MA. BELEN FLORDELIZA C. ANG-ABAYA, FRANCIS JASON A.

ANG, HANNAH ZORAYDA A. ANG, and VICENTE G. GENATO

vs.
EDUARDO G. ANG

G.R. No. 178511; December 4, 2008

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Facts:

Vibelle Manufacturing Corporation (VMC) and Genato Investments, Inc.

(Genato) (collectively referred to as "the corporations") are family-owned
corporations, where petitioners Ma. Belen Flordeliza C. Ang-Abaya
(Flordeliza), Francis Jason A. Ang (Jason), Vincent G. Genato (Vincent),
Hanna Zorayda A. Ang (Hanna) and private respondent Eduardo G. Ang
(Eduardo) are shareholders, officers and members of the board of directors.
VMC, Genato, and Oriana Manufacturing Corporation (Oriana) filed Civil
Case which is a case for damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against herein
respondent Eduardo, together with Michael Edward Chi Ang (Michael), and
some other persons for allegedly conniving to fraudulently wrest
control/management of the corporations.

During the pendency of Civil Case, in July, 2004, Eduardo sought

permission to inspect the corporate books of VMC and Genato on account of
petitioners’ alleged failure and/or refusal to update him on the financial and
business activities of these family corporations. Petitioners denied the
request claiming that Eduardo would use the information obtained from said
inspection for purposes hostile to the corporations’ interests because this
Eduardo filed an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners Flordeliza and
Jason, charging them with violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144,
of the Corporation Code of the Philippines.9 Ma. Belinda G. Sandejas
(Belinda), Vincent, and Hanna were subsequently impleaded for likewise
denying respondent’s request to inspect the corporate books.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred exceeded it authorityin in conducting the

investigation on the petitioners.
Ruling:

Yes, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the
Secretary of Justice exceeded his authority when he conducted an inquiry on
the petitioners’ defense of improper use and motive on Eduardo’s part. As a
necessary element in the offense of refusal to honor a stockholder/member’s
right to inspect the corporate books/records.

The stockholders’ right to inspect corporate books is not without limitations.

It is now expressly required as a condition for such examination that the one
requesting it must not have been guilty of using improperly any information
secured through a prior examination, or that the person asking for such
examination must be acting in good faith and for a legitimate purpose in
making his demand which in this case Eduardo has not shown intent.
 TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR.
VS
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s

compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners, for when he allegedly entered
into an agreement with the petitioners wherein Peña undertook to perform acts
necessary to prevent any intruders or squatters from unlawfully occupying Urban
Bank’s property. Petitioners presented documents to show that the respondent Peña was
appointed as agent by ISCI (former owner of the banks property) and not by Urban
Bank or by the petitioners.

Peña claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI. The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded that
the petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing falsified documents, subsequently,
information were filed with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros, Occidental. The Judge
subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and insisted that they were denied due
process because they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavits. And
avers that since they were not afforded to submit their counter -
affidavit, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of
the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners
further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to submit counter-affidavit before a warrant of
arrest shall be issued against them.

RULING:
No. The prosecutor may take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor may
either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case
or file the information if he finds probable cause.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
Although the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses he shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause;
 Manuel Isip
vs.
People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 170298; 26 June 2007.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:

Manuel Isip and his wife Marietta received jewelries from Leonardo A Jose for the
purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the
sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same. The
accused issued bounced checks in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received
from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank for
payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Leonardo filed criminal charges of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law in the RTC of Cavite City.
Although The complainant has residence in in the Towers Condominium in Manila
but testified that the trasanctions were happened in his ancestral house in Cavite
while the defendants contested that such transactions really happened in the
Towers Condominium.

The RTC in Cavite rendered judgment in favor of Leonardo Jose, charged the
accused-petitioner guilty of the crimes and the court found out that the crime
happened in the ancestral house of the coplainant when he was on leave of absence
from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected since the defendants failed to
substantially proved that such transactions occured in Manila.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE

Ruling:

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is

jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental
rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction took place in his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs.
Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioner’s task to
prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.
 JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder of Rafael
de las Alas but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide.
He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he filed an application for
admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for
bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
application for bail of Leviste.
Ruling:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion Perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Furthermore, petitioner failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
 ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III,
ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and
REBECCA B. TAN

G.R. No. 96080 April 19, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the

former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for multiple murder,
through a second amended information, and to restrain them from
prosecuting him.The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an
information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths
on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son
Renato Bucag II.

Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from
detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,"
"Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas,
petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The
trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but
directed the City Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation to grant the accused all the opportunity to present whatever
evidence he has in support of his defense.

In a resolution dated September 6, 1989, respondent State Prosecutor

Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of
the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of
the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner
as one of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when
said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to
present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to
the determination of his alleged “linkage" to the crime charged. The motion
was, however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January
29, 1990.3

The filed a Petition for Review4 with the Department of Justice. Thereafter,
he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum,5 and then a
Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating
Evidence Annexed,6 attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated June 20,
1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990
wherein he implicated herein petitioner but the petition and memorandum
was yet again dismissed and as remedy the Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus an prohibition. The petition stated the issue that the preliminary
investigation was not completed and that the probable cause was not
sufficient to justify the inclusion of the petitioner in the second information.

Issue:

Whether the Fiscal have the jurisdiction to determine the probable cause of
the accused in the preliminary investigation conducted

Ruling:

Yes, Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the

only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof of the crime
accused of him. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence the sound judgement
of the Judge upon the preliminary investigation rendered the petitioner guilty
due to probable cause resulting to the dismissal of the petition.
 PEOPLE
v.
GARFIN
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004

FACTS:
Private respondent Serafin Seballegue was charged with refusal to file
and remit premiums of his employees which is a violation of the Social
Security Act. The information contains a certification signed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not
guilty to the charge and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss due to the
information being filed without the prior written authority or approval of the
city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Trial court dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior

written authority or approval from the city prosecutor renders the dismissal of
the case

RULING:

The Supreme Court believes that the filing of this Information must be in
conformity with the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of
Rule 112 which states that “No complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor”.

When examining the Information, it presented that nowhere in the

Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City signed off the above-quoted
notation presented in court, without such rendered the information invalid. It
was mistaken on the part of the accused as the authority of the special prosecutor is
only for the conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases
after they are filed however information and replies are under the care of the
city prosecutor and judges.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
DANILO LAZO alias "DANNY" and BERTING ARELLANO Y SABAL

G.R. No. 75367 June 19, 1991

Facts:

Accused-appellants were found guilty of murder with frustrated murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify jointly and severally the widow of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. 1

October 13, 1979, Felipe Garcia, his wife Felicidad, Bernardo Venture, Cresencio Garcia,
Emma Ventura, Margarita Ventura, Annong Garcia, Abba and Tony Arellano, a farmhand,
were taking their supper inside the kitchen at the ground floor of Felipe's house located in
Sitio Macugay, Barangay Abulug, Cagayan. Lamps were placed on top of the dining table,
one on each end of the table and the third at the center, Antonio "Tony" Arellano was seated
on a bench immediately facing Felipe Garcia whose back was to the door. Suddenly, the
kitchen door opened. Since Tony Arellano was facing the door to his north, he immediately
saw the face of the intruder. It was Berting Arellano whom he had already known for about
nine (9) years. About one (1) meter behind Berting was Danilo Lazo who was holding a
carbine rifle.

Then, Danilo fired his rifle in two successive bursts at the occupants. The first shot hit the
kitchen wall while the second shot hit Felipe Garcia after which it grazed the left leg of Tony
Arellano. Felipe shouted, "I am shot" and then fell on the floor. Stunned, Tony could only
stare at the two assailants. The others, who were either too old or too young, were petrified
with fear. It was Tony who carried the mortally wounded victim to the second floor of the
house. Subsequently, Felipe was rushed to a hospital in nearby Ballesteros where he died
seven or eight hours after an emergency operation. It was only on the following morning,
October 14, 1979 that Tony Arellano revealed the identities of the assailants to the victim's
widow, Felicidad Garcia, at the hospital. They were Danilo Lazo and Berting Arellano. On
that same day, Tony reported the fatal shooting to the members of the Integrated National
Police of Abulug, Cagayan, who immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime.

On the basis of the preliminary examination by the municipal judge on October 26 and 27,
1979, the two accused were ordered arrested and detained without bail. In two separate
complaints, Danilo Lazo and Berting Arellano were charged with murder with frustrated
murder and Danilo Lazo alone with illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
Arraignment of the accused in the aforementioned cases was set on November 15, 1979
before the office of the municipal judge. Danilo and Berting entered a plea of not guilty and
waived their right to the second stage of preliminary investigation. The two cases were then
forwarded to the then Court of First Instance for the filing of the appropriate information.

In adjudging Danilo and Berting guilty as charged, the lower court relied principally on the
eyewitness account of Tony Arellano, 29 years old and a farm helper of the Garcias for about
seven years. Tony was directly facing the kitchen door when it was flung open by the
malefactors. The same bullet that felled Felipe grazed his left leg. Of the several occupants
of the kitchen that Saturday night, it was only Tony who came forward to name Danilo and
Berting as Felipe's killers.
Danilo assailed the trial court for giving credence to the unreliable testimony of alleged
eyewitness Tony Arellano, for not appreciating his defense of alibi and in not acquitting him
on reasonable doubt. For his part, Berting contended that he was denied due process of law
when the information for murder with frustrated murder was filed against him in the absence
of a valid preliminary investigation and representation by counsel. He likewise maintained
that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed.

Issue:

Whether preliminary investigation can be waived by the accused.

Ruling:

Yes, in the case at bar Berting and Danilo were duly informed of their right to preliminary
investigation and to counsel but it was they who chose to forego with the second stage of the
proceedings. It must be stressed that the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is
a personal right and can be waived expressly or by implication. The preliminary investigation
should be thoroughly don’t by the presiding judge and should determine the probable cause
of the crime. Hence preliminary investigation is a privilege of the accused that can be waive
when they implied to.