court. The case against Judge Arcilla is dismissed
for having become moot. A copy of this decision should be attached to the personal record of Judge
Moya.

SO ORDERED.