1. Re: Letter of Tony Q.

Valenciano, re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Halls of Justice Building in Quezon
City, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 (Include Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen)
Facts:
This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a
Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious activities. He
believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect,
church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the
basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other
activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to the masses
that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.
Issue: Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution or system of religion.
Ruling:
No. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer of
Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any
halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.
Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people as reflected in lmbong v.
Ochoa,20 as follows: At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made
up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to
thrive in a single society together.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature
and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the
mind the purest principles of morality.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
LEONEN, J.:
Tolerating and allowing court personnel to hold and celebrate daily masses within public Halls of Justice is a
clear violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the State's establishment of a religion. It has no
secular purpose other than to benefit and, therefore, promote a religion. It has the effect of imposing an
insidious cultural discrimination against those whose beliefs may be different. Religious rituals should be
done in churches, chapels, mosques, synagogues, and other private places of worship.
To provide that all faiths of all denominations may likewise avail of the same public space within courts of law
is a painful illusion. Apart from violating Sections 5 and 29 (2) of Article III of the Constitution, it is a privilege
that is not available to those who profess non-belief in any god or whose conviction is that the presence or
absence of god is unknowable. It likewise undermines religious faiths, which fervently believe that rituals that
worship icons and symbols are contrary to their conception of god.
Furthermore, the majority opinion invites judges to excessively entangle themselves with religious institutions
and worship. Decisions on the duration, frequency, decorations, and other facets of religious rituals are not
judicial functions. This also should certainly not be a governmental one.
By holding daily Catholic masses or any religious ritual within court premises, courts unnecessarily shed their
impartiality. It weakens our commitment to protect all religious beliefs.
2. Reagan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968
Facts:
Petitioner William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to
the United States Air Force in the Philippines disputed the payment of the income tax assessed on him by
respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention,
seriously and earnestly expressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory
and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Issue: Whether or not the said income tax was legally collected by respondent for petitioner who is based in
Clark Air Base, a base outside the Philippines, where the sale therefore having taken place on "foreign soil."
Ruling:
No. Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is
the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.
"By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."
Thus: "This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights
of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not
exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself."25
It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question confronting us in this litigation. We hold, as
announced at the outset, that petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his automobile
in the Clark Field Air Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within our territorial
jurisdiction to tax.
3. People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
Facts:
Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which she then demolished to build another one in its place. These she
did without securing the building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in Municipal
Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of violation of the said ordinance, which she
contested by invoking due process as taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that her house
was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. She argued the validity of
Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within
the naval base.
Issue: Whether or not Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced within the naval
base.
Ruling: Yes. First, the Court held that using the precedent in People vs. Fajardo is fruitless because this case
contemplates upon defendant Fajardo who tried securing a permit from the Mayor and, when unable to, built
his home nonetheless for needing it badly. The case at bar, on the other hand, shows that the appellant never
bothered to comply with the ordinance. The Court reiterated that, under the terms of the Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States, The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. The United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
Jurisdiction of the Philippines over the military bases may be diminished but it does not disappear. These
bases are under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They
are not and cannot be foreign territory.
4. Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under
the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III
requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of
the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
5. Most Rev Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, GR 206510, Sept 16, 2014
Facts:
While transiting the Sulu Sea, the USS Guardian, a US Navy ship, ran aground on the South Shoal of Tubbataha
Reefs, a restricted and marine protected area. The US Government provided compensation for the damaged
caused and undertook salvage operations to remove the grounded ship from the coral reef.
A Petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) was filed relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the
Tubbataha Reefs.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in the case.
Ruling:
No. The inhibition to implead a foreign state in a local jurisdiction is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium. That is, all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. This is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while the US respondents were performing official military duties and working as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself as the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government. Therefore, the principle of State
immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling – nabangga nila. It’s a suit against the state. With consent.
6. People vs. Gozo, G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973 *is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."
Facts: Appellant Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City, which she then demolished to build another one in its place. These
she did without securing the building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, as provided for in
Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964. She was convicted by the trial court of violation of the said ordinance,
which she contested by invoking due process as taught in People vs. Fajardo. Appellant Gozo maintained that
her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. She argued the validity
of Municipal Order No. 14 or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling
within the naval base.
Issue: Whether or not Municipal Order No. 14 Series of 1964 is valid and may be enforced within the naval
base.
Ruling:
Yes. The appellant’s contention that because her property was located within the naval base leased to the
American armed forces located inside the United States Naval Reservation, she must be entitled of the
exemption from complying with the ordanance was given no merit. Though the property yielded within the
Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine that the Philippines still possesses the sovereignty over that area – given
the record that it is still a part of its territory.
"It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16
The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of
jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.
7. Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts: Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. We find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is
measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second,
it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
8. Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts: Petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is constitutional.
Ruling:
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III
affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and
subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn
in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the
status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for
sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
9. Laurel vs. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947
Facts: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that
there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue: Whether or not treason be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government.
Ruling:
Yes. Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of
the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the
Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot
agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the
sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an
independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against
the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not
possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of
the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the Republic.
10. Lansang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000
Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that
there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension
of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. With such presidential determination of the existence of the conditions required by the Constitution to
justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ no longer conclusive on the other branches, this Court may
thus legitimately inquire into its validity. The question before us, it bears repeating, is whether or not
Proclamation No. 889 as it now stands, not as it was originally issued, is valid. The starting point must be a
recognition that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ belongs to the Executive, subject to limitations.
So the Constitution provides, and it is to be respected. The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by
this Tribunal is necessarily limited then to the ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light
of the credible information furnished the President, was arbitrary. Such a test met with the approval of the
chief counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno. To paraphrase Frankfurter, the question before the
judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the Executive but
equally knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with the occupant of the office.
As would be immediately apparent even from a cursory perusal of the data furnished the President, so
impressively summarized in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult
to sustain. Moreover, the steps taken by him to limit the area where the suspension operates as well as his
instructions attested to a firm resolve on his part to keep strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under the
circumstances, the decision reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is warranted
commends itself for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a manifestation of presidential
power well-nigh touching the extreme border of his conceded competence, beyond which a forbidden domain
lies. The requisite showing of either improvidence or abuse has not been made.
11. Amigable vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972
Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership
and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its
consent to be sued.
Issue: WON the appellant may properly sue the government.
Ruling:
Yes. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of
the taking.
12. City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003
Facts:
The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed
by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to
sign the check intended as payment for respondent Santiago’s claims. This, despite the fact that he was one
of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.
Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal with a warning that it would hold PNB
liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply
with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a manager’s check.
Issue: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to
satisfy Santiago’s claim.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a
corresponding appropriation as required by law:[11]
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty
to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against
the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only
convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
satisfaction thereof.[12]
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.[13]
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds
from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already
allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a
case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.
13. Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of
the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of 700k. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written
demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their
answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No.
1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected
portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action
without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of
governmental functions.
Issue: WON ATO be sued without the State's consent?
Ruling:
Yes. The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State
engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative. It is tasked with private or
non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from
suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states:
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits
is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in
Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes,
but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the
state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a
corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits
against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Italics
supplied.]

14. Tondo Medical vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioners allege that the Hospital Sector Reform Agenda launched by the Department for Health should
be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the
Constitution.They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II. Such policies allegedly resulted in
making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action in declaring the HSRA void.

Ruling:
No. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared
by this Court as non self-executing.
The Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-
executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be
implemented. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies."
x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
15. BCDA vs. COA

Facts:

COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board
members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January
2002. In Notice of Disallowance, Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang , disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board
members and full-time consultants. BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted
the year-end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the COA’s disallowance of the year end benefits to BCDA’s Board member unconstitutional?

Ruling:

No. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a
statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not
self-executing provisions. Since the implementing law which is RA No. 7227 did not unreasonably single out Board
members and full-time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit, thus it did not show any clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.
16. Tanada vs. Angara
Facts:
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which concurred in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Thus, the
present petition. Arguing mainly that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO
Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution such is prejudicial to the economy
and constitutionally impermissible. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by
Filipinos."
Issue: Whether or not the WTO agreement violates the Filipino first policy and is contrary to the
Constitution

Ruling:
No. Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13. Thus,there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate
to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. All told, while the Constitution indeed
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does
not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
17. Legazpi vs. CSC
Facts:
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information as these government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians
Issue: Whether or not the remedy of mandamus compelling CSC to disclose such information would prosper
Ruling:
Yes. From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
Since petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right, CSC is without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or
access to, information of public concern.
18. Oposa vs. Factoran
Facts:
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment
be rendered: ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of legal standing and valid cause of action
Issue: Whether or not the a valid cause of action based on the right to healthful ecology exists against the
respondent
Ruling:
Yes. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. Thus, they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit.
19. Imbong vs. Ochoa

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. Specifically, they aim to
strike down Section 3.01 as it allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily (TAKE
NOTE OF THRE WORD PRIMARILY) induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.

Issue: Whether or not such provision of the RH law violate of the right to life as guaranteed by the constitution?

Ruling:

Yes. It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally established,
the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men. (Main point in the
syllabus).

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
20. Espina vs. Zamora
Facts:
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the
Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000 petitioners all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition,
assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as the law runs afoul of the Constitution which enjoins the State to
place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities,
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and
trade policies and, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken
together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control
of the economy.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law
amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have
the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of
foreign investors.

21. Bacani vs. Nacoco

Facts:
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714
pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut
Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and
sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to
reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was
expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment
of the fees in . Thus, plaintiffs were ordered to reimburse NACOCO for the said amount.
Issue: WON Nacoco is performing governmental functions?
Ruling:
No. It was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the
proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned.
The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective
whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal
corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law.
Constituent (mandatory) vs Ministrant (Optional)
22. ACFA vs. CUGCO
Facts:
The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a government agency created
under Republic Act No. 821, as amended.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed for certification election with
the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for violation of the collective
bargaining agreement. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack
of jurisdiction of CIR over the case raising the defense that it was engaged in governmental functions
Issue: Whether or not ACFA is engaged in governmental functions
Ruling:
Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844
is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function;
The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is
most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has
placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for assignment from
one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and
wage structures.
There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond
the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less
than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from
the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program
of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans
and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land
Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;
23. PVTA VS. CIR
Facts:
Claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged their
employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them,
and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA raises the defense that they are performing governmental functions and not proprietary as claimed by
respondent thus CIR doesn’t have any jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA is performing governmental functions
Ruling:
Yes. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth thus (a)
To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those
engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security. The Court explained that the traditional
classification of governmental functions is obsolete.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals",
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
24. PHCC vs. CIR
Facts:
People’s Homesite and housing corporation recruited participants for it’s Sapang Palay Project. In recruiting
participants to the program, application forms entitled WFP Self Help Community Project Information Sheet,"
(Exh. "2") were issued, mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered.
Although the participants were assigned to work on canals and roads, the projects agreed upon between the
PHHC and the World Food Program were never fully implemented.
Complaining about their work and compensation, the participants went to the Department of Labor. After
investigation, Secretary Ople sent to the PHHC General ManageIn its answer, PHHC claimed, among others,
that it was exercising governmental functions; that it did not employ private respondents herein; and that the
CIR had no jurisdiction over PHHC, and over the subject matter of the action.
Issue: Whether or not PHCC is exercising governmental functions
Ruling:
Yes. Coming now to the case at bar. We note that since 1941 when the National Housing Commission
(predecessor of PHHC, which is now known as the National housing Authority [NHA]) was created, the
Philippine government has pursued a mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos
for decent housing. The agency tasked with implementing such governmental program was the PHHC. These
can be gleaned from the provisions of Commonwealth Act 648, the charter of said agency.
We rule that the PHHC is a governmental institution performing governmental functions
This is not the first time We are ruling on the proper characterization of housing as an activity of government,
In the 1985 case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco and the NLRC (No. L-64313, January 17, 1985, 134
SCRA 172), We ruled that housing is a governmental function.
25. Spouses Fontanilla vs. Hon Maliaman
Facts:
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National
Irrigation Administration, a government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla was injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later
transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. The Spouses Fontanilla then instituted an
action against NIA for the tortuous conduct of it’s driver to which they alleged that the driver was performing
governmental functions.
Issue: Whether or not NIA is performing governmental functions
Ruling:
No. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions,
by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-
governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the
tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
26. VFP vs. Reyes
Facts:
Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a corporate body organized under
Republic Act No. 2640, and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Respondent Angelo
T. Reyes was the Secretary of National Defense (DND Secretary) who issued the assailed Department Circular
No. 04, dated 10 June 2002. Respondent Edgardo E. Batenga was the DND Undersecretary for Civil Relations
and Administration who was tasked by the respondent DND Secretary to conduct an extensive management
audit of the records of petitioner.
Petitioner mainly alleges that the rules and guidelines laid down in the assailed Department Circular No. 04
expanded the scope of "control and supervision" beyond what has been laid down in Rep. Act No. 2640.
Petitioner claims that it is not a public nor a governmental entity but a private organization, and advances this
claim to prove that the issuance of DND Department Circular No. 04 is an invalid exercise of respondent
Secretary’s control and supervisio
Issue: Whether or not VFP is a private corporation
Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031
should most certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war
veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism.. It would be
injustice of catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to reward the people who
defended her.
Like the holding of the National Centennial Celebrations, the functions of the VFP are executive functions,
designed to implement not just the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640, but also, and more importantly, the
Constitutional mandate for the State to provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of
assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.
27. Ramiscal vs SGB
Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were charged with
Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged
that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from
the funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the
AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent
Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution
issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence,
it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion
for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
Held: No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and
functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and
pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore,
soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration
of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that
the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
28. Alzaga vs SGB
FACTS: October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the petitioners regarding alleged irregularities which
attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas by the AFP-RSBS. Being vice presidents and assistant
vice president of the AFP-RSBS, the petitioners claim that they are not under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan since AFP-RSB is a private entity.
ISSUE: (1) WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.
(2) WON the petitioners are under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: (1) Yes. Considering that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public
interest and its fund are in the nature of public fund, it is indeed a government entity.
(2) Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over “presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs, state
universities, or educational institutions or foundations.” The positions of the petitioners being vice president and
assistant vice president are not specifically enumerated in RA 8249 but it is clearly higher than managers. Thus,
considering them under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

29. Javier vs SGB

FACTS: Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which
was created by R.A. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act.” R.A. No.
8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and supervision of the
Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the President,
five (5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the
private education sector.
Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of one year. During that time, she was also
the President of the Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a holdover capacity in
the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the same
period of one year. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish
linkages with international book publishing bodies.
ISSUE: Whether or not Javier is a public officer. (YES)
HELD: YES, Javier is a public officer.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested
her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is
achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role
in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the
other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.
30. Manila International Airport Authority vs CA
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located
at Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA then settled some of the amount.
MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the
ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public
dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque
City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real estate
tax.
Issues: Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and
controlled corporation and as such exempted from tax.
Ruling: No.
 Under the Local government code, government owned and controlled corporations are not
exempted from real estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to
become one MIAA should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for
its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no members. MIAA is an
instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.
31. PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA
FACTS: The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws
relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to
do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their
welfare.
In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of
the laws related thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel
treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is
duty bound to enforce;
When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a
private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities.
On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.
ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.
RULING: YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied.
Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government
owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are
compulsory members of the GSIS.
32. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, vs SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a
one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the
Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information.
She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person,
in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; and
the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over
her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex
officio capacity.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
Held: No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first
part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
33. SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED VS CA
Facts: On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael
Galvez, over four parcels of land Lot 1-4. Lot 1 and 4 was sold by Galves to Mamaril, et. al. who then sold the
said lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Without knowledge of the order issued by the Court of
First Instance of La Union, declaring OCT 0-381 null and void, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold
Lot 1 and 4 to the petitioner herein.
Petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss as one of its grounds is that the plaintiff Republic is
not the real party-in-interest because the real property, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station),
were under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under
Republic Act No. 7227. The Solicitor General on the other hand states that the real party-in-interest in the case
at bar being the Republic of the Philippines, it claims it imprescriptible.
Issue: Whether or not the BCDA is a government agency
Ruling: No. BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. It is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in
nature—the promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s
goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government.
The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for
enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been
created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the
NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with
governmental attributes.

34. PVTA v CIR

Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez
issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and
that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction
between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can
rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case.
35. ROSAS VS. MONTOR, G.R. No. 204105. October 14, 2015

FACTS:
 On December 7, 2004, Iranian nationals Jafar Saketi Taromsari and Jalal Shokr Pour Ziveh, arrived in
the Philippines at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA). After staying in a hotel in Cebu City
for a few days, they left for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004.
 On December 16, 2004, Japanese immigration authorities discovered that Taromsari and Ziveh had
counterfeit or tampered Mexican and Italian passports and used falsified names: “Jaime Humberto
Nenciares Garcia” for Ziveh and “Marco Rabitti” for Taromsari.
 For using these fraudulent passports and lack of entry visa, the Japanese immigration authorities denied
entry to Taromsari and Ziveh and sent them back to the Philippines.
  Taromsari and Ziveh arrived at MCIA on the same day at 6:45 p.m. and admitted at the detention cell of
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Cebu Detention Center.
 Petitioner Geronimo Rosas gave his report and an Exclusion Order was issued against Taromsari and
Ziveh on grounds of “Not Properly Documented” and “No Entry Visa
 Security guards, Napilot and Ugarte received an order from petitioner to escort the Iranian nationals
from BI to MCIA
 On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released from detention and brought by Napilot and
Ugarte to the MCIA for deportation. They were allowed to leave for Tehran, Iran via Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia onboard Malaysian Air Lines.
 On January 18, 2005, respondents Imra-Ali Sabdullah and Dilausan S. Montor, employees of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), Cebu, filed a Complaint-Affidavit12 before the OMB against petitioner, Napilot
and Ugarte for grave misconduct, violation of Section 3(e)13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and
conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service.

Issue: Whether or not the power to deport is an act of the State

Ruling: Yes. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.

36. Pp vs Perfecto
Facts: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding
the disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate. The article of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official
concealment by the Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses
in the investigation of oil companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of
Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that
Article 256 was not in force anymore.
Issue: Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?
Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to
protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of
the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
citizen must speak of him only in bated breath.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of
the Crown have no place under the American flag.
Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.

37. VILAS VS CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
 Vilas was a creditor of the Ayuntamiento of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its
present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon
the obligations of the old city.

 The City of Manila argued that its charter has no reference to obligations or contracts of the old city; that
their case is analogous to a principal and agent, where the sovereign gets changed, the city, as agent of the
State, could no longer be held accountable for debts of the previous sovereign; that the city of Manila has
been reincorporated under Act 183 of the Philippine Commission and thus not liable for the said obligations.

 The Philippine Supreme Court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in
no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The case was appealed to the US Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Is the city of Manila still liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the
United States?
Ruling: YES. Municipal corporations exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of
a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision,
and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a
mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of
local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purpose for which its governmental powers are conferred.
38. Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 (1947)
Facts:
In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus
filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended.
Issue: Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was then suspended
Ruling: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which
constitute the state).

39. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (de facto and de jure govt)
Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines
in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto government.
Issue: Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces.
Ruling: Yes.
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial
but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and
valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the
leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

40. IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO, 210 SCRA 588

Facts: Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno was first appointed as associate justice of the CA in 1980. The CA was
reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). In Edsa Revolution in 1986 brought about
reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening Committee that was created
assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, When the
appointments were signed by President Aquino, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, from number eleven
to number 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued
Executive order No.33 of Pres. Aquino.

Issue: Whether the present CA is a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority
enjoyed by the petitioner.
Ruling:  No. The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in
the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the
people power. A government as a result of people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by
the family of nations or countries. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno
concerning his seniority ranking.

41. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR. 104768

Facts: Following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1, creating
the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover
all... ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained
wealth of Major General Ramas. PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379] against the
latter.

Issue: Whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against M/G Ramas for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
Ruling: The court held that PCGG has no such jurisdiction. Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President
Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1. Mere position held by a military officer does not
automatically make him a "subordinate". The term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who
enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close. The PCGG failed to do.

42. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476

Facts: Apellant, Loreta Gozo, bought a house and lot within the naval base leased to the American Armed
Forces. She then destroyed the old house and built a new one without getting a permit from the Mayor’s
Office, in which the Court of First Instance found her in violation of an Ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales. To
which she seeks to set aside.
Issue: Whether the Court of First Instance ruling that the appellant is in violation of the municipal
ordinance.
Ruling: Yes. Military-Bases Agreement with foreign Countries, within a state, does not preclude municipal
corporations of the state from exercising administrative jurisdiction.

43. TANADA VS ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18

Facts: Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. A petition was
filed assailing its constitutionality as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant
and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issues: Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional?
Ruling: No. The ratification of the WTO Agreement only limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A
treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. While the constitution mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

44. AGUSTIN vs.EDU, 88 SCRA 195

Facts: President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to
procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled.
LTO then issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. However, this Letter of
Instruction and Adm. Order was petitioned assailing its validity for being unlawful and unconstitutional as it
violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue: Whether or not it is valid and constitutional.

Ruling: Yes, the orders and issuances in question are deemed valid and constitutional. The exercise of police
power as such was established to promote public welfare and safety. The letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land. It is premise and base on the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in this case.

45. JBL REYES VS BAGATSING, GR No 65366

Facts: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition pursued a permit to rally
from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks away. The permit has
been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing which claimed that there have been intelligence reports
affirming that the rally would be infiltrated to disrupt the assembly. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to
prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was
his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Issue: Whether or not the treaty as the basis of denial of the petitioner’s permit request, used by the Mayor
was vaild?
Ruling: No, the implementing state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element
and the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But it
cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights, which is
the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly.

46. TANADA VS ANGARA, 272 SCRA 18

Facts: Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. A petition was
filed assailing its constitutionality as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self-reliant
and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issues: Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

47. BAYAN v. ZAMORA, GR 138570

Facts: Zamora submitted the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article II of the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII and or Section 25,
Article XVIII of the constitution.
Ruling: Both constitutional provisions, contradicts each other but shares some common ground. The
concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
VFA was ratified by the then-president Estrada and was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of
its members.

48. BAYAN vs. ROMULO, GR. 159618

Facts: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of
Notes, the Phil., represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals
embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations
that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: No. the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With that view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law
concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

49. LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SEC., GR. 151445

Facts: Lim attacks the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. It averred that the Visiting Force Agreement (VFA)
permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," hence authorizing
American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the petition has merit.

Ruling: No. The issue raised by petitioners was based on fear of future desecrations. The meaning of the
word “activities", was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus,
the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting
Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party,
must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2.

50. SHANGRI-LA HOTEL INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT vs. DEVELOPERS GROUP OF COMPANIES

Facts: The core of this controversy: “Shangri-La” mark & “S” logo. Respondent DGCI claims ownership of said
mark & logo in the Philippines. Bureau of Patents, Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) issued DGCI a
certificate of registration (may 31, 2983) and since then, DGCI started using the “Shangri-La” & “S” in its
restaurant business. Petitioner SLHIM, owned by the Kuok family worldwide moved to register the mark and
logo in its name. DGCI filed a case of infringement against petitioner.

Issues: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of infringement?

Ruling: No. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioner of infringing a mark and when they are the
originator and the creator of it. Protection should be afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to
the Paris Convention. International law has been made part of the law of the land.

51. PHILIP MORRIS INC. VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GR. 158589
Facts: The petitioners are foreign corporations that are not doing business in the Philippines and are
registered owners of the trademarks ‘MARK VII’, ‘MARK TEN’, and ‘LARK’. They claim that an infringement of
their trademark had been committed by the respondent in the country.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to enforce trademark rights in this country?
Ruling: No. They lack of evidence that their product is well-known in the Philippines. Petitioners may have the
capacity to sue for infringement without the need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the
Philippines. However, appellants failed to establish that their products are widely known by local purchasers
on the country or in other countries circulated locally. International law has been made part of the law of the
land.

52. MIJARES V. RANADA, GR. 139325

Facts: Ten prominent petitioners filed a complaint to the estate of the deceased former President Marcos, as
the petitioners suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of
police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Final Judgement was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals and the petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final
Judgement. However, Marcos Estate contended that the PHP 410 filing fee was incorrectly computed
for they argue that the amount is too small to constitute damages amounting to $2.25 billion.

Issues: Whether or not the enforcement of a foreign judgement is incapable of pecuniary estimations?
Ruling: No. In this circumstance, the Final Judgement is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a
right of the petitioner against the Marcos Estate. Petitioners' complaint is clearly based on a judgment, the
Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our
local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.