Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]),
Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the
tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under
Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and
that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of
paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both
the sale and export of sugar.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23794

February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of
Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon
&
Taada
for
plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
1

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed

Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City
a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the
United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for
P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General,
a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal
Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1],

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within
defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial
and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on
August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city
broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional
violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City
Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the
export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For
production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is
when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to
levy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to

impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon
goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and
any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise
of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective
June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts
authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or
fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin
Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been
repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental
effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the
national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that
there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial
measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional
limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and
rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In
Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies
not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned

ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the
time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification,
to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because
the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient
basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional
until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the
challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendantsappellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant
paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.1wph1.t

relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business

associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by
taking undue advantage of his official position,
authority, relationship, connection, or influence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by
himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth
of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines, through any or a combination
or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2001

Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift,

share, percentage, kickback or any form of
pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in
connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does,
in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling

Diverting,
receiving,
misappropriating,
converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for
his or their personal gain and benefit, public
funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less,
representing a portion of P200,000,000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171,
by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane
Does

For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks,

Lessons Applicable:
Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine
Crim Law 1- mala in se
Crim pro proof beyond reasonable doubt
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 RPC
FACTS:

An information is filed against former President Joseph

Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane
Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
o

June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself

and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his coaccused, who are members of his family,

More Or Less, And The Social Security System

(SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or
Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth
P1,102,965,607.50
and
P744,612,450.00
respectively and by collecting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
commissions or percentages by reason of said
purchases which became part of the deposit in
the equitable-pci bank under the account name
Jose Velarde
o

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

by unjustly enriching himself from commissions,

gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form
of pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, P3,233,104,173.17 and
depositing the same under his account name
Jose Velarde at the Equitable-Pci Bank

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law

since for him:

it suffers from the vice of vagueness

it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8
separate Informations, docketed as:
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par.
(a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively
Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code)
Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085)

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
1.

April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack
of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional
for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
than 1 offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES:
W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)
W/N the Plunder Law dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions (crim pro)
W/N the Plunder Law is a malum prohibitum (crim law 1)
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law

o
o
o
o
a.
b.
o

2.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is

whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on
its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction
a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application.
the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases.
NO.
The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal
law.
has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact

necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a

number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth
o Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be
no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to
stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth."
3. NO

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens

rea)
o Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the
dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints,
for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the
Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as
an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command

(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As
part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the

residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the
NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint
and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have
occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by
the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare
the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed
committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search
and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it
was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights
were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4
or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been

stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a
vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro

Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command
Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.