1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Villa Gomez v. People

G.R. 216824
November 10, 2020

Facts:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by accused Villa Gomez, who was prosecuted for bribery,
seeking to set aside the decision rendered by Court of Appeals which issued a writ of certiorari, annulling
the decision orders from the Regional Trial Court by dismissing the charge of corruption of public
officials, on the ground that the Information filed was without the signature and authority of the City
Prosecutor.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over a criminal case if the Information lacks
on its face (1) the word “approved” and (2) the signature of the city prosecutor?

Ruling:
No. The case of Villa v. Ibanez was abandoned by the Supreme Court.
First, there is no law that requires that an Information filed must be signed by the provincial, city, or state
prosecutor for trial courts to acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case. The ruling in Villa v. Ibanez which
states that the absence of the signature of a city, provincial, or chief state prosecutor results in a
jurisdictional defect is unconstitutional. Only a law may confer jurisdiction to courts of law. Once
jurisdiction is conferred, the jurisdiction does not cease simply because the prosecutor who filed the
Information had no authority. At worst, the absence of authority on the part of prosecutor who filed the
Information only gives rise to a question on his standing in court. The Supreme Court also emphasized
that to allow the ruling in Villa v. Ibanez to subsist is tantamount to judicial legislation, which is a
violation of the separation of powers. The court requiring that a city prosecutor, provincial prosecutor, or
chief state prosecutor must first sign an Information filed before the court can acquire jurisdiction is
improper because only law may confer jurisdiction and its requirements.
Second, this defect must be raised by the accused prior to entering his or her plea. Once plea is made,
any defect in the Information is deemed waived except those that pertain to Section 3a (facts charged do
not constitute an offense), 3B (lack of jurisdiction over the offense, 3g (prescription), 3i (double
jeopardy) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Alva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. 157331
April 12, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Arnold Alva, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation, made to Yumi
Vergara that he could process the latter’s application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of
P120,000. Said money was given and delivered on the strength of said manifestation and representation,
well knowing that the same were false and untrue because the U.S. visa was not genuine and were made
solely to obtain the said amount.
The Regional Trial Court issued a Recall Order of the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner in view of the
approval of his bail bond. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After the trial on the merits, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision. Thereafter, petitioner’s
counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation praying for the resetting of the schedule of
promulgation of the RTC’s decision. The RTC granted the motion.
A day before the scheduled promulgation, however, the petitioner’s counsel again moved for the
deferment of the promulgation due to prior “undertakings of similar importance.” On the day of
promulgation, both petitioner and his counsel failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his stead,
certain petitioner’s representative delivered to the RTC a handwritten medical certificate expressing
petitioner’s inability to attend the day’s hearing due to hypertension.
Despite aforestated acts of the petitioner and his counsel, the RTC issued and Order directing the
promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner
for his failure to appear before it despite due notice. In its decision, the RTC found the petitioner guilty of
the crime of estafa. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC but was declined to
give due course to the said motion. A Notice of Appeal was filed but was declined again to give due
course by the RTC. Petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTC’s categorical resolution of his
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC granted the said motion in the interest of justice but the same was
denied for lack of merit.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner to show cause why his appeal
should not be dismissed if it appears that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been
posted. Eventually, the petitioner’s appeal was declined. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereto seeking its reversal, manifesting that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation had
already extended the period covered by its bail bond. The Office of the Solicitor General interposed
objections, raising these following arguments: 1) that “an application of bail bond only be availed of by a
person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty” and 2) that “bail on appeal
is a matter of discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
The CA issued the second assailed Resolution declining the petitioner’s motion.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the
law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Ruling:
Yes, the record of the case reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower
court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. Right after the promulgation of the decision in
the lower, the petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond.
It should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussions, the question
posed has now become academic. However, to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly
equating the term “jurisdiction in court (over the person of the accused)” with that of “custody of law,” it
is fundamental to differentiate the two.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while the term jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. In the case at
bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the
manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Navaja v. Hon. De Castro, et al.

G.R. 182926
June 22, 2015

Facts:
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private documents before the Municipal Trial Court in
Jagna, Bohol. It was alleged that while she worked as Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by
making it appear that she incurred meal expenses more than the actual amount in Garden Café located
in Jagna and claimed reimbursement for it.
Within the jurisdiction of the said court, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the
ground that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in
Jagna, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. The
said court denied the Motion to Quash and set the case for arraignment. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by the petitioner, but the MCTC denied it. That prompted the petitioner to file a petition for
certiorari before the RTC, assailing that MCTC had issued a resolution with grave abuse of discretion. RTC
denied the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit. Per RTC, if the court were to follow the
logic of the petition, Navaja’s claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City, not in
Jagna, would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City.
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with CA, which eventually dismissed Navaja’s appeal and affirmed in
toto. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied, thus, she filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

Issue:
The Municipal Trial Court of Jagna, Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the instant criminal case.

Ruling:
Yes, the Municipal Trial Court of Jagna has jurisdiction over the case.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over the person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Further, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Furthermore, Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or Information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
In conclusion, the court rules that in cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place
where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third
person, regardless of whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for
which it was intended.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Yalong v. People
G.R. 187174
August 28, 2013

Facts:
A complaint was filed by Lucila Ylagan before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas (MTCC)
charging Yalong with the crime of violation of BP 22. During arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty.
During trial, Ylagan testified that the check for the payment of the amount Yalong borrowed was
dishonored and returned. After verbal and written demands to pay, Ylagan resorted to filing a criminal
case. Yalong asserted that she paid but did not ask for a receipt. Yalong also claimed that the check was
her husband’s but knew the insufficiency of the funds. The check was already signed by him when she
handed the same to Ylagan. Her defense was she was not the owner of the account, and she did not
issue a check.
MTCC found Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt; all elements have been duly established.
Yalong filed a Motion of Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of Arrest but was denied. A Notice of
Appeal was filed and denied again because of unjustified absence. A Petition for Relief form Order and
Denial of Appeal was denied also because she lost the remedies available for her. Likewise, she moved
for reconsideration but was denied, thus, a petition for certiorari with petition for bail was filed before
the RTC Batangas.
RTC denied said petition and MR was also denied, thus elevated the case to Court of Appeals for petition
for review but was dismissed on the ground that the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction where appeal
(by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC) and not a petition for review is the proper remedy.
Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the MTCC properly acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Ruling:
Yes, the MTCC had acquired proper jurisdiction over the criminal case.
It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the
places where any of its elements occurred—in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued,
delivered, or dishonored.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records
reveal that Ylagan presented same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank of Batangas City where
she learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of the criminal case as it had
the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition
remains warranted. As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the present
petition, it is unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues in this case.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Chavez v. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. 125781
February 6, 2007

Facts:
Former Solicitor General Chavez filed an Information for libel against respondents Baskinas and Manapat
in the RTC Manila, alleging that respondents published in magazine “Smart File” articles which meant to
convey false and malicious imputations of a defect, vice, and crime against Chavez. In the Information,
Smart File is indicated as a magazine of general circulation in Manila.
Court of Appeals granted the motion to quash the Information because the Information failed to allege
where the written defamation was “printed and first published,” an allegation sine qua non “if the
circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of
the publication.”
CA observed that “venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private person is either in any of the
two places, namely: (1) where the subject article was printed and first published; and (2) where
complainant of the commission actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.” The
Information did not indicate that the libelous articles were printed or first published in Manila, or that
petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the publication of the articles.
During the preliminary investigation, the respondents also interposed that Smart File was actually first
printed and published in the City of Makati.

Issue:
Whether or not the Information sufficiently vests jurisdiction in the Manila Trial Courts to hear libel
charge in consonance with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:
No, the trial courts in Manila have no jurisdiction to hear libel charges against the respondents.
The rules on venue in Article 360 of the RPC may be restated thus:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of commission of
the offense.
The rule is quite clear that the place of printing and first publication stands as one of only two venues
where a private person may file the complaint for libel, the other venue being the place of residence of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the offense was committed. The very language of
Article 360 of RPC does not support Chavez’s thesis that where the complainant is a private person, a
more liberal interpretation of the phrase “printed and first published” is warranted than when a public
officer is the offended party. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Dio v. People
G.R. 208146
June 8, 2016

Facts:
Desmond filed a libel complaint against Dio arising from a purported libelous statement contained in an
email and sent by Virginia Dio to officials of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
These are the 2 separate Information were filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 9108 and 9109.
Regarding Case No. 9108, the following facts were stated:
“That on or about July 6, 2002, in Morong, Bataan, the accused with malicious intent besmirch the
honor, integrity, and reputation of Desmond through electronic message. As such, the content of the said
electronic message is defamatory and constitutes an act causing or tending to dishonor, discredit, or
contempt against Private respondent Desmond.
As for the second Information Case No. 9109, the following facts were stated:
“That on or about July 13, 2002, in Morong, Bataan, the accused with malicious intent besmirch the
honor, integrity, and reputation of Desmond. Also, the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously sent
electronic messages to Atty. Ginez, Paglicawa, Payumo, Nichoson, Corocan, and Laule. As such, electronic
messages are considered defamatory and constitute an act causing or tending to dishonor, discredit, or
contempt against private respondent Desmond.
On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings, but it was denied.
Dio moved for reconsideration, and she moved to quash the Information arguing that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense. However, the trial court denied both Motions of Dio and held that the
arraignment shall proceed.
Again, Dio moved for partial reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court.
Later, she filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a second motion for reconsideration. She also filed an
Omnibus Motion to Quash the two information for failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction,
and for the second consideration with leave of court. But the trial court again denied the said motions of
Dio and scheduled the arraignment. This prompted Dio to file a Motion for Partial Consideration and trial
court granted Dio’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but the two Information filed against the accused
thereby quashed and dismissed.

Issue:
Whether an Information’s failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by amendment before
arraignment of the case

Ruling:
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Dio’s petition was denied and the decision on Desmond’s prior libel is hereby affirmed. Dio’s arguments
are ineffective because the inadequacy of the prosecutor’s authority to file the Information must be
obvious from the Information itself for it to be quashed on that basis. That material presented herein
makes no claims that the incident occurred elsewhere other than Morong, Bataan. As a result, it does
not appear from the Information that the prosecutor lacked the power to submit it. Giving the
prosecution the chance to update the material is the right course of action. After the Information has
been changed, if it seems that Morong, Bataan is not the suitable venue, the trial court may dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction and lack of authorization to file the Information.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

De Lima v. Hon. Guerrero, et al.

G.R. 229781
October 10, 2017

Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in
support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of three complaints with the
Department of Justice against Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.
On February 17, 2017, three Information were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused
before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. One of the Information was raffled off to Branch 204, presided by
respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation of RA 9165.
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued an Order finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. Accordingly, the Warrant of Arrest which
contained no recommendation for bail, was issued against the petitioner.
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest on the
petitioner and the respondent judge issued an Order committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center.
On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to the Supreme Court via the present petition, praying for
annulling and setting aside the Warrant of Arrest of the Regional Trial Court – Branch 204, Muntinlupa
City as the said court lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner.
The petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in the Criminal Case, the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information
charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31.
For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165,
the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described
in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of
this Court would even adopt the petitioner’s view, declaring that the Information charged against the
petitioner is Direct Bribery.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner?

Ruling:
No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for cases in violation of RA
9165.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of the statute will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court
with exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was
expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases.
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of
drug-related cases. In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to
“exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of the said law.”
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Genduspan v. People
G.R. 158187
February 11, 2005

Facts:
An Information was filed against Geduspan, PhilHealth Manager and Dr. Farahmand, Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as, Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash and a motion for reconsideration contending that the
Respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering the principal accused Geduspan
was a Regional Director of PhilHealth, a position classified under the salary grade 26. Both motions were
denied by the respondent court.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned
or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

Ruling:
Yes, the respondent court has jurisdiction over the petitioner. The records show that, although Geduspan
is a Director of PhilHealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department
Manager. It is the petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine
the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager of PhilHealth. The position of manager in
a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of PhilHealth, is within the jurisdiction of
respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over the
petitioner together with Dr. Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Salazar v. People
G.R. 149472
October 15, 2002

Facts:
Olivier Philippines is the buying agent of an American corporation “Skiva.” Uni-Group, Inc. and Aurora
Manufacturing are both domestic companies which supply finished clothes to Skiva. Skiva is a New York-
based corporation which imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent Olivier.
An Information was filed against the petitioner Salazar, the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group,
Inc. for violation of Article 315 of the RPC, particularly, estafa. On arraignment, the petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
Skiva ordered dozens of ladies’ jeans so its buying agent Olivier informed Uni-Group and Aurora. A
purchase contract was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group where the latter’s payable by means of a letter of
credit at sight. The contract was confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr, the president of both Uni-Group and Aurora.
The fund was remitted to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Salazar and Mr. and Mrs. Lettmayr. There was
a failure to deliver the ordered jeans and so a complaint for estafa was filed against the petitioner and
Mr. Lettmayr.
After preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Lettmayr and an
Information was filed the petitioner. After trial, the court found petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
The decision was later affirmed by the CA, hence, this petition with the Supreme Court.
One of the petitioner’s arguments is that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa
was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group based on the finding that the transaction
between Skiva nd Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, the petitioner argues that pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the complaint should not have been instituted by
Skiva as it is the “offended party” contemplated by the Rules and the petitioner had no obligation to
account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint was validly filed?

Ruling:
Yes, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no
obligation to account to Skiva.
The “complaint” referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal
action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of Information
which is generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” files a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de officio, any competent person may file a complaint for
preliminary investigation.
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or Information, both of which are
filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in
case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a “complaint” filed with the fiscal
prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly
filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that the petitioner had no obligation to account to
Skiva.
The ruling of the trial court and CA was affirmed.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Villarba v. Court of Appeals

G.R. 227777
June 15, 2020

Facts:
Sometime August 2001 Villarba as Chairman of Junior Order of Kalantiao Fraternity recruited his
classmate Dordas.
A month after, Dordas and all the other applicants were brought to Racrap Beach Resort in Calaparan,
Arevalo in Iloilo City to undergo the final rites. All the applicants were subjected to hazing by the said
fraternity. Dordas was blind folded, punched, and tortured physically and psychologically by Villarba and
the other members present in the initiation rights. Dordas blindfold fell so he saw the perpetrators of his
injury. He was punched by Villarba and the other defendants which caused him to be hospitalized and
his liver to be damaged.
For its part, the defense presented several witnesses, among them is Villarba. Villarba testified that their
recruits only had to sit-ups, push-ups, or jogging, insisting that “no physical harm was inflicted on the
recruits.”
All the accused were arraigned under the original Information, and they accordingly pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Later, the Information was amended by adding the suffix “III” to the Dordas name
to correct his name. Pre-trial ensued without arraignment on the amended Information.
RTC, in its decision, found the accused guilty of the crime charge.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, Villarba argued that the Information charged against him was
invalid for 2 reasons: (a) the phrase “as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority, or organization” was as essential element of hazing, which should have been alleged in the
Information, and (b) he also questions not being arraigned under the amended Information, which
added “III” to the victim’s name. However, the lower court’s conviction was upheld by CA. Hence, a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
a. Whether or not the phrase “as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity.
Sorority or organization” which is essential element of hazing should have been included in the
Information.
b. Whether or not the Information was valid despite the amendment of the victim’s name.

Ruling:
The SC denied the appeal.
The petitioner argues that the inclusion of the suffix “III” to the name of Dordas in the Information was a
substantial amendment which should have warranted a second arraignment. The Court disagreed. The
amendment does not change the crime charged and the theory or defense of the petitioner. It added
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

nothing crucial for a conviction of the crime charged. It did not change the essence of the offense or
cause surprise as to deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to meet the new Information. Instead, the
amendment only states with precision something that was already included in the original Information.
It is therefore merely a formal amendment.
Formal amendments under the Rules of Procedure can be made after the plea and during the trial
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused as in this case.
On the second issue, the lack of the phrase “prerequisite to admission” does not make the Information
invalid. Even with its absence, the alleged facts, which include the controlling words ‘fraternity,’
‘initiation,’ ‘hazing,’ and ‘recruit,’ would have reasonably informed petitioner of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is
upheld if the crime, as described, is reasonably adequate to apprise him of the offense charged. This
mandate does not require a verbatim reiteration of the law. The use of derivatives, synonyms, and
allegations of basic facts constituting the crime will suffice.
Moreover, this Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was able to prepare his defense and evidence
based on the Information. There is no showing that petitioner was caught by surprise during trial or that
he obvious to the crime charged.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Opemia
G.R. L-7987
March 26, 1956

Facts:
This is an appeal by the prosecution for an order of dismissal.
It appears that on February 26, 1953, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, charging four persons with theft of large cattle alleged to have been committed on or about June 18,
1952. After the Defendants had pleaded not guilty and in the course of the trial, the caretaker of the
stolen carabao, testifying as fourth witness for the prosecution, declared that the theft occurred
sometime in July 1947, whereupon the fiscal asked for permission to amend the information to make it
conform to the evidence as regards the date of the commission of the crime. Instant objection to the
proposed amendment was raised on behalf of the Defendants on the ground that it would violate their
substantial rights for the reason that the case had already been pending for a long time and the trial had
progressed to such an extent that their defense had already been revealed to the prosecution. Believing
that the amendment would really prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, the trial court
sustained the objection. And the defense having also asked that the information be quashed on the
ground of variance between its allegations and the evidence, the court verbally ruled that it was
dismissing the said information and implemented the ruling by declaring the case dismissed in the
judgment rendered at the conclusion of the trial.

Issue:
Whether or not the Information should have been amended instead of dismissing the case by the lower
court.

Ruling:
The appeal was dismissed.
The information of complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the Defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant.
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the commission of the
crime charged, not permitting the amendment.
It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an offense was committed need
not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information
or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the
accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to
prepare his defense and thus avoid a surprise.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

With the proposed amendment disallowed and seeing that the prosecution could not contradict the
testimony that created the necessity for the amendment, the trial court dismissed the case on the
ground of variance between allegation and proof, so that the dismissal really amounted to an acquittal.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Uy v. Contreras
G.R. 111416
September 26, 1994

Facts:
When the sublease between sublessor Felicidad and sublessee Susanna expired, the former failed to
remove her personal properties in the house. An argument, which eventually ended in a scuffle, arose
between the two when Felicidad attempted to withdraw the movables.
A complaint was filed before the Barangay Captain. Meanwhile, the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed
two (2) Information’s against Felicidad before the Municipal Trail Court of Makati. Felicidad moved for
the dismissal of the complaint in court contending that there is an ongoing conciliation proceeding
before the barangay making the court proceedings premature. The court denied the motion to dismiss
because Felicidad already submitted a counter-affidavit to the complaint thereby waiving her right to
pursue the proceedings in the barangay.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by Felicidad for failure of Susanna
to comply with the mandatory provisions of PD 1508 and the Local Government Code of Katarungang
Pambarangay.

Ruling:
The court erred in not dismissing the Information.
First, the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have inquired from Susanna if there was a prior referral to
the lupon before filing the Information. Second, the judge should have taken judicial notice of the
provisions of the Local Government Code on Katarungang Pambarangay because under Section1, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of official acts. Third,
Susanna failed to appear during the two scheduled mediations, which should have resulted in a no
complaint about slight physical injuries.
In view of the failure of Susanna to comply with the Local Government on Katarungang Pambarangay,
the case should be dismissed for being premature.
Citing previous rulings, the SC held that PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the barangay level a
condition precedent before filing a complaint in court. Non-compliance with this rule could affect the
sufficiency of the complainant’s cause of action and makes his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.
However, this rule can be waived if the defendant failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral to the
appropriate lupon; or if the defect was initially present when the case was filed in the trial court, the
subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay will cure the defect.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Pascual v. Pascual
G.R. 157830
November 17, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Dante, a permanent resident of USA, appointed Sagario as attorney-in-fact by an Special
Power of Attorney. Pursuant to such SPA, Sagario filed a complaint entitled “Dante Pascual versus
Marilou Pascual and Registry of Deeds, Defendants for Annulment of Transfer of Certificate of Title and
Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.
Respondent then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement under
Section 412 of the Local Government Code, contending that there is no showing that the dispute was
referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. RTC granted the motion to dismiss that
when real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay
where the property is located regardless of the residence of the parties. Hence, this petition where
petitioner Dante argues that he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario is the real party-in-interest and since he
actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real
property. Respondent, on the other hand, argued that it is Sagario who is considered as the real party-in-
interest, and that since Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers, the matter shall be
brought under the jurisdiction of the lupon.

Issue:
Whether or not the lupon has the authority to act upon the case under PD 1508.

Ruling:
No, the lupon has no authority to act upon the case. Sec 408 of the Local Government Code provides
that “the lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes xxx"
In the case of Tavora v. Veloso, SC held that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Section 2 and 3 of PD 1508.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of
the party-plaintiff, as contended by the respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party-in-
interest” as defined in Sec 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In fine, since the plaintiff herein petitioner,
the real party-in-interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant herein
respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for
conciliation is not pre-condition to its filing in court. RTC, thus, erred in dismissing the complaint.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Dela Cruz

G.R. 135022
July 11, 2002

Facts:
Jonalyn, with the assistance of her aunt, filed a complaint for rape against Dela Cruz. During trial,
prosecution presented Dr. Tuazon who testified that she conducted a psychiatric examination on Jonalyn
and found that the latter was suffering from moderate level of mental retardation. That although
chronologically she was already 20 years old, she had amental age of 8 and ½ y/o child.
The court issued an order allowing leading questions to be propounded to Jonalyn in accordance with
Section 10(c), Rule 132. So, Jonalyn took the witness stand and identified her signature and that of her
aunt on her Sinumpaang Salaysay. She also identified Dela Cruz as the person against whom she filed a
complaint for rape. She declared in open court that the accused raped her twice.
The Court convicted Dela Cruz. However, Dela Cruz argues that the trial court erred in having considered
the narration read to the complaining witness from prepared statements and asked of her simply to
confirm as true, as her own, and having given full credence and weight to complaint’s conclusions of fact
merely put to her mouth by leading questions of the prosecutor.

Issue:
Whether or not propounding the leading question to Jonalyn was proper.
Whether or not presecution’s referral to Sinumpaang Salysay was proper.

Ruling:
Yes, the propounding questions were proper.
The trial court was correct in concluding that Jonalyn’s testimony should be taken and understood from
the point of view of an 8-year-old child. Her testimony is consistent with the straightforward and
innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious, and painstaking effort to
draw out from Jonalyn’s lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her by Dela Cruz.
It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a
witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or
accustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand;
lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak
or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith.
The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present
testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

The Court validly took cognizance of the complaint filed by Jonalyn. Her complaint can be rightfully
considered filed by a minor which is allowed by the Rules. The prosecution has proved Jonalyn’s
competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding does not obviate the fact of her competency.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed, and the petition was dismissed.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

David v. Marquez
G.R. 209859
June 5, 2017

Facts:
Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that
sometime in March 2005, the petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she
could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that the petitioner demanded payment of
placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for processing of the latter’s application, to
which the respondent heeded. Respondent’s application was, however, denied, and worse, the money
that she put out therefore was never returned.
In her Counter-Affidavit and Countercharge, the petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for
her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as
evidenced by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the
recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not for her
but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one processing
respondent’s application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the said friend. Further,
the petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming that the allegations of recruitment were true,
the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.

Issue:
Whether the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.
Whether the respondent has legal personality to file the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.

Ruling:
Yes, the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.
The express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment
before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal
recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper,
considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila.
During the preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the
essential elements of the crime were committed within Mnaila, such as the payment of processing
and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in certain banks located in Manila.
Yes, the respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The court has
ruled that a private offended party can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the trial court’s
order acquitting the accused or dismissing the case, viz: In such special civil action for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, where it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he/she may file such a special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of
the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of the said complainant.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Daguna y Codog

G.R. 235660
March 4, 2020

Facts:
The prosecution alleged that in July 2011, AAA 15-year-old girl who ran away from home was at her
friend’s place. Her friends informed her that accused appellant, who they called “Nanay Jacky” was going
to offer them to some men in Espana, Manila for a fee. When the accused appellant arrived, she asked
AAA to go with them. She brought the three girls to Espana, Manila where they met a man. After talking
to the man, accused-appellant led the group to a nearby hotel rooms and had sexual intercourse therein,
while accused-appellant waited at the lobby. After they had left the hotel, accused appellant gave the
victim the money as her payments for the sex.
This kind of arrangement between the accused and the victim was recurred in the same month of the
same year. On their occasion, the victims refused to go with the accused to have the same transaction,
but the latter insisted, and AAA saw that the man was already about to pay, AAA called up her mother
and asked for help. AAA’s mother arrived at the mall together with some barangay officials who arrested
the accuse-appellant.
The RTC convicted the accused appellant of the offense of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and the CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CA correctly found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in the affirmative.
As correctly ruled by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the existence of the elements of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons was sufficiently established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1. That AAA was a minor when the offense against her was committed.
2. That accused appellant introduced AAA to different customers on several occasions to engage in
sexual intercourse; and
3. That accused appellant received money in exchange for sexual exploitation of AAA.
The offense is Qualified Trafficking in Persons because AAA is a minor. The means used to commit the
offense becomes immaterial. At any rate, it may not be denied that accused appellant took advantage of
the vulnerability of AAA who was a minor.
Moreover, the Court finds no merit in accused appellant’s plea for acquittal on the ground that the acts
she allegedly committed merely amounted to an attempt to commit the offense as it was aborted by her
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

subsequent arrest; and that such attempt to commit the offense was not punishable under RA 9208 and
became so punishable only upon the amendment introduced by RA 10364.
The allegations in the Information filed against the accused appellant clearly refer to the consummated
acts of trafficking in persons she committed on two occasions in the month of July the same year.
Therefore, the appeal was denied.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Zaldivia v. Reyes
G.R. 102342
July 3, 1992

Facts:
A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The
fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The
defendant’s counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has
prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the
prescription period.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against
a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Ruling:
The mere filing of a complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription on
offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time
before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.
**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that
prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceedings.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, et al.

G.R. 167571
November 25, 2008

Facts:
Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business associate, Tongson,
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in payment of the said
loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored. Petitioner Panaguiton made
demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson
alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not associates. Panaguiton
showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a
resolution, the City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges
against Tongson.
A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation.
Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense had
already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the Department of Justice through Undersecretary
Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez declared that the offense had not been prescribed. On motion for
reconsideration, this time by Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not the offense has been prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of special acts and
that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings are instituted.

Ruling:
SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under BP 22. An offense under BP 22 merits the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of BP 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold the
position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.
The court ruled and so held that the offense has not yet been prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses, they had been charged under BP 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Pangilinan
G.R. 152662
June 13, 2012

Facts:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the
respondent, Pangilinan with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Pangilinan filed a civil case against Malolos assailing for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question”
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action
she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the
recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice and was reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of BP 22. The case
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging that her criminal liability has been extinguished by
reason of prescription.

Issue:
Whether or not prescription has set in.

Ruling:
No, the action has not been prescribed.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Justado v. People
G.R. 219567
February 1, 2017

Facts:
Belen filed a complaint for grave threats against her brother Justado alleging that she intervened
between the quarrel of her siblings Rosa and Justado when the latter pointed a gun at her forehead
while uttering "Dito, dito kita babarilin". The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) found probable cause
for other light threats instead of grave threats and an Information was filed before the MeTC. The MeTC
convicted Justado of Other Light Threats.
On appeal to the SC, Justado claimed that the offense had already prescribed on the basis of Section 11
of the Rules on Summary Procedure and Section 20 of the DOJ Manual. He argued that the Information
should have been filed before the court within two months, or the date the incident occurred, the crime
of Other Light Threats being a light offense with a prescriptive period of 2 months. The Information,
however, was only filed 7 months from the date of the incident. He asserted that the prescription for the
offense was not tolled with the filing of the complaint with the OCP.

Issue:
Did the filing of the complaint before the OCP stop the running of the prescriptive period of the offense
charged?

Ruling:
The filing of the complaint before the OCP stalled the running of the prescriptive period of the offense.
Article 91 of the RPC is clear and categorical that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. The Rules on Summary Procedure cannot supplant what is provided under the
RPC regarding the prescription of offenses. Further, the Court stressed that the Rules on Summary
Procedure could not prevail over the rules on prescription set forth in RPC, to wit:
“We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case,
the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or
MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan
Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section
cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.”
“It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.”
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Sermonia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. 109454
June 14, 1994

Facts:
Jose Sermonia was charged with bigamy for contracting marriage to another woman while his prior
marriage remained valid and subsisting. Sermonia contends that the principle of constructive notice
should be applied citing in support of the cases People v. Reyes and People v. Dinsay. Arguing that his
criminal liability of bigamy has already been extinguished by prescription where the prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. The second marriage was registered
in 1975 while the Information filed against Sermonia was in 1992, thus, it should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not 1992 for it to be valid.

Issue:
Whether or not the prescription period should commence on the day the second marriage was
registered.

Ruling:
No, the prescription period should not commence on the day the second marriage was registered. The
principle of constructive notice, as Sermonia contends, is not applicable to the case at bar. The said
principle is only applicable to cases involving land or property disputes, and marriage is certainly not
property. If the computation of the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy would commence from
the registration or the marriage, it would result to almost absolving the offenders from their criminal
liability. In the case at bar, although the second marriage was celebrated publicly and was secured by a
public document, it was done in concealment because he was not truthful to all the parties concerned.
He even contracted the said bigamous marriage in a place where he was not known as a married person.
It is, therefore, reasonable that the computation of the prescriptive period should commence from the
day of its discovery and not based on the date of the registration of marriage.
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Lee
G.R. 234618
September 16, 2019

Facts:
Accused Mateo Lee Jr., the Deputy Executive Director of the National Council on Disability Affairs, was
charge with violation of RA 7877 before the Sandiganbayan for demanding sexual favor from Diane Jnae
Paguirigan, an Administrative Aide in the same offense and served directly under his supervision. The
accused allegedly asked the victim on several occasions when they would check in a hotel, sending food
and flowers and messaged of endearment and continuing to do so after several protest from her which
created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment to Ms. Paguirigan.
Thereafter, Lee filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and prescription extinguishing
criminal liability with prayer for outright dismissal of the case which drew an opposition from the OSP.
Aggrieved by the denial of his motion by the Sandiganbayan which considered and set aside its earlier
resolution and ordered the dismissal of the case against Lee on the ground the offense charged had
already prescribed. Subsequently, the OSP filed MR which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in ordering the dismissal of the case against Lee on the grounds of
prescription.

Ruling:
Yes, the Sandignabayan erred in ordering the dismissal of the case.
In reversing the CA’s decision, We emphatically ruled that “(t)here is no more distinction between cases
under the RPC (Revised Penal Code) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption
of the period of prescription” and reiterated that the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of
the complaint before the fiscal’s office for purposes of preliminary investigation against the accused.
In the case at bar, it was clear that the filing of the complaint against the respondent with the Office of
the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription. Thus, the filing of the Information
before the Sandiganbayan, for unlawful acts allegedly committed, is well within the three (3)-year
prescriptive period of R.A. No. 7877.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Reodica v. Court of Appeals

G.R. L-42557
December 7, 1935

Facts:
The appellant, municipal treasurer of Bacuit, Palawan, was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, for the falsification of a public document. The information alleges that he falsified the
municipal payroll corresponding to that month by making it appear therein that one, Sinforoso Cordero,
rendered services as municipal secretary which was not true as the latter was absent from the said
municipality on the date mentioned in the case.
The evidence discloses that this municipal payroll was submitted to the appellant by the municipal
president, already prepared authorizing him to pay Sinforoso Cordero's salary. When this payroll was
received by the appellant, it was already signed and payment thereof approved by the president, with
the latter's certification that the services therein mentioned were rendered.
The CA rendered its decision convicting the appellant for falsification of public document.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in its conviction against the appellant.

Ruling:
For the foregoing considerations, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellant acquitted.
This being the case, the appellant is not guilty of the falsification of this pay roll, as alleged in the
information, because the president and not he is the one who certifies that the services of the officers
mentioned therein were in fact rendered.
However, in view of the leave granted to Sinforoso Cordero, for the purpose of the payment of his salary,
this amounted to his having rendered services during this period. While the information likewise states
that the appellant certified in the payroll that paid Sinforoso Cordero's salary, it does not allege,
however, that this was not true.
Such alterations, even granting that the appellant was responsible therefor, do not effect either the
veracity of the document of the effects thereof, and do not constitute the crime of falsification.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, et al.

G.R. 169588
October 7, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking
spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally
parked.
Jadewell, through its General Manager Tan and personnel Ulpindo and Dulay alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that the respondents Ang, Balajadia and Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was
then illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging
to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal. The fines for illegal parking and
the declamping fee were also not paid by the respondents herein.
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. A preliminary investigation took place and respondent Balajadia likewise filed
a case charging Jadewell president Tan, and four employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave
Coercion.
Two criminal Information’s were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Respondent Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a Motion to
Quash and Manifestation and said motion was granted and dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. However, the respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that proceedings in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, the court held that the filing
of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime and ended two
months after. Since the Information’s were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cases.
The RTC favored the respondents and the same was dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period
of the commission of the offense charged against respondents.

Ruling:
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. Regarding the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended,
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal
ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide
any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Regarding the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if
he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

Perez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. 245862
November 3, 2020

Facts:
Salvador Perez and Juanita Perez are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They
“willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing P120,000 acquisition
by personal canvass,” violating Sec. 362 and 367 of the LGC. No public bidding occurred and no
Committee of Awards was constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and Juanita gave MobilLink
Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or preference through manifest partiality, showing
evident bad faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in the original information,
so it was recommended by the Special Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the manner
of the commission of the offense, based on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original information.
The amended information was admitted. The petitioners challenge this, saying that the Sandiganbayan
committed GAD in accepting the amended information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman,
amounting to denial of due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the power to file information without delegation
from the Ombudsman.

Ruling:
No. The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study whether the accused, assuming arguendo that
there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the seller of the subject
computer “and “submit your recommendation soonest.” The recommendation must be submitted to one
who has authority to implement such recommendation. The Ombudsman has the power to file
information as well as the power to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05 delegates the
disposition of administrative and criminal cases to the Deputy Ombudsman, but NOT the Special
Prosecutor. All that is delegated to the Special Prosecutor is the discretional authority to review and
modify the Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but without departing from the basic
resolution.
Since there is no express delegation, the Court looked into whether or not there was an implied
delegation. RA 6770 provides that the powers of the OSP include: conducting preliminary investigations
and prosecute criminal cases w/in jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining agreements,
and perform other duties assigned by Ombudsman. Respondents argue the doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, saying that since the amended information has not been disapproved by the Ombudsman, it has
his tacit approval. The SC said no. This doctrine does not apply to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
an apolitical agency.
The instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED.
1B_CrimPro_TAGAB, Edwin

People v. Dela Pena

G.R. 238120
February 12, 2020

Facts:
Rico Dela Pena was charged for the murder of his brother in law, Olipio Gomez Amahit before the
Regional Trial Court of Bais City. The information read:
“That on or about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 14, 2006 , at Barangay Samak,
Mabinay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, with treachery, and with
intent to kill his brother in law, OLIPIO GOMEZ AMAHIT, assault, attack, and stab said Olipio Gomez
Amahit with a "pinuti", thereby inflicting upon himmultiple stab wounds on his body, which directly
caused the death of said Olipio Gomez Amahit, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. Xxx
The RTC found Dela Pena guilty of the crime of murder. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both
the RTC and the CA ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Was the information filed sufficient to convict petitioner of murder?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court found that the CA committed no error in concluding that appellant is indeed guilty of the
crime of murder.
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Information is sufficient if it contains the full name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, as well as the place of the offense. To
the Court's mind, the Information herein complied with these conditions since the qualifying
circumstance of "treachery" was specifically alleged in the Information.
It also bears emphasis that accused-appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the Information. This is
indicated in Section 9 Rule 117 Motion to Quash.
Section 9 of the same rule states that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g),and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
In this case, the defense not only failed to question the sufficiency of the Information at any time during
the pendency of the case before the RTC, but it also even allowed the prosecution to present competent
evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense. At this point, herein
accused-appellant is deemed to have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information.