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Technical Safety: Norsok Standard
Technical Safety: Norsok Standard
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
TECHNICAL SAFETY
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
Technical Safety
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
CONTENTS
1. FOREWORD
2. SCOPE
3. NORMATIVE REFERENCES
4
4
4
5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
5.1 General
5.2 Safety Management
5.3 Analyses and Optimisation
5.4 Risk Reduction Principles
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NORSOK Standard
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Technical Safety
1.
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
FOREWORD
This standard is developed by the NORSOK Standardisation Work Group.
All annexes are informative.
2.
SCOPE
This standard applies to design, construction and modifications on installations for
offshore drilling, production and transportation of petroleum.
The objective of this document is to achieve implementation of technology which
establishes and maintains an adequate level of safety for personnel, environment and
material assets.
This standard defines Safety Design Principles for installations, arrangements and
systems.
3.
NORMATIVE REFERENCES
API RP 521Guide for pressure-reliving and depressing system.
ISO 13 702
ISO 10418
prEN 50145
Electric apparatus for potentially explosive gas atmosphere Classification of hazardous areas.
IEC 79-10
IEC 79-13
API 500 B
S-DP-003
Environmental Care.
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4.
4.1
Definitions
All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the
regulations and international codes and standards referred to in this document.
4.2
Abbrevations
APS
CCR
ESD
ESDV
F&G
LEL
LQ
PA
HVAC
HC
PSD
NPD
IR
UPS
DHSV
UV
5.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
5.1
General
Governing documents, in the form of Acts, Regulations, Standards and Recognised
Practices shall be identified and applied in the design process.
Use of international standards and codes shall be preferred to non-standard solutions unless
it is documented that the alternative solution altogether will be optimal from a safety and
cost point of view.
Any implications of Safety objectives established by project with respect to the design
shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectives and requirements.
The technical safety requirements shall comply with the established risk acceptance
criteria.
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The main goal is to develop cost optimum concepts which shall give sufficient protection
for personnel, environment and material assets.
Risk analyses are acknowledged as vital tools which provide input to the decision
processes in both the design and during the operation of the installations. Analyses of
scenarios that have been adequately covered by relevant previous analyses or of recognised
standard designs, should be avoided.
5.2
Safety Management
This standard presumes that each project establishes a Safety Program that includes or
addresses :
5.3
5.4
5.4.1
Overall Principles
Cost/benefit evaluation shall be applied to study different design alternatives.
This principle shall be considered in connection with items below.
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5.4.2
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Rev. 1, December 1994
Inherent safety
The design shall aim at a sufficant level of inherent safety, e.g. through:
5.4.3
Failure mechanisms
A systematic and documented identification of relevant failure mechanisms shall be
performed. Relevant subject disciplines shall be involved.
In particular this applies to:
5.4.4
Failure mechanisms which can cause leaks and releases of hazardous substances,
including all types of corrosion, erosion, cavitation, material fatigue and ageing
Failure mechanisms which can cause ignition, e.g. ageing of electrical materials or
components, self heating of rotating machinery, current leakage due to water, static
electricity, earthing faults potential
Failure mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety
systems
Escalation Prevention
Possible escalating events shall be identified and relevant measures taken to reduce this
risk.
The need for establishing safety barriers to avoid escalations shall be considered as part of
the design.
5.4.5
Vital systems shall be properly marked and easily recognisable and understandable.
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The muster area and the access to the evacuation station shall be arranged and
protected in order to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and
efficient way. Area allocation: 0.4 m2 per lifeboat seat.
Gravity/free fall life boats with minimum life boat capacity of 100 % of personnel on
board the installation.
One additional lifeboat in the far end of the installation shall be considered if escape
to the main evacuation area is impossible
For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on the helideck is within
acceptable limits, helicopter may be considered as the primary means of evacuation
For bridge connected installations and flotels the primary means of evacuation shall
be the bridge. One additonal lifeboat in the oposite end of the installation shall be
considered if escape to bridge is impossible in credible accident scenarios.
Evacuation chutes with rafts shall be used as a secondary means of evacuation, with
one located in the main evacuation area.
The Emergency Preparedness Assessment shall be applied to identify any need for
additional evacuation means and the optimum location of these.
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7.
7.1
General Requirements
The installation shall be divided into main areas which shall be designed and located so as
to minimize the risk to people, environment and material assets. The division of areas shall
be made based on the risk they represent in the operations.
Living quarters, control centre and equipment of major importance to safety shall be
located in non-hazardous areas.
Gas release points, e.g. flare/cold vent, shall be located and designed so that release of gas
does not entail increased level of risk in the operations.
Risers shall be located and designed so that fracturing will have acceptable consequences.
Reference is given to chapter 5 and 10 in ISO/WD 13 702 for layout, orientation and
location of equipment and functions.
7.1.1
Area Classification
Installations shall be classified in terms of explosion risk, and divided into zones according
to degree of risks.
The definition of zones shall be in accordance with IEC 79.10. The extent of zones should
be in accordanse with API 500B for small and open concepts.
References are also given to draft EN Standard pr EN 50145.
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated
with normal platform operations, e.g. continuous or periodic venting, evaporation from
open handling systems, small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of flammable
substances during maintenance and work-over operations.
"Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of
material weakness, design error, falling loads, collision or sabotage, shall not be regarded
as giving rise to a higher classification. This shall be reflected in the risk analyses, and may
impose stricter requirements to arrangements and equipment than defined by the area
classification alone.
The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements
to:
Technical Safety
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms, alarms and disconnection upon
loss of pressurisation, ref. is made to IEC 79-13.
7.2
Escape Routes
The total time needed for escape to safe area , including time for safe termination of
critical tasks, rescue operations, etc., shall be estimated and efforts shall be made to
minimise this time.
For large manned installations the escape route system and the safe area shall be available
for at least 1 hour.
The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1 m width (0,9 m for doors) and 2,1 m
height. Escape routes intended use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to 1.5 m (1.2
m for doors) width and 2.2 m height.
Other general principles are listed below:
There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from every regularly manned area
outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions
The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows:
Living Quarters
Shelter Areas
Life Boats and Life Rafts-stations
Boat Landings
Helideck
Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way
Escape routes shall preferably be part of the daily used transport- and passageways.
Where appropriate, main escape routes shall be provided on the outside along the
periphery of the installation.
Doors shall normally open in the escape direction, but not block the outside escape
route. Opening of doors should not require electric, hydraulic or pneumatic power. If
such power is required the power supply shall be local.
Any dining room, recreation room in L.Q. etc., where more than 15 persons may be
assembled shall have at least 2 exit doors. Internal room arrangement shall be
evaluated for possible blocking of exits following an accident as well as external
blockings. For all areas where there is a risk of congestion and panic, the doors shall
be provided with panic bars.
Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level shall be provided by stairways. The
number of these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size, configuration
of areas and equipment layout. Vertical ladders can be used in areas where the work
is of such a nature that only a few persons (max. 3) are in the area on short time
basis.
It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a wellhead
area.
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A dead end corridor of more than 5 metres length is not acceptable. Stairways
included in escape routes shall be designed to allow for transport of injured
personnel on stretcher.
Lifts shall not be considered as a part of escape ways. However, it shall be possible
to escape from the lift and the hoist way with the lift at any elevation. Escape from
legs/shafts/coloumns of an installation shall be considered separately. If use of lift is
necessary to
ensure adequate and effective escape, the lift system shall satisfy special
requirements, e.g. concerning transport of injured personnel on stretchers, protection,
ventilation, power supply.
Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. Escape routes shall be
provided with adequate emergency lighting. Emergency station should have
minimum 15 Lux, Escape routes minimum 4 Lux.
Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarter shall be marked by yellow
painting.
The escape routes within the living quarter shall be provided with low level
directional lighting, showing correct escape direction. Other enclosed and regularly
manned utility and process areas shall be considered separately.
Escape routes shall be arranged from the drillfloor to adjacent modules and also
down the substructure. Protection of these escape routes from radiation heat shall be
considered.
Safe Area
The Safe Areas shall be in accordance with ISO WD 13702 14.
7.4
Living Quarters
The living quarters shall be designed, equipped and located so that acceptable safety for all
accomodated personell is achieved.
Special emphasis shall be given to separation of the areas with drilling, production and
auxiliary systems from areas for living quarters.
Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the functions they are
designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event.
The living quarters shall be equipped with a reliable smokedetection and alarm system.
The ventilation system shall be designed to vent out smoke in a fire scenario.
7.5
Helicopter Deck
The helicopter deck shall be subject to approval by the National Civil Aviation
Administration.
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Utility Area
The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/Emergency
Service Areas.
Routing of hydrocarbon piping to, or through, the utility area shall be minimised.
7.7
7.8
Process Area
The separation philosophy for different parts of the process systems shall be that
equipment items of relatively high integrity but containing large volumes of liquids and
low pressure hydrocarbons (separator vessels) shall be separated from equipment with high
pressure which are the most likely sources of leakage (gas compression plant).
Process equipment containing larger volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons should be
located above main loadbearing structures to minimise the potential fire and explosion
loads on such structures.
Process piping, pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external
impact, e.g. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery
or as found required through analysis.
ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure to fires and
explosions are minimised. Electric cables, pneumatic tubings and hydraulic systems shall
be protected from fire and explosion loads until they have completed shut down sequence
time.
7.9
Riser Area
For risers which may release larger amounts of hydrocarbons, protection from external
impact due to ships and drifting objects shall be evaluated by locating the risers behind
main support structures or by dedicated protection structures able to resist the
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dimensioning impact energy. Impaced energy of 14MJ may be assumed until a detailed
collision risk study is available.
The following means of protection to be considered:
7.10
For two or more gas risers, or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive
fire protection
Pig launchers and receivers: location in open, naturally ventilated areas, at the
periphery of the platform, and with hatches directed away from equipment and
structures.
ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practical.
7.11
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Consideration should be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment, such as
control panels and hydraulic systems and their related signal paths.
When simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production is planned for, operational
procedures shall ensure an acceptable safety level of the installation.
8.
8.1
General Requirements
Installations, equipment, systems and components shall be designed, equipped and located
so that they can be operated safely and withstand anticipated loads.
Structures, systems and operations shall be planned, designed and implemented in such
ways that no single failure during design, fabrication or operation may lead to hazard or
accident. This applies both to operational failure as well as to faults/deficiencies related to
structures and equipment used directly in operations, or to equipment with auxiliary
functions.
8.2
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Explosion:
Ref. is given to ISO/WD 13702.
Dropped objects:
Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container, pipes etc.
based on estimated weight, probability drop height, vulnerability and
criticality of the exposed areas.
Ship collision:
The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for
adequate Sea Traffic Surveilance System should be evaluated. For supply
vessels operating beside the installation, a collision load of 14 MJ shall be
assumed.
Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the platform or adjacent platform, from
risers or from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of
subsea gas releases.
-
Fire:
Fixed installations shall be able to withstand a dimensioning blowout/fire on
sea for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. The
endurance shall not be less than 1 hour. Fixed installations shall be
protected
against fire on sea, as identified by risk analyses. For blowout/fire on sea
concerning floating installations, see clause 12.2.6
9.
9.1
General Requirements
Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed, manufactured, equipped and installed in
such a way that the installations can be operated safely.
Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during
operations can lead to unacceptable hazardous situations. This principle shall apply to
operational errors as well as equipment failure.
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Safety Systems
A Safety Shutdown System shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and
equipment used for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall act as a safety
barrier in case of malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment.
The Safety Shutdown System is logically divided into three main levels of shutdown:
Basic system philosophy is that a shutdown on a certain level shall never initiate
shutdowns on higher levels, but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels.
For more details reference is given to Clause 10.3 Emergency Shutdown.
9.3
Process Safety
Abnormal operating conditions leading to potential hydrocarbons release shall be
controlled by two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 (API RP 14C):
As far as possible, the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis.
Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points shall not be regarded to
satisfy the requirement of two levels of protection.
The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operation conditions within systems
or equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented.
The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within
PSD, i.e. shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not
developed as a result of the initial trip action.
The system philosophy also implies that the fail safe principle shall apply. I.e. components
shall move to, or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power.
The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality, and may
vary from equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate, to a total
process shutdown.
9.4
Depressurisation
Fast depressurisation shall be the primary mean of avoiding rupture of pressure
vessels/piping which may cause escalation. Active and passive protection are secondary
means.
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All pressure vessels and piping segments, which during shut down contains more than 1.0
ton of produced hydrocarbons or unprocessed crude, shall be equipped with a depressuring
system.
Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the
loss of material strength during a fire.
Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain
flammable or toxic materials by passive means alone. Loss of the active method of
containment will require depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e.g.
centrifugal compressor's dependence on seal oil systems).
The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation, steel
thickness, active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure
vessel/piping segment does not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario
beyond the control of the protective systems and arrangement. This may call for a detailed
study of each ESD segment in particular.
The design procedure outlined in clause 11.3.
The depressuring, manually or automatic, shall be applied the following way:
The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. The objective is to avoid
condensate dropping from flare. The particle size shall be less than 400 microns. In case of
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vertical flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size shall be less than 300
microns.
The K.O. Drum liquid containment capacity shall be based on the largest foreseeable liquid
condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. This period shall provide realistic
time to identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. Longer periods may be
required, e.g. for subsea flowlines and interfield pipelines. This shall be evaluated for each
case. In addition the knock-out drum shall provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry
over from the largest source (assuming overfilled vessel).
Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause
significant escalation of a fire, shall be avoided. As a minimum, the piping system and the
pressure vessels shall maintain their integrity during depressurisation. The depressuring
system itself (blowdown valves, branch piping and headers and K.O. Drums) is of
particular importance. The ability to maintain integrity when exposed to the fire loads
depends on selection of material, wall thickness, pressure rating and applied fire
protection.
9.6
Flaring
The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. Ref. Design
Principles Environmental Care, NORSOK S-DP-003.
Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the
platform for critical flare conditions.
Flare radiation calculations shall account for variations in flaring quantities and wind
conditions.
Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on
locations where structures and equipment are exposed shall be as follows:
Permissible radiation levels to personnel shall follow radiation levels as given in API
RP 521.
The heat loads from planned continuos flaring conditions on areas where personnel
are supposed to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working
environment requirements for exposed areas shall be considered and ample
protection provided as required.
For long periods of flaring (continuos flaring) , consideration shall also be given to
the radiation level on the helideck., i.e. the radiation/temperatures on the helideck
shall not become intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter
operations. Unless otherwise accepted by the responsible for helicopter operations,
max. 1.9 KW/m2 is allowed on helideck.
Max heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat
loads shall be limited to meet the requirements below. Higher exposure for short
times, e.g. during emergency flaring conditions, that will not harm the structure or
equipment can be accepted. Such deviations shall be documented.
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Heat loads on steel- or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that
results in loss of structural integrity.
Heat loads on wires in drill tower and cranes shall be limited depending on
type of lubrication and inspection- /replacement frequency.
Heat loads on areas classified as zone 2 shall be kept below 200oC.
Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation shall not give
temperatures exceeding 40C.
Cold Vent
The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the
foreseen gas rates can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the
installation or in its vicinity.
Further, the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design
and dimensioning of the cold vent, i.e. ignition of foreseen gas rates shall not give
unacceptable heat loads or other consequences on the installation.
The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent shall be considered.
9.8
Drainage Systems
The platform shall be equipped with the following drainage systems:
Open drainage systems from areas where there is no pollution, e.g. rain water drain from
roofs and helideck shall be routed directly to the sea.
Reference to ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 8.
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10.
10.1
General Requirements
The general requirements to safety and communication systems are to be in accordance
with ISO/WD 13 702 Clause 10.
Safety and communication systems shall be designed and protected so as to retain their
operational capability for the required period of time during an accidental event.
Safety systems shall be designed to operate independently of other systems or with a safety
equivalent to an independent system.
10.2
10.2.1
General
All F&G detection system display- and information facilities shall be centralised, and
located in a continuously manned area, normally the Central Control Room.
With the installation divided into "fire areas" the design of F&G System shall presume that
each fire area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors.
The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDU's) be given on a simple
fire and gas mimic. Only essential information shall be shown on the mimic, i.e. with fire
area status, unless for areas or equipment where a more detailed alarm identification is
appropriate, e.g.:
Local F&G display - and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area
incorporating F&G control of the drilling facilities.
10.2.2
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HVAC intakes
Gas detectors in HVAC supply shall be located at the air intake, alternatively in the
duct as close to duct opening as possible. Detectors in a duct shall be positioned as
near as practicable to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and
where the response time to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. At big intakes, the
flow patterns around the opening shall be determined to achieve an optimum position
of the detectors with regard to response.
HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by minimum two gas detectors.
"Confirmed Gas"
Is activation of two detectors arranged in one voting area, one at "high" and the other
at "low" LEL set point. . Each project shall define the high and low set points,
considering the distance between individual detectors working in a voting area,
ventilation conditions, etc. However, the "high" level shall be set not above 60%
LEL.
Where single detector logic is employed, single detector at "high" gives "Confirmed Gas".
.
Areas covered by two detectors should be arranged in a voting logic with detectors in
adjacent hazardous area.
Alarm on Gas detection
Alarms shall be automatically initiated according to table 10.1
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Table 10.1
Automatic alarm in area
CCR Living Non-haz. Process Drilling
Quarter utility area area
area
Confirmed gas
detected at :
HVAC intake LQ
Non-hazardous
utility area
HVAC/air intakes
Process area incl.
HVAC outlets
Drilling area incl.
HVAC
Any single dete
ctor "low" LEL
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Drill control
cabin/office
X
X
X
X
X (detector in
drilling area)
10.2.3
Manual detection
Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations, e.g. exits from
process areas, escape routes, fire stations.
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"Confirmed Fire"
Is activation of two fire detectors working on a voting principle in a fire area.
"Confirmed Fire" is activation of one single fire detector when no voting is
employed.
CCR
Confirmed fire
detected at :
LQ
Non-hazardous
utility area
Process single
wellhead
Conf. process
Conf./Drilling
Any single
detector
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Drilling
area
X
X
Drill
control
cabin/office
X
X
X
X
X
X
Detector in
drilling area
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Area/room
Automatic
ShutFire detection down
Action
Wellhead Area Flame or Heat ESD II
(fusible plugs*)
Automatic
Gas
detection
Area
Shutdown
Action
ESD II
Manifold Area
Nat. vent./
outdoor H.C.
Process Area
Mech. vent.
Process Area
(separation/gas
compression)
Water
Injection
Treatment
Area
ESD II
ESD II
* Not normally
manned
installations
Flame
Flame
ESD II
ESD II
Area
Area, leak
detection
Flame
ESD II
Area +
ESD II
HVAC extr.
duct
Flame or
smoke *
ESD II
HVAC
intake*
None **
ESD I*
ESD II
Area
ESD II
Manual
Manual
Area
HVAC
intake
HVAC
extract
Manual*
Manual*
*See 10.3.5
*See 10.3.5
Manual*
Drillers
cabin
Area, H2S* Manual
Drillers
cabin**
Area +
Manual*
HVAC
Drillers
extract
cabin
HVAC
ESD II
intake
HVAC
ESD II
intake
*See 10.3.5
Flame
Shale Shaker
Room
Flame
Active Mud
Tank Room
Flame
Sack/Bulk
Heat
Storage Room
Mud Lab
Smoke
Cementing
Unit Room
Comments
Flame
Manual
Drillers
cabin
Manual
Drillers
Cabin
Manual
Drillers
cabin
None
None
None
HVAC
intake
Area assumed
non-hazardous
*Mech.
ventilated area
**
Nat.vent/outdo
or area
* If sour
service
**See 10.3.5
*See 10.3.5
Assumes no
piped
connection to
mud system
Manual
Drillers
Cabin
Technical Safety
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
Turbine
Switch board
and electrical
room
Battery room
(lead acid)
Fire pump
room with
diesel engine
Air compres.
detection down
Action
HVAC
ESD I
intake
* Fire detection
Early warning
system
HVAC
ESD I
* Fire detection
intake
Early warning
system
HVAC
ESD I
* Fire detection
intake
Early warning
system
Smoke
Manual HVAC
ESD II*
*Shut down of
intake
internal
equipment to be
evaluated
Flame *
Manual HVAC
ESD I
* Fuel system
Smoke **
intake
**Electric
equipm.
Flame and heat* Unit
Area
Unit **
* Supplier to
shutd.
(hood)
shutd.upon confirm.
upon
area gas
** Continue
area fire
detect
ventilation.
detect
Block and bleed
fuel gas system
Combust. ESD I
air intake
Smoke *
El. ** HVAC
ESD 1
* Fire detection
power
intake
Early warning
switch
system
off
** Manual or
automatic with
timer to be
decided
Smoke
HVAC
ESD
intake
Shutd.
H2 gas
boost
detector at charge
extract
Flame
Manual HVAC
ESD I,
* Running fire
intake
Close fire- pump will be
damper *
shut down only
on overspeed
Smoke or heat Manual Air intake ESD I*
*Incl. unit shut
down
2 of 3
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Area/room
Automatic
Fire
detection
Mechanical
workshop
Instrument
Workshop
Paint Storage
HVAC intake
common for
LQ.
LQ,
cabins/rooms/
areas
Shutdown
Action
Comments
ESD I
Separate
welding HVAC
extract
ESD I
Vent extract
Heat
from galley
General galley Heat
area
Crane engine Heat
room
Helideck
Hangar
None
Smoke and
flame
Chain locker
None
Turret Area
Flame
Pump room in Smoke, heat
column
Shut- Gas
down detection
Action
ESD I
ESD I
*Covered by
gas detector in
HVAC intake
(see above line)
Manual
Manual
Manual Combustion ESD * Unit * Depend on
air intake * s.d. timer
crane location
delay 30sec
None
None
None
ESD II Area
HVAC
intake
ESD II
ESD I
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Technical Safety
10.3
Emergency Shutdown
10.3.1
General
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
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Technical Safety
10.3.2
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
Depressurised
Electrically dead
Navigational aids
Helideck perimeter lights
Emergency lights
Shutdown of other emergency systems shall be via 'timer' to ensure that systems are
operational as long as required, for ensuring a safe shutdown, evacuation and abandonment
(see fig. 10.1).
10.3.3
ESD
With a few exceptions as further described below, initiation of ESD I shall only leave the
Emergency Systems active.
Typical Emergency Systems are:
F&G Detection
Fire Fighting
ESD
Radio/External Communication
UPS
PA
Blowdown and Flare
Bilge/Ballast Water
Emergency Generation & Distribution
Emergency Lighting
Evacuation
Vital Equipment required in an Emergency Situation
Personnel lifts and hydraulic work platforms must be kept operable to ensure that
personnel can escape safely from such equipment after a shutdown. Shutdown of utility
systems and activation of emergency systems are shown in fig. 10.1.
Initiation of ESD II shall shut down the process; close riser/flowline valves and wellhead
valves and switch over turbine generators from fuel gas to diesel. Welding sockets and
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other sockets which serves areas where hot work permit are required shall be disconnected
in all areas upon ESD II as well as upon gas detection (single detector).
Depressurisation upon fire in the process or wellhead area shall be manual or automatic
subject to the evaluations outlined in Clause 9
10.3.4
Manual ESD stations shall in principle be distributed in essential areas such as:
10.3.5
Exits from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment, e.g. wellheads, drilling,
process etc.
Along major escape routes, muster areas, eg. life boat stations, helideck
Control points, e.g. central control room, drillers cabin, local manned control room,
emergency operation centre, radio room etc.
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10.4
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Rev. 1, December 1994
Emergency generator
Emergency switch gear
Central equipment for internal/external communication
Upon ESD II, all equipment operated under "hot work permits" shall be disconnected.
10.5
PA/Alarm System
The objective of a PA/ Emergency Alarm System is to warn and guide personnel as
quickly as possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation and to promote
quick response.
Location, number, type and effect of alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be so that the
alarm condition is easily recognised in any area where distribution of the alarm is required.
The Emergency Alarm System shall be designed in accordance with table 10.4.
Alarm Type
Muster Alarm
General Alarm
Toxic Gas Alarm
Alert
Signal
Continuous audible signal.
Yellow flashing lamp
Intermittent audible signal.
(1sec. on, 1 sec. off) Yellow
flashing lamp
Intermittent audible signal
(0.1 sec. on, 0.1 sec off).
Yellow flashing lamp
Two level audible tone on
P.A. system. Yellow flashing
lamp
Indicates
Prepare to abandon installation
Fire, or fire related situations,
gas leak or other serious
situations
Toxic gas
Important announcement to
follow on PA system
Emergency Power
The Emergency Systems listed in Clause 10.3.3. shall be supplied with emergency power.
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The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator
located in an unclassified area. The consumers shall be supplied with emergency power for
at least 18 hours.
An uninterrupted power supply for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed.
Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum
period of 30 minutes.
The emergency generator shall be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power.
The emergency generator system shall be selfcontained. Arrangements for black start shall
be provided.
Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR
where a matrix panel shall display the status of the generator.
The time required for the emergency generator to accept electrical loading after initiation
of start signal shall be evaluated.
In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be
provided.
The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and
explosion to operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been
performed.
In special cases, fire pumps can be fed by emergency power. Such solutions are to be
subject to special considerations, e.g. of the size and complexity of the emergency
generator system, the need for load shedding, start-up time etc.
For operational reasons, the following systems should also be supplied with emergency
power :
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11.
11.1
General Requirements
The general requirements to explosion and fire protection are given in ISO/WD 13 702
11.2
Accidental loads
Relevant fire scenario
Fire water capacity
Manning
Availability of fire protection equipment during emergencies
Requirements for automatic detection
Mutual aid
Compatibility of equipment
System availability during maintenance
For utility areas, including el. - and instrument. rooms, choice of fire retarding
materials, for sectioning of switch boards, etc.
The fire load shall be established based on fire load analyses where due attention is given
to:
In addition to requirements given in ISO Standard, the fire protection design shall be
documented by Fire Protection Data Sheets, Annex A.
Credit for fire water can be taken in the protection of equipment piping and (secondary)
structures, subject to considerations outlined in 11.3. such credit shall not affect design of
primary firepartitions segregating areas or design of load carrying structures. It is a
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condition that escallation within an area due to failure of the fire water systems does not
affect the main fire partitions and load carrying structures.
11.3
Jet fires
Step 2. Effect of fire water
Water applied for controlling the fire and cooling of pressure vessels and piping is very
effective when evenly distributed over the exposed areas. Credit for fire water can be taken
when the design provides :
Spray of deluge water from nozzles from below, from both sides and from above
Spray nozzle location ensuring that water spray projection covers all surfaces of the
protected equipment/piping
Supply of deluge water to a module is arranged so that accidents can not damage the
supply
Coverage of fire detectors that ensures immediate detections of small fires in all parts
of the fire area
Operation procedures shall ensure high availability of these systems
Alternatively, heat loads shall be based on detail evaluation of the credible fire scenarios.
Application of predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the
evaluation.
Step 3. Heat flux values for the next step are then selected from the following table:
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Rev. 1, December 1994
130 kW/m2
250 kW/m2
80 kW/m2
100 kW/m2
200 kW/m2
Upgrading of active fire water system so that credit from fire water can be taken
Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed
pressure vessels/piping
Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material , wall thickness etc.)
Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture
Change from manual to automatic depressuring
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Figure 11.1 Flowdiagram for deciding of use of passive fire protection on pressure
vessels and piping.
11.4
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The choice of materials and interior design of living quarters shall be decided in relation to
the fire risk, and shall prevent fire from spreading.
Windows should not be installed in H-rated fire divisions.
11.5
11.6
Fire pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall not be selected without
special reason.
12.
12.1
General
This clause contains additional safety design principles related to Floating production/
drilling/storage installations. Installations intended for short term drilling and general
service are not covered by this standard.
12.2
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12.3
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Rev. 1, December 1994
Crude Storage
Crude storage tanks, and in particular large tanks, shall be subject to special safety
considerations in light of their fire- and explosion potential. Main principles for such tanks
are described below:
12.4
Large crude storage tanks shall be provided with an adequate and safe vent system,
and gases shall be routed to either cold vent, flare or re-cycling system.
Pumping units shall be of the 'deep well' type.
Layout
The following additional requirements shall apply concerning the layout of floating
installations:
12.5
Vital control functions, e.g. maritime control/bridge, process control and special
emergency preparedness functions, should be arranged in one common control centre
for the entire installation.
Turret location/arrangement shall be based on evaluations including leak frequencies
and potential leak quantities.
Hydrocarbon pressure vessels and heary duty equipment shall not be located within
main hull structure unless it is verified that:
the explosion venting is sufficient to prevent unacceptable overpressure.
the fire loads do not cause structural collapse.
Process decks and relevant parts of the floater deck shall be arranged with the
aim of minimising the risk of large pool fires on decks and tank tops.
Process areas, turret areas and piping shall be designed to minimise the risk of jet
fires towards tank tops.
Turret
The following design principles applies to turret design:
1.
The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas
and minimising explosion pressure. Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas shall be
restricted to containers or small rooms with control- and special equipment that
requires special protection or cannot be located in outdoor environment. Such
enclosed premises shall have overpressure ventilation, with air taken from a nonhazardous area. Location of the premises themselves as well as their ventilation
intakes shall take into account the prevailing wind directions.
Equipment that can be ignition sources, e.g. electric equipment shall not be arranged in
moon pool area.
2.
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water under normal operations. For spraying of other equipment, fresh water shall be
applied. Where winches are arranged on the deck below Riser Termination and ESD
valves, the deck separating the areas shall be solid and gas tight.
12.6
3.
The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer, within the turret and
between turret and ship, should be minimised. Turrets based on swivels are preferred
in stead of drag chain turrets.
4.
Fire protection of turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located
on the ship, e.g. on gantry structure. Portable equipment and fixed systems for
enclosed rooms shall be arranged according to Clause 11.
5.
Production or export/ gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret
by passive means. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design
principle. At riser termination end, the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be
protected by passive means. For protection of other parts of the structure, please refer
to other relevant parts of this standard.
6.
Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring.
Arrangements that provides both protection against such loads as well as fire
protection are preferred.
7.
Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate
drain routed to a collection tank.
Drainage
Drainage systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all
sea states in which the installation is intended to be operable. Drainage systems for the
process systems shall be designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the
process system is intended to be operable.
12.7
Emergency re-positioning
The need for quick re-positioning of the floater in case of specific emergency situations
shall be evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser
pressures, subsea ESDV and mooring arrangement.
Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able
to move 150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes, or as specified through adequate
risk analyses.
12.8
Topside/floater interface
All interfaces between the typical maritime 'floater technology' and offshore 'petroleum
technology' shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process, and be monitored
during the project to ensure compatibility and consistency in the total design.
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Technical Safety
12.9
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Rev. 1, December 1994
13.
13.1
General
This section outline the design principles to the design of process, safety and auxiliary
systems for production installation which are normally not manned.
The design principles only apply to installations which are designed as remote-controlled
units with no requirement for permanent manning. The personnel will usually only be
present during daytime.
It is recognised that a large variety of designs can be developed. Specific design.
requirements will have to reflect the special conditions.
Examples of design is given in ANNEX B.
13.2
Common requirements
13.2.1
Risk evaluations
Risk evaluations shall take into consideration drilling and process data weather conditions,
ship traffic or the environmental acceptance criteria.
13.2.2
Design principles
Simple, reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimizing maintenance activities
on the installation shall be emphasised.
The following special activities related to manned operations onboard shall be evaluated
during design:
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Technical Safety
13.2.3
S-DP-001
Rev. 1, December 1994
Supporting structure
The minimum requirements to the design concerning resistance to impact from collisions
with ships, shall be based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation
shall take into consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the
installation, boarding procedures (boarding zone, weather restrictions, loading
requirements, call frequency, anchoring philosophy etc.) and the layout and arrangement of
the installation.
13.3
Welhead system
13.3.1
Welhead system
The wellhead system includes the wells, the X-mas trees and the flowlines up-stream to
and including choke valves.
The wellhead system shall be designed to withstand the highest load combination of
pressure and temperature occurring during operation, shut-down and maintenance of the
wells.
In addition to local operation, wing control valves may be controlled from the remote
control center, allowing remote shut-down and restart of the production. Blocking of
remote start-up of production shall be possible while the installation is manned.
13.3.2
13.3.3
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Risers
Production and lift gas risers shall normally be equipped with a riser emergency shut-down
valve.
On risers for stable fluids which may be depressurised from the main installation, omission
of riser emergency shut-down valves may be considered.
13.4
Auxiliary systems
Engines shall be certified for operation in hazadous areas.
13.5
Escape routes
Muster areas and the primary escape routes shall have radiation shielding from fire in the
wellhead and process areas in order to allow evacuation of the installation.
13.6
Life-saving appliances
When the installation is manned, life-saving appliances with a capacity of 2 x 100% of the
crew on board shall be available. Life-saving appliances may be lifeboat(s), liferaft(s) to be
lowered into the water or motor-driven rubber dinghies operated from standby vessel.
13.7
Emergency shut-down
Provisions shall be made for emergency shut-down and operational shut-down of the
installation to be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre.
The emergency shut-down signal from the remote control centre shall be by a fail-safe
signal (e.g. by means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not
manned installation. A possible time delay in shut-down due to a link failure shall not
exceed 5 min.
Emergency shut-down of the remote control centre or plant shall result in operational shutdown of the not normally manned installation.
It shall not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shut-down system from the remote
control centre.
The emergency shut-down system shall be in operation when the installation is unmanned.
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ANNEX A
FIRE PROTECTION DATA SHEET
(Informative)
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ANNEX B
TYPE A OF NORMALLY
NOT MANNED INSTALLATIONS
(Informative)
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Alarm systems
Upon gas detection an audible alarm shall be activated. This alarm may be provided by
portable gas detectors themselves.
When the installation is manned, an APS signal shall be operable, which can be perceived
by all on board.
Communication equipment
An emergency shut-down link between the remote control center and the not normally
manned installation shall be established.
Voice communication between the installation and the remote control center and directly
between the installation and standby vessel shall be possible when the installation is
manned.
If voice communication is based on protable radios, a minimum of two radios shall be
available on the satellite installation.
Active and passive fire protection
Primary protection of personell in case of fire, shall be effective evacuation.
As a minimum, the fire fighting equipment shall consist of portable carbon dioxide and
powder extinguishers.
Escape routes
A primary escape route to the boat landing via stairs shall be established. However, ladders
can be accepted, if warranted by special circumstances.
A secondary escape route to the boat landing shall be established if it can be provided at a
distance form the primary escape route that effectively make a contribution to the
evacuation options in an emergency situation.
Life-saving appliances
The installation shall be provided with at least one inflatable liferaft to be lowered into the
sea and which hold the maximum crew of the installation.
During manning of the installation a motor-driven rubber dinghy shall be available for
evacuation of the installation crew. The dinghy shall be in the immediate vicinity of the
installation in order that mobilisation of the dinghy will not increase the total time of
evacuation. The rubber dinghy shall be able to hold the entire crew on board the
installation at any time.
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Shelter
The installation shall have a place at which the crew can take shelter from the rain.
A lavatory shall be available.
Helicopter hoisting deck
A deck allowing emergency evacuation of personnel to hovering helicopter shall be
arranged.
Standby vessel
A standby vessel shall be available near the installations when it is manned.
The vessel shall be equipped with two motor-driven rubber dinghies and with a firewater
monitor with a minimum capacity of 2500 m3/h with throw length of approximately 50
meter.
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ANNEX B2
TYPE B OF NORMALLY NOT
MANNED INSTALLATIONS
(Informative)
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ANNEX C
INFORMATIVE REFERENCES
(Informative)
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Regulations relating to drilling and well activities and geological data collection in
the petroleum activities. Stipulated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Regulations for fixed means of access, stains, ladders and railings on production
installations stipulated by Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
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