[People vs. Valenzuela, G.R. NO.

178266 July 21, 2008]

Facts:
Spouses Valenzuela were agricultural tenants leasing and occupying the farmland of
Veneranda. Spouses Valenzuela were charged with estafa when they allegedly misappropriated
the land’s harvest.

The RTC dismissed the case, holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. The
RTC held that the case involves a lease of an agricultural land and thus involves an agrarian
dispute, which falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: YES.

The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1)
jurisdiction over subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the person accused; and (3) territorial
jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on
it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa, as mandated under Article 315 of the
RPC.

Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction.

Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they
voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the
court to resolve.

In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for
estafa, a subject matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has
criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try
criminal cases at all.

Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, [March 31, 2006], 520 PHIL 907-934]
Facts: Petitioners were charged with two counts of murder for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao (son of respondent). The petitioners were found guilty and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. On automatic review, the SC acquitted them on reasonable doubt.
After the above events, Maderal, one the accused who were at large during the previous case,
was arrested and executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the persons
responsible for the deaths of the deceased.
Private respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners.
The petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate and
to recall, and/or QUASH THE WARRANTS OF ARREST.
The judge denied urgent motion on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons. The decision was reversed by the replacing judge.
Upon appeal, the CA reinstated the order of Judge Tumaliuan and ordered the criminal cases of
murder against the petitioners to be reinstated.
Issue: WON adjudication of a MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT OF ARREST requires either
jurisdiction over the person of the accused or custody over the body of the accused. – NO
Ruling: NO. The rule is that, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived (hence, you then submit yourself to the jurisdiction of the court) when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, 
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person (you question the jurisdiction of the court). In such cases where
jurisdiction is impugned, such as MOTIONS TO QUASH A COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED and MOTION TO QUASH A WARRANT OF
ARREST, an accused can invoke the processes of the court EVEN THOUGH THERE IS
NEITHER JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON NOR CUSTODY OF THE LAW. In cases not
involving special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e. the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.

Brocka vs. Enrile. G.R. No. 69863-65 December 10, 1990

Facts: Brocka and others were arrested by Northern Police District Officers after the forcible and
violent dispersal of a demonstration for a jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization. Petitioners were charged with Illegal Assembly by RTC QC. Petitioners
except Brocka et al (leaders of the offense) were released on bail. Despite their subsequent
service of release order, they remained in detention because respondents invoked Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) issued against petitioner, who were later on charged with Inciting to
Sedition. Since then President Marcos had ordered the provisional release Brocka et. al.
however they still contend that bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases foe enjoining their
criminal prosecution.
Issue: Can criminal prosecution of a case be enjoined?
Ruling: YES.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final. There are however so exceptions, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied

Isip v. People, G.R. No. 170298, June 26, 2007

Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of
the RTC of Cavite City... on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines... accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (men's
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the... purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to
deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold... but the herein accused
once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave
abuse... of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the
proceeds... of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in Manila,
complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional
Trial Court... accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa...
petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors
Issue: Is the trial court the proper venue for the case?
Ruling: YES. In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown
that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in
Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The
place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Union Bank v. People, February 28, 2012

Facts:Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation
stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin. The first complaint filed before the RTC of Pasay. The second complaint was
filed to the MeTC, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating
Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the
same issue in another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, she argued that the
venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

Issue: Where should the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court?
Ruling: MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and
hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited
to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary
for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under
oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given.
Hector Trenas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
Petitioner: HECTOR TREÑAS Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 195002,
January 25, 2012 DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. Facts:
1. Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house
and lot located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage. He also gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000.
However, when Elizabeth consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the
money for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against Hector. 2. An Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also rendered a Decision affirming that
of the RTC. 3. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the place
where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by
petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the only logical
conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his
residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of
delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the
ordinary course of nature.
Issue: 1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.
Ruling + Ratio: NO. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The
RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with
an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In
this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was committed within the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth
does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. Aside from the lone
allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that
the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Mondejar v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001

Complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, with
gros ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to
Criminal Case No. 98-07 CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and
Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure order" against her on October 23,
1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold departure
orders" shall be issued ONLY in CRIMINAL CASES within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts.
She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before
issuing the questioned order. When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge
admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No.
39-97. He alleged that he was no furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a
copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997 he issued an order lifting
and setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of
denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly
notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.
Issue: Did the respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed “hold departure order” ?
Ruling: YES, the respondent judge erred. It was not within his jurisdiction to issue a hold
departure order as an MtCC judge because the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction of issuing hold
departure orders for criminal cases.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
"hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the regional trial court." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent
judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Foz v. People, October 9, 2009, G.R. No. 167764
Facts: That on or about July 5 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines both Vicente Foz. Jr and
Danny G. Fajardo as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in
Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on
July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled “MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN,” wherein
said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused
knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly
libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr.
Edgar Portigo. Petitioners pleaded not guilty, but the RTC found them guilty as charged.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied they appealed to CA but their appeal and
their motion for reconsideration were denied hence, this petition. Petitioners raise for the first
time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient
to vest, jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel
as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
Ruling: YES. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
LANDBANK VS BELISTA
G.R. No. 164631June 26, 2009
FACTS:
Sps. Ralla donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene
Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent. The said parcels were placed under CARP.
Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural
lands. Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated by Landbank, private respondent, on
11November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against
petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V. Aggrieved by the
DARAB's decision, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for
Determination of Just Compensation at RTC. The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case
when it issued an order dated 12 November 2003 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX,2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, violative of
the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DARAB and not RTC has the jurisdiction of the Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation of the subject lot.
RULING:
The RTC has jurisdiction. Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under RANo. 6657 is vested in the courts. In Republic v. CA, the Court explained: Thus, Special
Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction
over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]

People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and Victoria Amante
G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu. On January 14, 1994, she obtained a cash advance for the defrayal of seminar expenses
of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed but as of
December 19, 1995 no liquidation was made. The investigation report of the Commission on
Audit submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas)
recommended for further investigation to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed
against her. On May 21, 2004, an Information for Malversation of Public Funds was filed against
her. However, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position
with Salary Grade 26 who is charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 which
states that “Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office“. An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance of his official functions.
Public officials below Salary Grade 27 may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions particularly and exclusively enumerated under Section 4(a)
such as provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors,
vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers ,
and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as
consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Applying the above provisions, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059

Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one-year term.
Hannah Serana with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of
the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Hannah Serana moved to quash the information and posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio
capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student
regent.

Issue: Whether or not, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Serana as she contended that
she was not a public officer.

Ruling: Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In
Geduspan v. People, the Court held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Hannah Serana falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of
P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees
of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Hannah Serana is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, September 17, 2002, G.R. 137237
Facts: Police officers Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero
Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay
captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment,
attempted murder, and grave threats. According to Eduardo, he was about to eat lunch at his
parents’ house at Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived who disarmed him of his Cal. 45 service
pistol. They then forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal
Hall. On the way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo,
papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" Mayor Esquivel then ordered
SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." He was
struck with a handgun and released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a
statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition. PO2 Eduardo told the
PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng
and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng
den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested
members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor. Thereafter, separate informations
docketed as Criminal Case No. 24777 for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel
and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778 for grave threats against
petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners submit that Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over the offenses filed against petitioners, and thus committed GAD when it
assumed jurisdiction.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction? YES
Held: Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they
hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors and
barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo,
Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we already
held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by
R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring
supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher"36 that "exclusive
original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that
under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since
Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No.
24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.
Esteban v. Sandiganbayan March 11, 2005, G.R. No.146646
FACTS: Two Informations for violation of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) and
two other Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed against Judge Rogelio Esteban
before the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Judge Esteban has been soliciting sexual
demands upon his casual employee, Ana Mae Simbajon, such as demanding her to be his
girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for her permanent appointment. It
was also alleged that he once embraced her, kissed her all over her face, and touched her right
breast which prompted Simbajon to file a complaint against him. It was expressly stated in the
Informations that these acts were done in relation to his office or position.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case

RULING: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case because the crimes committed were
intimately connected to his office.
Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249, provides:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
In People v. Montejo, the Supreme Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed
in relation to the office if the offense is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the information is
wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the
offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the case.
In this case, it was alleged in the Information that Simbajon was constrained to approach Judge
Esteban as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such
recommendation — she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used his official position in committing the acts
complained of. While it is true that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the
fact that as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to
recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly
committed are intimately connected with his office.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The
Informations contain allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by
petitioner in relation to his official function.
Therefore, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case.
Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, July 6, 2011, G.R. No. 175482
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were
found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring
with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

Issues:
1.) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused
has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2.) Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a
violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position
with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a
position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for
being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code and
Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested
before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias
and bad faith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to
the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with
such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the recipient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not
preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive
in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect
his personal interest.
Thus the verdict by the Sandiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was
proper.

People v. Go, March 25, 2014

FACTS:
An information was filed against Henry Go for alleged violation of entering into a contract which
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government and for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile.
Henry Go filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019

ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private person who was alleged to have
conspired with a public official whose salary grade is 27 and that public official has died prior to
the filing of the information.

RULING:
The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being
charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile.
Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before
and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can
no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is
already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of its jurisdiction over the person of and the
case involving herein respondent.
Liyag missing
CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, GR No. 147097, 2009-
06-05
Facts:
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal
Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
and... violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello
F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed... vouchers and
supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as
claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the
help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly
able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution[2] dated May 29, 2000 recommending the
filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman;

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
Resolution. In a Memorandum [4] dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the
OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the... trial of the
cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and
ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

Issues: Petitioners allege that:

I. THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II. THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.
Ruling:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers
and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional... infirmity. The issue of whether
said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back
as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.[9] More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, [10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in
Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged... only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The Court's ruling in Acop
that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by
the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in
Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the
power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It
is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from
legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman.
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described
above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly
exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution
dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in this
petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

Principles:
Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth
known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred... on the Office of
the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to
the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows
then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special
Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers
conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such
other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then
that
Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the
Special
Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise.
This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. ANIANO A.

DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, GR No. 130140, 1999-10-25

Facts:
Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to
comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment),[2] the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)...
manifested that it would "rel[y] on the evaluation and exercise of the discretionary power
conferred on Petitioner in the prosecution of the instant... petition."
In its Manifestation and Motion[3] of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: (a)
the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of... petitioner COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of
the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition
was signed by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the
PCGG, and by Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of... the PCGG, which is also a client of the
OSG.
Initially, the Court dismissed the petition in this case on technical grounds. But, upon petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated, and the respondents were required to
comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment),[2] the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
manifested that it would "rel[y] on the evaluation and exercise of the discretionary power
conferred on Petitioner in the prosecution of the instant... petition."
In its Manifestation and Motion[3] of 16 February 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
informed the Court that it could not represent the OMBUDSMAN for the following reasons: (a)
the Solicitor General is the Vice-Chairman of... petitioner COMMITTEE; (b) being an agency of
the Government, the COMMITTEE is entitled to be represented by the OSG; and (c) the petition
was signed by Associate Solicitor Salvador C. Guevarra, who is presently on detail with the
PCGG, and by Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza of... the PCGG, which is also a client of the
OSG.
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman of the PCGG
as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative... each from the
Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, Development
Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government
Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation... as
members.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the
COMMITTEE to "include in its investigation, inventory, and study all non-performing loans which
shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans." It likewise provided for the following criteria...
which might be "utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan,"

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE
COUNTED FROM THE DATE OF THE GRANT OF THE BEHEST LOANS INVOLVED, AND
NOT FROM THE DATE OF DISCOVERY OF THE SAME BY THE COMMITTEE.

Ruling:
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Marcos and his cronies
accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even
assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges against the respondents is...
prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes
charged, and not from the date of their commission.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[19] as amended,... which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should
commence from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first received... the
evidence from the complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the
issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition,
and SETTING ASIDE the resolution of 14 May 1996 and the Order of 19 May 1997 of the public
respondent OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968.
The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case
OMB-0-96-0968 taking into account the foregoing disquisitions.
Castro v. Deloria, January 27, 2009, G.R. No. 163586

Facts: On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds. Petitioner pleaded NOT
GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information.
Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade - a material fact upon
which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner further
argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was
cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor,
and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.

RTC Ruling
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order dated September 7, 2001. It held that the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman can prosecute cases cognizable by the RTC.

SC RULING. YES.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in
Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Antonino vs. Desierto

PETER L. SESBREO, complainant, vs. JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial

Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna, respondent.

Facts: Peter L. Sesbreo filed a Verified Complaint[1] dated March 2, 2004 against respondent
judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of
Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case No.
39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al. In criminal cases PP vs Marcelino, et. al., the
three accused were Enrique Marcellino, Susan Nuez and Edna Tabazon, all employees of
Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna. They were charged of Falsification, Grave
Threats and Usurpation of Authority under the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge. But upon
arraignment, only the Usurpation of Authority pushed through and the other two charges were
dismissed. All accused, except Enrique Marcelino, were arraigned. A warrant of arrest was
issued against Marcelino. Following the arraignment, the complainant filed a Private
Complainants Urgent Manifestation alleging violation of RA 10(4) and prayed that all three be
issued with warrants of arrest. The respondent judge issued an order statement that the
violation of RA was indeed alleged in the complaint of Usurpation of Authority but was not
resolved due to oversight. However, finding no probable cause, respondent dismissed the
prayer for warrants and ordered to forward the records of the case back to the Provincial
Prosecutor for review. The PPO affirmed respondents order and remanded the case to the court
for further proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.During the hearing of the case
on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however,
did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the
cancellation of the scheduled hearing. The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of
the instant administrative complaint.

Issues:
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary
investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure
of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing
the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO
instead of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Held:
Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted the preliminary
examination of the complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found
no probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore, when respondent Judge
motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in
accordance with the procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest
for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound
discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor did not move for
the issuance of such warrant. It is respondent Judges contention that the resolution shall be
reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of
1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of
R.A. No. 10. However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to act as special investigator or
prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is not applicable to the issue at hand.
Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the Provincial
Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that respondent Judge was
motivated by bad faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error
for which she could not be held administratively accountable absent any proof of fraud or other
evil motive. In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be
erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judges actuations are hardly indicative of bad
faith or any motive to delay the case which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the
law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties in the future.
Punzalan vs. Dela Peña
G.R. No. 158543 July 21, 2004
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and
against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña
filed several counter-charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious
mischief and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder
filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave
Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin. Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of
Rainier, On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan. The charge of Attempted
Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor.
On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the
July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others – (1)
that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight
Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14
others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against
Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of
Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations
against the movants..
ISSUES
(1)Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed GAD? No.
HELD
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. “Supervision and
control” includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify
acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.

People vs. Duca missing

Cariaga vs. People

G.R. No. 180010; July 30, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Cenita M. Cariaga is a municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela whose been charged
with three separate cases before the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, all for malversation of
public funds. Cariaga was convicted for the said cases. Hence, an appeal was filed before the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. Petitioner, admitting the
procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the Court to relax the Rules to
afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests the Court to
endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of
substantial justice.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT OR BE ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.

HELD:
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of
liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court
grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
substantial justice must always be avoided.

In Ulep v. People, the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The
omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose
had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction which
was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the
proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the
pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases
involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit
regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules
of procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they
should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully
observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the
law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.
[11]
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions
thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients
liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the
case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and
defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the
Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are
SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition.