Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

160261, November 10,

2003
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. But on October 13, 2003, The House Committee
on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least onethird
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
Issue:
(1)Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution or Whether or
not the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. is unconstitutional and be declared as null and void as it
violates Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(2)Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question.
(3)Whether or not the petition for prohibition involves public interest.
(4)Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi to bring petitions.

(5)Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over impeachment cases.

(6)Whether or not petition is moot and academic.
Discussion:
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners
b) ripeness(prematurity mootness)
c) political question/justiciability
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment visavis Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
Judicial Review
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Justic Laurel discoursed:
Xxx In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases
suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Held:
(1)Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives

falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution or Whether or
not the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. is unconstitutional and be declared as null and void as it
violates Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(2)Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question.
(3)Whether or not the petition for prohibition involves public interest.
(4)Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi to bring petitions.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke
the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will
affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
(5)Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over impeachment cases.

(6)Whether or not petition is moot and academic.

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997

Facts:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is
invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the
51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the
protective mantle of the Constitution.
[1]

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner,
is to
provide
management
expertise
and/or
an
international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on
18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
[2]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner

and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad x x x x which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
[4]

[5]

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court

on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En

Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for
oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 10, 2nd par., Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
YES.
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by
arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a
clear constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to
ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions
of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We
cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws,
including the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that
there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the
executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates.[45]

(2) Whether or not the constitutional provision s addressed to the State, not
the GSIS.
This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of
51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the
act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent
GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority
from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid
it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that
the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be

declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to

make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with
the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
their reason for being.
(3) Whether or not GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion when
denying the second bid offered by the Filipino entity bidder, MHC.
YES.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding.
But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if
the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the
foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had
matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the
Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as
any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus
we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an

opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of

forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding
rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
(4) Whether or not MHC form part of our patrimony as a nation.
YES.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines
as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the
dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting
that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts
of respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of
hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this
epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable
alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we
ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified

Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it
stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will
vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On
the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and
well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty
of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Discussion:
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of
an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness
of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned
by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
[6]

unquestionably a part of the national economy.Thus, any transaction involving

51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the
bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
in terms of price per share.
[8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since
it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x
x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay
down conditions under which business may be done.
[9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does

not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited
in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests
who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of
the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it
had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding
rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by
petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very
well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion
should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a
capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of
them by petitioner.

Pamatong vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision,
however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco
and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No.
6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No.
04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and
on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions,
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated
February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35)
others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain
maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had
retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended
the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of
the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership,
he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of

Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does
not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications
of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his
program of government.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Section 26, Article II of the Constitution, "equal access to
opportunities for public office" invokes a constitutional right to run for or
hold public office.
NO.
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

(2) Whether or not Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is self-executing.

NO.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article
II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does
not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision
is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The
State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public
dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth
an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and
the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important
would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that
the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening
opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to
make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may

be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change
the word "broaden."7
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of
the Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time,
remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.

(3) Whether or not Congress amended the electoral provisions through

Resolution No. 6558 by limiting the number of candidates.
No.
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it
promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the
study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As
observed in the COMELECs Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case
of candidates for national positions because the election process
becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national
campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the
Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government.
For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes,
an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).

xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue

if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect
of winning, no matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by
allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election
laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such
as watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of
canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of
which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance

candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election
with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the
mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant
minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are
cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible
elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance
candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide
candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fide candidates is
governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily
defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

(4) Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

disqualifying petitioner.
(5) Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to
the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner
Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to
this Court with deliberate dispatch.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the
dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that,
as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the
country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued
by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition
is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating
Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago
filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed
this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in
the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA
would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and
the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and
legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

Issues:
(1) Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments
to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

(2) Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct
of such initiative.

(3) Whether

the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the
draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an

Whether or not such alteration of the

provisions of the Constitution included are amendment in nature and not
revision.
amendment to, the Constitution./

(4) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the

Whether or not
COMELEC has power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise
of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution/

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C
of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and
the "sufficient standard" tests.

(5) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and
blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a)

GRANTING the instant petition;

b)
DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation;
c)
DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d)
ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against
private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 26, 2006

Facts:
A group led by Raul L. Lambino asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a
plebiscite to ratify the petition under Section 5 (b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) 6735. Lambino claimed his group has the support of 6,327,902 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters with each legislative district represented by
at least 3% of all registered voters. They petitioned to modify Sections 1 to 7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1 to 4 of Article VII (Executive Department) from
present Bicameral Presidential to Unicameral Parliamentary form of government. The
COMELEC denied their petition for lack of enabling law governing the initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution. ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Lambino group petition complies with Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution through a Peoples Initiative.
(2) Whether a peoples initiative petition can propose an amendment or revision to the
constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. The Lambino Group petition does not comply with Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution through a peoples initiative since the petition does not indicate the full text of
the proposed changes to the constitution. The signatory must be informed at the time of the
signing the nature and effects of the proposal. Otherwise, such proposal is deceptive and
misleading, thereby rendering the initiative void. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing such full text. (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied)
(2) NO. The process of peoples initiative is only limited to an amendment of the
Constitution, and not a revision. The change from a bicameralpresidential to a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government is indeed a revision, as it seeks to
overhaul the entire constitutional structure, affecting two (2) of the three (3) branches of
government the executive and the legislative. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08
piculs[1] of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their
acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40
piculs marked for export.
Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols sugar production
venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under
said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the
petitioners attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latters sugar in both domestic and export
markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 579[2] in November, 1974. The decree authorized private
respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the
United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar
Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of
the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEXs purchases. Finally, the
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be
remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and
liabilities had been deducted. The government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and
administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar
in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul.
PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976
and 1976-1977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages
over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops. Believing that
the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to
pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their
export sugar.PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, petitioners continued to avail of other loans
from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB
then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands
for payment, petitioners on August 4, 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued
at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account
of P1,513,347.78.
On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by
petitioners to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said
due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged

properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still
had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar
for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated,
could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the
export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the disposition of
the President of the Philippines for public purposes.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and
damages against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil Case No.
14725.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional.
On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order.[9] The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to
rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution, thus:
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was proper for
the trial court to have exercised judicial review.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was
improper for the trial court to have declared P.D. No. 579[12]

unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with Rule 64,

Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that said Rule
specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an
ordinary action for accounting, specific performance, and damages.
Petitioners contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. In any action which involves the
validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor
General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive
order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such
question.
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No. 478,[13]
which states in part:
SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations (1) The Office of the Solicitor
General shallhave the following specific powers and functions:
xxx
[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty,
law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his
judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested by the court.
It is basic legal construction that where words of command such as
shall, must, or ought are employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory.[14] Thus, where, as in Rule 64, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court, the word shall is used, a mandatory duty is imposed,
which the courts ought to enforce.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable
the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the
action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of
his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners stand, the

mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving

declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such
notice is required in any action and not just actions involving declaratory
relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is
no room for construction.[15] In all actions assailing the validity of a
statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the
Solicitor General is mandatory.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case
No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person
or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the
constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for
the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned
presidential decrees.
(2) Whether or not PD 759 is unconstitutional
As regards the second issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and
its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause
and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just
compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of
this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling
for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and
lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
[16]
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the
controversy can be settled on other grounds.[17] The policy of the
courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and

unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This

presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. This
means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the
legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the
Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.[18]

The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific
performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNBs obligation
to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without
having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is
nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNBs intransigence in
refusing to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on
agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners agent. In
other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question
be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.
Petitioners further contend that the passage of R.A. No. 7202[19]
rendered P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional, since R.A. No. 7202 affirms that
under P.D. 579, the due process clause of the Constitution and the right
of the sugar planters not to be deprived of their property without just
compensation were violated.
A perusal of the text of R.A. No. 7202 shows that the repealing clause of
said law merely reads:
SEC. 10. All laws, acts, executive orders and circulars in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication
are not favored.[20] R.A. No. 7202 cannot be deemed to have repealed
P.D. No. 579. In addition, the power to declare a law unconstitutional
does not lie with the legislature, but with the courts.[21] Assuming
arguendo that R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579, said
repeal is not a legislative declaration finding the earlier law
unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not PD No. 759 is subject to judicial review.

Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al.
vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
Facts:

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon
A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of
his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file petitions and question EO No. 1.
YES.
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure
to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have
not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations,
petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators
to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their
resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the

usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the
creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used
for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission
will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order
No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the
Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v.
ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the
issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino
people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the
Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with
overreaching significance to society
(2) Whether or not EO No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
No.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines:
(1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,

consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.

These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31
is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an
alteration of an existing structure.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to
create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from
either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416
was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer
appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national government.
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow
an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure,
the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the
direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but
only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further,
there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.[55] Moreover,
since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
(3) Whether or not EO No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman.
No.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the
commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights
this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function
of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v.
Galicia,[65] it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.
The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials
is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the
President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
[Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is
categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the

execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title
III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their
mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.
(4) Whether or not EO No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the
unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains
that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its
mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court,
however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The
Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of
graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions
of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions
would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in
partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of
such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race,
national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or
membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] Such a classification must
not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the
number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable
from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated
by it in the same way as are the members of the class.[97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under
the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not allembracing and does not include all the evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a
regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate
simply because it happens to be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness
was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be
attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step process.[101]
With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil
that might conceivably have been attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration
was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was
underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive
Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the
investigative commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]
(5) Whether or not petitioner are entitles to injunctive relief.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a coequal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with
the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court
finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.
Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a
government of laws and not of men.[110]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
Discussion:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)

there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus
standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and
taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in
a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit.In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a

public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a

public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must
show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action,
and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct
injury
test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a
litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations
omitted]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due

process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted

partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that

all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.[78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. [83] The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application
of the law to him.[84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Lacson vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001

Facts:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting
and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an
urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G.R.
No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam
Defensor-Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by Rolando A. Lumbao; and (4) G.R. No.
147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact an in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered
the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of
a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the
rebellion.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not by virtue of the proclamation of state of rebellion validates the warrantless arrest.
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent
danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without

adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is
improper at this time.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null
and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the
subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the
country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is
to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very
day.
Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking
earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial
warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of
Malacaang.
(2) Whether or not petition was raised by the proper party
Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that
a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and to
justify the exercise of the courts remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.,
239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.
Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
(3) Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and
Mancao pray that the appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed
be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant
petition is finally resolved. This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no
complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the
event that the same are later filed, this court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in
accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a
duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null
and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the
subject hold departure orders in their petition. The are not even expressing intention to leave the
country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is

to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a
matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Pimentel, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004

Facts:
On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private respondent
herein, filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest
against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, and other senatorial candidates
who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections, docketed as SET Case No.
001-95.
On June 30, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Issues
having been joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot
precincts numbering not more that 25% of the total precincts involved in
respondents protest.
Subsequently, the SET conducted the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts, namely: Paoay, Ilocos Norte; Tarlac, Tarlac; Tawi-Tawi;
Maguindanao; Sulu; Bulacan; Lanao del Sur; Lanao del Norte; Pasig City;
Bian, Laguna; Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; Pangasinan; Agusan del Sur and Agusan
del Norte. Thereafter, the SET directed the parties to submit their evidence
and memoranda.
On August 21, 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held a
press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial
and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. A press
release entitled Partial Results in Pimentels Protest was then issued
accompanied by the tabulation of votes for the parties. In the said tabulation,
the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number 15.
[3]

[4]

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial

Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in
the Presence of All Parties. Petitioner alleged that the partial results were
manifestly erroneous. The SET then issued Resolution No. 97-20 requiring all
the parties to file their respective comments on petitioners motion. Only
respondent and Senator Nikki Coseteng filed their separate comments
alleging, among others, that petitioners motion is premature considering that
the SET has not yet resolved respondents election protest.
[5]

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an
oversight, hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be

made.Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those

garnered by petitioner were given back to him.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion, holding that there is no
sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners Motion To Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to
Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties.

(2) Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy

both respondent and the Solicitor General maintain that the SET did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Resolutions. Furthermore, the
Solicitor General asserts that the present petition has become moot and
academic because the tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of
respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions originated expired on June
30, 1998.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual

controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits.
[6]

In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that where the issues have become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.
[7]

Likewise, in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, we

ruled:
[8]

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon

substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are
involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Petition dismissed.

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in
their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.