Wills and Succession

WILLS AND SUCCESSION
Course Syllabus
COURSE TITLE: Wills and Succession
FACULTY: Atty. Reginald Matt Santiago
SEMESTER: 1ST Semester
SCHOOL YEAR: SY 2022-2023
PRE-REQUISITES: Persons and Family Relations;

Property
CLASS/SECTION: 3RD Year, 4-Year Program
SCHEDULE: Mon/Tue [5:30PM– 7:30PM]
COURSE OUTLINE – FIRST EXAMINATION
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION
1. Concept and Bases of Succession

Succession in a Broad Sense
Succession in a Technical Sense
Kinds of Succession
- Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (New Civil Code of the
Philippines)
The following are elements of succession according to Paras (2008):
[a] Mode of acquisition (of acquiring ownership)

[b] Transfer of property, rights, and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person (called grantor or transferor, decedent, testator, or intestate). The word "testator" applies
only if the decedent has left a will.
[c] Transmission through death (not during life). The law on succession does not apply without
death, either actual or presumptive. The best proof of death in court is a person's death
certificate.
[d] Transmission to another (called grantee, or transferee, heir, legatee, or devisee). Another or
others will acquire the inheritance either by operation of law (intestate) or by virtue of a will
(testate).
[e] By will or by operation of law (testamentary or legal succession).
[A] MODE OF ACQUISITION (OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP)
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified
into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription,
law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or
tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
(G.R. No. 118114)
Under the New Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are as follows: (a) occupation; (b)
intellectual creation; (c) donation; (d) succession; and (e) prescription. Estoppel is not one of
them. The recognition by the defendants-appellants of the plaintiff-appellee as co-owner of the
subject parcel of land in the "Salaysay ng Pag-aari ng Iba’t Ibang Lupa" was based on the
mistaken belief that the said land was a conjugal property of Francisco Caldo and Juana
Manaresa. To rule otherwise, will not only cause injustice to the vested right of the defendants-
appellants but also will run counter to the provisions of the law and applicable jurisprudence. In
accordance with the settled rule, an innocent mistake on the part of the defendants-appellants as
to the legal right does not estop them to assert the same. (G.R. No. 164453)
The law provides the different modes of acquiring ownership, namely: (a) occupation; (b)
intellectual creation; (c) law; (d) donation; (e) succession; (f) tradition, as a consequence of
certain contracts; and (g) prescription. It will be noted that accession is not one of those listed
therein. It is therefore safe to conclude that accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The
reason is simple: accession presupposes a previously existing ownership by the owner over the
principal. This is not necessarily so in the other modes of acquiring ownership. Therefore,
fundamentally and in the last analysis, accession is a right implicitly included in ownership,
without which it will have no basis or existence. (p. 179, Paras, Vol. II, Thirteenth Edition
(1994), Civil Code). In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior
act on the part of the owner of the principal. (G.R. No. 149418, citing Villanueva v. Claustro, 23
Phil. 54)
[B] TRANSFER OF PROPERTY, RIGHTS, AND OBLIGATIONS TO THE EXTENT OF

THE VALUE OF THE INHERITANCE OF A PERSON (CALLED GRANTOR OR
TRANSFEROR, DECEDENT, TESTATOR, OR INTESTATE)
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for
some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of
Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of
land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The
estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner
may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the
portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and
why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting
and receiving the inheritance. (G.R. No. 92436. July 26, 1991)
2. Constitutional Rule – Article XII, Section 7 - (Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.)
Case:
1) Testate Estate of Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.

GR No. L-27962, February 15, 1982
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez died leaving as principal beneficiaries his widow, MarcelleSemoron de
Ramirez, a French woman; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance.
According to the will ½ shall go to Marcelle in full ownership plus usufruct of the 1/3 of the
whole estate; the grandsons shall have the ½ of the whole estate; and a usufruct in favour of
Wanda.
ISSUE:
Is the partition according to the will valid?
RULING:
No. As to the usufruct granted to Marcelle, the court ruled that to give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for his dispositions even impaired her legitime
and tended to favor Wanda.As to the usufruct in favour of Wanda, the Court upheld its validity.
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for devise of a piece of land. Notwithstanding this, the Court upholds the usufruct in
favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
The court distributed the estate by: ½ to his widow and ½ to the grandsons but the usufruct of the
second half shall go to Wanda.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his
two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for
substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow
as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she
submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97

The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,

residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D.
Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes,
y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca

Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en
atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por
ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia,
con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma
de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da.
Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo

Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a
favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita,
Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las

usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion
alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct
over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5,
Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in
the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the
testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project
of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to
this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership.
They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of
the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of
his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who
is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what
she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle
more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may
enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that
there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious,
reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code
enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish,
or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall

comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of
the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question
the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the
one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become
moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's
usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or
stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not
the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance
as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that
it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or

transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties
subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We
are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a
real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor
of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed
as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership
and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. Succession Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa
Article 728-730, Civil Code

Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on
Succession.
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the
donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation,
shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take
place beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as
a donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention appears.
Distinction between Donation Inter Vivos and Donation Mortis Causa

INTER VIVOS MORTIS CAUSA
 Takes effect during lifetime of donor  Takes effect after the death of the donor
Must follow the formalities of  Must follow the formalities of wills and codicils
donations  Can be revoked anytime and for any reason
 Cannot be revoked except for grounds while the donor is still alive
provided for by law  In case the legitime is impaired, donations
 In case of impairment of the legitime, mortis causa are reduced ahead of donations
donations inter vivos are preferred to
inter vivos, the latter being preferred
donations mortis causa
 The right of disposition isn’t transferred to the
 The right of disposition is completely
donee while the donor is still alive
transferred to the donee
 Acceptance by donee mortis causa can be only
 Acceptance by donee must be during
be done upon donor’s death
lifetime of donor
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-
testator.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be
executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the
donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise
it is void and cannot transfer ownership
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death,
then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which
should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to
the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
Characteristics of a Donation Mortis Causa

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right,
title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of
Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina
on her death, not during her lifetime.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor,
the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation
is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.
A gift made by a person (the donor) in contemplation of impending death, also known as a
deathbed gift. When the donor dies, the subject-matter of the gift does not pass to the personal
representative but to the person the deceased intended to benefit (the donee). To qualify as
a donatio mortis causa:
 The gift must be made by the donor in contemplation of the donor's impending death.
 The gift must be contingent on the donor dying.
 The donor must part with the gift or deliver it in some way to the donee.
 The subject-matter of the gift must be capable of being given away in this manner. The
doubt about whether land could be given away is now resolved
Donations In Praesenti
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the
donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation,
shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take
place beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as
a donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention appears. (n)
Cases:
1) Ganuelas v. Cawed, G.R. No. 123968, April 24, 2003
URSULINA GANUELAS, et al. v. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, et al.

G. R. No. 123968, 24 April 2003
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor,
while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-
testator.
Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of
petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for
and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the
faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these
presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further
force and effect.‖
However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking such
donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties and refused to
give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share in the produce of
the properties despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before
the San Fernando, La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of
Donation. They alleged that such donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of
wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa.
On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of
wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos.
The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to
comply with the formalities of wills and testaments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
HELD:
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos
differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if
the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is
conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death,
then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should
be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to
the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be
executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the
donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise
it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina
on her death, not during her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor,
the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation
is a postmortem disposition.
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed
contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To classify the
donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is
erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the
services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed
constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In
other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation
is void and produces no effect.
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union
(Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY
and ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA
ROSA, Administrator, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law, the
February 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in
Civil Case No. 3947, an action for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of
Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina),
one of herein petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
xxx xxx xxx
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the
DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said
DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the
DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR;
but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx.3
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of

Donation4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or on August 18,
1967, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings.
After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with private
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina.
In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina secured the
corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, to wit: Tax Declarations
Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give
private respondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands.
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando, La
Union a complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas who were
alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by
Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto
before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which
failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments,
hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the
properties. They likewise prayed for the cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of
Ursulina, the partition of the properties among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by
Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the
value of their shares.
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer 6 that the donation in favor of Ursulina
was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code, 7 hence, the deed did not have to
comply with the requirements for the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is null and
void as the ground mentioned therein is not among those provided by law to be the basis thereof;
and at any rate, the revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint
in court within the prescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the complaint
was filed, already lapsed.
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of Donation
that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation
mortis causa,8 found for the plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of Donation of
Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition of the estate of
Celestina among the intestate heirs.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestina
retained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion that the donation
is mortis causa,10 and that while the deed contained an attestation clause and an acknowledgment
showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the acknowledgment was
defective as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the deed before the notary
public, thereby rendering the entire document void. 11
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of Donation
showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding
that the conveyance was mortis causa.12
On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the ground mentioned
therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the trial court held that the
legal grounds for such revocation as provided under the Civil Code arise only in cases of
donations inter vivos, but not in donations mortis causa which are revocable at will during the lifetime
of the donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the disposition mortis causa in
view of a failure to comply with the formalities required therefor, the Deed of Revocation was a
superfluity.13
Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court erred:
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY

CELESTINA GANUELAS;
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA

GANUELAS.14
Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main consideration for
its execution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the donor's death; 15 that the
provision on the effectivity of the donation — after the donor's death — simply meant that absolute
ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor's death; 16 and that since the donation is inter
vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil
Code.
In a letter of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this Court's January
28, 1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for failure to submit the name and address of their new
counsel, explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are "willing and ready
to waive whatever rights" they have over the properties subject of the donation. Petitioners, who
were required to comment on the letter, by Comment of October 28, 1998, 21 welcome private
respondents' gesture but pray that "for the sake of enriching jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given
due course and resolved."
The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer
the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. 22
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the
latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. 23 The
following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's
death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of
the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed
and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 25 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except
when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation
must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and
cannot transfer ownership.27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 28
Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but
that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not
during her lifetime.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the
donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a
postmortem disposition.
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. 30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donation
mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of
each other have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee
and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the
deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. 32 In
other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.33
In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained provisions almost identical

to those found in the deed subject of the present case:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x.
the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the
DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.
(Emphasis supplied)
In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-quoted provision
conclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the
donated property to the donee only after the former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds
therein did not contain any clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior
to the donor's death.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under
Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and
produces no effect.35
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary
public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of Donation to
be mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
2) Cuevas v. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-8327, December 13, 1955

ANTONINA CUEVAS v. CRISPULO CUEVAS,
GR No. L-8327, 1955-12-14
Facts:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion
Montis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of
unregistered land in Nueva Ecija
In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
on May 26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument... purporting to set aside the
preceding conveyance on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to
recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been
lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because... the donor did not reserve
sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude,
for having refused to support the donor.
Court of First Instance denied the recovery
Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court crux of the controversy revolves around the
following provisions of the deed of donation:
"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas m samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na
ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho,
makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko
binabawian ng... buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay
mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya."... apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in
that the donor reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights
and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the
same donor... states that she "will not take away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the
donee) when, I die." :
Issues:
whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable
freely by the transferor at any time before death
The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the
donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted... with a disposition
mortis causa, void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed
Ruling:
The court agree with the Court below that the .decisive proof that the present donation is
operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take
away ("hindi ko ñga iya-alis" in the priginal) the land "because I am reserving it to him upon my
death." By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property
in. favor of another (a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the
conveyance of the naked, title to the property in favor of the donee.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she
should retain-the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
"possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant
only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
the words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the
preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed.
Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership... she had no need to specify
possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute
ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and
attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.
Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos, with
reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor.
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely recites that (1)
the donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its
terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his... gratitude" but there is no
show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the
donation, and at the same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes
sufficient acceptance.
Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor failed to reserve
enough for her own support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived.
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude, because it was expressly
stipulated that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support
himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add the...
donor's support to his own burdens.
Principles:
neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take effect at the
death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs.
Mata
As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is
characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition
post mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil
Code, that provides:
"Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is void."... it is highly desirable that all those who are called to prepare or
notarize deeds... of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of clearly
specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control and
dispose at will of the property before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of
the... beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that
the liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments
should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free... disposition would
place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals).
G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CRISPULO CUEVAS, defendant-appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled

"Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of
unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit
A). In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument entitled
"Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa" (Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the preceding
conveyance; and on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to recover the
land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked
by the donor; and (2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it
was not properly accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitute, for having refused to support the
donor.
Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied the recovery sought, and
Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court
because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of facts, the appellant raised only
questions of law.
The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed "Exhibit A"; whether it embodies a
donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely by the transferor at
any time before death. 1
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to
take effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations
(Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the
controversy revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:
Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and lupa na

ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na mamomosecion,
makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin
pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian ny buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga
iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor reserves to herself
"the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I
am not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same donor states that she "will not takle
away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee) when I die."
The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the
donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a disposition mortis
causa, void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil
Code, Arts. 728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 250 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568; Tuason
vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8 July 1943).
We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter
vivor lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko nga
iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these words
the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right
essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to
the property in favor of the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante,
such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea
of a disposition post mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is void.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she should
retain the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably
pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full
effect; and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession, cultivation,
harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile, not
the full ownership. As the Court below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of
ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of "possession,
cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or
absolute ownership she had no need to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all
these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right
of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for
herself.lawphi1.net
Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos,
with reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly
desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should call the
attention of the donors to the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation,
they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without
need of the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right
would be conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore,
the formalities of testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right
of free disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of
Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568).
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely recites that (1) the
donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms'; and
(3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his gratitude" but there is no show of
acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at the
same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the
donee did not accept, what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary
system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used under paid of nullity.
Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor failed to reserve
enough for ther own support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived. During that time, she suffered no
diminution of income. If that was not enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the
donation.
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude, because it was expressly stipulated
that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his
wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add the donor's support to his
own burdens.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance, appellant having
obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered.
3) Del Rosario v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by
her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G.
FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents. (G.R. No. 187056;
September 20, 2010)
FACTS: There was a donation by the spouses to their children and granddaughter captioned as
“Donation Mortis Causa,” stating that it is not revocable.
DEFECTS: It had no attestation clause, and had only two (2) witnesses.
ACTION OF THE DONEES: The donees accepted the donation.
After the death of one of the donors, the donation was submitted to probate but the Regional
Trial Court made a ruling to the effect that it should be considered, despite of the caption, a
donation inter vivos due to its irrevocability. The The Court of Appeals, on appeal, ruled it to be
one of mortis causa and since it did not comply with the formalities of a will, it is void.
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in its ruling?

HELD: No, the CA is not correct. The designation that it is a Donation Mortis Causa is not
controlling. If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that
the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 263 (2002), it was held that “irrevocability” is
a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where
“revocability” is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
[1] It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
[2] That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
of the properties conveyed; and
[3] That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final.
The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned
of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner
of the property donated.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,

vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO,
JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in reality is a
donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the
donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter, thus
precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors.
The Facts and the Case
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled
"Donation Mortis Causa"1 in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126-
square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila 2 in equal shares. The deed of donation
reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the
portions now occupied by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other
distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where
ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and
administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall
be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.3
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed
had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however,
signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December 19, 1968,
Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject
property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis
causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589. 4 Asuncion opposed
the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to
her.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20, 2003, 5 finding that the donation was in fact
one made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees
during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to
assign. The RTC thus directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal
shares.6
On Asuncion’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision on December 23,
2008,7 reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the
probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in
Asuncion’s favor. The CA further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what
Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it
did. Finally, the CA held that the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the
requirements of a notarial will,8 rendering the same void. Following the CA’s denial of Jarabini’s
motion for reconsideration,9 she filed the present petition with this Court.
Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to
Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a
donation inter vivos.
The Court’s Ruling
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling.
This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the
fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.10
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely

incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the
essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the
"distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly
said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by
the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the
proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the
donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of
the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held
that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the
donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property
while they lived.13
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos,
since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in
1awphi1
the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime. 15
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the conveyance
should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to
the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final.
The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of
the property donated.17
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by
then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non
habet.18
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what was initially
supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and
the nullity of one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property.
The Court has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. 19 Moreover, in
opposing the petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in
issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court improperly
allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008
Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and
REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in
Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
SO ORDERED.
4) Villanueva v. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172904, January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FROILAN
and LEONILA BRANOCO, respondents
G.R. No. 172804 | January 24, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner claimed ownership over the subject property through purchase in July 1971 from
Casimiro Vere, who in turn, bought the said property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970.
Respondents similarly claimed ownership over the property through purchase in July 1983 from
Eufracia Rodriguez, to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The deed of donation,
signed at the bottom by the parties and 2 witnesses, reads:
Xxx
xxx. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept
of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in
favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein
Donee predeceases me, the same land RUwill not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited
by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia
Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give
one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.”
The trial court ruled for petitioner. The trial court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after
treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the
Property to Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983,
she had no title to transfer.
The CA set aside the trial court’s ruling. The CA found the following factors pivotal to its
reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property
as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the
Deed’s consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her “love and affection” for Rodriguez,
considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in
case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez
accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not
devises. Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and,
conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void
for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation inter vivos
RULING:
Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
[4] The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa;
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect
that the donation is “to take effect at the death of the donor” are not controlling criteria; such
statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to
the real intent of the transferor; and
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x
Rodriguez,” signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving
Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned
of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on
the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident
from Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve
during her lifetime.” Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that “the ownership shall be vested on
Rodriguez upon my demise,” taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo’s beneficial title.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and
affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
“corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers.”
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to
recover a realty.
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, 3 sued respondents,
spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran
(trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property)
and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971
from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in
August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July
1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The
two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in
full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of
Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby
depose and say:
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely:
LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of
poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas
aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never
cared what happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my
nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and
because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio
Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I
give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns
together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is more or less described
and bounded as follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by
Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to coconuts now
bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor
of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of
EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo
and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2)
of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime. 4
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to
surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Property’s produce since
1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents’ claim of
ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by
selling the Property to Vere in 1970. 6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents
in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation
of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos donation, passing title to
Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While conceding that the
"language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different
interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as
donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May
1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration was
not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter
rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed
itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld
the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, petitioner
claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for
more than 10 years.9
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to respondents’. The
resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-
interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold
superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having
obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier
devise to Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution
or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence.
Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 10
Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria;
such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give
effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of
the deed.11
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to
reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had
Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator
did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the
properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title
over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit
from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause. 15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is
laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the
crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary
substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the import of the
contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from
Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title.
We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding]
herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb [the donee’s]
right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but
when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the
disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to
[the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the
moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by
virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee
said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their
contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title during
my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the
donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of
said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to
reserve partial usufructuary right over it.20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and
affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
"corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no
error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his
cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise").
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa"
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are not
controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to
give effect to the real intent of the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are
resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of
her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will
great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property
owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid
mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing
such practice.25
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all
adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Vere’s
combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s purchase of the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary
prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner
requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property
through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-
iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven
years before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo
and all those tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started
paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in
1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in
good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by
prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30
years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement. 1avvphil
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that
Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered
the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a
waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the Property. None of these facts detract from our
conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted,
obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment
is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere
had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s
motivation in obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title
Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the
Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 774-782
Art. 774 of the New Civil Code is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
There are two kinds of successors:
Compulsory heirs refer to the legitime reserved by law, and who succeed whether the testator
likes it or not.
Voluntary heirs refer to the person other than the compulsory heirs.
Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is
transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the
testator. (n)
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. (659)
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir, made in
a will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law. (n)
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession. (n)
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively
given by virtue of a will. (n)
Article 774
Art. 774 of the New Civil Code is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Cases:
1) Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996
Coronel v. CA
G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996
The case arose from a complaint for specific performance filed by private respondent Alcaraz
against petitioners to consummate the sale of a parcel of land in Quezon City. On January 19,
1985, petitioners executed a “Receipt of Down Payment” of P50,000 in favor of plaintiff
Ramona Alcaraz, binding themselves to transfer the ownership of the land in their name from
their deceased father, afterwhich the balance of P1,190,000 shall be paid in full by Alcaraz. On
February 6, 1985, the property was transferred to petitioners. On February 18, 1985, petitioners
sold the property to Mabanag. For this reason, Concepcion, Ramona’s mother, filed an action for
specific performance.
ISSUE: Whether the contract between petitioners and private respondent was that of a
conditional sale or a mere contract to sell
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. In a
contract to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective
buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of
the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present
purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees or
obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount
of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the purchase price
partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell
from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by
the prospective buyer. A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite
delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to
the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the
purchase price.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially
in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted
with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous
sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer
in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property.
There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after
registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the latter, of course,
may be used for damages by the intending buyer. In a conditional contract of sale, however,
upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will
definitely affect the seller’s title thereto.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance
which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers
themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the
purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely
presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there
would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and
consummated right there and then. What is clearly established by the plain language of the
subject document is that when the said “Receipt of Down Payment” was prepared and signed by
petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale,
consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from
the name of petitioners’ father, Constancio P. Coronel, to their names.
The provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the
exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first
buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer,
in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second
buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of
the first buyer. In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or
not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers
such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property sold. If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that
there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said
property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not
confer upon him any right.
2) Balus v. Balus, G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C.

GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A.
CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
MELO, J.:p
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific performance to compel herein petitioners (except the last named, Catalina
Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered
into by the parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
The undisputed facts of the case were summarized by respondent court in this wise:
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter

referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment"
(Exh. "A") in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as
Ramona) which is reproduced hereunder:
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
P1,240,000.00 — Total amount
50,000 — Down payment

———————————
P1,190,000.00 — Balance
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT
No. 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
P1,240,000.00.
We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father,
Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the
down payment above-stated.
On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will immediately execute the
deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall
immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.
Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos upon
execution of the document aforestated;
2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title of the property
registered in the name of their deceased father upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos down payment;
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronels will execute
the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the
whole balance of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P1,190,000.00) Pesos.
On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz

(hereinafter referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down payment
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos (Exh. "B", Exh. "2").
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels'
father was transferred in their names under TCT
No. 327043 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4")
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to
intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for
One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after the latter
has paid Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. "F-3"; Exh. "6-C")
For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract (Exh. "A") with
Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for
Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance
against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
back of TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "E"; Exh. "5").
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim

covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. "F";
Exh. "6").
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property in favor of Catalina (Exh. "G"; Exh. "7").
On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of
Catalina under TCT No. 351582 (Exh. "H"; Exh. "8").
(Rollo, pp. 134-136)
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court (Branch 83, RTC, Quezon City) the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of documentary exhibits. Thus, plaintiffs
therein (now private respondents) proffered their documentary evidence accordingly marked as
Exhibits "A" through "J", inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Adopting these same exhibits
as their own, then defendants (now petitioners) accordingly offered and marked them as Exhibits "1"
through "10", likewise inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Upon motion of the parties, the
trial court gave them thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously submit their respective
memoranda, and an additional 15 days within which to submit their corresponding comment or reply
thereof, after which, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 14, 1988, the case was submitted for resolution before Judge Reynaldo Roura, who was
then temporarily detailed to preside over Branch 82 of the RTC of Quezon City. On March 1, 1989,
judgment was handed down by Judge Roura from his regular bench at Macabebe, Pampanga for
the Quezon City branch, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering

defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel
of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now
TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, together with all the
improvements existing thereon free from all liens and encumbrances, and once
accomplished, to immediately deliver the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon
receipt thereof, the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon receipt thereof, the
plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price
amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby canceled and
declared to be without force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other
persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and
deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' claim for damages and attorney's
fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are hereby
dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So Ordered.
Macabebe, Pampanga for Quezon City, March 1, 1989.
(Rollo, p. 106)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner before the new presiding judge of the Quezon
City RTC but the same was denied by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, thusly:
The prayer contained in the instant motion, i.e., to annul the decision and to render
anew decision by the undersigned Presiding Judge should be denied for the
following reasons: (1) The instant case became submitted for decision as of April 14,
1988 when the parties terminated the presentation of their respective documentary
evidence and when the Presiding Judge at that time was Judge Reynaldo Roura.
The fact that they were allowed to file memoranda at some future date did not
change the fact that the hearing of the case was terminated before Judge Roura and
therefore the same should be submitted to him for decision; (2) When the defendants
and intervenor did not object to the authority of Judge Reynaldo Roura to decide the
case prior to the rendition of the decision, when they met for the first time before the
undersigned Presiding Judge at the hearing of a pending incident in Civil Case No.
Q-46145 on November 11, 1988, they were deemed to have acquiesced thereto and
they are now estopped from questioning said authority of Judge Roura after they
received the decision in question which happens to be adverse to them; (3) While it
is true that Judge Reynaldo Roura was merely a Judge-on-detail at this Branch of the
Court, he was in all respects the Presiding Judge with full authority to act on any
pending incident submitted before this Court during his incumbency. When he
returned to his Official Station at Macabebe, Pampanga, he did not lose his authority
to decide or resolve such cases submitted to him for decision or resolution because
he continued as Judge of the Regional Trial Court and is of co-equal rank with the
undersigned Presiding Judge. The standing rule and supported by jurisprudence is
that a Judge to whom a case is submitted for decision has the authority to decide the
case notwithstanding his transfer to another branch or region of the same court (Sec.
9, Rule 135, Rule of Court).
Coming now to the twin prayer for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 1,
1989 rendered in the instant case, resolution of which now pertains to the
undersigned Presiding Judge, after a meticulous examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the parties, she is convinced that the Decision of March 1,
1989 is supported by evidence and, therefore, should not be disturbed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Annul

Decision and Render Anew Decision by the Incumbent Presiding Judge" dated
March 20, 1989 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 1989.
(Rollo, pp. 108-109)
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, 1991, the Court of Appeals
(Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Abad Santos (P), JJ.) rendered its decision fully agreeing with the trial
court.
Hence, the instant petition which was filed on March 5, 1992. The last pleading, private respondents'
Reply Memorandum, was filed on September 15, 1993. The case was, however, re-raffled to
undersigned ponente only on August 28, 1996, due to the voluntary inhibition of the Justice to whom
the case was last assigned.
While we deem it necessary to introduce certain refinements in the disquisition of respondent court
in the affirmance of the trial court's decision, we definitely find the instant petition bereft of merit.
The heart of the controversy which is the ultimate key in the resolution of the other issues in the case
at bar is the precise determination of the legal significance of the document entitled "Receipt of
Down Payment" which was offered in evidence by both parties. There is no dispute as to the fact
that said document embodied the binding contract between Ramona Patricia Alcaraz on the one
hand, and the heirs of Constancio P. Coronel on the other, pertaining to a particular house and lot
covered by TCT No. 119627, as defined in Article 1305 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
reads as follows:
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
While, it is the position of private respondents that the "Receipt of Down Payment" embodied a
perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to enforce by means of an action for specific
performance, petitioners on their part insist that what the document signified was a mere executory
contract to sell, subject to certain suspensive conditions, and because of the absence of Ramona P.
Alcaraz, who left for the United States of America, said contract could not possibly ripen into a
contract absolute sale.
Plainly, such variance in the contending parties' contentions is brought about by the way each
interprets the terms and/or conditions set forth in said private instrument. Withal, based on whatever
relevant and admissible evidence may be available on record, this, Court, as were the courts below,
is now called upon to adjudge what the real intent of the parties was at the time the said document
was executed.
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in

exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the
first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicity reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or
consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an
event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill is promise to sell the subject property when the
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the full payment of the
purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents the
obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further
remedies by the prospective buyer. In Roque vs. Lapuz (96 SCRA 741 [1980]), this Court had
occasion to rule:
Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a
contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event
that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, the prospective seller's obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a
contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the
Civil Code which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct
from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective
buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract of
sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment
of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is
present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not
occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely
abated (cf. Homesite and housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]). However, if
the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had
already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto
automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may
have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in
cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted with, but
to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the
property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such
as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and
the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no double
sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no
defect in the owner-seller's title per se, but the latter, of course, may be used for damages by the
intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale
becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the seller's title thereto. In fact, if there had been
previous delivery of the subject property, the seller's ownership or title to the property is
automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to
any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who
may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title, or at least was
charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such
second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's title. In case a title is issued to the second buyer, the
first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
With the above postulates as guidelines, we now proceed to the task of deciphering the real nature
of the contract entered into by petitioners and private respondents.
It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein should be given their
natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning was intended (Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]). Thus, when petitioners declared in the said "Receipt of Down
Payment" that they —
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT
No. 1199627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of
P1,240,000.00.
without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase price, the natural and
ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their property.
When the "Receipt of Down Payment" is considered in its entirety, it becomes more manifest that
there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title to the buyer, but since the transfer
certificate of title was still in the name of petitioner's father, they could not fully effect such transfer
although the buyer was then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase price. Therefore,
petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private respondent Ramona P.
Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names from that of their father,
after which, they promised to present said title, now in their names, to the latter and to execute the
deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn, pay the entire balance of the purchase
price.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance which
prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers
themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase
price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume
that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there would have
been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed and consummated
right there and then.
Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case at bar did not merely promise to sell the
properly to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition. On the contrary,
having already agreed to sell the subject property, they undertook to have the certificate of title
changed to their names and immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers, after compliance by
the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell the property to the latter. What may be
perceived from the respective undertakings of the parties to the contract is that petitioners had
already agreed to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father, completely willing to transfer
full ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the documents were then in order. It just
happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title was then still in the name of their father. It
was more expedient to first effect the change in the certificate of title so as to bear their names. That
is why they undertook to cause the issuance of a new transfer of the certificate of title in their names
upon receipt of the down payment in the amount of P50,000.00. As soon as the new certificate of
title is issued in their names, petitioners were committed to immediately execute the deed of
absolute sale. Only then will the obligation of the buyer to pay the remainder of the purchase price
arise.
There is no doubt that unlike in a contract to sell which is most commonly entered into so as to
protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the property in installment by withholding
ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor, in the contract entered into
in the case at bar, the sellers were the one who were unable to enter into a contract of absolute sale
by reason of the fact that the certificate of title to the property was still in the name of their father. It
was the sellers in this case who, as it were, had the impediment which prevented, so to speak, the
execution of an contract of absolute sale.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said
"Receipt of Down Payment" was prepared and signed by petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al., the
parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the
successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, Constancio P.
Coronel, to their names.
The Court significantly notes this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled on February 6, 1985
(Exh. "D"; Exh. "4"). Thus, on said date, the conditional contract of sale between petitioners and
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz became obligatory, the only act required for the
consummation thereof being the delivery of the property by means of the execution of the deed of
absolute sale in a public instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves to do as
evidenced by the "Receipt of Down Payment."
Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly applies to the case at
bench. Thus,
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From the moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the

extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening
of the event which constitutes the condition.
Since the condition contemplated by the parties which is the issuance of a certificate of title in
petitioners' names was fulfilled on February 6, 1985, the respective obligations of the parties under
the contract of sale became mutually demandable, that is, petitioners, as sellers, were obliged to
present the transfer certificate of title already in their names to private respondent Ramona P.
Alcaraz, the buyer, and to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale, while the buyer on her
part, was obliged to forthwith pay the balance of the purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00.
It is also significant to note that in the first paragraph in page 9 of their petition, petitioners
conclusively admitted that:
3. The petitioners-sellers Coronel bound themselves "to effect the transfer in our
names from our deceased father Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of
title immediately upon receipt of the downpayment above-stated". The sale was still
subject to this suspensive condition. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Rollo, p. 16)
Petitioners themselves recognized that they entered into a contract of sale subject to a suspensive
condition. Only, they contend, continuing in the same paragraph, that:
. . . Had petitioners-sellers not complied with this condition of first transferring the title

to the property under their names, there could be no perfected contract of sale.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Ibid.)
not aware that they set their own trap for themselves, for Article 1186 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that:
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.
Besides, it should be stressed and emphasized that what is more controlling than these mere
hypothetical arguments is the fact that the condition herein referred to was actually and indisputably
fulfilled on February 6, 1985, when a new title was issued in the names of petitioners as evidenced
by TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
The inevitable conclusion is that on January 19, 1985, as evidenced by the document denominated
as "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A"; Exh. "1"), the parties entered into a contract of sale subject
only to the suspensive condition that the sellers shall effect the issuance of new certificate title from
that of their father's name to their names and that, on February 6, 1985, this condition was fulfilled
(Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
We, therefore, hold that, in accordance with Article 1187 which pertinently provides —
Art. 1187. The effects of conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been
fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation . . .
In obligation to do or not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with.
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the perfected contract of sale became
mutually due and demandable as of the time of fulfillment or occurrence of the suspensive
condition on February 6, 1985. As of that point in time, reciprocal obligations of both seller
and buyer arose.
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they
were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent
Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of
law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes
insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining
thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil
Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have
been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the
property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into
an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which
they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The
Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive

upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of
sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that
time.
Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale between them
and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered impossible
the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving her address,
telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney (Paragraphs 14 and 15, Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43), for which reason, so petitioners
conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding rescinding the contract of sale.
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the
instant case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere allegations
found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are deemed
controverted even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The
records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners' allegations. We
have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs.
Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]. Mere allegation is not an
evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February
6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the
contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially rescind
the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon, 132 SCRA
722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz because
although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the
buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother, who had acted
for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made
by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check (Exh. "B"; Exh. "2") for and in behalf of
Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcion's
authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal check. Neither did they
raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third person. Accordingly, as far as
petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the
contract of sale.
Corollarily, Ramona P. Alcaraz cannot even be deemed to be in default, insofar as her obligation to
pay the full purchase price is concerned. Petitioners who are precluded from setting up the defense
of the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz as above-explained offered no proof whatsoever to
show that they actually presented the new transfer certificate of title in their names and signified their
willingness and readiness to execute the deed of absolute sale in accordance with their agreement.
Ramona's corresponding obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of
P1,190,000.00 (as buyer) never became due and demandable and, therefore, she cannot be
deemed to have been in default.
Article 1169 of the Civil Code defines when a party in a contract involving reciprocal obligations may
be considered in default, to wit:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in delay from the time
the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From
the moment one of the parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale between petitioners and
respondents.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B. Mabanag, gave rise to a
case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code will apply, to wit:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the
second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the
second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer, the
exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the first
buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second buyer, in
good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer
satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first
buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished
member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).

Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights
except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares
vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge taints his
registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26
December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129 SCRA
656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R.
No. 95843, 02 September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
Petitioner point out that the notice of lis pendens in the case at bar was annoted on the title of the
subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the second sale between petitioners Coronels
and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly perfected prior thereto or on February 18, 1985. The idea
conveyed is that at the time petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer, bought the property under a
clean title, she was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for which reason she is buyer in
good faith.
We are not persuaded by such argument.
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer
was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good
faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good faith,
registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22, 1985, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names of
petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time
of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already been
previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous
buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect
in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that
there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person
claims said property in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in
bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349
[1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43
Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected
on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18,
1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts below.
Although there may be ample indications that there was in fact an agency between Ramona as
principal and Concepcion, her mother, as agent insofar as the subject contract of sale is concerned,
the issue of whether or not Concepcion was also acting in her own behalf as a co-buyer is not
squarely raised in the instant petition, nor in such assumption disputed between mother and
daughter. Thus, We will not touch this issue and no longer disturb the lower courts' ruling on this
point.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
judgment AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Article 775
Decedent and Testator
Art. 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is
transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the
testator. (n)
Article 776
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. (659)
Sections 6 to 8 of R.A. No. 7170 or the Organ Donation Act of 1991
Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees. – The following persons may
become legatees or donees of human bodies or parts thereof for any of the purposes stated
hereunder:
(a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation;
(b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university - For education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
(c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental education, research, therapy, or
transplantation; and
(d) Any specified individual - For therapy or transplantation needed by him.
Section 7. Duty of Hospitals. – A hospital authorized to receive organ donations or to conduct

transplantation shall train qualified personnel and their staff to handle the task of introducing the
organ donation program in a humane and delicate manner to the relatives of the donor-decedent
enumerated in Section 4 hereof. The hospital shall accomplish the necessary form or document as
proof of compliance with the above requirement.
Section 8. Manner of Executing a Legacy. –
(a) Legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may be made by will. The
legacy becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate of the
will. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the
legacy, to the extent that it was executed in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may also be made in
any document other than a will. The legacy becomes effective upon death of the testator and
shall be respected by and binding upon his executor or administrator, heirs, assigns,
successors-in-interest and all members of the family. The document, which may be a card or
any paper designed to be carried on a person, must be signed by the testator in the
presence of two witnesses who must sign the document in his presence. If the testator
cannot sign, the document may be signed for him at his discretion and in his presence, in the
presence of two witnesses who must, likewise, sign the document in the presence of the
testator. Delivery of the document of legacy during the testator's lifetime is not necessary to
make the legacy valid.
(c) The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or without specifying a legatee. If the
legacy is made to a specified legatee who is not available at the time and place of the
testator's death, the attending physician or surgeon, in the absence of any expressed
indication that the testator desired otherwise, may accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy
does not specify a legatee, the legacy may be accepted by the attending physician or
surgeon as legatee upon or following the testator's death. The physician who becomes a
legatee under this subsection shall not participate in the procedures for removing or
transplanting a part or parts of the body of the decedent.
(d) The testator may designate in his will, card or other document, the surgeon or physician
who will carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a designation, or if the
designee is not available, the legatee or other persons authorized to accept the legacy may
authorize any surgeon or physician for the purpose.
Inheritance versus Succession

Succession is the process by which the all the earthly property of a now dead person are dealt
with. Succession results into inheritance. Inheritance is the transfer of rights of property from the
dead person to a successor.
Components of Inheritance
Property
Human Body
Necessity of Probate
Rights
Right Must be Existing
Transmissible Rights
Non-Transmissible Rights
Article 1311, Civil Code
Purely Personal Rights
Obligations
Extent of Liability
Cases:
1) Heirs of Ciriaco Bayog-Ang v. Quinones, G.R. No. 205680, November 21, 2018
HEIRS OF CIRIACO BAYOG-ANG v. FLORENCE QUINONES, GR No. 205680, 2018-11-21
Facts:
In 1998, an action for Specific Performance and Damages was filed by Florence Quinones
(Florence), together with her husband Jeremias Donasco (respondents), before the RTC of
Midsayap Cotabato against the heirs of Bayog-Ang (petitioners). The subject of this dispute is a
10,848 square-meter parcel of land which is part of the property previously owned by Ciriaco
Bayog-Ang (Bayog-Ang), located at Barrio Sadaan, Municipality of Midsayap, Province of
North Cotabato covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-1078 (1596) (subject
land). Respondents claimed that the said parcel of land was sold to her by Bayog-Ang as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 25, 1964, and she demanded from the
petitioners that the said portion be segregated and transferred but the same went unheeded.
Worse, the petitioners, through alleged malicious manipulation, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate in 1996 adjudicating the land in their favor, and as a result of which, OCT
No. RP-1078 (1596) was canceled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91543 was issued on
April 3, 1997 under their names.[3] Respondents prayed for the nullification of the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement and for the segregation of the parcel of land which they bought from
Bayog-Ang, and asked for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.[4]Petitioners,
in their Answer, denied any knowledge of the deed of sale executed by Bayog-Ang in favor of
Florence nor of the latter's claim over the land. They also claimed that before the execution of the
extra-judicial settlement, they went to the Register of Deeds to verify the status of the land and
found nothing was annotated on the certificate of title. By way of affirmative defenses, they
claimed that the respondents' action was barred by prescription and laches, and that respondents
were never in possession of the subject lot. They averred that the action was one based on written
contract which prescribed in 10 years reckoned from the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in 1964, and the complaint, filed only in 1998,[5] is thus belatedly filed.In the proceedings
before the RTC, Florence testified that she purchased a parcel of land from Bayog-Ang which
was paid for by her father Pedro Quinones (Pedro). As a result, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed on February 25, 1964 and notarized before a certain Atty. Cambronero. Furthermore,
the pertinent documents (including the certificate of title and tax declaration) were given by
Bayog-Ang to Pedro who in turn gave them to Atty. Domingo for purposes of transferring title to
her name. It was only in 1980 when Atty. Domingo returned the papers to her that she learned
that the papers to the land were not processed.[6]Florence also presented Antonio Gasparillo, a
resident of BPH, Sadaan, Midsayap, Cotabato, who testified that he was staying on the land
owned by Florence, which was formerly owned by Bayog-Ang. He further testified that after
Pedro bought the land, he allowed him to enter and work there as a tenant from 1964 until 1995,
when he stopped tilling the land because of sickness. After Pedro's death, Gasparillo remitted
Pedro's share in the produce of the land to the latter's children.[7]Petitioners did not present
evidence, and instead asked the court for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which the RTC
granted.[8]
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the RTC applied the rule on double sales under Article 1544
of the Civil Code and concluded that since petitioners were the first to register the land in good
faith, they have a superior right over the subject land, to wit:This action is for specific
performance and was also ruled upon earlier by the court as similar to reconveyance. The
plaintiffs demand that the deed of extra-judicial settlement executed by the defendants [sic] and
that they segregated [sic] that portion of land sold to them by the late Ciriaco Bayog-Ang.The
existence and due execution of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ciriaco Bayog-ang in favor
of Florence Quiñones Donasco is not disputed. This is made the basis in the claim of the
plaintiffs of ownership of the subject land. It is noted, however, that at the time the plaintiffs laid
claim to the land, the same has already been registered, titled in the names of the defendants.
Issues:
Therefore, the proper question that should have been addressed was whether Florence was able
to prove by preponderance of evidence that she already acquired ownership of the subject lot
from Bayog-Ang, as this will determine whether the subject lot remained part of Bayog-Ang's
estate which passed to his heirs by succession at the moment of his death.[28]
Ruling:
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, tradition as a consequence of contracts and succession are
modes of acquiring or transferring ownership, to wit:Art. 712. Ownership is acquired by
occupation and by intellectual creation.Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in
consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.They may also be acquired by means of
prescription. (609a)Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.[29] The inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death.[30] These provisions emphasize that what is passed by a decedent to his heirs by
succession are those which he owned at the time of his death. It follows then that his heirs cannot
inherit from him what he does not own anymore.Under the law on sales, Article 1496 of the New
Civil Code provides that "the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any
other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the
vendee." In particular, Article 1497 provides that "the thing sold shall be understood as
delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee," while Article 1498
states that "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."
The existence and due execution of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ciriaco Bayog-ang in
favor of Florence Quiñones Donasco is not disputed. This is made the basis in the claim of the
plaintiffs of ownership of the subject land. It is noted, however, that at the time the plaintiffs laid
claim to the land, the same has already been registered, titled in the names of the defendants.
Thus, in accordance with Article 1498, the sale of the subject land through the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated February 25, 1964, which is a public instrument, transferred ownership from Bayog-
Ang to Florence, there being no indication of any intention to the contrary.The action is not
barred byprescription or lachesAs a result of this Court's pronouncement that respondents have
already acquired ownership of the subject land, We also rule that the respondents' complaint has
not prescribed nor were they guilty of laches.
In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana,[42] this Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that an
action to quiet title where the plaintiff under claim of ownership, is in actual possession of the
land, does not prescribe, citing American Jurisprudence, to wit:The prevailing rule is that the
right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse
claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession
of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in
fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing
right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its
effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. But the rule that the
statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can
only be invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. One who claims property which is in
the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period.[43]
(Citations omitted)
Furthermore, it has been held that "the purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-
registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their
obligations thereunder."[49] In this case, the petitioners cannot be held to be third persons to the
contract between their grandfather and Florence, for as heirs, they were bound by the same.
Article 1311 of the New Civil Code provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." The general rule is
that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the
rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation
or (3) provision of law.[50] In the present case, it is not alleged nor proved that the sale between
Bayog-Ang and Florence falls within any of the exceptions provided under the aforementioned
provision of law.IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for review on Certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 8, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-
Cagayan De Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED.
2) Estate of K.H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co. Inc., G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956
ESTATE OF K.H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant and appellant.
No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.
Rule Synopsis
The obligation of a surety is not strictly personal. Hence, transmissible to the heirs by succession
upon his death.
Case Summary
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (Luzon) was a surety to some 20 indemnity agreements. KH Hemedy
executed counterbonds in favor of Luzon whereby he was made a surety solidary guarantor in all
of the indemnity agreements entered into by the latter. This means that Hemedy will indemnify
Luzon in case the latter was made to pay. Hemedy died.
Luzon filed a claims against the estate of Hemedy, pertaining to contingent claims for the value
of the 20 bonds.
The lower court dismissed the claim on the ground that upon Hemady’s death, his obligation as a
surety. It justified such ruling by essentially saying that the obligation of a guarantor is strictly
personal. Hence, terminated upon the death of said guarantor and not transmitted to his heirs.
The SC reversed this decision saying that the liability of a surety or guarantor is not strictly
personal. Hence, transmitted to his heirs upon his death. The contingent claims against the estate
were therefore allowed.
Issues resolved —
May the obligations of a decedent as a surety or guarantor be transmitted to his heirs?
HELD – YES.
The heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations (Arts. 774
anb 776 NCC).
— Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law (Art. 1257 NCC). When a party enters into a contract, he is
deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns.
— The binding effect of the contract upon the heirs is not altered by the requirements under the
Rules of Court (Rule 89) saying that money claims against the estate shall be settled first before
distribution of the same to the heirs may be made. The reason is that, the payment for those
claims against the estate were ultimately payments made by the heirs since the amounts so paid
constitute diminution or reduction in the eventual share of the heirs in the estate.
The obligation of a surety or guarantor does not fall in any of the exceptions provided for
under Art. 1257.
— As to the nature of the obligation. The obligation of a Hemady is to reimburse sum of money

paid by Luzon. It is an obligation to give. It is not relevant whether the payment was made by
Hemady himself or by another person so long as the payment was made.
— As to the stipulation of the parties. Failure to expressly provide in the contract that the
obligations arising therefrom shall transmit to the heirs upon the death of Hemady does not show
of the intent of the parties to have such obligation termination upon Hemady’s death. In fine,
such need not be provided for as the law already expressly provided for the same.
— As to the provision of law. The provisions of the civil code regulating guaranty and suretyship
do not provide that the obligation shall of a surety or guarantor shall be extinguished upon his
death.
Order reversed.
3) Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, G.R. No. 201787, September 25, 2013
G.R. No. 201787 September 25, 2013 ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON
INOCENCIO (Deceased), Petitioner, vs. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, Respondent.
FACTS: On 1 March 1946, Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land located in Pasay
City to German Inocencio (German). The lease contract was effective for a period of one year,
and was renewed for one-year periods several times. The last written contract was executed on
31 May 1951. Section 6 of the lease contract provides: Este contrato es intransferible, a menos
que para ello se obtenga elconsentimiento escrito del arrendador. (This contract is non-
transferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing.) In 1946, German
constructed two buildings on the parcel of land which he subleased. He also designated his son
Ramon Inocencio (Ramon) to administer the said property. On 21 September 1990, German
received a letter from HDSJ informing him that the increased rentals shall take effect in
November 1990 instead of August 1990, "to give him ample time to make the necessary rental
adjustments with his sublessees." German passed away in 1997. Evidence on record shows that
Ramon did not notify HDSJ of German’s death. After German’s passing, Ramon collected the
rentals from the sublessees, and paid the rentals to HDSJ, and the taxes on the property. On 1
March 2001, HDSJ’s property administrator, Five Star Multi-Services, Inc., notified Ramon that
HDSJ is terminating the lease contract effective 31 March 2001. Ramon then sent a letter to
HDSJ dated 12 March 2001, suggesting that the lease contract be renegotiated for the welfare of
the sublessees occupying the parcel of land. On 3 April 2001, HDSJ notified Ramon that the
lease contract shall not be renewed because Ramon has "continually subleased the subject
premises to about 20 families (in addition to a commercial establishment) x x x without the
knowledge and consent of the lessor, [HDSJ]." Thereafter, HDSJ refused to accept Ramon’s
tender of payment of rentals. On 3 March 2005, HDSJ sent a letter to Ramon: (1) reiterating its
stand that the lease contract was terminated effective 31 March 2001;(2) demanding payment of
₱756,449.26 as unrealized fruits; and (3) giving him 30 days to vacate the property. The
sublessees were given written notices to vacate within 30 days. HDSJ also posted a Patalastas
stating that it is willing to work out an amicable arrangement with the sublessees, although the
latter are not considered as legal occupants or tenants of the property. Because of this, some of
the sublessees refused to pay rentals to Ramon. HDSJ also entered into lease contracts with: (1)
Harish Chetandas on 25 May 2005;18 (2) Enrique Negare on 12 April 2005;19 (3) Lamberto
Estefa on 25 May 2005;20 and (4) Sofronio Chavez, Jr. on 21 May 2005. On 28 June 2005,
HDSJ filed a Complaint before Branch 48 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay (MeTC-
Pasay) for unlawful detainer against Ramon and his sublessees. The complaint alleged that
Ramon and his sublessees have been illegally occupying the leased premises since 31 March
2001. In his answer, Ramon claimed that HDSJ interfered with the contractual relations between
him and his sublessees. While the case was being tried before the MeTC-Pasay, Ramon passed
away. He was substituted by AnalitaP. Inocencio. The MeTC-Pasay ruled in favor of HDSJ.
Aggrieved, Analita filed an appeal before the RTC-Pasay. However, the RTCPasay dismissed
Analita’s appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC-Pasay. Analita then filed a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC-Pasay but modified the award for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not HDSJ commited tortious interference in the contractual relations
between Ramon and his sublessees.
HELD: No. The HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. Article 1314 of the Civil Code
states: Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. As correctly pointed out by the Inocencios, tortious
interference has the following elements: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of the contract; and (3) interference of the third person
without legal justification or excuse. The facts of the instant case show that there were valid
sublease contracts which were known to HDSJ. However, the third element is lacking in this
case. The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees
for purely economic reasons (payment of rentals). HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from
the sublessees upon termination of the lease contract. It does not appear that HDSJ was
motivated by spite or ill will towards the Inocencios.
ON THE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE BUILDING
The Inocencios claim ownership over the buildings since these are separate and distinct from the
land on which they are erected. Thus, as owners of the buildings, they have a right to lease the
buildings to third persons, even after termination of the lease contract with HDSJ. The
Inocencios also claimed that when they entered into lease contracts with tenants for the lease of
portions of the said buildings, these contracts were independent contracts of lease over their own
building and not subleases of the parcel of land which they leased from Respondent. The
Supreme Court did not agree with the Innocencios and discussed the case of Duellome v. Gotico
and Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, where it held that the lease of a building includes
the lease of the lot and consequently, the rentals of the building include the rentals of the lot.
However, the Supreme Court found that the CA erred in not applying Article 1678 of the Civil
Code which provides: Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of
the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of
the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount,
the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary. With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the
principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the
lease is extinguished. The foregoing provision applies if the improvements were: (1) introduced
in good faith; (2) useful; and (3) suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form and substance.52 We find that the aforementioned requisites are satisfied in this
case. The buildings were constructed before German’s demise, during the subsistence of a valid
contract of lease. It does not appear that HDSJ prohibited German from constructing the
buildings. Thus, HDSJ should have reimbursed German (or his estate) half of the value of the
improvements as of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter
should be allowed to demolish the buildings.
WAS THE ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION? No.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed
"within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." In
interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court, in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,53 held that: The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted
from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for
petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for
unlawful detainer. "Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last
demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does
the possession become unlawful." HDSJ’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed
the complaint for unlawful detainer on 28 June 2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the
period provided under the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 201787 September 25, 2013
ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased), Petitioner,

vs.
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated 12 January 2012 and the
Resolution2 dated 9 May 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117009. The
Decision dismissed Analita P. Inocencio’s (Analita) petition for review and affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated 21 January 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Branch 119 (RTC-Pasay).
The Resolution denied Analita’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 1 March 1946, Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land located in Pasay City to
German Inocencio (German).4 The lease contract was effective for a period of one year, and was
renewed for one-year periods several times. The last written contract was executed on 31 May
1951.5 Section 6 of the lease contract provides:
Este contrato es intransferible, a menos que para ello se obtenga elconsentimiento escrito del
arrendador. (This contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in
writing.)6
In 1946, German constructed two buildings on the parcel of land 7 which he subleased. He also
designated his son Ramon Inocencio (Ramon)to administer the said property. 8
On 21 September 1990, German received a letter from HDSJ informing him that the increased
rentals shall take effect in November 1990instead of August 1990, "to give him ample time to make
the necessary rental adjustments with his sublessees." 9
German passed away in 1997. Evidence on record shows that Ramon did not notify HDSJ of
German’s death. After German’s passing, Ramon collected the rentals from the sublessees, and
paid the rentals to HDSJ, and the taxes on the property. On 1 March 2001, HDSJ’s property
administrator, Five Star Multi-Services, Inc., notified Ramon that HDSJ is terminating the lease
contract effective 31 March 2001:
We acknowledge the fact that Hospicio de San Jose has been accepting the payment of your rentals
since the demise of Mr. German Inocencio. Hence, an implied contract of lease between the two of
you exists. However, since there is no stipulation as to the period of the contract and you are paying
a monthly rental to our client, the period for the lease is on a month-to-month basis (Art. 1687). Thus
as of this date, your contract should expire on March 31, 2001. 10
Ramon then sent a letter to HDSJ dated 12 March 2001, suggesting that the lease contract be
renegotiated for the welfare of the sublessees occupying the parcel of land. 11 On 3 April 2001, HDSJ
notified Ramon that the lease contract shall not be renewed because Ramon has "continually
subleased the subject premises to about 20 families (in addition to a commercial establishment) x x
x without the knowledge and consent of the essor, [HDSJ]." 12 Thereafter, HDSJ refused to accept
Ramon’s tender of payment of rentals.13
On 3 March 2005, HDSJ sent a letter to Ramon: (1) reiterating its stand that the lease contract was
terminated effective 31 March 2001;(2) demanding payment of ₱756,449.26 as unrealized fruits; and
(3) giving him 30 days to vacate the property.14 The sublessees were given written notices to vacate
within 30 days.15 HDSJ also posted a Patalastas stating that it is willing to work out an amicable
arrangement with the sublessees, although the latter are not considered as legal occupants or
tenants of the property.16 Because of this, some of the sublessees refused to pay rentals to Ramon. 17
HDSJ also entered into lease contracts with: (1) Harish Chetandas on 25 May 2005; 18 (2) Enrique
Negare on 12 April 2005;19 (3) Lamberto Estefa on 25 May 2005;20 and (4) Sofronio Chavez, Jr. on
21 May 2005.21
On 28 June 2005, HDSJ filed a Complaint before Branch 48 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
(MeTC-Pasay) for unlawful detainer against Ramon and his sublessees.22 The complaint alleged that
Ramon and his sublessees have been illegally occupying the leased premises since 31 March 2001.
HDSJ sought the following damages:
17.1 Actual damages, in the amount of Php552,195.36, equivalent to the reasonable value of the
use and occupation of the premises from the period of 31 March 2001 until the present; and
17.2 Attorney’s fees in the amount of Php50,000.00, for defendants’ refusal to vacate the property
and for compelling plaintiff to incur expenses to protect its interests. Furthermore, it is clear that
defendants acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff’s plainly valid, just, and
demandable claim.23
In his Answer dated 1 August 2005,24 Ramon claimed that:
(1) German was the owner of the two buildings constructed on the leased property as evidenced by
the building permits obtained from the government agencies and the tax declarations covering the
buildings;
(2) The Spanish lease contract, which was not translated into English or Filipino should not be
admitted as evidence in view of Section 33 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence;
(3) HDSJ is estopped from raising the issue of non-transferability of the lease contract because it
admitted in its letter to Ramon that there is an existing lease agreement between the parties, even
after German’s death:
Your Lease Contract with [HDSJ], which is an implied month-to-month contract, has to be terminate
defective March 31, 2001, because by your own admission, you have continuously subleased the
subject premises to about 20 families including a commercial establishment).This was done without
the knowledge and consent of the lessor, [HDSJ], and is in violation of the Lease Contract your
father signed with them.25 x x x.
(4) There is no prohibition against subleasing in the lease contract. Thus, under Article 1650 of the
Civil Code, Ramon is permitted to sublease the premises; and
(5) The letters sent by HDSJ to the Inocencios sometime in1990 revealed that the former already
knew that the premises were being subleased.
Ramon also claimed that HDSJ interfered with the contractual relations between him and his
sublessees.26
While the case was being tried before the MeTC-Pasay, Ramon passed away. In an Order dated 23
August 2006, the MeTC-Pasay allowed the substitution of Ramon by his wife, Analita. 27
The Ruling of the MeTC-Pasay
The MeTC-Pasay ruled in favor of HDSJ. In its Decision dated 22May 2008, the MeTC-Pasay held
that the lease contract could not be transmitted to Ramon as German’s heir in view of the express
stipulation found therein. Since there was "no lease contract between [HDSJ] and Ramon x x x the
latter cannot sublease the property."28 The dispositive portion of the MeTC-Pasay Decision reads:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant as
follows:
1. Ordering defendant Ramon Inocencio, substituted by AnalitaP. Inocencio, and Felipe Enar, and all
persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the premises located at 61-CSta.
Escolastica cor. F.B. Harrison St., Pasay City and to peacefully turn over the same to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff reasonable compensation of ₱552,195.36 for the use and
occupation of the property from 01 April 2001 to 31 March 2005, and the amount of ₱10,512.00 a
month from 01 April 2005 up to the present, plus twelve per cent 12% interest per annum until the
premises shall have been vacated;
3.Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.29
Aggrieved, Analita filed an appeal before the RTC-Pasay.
The Ruling of the RTC-Pasay
On 21 January 2009, the RTC-Pasay dismissed Analita’s appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of
the MeTC-Pasay.30 It held that "even before the termination of the contract, [Ramon] had no right to
sublease the said property due to the intransferability clause in the contract." 31
Analita moved for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated 25 October 2010. 32 Analita
then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Pasay but modified the award for damages. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated21 January 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 119, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award for
reasonable compensation in paragraph 2 is pegged at Five Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred
Seventy Six Pesos (₱504,576.00) representing the accumulated rentals for the period from 01 April
2001 up to 31 March2005 with six percent (6%) interest per annum, plus the further amount of Ten
Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos (₱10,512.00) per month from 01 April 2005 until possession
is restored to respondent, also with six percent (6%) interest per annum, up to the finality of this
Decision. Thereafter, the interest shall be twelve percent (12%) until the amount is fully paid. 33
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petition questions the following rulings made by the CA:
(1) The sublease contracts were invalid;
(2) There was no tortious interference on the part of HDSJ;
(3) Ramon did not own the buildings erected on the leased premises;
(4) HDSJ is entitled to reasonable compensation in the amount of ₱504,576.00 and

attorney’s fees; and
(5) HDSJ’s action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription.
The Ruling of this Court
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent.
xxxx
We have previously ruled that lease contracts, by their nature, are not personal. The general rule,
therefore, is lease contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the heirs except if
the contract states otherwise.34 In Sui Man Hui Chan v. Court of Appeals,35 we held that:
A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are
transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are
not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of
Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms
and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to
their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a
party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.
Section 6 of the lease contract provides that "this contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of
the lessor is obtained in writing." 36 Section 6 refers to transfers inter vivos and not transmissions
mortis causa. What Section 6 seeks to avoid is for the lessee to substitute a third party in place of
the lessee without the lessor’s consent. This merely reiterates what Article 1649 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary.
In any case, HDSJ also acknowledged that Ramon is its month-to-month lessee. Thus, the death of
German did not terminate the lease contract executed with HDSJ, but instead continued with Ramon
as the lessee. HDSJ recognized Ramon as its lessee in a letter dated 1 March 2001:
We acknowledge the fact that Hospicio de San Jose has been accepting the payment of your rentals
since the demise of Mr. [German] Inocencio. Hence, an implied contract of lease between the two of
you exists. However, since there is no stipulation as to the period of the contract and you are paying
a monthly rental to our client, the period for the lease is on a month-to-month basis (Art. 1687). Thus
as of this date, your contract should expire on March 31, 2001. 37
Section 6 of the lease contract requires written consent of the lessor before the lease may be
assigned or transferred. In Tamio v. Tecson,38 we explained the nature of an assignment of lease:
In the case of cession or assignment of lease rights on real property, there is a novation by the
substitution of the person of one of the parties — the lessee. The personality of the lessee, who
dissociates from the lease, disappears; only two persons remain in the juridical relation — the lessor
and the assignee who is converted into the new lessee. 39
Assignment or transfer of lease, which is covered by Article 1649 of the Civil Code, is different from
a sublease arrangement, which is governed by Article 1650 of the same Code. In a sublease, the
lessee becomes in turn a lessor to a sublessee. The sublessee then becomes liable to pay rentals to
the original lessee. However, the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not dissolved.
The parties continue to be bound by the original lease contract. Thus, in a sublease arrangement,
there are at least three parties and two distinct juridical relations. 40
Ramon had a right to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not contain any stipulation
forbidding subleasing. Article 1650 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1650. When in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance
of the contract toward the lessor.
Therefore, we hold that the sublease contracts executed by Ramon were valid.
We also find that HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. Article1314 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to
the other contracting party.
As correctly pointed out by the Inocencios, tortious interference has the following elements: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract; and (3) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse. 41
The facts of the instant case show that there were valid sublease contracts which were known to
HDSJ. However, we find that the third element is lacking in this case.
In So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,42 we held that there was no tortious interference if the intrusion
was impelled by purely economic motives. In So Ping Bun, we explained that:
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule,
justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor’s motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer’s interest outweighs
that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest
that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived,
for he acts in self- protection. Moreover, justification for protecting one’s financial position should not
be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of
others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.43
The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees for purely
economic reasons (payment of rentals). HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the sublessees
upon termination of the lease contract. It does not appear that HDSJ was motivated by spite or ill will
towards the Inocencios.
The Inocencios claim ownership over the buildings since these are separate and distinct from the
land on which they are erected. Thus, as owners of the buildings, they have a right to lease the
buildings to third persons, even after termination of the lease contract with HDSJ. To bolster their
claim of ownership, the Inocencios presented the following evidence: (1) the building permit; 44
(2) the receipt for the payment of the permit fee;45 (3) the Tax Declarations; and (4) the proof of
payment of insurance.46 The Inocencios also claimed that:
as the Inocencios owned the Subject Buildings, it is respectfully submitted, and it should be clear
that when they entered into lease contracts with tenants for the lease of portions of the said
buildings, these contracts were independent contracts of lease over their own building and not sub-
leases of the parcel of land which they leased from Respondent. It is Respondent’s inaccurate
characterization of the leasing by the Inocencios of portions of their own building that has obfuscated
the legal issues in this case and partially led to the incorrect decisions of the courts a quo. 47
We do not agree. In Duellome v. Gotico48 and Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation,49

we held that the lease of a building includes the lease of the lot and consequently, the rentals of the
building include the rentals of the lot. As correctly pointed out by HDSJ in its Comment: 50
x x x When the Inocencios leased the buildings to third parties, they also "leased" to the third parties
the plot of land on which the buildings stood — either by implied transfer of the lease covering the
plot of the land, or by sublease. Either way, x x x the Inocencios themselves must have a valid lease
contract with [HDSJ] over the land. However, when the lease contract x x x with HDSJ ended on
31March 2001, Ramon lost his status as lessee of the land, and therefore, had no authority to
transfer the lease or sublease the land. x x x.51
However, we find that the CA erred in not applying Article 1678 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor
upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at
that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he
may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the
lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
The foregoing provision applies if the improvements were: (1) introduced in good faith; (2) useful;
and (3) suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form and substance. 52
We find that the aforementioned requisites are satisfied in this case. The buildings were constructed
1âwphi1
before German’s demise, during the subsistence of a valid contract of lease. It does not appear that
HDSJ prohibited German from constructing the buildings. Thus, HDSJ should have reimbursed
German (or his estate) half of the value of the improvements as of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to
reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter should be allowed to demolish the buildings.
We also find that the action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed "within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." In interpreting the foregoing provision,
this Court, in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 53 held that:
The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning
period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period
should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful." 54
HDSJ’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on
28 June 2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the period provided under the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 January 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117009 is AFFIRMED with modification. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay, Branch 48, for determination of the value or
the improvements to be paid to the lnocencios, if Hospicio de San Jose desires to keep the
improvements. Otherwise, the Inocencios shall be allowed to demolish the buildings at their
expense.
SO ORDERED.
4) DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118248, April 5, 2000
DKC Holdings v. CA
G.R. No. 118248. April 5, 2000
On March 16, 1998, petitioner DKC Holdings Corporation (DKC) entered into a Contract of
Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, decedent herein, whereby petitioner was
given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land.
Encarnacion died. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor
Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these
payments. On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it
was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent.
Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the
property to petitioner. On April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights under a Contact of Lease with Option to Buy were
transmissible.
YES. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. The Court held that there
is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the
lease contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein
are, by their nature, transmissible.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is a lease, which is a property right. The
death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right,
and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased.
Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
Therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000
DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO
MANILA, DISTRICT III, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the December 5, 1994 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40849 entitled "DKC Holdings Corporation vs. Victor U.
Bartolome, et al.", affirming in toto the January 4, 1993 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
1
Valenzuela, Branch 172, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 and ordered petitioner to pay
2
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's
deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 of the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of
petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site.
On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion
Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land,
which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the
Contract. In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation
of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor
Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The contract also provided that in case
petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. In such an
event, the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable for another six years, and the monthly
rental fee shall be P15,000.00 for the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of
renewal.
Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her
death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor
Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments.
Meanwhile, on January 10, 1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the
properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds
cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-
14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome.
On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising
its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March.
Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property
to petitioner.
Petitioner thus opened Savings Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1 with the China Banking Corporation,
Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for
March as well as P6,000.00 reservation fees for the months of February and March.
Petitioner also tried to register and annotate the Contract on the title of Victor to the property.
Although respondent Register of Deeds accepted the required fees, he nevertheless refused to
register or annotate the same or even enter it in the day book or primary register. 1âwphi1.nêt
Thus, on April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Victor and the Register of Deeds, docketed as Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 which was raffled off to
3
Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and
delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of
title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as
actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P300,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1990, a Motion for Intervention with Motion to Dismiss was filed by one
4
Andres Lanozo, who claimed that he was and has been a tenant-tiller of the subject property, which
was agricultural riceland, for forty-five years. He questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court over
the property and invoked the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to protect his rights that would
be affected by the dispute between the original parties to the case.
On May 18, 1990, the lower court issued an Order referring the case to the Department of Agrarian
5
Reform for preliminary determination and certification as to whether it was proper for trial by said
court.
On July 4, 1990, the lower court issued another Order referring the case to Branch 172 of the RTC
6
of Valenzuela which was designated to hear cases involving agrarian land, after the Department of
Agrarian Reform issued a letter-certification stating that referral to it for preliminary determination is
no longer required.
On July 16, 1990, the lower court issued an Order denying the Motion to Intervene, holding that
7
Lanozo's rights may well be ventilated in another proceeding in due time.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Valenzuela, Branch 172 rendered its Decision on January 4,
1993, dismissing the Complaint and ordering petitioner to pay Victor P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On appeal to the CA, the Decision was affirmed in toto.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following errors:
(A)
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION ON

THE NOTICE TO EXERCISE OPTION WAS NOT TRANSMISSIBLE.
(B)
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NOTICE OF

OPTION MUST BE SERVED BY DKC UPON ENCARNACION BARTOLOME
PERSONALLY.
(C)
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONTRACT

WAS ONE-SIDED AND ONEROUS IN FAVOR OF DKC.
(D)
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF

A REGISTERED TENANCY WAS FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.
(E)
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT WAS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 8
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy
entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or
whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.
Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals held that the said contract was terminated upon the
death of Encarnacion Bartolome and did not bind Victor because he was not a party thereto.
Art. 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows —
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property he received from the decedent.
x x x x x x x x x
The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-
in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their
nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and
obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and
obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as

follows:
Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by
provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the
obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the
obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not
transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the
client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the
lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the
probate court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract
could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis
of quantum meruit. 9
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special
knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal
qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the
death of the party who is required to render such service." 10
It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the
death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the
promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or
act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its
terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract
or excuse nonperformance. 11
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather,
the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to
petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed
by her heir Victor.
As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs." In 1952, it
12
was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the
reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for
reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have
inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. 13
It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of
Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest
between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is
valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him. This is clear from Parañaque
14
Kings Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, where this Court rejected a similar defense —
15
With respect to the contention of respondent Raymundo that he is not privy to the lease
contract, not being the lessor nor the lessee referred to therein, he could thus not have
violated its provisions, but he is nevertheless a proper party. Clearly, he stepped into the
shoes of the owner-lessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed all the
obligations of the lessor under the lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in the form
of rental payments. Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for the
annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both pleadings also alleged collusion between
him and respondent Santos which defeated the exercise by petitioner of its right of first
refusal.
In order then to accord complete relief to petitioner, respondent Raymundo was a necessary,
if not indispensable, party to the case. A favorable judgment for the petitioner will necessarily
affect the rights of respondent Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which petitioner
would like to assert its right of first option to buy.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a property right. The
death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and
the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased.
Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
16
Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the subject
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
That being resolved, we now rule on the issue of whether petitioner had complied with its obligations
under the contract and with the requisites to exercise its option. The payment by petitioner of the
reservation fees during the two-year period within which it had the option to lease or purchase the
property is not disputed. In fact, the payment of such reservation fees, except those for February and
March, 1990 were admitted by Victor. This is clear from the transcripts, to wit —
17
ATTY. MOJADO:
One request, Your Honor. The last payment which was allegedly made in January 1990 just
indicate in that stipulation that it was issued November of 1989 and postdated January 1990
and then we will admit all.
COURT:
All reservation fee?
ATTY. MOJADO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
All as part of the lease?
ATTY. MOJADO:
Reservation fee, Your Honor. There was no payment with respect to payment of rentals. 18
Petitioner also paid the P15,000.00 monthly rental fee on the subject property by depositing the
same in China Bank Savings Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1, in the name of Victor as the sole heir of
Encarnacion Bartolome, for the months of March to July 30, 1990, or a total of five (5) months,
19
despite the refusal of Victor to turn over the subject property.

20
Likewise, petitioner complied with its duty to inform the other party of its intention to exercise its
option to lease through its letter dated Match 12, 1990, well within the two-year period for it to
21
exercise its option. Considering that at that time Encarnacion Bartolome had already passed away, it
was legitimate for petitioner to have addressed its letter to her heir.
1âwphi1
It appears, therefore, that the exercise by petitioner of its option to lease the subject property was
made in accordance with the contractual provisions. Concomitantly, private respondent Victor
Bartolome has the obligation to surrender possession of and lease the premises to petitioner for a
period of six (6) years, pursuant to the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
Coming now to the issue of tenancy, we find that this is not for this Court to pass upon in the present
petition. We note that the Motion to Intervene and to Dismiss of the alleged tenant, Andres Lanozo,
was denied by the lower court and that such denial was never made the subject of an appeal. As the
lower court stated in its Order, the alleged right of the tenant may well be ventilated in another
proceeding in due time.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40849 and that of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
in Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 are both SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering private
respondent Victor Bartolome to:
(a) surrender and deliver possession of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. V-14249 by way of lease to petitioner and to perform all obligations of his
predecessor-in-interest, Encarnacion Bartolome, under the subject Contract of Lease with
Option to Buy;
(b) surrender and deliver his copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 to respondent
Register of Deeds for registration and annotation thereon of the subject Contract of Lease
with Option to Buy;
(c) pay costs of suit.
Respondent Register of Deeds is, accordingly, ordered to register and annotate the subject Contract
of Lease with Option to Buy at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 upon submission
by petitioner of a copy thereof to his office.
SO ORDERED.
5) Liu v. Loy, G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004 (Resolution)
6) Alvarez v. IAC, G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990

7) Genato v. Bayhon, G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009
8) Pamplona v. Moreto, G.R. No. L-33187, March 31, 1980
Article 777
Article 390-392
Rule 131, Section 3(kk), Rules of Court

Death is the Operative Act of Succession
Article 1347
Future Inheritance as Object of Contracts; Exception
Cases:
1) Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, G.R. No. L-60174, February 16, 1983
2) Locsin v. Court of Appeals and Jaucian, G.R. No. 89783, February 19,
1992
3) Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
4) Spouses Salitico v. Heirs of Felix, G.R. No. 240199, April 10, 2019
Kinds of Death Contemplated

Section 2(j), R.A. No. 7170
Article 390-392
5) Tadeo-Matias v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
6) Eastern Shipping Lines v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-60101, August 31, 1983
Delivery of Presumptive Legitimes

7) Emnace v. Court of Appeals and the Estate of Tabanao, G.R. No.
126334, November 23, 2001
8) Rioferio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004
Article 778; Article 780
Kinds of Succession
Concept of Contractual Succession
Article 779
Designation of an Heir
Cases:
1) Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
2) Rodriguez v. Borja, G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966
Article 781
Property Accruing After Death
Article 782
Successors in Testamentary Succession
Compulsory Heirs and Voluntary Heirs
Legatees and Devisees
III. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

1. Wills
A. Wills in General
Articles 783-795
(i) Definition and Characteristics of Wills
Definition of a Will
Will as a Statutory Creation
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death. (667a)
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part of
the discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or
attorney. (670a)
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to
the discretion of a third person. (670a)
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums
of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of
the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or
applied. (671a)
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another
person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers
the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context
of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his
intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any
of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking
into consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
(n)
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that he was unacquainted with
such technical sense. (675a)
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n)
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)
Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator
had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such
was his intention. (n)
Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest which the testator could device or
bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he intended to
convey a less interest. (n)
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made. (n)
Cases:
1) Testate Estate of Carlos Gil v. Vda de Murciano, G.R. No. L-3362, March 01, 1951
Disposition of Estate
Facts:
A last will and testament was executed by Carlos Gil, In 1945, before the will come up for
probate, the record, along with the will was destroyed by fire or looted necessitating its
reconstitution. The parties submitted a stipulation of the facts agreeing that the will as
transcribed in the record appeal in another case is true and correct copy. The CFI Manila
admitted to probate the will of Carlos Gil. Carlos Gil’s nephew and sister contended that the will
is invalid since the attestation clause did not state that the testator signed the will, it declared only
that it was signed by the witnesses (Alfredo T. Rivera, Ramon Mendiola and Mariano Omana)
Issue
Whether or not the will is valid?
Ruling.
No. It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor
signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the
precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being
the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the
court may correct a mere clerical error. The court held that the right to dispose of property by
will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied. The right to make
a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory creation, and is available only
upon the compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature
has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot be disregarded It
has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we
cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a
situation may be presented apparently meritorious. The decision appealed from is reversed,
denying the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos
Gil.
2) Vitug v. CA and Faustino-Corona, G.R. No. 82087, March 29, 1990
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of
American National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement contained the following
stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account
shall be both their property and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or
any of them during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the
surviving spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion
asking authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover
his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from their savings
account. Rowena opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings
account were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no
reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property
acquired through the survivorship agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate
No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causa nor a
donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall
give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is
uncertain, such as death. The Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not
contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be violative of a law such as in
the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is
used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a
compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently,
the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As
such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts under the
savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the
survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership
properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills
1
of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming
private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal
funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for
2
the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment
thereto." According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from
3
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate."
4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement
provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL
TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all
money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our
joint savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime,
and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of
the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by
such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either,
any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors,
for any payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid
and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the
6
estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis
causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the
Civil Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
8
under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II,
petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In
addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in
Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of
actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With
costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. and Macam v. Gatmaitan in which we
11 12
sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the
14 15
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case
relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
16
purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint
holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was
the exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in
turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the
deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank
in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from
him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of
himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in
question although there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of
master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we
must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect that
the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were
joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or
the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon
the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, it was held:

18
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according
to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is
to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen
at an indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house
and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C,
Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and
Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were
to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death
determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other
depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.
Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the
ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the
ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to
take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because
it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership,
as held by the Court of Appeals, by "mere stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the
21 22 23
law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal
property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking
parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings
account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making
venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality,
that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are
permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:

ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or
do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A
survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. In 25
either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that
such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property
in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and
annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established
against the agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such
unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
3) Merza v. Porras, G.R. No. L-4888, May 25, 1953
FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B),
disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were
submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of
the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed
by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.
ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to
a supposed last will, be probated?
HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day
before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is
only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents
of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.
G.R. No. L-4888 May 25, 1953
JOSE MERZA, petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.
Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.

Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.
TUAZON , J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and
so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was
survived by the husband and collateral relatives, some of whom, along with the husband, were
disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein.
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause. Written in
the local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as translated into English in the record
on appeal, reads:
The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-mentioned, was
executed, signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared that the said
instrument is her last will and testament; that in our presence and also in the very presence
of the said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two witnesses and the testatrix each of us
three witnesses signed this a testament.
The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the tetratrix and the witnesses had signed
each and every page of the will or that she had signed the instrument in the presence of the
witnesses. The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to estate in the
attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page
of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to be signed
by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, (1924);
Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932); Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. (October 18,
1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940)." But granting the correctness of the
premise, the court held the second objection well taken and thus concluded: "The question whether
the testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses can not be verified upon physical
examination of the instrument. Hence, the absence of the require statement in said clause may not,
pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset by proof aliunde even if admitted without
any objection."
The premise of the conclusion is, in our opinion, incorrect.
It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn, its language exceedingly
ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand; but from a close examination of the whole
context in relation to its purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence
of the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and attest to the
testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors of the proceeding were the maker and
the witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our presence,"
used as it was in connection with the process of signing, can not imply anything but the testatrix
signed before them. No other inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our presence"
denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. The verb could not be other than signed and the
subject no other than the testatrix.
The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the witnesses sign in
the presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the testatrix sign in similar or like manner — in
their presence.
In consonance with the principle of the liberal interpretation, adhered to in numerous later decision of
this Court and affirmed and translated into inactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827), we are
constrained to hold the attestation clause under consideration sufficient and valid.
"Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it." (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
"It could have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the
execution of a will to shackle the very right of the testamentary disposition which the law recognizes
and holds sacred." (Leynes vs. Leynes, supra.)
With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the document having
been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as
the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that
"the content of Exhibit B are couched in the language of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as
such, may not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition." Furthermore, the Court
of Appeals observed, disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will of
Exhibit A, as expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being no disposition
as to the disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving spouse), in the said
Exhibit A, it is quite clear that he can not be disinherited in any other instrument including Exhibit B,
which is, as above stated, a simple affidavit."
Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain
as "the act by which a persons dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the
new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B
comes within this definition.
Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is
entitled to probate as an independent testementary desposition. In the absence of any legal
provision to the contrary — and there is none in this jurisdiction — it is the general, well-established
rule that two separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other (68 C.J.,
885) and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been
complied with (Id. 881). As seen, Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will, even free of such
formal of literary imperfections as are found in Exhibit A.
It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or
intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not, as the appealed decision
seems to insinuate, require that the disinheritance should be accomplished in the same instrument
by which the maker provides the disposition of his or her property after his or death. This article
merely provides that "disinheritance can be affected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause
upon which it is based is expressly stated."
It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to probate, subject of
courts to the right of the disinherited person under particle 850 to contest the disinheritance, and it is
so ordered, with costs against the appellee.
Animus Testandi
(the intent to make a testament or will)
4) Montinola v. Herbosa and Ofiana, CA 23022-R, February 14, 1963
FACTS
Montinola filed this action against the heirs of Jose Rizal for the recovery of possession of
personal property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Dona Trinidad Rizal. The trial
court held that neither party is entitled to possession of property, relying principally on the fact
that in Rizal’s MI ULTIMO ADIOS, there was a stanza where Rizal allegedly bequeathed all his
property to the Filipino people: “Sintang Pilipinas, lupa kong hinirang…Huling paalam ko’t
sayo’y iiwan. Ang lahat at madlang iniwan sa buhay.” The handwritten work of Rizal to the
mind of the trial court constitutes a holographic will giving to the State all his property.
ISSUE
Is Rizal’s handwritten MI ULTIMU ADIOS a holographic will therefore bequeaths to the State
all his property?
HELD
No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not
contain a disposition of property and was not executed with ANIMUS TESTANDI cannot be
legally considered a will. Under the Spanish Civil Code, Art 688 requires that it be drawn on
stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator
and signed by him and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of execution. Art.
689 requires that holographic wills be protocoled and shall be presented for this purpose to the
judge of first instance of the last domicile of the testator or to the one of the place where he died
within 5 years from the day of the testator’s death. Without these requisites, the holographic will
shall not be valid. ITC, Rizal’s MI ULTIMO ADIOS is a literary piece of work and was so
intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical sense, but not in a legal or juridical sense.
Assuming arguendo that the concerned 13th stanza in the said writing was a holographic will, the
fact remains that it is still worthless for noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Article 784-787
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part of
the discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or
attorney. (670a)
Art. 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to
the discretion of a third person. (670a)
Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums
of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of
the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or
applied. (671a)
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another
person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n)
(A will is defined as an act whereby a person is permitted with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. When a
person dies while leaving a will behind, his death is called a testate death (as opposed to an
intestate death) and he's called a testator (even while alive.)
Characteristics:
1.) Statutory/legal right

2.) Unilateral act
3.) Formal/solemn act
4.) Animus testandi/intent to make a will must be present
5.) Testator must have the capacity to make a will
6.) Strictly a personal act in all essential matters
7.) Effective mortis causa/when the testator dies
8.) Ambulatory/revocable
9.) Free from vitiated consent (must have been executed freely, knowingly and voluntarily) or
will be disallowed
10.) Individual act
11.) Disposes of the testator's estate in accordance to his wishes (to a certain degree)
Consequences of Being Strictly Personal
A will can't be left partly or completely in the discretion of a 3rd person; it also can't be
accomplished through the instrumentality of a lawyer or agent (but the lawyer can assist the
testator in making the will.) Duration/efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees and legatees,
as well as the portions they will receive, can't be left to a 3rd person's discretion. The testator
may entrust money or specific property to a 3rd person to be distributed to specific classes or
causes (charities, etc.) and may even specify the persons, institutions or establishments to which
the money and/or properties are to be delivered.
The testator can't make a testatmentary disposition in a way that another person has to
determine whether it is operative or not.
Testamentary capacity has the following requisites: (1) the testator must be at least 18 years
old at the time he made the will, (2) there must be no express legal prohibition for him to make
a will, and (3) he must be of sound mind when he executed the will (not before or after.) A
person suffering from civil interdiction can make a will because even though he's legally
prevented from managing or disposing of his property while living, a will becomes
effective mortis causa.
A woman can make a will without her husband's consent; she can even do it without the
authority of the court. But when making a will, when it comes to conjugal or absolute property
she can only dispose of her share. She can dispose of her separate property.
Soundness of mind has the following (legal, not psychological) characteristics: (1) the testator
knows the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) he knows the proper subjects of his bounty
(he knows what he owns, in other words,) and (3) he knows the character of the testamentary
act/making of the will.)
Characteristics of Wills
Strictly Personal Act
Non-Delegable Testamentary Acts
Valid Delegation
Unilateral and Individual Act

Act Mortis Causa
Essentially Revocable
Solemn and Formal Act
Free and Voluntary Act
(ii) Interpretation of Wills
Article 788; 791

Fundamental Rules in Interpretation of Wills
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers
the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context
of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his
intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any
of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking
into consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
(n)
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n
Cases:
1) Vda. De Villanueva v. Juico, G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962
Facts: On 9 October 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, penned a will in Spanish, bequeathing in favor
of his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his properties, giving the other half to his
brother. Don Nicolas died on 3 March 1922 childless. His wife was appointed as judicial
administratix in the settlement proceedings instituted in CFI Zambales. In 24 November 1924,
Fausta, by virtue of an approved project partition, received the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of estates, and the use and possession of all properties mentioned in Clause
7th of the will. In the 8th clause, the will provides that Fausta is bequeathed the “use and
possession of all properties mentioned in clause 7th while she is still alive and does not remarry”,
otherwise the properties will go to Nicolas’ grandniece. On 1 May 1956, Doña Fausta died
childless and still not remarried. On 8 February 1958, plaintiff instituted special proceeding in
CFI Rizal against defendant Juico, the appointed administrator of Fausta’s estate admitting to be
the Leonor mentioned in the will as ‘grandniece’. She contends that upon Fausta’s death,
plaintiff became vested with ownership of the properties mentioned in clause 7th pursuant to the
8th clause. Defendant argued that the title to the properties became vested in Fausta upon her
death on account of the fact that she never remarried. The CFI decided in favor of defendant.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff cannot get the properties mentioned in Clause 7th on the ground
that Fausta did not remarry.
Ruling:
No. Decision Appealed from is Reversed.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8
of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if
the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased, "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive), in which the first half of the phrase ("uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propriedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator
plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right
to their possession and use (or enjoyment)during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator’s
brother (clause 6). "SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo
por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto
Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en igualas partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados
que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the
widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva", and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to
"dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of The
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court: "ART. 791. The words of a
will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expression inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." "SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give
effect to all provisions. — In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all."
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of
his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are ever the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the nonremarriage of his widow, the words "uso
y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime. The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: "ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and
that other can be ascertained. Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense,
unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the
will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)"
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1912;
30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925). "La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y
constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultima voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria
que han de obedecer y cumplir fielmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin
que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda,
pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguno de los interesados, ni tampoco por el
judicial." (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sept. 20, March 1918)
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief are inapplicable, because they involve
cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As
already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his
widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies
should pass to the testator’s "sobrina-nieta", appellant herein, upon the widow’s death, even if
the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or
dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for
their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of
innocent third parties have intervened.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which
he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en

prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su
uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a
ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted
a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the
probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership
and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said
project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh.
"C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la
clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled
in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the
widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the
widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of
his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is
evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the
full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words
"uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of

an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words,
which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo

voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no
ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had
been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting
and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
2) Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-24561, June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA v. ESTELA DIZON, GR No. L-24561, 1970-06-30
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon,... Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir... of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppo-
sitors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano
Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiamzon.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced[2] and by order dated March 13, 1961, the
last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the
appellee Marina
Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided"... in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight
grandchildren.
Issues:
Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of
devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction
Ruling:
the Court, stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its...
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."...
testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition
Principles:
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's
project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.
1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas
V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina
Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory
heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon,
Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued
at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last
2
will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee
Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond
and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga
was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his
report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised
value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11. (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). In her will, the testatrix
3 4
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of
the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80

2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the
estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee)
and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more
than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them
in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to
P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the
properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.
anº•1àw>
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On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the
following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-
half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to
P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus
other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to
the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of
the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix
of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to
the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof
as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the
executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of
P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired
or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code"
adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot
be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference
to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary
of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper
adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been
impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of
the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise
anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises
imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely
to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime,
instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the
life and soul of a will." In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in
5
Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico for 6
violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and
wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments,
and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his
last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and
restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the
nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding
that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with
law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided"
in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each
real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her 10
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their
legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,

wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina
and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old
Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only
amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under
the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." This was intended to repeal the then
11
prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make
12
a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will,
13
duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition
or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half
of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil
Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator
14
Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against
adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080
of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of
said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject
to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). Concepcion Teves could, as
15
she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her
co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the
nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous
premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs
passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is,
the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to
be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small
properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to
be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix'
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs
and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall
die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides
that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors'
own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of
the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate
in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided
its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix
constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed
subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case
remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the
legitime", while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the
19
present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call
for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime
of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues
are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime
under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the
estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not
available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her
heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention
of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report
of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was
approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any
question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the
heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of
the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code)
and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never
be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the
currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25,
1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, "does not in any way affect the adjudication
20
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that
she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper
adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as
to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. That her
21
co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has
declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of
approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their
own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
3) Delfin Yambao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-10763, April 29, 1961
G.R. No. L-10763 April 29, 1961
DELFIN YAMBAO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Marcial G. Mendiola for plaintiff-appellant.

Onofre P. Guevara for defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against Angelina Gonzales and Maria Pablo praying that the
latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant during his lifetime on the parcels of land
bequeathed to and inherited by them from Maria Gonzales, as well as to deliver to him the value of
the harvests belonging to him as tenant of said parcels of land. In their answer, defendants averred
that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff is not mandatory; that the determination of who
should be the tenant of the land is vested in a special court; and that the present action is not the
proper remedy.
After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. It held that the
provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff merely amount to a suggestion to the defendants who,
though morally bound, are not legally compelled to follow said suggestion, invoking as authority
Article 797 of the old Civil Code. Plaintiff has appealed.
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as follows:
Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at
ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga
sumusunod:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng bukid habang panahon,
at ang nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay
nasa usapin at may utang pa.
It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to appellees all her
properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated in 1948. Immediately, thereafter,
appellant went to appellees to request that he be placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an
express provision of said will, they were directed to give to him for cultivation, as tenant, and when
they refused alleging that they had already given it to another tenant he filed the present action.
In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes only a moral but not
a legal obligation, the trial court went on to consider the import of the word "Pahihintulutan"
employed with reference to appellant. In its opinion said word only means to permit or to allow, but
not to direct appellees to appoint appellant as tenant. Rather, it opines, it merely contains a
suggestion to employ because the testatrix did not use the words "ipinaguutos ko" which she used in
connection with other provisions of the will, so that there is no clear indication that it was her
intention to make such provision compulsory.
We believe, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the real import of the wish of
the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the same contains a clear directive to employ
appellant as may be seen from the words preceding the word "pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din
naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES
na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod." The words 'dapat
TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a mandate or directive, and having
reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon
appellees. To follow the interpretation given by the trial court would be to devoid the wish of the
testatrix of its real and true meaning.
Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is inapplicable. That refers to an
institution of an heir intended to be conditional by providing that a statement to the effect cannot be
considered as a condition unless it appears clearly that such is the intention of the testator. We are
not faced here with any conditional institution of heirship. What we have is a clear-cut mandate
which the heirs cannot fail to carry out.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Appellees are hereby ordered to employ
appellant as tenant immediately after this decision has become final. Costs against appellees.
4) Hacbang v. Alo, G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015

Dolores Hacbang vs. Atty. Basilio Alo, GR.No. 191031, October 5, 2015, J. Brio
FACTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties
behind. Among these was a Lot located at España Street, San Juan, Rizal. Bishop Sofronio was
survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings. The respondent Basilio Alo
(Basilio) is the son of petitioner Dolores Hacbang who is Bishop Sofronio’s sister.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of
his properties to his parents and devised the other half — including the subject lot — to his sister
Dolores. His last will and testament were probated and a transfer certificate of title to the subject
land has been issued to respondent.
Petitioners filed a petition to cancel title issued to respondent on the ground that it was
fraudulently secured. Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He also
moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop
Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to
prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio’s will have already
been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question.
Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs:
Bishop Sofronio’s parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the
respondent’s mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion).
Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties-in-
interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied. The petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio’s will did not validly transfer the
subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the
validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests
title on the properties from the estate on the distributees.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of Bishop
Sofronio’s will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid
or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely
because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners’ claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the
presence of Bishop Sofronio’s parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from
being compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are not entitled to succeed.
Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal
interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial
paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bishop Sofronio died intestate.
HELD
No. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937.
He left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang
Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and
extrinsic validity.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether
under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code.
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in
part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has
compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is
treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence, there is
no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Article 789 - Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property
exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears
from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the
testator as to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such
oral declarations. (n)
Rule 130, Section 10, Rules of Court - Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its
legal meaning. — The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning
it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Article 1366, Civil Code - Art. 1366. There shall be no reformation in the following cases:
(1) Simple donations inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;
(2) Wills;
(3) When the real agreement is void.
Ambiguities in Wills
Patent Ambiguities
Latent Ambiguities
Resolving the Ambiguities
There are two kinds of ambiguities in wills. First is patent or extrinsic ambiguities. Second is
latent or intrinsic ambiguities.
Patent ambiguity is one which appears upon the face of the instrument. Latent ambiguity is one
which cannot be seen from the reading of the will but which appears only upon consideration of
extrinsic circumstances.
Case:
1) Estate of Fr. Rigor v. Rigor, G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979
FACTS
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testator’s three sisters. The will also
contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical
career until his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise
and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no
right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.
ISSUE
Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after the testator’s death
falls within the intention of the testator in providing to whom the bequest is to be given.
RULING
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit,
the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper” (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not
survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH
PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR
DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants.
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the
late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the
said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935,
leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora
Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to facilitate
comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros situados en
el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de
CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; — Titulo Num. 6530, mide
16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de
superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num.
6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas
cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea
Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos de este
legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar a gozar
y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado
de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este derecho de
administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse
de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada año VEINTE
(20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y si el actual
legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este legado, y la
administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la
Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo arriba queda

expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del actual Parroco
Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los

productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los productos
anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los derechos
correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celebrar
cada año, depositando todo lo restante de los productos de estate legado, en un
banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project containing the
following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male
relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the
actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines,
or his successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
Title No. Lot Area Tax Ass.

No. in Dec. Valu
Has. e
T-6530 3663 1.624 18740 P

9 340.
00
T-6548 3445- 24.29 18730 7,29

C 98 0.00
T-6525 3670 6.266 18736 1,88
5 0.00
T-6521 3666 11.92 18733 3,58

51 0.00
Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed
that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church
of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and
the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the
same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish
priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a
new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to
the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render
an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was
appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the
bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands
since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever
studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the
parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino, declared
the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June
28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10, 1957
on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of
his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon
City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had
created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that
such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate
"the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years
after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of
the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions
so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative because no
one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the
trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this
Court. They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in this
appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention
of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the
determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos
vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is
clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal
meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different from that
literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul of a
will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See
Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-statement of the
provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an
ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer the
ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the same up
to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty masses
with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the administration
of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated above, the
administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of
Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products
thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration and
the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for
each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his
bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise
the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the
ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in
two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado", or
how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue
an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between
the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would study
for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male
relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime
after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his
death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee
or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as
referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions
difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been
his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified
his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be
his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact
date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the
time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or
grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male
relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao,
the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that
contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the
maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own
son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood
at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise
for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one
contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by
the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was
based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at
the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961.
For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order
adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's

intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to
the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and
the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of
the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera
eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he
could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend
for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"?
The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of
his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not
yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before
the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then
he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that
event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in
1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to
follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that
"not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor
assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the
testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered
the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies
did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested
any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code,
now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be
merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion
exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia,
fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides
that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator."
There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed
among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the
said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may
be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus,
if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property
recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Article 790
Ordinary Terms and Technical Terms
Article 792
In Case of Invalid Dispositions
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n)
Case:
1) Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975
Article 793 - Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if
the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will
that such was his intention. (n)
After-Acquired Properties
(iii) Laws Governing Intrinsic and Extrinsic Validity of Wills
(iii.a) As to Extrinsic Validity
(iii.a.1) Rule as to Time
Validity of wills consists of 2 parts: extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic validity refers to the forms
and solemnities prescribed by law. Intrinsic validity refers to the legality of the will's provisions.
Extrinsic Validity
1.) From the viewpoint of time: the laws in force at the time the will was made.
2.) From the viewpoint of place/country:
a.) If the testator is a Filipino, he can observe Philippine law or the law of the country where he
executes the will.
b.) If the testator is a foreigner living abroad, he can follow the law of his domicile (the country
he's permanently staying in,) the law of his home country or Philippine law.
c.) If the testator is a foreigner in the Philippines, he can either follow the law of his home
country or Philippine law.
Intrinsic Validity
1.) From the viewpoint of time: the law in force at the time of the testator's death governs
succession rights.
2.) From the viewpoint of place/country: the national law of the testator governs, regardless of
the place the will was executed or where the testator died.
Art. 795 of the Civil Code says that the law in force at the time the will was made governs its
form.
Article 795
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made. (n)
Cases:
1) Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005
FACTS: Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate children. Abaja, filed with CFI of
Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. (respondent Abaja
was the son of Eulogio) One Caponong opposed the position on the ground that Abaja left no
will when he died and if such was really executed by him it should be disallowed for the
following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended
as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the
alleged intestate heirs of Abada, Joel Abada et. al. also opposed the petition. The oppositors are
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. Respondent Abaja filed another
petition for the probate will of Toray. Caponong and Joel Abada et. al opposed the petition on
the same grounds. Caponong likewise filed a petition praying for the issuance in his name of
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray. RTC admitted the probate
will of Toray since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing
the probate of Toray’s will became final and executory. The court also assigned one Caponong-
Noble as special administratix of the estate of Abada and Toray. Caponong – Noble moved for
the dismissal of the petition for the probate will of Abada which was denied by the Court. During
the proceeding, the judge found out that the matter on hand was already submitted for decision
by another judge admitting the probate will of abada. Since proper notices to the heirs has been
complied with as well as other requirements, the judge ruled in favor of the validity of the
probate will. RTC ruled only on the issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the
petition for probate that is whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law.
It held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA ruled in sustaining the RTC admitting the probate will of Abada.
HELD: No, CA is correct. Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the
attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of
pages on which the will is written. The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in
the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the
will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and
"TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las
letras "UNO" y "DOS." Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state
expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses.
She then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial
compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code. The first sentence of the attestation
clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y
testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia
en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is:
"Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our
presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every
one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and
its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule
on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it. This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent
form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will,
therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. The
court rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly
shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that
there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by
an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The
Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus: The so-called
liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line
with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or
supply missing details that should appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only permit a probe
into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the
existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results. The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or
"in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after the attestation
clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses
that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each
page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses. Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that
the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. The last part of
the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one of us also
signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the
presence of one another and of the testator.
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner,

vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12
January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to
probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940. 4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in September
1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition, 5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate
of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he
died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed
for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not
intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged
intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and
Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela
Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces
and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP

No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada,
et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070
(313-8668).
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No.

069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since
the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray’s
will became final and executory.8
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble

("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray. 9 Caponong-Noble
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied
the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in
an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the
case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as
follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial
compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his
testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution
of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said
Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed
probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar 11 is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who
shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor
and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue
discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the
petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law.
The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter
forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the
RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate
the will of Abada.
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public; 13
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation
clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada
is written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of
Abada.
The Applicable Law

Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or
the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure 14 which governed the execution
of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, 15 governs the form of the attestation
clause of Abada’s will.16 Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. – No will, except as provided in the preceding section, 17 shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language
or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number
of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a
notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the Old
Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee, while
Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is
taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken
from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the
testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted
with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses
shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity
required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700
and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution
of any will.23 Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public. 1awphi1.nét
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish
language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this
issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is
now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings. 24 In addition, the language used in the will is part of
the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to
pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state
in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. 25 This is a matter that a
party may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony,
has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the
Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-
speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the
Spanish language.27 This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will
A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abada’s
will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de
nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el
margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales
estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS’ en la parte superior de la carrilla. 28
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos
hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one of
the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are
numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of
Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of
the New Civil Code.29
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada
como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador
firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo."
The English translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and
testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of
each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada
signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does
not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two divergent
tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal
construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal
construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable
laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending
that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view.
The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular
execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance
with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad
faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from
some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will,
therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x x 33 1a\^/phi1.net
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are
three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court
explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line
with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or
supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the
l^vvphi1.net
will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence
or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty
and ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing
on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and
professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the
will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not

imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.35
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one
of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence
of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 47644.
SO ORDERED.
2) In Re: Will of Jose Riosa, G.R. No. 14074, November 07, 1918
FACTS: Jose Riosa died and left a will on January 1908 in which he disposed his estate valued at
more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested
and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but
was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor
did the attestation state these facts. The new law went into effect after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: No will, except as provided in
the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall
state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at
his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it
in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation
shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in
this section provided. Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so
as to make said section read as follows: SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as
provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed
by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page
thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Jose died on April 17, 1917 without having left a will which
conformed to the new law, hence the CFI of Albay disallowed the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law existing on the date of the execution of a will controls.
HELD: The instant case presents a situation wherein the will was made prior to the new law and
the testator died after said law took effect. However, there is a cleavage of authority among the
cases and text-writers as to the effect of the change in the statutes. Three rules were considered,
but in deciding which was to be applied, the Court depended more on reason than technicality.
First rule was that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and that a will not be
executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the
time it was made. The reason for its application in other jurisdictions was that as until the
testator’s death, the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere
inchoate act which may or may not be a will. Second rule states that the validity of the execution
of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes
subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. On ruling out the retrospective effect of the
law, it was held that retrospective laws generally work injustice and ought to be construed only
when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. It is true, that every will is ambulatory until
the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then.
General words apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the
power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place
when the will is executed, though to go into effect at a future time. The Court held that, citing the
general rule of statutory construction, ‘all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature is to give them
retrospective effect. The language of Act No. 2645 did not indicate a retrospective effect. Also,
section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that a will shall be disallowed if not executed
and attested as provided by this Code. Third rule states that statutes relating to the execution of
wills, when they increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the
validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be
construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their
making.
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.

MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date
of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with
the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed
in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words,
the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and
the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts.
The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the
testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed
the will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in
the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the
will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section
read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written
in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made
after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law.
(Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has
further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose
death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable.
(Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different
question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after
the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a
change in the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the execution of a will,
when such change is made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator.
(See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57
Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the
testator's death are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is
invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for
applying the later statute are the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by
him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the
law in force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault
[1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it
would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted
have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It
was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is
reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and
not the testator's death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions
one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil
Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt.,
103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood
(Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is
found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed
only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will,
formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its
execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule
subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable
to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his
past act, and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is
ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually
take effect until then. General words apply to the property of which the testator dies
possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of
bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into
effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of
Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made
and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively
executed according to the law in force at the time of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26
Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our
selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality.
Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition
of his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader
for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The
act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes
a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not
take effect on the property until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to
be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective
effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew
Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.)
Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not
have a retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives
no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession.
(Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254;
Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G.
No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of
five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of
course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not
executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is
proper to observe that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions
of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which
must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator
is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not
effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing
the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction
to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
3) Enriquez v. Abadia, G.R. No. L-7188, August 09, 1954
FACTS
The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in his own handwriting,
numbered and signed by the testator himself and attested by three (3) witnesses on September 6,
1923. He died on January 14, 1943 in Cebu. The will was admitted to probate on January 24,
1952. Some of the cousins and nephews, who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left
no will, filed opposition.

ISSUE
What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the old Civil Code when the
will was executed or the new Civil Code which could have validated the will?

RULING
It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect August 30, 1950,
provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the
law in force at the time it is made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be judged not
by the law enforced at the time when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution, just like in this case, then upon his
death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate. This is because the general
rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu,
he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He
left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out
in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed
on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document
is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end
of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling
that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit
any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing
and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the
testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in
form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last
Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and
because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself
and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in
1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the
law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the
testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit
"A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by
the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the
testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages
having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the
signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six
pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2
of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a
fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil
Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition
is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the
rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn
expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a
completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil.,
23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time
of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under
the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new
legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more
liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to
validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills,
Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
(iii.a.2) Rule as to Place
Article 17, 815-817, Civil Code

ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the
forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the
Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
4) Gaspi v. Pacis-Trinidad, G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020
G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LUZ GASPE

LIPSON AND ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,
ROEL P. GASPI, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE MARIA CLARISSA L. PACIS-

TRINIDAD, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, IRIGA CITY,* Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The nationality principle is not applied when determining the extrinsic validity of an
alien's last will and testament. When it comes to the probate of an alien's will, whether
executed here or abroad, the alien's national law may be pleaded and proved before
the probate court. Otherwise, Philippine law will govern by default.
This Court resolves a Petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the October 6, 20162 and November 16, 20163 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, which motu proprio dismissed a petition for probate
and issuance of letters testamentary.
On February 23, 2011, Luz Gaspe Lipson (Lipson), an American citizen temporarily
residing in Iriga City, executed her last will and testament and designated Roel R Gaspi
(Gaspi) as executor.4
On October 17, 2015, at 70 years old, Lipson passed away due to lymphoma. 5
On October 3, 2016, Gaspi filed a Petition 6 for the probate of Lipson's will and the
issuance of letters testamentary without bond in his behalf.
On October 6, 2016, the Regional Trial Court7motu proprio dismissed the petition for
probate for lack of jurisdiction.
The Regional Trial Court pointed out that Lipson was an American citizen. Thus, her
national law must govern and her will must be probated in the United States of
America, and not in the Philippines.8
The Regional Trial Court continued that it is only when Lipson's will is probated,
according to her national law, that the Philippines may recognize and execute her will
through a petition for recognition of foreign judgment. 9
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is motu proprio DISMISSED,

without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of herein
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original)
Gaspi moved for reconsideration11 of the Regional Trial Court Order, but his motion was
denied on November 16, 2016.12
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court stated that the
ruling in Palaganas v. Palaganas13 was not applicable to Gaspi's petition. It continued
that the jurisprudence cited in Palaganas involved the probate in the Philippines of an
alien's will, which was executed abroad, while Lipson's will was executed in the
Philippines.14
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioner is DENIED for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.15
In the Petition16 for review on certiorari, petitioner Gaspi contends that there is no

prohibition under Philippine law for the probate of wills executed by aliens. He adds that
under the Civil Code, the will of an alien residing abroad is also recognized in the
Philippines, if it is made in accordance with the laws of the alien's place of residence or
country, or if done in conformity with Philippine laws. 17
Citing the ruling in Palaganas, petitioner pointed out that this Court has allowed the
probate of a will executed by an alien abroad, even though it has not yet undergone
probate in the alien decedent's country of citizenship or residence. Thus, he stresses
that with more reason should an alien's will executed in the Philippines, in conformity
with our law, be allowed to undergo probate.18
This Court then directed19 respondent to comment on the petition.
In her Comment,20 respondent stresses that the petition for probate was properly
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.21 She points out petitioner's admission that the
decedent was an American citizen, yet Lipson's will was executed in accordance with
Philippine laws, contrary to the nationality principle. 22 Respondent states:
Logic and reason dictate that this Court a quo cannot establish the extrinsic validity of a
will in a testamentary succession of a foreigner, which must be based on his national
law and executed in accordance with the formalities of the law of the country of which
he is a citizen or subject. In view thereof, clearly herein Court a quo cannot take
cognizance of the petition.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent likewise posits that petitioner's reliance on the ruling in Palaganas was
misplaced, as it involved the probate of a will executed by an alien abroad, while in this
case, the will was executed in the Philippines by an alien 24 She opines that instead of
Article 816 of the Civil Code, upon which Palaganas was based, the applicable provision
was Article 817.25
In his Reply,26 petitioner explains that the nationality principle adverted to by

respondent in Article 16 of the Civil Code not only pertains to the decedent's internal
law, but also to conflict of laws.27
Petitioner also states that there was no basis for respondent's statement that the
probate of an alien's will in the Philippines was conditioned on its prior probate and
acceptance in the alien's country of nationality or residence. 28
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has
the competence to take cognizance of an alien's will executed in the Philippines, even if
it had not yet been probated before the alien decedent's national court.
Generally, a person's death passes ownership over their properties to the heirs. 29 When
there is no will, or when there is one—but does not pass probate, the law provides for
the order of succession and the amount of successional rights for each heir. 30 When real
properties are involved, law will also govern the formalities and consequences in the
transfer of properties.
However, prior to death, a person retains control as to how their estate will be
distributed. This is done by executing a written 31 document referred to as a will.32
Wills may be notarial33 or holographic.34 In either case, the formalities required for their
execution is more elaborate than most deeds relating to other transfers of property.
Death makes it impossible for the decedent to testify as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, which contains their testamentary desires. The proof of the
formalities substitutes as the legal guarantee to ensure that the document purporting to
be a will is indeed authentic, and that it was duly executed by the decedent.
A will is then submitted to the Regional Trial Court for probate proceeding to determine
its authenticity, as "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." 35 Heirs of Las am v.
Umengan36 describes the probate proceeding:
To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with
authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and
testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that
it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator
was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will."
Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public
policy.37 (Citation omitted)
The probate court can then disallow a will under any of the following circumstances
enumerated by the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The disallowance list is likewise echoed in the Rule 76, Section 9 of the Rules of Special
Proceedings:
SECTION 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of
its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
Thus, the extrinsic validity of the will refers to a finding by a trial court that all the
formalities of either a holographic or notarial will have been sufficiently complied with,
leading to the legal conclusion that the will submitted to probate is authentic and duly
executed. Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals38 elaborates:
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
•whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
•compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
•the testamentary capacity of the testator;
• and the due execution of the last will and testament. 39 (Citations omitted)
The extrinsic validity of a will, that is, that the document purporting to be a will is
determined to be authentic and duly executed by the decedent, is different from its
intrinsic validity.
The intrinsic validity of the will "or the manner in which the properties were
apportioned,"40 refers to whether the order and allocation of successional rights are in
accordance with law. It can also refer to whether an heir has not been disqualified from
inheriting from the decedent.
Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which is the preliminary issue in probate of
wills, is governed by the law of the country where the will was executed and presented
for probate.41 Understandably, the court where a will is presented for probate should,
by default, apply only the law of the forum, as we do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws.42
This is the situation here. A Filipina who was subsequently naturalized as an American
executed a will in the Philippines to pass real property found in the country. The
designated executor now files a petition for probate in the Philippines.
Respondent motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate, because it purportedly

went against the nationality principle embodied in Article 16 of the Civil Code by not
adhering to the required probate proceedings of Lipson's national law. 43
Respondent is mistaken.
The nationality principle is embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
The second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code then provides that the national law
of aliens shall regulate their personal rights:
ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Under the nationality principle, Philippine laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens
when it comes to their "family rights and duties... status, condition and legal capacity"
even if they do not reside in the Philippines. In the same manner, the Philippines
respects the national personal laws of aliens and defers to them when it comes to
succession issues and "the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions."
However, the probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into
its intrinsic validity, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would require the
probate court to touch upon the intrinsic validity of the will. 44
When it comes to the form and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic
validity, the Civil Code provides that the law of the country of execution shall govern:
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even if we assume that the foreign law applies, it does not necessarily mean that the
Philippine court loses jurisdiction. Foreign law, when relevant, must still be proven as a
fact by evidence, as Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. 45
Courts, therefore, retain jurisdiction over the subject matter (probate) and the res,
which is the real property in Iriga in this case.
Moreso, there was no objection with respect to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Thus, respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in motu
proprio dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II
It was error on respondent's part to conclude that Philippine law cannot be applied to
determine the extrinsic validity of Lipson's will.
Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code provide for the probate of an alien's will. Article
816 reads:
ARTICLE 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which
this Code prescribes.
Article 816 covers a situation where the decedent was abroad when the will was
executed. It provides that the will can be submitted for probate here in the Philippines,
using either the law where the decedent resides or our own law. Article 816 of the Civil
Code clearly made our own law applicable, as seen with the phrase "in conformity with
those which this Code provides."
On the other hand, Article 817 states:
ARTICLE 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Article 817 provides that a will by an alien executed in the Philippines shall be treated
as if it were executed according to Philippine laws, if it was validly executed and
accordingly could have been probated under the laws of the alien's country of
nationality.
Further, Article 817 does not exclude the participation of Philippine courts in the
probate of an alien's will, especially when the will passes real property in the
Philippines. It provides an option to the heirs or the executor: to use Philippine law, or
plead and prove foreign law. Thus, it does not remove jurisdiction from the Philippine
court.
This option is clear from the clause "which might be proved and allowed by the law of
his own country," which implies that either the alien's national law or Philippine law
applies in the probate proceedings. Additionally, the clause "shall have the same effect
as if executed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines" creates a fiction that
foreign law if proven will have the same effect as Philippine law.
Clearly, as to the extrinsic validity of an alien's will, Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil
Code both allow the application of Philippine law.
The power of our courts to probate a will executed by an alien is likewise apparent in
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Special Proceedings, which provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, their will may be proved in the Regional
Trial Court of any province in which they had an estate:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
In Palaganas, this Court ruled that the trial court properly allowed the probate of an
American citizen's will, which had not yet undergone probate in the alien decedent's
country of nationality:
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code
states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far
as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devises of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.46 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
If an alien-decedent duly executes a will in accordance with the forms and solemnities
required by Philippine law, barring any other defect as to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the courts may take cognizance of the petition and allow the probate of the will.
Wills of foreigners executed in the Philippines may be probated if they have estate in
the Philippines, because probate of the properties can only be effected under Philippine
law. In Johannes v. Harvey,47 this Court held:
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the
jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any
other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond
the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a
foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is
proper, wherever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile,
property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his
individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.... 48 (Citations omitted)
Here, Lipson's will was executed in Iriga City, Philippines, where she had real property.
Thus, Philippine law on the formalities of wills applies. Assuming that Lipson executed
the will in accordance with Philippine law, the Regional Trial Court did not lack
jurisdiction over the petition.
As respondent has yet to rule on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is proper that the
petition be remanded to determine due compliance with the formalities prescribed by
law, Lipson's testamentary capacity and voluntary execution of the will, and whether it
was truly Lipson's last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 6, 2016

and November 6, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 in Spec.
Proc. No. IR-2919 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
(iii.b) As to Intrinsic Validity
(iii.b.1) Rule as to Time
Article 777, 2263, Civil Code
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court.
(iii.b.2) Rule as to Place
Article 16, 1039, Civil Code

ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Cases:
1) Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 06, 1967
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST
COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children
with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate
should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid
the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered
to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of
P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as
illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas
Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and
that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be
determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate
of Amos Bellis.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
2) Miciano v. Brimo, G.R. No. 22595, November 1, 1927
Facts
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the
judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s opposition is based on the fact that the partition
in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of
Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition.
Ruling
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern
the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator‘s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that ―it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island‖, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as

well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
3) Testate Estate of Christensen v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Doctrine: If Conflict Rule of the country refers back the matter to the domicile country of the
decedent, the court has to accept the referring back.
Facts: The deceased, Edward Christensen, was recognized as citizen of California, died in the
Philippines, it being his domiciliary. He acknowledged his natural daughter Mary Lucy
Christensen, as his only heir and just left a legacy sum of money to Helen Christensen Garcia,
who declared by SC, as acknowledged daughter of the deceased. Counsel of Helen claims that
under par. 2 of Article 16 of Civil Code, her share must be increased in view of successional
rights of illegitimate children under Philippine Law. The counsel of Maria Lucy contends that
the national law of the deceased shall prevail, stating that no compulsory heirs and testator can
disposed off his property by his absolute dominion, that his illegitimate children are not entitled
to such
Issue: Is the national law of California applicable?
Ruling: No. Since the conflicts of law rule of California refers back the matter to the Philippines,
being place of domicile of the deceased, our courts have no alternative but to accept the referring
back to us. If our courts will do the otherwise and throw back the matter to California, the
problem would be tossed back ad forth between estates and concerned, resulting to international
football.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property

in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
4) Paul Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo
was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through
naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she
was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the
name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became
final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his
last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He
filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate.
Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial
Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have
acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law.
Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine
Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen.
Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the
1
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
2
(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)
years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula")
were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that
7
his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua
as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the father’s name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a
written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy
as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would
be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to
be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
13
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation. 14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25)
15
year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever
and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located
in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of
the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only
be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age,
if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side
should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my
children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each
one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition
for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was
still alive.
19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over
22
Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary. 24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to
Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo
having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares
the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to
partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a
bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within
three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate
which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and
from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED." 27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
29
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED." 32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
34
Hence, this petition. 35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, the issue is
36
simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time
of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign
law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows
the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
1ªwph!1
Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the
39
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving
Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
40
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
41
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
42
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
43
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law. 45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the
estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
5) Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
FACTS
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among
other things that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains
that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C.
Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will
executed by an undisputed foreigner.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s
heirs.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore
evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039,
Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed
an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on
July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined
and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury
to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in

her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent
residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when
alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-
3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of
the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters
of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of
Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the
will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among
the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that
the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several
motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice
of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in
the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called
for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of
adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null
and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was
granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic)
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way
of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30
days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to
afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process and a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the
time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court
of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No.
L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to
the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to
support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means
and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of
the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that
the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion
was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case
and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner
cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of
filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing
the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
(Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the
law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear
the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was
the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is
no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished
the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled
rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
6) Alonzo Ancheta v. Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868, June 08, 2006
Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife
died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death,
the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his
entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his
adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on
their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).
Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated
Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However,
since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her
national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession
is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the
property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines,
however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the
testator.
B. Testamentary Capacity and Intent

Articles 796-803
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. (662)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution. (n)
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. (n)
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month,
or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n)
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an
incapable validated by the supervening of capacity. (n)
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without the consent of her husband, and without the
authority of the court. (n)
Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate property as well as her share
of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property. (n)
Article 796
Testamentary Capacity
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. (662)
Article 797
Age Requirement
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)
Article 798
Requirement of Sound Mind
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution. (n)
Article 799
Definition of Sound Mind
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. (n)
Cases:
1) Torres v. Lopez de Bueno, G.R. No. L-24569, February 26, 1926
2) Neyra v. Neyra, Adm. Case No. 8075, March 25, 1946
3) Bagtas v. Paguio, G.R. No. 6801, March 14, 1912
4) Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
5) Alsua-Betts v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46430-31, July 30, 1979
6) Cuyugan v. Baron, G.R. No. 41947, January 16, 1936
Article 800
Presumption of Sound Mind
Presumption of Unsound Mind
Rule 131, Section 3(ee)
Evidence of Soundness of Mind

Cases:
1) Ramirez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-19910, May 31, 1971
2) Junquera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-18498, March 30, 1967
3) Samson v. Corrales Tan Quintin, G.R. No. 19142, March 5, 1923
4) Gonzales v. Gonzales-Carungcong, G.R. No. L-3272-33, November 29, 1951
Article 801
Reckoning Point of Capacity
Article 802
Married Woman
Article 803
Article 97, Family Code
C. Forms of Wills
Articles 804-819
Article 804
(1) In Writing
Nuncupative Wills, Void
(2) Language Requirement
Presumption
Consequences of the Presumption
Cases:
1) Abangan v. Abangan, G.R. No. 13431, November 12, 1919
2) Reyes v. Vidal, G.R. No. L-2862, April 21, 1952
3) Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005
When Presumption Not Applicable

4) Acop v. Piraso, G.R. No. L-28946, January 16, 1929
5) Testate Estate of Javellana v. Javellana, G.R. No. L-13781, January 30, 1960
Explanation In Lieu of Language Requirement
6) Suroza v. Honorado, A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981
Article 805
Formalities of Notarial Wills, In General
(3) Testator’s Subscription
Location of Testator’s Signature
Person to Sign the Will
Requirements if Signed Through Another Person
Form of Signature if by Third Person
Nature of Subscription Required by Law

Cases:
1) Leano v. Leano, G.R. No. 9150, March 31, 1915
2) Garcia v. Lacuesta, G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951
(4) Requirement of Three Witnesses
Attesting Witnesses
Attestation versus Subscription
3) Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
Presence of Testator and Witnesses
Tests of Presence
4) Jaboneta v. Gustilo, G.R. No. 1641, January 19, 1906
5) Nera v. Rimando, G.R. No. 5971, February 27, 1911
6) Maravilla v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-23225, February 27, 1971
(5) Marginal Signatures
Purpose
Location
Exception
Consequence of Absence of Marginal Signatures
7) Taboada v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
8) Icasiano v. Icasiano, G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964
(6) Paging or Numbering
Purpose of Numbering
Correlatively in Letters
Location of Page Numbers
(7) Attestation Clause
Concept, Nature and Purpose
Attested Matters
Statements Required to be in the Attestation Clause
9) Felix Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
10) In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of Enrique Lopez, G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012
11) Taboada v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
12) Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005
Matters Provable by Intrinsic Evidence
Matters Cannot be Proved by Extrinsic Evidence
Marginal Signatures vs. Attesting Signatures
Language Used in Attestation Clause
13) Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018
14) Tanchanco v. Garcia Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Article 806
(8) Acknowledgement
Confidential Nature of Wills

Prohibition to Become Witness
Cases:
1) Cruz v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
Purpose of Acknowledgement
2) Felix Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
3) Echavez v. Dozen Construction, G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010
Article 807
Deaf-Mute Testator
Article 808
Blind Testator
Cases:
1) Garcia v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-26615, April 30, 1970
2) Alvarado v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
Article 809
Substantial Compliance
Excusable Imperfections and Defects, Limitations
Case:
1) Caneda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
Article 810
Holographic Wills
Requisites of a Holographic Will
Cases:
1) Roxas v. De Jesus, Jr., G.R. No. 38338, January 28, 1985
2) Labrador v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83843, April 5, 1990
Article 811
Probate of Holographic Wills
Kinds of Probate Proceedings
Uncontested Holographic Wills
Contested Holographic Wills
Three-Witness Rule
Cases:
1) Jose Rivera v. IAC, G.R. No. 75005-6, February 15, 1990
2) Azaola v. Singson, G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960
3) Codoy v. Calugay, G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999
4) Rodelas v. Aranza, G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982
Article 812
Dispositions Below Signature
Article 813
Additional Dispositions Signed but Undated
Article 814
Authentication of Corrections by Full Signature
Cases:
1) Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984
2) Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994
Article 818
Prohibition Against Joint Wills
Mutual or Reciprocal Wills
Case:
1) De la Cerna v. Potot, G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964
Article 819
Joint Wills by Filipinos Abroad
Joint Wills by Aliens
D. Witnesses to Wills
Articles 820-824
Article 820-821
Qualifications and Disqualifications for Witnesses
Time to Determine Competency
Case:
1) Tanchanco v. Garcia Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Article 822
Effect of Subsequent Incapacity
Article 823
Disqualification to Inherit by Witnesses
Article 824
Creditors as Witnesses
Case:
1) Caluya v. Domingo, G.R. No. 7647, March 27, 1914
E. Codicils and Incorporation by Reference
Articles 825-827
Article 825
Codicils, Defined
Time Executed
Codicil versus New Will
Article 826
Formalities of Codicils
Article 827
Incorporation by Reference
Requisites for a Valid Incorporation by Reference
Applicability to Holographic Wills
- END OF FIRST EXAMINATION COVERAGE -

Wills and Succession - Notes

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Wills and Succession - Notes

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PRE-REQUISITES: Persons and Family Relations;

I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSION

1. Concept and Bases of Succession

The following are elements of succession according to Paras (2008):

[a] Mode of acquisition (of acquiring ownership)

[A] MODE OF ACQUISITION (OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP)

[B] TRANSFER OF PROPERTY, RIGHTS, AND OBLIGATIONS TO THE EXTENT OF

Testate of Estate of Ramirez v. Ramirez, et al.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te

rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen

la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos

parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones

de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00

por accion ................................................................................8,347.00

Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en

liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00

VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97

A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,

El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca

B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —

En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo

A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:

Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

3. Succession Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa

Article 728-730, Civil Code

Distinction between Donation Inter Vivos and Donation Mortis Causa

Characteristics of a Donation Mortis Causa

URSULINA GANUELAS, et al. v. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, et al.

G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, petitioners,

The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx.3

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of

I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY

II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;

III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA

The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained provisions almost identical

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

2) Cuevas v. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-8327, December 13, 1955

G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955

Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled

Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and lupa na

3) Del Rosario v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010

ISSUE: Is the CA correct in its ruling?