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FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY ‘An Essay on Interpretation by Paul Ricoeur translatéd by Denis Savage [New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1970 opm © 1970 by Yale Unive ‘Ar red Pas Bk yak be ‘profane orn pe ey fom (Gicpr by reviewers forthe pis pes) ibe of Cnc sy Cad aad WS on07 Deen’ yy Sain a'batey Prem tc, Rnghusnon, Sst cides Cater ‘enienson wuss Ge ‘Odense Universicers Tod ‘The Dwight Harrington Terry Foundation Lectures ‘on Religion in the Light of ‘Science and Philosophy ‘The deed of gift declares that “the ‘objet ofthis foundation isnot the promotion of scientific investiga: tion and discover, but rather the assimilation and interpretation of that which has been or shal be ereafer discovered, and its ap- plication to human welfare, especialy by the building of the truths ‘of science and philsopty lato the structure of a broadened and Putifed religion. The founder believes that sich a religion will ‘relly stimulate imeligent effort fr the improvement of human conditions and the advancement ofthe race in strength and ex cellence of character. To this end it desir that a series of lee tures be given by men emineat in thee respective departments, on| this, te history of ehvilzation and eligi, bibles! research, all sciences and branches of knowledge which have an important bear- ing on the subject, al tbe great laws of ature, expecially of evoh tion «also such interpretations of Ierature and sovilogyas| are in accord withthe spirit ofthis foundation, to the end thatthe (Christian spirit may be nurtured in the fllest Tight of the world’s Knowledge and that mankind may be helped to attain its highest possible weltare and happiness upon this earth.” The present work constitutes the thiny-ighth volume published on tht foundation, CONTENTS: Preface ‘Translator’s Note Book Book II: Problematic: The Placing of Froud 1. Language, Symbol, and Interpretation Pryeizonl and Langue, 3: Shield Inter pretom 6: Towanda rine of Smee 3 2. The Confit of Interpretations The Concept of Integration 205 Inepeaton Fecoecnan of Mean, 28: nerpreatont Exr- of Supicon 32 5. Hermeneatic Meth and Reflective Philsopty ‘he Recoune of Symbol o Rfecton, 37: The Re our of Refection to Symbol Rech od ‘Eien Lapa, 7; Refi ond the Heme st Cone 5 Analytic: Reading of Freud Introdvetion: How to Read Freed The Epistemologica Problem in Freudiaism 1. An Energetics Without Hermeneutics The Constancy Pine andthe Quantave Appe 2. Energetics and Hermeneutics in The Inter pretation of Dreams The Dre oad the Work of Exe “Prchlon”of Chapter. 10! 3, Tnsint and Idea inthe "Papers on ‘Metapaychology" he Anaiment of the Toporapie Economie View 3 59 37 us Book III: dof the Concept of Inet 117: Represntaver 1. The Analogy of Dreams 19 The Prlened Pe of Dream, 159; The Analogy of Ihe Work in t63 2. From the Once to the Sublime 18 The Cla and Deserve Approaches vo Integr {etn The Gone Way of nerpeaion. 185: Pethanpeloed oben The Noon of he 3. Ilion 20 ‘sion andthe Satey of ese, 231; The Gente ‘Sage of Eaponaon! own and Monahan, ha rhe doom Function of elon 287 PARE I: R05, THANTOS, ANANKE 1. The Pleasure Principle and the Realty Principle 261 The Realy Principle and the Socondary Process, 26: The Rely Prince nd "Objet 970: The Fesiy Pinte andthe Ezononte Tw of the Eo, ms 2. The Death Instincts: Speculation and Interpretation 281 Frou Speen on Life and Death 28: The ii et nh ascent Soper ‘Trinaton 302, 3. Tatrogatons 310 Wha ig Nena? 311; eenre and Susecion Dialectic: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freud 1. Epistemology: Between Pachology and Phenomenology aaa he Enstemoloal Car api Prchaaelr 34 Piychamals tno an Donerson Sane, 38 The’ hamamencloveal'Spprech tothe Ppeo- yk Fl 8 Poco net Phnom contents Index 2. Reflection: An Archeology ofthe Subject 419 Froud andthe Quer of the Sublet 20) Resi te 1 ey of Meaning, #30" The Cone ‘rhe Arkon 3. Dialectic: Archeology and Teleology 459, 4 Tease! Mada of Consumers The Hegel. itn Phinomenoley. 482: The Unrpanable Chaar: {oof life and Beso, #68. The plc Talon, Sf Preaioninn: The Operaure Concept, 42, The Int Telly of Freinds, rail Tea of Pra: the Oto 4. Hermeneutics: The Approches to Symbol 494 The Overdemination of Sots, 94; The Her htt Ondorof Sym s08r 4 Dieta Res ‘tet ofthe Probl e Subtinaonen th Ce bin S14 Fath aed Reon: The Amity of ‘he Seed S42 The Value and Limi of Pach na of Rtn 3 553 PREFACE ‘This book originates in the Terry Lectures given at Yale University in the autumn of 1961.1 wish to expess my deep thanks tothe Lecture Committee, the Philosophy Department, the Director of the Yale University Pres, and the President of Yale University for the invitation to undertake this work, In the autumn of 1962, eight lectures given in the Cardinal Mercier Chait atthe University of Louvain became the next sage ofthe work. I wish to thank the President ofthe Inst supriur Ae philosophic andthe colleagues who weleomed me in this chair for thelr cricism as well as forthe indulgence they showed toward sn enterprise in progres T now owe it to the reader to give some indication of what he ‘may and what he may not expect fom this book. Tn the fist place, this book deals with Pred and not with psy- ‘choanalyss. This means there ar to things lacking: analytic ex- perience ise and a consideration ofthe post-Freudin schools, As fer the fist point, it staking a gembe, n0 dow, to ite about Freud without being an analyst or having been analyzed and 0 {teat his work asa monument of our culture, aya tet in which out culture is expressed and understood. The reader will have to jadge ‘whether the wager has been Won or lot. As forthe post Freudian erature, T have deliberately set it aside, ether Because it etm faom corections brought to Fread's ideas fom analytic experience that 1 do not have, or because i introduces new theoretical concep tions the discussion of which would have led me evay fom rigor: ‘ous debate with the true founder of payehounalyss, Therefore T have rested Freu's work a a work unto tell, and ve avoided Aiscussing the conceptions of dissidents formed adversaries! Adlet fand Jung, ot of students turned dissidents Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Hary Stack Sullivan, or of disciples tre creators: Mel ane Klein, Jeeques Lacan, Secondly his book one not of psycolny but of piowphy My intrest centers on the ow undersancng of man at Frew intradces place myelin the company of Raland Daice my fs profesor of plilsopby, to whom I ete wi o fence ham age, and of Heer Maree? Pip Ri? an J.C: Fle iy work ders fom that of Rolahd Daler onan esental point: donot belive that Foul may be confi to te explora Eon of te fs human cents in man. My ener ems rm the opposite conviction: rychoanagi ons wih every ober {tal inerpetatin of the phenomenon of man Beas an {cerrtaton of etre. On th ott Tam in agreement wih the last toe author sed Titer fom them, however, the nature my piknophiea! preoccupation; my’ problem” concms the texture structure of Freudian dacoure Fist, i an epsemo- lope! problem: Whats iterprcation in pjehoanasi, ad how {nthe imerpreaon of the signs of tan irl wih the eo: ‘omc expaaton that cms wo get atte rot of deste? Second, itisa problem of eectiepilsopy: What new seltundersan ing comes out his interpretation, and what sl which ths comes to witanderstanding? Thr, te a dalecieal problem: Does Frat interpretation of cule exclude al ote? Tf no, ‘hat isthe role of thought by which canbe cootinated ith ‘ier Iterrtatonswithou fang into exec? These thee ‘qurstons mar he ceitou ote by which ake up the problem transaid atthe end of my Symbol of Evi mel he re Intontiptetween a bermeneutes of symbols and 8 phlxophy of concretsralecton, “Te exceton of this program reuired that Bok TH the “Read tng of Fead” conducted sn igoroaly a posible e Kept sparate 1. Rela Dai, La Mideast dori rene 2k ai ae it) el wit te mee {Serpe ay enn of ems mn ew a a OP ate Macca, Errand Cilzaton: A Pilsophial Inquiry ino ‘red aa se ra 35). (pia Ft ose eat (Se Yr Win Pre "2%, ap, Mon Moa an oi (Now Yor, neato Us set ren) Reeae Boas 12 tae eee ate ee ee ono cane ee erp rete reer ais 5 Init ofthe cumbersomene ofthe prcedre, I ave decided ace (@)- th German ext be Gesonmete Werke 18 yas eden fom {Stor Soren, GW) bests the original tex (6) the Sandrd| anon (24 ee London trom 1983 aboenstn: SE) ects It he ‘nya cin (ye tale Frenh trary, soit rea ‘ides cn neat the cate mth ont and deh th pec: (Comino, framltes nt Byte abort a gues eat Freud tes wi be taan om the Sunda ao, referee tthe ‘rem ston wil be itd Yl of tothe Ens reader) Tet oor rons mana soe cose fee fk TRANSLATOR’S NOTE “This transation began when my wife, Ros and T fist tanslated the tree letues which Paul Rioeur presented asthe Terry Lec- tures, We both fel very grateful to M. Ricoeur for his friendship tnd for opening up tow the rchnes of his meditations on Freud, Symbolism, and interpretation Thave tried to make the taslation conform as closely at post- ble to th French tex. Several minor coretions were made of the ovginal text, al of them after consultation with the autho 1 wish to thank Mary Par for reading several chapters for syle, and especially Paut Lee ofthe University of Cafori, Santa Cruz, for his painstaking reading ofthe entire manuscript and for is ‘many helpful suggestions. 1 aso wis to thank the Department of| Pilsopty of Marquette Univenity for their seeretafal help in typing the manuscript. Denis Savage Mitwaue, Wisconsin November 1969 BOOK I Problematic: The Placing of Freud Chapter I: Language, ‘Symbol, and Interpretation Ths book ira duson dente wih Feu. Why this inure pcos, anne ted Trier ty de conpeecr oan aut nr bythe expec of Raving ben snlan? Tho puro of book eer eye {ten ny ever no ene ued to pay hs motes So Caunge tine scone, To sient wolfe le ‘tls, Yes or ths anyone te plop cannot ef fo fer enor Til do ety pang my lesan in 8 ‘kr flo qusioning aby ing my peri ee 8 Common vay opting cela probs Trove fo me tee an ea nay where alpina inept ats ons ahs bet of lense La fog: ts common mening grand cl Witte veg Sn the Emp gue poopy, te plemmensoy tt Sms fom Hs Hekate invsigaons be werk te Buttman school and of he ote shook of New Tesunest tccgeia te work of compere hnory of tpn nd of htloploy contenng my st, a teat—and Brly, pay Somat Tay we ate in search of competes icin ofan ngs to erat forte moll frcone oe uss lpn nd forte areloshpe ow can ngage te pt ‘ch dene eu ss muhemae to yh pyaar no ‘Sete ur eat caches got lay. We hve ar ‘Sop ssmbole ogi an erga ince, a ethology, nds pochaaala ad; pap fone ft tine we arse Sccompen ins Hg ison the pole of th ticaon of Iman dicouns. The very poset ofthe aforementioned di arate dcipnes bas bh eed and intend the, Ser Retest of that cre Tay the uy of man legge a pobem Pe Sechiethe toad horizon win whch our investigation swt The greet sn in m0 way pretends to oer the comprehen lop of language we sie wing for I doubt morcover hat Sieh ilnpty could elaborated by anyone man, A modem sib wth the ambition and capcy achieve meld hae 0 be an some mathematicen, aes eepte,&cie ‘ened in several ofthe ar end goa! pscoanalt. Whe sing tet pilose of pal anguage perhaps possible feraeto explore some ef he key comector between te Sie lines conered with ianggs Phe preset ey an ae © nut that investignon ont that he pchonabt a ein print in any eneal discussion about language. To sac with pryeboaals Ectogs oor ine by sie of Fret writen work ugh his tneium pychoanajesaldeucs elt hse whoa not ana ijt anno have ao bee tale am nell vara iho ta practices eaing of Frew is trun and rns the isk of Cmbracng ely fein But if texte approach to yeh fsb hs nit which pace alone can cove sl tha the fvantge of fcaing anton upon an ete apes of Peas ork tht may be hen by prt or vented by 8 mene ‘ron al coer to account fee what gos on the tai ‘nonship. A medion on Freus work bes the avantee of feveing tat work's brafet sm ot aly the renovation of Posh, but a reneretation ofall pacha proeions pe {Sing tare, rm es, tugs vy ee Bion. This ow pychoanis belongs to moter cle. By Inerpeting cre it moder iby ging i an ism ‘eet t amps with aig mark “Te tution in Fred wings botcen mesic investi om ana theory oes fers wins to he spe of te Freudian rj. Tos, th major ext om cure arto be fond Inthe last part of Fru's work* However, psychoanalysis should not be regarded as a form of individual psychology, tarily tans posed into a sociology of culture, A summary lance atthe Freud lan bibliography shows tha the fist texts on art, morality, and relic on follow shortly upon The Interpretation of Dreams and ae then developed alongside the great doctrinal texts that consti the “Papers on Metapsychology” (1913-17), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), and The Ego and the Id (1923)2 Ia fact «9 tsp how the theory of eulture is telated tothe theory of reams and te neurosts, ts necessary to go back o The Interpretation of Dreams of 1900, fr itis here thatthe connection with mythology and literature was fist established. Ever since 1900 the Traum deutung bad proposed that dreams are the dreame’s private my tology and myths the waking dreams of peoples, tat Sophocles Gedipus and Shakespear’ Hamlet are to be interpreted in the sme way a5 dreams. We shall see that this proposal presente a problem, ‘Whatever the outcome ofthis dificult, the entrance of paycho- analysis into th geneal contemporary discussion about language i not due solely to is interpretation of eultore. By making dreams not only the fist object of his investigation but & mods (in whet sense we wll discus below) of all the disguised, subatutive, and fictive expressions of human wishing or desire, Freud invites us 10 look fo dreams themselves forthe varius relations between desis and language. First it isnot the dream ax dreamed that can be interpreted, but rather the txt of the dream account; analysis at tempts to substitute for this text anotber text that ould be called 1h qin tite Se 58 Eom Vin a Mon Yr Cho a 23. Ns of Mant appee914“Thweht fo te ee Se ee ree Pe hy lb the primitive speech of desire, Thus analysis moves from one me fing to another meaning; ts not desires as such that are placed the center of the analy, but rater thee language. Later we will discuss how this semantics of desire relates to the dynamice ex preted inthe notions of discharge, repression, cathexis, ec. But it {Simportat to stress from the sat that this dynamies—or ener- seis, of even hydraulcs—is articulated onl in @ semantics: the "eissitudes of isnt," to use one of Freud's expressions, can be aitsined only inthe viisitudes of meaning. Therein lies the deep reason forall the analogies between dreams and wit, dreams 20d myth, dreams and work of a, dreams and religious “ison,” ete. All hase “psychical productions” belong to the area of meaning ‘and come under a unified question: How do desires achieve speech? How do desires make spesch fall, and why do they themscies fail to speak? This new approach tothe whole of human speech, 10 the meaning of human dese, is what ents psychoanalysis t0 ts place inthe general debate on language. 1st posable to locate more exactly jst where psychoanalysis enters this general debate? Having found the orgin ofthe problem in tbe theme of Freud's fst great book, [et us ao look there fora fst indication ofthe program of psycho analysis. We are not yet ready to enter into the book itself but at leas the tile Traumdewtung may serve a8 guide. In this com paste word we are confronted with the question of dreams and the {question of interpretation. Let us take the two paths of the te and fellow each ia then. The interpretation is concerned with dreams the word “dream” is nota wor that closes, bata word that opens. 1 dees not close in upon a marginal phenomenon of out psyho- logical lie, upon the fantasies of our night, the onic. It opens ‘ut onto ail pyehical production, those of insanity and these of culture, insofar a they are the anaiogues of dreams, whatever may be the degree and principle ofthat relationship. Along with teams is posted what I called above the vemantics of dese, a semantics that centers around a somewhat nuclear theme: as aman of desires go forth in diguise—larvrus prodeo. By the sme token lan- guage ite is from the outst sn for the most part dsorted: it ‘means something other than what it says, thas a double meaning, itis equivocal. The dream and its analogues ae ths set within & region of language that presents itself as the locus of complex sig- nifiations where another meaning is both given and hidden in an Jmmediae meaning. Let us eal this region of double meaning “symbol” and reserve dscusion ofthe equivalence for later. ‘The problem of double meaning isnot peculiar to psychoanal- 4s Its also known to the phenomenology of religion in its con- ‘Sant encounter with those great cosmic symbols of earth, Heaven, ‘water, lie, tres, and stones, and with those strange narratives bout the eign and end of things which are the myths. However, insofar as this discipline is phenomenology and not psychoanalysis, the myths, tual and beliefs it studies are not fables but a particu lar way in which man places himsif in elation to fundamental realy, whatever it maybe, The problem dealt with by the peson- ‘nology of religion isnot primarily the disimution of Gesie in double meaning; this discipline does not bepin by regarding sym- bol asa distortion of language. For the phenomenclogy of rel lon, symbols are the manifestation inthe senile—in imagina- Hon, gestures, and feelings —of a furthor reality, the expression of &| portant, since it covers the totaly of double meaning expressions. ‘Atte same tine the frm of the debate stand the key question ‘Proposed: Ts the shoming-iding of double meaning alvays a di ‘Siblation of what desire means, or can it sometimes be a manifs- tation, a revelation, ofthe sacred? And is this alternative itself eal ‘or ilsory, provisional or definitive? This question rons throughout this book. Before elaborating inthe next chapter the terms ofthe debate and before sketching the method of its eslutin, let us continue to txplre the oalines ofthe problem. [Let us return tothe title ofthe Troumdewtung and flow the ‘other path of this great tile, The term Deuung doss not mean science in general way; it means interpretation in a precise way. ‘Te word is chosen by design, and ie juxtaposition withthe theme of dreams is itself quite meaningful. If dreams desigste—pars pro {oto—the entre region of double measing expressions, the problem of interpretation in tum designates all understanding spcically ‘concerned with the meaning of equivocal expressions. To interpret {nto understand a double meaning Tn this way the place of psyhoanalyis within the total sphere of language is specified it isthe area of symbols or double meaaings and the ares in which the vavious manners of interpretation co front one another. From now on we shall allthis special area, ‘broader than psychoanalysis but narower than the theory ofl guage ea whole which ists horizon, dhe “hermeneutic field.” By Femenestcs we shall always understand the theory of the rules ‘that preside over an exepesis—shat is, ove the interpretation of particular text, oF ofa group of sigs that may be viewed asa text (We shall expan Inter whet we mean by the notion of text and by the extension of the concept of exeyesis to all signs bearing an analogy toa text.) Tf then double-meaning expressions constitute the privileged theme of the hermeneatic fel, it sat once cles that the problem ‘of symbolism enters a philosophy of language by the intermediary ofthe act of interpretation. ‘Bt this iia decision to nterelate the problem of symboism and the problem of interpretation rss a ses of cris! questions ‘hich I wish to pote a the beginning ofthis book. These questions trill not be resolved in this chapter but will remain open to the end, tis precisely this mutual relationship that makes the hermeneutic problem a unique one; at the same time i is decisive forthe deini- ‘Hons of symbol an interpretation. And these are anything bat self evident. The extreme confusion of voabulary in these mates calls for a decison, for taking a positon and sticking tot; nd this dock slon entails whole philsophy which must be brought into the ‘open. Thave decided to defn, ie. iit, the notions of symbol and Jmerpretaton through oae another. Thus a symbol is 4 double- meaning linguistic expression that requires an inerprstation, and Interpretation is a work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols. The erilcal discussion wil be concerned with te lest imacy of seeking the semantic eterion of symbolism i the inten tional stricture of double meaning, and with the lptimsey of taking this structure asthe privileged object of interpretation, This ‘what iat stake in my decison to mutually delimit the Sed of sym Bolism and interpretation, Tn the semantic discussion to follow I shall bracket the confit that, atleast on a fst reading, opposes prychosnastic interpreta tion, as well as any interpretation conceived ae the unmasking, emystication, or reduction of ilusions, to interpretation con ‘ceived a the recollection or restoration of meaning Iam interested here merely in recognizing the contours ofthe hermeneutic fel, although a discussion that alls hort ofthe above confit undoubt- ‘edly remains formal and abstract. es important at fit not to de Imatiz the debate but rather to contain it within the sit limite ofa semantic analysis that igoores the opposition between distortion and revelation ‘TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF sYaHNOL ‘Lotus take up the question on the side of symbolism. Certain widespread uses of the Word sre totally Incompatible with ove another and call for a reasoned decison, ‘The definition T propose les between two other definitions, one {00 broad, the other foo narrow, which we shall proceed to discus ‘Moreover, itis completely distinct from the conception of symbol in symbolic logic; we sall beable to account for thie third difer- ence only afer we have elaborated the problem of hermeneutics fd have located this problem within a wider philosophical perspec- "Too broad a definition is one that makes the “symbole function” the general function of mediation by which the mind or conscious tess construct all is universes of perception and discourse; this ‘efniton, ais known, isthe one given by Est Cassiver in his Philosphy of Symbotc Forms. We shoul ot forget thatthe ex plicit aim of Casier, inspired by Kant’spilosophy, was to break {he too narrow framework ofthe transcendental method confined bitin th etgue ofthe pincples of Newtonian philosopy and to explore al the activites of synthesis and their corresponding realms ‘St obpetivzation, But si legitimate to we the term “symbole” for those various “forms” of synthesis in which objets are ruled by functions, for those “ores” each of which produces and posts 2 ‘world? ‘Let us do justice to Caster: he was the fist to have posed the problem ofthe reconstruction of language. The notion of symbolic form, pir to consituting an answer, delimis a question, namely, the question ofthe composition ofthe “mediating functions" within a single fonction, which Cassierealls das Symbolische. “The sym- bolic designates the common denominator of al the ways of objee- tivzng, of giving meaning to reality. ‘Bat why call this oncton symbolic? Case chose the term fst ‘ot alin order to expres the universality ofthe Copernican revolu- ‘ion, which substituted the question of bjectivizaton by the mids sythete function for the question of reality as it in iell. The Symbolic i the universal mediation ofthe mind between ourselves ‘nd the reals the symbolic, above all, indicates the nonimmediacy of our apprehension of realty. The use ofthe erm in mathematics, linguistics, and the history of religion seems to confirm that “sym Dole” has this species of universality Furthermore, te word “symbol” seems well sited t0 designate the cultural instrument of our apprehension of tealty Inguae, religion, at, scence, The task of&phileophy of symbolic forms i to arbitrate the claims of aboluteness of each of these symbolic functions and the many antinomies of the concept of culture that result from tho else. "inal the word “symbol” express the mutation undergone by a theory’of cteperies—space, time, cause, number, etc—whea it scapes the limits ofa mere epistemology and moves from a ertque lof reason toa ertigue of culture To not deny the advantages ofthis choice, sil lest the lgi- macy of Case’: problem, although the Kenan tansenden tals which continues to govern the notions of objectvzation, synthesis, and reality is prejudicial, in my opinion, to the work of desription and lasifestion of the symbolic forms, We mentioned the unigue problem that Cassier denotes by the term “symbol” from the beginning: the probem ofthe unity of language andthe intercelationsip of ite mulkple functions within a single empire of scours. But this problem sem to me better characterized by the ‘notion of sign or sgifying function* How man gives meaning by ‘ling a seasory content with meaning—that isthe problem Cat ser deals with, Tsthis a dspate over words? Ido not think so. What i at take in this terminological discussion isthe specifiy ofthe hermeneutic problem, By urifyng all the funetions of mediation under the the (Of “the symbol,” Cassier makes this concept equally a broad as the concep of reality and culture, Thus a fundamental dsinetion is wiped out, which constutes, as Tee it, a true dividing lin: the Aistintion between univocal and plrivocal expressions. Iti this isnt that erates the hermeneutic problem. Moreover, Anglo- ‘Saxon linguistic philosophy wil see tot that we are mind of this cation, the mythic cammentary—that declarer the cosmic expres: sivenes, thanks to the double meaning of the words earth, heaven, water, life, ee. "The work's expressivenese achicves language ‘through symbol as double meaning. The situation sno dierent in the second zane ofthe emergence ‘of symbolism, tht ofthe onerc, if one designates by this word the dreams of ou days and our nhs, H ie well Kaown that dreams ate the royal road to psychoanalysis, All question of schools ase reams attest that we constantly mean something other than what we sayin dreams the manifest meaning endlesaly refers to hidden ‘meaning; thats what makes every create a poet. From this point of view, dreams express the private archeology of the dreamer, which at times coincides with that of entire peoples; that is why Fread offen limits the notion of symbol to those once themes Which repeat mythology.* But even when they do not coincide the mythical and the oneiric have in common this tucture of double ‘meaning, The dream asa nccturnalspetaceis unknown tus it isacesibe only through the account ofthe waking hours. The aa lst interprets ths aecount, substituting fori another text whichis, inhiseyes, the thought-conient of desire, i. what desire would say could speak without restraint must be assumed, and this prob Jem will occupy us a length, that dreams in themselves border on language, since they can be told, analyzed, interpreted. ‘The third zone of emergence is that of poetic imagination. T Aight have started here were it not fr the fst that without the detour through the cosmic and oneiri, poetic imagination is the least undersiood ofthe thee, Too often it hasbeen said that ime agintion isthe power of forming images. This is not true i by lage one means the representation of an absent or unreal thing, roces of enderngpresent—ofpresenifying—te thing over ther, hewhere, or nowhere. In no way does poetic imagination reuse itself tothe poner of forming « mental picture ofthe unreal the Imagery of sensory origin merely serves ata vehicle and a mati fo the verbal power whose true dimension is gvea to ws by the ‘neti athe cosmic. As Bachelard ays, the poetic image “places 1s tthe origin of articulate being the poetic image “becomes & new being in our language, it expresses us by making us what it ‘expresses "This word-image, which rons though the representae tionimage, is symbolism. ‘Three times, then, the problem of symbolism hes turned ou o be coextensive withthe problem of language itself, There ino sym bolsm prior to man who speaks, even though tbe power of symbols is rooted more deeply, inthe expressiveness of the cosmos, in What desire wants to sa, inthe vared image-contnts that men have, ‘But in each casei is in language that the cosmos, deste, andthe lmaginary achieve speech To be sure, the Palm says: "The heave fens tel the glory of God.” But the heavens do not speak; or rather they speak through the prophets, they speak through hyrmas, they speak through liturgy. Thee must always Bea ord to ake up the ‘world and tura it into hitophang, Likewise the dreamer, in his private dream, is closed tall be begins to nstevt us only when he counts his dream, This narrative ls what presents the problem, just ike the hymn of the pssimist. Thus it is the poet who sows us the birth of te word i hidden form in the enigmas ofthe cos mos and ofthe psyche. The power ofthe poe is to show orth sym bos at the moment when “poetry places language in a state of emergene,” to quote Bachelard again whecea ital and myth i ‘symbols in thir hiratic stability, and dreams clos them ia upon the labyrinth of desies where the dreamer loses the thread of his {obidden and mutilated discourse. "In oder to give consistency and unity to these seateed maifes- tutions of symbol, T define it by a semantic sruture that these ‘manifeatons have in common, the sructre of multiple meaning. Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree jn which the meaning, not satifed with designating some one thing, designates another mening atanable ony in and through the fst intentionality, is ere that we are tempted by another definition which thie time sisks being t00 narrow. The definition is suggested to us by some of our examples. I consists in characterizing the bond of 2, Gaston Buchel Le Plt de Feigser (Pas Preis Usivese sate ae rane 151), Ties Pb meaning 10 meaning in a symbol as antlogy. To revert the ‘examples ofthe symbolism of evi, is there not an analogy between ‘spot ad stain, deviation and sin, burden and fault, which would be, ina way, the analogy of the physical and the existential? Is there not also an analogy between te okmensity ofthe heavens and the inity of being, whatever that signifies? Is not analogy atthe rook ofthe “eomespondences” of which the poet sings? Does not this 5). “ cat eck aid eto mtn 3 pepe elena py ast! SENS 2 types of discourse to thetic and poses and retains only dears tive dicoure, the fist form of which isthe afrmation that “says something of something” Let us sop with these definitions: they sufce to clarify in what sens the “semantic voice”—te sgifying word—is interpretation is iterpretaton inthe sease hat, for Cassie, the symbol is unie versal medion; we say the ral By slanfying it ia this sense we interpeet it The break between sgrifation and the thing has aleady occured with nouns, and this intervening distance marks the locus of interpretation. Not all lscourse is necessarily within the truest does not adhere to being. In tis regard, nouns that desig- nate ftitions things—the “poststag” of Ch. 1 of the Arsoteian Iteatie-—cleaely show that there can be signification without the posing of erstence, But we would not have thought of ealing houns “interpretation” if we didnot se their signifying import in| the light ofthat of verbs and that of vebs inthe context of dis ‘course, and if ins tum, the signifying import of dicourse were not concenteatd in declarative discourse that sas something of ‘something. To say something of something i, in the complete end strong Sense ofthe term, ointerpret "How does this “interpretation,” propee tothe declarative propo sition orient us toward the modern concept of ermenevtcs? The connection isnot immediately evident. The “to say something of fomething” interests Aristo only insofar a i the locus of the fue and the falie, Hence the problem of the opposition between lfmmation and negation becomes te central theme of the teat the semantics ofthe decaraive proposition serves merely a6 an Introduction tothe logic of propostions which sesetialy a logic of oppesitin, and the Iter in turn lads to the Analytics, Le. the logic of arguments. This logical sim prevents the development of 5. The ntion of interpretation ces ote fre inthe wrk. On te one feng ilo: oie abe, (Ch. 3 inl Some ett ore anirumen of the webton hich semantics for its ona sake, Further, the way toa hermeneutics of double-meaningsignifcations appears blocked from another sie. ‘The notion of signification requires univocity of meaning: the def nition of the principle of idenity, in ite logical and ontological sense, demands i Univecty of meaning is ulimately grounded in ceence, oe and seleidential; the entire refutation of the sophis- tical arguments is based upon this recourse to essence: "Not to have fone meaning isto have no meaning."* Thus communication be- tween men i posible only if woeds have a meaning Le. one mean ing ‘A reflection that extends the properly semantic analysis of the “to say something of something” leads us back tothe area of our sown problem, If man interprets realty by saying something of fomething, i is because real meanings Ae indirect attain things only by atribsting a meaning to a measing. Predication, inthe Jogial sense ofthe tem, pus ito canoacal form a relation of sig letion that frees ust reexamine the theory of univeity. The study of sophisicalreasoaing poses not ne problem but 160: the problem of the univocity of meanings without which dialogue is Imposible, and the problem oftheir "communication”——e0 use the expresion of Pat's Sophis—without which attribution is impos Sle, Without ths counterpart univocity condemns one to logical stomism, acoeding to which a meaning simply is what its. eis not nough to srugle against sophinic equivosty; a second front must ‘be opened against Eletic tnivocity. Nor is this second struggle without an echo inthe pilosophy of Asal. I breaks cu even at the heat of the Meraphysies: the notion of Being cannot be univor cally defied: "being is said in several waye being means sab- Sanee, qualiy, time, pce, and so on. The famous isincton of ‘the maay meanings of being i not an snomaly in discourse, ‘xpton in the theory of signification, The many meanings of are the categories—or fgures—of predication; hence this mult lity cus actos the whole of discourse. Nor can it be overcome Although it does not constitute @ pure disorder of words, seing ‘thatthe diferent meanings ofthe word “being” are al ordered by reference to a ist, orginal meaning, sl dis uty of reference 6 Metaphysics), 10067 roe her leromenon—does not make one signification; the notion ‘of being, it has recently been seid, is but “the problematic unity of fnirzedicibl plurality of meanings." do not mean to draw from the general semantics ofthe Peri erméneias a trom the panicular semantics of the word “being” ‘more than i allowed; Ido ot say that Aristotle raised the problem of plusvocal meanings in the way we shall elaborate it hee. T smetely suggest hat his defiion of interpretation as "to sy some- thing of something” lads toa semantis distin from lgio and that his disession ofthe molple meanings of being opens a breach in the purely logial and ontological theory of univorty. The task of founding theory of interpcetation, conceived asthe understanding of plrivocal meanings, has nt yet been accomplished. The second teaition wll ring us closer tothe goal. “The second tradition comes to ur from bibles exegesis. Her imeneutics inthis sense isthe science of the rules of exegesis the laner being understood as the particular interpretation of a tet ‘There is no question thatthe problem of hemeneutics has (0 & seat extent been constituted within the Boundaries ofthe interpre {ation of Holy Sripcure. Tao core of this hermeneutics les in what has traditionally teen called the "Your senses of Scripture.” It can- not be emphasized too strongly that philosophers should be more attentive to those exegetical discussions in which a general theory of interpretation was operative® Therein particule the notions of analogy, allegory, an symbolic meaning Were elaboated—notions to which we shal frequenly have to retura. This second tradition, then, relates hermencutis to the definition of symbol by analogy, although it doesnot entirely redoce hermeneutic to this detniton ‘What limits the definition of exegecal hermeneutics i, st, is reference to an authority, whether mooarchical, collegial, or eccle- sas the later being the case of biblical hermeneutics as prac- ticed Within the Chistian communities. Most of all, however, iis Timited by being applied to alerary txt: exegesis Isa science of| wings. Sil, the exegetical tration affords «good stating pont for our Bea Ee nde mia (4 val Pai, Ait, 1959-6. caterpis, for the notion of text ean be taken in an antlogous Sense. Thanks to the metaphor af “he book of nature the Mide ‘Ages was able to speak ofan interpretaio naira. This metaphor brings to light possible extension of the notion of exegesis in asmuch as the notion of “ext” i wider than that of "scripre” With the Renaissance the interpretatio naturae was completely freed from its properly scriptural references, with the result that Spinoza could use it (0 inaugurate a new conception of biblical ekepesis. The interpretation of nature, he says in the Theoloiee- Poliical Treats, isto inspire a new hermeneutics ruled by the principle of the interpretation of Seriptre by isle. This sep of Spinazas, which does not interest ws here from the steely biblical pint of view, marks a curious rebound ofthe Interpretati natorae ‘upon the interpretation of Scripture: the forme secur model is now called imo question, and the new model is henceforward the {mterpretationatoae This noion of text—thus feed from the notion of scripture ot ‘writing is of considerable interest, Proud often makes se of i, particularly when he compares the work of analysis to translating from one language to another; the dream account isan unistli- sible text for which the analyst subscutes a more intelligible text. ‘To understand isto make this substitution. The title Traumdeutung, hich we have brily considered aloes to this analogy between snalyis and exegesis ‘AL this pint we may raw an inal comparison betwoen Freud and Nietwsche. Nietsche borrowed the concept of Deuturg or Ausiegung from the discipline of philology and introduced it into Dilsophy. I iste that Niewsche remains a philologist when he Imterprets Greek tagedy or the preSocraicy, but with him the ‘whole of philosophy Recomes interpretation. Interpretation of what? We shall answer that question Inter, whea we ener into the conflict of interpretation, For the preset this point can be made: the new carer opened up forthe concept of interpretation i linked to new problematic of representation, of Vorstellang. It is m0 Jongee the Kantian quertion of how a subjective representation ot idea can have objective validity; this question, central toa critcal Dillosophy, gives way tow more radical ene. Th problem of objee- tive vty sil remained inthe oxbit of the Platonic philosophy of truth and science, of which error and opnioa are the conraies. ‘The problem of interpretation refers to & new possibility which Is zo longer eter err inthe epistemological sense or Iying in the ‘oral sets, bt illson, che status of which we wil discus further fn, Lets leave aside fo the moment the problem we shall ttn shorty, namely, the use of interpretation as a tactic of suspicion and fsa batle aginst mask; this ue ells for @ very specific phils ‘phy which subordinates the ene problem of truth and error 19 the expression ofthe will fo power. The important point here, fom the standpoint of method is the new extension given to the exege cea concep of interpretation, revi’ position ies at one of the ends ofthis extension, For htm, iterpreaton is concerned not only wih a scripture or wring but with any set of sign that may be taken asa tet to decipher, hence {dream of neurotic symptom, aswel asa ritual myth, work of art, fra belie, Thus me return to our notion of symbol as double meane Sn. withthe question sll undecided whether double meaning 1s simulation or revelation, necessary lying or access tothe sacred ‘We had in mind an enlarged concept of exegesis when we defined hermeneutics asthe seience of exegctical rules and exegesis as the ierpretaton ofa particular text or of a set of signs considered as 8 text "As may be seen, this ntermite defaition, which goes beyond fa mere seriptural scence without being disiolved in a general theory of meaning, roceves is authority from both sourecs. The ‘exegetical source seems the closer, but the problem of univocty and tsuivrity to which interpretation in the Aristotelian sense lads us is perhaps sill more radical than the problem of analogy inexege- sis, We retum fo this inthe next chapter. On the other hand, the problem of illusion, cental to de Niewschian Auslegung, brings Us| {othe threshold ofthe key dificult that govern the fate of moder Inermencuties. Ths dificult, which we shall now consider, i not & mete duplicate of the one involved inthe definition of symbol i is 2 eifieultypesulit to the act of interpreting s such “The difeuty—it inated my research inthe fst plce—~is hs there is no geteral hermeneutics, no universal canon for exegesis, THE PLACING OF FREUD ” ‘ut only disparate and opposed theories concerning the rues of inerpretation. The hermeneutic fel, whose outer contours we Ihave raced is internally at variance wit ise have neither the inteation noe the means to attempt a complete enumeration of hermeneutic styles. The more enlightening coure, itseems to me, ito start withthe polarized opposition that erates the greatest tension at the oust of our investigation, According to the one pole, hermeneutics is understood asthe manifestation and restoration oft meaning adéresed to me inthe manner of a mes sige, a proclamation, or ass sometimes said, a kerypma; according fo the other poe itis understood as a demystiation, as a redue~ tion of illusion. Psychoanal atleast ona fst reading aligns i= self withthe second understanding of hermeneutics. From the begining we must consider this double possibilty: this tension, this extreme polar, is the truest expesion of our “mod ceri." The situation in whic language today finds itself comprises this doube posits, this double soltation and urgency the ‘one hand, purty discourse of is excrescences, liquidate the iol, ‘0 from drunkenness to sobity, realize our sate of poverty once nd forall; on the other hand, use the most “sisi,” destructive, iconoclastic movement so as to let speak what once, what each time, was sid, when meaning appeared anew, when meaning was at is fullest. Hermeneuis seems to me to be animated by this Aube motivation: willingness to suspect, willingness to listen, vow of rigor, vow of obedience. In our time we have not fished doing ‘away with idols and we have barely begun t lsten to symbole. Tt ‘may be that this situation, in is apparent distress, is instructive: it ‘may be that extreme iconocasm belongs tothe restoration of mean- ing "The underlying reason for inially posing the problem in the bove way iso bring int the open the crisis of language that today makes us osillate between demyatifcation and restoration of mesa ing, To my mind, an inzoduction to the payehoanalys of cure has had to prosed in this roundabout way. In the next caper we willy to probe deper into these prolegomena and elt the eis ‘of language to an astesis of reflection whose fst moverent i (0 Iet lise te dispossessed ofthe origin of meaning. ‘To finch locating psychoanalysis within the general dscusion of Tanguage, te tems ofthe conflict need tobe sketched ‘This section is concerned with her- ‘meneutics as the restoration of meaning. The point at issee In the psychoanalysis of eultre and the school of suspicion is beter understood if we first contrast what i adealy opposed to them. “The coatrary of suspicion, Iwill ay bluntly, is fait. What faith? No longer, tobe sure, the ist faith ofthe simple soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engage in bermeneutcs, ith that Ina undergone crtcism, postrital faith. Let us lok for itn the series of pilorophic decisions that secretly animate a phenom nology of religion and li hidden even within its apparent neura- ity Its a rational ith, for ititerprets; bat i is faith Beeause it seeks, through intrpetatin, a second naivest. Phenomenology is its instrument of hearing, of recollection, of restoration of meaning “Believe in onder to understand, understand in order to believe ‘such sits maxim; and is maxim isthe "hermeneutic circle” itself of boliving and understanding. We will ake our examples frm the phenomenology of religion in the wide ens, embracing here the work of Lenhart, Van det ‘Leeuw, and Eliade, to which I add my owa research in The Sym- Doli of Evi Tew be oar task to disengage and display the rational uth that runs through the purely ftenionalanaljsis of religious symbolism and "converts this stening analysis from within, "The first imprint of thie faith ina revelation throwgh the word i to be sen in the care or concer for the object, a characteris of all phenomenological analysis. That concer, as we know, presents ‘self as a "nouea” wish to describe and ot to reduce. One reduces by explaining trough causes (psychalogial, socal, ec), through ‘genesis (indvidval, historia, ee), though function (fective, Heologcal, te). One describes by disengaging the (noeti) inten ion and its (noematic) correlate—the something intended, the im plist object in itl, myth, and bebe. Ths, nthe case ofthe sy bolsm ofthe pure and the impure allded to in Chapter 1, the tsk [sto understand what is signed, what quality ofthe sacred i ine fended, what shade of threats implied in the analogy between spot and ssn, between piysical contamination and the los of exsten- tial integrity. In my own research, concer forthe object consisted in surender tothe movement of meaning which, starting from the eral sense—the spot or contamination—points to something rsiped in the region of the sacred, To generalize from thy We stall say that the theme of the phenomenology of religion is the something intended in itval actions, in mythical speech, in bei ot| mystical feeling; it task sto disimpliate that object from the varie ‘ous intentions of behavior, discourse, and emotion. Let us eal thie Intended object the “sacred” without determining its nature, whether it be the remenduns rurinosum, asconding to Rudoll tio; “the powerful” according to Van er Leeuw; of “funda- rental Time,” according to Eliade. Ia this general sense, and with «view to undetining the concer for the intentional objet, We may sy that every phenomenology of celigion is « phenomenology ofthe sacred. However, is it posible for a phenomenology ofthe ‘sacred 0 stay within the mits of a neutral ate governed by the ‘poche, by the bracketing of absolute realty and of every question concerning the absolute? The epoché requis that I participate in the belie inthe rey ofthe religious object, but fa neutralized ‘mode; that believe withthe Beever, but without posting abso- Intl the object of hs bli, But while the sient as such en and must practice this method of bracketing, the philosopher as such cannot and most not avoid the question of the absolute validity of his object. For would I be interested in the object, could I stress concern for the objet, through the consideration of cause, genesis or function, if id no expect, from within understanding, this something t0 “address” ‘vel t me? Is not the expectation of being spoken to what mot vats the concern for the object? Implied inthis expectation is @ confidence in language: the bei that language, which bear sym bol, snot so much spoken by men as spoken to men, that men te tor into language, into the light of the opos “who enlightens very man who comes into the World.” Ti this expectation, this Confidence this bel that confers on the study of symbols spar teutar seriousoess, To be tutu, X must ay itis what animate all tay zeearch, But it alo what tolay s contested by the whole ream of hermeneutics that me shal soon place under the heading fof snuspicon " This later theory of interpretation begins by doubt- ‘ng wheter there i such an object and whether this objet could be the place of the transformation of intentionality into Keryzma, tmanfctation, proclamation, This hermeneutics is not an expliea- tion ofthe object, but a tearing off of mass, an interpretation that reduces disguises, ‘Second, according to the phenomenology of religion, there i a “rath of symbols his tut, inthe neural atte ofthe Huser in epoché, means merely the fllment—dle Erfilung—of the enifying intention. For & phenomenology of religion to be pos: ble it i necessary and suflent that there be not only one but feveral ways of fling varios intentions of meaning according 19 ‘Various regions of objects, Verifieation, inthe sense of lopieal pos Tivism, is one typeof fofllment among others and not the canon al mode of flfiloent i sa type required by the corresponding type of object, namely, the physieal object and, in another sense, the historical objet—but not bythe coacept of truth as uch or, ther words, by the requirement of fulfillment in general Tt i in Virtue ofthis taulipicty of types of flliment that phenome- ology in a reduced, neutralized mode, speaks of religious experi- nce, not by analogy, but according 10 the specific type of objet fn the specie mos of allment in hat fel ‘We encountered this problem of fulllment In the order of ym ‘oli meanings in our investigation of the analogical bond between the primary or literal “signer” andthe secondary “signfed"—for fxample, the bond between spot and stain, between deviation (oF ‘wandering) and sn, between weight (or burden) and fault Here wee ron up aginst a pemorda, unfailing relationship, which never hs the conventional and arbitary character of “techoial” signs that mean ony what posted in them In this relaonship of meaning to meaning resides what I have called the filles of language, The fullness consists the fact that the second meaning somehow dwells in the fist meaning. Tn his Traté dhitire générale des religions, Mircea Eliade clasly shows thatthe force ofthe cosmic symbolism resides in te nonae- btrary bond between th visible heavens and the order they mani- fess thanks 19 the analogical power that binds mesning t9 mean ing, the heavens speak of he wise a the js, te immense and the ‘ordered, Symbols are bound in a double seas: bound 0 and bound by. On the one hand, the sacrod is Bound fo its primary, literal, sensible meanings thls is what constitutes the opacity of symbols On the other hand, the Meal meaning is Bound By the symbolic rmesning that resides init; this fs what T have called the revealing power of symbols, which gives them thee force in spite of their ‘opacity. The revealing poner of symbols opposes symbols to tech- ‘ical signs, which metely signify whats posted in them and which, therefore, canbe emptied, formalized, and reduced to mere objects fof wealeulus, Symbols alone give what they sy. But in saying this have we not aleady broken the phenomeno- Iogical neutrality? F admit it T admit that what deeply motivates the interes in fll language, fn boand language, i his iverson ofthe ‘ovement of thought which now adresses itself fo me and makes Ine a subject tht is spoken to. And this iverson is produced in ttalogy. How? How does that which binds meaning to meaning bind me? The movement that draws me toward the second meaning assimilates me to what is sid, makes me participate in what is Announced tome. The simiitude in which the fore of symbols Sides and fom which they daw their revealing power isnot an objective lkenes, which I may look upon lke & elation laid ut before me; itis sn existential assimilation, according tothe move- rent of analogy, of my beng to being. “This allusion tothe socient theme of participation helps us make 4 third stp along the path of explication, which is aso the path of intelectual honesty: the flly declared philosophical decision ani- rating the Iteationl analysis would be a medern version ofthe ancien theme of reminizcence, After the sence and forgetfulness ‘made wiespread by the manipulation of empty signs andthe con struction of formalized languages, the modem conecrn for symbols ttprescs anew desie tobe addressed. “This expectancy oft new Word, ofa new tidings ofthe Word the implicit intention of every phenomenology of symbols, which frst puts the accent on the abject, then underscores the fuses of ‘symbol, to faally greet the revealing power of the primal word. We shall complete our assigning of place to Fred by giving him not just one interlocutor but a whole company. Over aghast interpretation as restoration of meaning we shall oppose interpretation according to what I collectively call the schoo of suspicion. ‘A general theory of interpretation would thes have to account not oaly forte opposition between two interpretations of interpre- tation, the one as recollection af meaning, the other as reduction of the illusions and les of consciousness; but also fr the division and {scattering of each of thes two great “schools” of interpretation ito “tories” that difer from one another and are even foreign t0 one anothce. This no doubt trer of the school of suspicion than of the school of reminiscones. Three masters, semingly mutually ex- clusive, dominate the school of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud It sear to show their common opposition to a phenom «nology ofthe sacred, understood asa propaceutic othe “revelar tion” of meaning. than their iterelatonship within a single method of demystifcation. It relatively easy to note that these three figures all contest the primacy of the objet in our representa tion ofthe sacred, a well asthe fulfling ofthe intention of the sacred by a type of analogy of being that would engraft ‘us onto being dough the power ofan assimilating intention. Ii aso easy to recognize that this contesting isan exeriseof suspicion in thee dierent ways; “truth as Tying” would be the negative heading lunder which one might place these tree exercises of suspicion. But vee are stl far from having assimilated the positive meaning of the sterprises ofthese three thinkers. Weare stl oo attentive to their Aiterenes and to the limitation thatthe prejudices oftheir mes impose upon their sucesors even more than upon themselves ‘Thus Mare it relegated to esonomice and the absurd theory of the reflex consciousness; Nitche ie drawm toward bilogism and a perpectivism incapable of expressing itself without contradiction; Freud is restricted to psychlay and decked outwith a simplistic panexuabism, If ve go back to the intention they had ia common, we fn init {he decision to look upon the whole of consciousness primarily a8 “ake” conciousness, They thereby tke up agin, each ina dilr- ent mane, the problem ofthe Cartesian doubt, to cary i to the very hese of the Cartesian stronghold. The philosopher trained in fe school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they fre not such a they appear; but he does not doubt that conscious: res is such as it appears to itself in consciousness, meaning and conciousness of meaning coincide. Since Mars, Nietache, and Freud, this too has become doubifl, After the doubt about things, we have started to doubt consciousness “These three masters of suspicion are not to be misunderstood, however, a three masters of skepticism. They are, assuredly, three reat “destroyers.” Bat that of ise should ot mislead ws; dst ‘ion, Heidegger says in Sein und Zeit, i a moment of every naw foundation, including the destruction of religion, insofar a eigion |g in Nietzsche's phrase, a “Patonism forthe people.” I is Beyond formulates the common patil meaning, namely, that any hypo- thetic statement with @ rue antecedent anda false consequent ‘must be fale; the symbol is thus an abbreviation of 2 Songer yt- boism which expresses the negation of the conjunction of the tut value ofthe antecedent and the falsity of the consequent: ~

tory, as serie a ts irrefutable, of the Fahink, 1 a: it wil have become concrete reflection; and its concreteness will be due (0 the harsh hermeneutie discipline. BOOK II Analytic: Reading of Freud Introduction How to Read Freud Before entering my “Essay to Un- batant among many; in the end, he shall have Become the priv leged witness of the total combat, for all he oppestion wil be eat- ied ver into itn. ‘We wil rt come across hs ales now no longer alongside him ‘ba within him, The isues eased by Nitsche and Marx will grad- tally be sen to ie tothe heart of the Freudian question as ques tions of language, ethics, and culture. The thre interpretations of culture that we usualy st side by sde wil encroach upon one Snother, the question ofeach becoming the question ofthe ott. ‘But the greatest change in the course ofthese sucesive readings vill concer Freud's relationship to what is most opposed to him, Damely, a hermeneutics ofthe sacred. Ist wanted to become in- ‘volved inthe vest oppostion, inorder to pve myself the widest ange of thought, AE the start, ia an interpretation of peycho tnalysis completely governed by Freud's own systematizaiion, all ‘opposition is external; psychoanalysis has is “opposite” outside of ‘et. This st reading is necesary; it serves a8 & discipline of re= fection; it brings about the dsposesion of consciousness and gov tm the ascei ofthat narisism that wishes to be taken for the true Cogito, Hence this reading and it arsh schooling wil not be retracted bat rather preserved inthe final reading. Its only in a Second reading, that of our “Dialect,” thatthe external and com Dltly mechaticel opposition between the contending points of ‘View cane convert into an aternal opposition, with each point Ol view becoming in away ts opposite and bearing within ill the {rounds of the contrary point of view. “The basi reason for not ging directly to the dletcal view les in our concern fora dsipline of thought. First we must do jusice to each point of vow separately; we must adopt, so to speak, thei Instractiveexcloiveness. Next We must account for Ci oppos!- tion; we most do away with convenient ecleccisms and post all the oppastions a external. We wl uy to maintain this discptine of ‘ought hence we wil enter psychoanalysis from its most demand> ing side, it sytematization, which Froud callod his "metapy- stotogy” "2, But our “Analytic” snot a seltenclosd reading on single Jove; from the beginning i is oriented toward a more dialectical View, according to the movement from the more abstract tthe ‘more concrete that sustains the series of readings. T use the word “absiaet” notin the vagus and improper seas, according to which an idea is abstract when ts withoat basis in experience, detached {tom facts, purely theoretical,” but inthe presse and proper wns The topographic theory and is conjoined economics are not ab stract in the sense of being emote om the fats. Inthe seienes of ‘man, “theory” grounds the facts; the “fects of psychoanalysis are Set up by the tbeory—in Freadian language, by the “metapy. tology”; theory and facts can only be confirmed or invalidated together. “Tn what sense, the, isthe Freudian “topography” abstract? In the sense that it does not account forthe inlerubjctve mature of the dramas forming i main theme. Whether ic be the deama of the ‘parental relation of the dram of the therapeutic relation isl, in ‘Which the ther situations achieve speech, what nourishes analysis is always a debate between constiouseses. Moreover, in the Freudian topography that debate is projected onto a representation of the psjehical apparaus in which oaly the "vicissitudes of in- ‘sini within an Bolated psyhism are themaized. Stated bluntly, the Freudian systematization is solipsisic, whereas the situations and relations analysis speaks of and which speak in analysis are intersubjective. Therein es the abstract character of the Bist ea ing we propose in Part I ofthe "Anslti.” Tat is why he topog. raphy, adopted at fest asa necessary dscpine, wil gradually come to be seen a5 a provisional level of reference which will noe be sandoned bu surpassed and retsined. Gradual, within the “Ans yet, the reading of Freud will become enriched and inverted ee iescontny, unt the moment is reached when it wll peak a tines inthe manner of Hegel. "The manages of the movement that caries the Analytic toot i Dist are a fll. In a fist yele, entitled “Ee (pie and Hermenctis we wil st forth the basic concepts of aetna interpretation, This sty, properly epistemological in aaa contr on the metapsyehotoical papers of the years SOLE Ls in the investigation we ll be guided by one question: | Whatisaterpetation in payehoanalyss? This inguiry must precede wey sedy of cultural phenomena, forthe sights ofthat interpreta ‘ideas well a5 its Limits of validity depend exclusively upon the wernticn of this epistemological problem. This fist group of chap Tan thih wl allow fit closely the historical order of the con- ‘Sddon of the fist topography (unconsiows, preconscious 6 ‘Sous an the gral introduction of the economic explanation, ‘Shnplace ws before an apparent dilemma: by tums we wil Psy Ghocnalyss as an expliation of psychical phenomena through hones of force, bence as an energetics: and as an excgeis of ‘ppment meaning trough a ltent meaning, bene as ahermenes- tee At ane in Pare I ll be the unity of these wo manners of Utorstaning:on tbe one hand we wil see that dhe only possible Wy for paycoanelsis to ocome “interpretation” is by ineorpo- Tadhg ths economic point of view ino a theory of meaing: onthe Bhat nand the ewonemic pont of view will appear 10 ust be ie Gib To any other by reason of what we will call the unsut- passable character of desire “The scond eye, entitled “The Toterpretation of Coltre.” will tein the movement by which Feud extends bis ceural ens t0 Rider acer Freud's entice theory of culture may be regarded 38 a Tperely analogical transposition of the economic explanation of ‘Hears and the neuroses But the aplication of payetoanalyss 10 Sheri symbol ideal, and stlesions wil have repercussions call: {Re for revision ofthe initial model andthe schema of isterprela- Ban Gscused in Part L This revision is expresed inthe soon toe graphy Cege i, superego), which i alded to the fst without ‘Serzin ‘kt New relations will be reveled, essentially those conernd ithe eons, wich only cla suas and fron sn rig cit Inte cur of te hap en [Citgo dice ane! tn peel the saps Santa fn opays ie il pepe he way Tr 8 Senna wh th gtr ccs fae od of tere faton ef consionoes in ifcosownes, tn ht ‘Souy inte "De Ht: were des wl Sila ons pase and uurpl ete emg of Sear in Ps ce the nyo or, ee of Pe Sita min sig pit oe po "hi andes ce wil be ona ih he a rwoin ofthe thay of nse hig of et Tis row set ley feo farvecing tise. On theo had lone toane so compe ny of ct ying is try Site fal ete vga vce Eo nd Tato Bye Sin hea car ur cay to hs sponte Fron inet of the reaiy pce, which cos riot Se chuncrpai foie esr pi Hower nr come eligi over of tte and ely tem ay fins ‘cera int io qin ten ma mel te thee rng pt ef move pec te mech ‘anistic form in which the topography was first stated, This mechan- mn hon sept sou he cng of he Py prion re sel te epatiy of at oer ey Rhino ets pochasion oe opgapy ese Sciyineined i an mepeation of manag eng mean ing td wee pecron Git cmmcientewee eye ed meester in Fa Ir tendancy Sh ped only there os al ny 0 nine Bu pr ‘Seite fal Sevclpmen oe Beary mate ea Dorhenay ton soo gal py, th cates ot IM aetna Aon sour Atay prog, by sree mi eig 0 ward Dict Tat why thse Shapers shuld be oad 50 ‘Sth tn ps wih eran mang cm he sit ico changes mee. Os fd « 00K t, ANALYTIC rmore anal reaing, Fea sees ts oposton 8 alte erat to tse on cond and moe data ERE Stans erin meer wt escuela eee Asin Tepes ao ih ear hereto send ae nd tengo moving om funded ASSESS dm oa cond uses sich te che oat ead nh tee the mas of spon west PART I: ENERGETICS AND HERMENEUTICS The Epistemological Problem in Freudianismn (Our frst eye of investigation con- cerns the structure of psychoanalytic discourse, This prepares the ‘vay for an inapetion ofthe phenomenon of culture, whch wil be the subject matter ofthe second eye "Forth present ingly Ihave used ase that directly inicates the central difieuly in th psychoanalytic epistemology, Freud writings present themselves as a mined or even ambiguous dit course, which at times states conflicts of force subject an ene ‘etc, at times relations of meaning subject to a hermeneutics. T hope to show that there are good grounds for this apparent ambi uly, that this mixed discourse i the raiton ete of paychoanal- ys wil init myself inthis introdution to showing the necessity of both dimensions of psychoanalytic discourse. The precise tsk of the three chapters of Pat [wil be to overome the Ep between the two order of discourse and to reach the pont where oe see that the energetics impli a hermeneutics and the hemencuties die loses an energetics. That point is where the posing or emergence ‘of desire manifests ise in and through a proces of symbolization Within topopraphic-economic explanation the status of inte pretation, or Deutung presents ie at ft as an aporia. If we ‘emphasize the dliberiely antiphesomenoloical bent ofthe topog- raphy, we appear to remove any bass fora reading of pysho- ‘nals as hermencuts; the subtotion ofthe economic tins of catheisie. placement and displacement of energy—for the notions of ineaiona conseiousess and intended object apparntiy calls for a naturalistic explanation and excludes an understanding sae setig through meaning To shot it would seem thatthe p> seth eonomi pit of ew can uphold a enrgets but 8a saree And yet there is no doubt that psychoanalysis i & permeate: isnot by accident but by itersion tha t aims at ing am interpretation of cute init entety But works of af, Fre and unons are various modes of representation. And if we sae oom tn periphery tothe center, from te theory of cle £0 the theory of dreams and the neuroses, which forms he hard ore eT ppehosnayss we are constant id back to interpretation, 9 Mae eof incrpreting fo te work of interpretation, It was in the pest et dream interpretation, a we shall fll elaborate that the Freudian method was forged. All the "contents with which the Unalyt works ave increasingly representational, ffom fantasies to ara fart to eligious belles But the probles of iteration is Talay covttensive with the problem of meaning or representation. lone pochoanaljisisinterprtation from beginning to end “This whee he apria arises: What sche status of represetse sion ed laae in tcation to the tons of instinct, sm of instinct, $06 get How ean an interpretation of meaning evough meaning eat Aogeated with an economics of eathexis, withdrawal of et hens auteahexis? At fist glace, thee seems toe an antinomy a ae explanation governed by the principles ofthe metapsy- teclogy and en fterpretation that necessarily moves among mean mem nt among forces, among representations or ides and not arene inaioets As Lee the whole problem of the Fredian SEigumology may be ceatralizd in single question: How can the cacy etanation be involved in an interpretation dealing Wi etsige and conver, how can inepetation be an aspect of ‘Be ceomsac explanation? It seas to fallback on a disjction: ‘Bhan explanation in trms of energy, of an understanding in crs Of pienomenology It mast be recognized, however that ere ianign exits only onthe basis of ts refusal of that disjun "rye dficuky in the Freudian epistemology isnot only its prob- Jen bat ab its solution, At the oust, Freud did not clearly se the ver aement ofthe pnts of ew in he metapsyehology. ThE sue- cesive presentations of the toposrphy Bee the marisa Sly ir peonuncedy i tet a inal ate In which topopapy cut off fam te work of interpretation. What we cl {8 Sguattie hypo wig hes epee cewomle explanation. The rent fe that al the ler presentations of the topopaphy slr fom a red dsc: we wl ok fr the ey toe inal vote betwee explanation and ntepettio the “Poet” of 1898. Th wl be the sje of our fs chater West tino bead Cat Fo he pet ton of Dreams takes up the Hine of thought of te “roel bat {55 gs an noe hy eye a fr ne or of interpretation; th wil ete concern of our second chap Finally, we wil ok tote “Pape on May chology” of 1914-17 for the most mature expression of the ‘ey and concent a mgt on he elitnhip beth instinct and repens or fees, wich isthe ass ot al fo $i il ate alles weston vie maybe that the poesby of moving fom fe but also the impossibility of completely sie paperert omplstely integrating fore it Inguage, sine psn orcactgene faa. Sn ‘Chapter 1: An Energetics ‘Without Hermeneutics ‘The “Project” of 1895 represents \hat could be called a nonhermencutie state of the sytem. Indod, the notion of the “psychical apparatus” that dominates this essay fppears to have no correlation with a work of dociphering— although, as we shall se the interpretation of neurotic symptoms is ‘ot absent from this notion. The notion is based on a principle bor rowed from physcs—the constancy priacipie—and tends to be a ‘quantitative treatment of energy. This recourse to the principe of ‘constaney andthe quantitative hypothesis isthe aspect of Freudian- fm that most resists the reading I propose, based on the corelation between energetics and hermeneutics, between connections of forces 1. Tee exay knonn atthe "Projet for a Sete Photon” wat ‘tpl Landon i950 ste end of 4 sue ot ans fom reo to Wiel Fl (ules some fet aot), tole the oer ie usr nfangn dar Pchowatse (London, imag, 1980) Exeter Mosuchet and Janes Stacey, wit Ioedseton "Em kl Phe Oi of cham (ew ot, ke Bk, 8) Pig "apc for Neuopss”Chater 29 af Ao 77,198, Oran B18) of sp of te sate fu (Orin, po 123) fr fen we tal lite a 10), Goce Sie i of “Pj i “Project” Origin. pp. MOSK; alo Exe Jones, The Life and Wark of ‘Sard Front ( ie New Yok, as sk, 958," a he ofthe “Projet ae the ltr to Brewer of June 39, 192 (00717. 5, alee Popes, 83) txt wil pied mS, Vs wt a et spat) eal the import “Prelmnary Commas” whi to Eee November 1%, puted i rk und Winns a te ‘egning 01898 nd poe! atte Ret of the Sr ow Hac of 195 (GW, ite 317). Aman intend rats pr tos prot” brat D'and Gave cpl Bnd and selations of meanings. However, the “Projet” of 1895 is ‘pot meant to be 8 topography in the sense ofthe “Papers on Meta~ psychology ii important atthe outset not to Rent the notion FF prchical apparatus withthe “topographic point of view”; the firsts simply patterned 0a a physical mode, te second is corel fe to an interpretation of meaning through meaning. Ie must be lait that this quas-pbyscal conception of the psychical appa- ‘ats was never completely eiminatd from Freudian theory; how ver I tink the development of Freudian theory may be looked ‘pon asthe gradual reduction ofthe ton of psychical apparats ein he sense of "t machine which in'@ moment would run of ite feito a topography in which space is no longer place wih in the word but a scene of ation where roles and mass enter into Abate” this space wll become a place of ciphering and decipher- ing. ‘Ofcourse, because ofthe constaney principle, the expla terms of enerzy will lays remain somewhat external to the pretation of meaning trough meaning; de topography wil always fetain an ambiguous character: it may be regarded both a the “evelopment ofthe primitive theory of the psjcbical apparatus and i's susained movement to fee itself from that theory. Accord- ‘nly, we wil pay lose attention to what happens tothe quatita~ tive hypothest through the sucessive stages tht lad from the “Project” to the topography (oe topegraphies). In this connestion, ‘shouldbe mentioned thatthe four oe Hive ways in which the ys- tem ivexpresied have by no means the same epistemological signif face, In particular, Chapter 7 of the Trawndewang bos the ‘most equivet! position situated ast is tetween the “Project” and the two topographic. Ii aly a development of the “Projet.” of the principe of constancy, and of the quantitative hypothesis, and foc iis connected with interpretation in a way that suggests the Inter topography, Tis situation should nt perplex us. AT bope to Show ltr notin he topography that de quantitative hypotie- sis radically brought info question, but in the conrontation— J. We rad In Drs L(oncloed in Letter 61, of May 2, 1897): sha ets Pcie! Poa, The fact of ctetion may P= see sete se flag then erty" (Onan 19) nontopographical or hypertopopraphical—of all the forces of de Sie, ofall the forces ofthe ibido, withthe death instinct. I isthe death instinct that upsets everything: what is “beyond the pleasure Principle” cannot felp bot have reperessions upon the constancy hypothesis with whieh the pleasure principe was nally coupled (Gf. “Analyte.” Patt Il, Ch. 3) THe QuaNitarveAPPaRaTCs “The opening satement ofthe “Prof cet msi con: “he ineton of this projet sto fish with pepo hich sal Be a eal scene: hai to repre Dpychcal proces a uanitatvelydtemined sates of spect {able materi prices an 30 to make them pin and vd of Contadtos he projet inva two principal ee: 1. That St digs atv fom eat toe rpeded a un ty) abet the gnaw of ion 2. Tat to be "soe that the mater presi ution re the nero We are indebted to Bernfeki® Jones? and Kris for a careful reconstuston ofthe seientife environment in which sich project ould ars. Tis is also the environment psychoanalysis wil have to 4, Orgs 9385 i a eter dated May 25,1895, Freud ay: “Tam sesE Rela Show 8 ny ft Ril Ete hap I guaate conicerator sot of economic of nave fers nocd nt and ssonhy 0 cat (om yop iat may bea net oma peony” (Onaoe p18e%0). And Jretoethe er (Oct 30,008): eThe tes eyes snort he ound states of quay, be entry and sacntay proces, the slopes! ras of ateton and efera, te lnicaton of qual, rely, tot ical he i othe paral pn he el er Pct ue 9). 3a Sight aginst, But in any event Freud will never disavow its funda~ rental convictions ike all his Vienna and Berin teachers, Freud ‘ses and will continue to Se in scence the sole discipline of knowl- ‘ge, the single rule ofall iteliectal honesty, a Worldview that excludes all other views, especially that of the old religion. In Vienna, asin Berin, Notuphlowophie and its sintiie counter- part ital, gave way in biology 1 apiysco-physilogical theory Based on the ideas of force, attraction, and repulsion, all thee being governod bythe principle ofthe conservation of energy (ise covered by Robert Majer in 1842 and made prominent by Helm- halt). According to that principle the sum of forces (motor nd potenti!) remains constant ina isolated stem. Today we have & fetter knowledge of the influence of the Helmboltr school in Viennay! as well a8 of Froud’ fist siento works in neurology and embryology; as a result the "Project" of 1895 no longer seems fa singular tous Tt i of interest not so much because of is presup- postions, which are not peculiar toi, but because ofits aim of holding determinedly to the byposhess of consancy in new areas where it had not been teed: the theory of desire and pleasure, education to realty though “unpleasure," the incorporation with- in the system of observant and judging thought. Ins doing Freud rot ony extended Helmholtz but also linked up with the waition Of Herbart? who, beginning im 1824, had protested against fee ‘wll inked determinism with unconscious mativation, and applied the terminology of physics to a dypamics of ideas. The we of the word “idea” inthe sense of perception and representation; the ‘heme that ideas ave primacy ver afets, which plays an emineat role inthe metapeychoogil papers and perhaps even the word— if not the notion of —Verdrngung (eepesion) may also be traced to Herhart, Freud's relationship to Herbart on the precise pont of 4, re, Frat og mn, ithe Vin Ink Hence Ht "Thera eof fla, oe tom Helo to Feud ed one from Hest and Fcaner fo Feu ooh ne pn heaps Becks snd ID dlough Geningr an Meyer On Frew te ofthe wor ida" iBke Hetustan ea cA Macingre: The Unewnsur(Lsaa, ona 9), pis he Herr eg he word een Reine icetny Ruths ade by oe, 7, 30-8, the principle of constancy is beyoad all doubt: the “stving for cuir” isthe guiding principle of that "mathematical pyshol- ‘ogy” and its calculus of forces and quantities. Finaly, Freud places himself n the company of Herbert and Fechner when he gives ‘pany anatomical ass for his psychical stem, thus eestring psj- ‘chology tothe place Herbart wished to give ‘Thus the 1895 “Projet” belongs to a whole period of sienife thought. What is mos intresting is he manner in which Frew, by ‘extending tis thought, transforms it othe breaking point. In this regard the “Projet” sands a the greatest effort Freud ever made to force a mass of psychical facts within the framework ofa quant tative theory, and a the demonstration By way ofthe absurd that the content exceeds the frame: not even in Chapter 7 of the Traumdeatwng wil read ty to make so many things Ht together within such a'narow system. Nothing is more dated than the ex- Planatory plan of the "Project," and nothing more inexhaustible {han its program of description. As one eters more deeply into the “Projet” one has the impression thatthe quantitative framework and the neurone support recede into the background, uni they are ro more than a given and convenient language of reference which ‘supplies the necessary constant forthe expression of gest dscow- cries. The same adventure willbe repeated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which biology plays the double role of language of ref- ‘erence, and pretext forthe discovery ofthe death instinct. ‘Let us tr to untangle these two developments the generals: tion of the constancy principle, and the fact that itis transcended by its ova applications. ‘Te shouldbe noted that Frevd does no say much about the origin and nature of what he ealls “quantity.” AS for its origin, it comes fom external oF internal excitations and eovers prety much the idea of perceptual and instinctual simul; the notion O serves (0 ‘unify under a single concept anything that produces energy. As for its nature, Freud simply characteris it as a summation of excta- tion homologous to physical energy: i is @ curent which flows, seats hatte iy ot eh ni layed out 8 diferent one” (Later 8. Orne, por 2038) which “sores “file” of “empies:" and “charges” neurons he all Trmpertant notion of “there” was Gist elaborated within this neu foie ftamenork 88 a synonym of string up and filing (Orsins, pp. 358-82). ‘Thus the "Project talks about eathected or empty eurons it wll also speak of seo fll in level of charge of ds Charge and resistance to discharge, of contact barvers, screens, Stored quantity, tesly mobile of "bound" quant. Fread adopts {his Tat notion from Brever; Inter we wil se why. We will most ll ofthese notions in other contexts, but in an ineessingly metaphor- ical sense. Ii to be noted, however, tht in the “Projet” Freud ‘does not go father along the path of determining Q." No measure is sated: the quantities are spoken of as being “ot a comparatively low order" (p- 366), as being “large” of “excessively large”. 1368), but there Is no momerieal law concerning them. A curious ‘Quanity indeed! We shall come back o this point atthe end ofthe chapter. But if the quantity obeys na numeral law, i is nonetheless gov med by a principle, the principle of constancy, which Freud de- ‘ebpsffom the principle of itera. The principle of inertia means thatthe system tens to reduce ts own tension to zero, 2 0 di charge ls quantities, to “get Hid of them (pp. 356-57); the prin- ipl of constancy means tha the system tends to maintain the level of tension as low as posible, The divergence between constancy ‘and inert is inst very interesting for it already pints 0 the intervention of what will later be desribed 38 the “secondary ‘roves. The impossibility forthe system to eliminate al tensions Fesuls from the ack of an equivalent of Bight regarding dangers from within: the psyehieal spparauis is forced t0 sore up and fatect a slock of contrivances made up of & permanent group of 1, Macaye (pp. 1622) compares Feds notion of enti 0 ‘gi mat ttn and eetane Frew wih Karn, for whom te Sat eli cly a mode TP ie touans pn 1) ses Bede shch of se fe secon hacen te Nivana pean be pews pine, One might sista etic end sd seo Swe tpt he death ie ce ib ingen 10 ap that Bos wes © 0. Ch bound quantities whose object i to reduce the tensions although they cannot completely eliminate them. Freud writes loward the ‘beginning of the "Project: ‘The nearonic system is consequently obliged o abandon is orig ‘al tend towards inertia (thai, towards a reduction oft level ‘of tension to zero). It must leah to tolerate a store af quantity (Qi) sulicent to met the demands for specific action. In so fat sit does so, however, the same tend sil persists in the modified form ofa tendency o keep the quantity down, at least, 30 far as posible and avoid any increas nit (hat, to Keop its vel of {ension constant). All de performances of the neurone system fare tbe comprised under the heading cither of the primary function or of the secondary funetion imposed by the exigencies oflite* (p. 358). ‘Thus from its ft formulation, which distinguishes i from the pin- ciple of inertia, the principle of constancy brings ito play the see- fondary process, whose anatomical bass i strictly unknown: ine eed, further oa Freud wil postulate, for reasons of symmetry, & _roup of neurons which retain bound stored energy and which he calls the “ego” (pp. 384-86). Freud will always try to regard the Principle of constancy as equivalent to the principle of inertia for ‘an apparatus that fore to at and defend itself against internal dangers for which there is no screen comparable 10 the Sensory apparatus, te later acting both as bari and ecepoe."* "The metaphorical chracter ofthe constancy principle i eight ‘ened when one considers that it extends to avarety of apparatuses 13, The dsineion tween te primary ad he steondary process wi te eased a engh Tartu on forthe preset ett si Sen tat “mute of ddnpushing tween ston donhlosay eet fn tert epatton th nist fey ut the (Cig p 88-9). TE." ton ofthe tas temes of The Fo and the 1d, Where wy ct esl an ep ee tp cae ‘hte reuing excitations from tbe extemal world, whores dere eave Spel spf ox One nih enue he Niachean at least one of which concerns the contrary of quentty, namely quality" "Conslousness gives us what we call “qualies”” (p. 369) (oe will se the great importance these quaies have for yteing); "thus we must summon up enough courage to fssume that there isa hid sytem of neurons—pereptual neu- fon’ they might be called” which are “contrvanoes for chang ing external quantity ito quality” (p. 370). Freud tried to attach them to te quantitative system by assigning them a temporal prop: ty, perioicy: “the period of neuronic motion is transmised ‘without inition in every direction, as though it were a process of| Induction” (p-371)." This enables Freud to diferente himself {tom the school of parallelism and the epiphenomenalis sine i bound to a specife group of neurons, consciousness i not an i ‘fetus! double of the nervous process in general "What i yet move serio, however, ite fact thatthe whole ss tem rests on the simply potulted equivalence between unpleasure tnd the rise in th level of tension onthe one hand, and between pleasure and the lowering ofthe level onthe other Singe we have certain knowledge of a tend in prychical Tie towards avoiding unpleture, we are tempted to ientty tat wend. with the tend towards Hoe. In that ease unpleasure 1S Romy btdeg B ee Sa cas cae acne ey Steere Erie pee eh Tae as Seamaster nts, Pan a TESS spate ton mar yh ne (rca) oa eng ae aera TESS SePiaaraestmears Sos eae a hina aly met Renee Ieee re ew Ca aeons i mace ema Rn Soa a aly al Sel aaa an, oy Arai a tas CE en mets Pimms cometied nn quali, whieh playa role a reali READING OF FREUD 5 ‘would coincide with arse in the level of quantity (Q4) of with 8 quanttane increase of presre; it would be the percetval sensation when there isan Inrease of quantity (Q) in. Plea- ure woul be the sensation of discharge (p. 373) ‘This isa mere postulate, since unpleasure and pleasure are sensed intensities which Freud localizes along with sensory qualities in a third type of neurons, the w-neuron, and. since he characterizes ‘hse Intenstes asthe catbexis of w by W." In fact this it new example of the transformation of quantity into. quality, which Fread tres to liken tothe previous transformation by again sppesl: ing tothe phenomenon of periodicity (pp. 373-74) already called ‘upon to acount for sensory qualities.” Desires or wishes enter this mechanistic theory (pp. 383-84) through the intermediary of the teacs lf by the experienees of plesire and unpleasre: its to be assumed thatthe eather ofa pleasant memory ina state of desire is far grater than the eathexis of « mere perception. Tis assimp- tion allows fora fist definition of repression (equated herewith primary defense) asthe removal ofcathexis from & hose memory mage (p.383)." ‘At this point, however, the system starts to break down: the pleasure-npleasore combination sets into play much more than the Isolated functioning of the payehical apparatus it cts into play the extemal world (food, the seal partoer), and with the external cl 0 etn sone ee he ieemmiing pe (Onis. 399). Macnye (p 18) ii the de tke oe ras? " 19, Froud wil sway endeavor oid lw oenpinte aeration of sce sees iA" US acne ule of Renner oe ‘pin pit of reception, nes wat the esomenon of pers (Crip, pp at31): toon or son of at pt see shage (ater "Ge dacharge ae aoc ate yteied Feu kG ew Wat SS; ec hy hae of sition an of re nd. 20 Oa te relaon beeen the soins of lens snd rpeion, se th Import work of Pear Man, Freud Cony of Repeson and Deter Theol ond tween Lanuate (Minne, Ue ‘yo Seats Pres 1961: blow p38 3h and pe 9850 18 ‘worl other persons appeat ti emarkable that Fre, in desige ‘Bang the overall proces that encompasses being aided by others, hose to speak ofthe experience ofsatisactin: [At early stages the human oxgansm is incapable of achieving {his specie action. It x brought about by extraneous help, when the ateaton of an experienced person has been drawn to the ‘his condition bya discharge taking place along the pat of n- dial change [eg by the chs screaming). This path of dis ‘Shige thus acquires an extemely important secondary funtion see ot binging about an wnderstonding with other people “hs the orginal helplessness of buman being is thos the primal Source of all moral motives. (p. 379) “The expesince of satisfaction is inded a sort of “estexpeience™: This rote realising and marks the transition from the primary tothe secondary proces. . ‘Pisa tried to maintain this detour through reality within the framework of the principle of constancy by inking the regulation by realy tothe sole principle of unpeasure:"Unpleasure remains the sole means of education” (p. 428), But the avoidance of un- ‘seu in turn implies several process that are scarelyquant- Tubte these come down basically to the work of diseiminating between hallucinatory desires and perceptual qualities, 2 work ‘Coupled with te ego organization's function of inhibiting ‘Whoa st examined, these themes it in quite well with the cen- tral hypothesis: inthe primary proces, where the apparatus func ons mot in accord wth the principle of inertia, discharge takes the path ofa reatheis ofthe memory images of the "wished-for™ (bie and of movements to obtain titi assumed that this fea {ation produces the analogue ofa perception, ie. a hallucination ‘AThave Fo doubt that the wishful activation wil inthe Hirst instance froduce something similar to a perception—namely,@ hallucine Tou” tp, 381)." This mistake produces real unpleasre and an 21, Reson here she codon described by Meyoet a amen cree REN Mtns men Tones (250) ves an nef te SEN ty oe pty sce Caer Fo Te excessive reaction onthe pat ofthe prima defense; together these reactions can be biologially damaging. Chapter 7 of the Traum: dleuiung vill again postulate no disriminaion between images and Dereeptions in the primary process, and to account for ths ill eve a topographical repression within the functioning of the Dachical appartus;* the assumption is made that the excessive ‘charge of the desire produces an image similar to the indication of Dercepual gut. We shall have much to saya the proper te Shout this hypothesis For the present, how does dsriminaion| come about inthe secondary process? For the frst time Froud establishes @ conection between dis

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