G.R. No.

L-1800

January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties,

petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager
of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to
compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday
afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to
grievances on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the
case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the
petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned
decision.
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil
rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities
authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the
purpose.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative
body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among others, the
following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots,
affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ...
parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the same," and
"(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections
844 and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public
peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act,
in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect
with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:
"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public The streets and public places of the city shall be
kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the

pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided
by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or
exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the
city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of
a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions
thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided,
further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is
prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every
such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route,
and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to
hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four
hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section
1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be
applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the
Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer
upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the
permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may
pass or the meeting may be held.
Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire,
312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing
that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a
special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing
committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme
Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes firming the
judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using the public
streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities
is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and
press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly
limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade
and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity
to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license, ... ."
We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be
tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding
of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance
invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards is
empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public places, and the word

"regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the
power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with
construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal
Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the powers and duties of
the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to comply with and
enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and execution of laws and
ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the ligislative police power of
the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the excercise of the fundamental
personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated to the
Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down
rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality
and oppression prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that, under
Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of public
streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets
until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such
permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them.
The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W.,
1104, held the following:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were
also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to
the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was
held void because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured,
or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we remember that action or
nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from
favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to
be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the
injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes
apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an
ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the domain
of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of
police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a
reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to
commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which
the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and
not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority,
making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or
persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through
the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, ... without
first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the
Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of
the decision held:
". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far
as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects
referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance
with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as
secured by the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the
constitution than under the common law."

"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and
disorder in cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable
precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair
scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to
suppress lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized
countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by
day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music
of various kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are
resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and
frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and
numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors
in furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes
opposed to private or public security, they become unlawful, and their members and
abettors become punishable. . . ."
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public
disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible
public or private mischief, that the law interferes."
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful,
and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier
courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all,
must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city
ordinance which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to
parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical
instruments, without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants were
members of the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the
court in holding the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must
not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their
enforcement to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the
Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and
the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered and
regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions
allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this
ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose nations do
not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like parades of those whose
nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so arbitrary,
liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the
permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot
be other than partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and
discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme Court
of Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of
Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association to
use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage
without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do," held
the following:
"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets
is conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a

citizen of the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it
is not absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be
abridged or denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.,
496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the
use of public streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.,
569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following
appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
excercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.
One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his
religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for
parades and processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government, the
question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or
unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication
of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to
public places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949
[953]; Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S.
Ct., 954, 963, 964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey
[Town of Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164];
Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed.,
1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."
[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the
uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say
who shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No
standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as
drawn, the chief of police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this
privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049,
1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the
public streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before
us, and we therefore hold it null and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the
obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks,
or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after
investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be
proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the
course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said:
". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the

privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon
its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the
standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can
thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly
'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot
be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the
right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of
all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner,
for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the
Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in
Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or
substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as
Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover "one of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," except certain
powers of local government, specially of police regulation which are conferred upon the legislative
body of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police power to
regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the
Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is
to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in
section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in
conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has
conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes,
independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions of
section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary
notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the
use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and
void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted, specially in Willis
Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of a similar
statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances
apply to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which grants unrestrained
discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited power to any
officer either of the municipal or state governments. Under our democratic system of government
no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps
in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The
discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of
the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority
making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative
Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255-

261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a
mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the
decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the
Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the
City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting
been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844,
which is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the
Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches
uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above
stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and
obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting,"
and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason
given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of
the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort
and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the
Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the
instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the
following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in
Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious.
Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact
that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education
and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no
reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the
respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-31687 February 26, 1970

NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

GENTLEMEN:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court of even date:
"In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro vs. Villegas), the Court, after considering the pleadings and
arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following
considerations:
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order
to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not
cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further
offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration
sought to be held this afternoon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the
Court's disbelieving respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as
compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing
such disorders;
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in
such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general
detriment of the public:
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;
The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to
grant their application for permit unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.

G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
Lorenzo M. Taada Jose W. Diokno and Haydee B. Yorac for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:+.wph!1
This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some aspects, is called upon to delineate
the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceable
assembly, 1 against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. Petitioner,
retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon,
starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two
blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held.
2
During the course of the oral argument, 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief
speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International
Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military
Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its
personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The
march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was
likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and
rally." 4
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction on October 20, 1983 was due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been
informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On
October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor
General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied.
Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for
refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the
advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 To be more specific,
reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of
people is expected to attend." 7 Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the
recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be
held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured." 8
The oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the answer was filed. The
Court then deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute resolution was issued by the
Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. On this point, the Court was unanimous, but there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the
ground that the holding of a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No.

7295 of the City of Manila. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This resolution is
without prejudice to a more extended opinion." 9 Hence this detailed exposition of the Court's
stand on the matter.
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite
explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." 10
Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. 11 There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 12
prosecution for sedition, 13 or action for damages, 14 or contempt proceedings 15 unless there be a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." 16 Freedom
of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters Of public concern. 17 It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is
hot to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as 's the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. 18 Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Maicolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.
19
To paraphrase opinion of Justice Rutledge speaking for the majority of the American Supreme
Court Thomas v. Collins, 20 it was not by accident or coincidence that the right to freedom of
speech and of the press were toupled in a single guarantee with the and to petition the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not Identical, are inseparable. the every case, therefo re there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the
challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any
other legitimate public interest. 21
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly
better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be
forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty
of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining
access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational
modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But
utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become
part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
22
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or
printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise
provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their-views, even if
contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot
be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole
reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person
who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that
there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of
Ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One
may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of
dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. resort to
force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not
required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States
v. Apurado: 23 "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly
of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions
feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders

over their irresponsible followers." 24 It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be
invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided, To give free
rein to one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high
estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The
Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO: 25 Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. 26 The above excerpt was
quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. 27 Primicias made explicit what was implicit in
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas," 28 a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that
plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that
leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a
promenade for public use," 29 which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat,
there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the or oposed march and
rally starting from a public dark that is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US
Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any
lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should
grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared:
"Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2,
providing that 'no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall 'De permitted
unless a special license therefor shall first be explained from the selectmen of the town or from
licensing committee,' was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring
upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And
the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a statute requiring persons using
the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech
and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of
the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or
refuse license, ... " 30 Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion
of the opinion be ignored, "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of
an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the
most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it
cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances
would be entitled to protection." 31

5. There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted,
would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another park. As previously mentioned
though, there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of
the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It
was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification
was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with the
Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on
the Philippines. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a
special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
" 32 The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. ..." 33 To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. 34 That being the
case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the
peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of
the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor
relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery
and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as
a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question
the confronts this Court.
6. There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the
judgment must be confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past
occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been here. Hence, as noted, on the afternoon
of the hearing, October 25, 1983, this Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory
injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled for the next day. That conclusion was
inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public
interest. There was no justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of tree
speech and peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 35 The participants to such assembly, composed primarily of those
in attendance at the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. proceeding through Roxas
Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the same street. To repeat, it is
settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or
a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an
equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief
Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to
its purpose; not as to The relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." 36 There could be danger to
public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of
its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that
the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
37

7. In fairness to respondent Mayor, he acted on the belief that Navarro v. Villegas 38 and
Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP.) v. Bagatsing, 39 called for application. While the
General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at
a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be
shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made. In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa decisions, this Court was persuaded that the clear and
present danger test was satisfied. The present situation is quite different. Hence the decision
reached by the Court. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. Not that it should be overlooked. There was in this case,
however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera, Superintendent, Western Police District,
Metropolitan Police Force, that the police force is in a position to cope with such emergency
should it arise That is to comply with its duty to extend protection to the participants of such
peaceable assembly. Also from him came the commendable admission that there were the least
five previous demonstrations at the Bayview hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United
States Embassy where no untoward event occurred. It was made clear by petitioner, through
counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would
take place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the necessary steps would be
taken by it 'to ensure a peaceful march and rally.' " 40 Assistant Solicitor General Montenegro
expressed the view that the presence of policemen may in itself be a provocation. It is a sufficient
answer that they should stay at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to cope with any
contingency. There is no need to repeat what was pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes in Cox
that precisely, it is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those
exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression.
8. By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously
termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be
inconsistencies between this resolution and that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto
modified. So it was made clear in the original resolution of October 25, 1983.
9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be
admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery
and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of
his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of
unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly
presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need

to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of
Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate
accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
10. Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial or the modification
of the permit sought and order the respondent official, to grant it. Nonetheless, as there was
urgency in this case, the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day after the
hearing, this Court. in the exercise of its conceded authority, granted the mandatory injunction in
the resolution of October 25, 1983. It may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace
march and rally on October 26 was not marred by any untoward incident. So it has been in other
assemblies held elsewhere. It is quite reassuring such that both on the part of the national
government and the citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed. That is as it should be.
WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.

G.R. No. 132088

June 28, 2000

EVERDINA ACOSTA, NOEMI ACOSTA, ELVIRA AMPARADO, REBECCA AQUINO, ROBERTO

ARCAYA, EVA ARCEO, JULIET ARELLANO, ANITA ASCANO, GRACE AUSTRA, LUISA
AVILES, SUSIE AW, VICTORIA BADILLO, SUSAN BALDEMOR, ELISA BASA, NORY
BATUIGAS, TERESITA BAUTISTA, SEGUNDINA BERMAS, FERMINER BOCO, EVELYN
BULAONG, SYLVA BULARIO, GILDA BOLOSAN, JOSIE BUNGAY, ARCELI CABUSE,
TERESA CACHO, ROSSANA CAJANDINEZ, NELY CALPITO, OLIVIA CARDINES, THELMA
CARINO, CORAZON CARRACEDO, ELENITA CASAUAY, MARIETA CAULI, MARILOU
CAYTON, VIRGINIA CHIAPOCO, ALLEN CIPRIANO, MELINDA B. CONTRERAS, ZENAIDA
CORPORAL, PRISCILLA CORPUZ, LUZ COSIO, EMILIA CRUZ, CRISTINA DELA CRUZ,
ROSALINA DELA CRUZ, GRACE CUNANAN, EVELYN DE CASTRO, HAYDEE DE VALLE,
CECILIA DEL ROSARIO, GULLERMINA DE LA CRUZ, FRANCIS DINGIL, BELLA DY,
CORAZON ESTEBAL, LUZ FAJARDO, TERESA FRAGO, VIRGINIA GACHO, SABINO
GALES, MYRNA GALLEGO, MARILYN GARNA, NATIVIDAD GAVILAN, LOLITA GAVINO,
MARILOU GO, LETICIA GOMEZ, OLYMPIO GONZAGA, RUTH GONZALES, REMEDIOS
HAVOC, GREGORIA HERNANDEZ, OSCAR HIDALGO, BIBIANO HUGO, RITA HUERTA,
LOURDES HULIPAS, ROMEO IDOS, ERLINDA ISLA, LITA ITALIA, MATIAS JABONETE,
DIANA JIMENEZ, DOMINADOR LABACLADO, ALMA LAGUIAN, MELCY LALU, REBECCA
LAMALINAO, MARITA LAMSEN, LOURDES ESTER LAREDO, TERESITA LATION,
ROSALINA LEDESMA, NORMA LECCIONES, NORMA LEYTE, CECILIA LINCOPINES,
OFELIA LIZARDO, VENILLA LOCSIN, ADELINA LORENZO, SATURNINA LORENZO,
ALEJANDRA MABAET, JULIETA MADRID, ERLINA MAGPAYO, ROLANDO MAGSINO,
ERLINDA MAILIG, FLORENDA MALAPAYA, CORAZON MALLEN, ESMERALDA
MANALANG, MERLE MANALO, ERLINDA MANEGA, SHIRLEY MANGAHAS, ELFRIDA
MARQUEZ, EFIGENIA MENEZ, NILDA NAVA, MERLY NERY, ROSAMINDA OBEN, MELISSA
OLAQUERRA, ENRIQUETA OLIVAR, DOLORES ORDINARIO, ESTRELLA ORTEGA, ROSE
ORPRECIO, AURORA OSTACO, ELVIRA PAMPANGA, NORMA PAQUIZ, EVANGELINE
PARDO, GLORIA PARMA, ERLINDA PASTRANA, LERMA QUIRIT, MECELIN QUILANDRA,
MEWLIN QUILLANORA, NATIVIDAD RAGUD, ERLINDA RANTE, EUFEMIA RAMIREZ,
JUDITHA RANESES, ULDARICO REJABA, MELINA REJUSO, FELISA RENIDO, MILGROS
REY, REDENTOR REYES, RESALINA SAGUN, ZENAIDA SALAZAR, FE SALIMA, SHIRLEY
SARAGON, PURIFICACION SARI, ELVIRA SATUMBAGA, MARIBEY SEALMOY, EDITHA
SINJAY, TITA SILVINO, AURORA TOLENTINO, ESPERANZA URBIZTONDO, SATURNINO
YODICO, RODOLFO MARIANO, ALICIA MARINAY, SUSAN MATANGA, PATRIA MATIAS,
LOUELITA MAYUNA, LOLITA MERCADO, EUGENIA MILLA, CRESENCIA MIRADOR, ERMA
MORAL, RAQUEL MORALES, DOLORES LAGRADA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
DE LEON. JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated
August 29, 1997 and Resolution2 dated January 7, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39878, affirming the Resolutions3 of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and imposing a penalty of six-(6) months
suspension without pay.
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances.

On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners participated
in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return-to-work order issued September 17,
1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these
charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating Committees,
Secretary Cario found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from
the service.4
Petitioners appealed the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) and later to the CSC. In 1995, the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cario as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Everdina Acosta guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She is hereby meted out the penalty of six
(6) months suspension without pay. Considering the period of time she was out of
service, she is automatically reinstated to her former position (sic).5
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter before
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition for certiorari and subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT
WRONGLY PENALIZED PETITIONERS WHOSE ONLY "OFFENSE" WAS TO
EXERCISE THEIR CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND
PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THAT
WRONGLY DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR RIGHT TO BACKWAGES.
This petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioners do not deny their absence from work nor the fact that said absences were due to their
participation in the mass actions at the Liwasang Bonifacio. However, they contend that their
participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Petitioner likewise maintain that
they never went on strike because they never sought to secure changes or modification of the
terms and conditions of their employment.
Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions which
they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public
School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr.6 wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions'
were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons."7 In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 8 we added that:
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was
to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term

"strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance,
will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,
public employees for not have the right to engaged in concerted work stoppages for any
purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they
exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but
because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced
adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible. The
actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.1wphi1.nt
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceable assemble that was punished, but the manner in which
they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are
efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby
petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably
derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied
government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and
noble intentions in staging the "mass action," but that will not justify their absences to the
prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an
illegal work stoppage.9
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 10 De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 11 and Alipat v. Court of
Appeals, 12 we upheld our rulings in MPSTA and Bangalisan. Considering the factual
circumstances of this case and the doctrine of stare decisis to which we consistently adhere, we
find no compelling reason to deviate from our earlier rulings in these related cases.
Anent the second issue, petitioners invoke our statement in Bangalisan that payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is
found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and if his suspension is unjustified.
Petitioners cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162 and contend that the determination of the CSC
therein that not an iota of evidence was given to substantiate the conclusion that they participated
in a "teacher's strike" amounted to a finding that they were innocent of the charges filed against
them.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. 1 While there recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a
suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in
citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel us to rule otherwise.
Petitioners' reliance on CSC Resolution No. 93-162 is misplaced. Said CSC resolution disposed
of the appeals of Fely Ilarina, Adelaida Dela Cruz, Alicia Galvo, Nenita Albios and Nerissa
Abellanda. Petitioners were never parties to their appeals and, therefore, cannot cite CSC
Resolution No. 93-162 in support of their contention. Petitioner also overlook the fact that
although no evidence was presented to prove that Ilarina, et al. participated in the mass actions,
the CSC explained that the deficiency was cured by their admissions during the hearings before
the MSPB. 14 More importantly, however, herein petitioners' claim of exoneration is belied by the

determination of the CSC that their participation in the mass actions constituted conduct
prejudicial to the service. Being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to
exoneration. 15
Petitioners also point out that from the issuance of the orders of dismissal by Secretary Cario to
the modification thereof by the CSC, almost five (5) years elapsed. Petitioners argue that the
period in excess of their preventive suspension and penalty of six (6) months suspension
amounted to unjustified suspension for which an award of backwages was proper pursuant to our
rulings Bautista v. Peralta 16 and Abellera v. City of Baguio. 17
We disagree. It will be recalled that in Jacinto, we upheld the legality of the immediate execution
of the dismissal orders issued by Secretary Cario on the ground that under Section 47(2), 18
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, the decision of a department secretary confirming the dismissal of an employee
under his jurisdiction is executory even pending appeal thereof. 19 Since dismissal orders remain
valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period during which an employee is
not permitted to work cannot be argued as amounting to unjustified suspension. In Gloria v. Court
of Appeals, 20 we further explained that:
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated
and the administrative with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) state
that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is
affirmed, i.e. if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal. 21
Petitioners' reliance on Fabella v. Court of Appeals 22 is likewise unavailing. In that case, the
petitioners therein immediately went to court to seek injunctive relief against the DECS
administrative proceedings on the ground that they were deprived of due process. The trial court
declared the administrative proceedings void and ordered the payment of backwages to the
petitioners therein. The Court of Appeals then upheld the order of the trial court. In affirming both
the trial and the Court, we stated therein that:
. . . Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the
suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a
consequence, be reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to
them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. . . . 2
On the other hand, in the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of
due process by the DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly,
however, it had been our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of
due process. 24 Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and later on
before the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot now allege denial of due process to justify their
claim for backwages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169838

April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr.

Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO
Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO
BULAONG, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169848

April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante,
Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida
Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne
Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier,
Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes,
Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal
capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief, Philippine National
Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional
Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila
Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169881

April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary
General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO
LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO
BULAONG, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated

when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No.
169848,2 who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action
they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They
further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to
protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial
rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and
suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3 allege that
they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their
individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October
6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along
Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge.
Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further.
They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 4 Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And
Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability
of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to
the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in
strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang
227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or
other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership
where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit
shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for
by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office
of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create

a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for
an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction
so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that
the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in
the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties
always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right
peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be
in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter
to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without
a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set
out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally
liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions
of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area
of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly
by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined
in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and
one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months
and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No.
1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after
the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their
respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior
permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September
21, 2005, shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the
political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally"
policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of
the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.

The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of
the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting
of a democratic society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.5
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is
not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies
to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not
mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack
of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly
and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable:
First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and
present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is
too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would
possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even
before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates
the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City
Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao,
National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila
Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his
personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo
Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all
other public officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and instruction.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director
General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro
Bulaong.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had
been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand
to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that
the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the threepronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no
reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a
means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open
alternative channels for communication of the information. 6
3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the
statement of the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic rerouting to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the
free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the
denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the
speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present
danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been
recognized in Osmea v. Comelec.7
4. Adiong v. Comelec8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such
regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them.
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court9 held that a local chief executive has the
authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of
traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the
mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15
of the law.
6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence
that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger
test."10

7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws
and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate
to call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing
laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the
rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in
G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor
power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the
"clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and
to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,11 Primicias v. Fugoso,12 and
Jacinto v. CA,13 have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the
use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a contentbased regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the
Comments, the Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006, 14 stating the principal
issues, as follows:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12
13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and were
approved and/or noted by the Court:
1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions
of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P.
No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should
no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely

a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the

maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the affidavit
executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it
does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law.
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing
developments.
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected
by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets
and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the
Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis
of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S.
v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government
for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of
Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this
century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and
even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense
the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to
exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes
which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought
out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising."

Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech
and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In
Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil
rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities
by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for
the purpose.18
Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights
to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The
Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case
with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not
by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of
this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,
so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable
assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the
Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to
reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert

force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an
instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal
or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right
likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their
views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than
just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, welldefined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate
disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to
force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not
required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and
the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears
repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property,
and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to
call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual
liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939
vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval
in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite
v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and
streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza
Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade
for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there
can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and
rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US
embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has
resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the
City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this
Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of
Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New

Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be
obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was construed by
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme
Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a statute requiring persons
using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor
from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly
or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts,
the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration
of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point
made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: "Civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never
been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection."
xxx
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice
Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held
but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There
could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty
parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given
all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being
held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for
the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
in some other place."
xxx
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to
the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and

grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:

Reyes v. Bagatsing

B.P. No. 880

(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when

not required.-- A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in
private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided
for by law are not covered by this Act.

125 SCRA 553, 569)

8. By way of a summary. The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard
for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted
to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if
so minded, they can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.

Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All

applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in
writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such
public assembly; the date, time
and duration thereof, and place or
streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the
probable number of persons
participating, the transport and
the public address systems to be

used.
(b) The application shall
incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed
with the office of the mayor of the
city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is
to be held, at least five (5)
working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the
application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the
application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the
mayor or any official acting in his
behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official
acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2)
working days from the date the
application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any
reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a
permit, said application shall be
posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to

have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on
the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall
be in writing and served on the
applica[nt] within twenty-four
hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of
the same. No appeal bond and
record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under
this section shall be decided
within twenty-four (24) hours from
date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge
for disposition or, in his absence,
to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may
be appealed to the Supreme
Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be

followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in Osmea v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.21
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
xxx
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of
his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. "Public"
does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Websters Dictionary defines it,
thus:23
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by
common interests or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place."
So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard
the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an
inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under
Republic Act No. 716024 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not
pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through
the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition
at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after
the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their
respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior
permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.

The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has
declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality
set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of
freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws system of
regulation of the peoples exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is
constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may
be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until
that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such
alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should,
however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has
conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything
other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
14. The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance with
the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the
"highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall
observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." Unfortunately, however, the
phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken it
to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to
public order. More so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies
thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has
departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
15. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law
which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without
a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This could
only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no rally policy" or with the
dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum
amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law
enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the
view to preempting the outbreak of violence.
16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum
tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused
definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the public from the
notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace even when
confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a message that we would no
longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, "we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally
policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be
dispersed." None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any
law.25

At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880,
CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the
law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
xxx
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other
peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
xxx
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties
always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right
peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial.1avvphil.net Towards this
end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be
in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter
to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph

should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
xxx
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without
a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person
to disperse the public assembly;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of
activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
xxx
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do
not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could
not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application
duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under
the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the
application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of
maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to
nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh
heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the

courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to
heightened scrutiny."26
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation
to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided
under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with
Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in
effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office
to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the
giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet
complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR),
insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID
and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984

CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO LEONERO, and
JUNE LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE GREGORIO
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION; CESAR MIJARES, in his capacity as the President
of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, GONZALO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity
as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation;
TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; ATTY. LEONARDO PADILLA, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel
& Security Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. FABLITA
AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE and EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as members of
the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, respondents.
Honesto N. Salcedo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Leonardo G. Padilla & Pablita G. Ammay for respondents.

FERNANDO, CJ.:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and
free speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding. The principal respondents
are Anastacio D. Ramento, Director of the National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports and the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. 1 The nullification of the
decision of respondent Ramento affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is sought
in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a
meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with
other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein

stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the
Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science
Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued
their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and
using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held.
Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the
noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding
of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with
damages against private respondents 2 and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found
petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools
more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of
the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent ex-parte
motion for the immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for
petitioners, dated November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all respondents or any person or persons acting in their place
or stead from enforcing the order of the Ministry of' Education and Culture dated October 20,
1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges against them and suspending them for one (1)
academic year with a stern warning that a commission of the same or another offense will be
dealt with utmost severity, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this
Court, thus allowing them to enroll, if so minded. 3
Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the petition "for lack of factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting
of the temporary restraining order dated November 16, 1982." 4 Public respondent Ramento, on
the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition
based on the following conclusion: "Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent
Director of the MECS did not commit any error, much less abused his discretion, when he
affirmed the decision of respondent University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the
provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Revised Student's Code of
Discipline .and ordering their suspension for one (1) academic school year. However, since said
suspension has not been enforced except only briefly, thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr.,
Lucas and Malabanan to finish their courses, and allowing petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue
their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding is now moot and academic. 5
With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and private
respondents, the case was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of
the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the
ensuing semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so.
Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than a year having passed since October 20,
1982 when respondent Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for one year.
Nonetheless, with its validity having been put in issue, for being violative of the constitutional
rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech, there is need to pass squarely on the
question raised.

This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty
imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that
specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did
disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such
undesirable consequence could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the
basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of
proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be granted and the decision of respondent
Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the right to freedom
of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise
been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship
or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." 7
2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta
public park to the gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open
space of public property, a short program would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the
use of a public park and of the streets leading to the United States Embassy was before this
Court. We held that streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and have been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens
and to discuss public issues. 8
3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private
premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the
summary this relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required." 9 Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. According to the petition: "On
August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme
Student Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at the
VMAS basketball court of the respondent university." 10 There was an express admission in the
Comment of private respondent University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to
hold a student assembly. 11 The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as
disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement
of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do
so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate
their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do
not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School
District, 12 "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." 13 While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students
must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more
specific level there is persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use
to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the
purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication
among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is
also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace
merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the

rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 14
5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was
a disregard of their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in
their favor, but subject to qualification in view of their continuing their demonstration in a place
other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones
therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic
personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.
6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders.
That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no
concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious
problem (iisang malaking suliranin.") 15 They believed that such a merger would result in the
increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng
ating mga magulang."). 16 If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience
goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth, They may give the
speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises
and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is
without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were denied the right to
peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision, United States v. Apurado, 17 the facts disclosed that
shortly before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its session, some
five hundred residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the
opening of the session, a substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber,
demanding that the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police be
dismissed, submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its
conformity. Such individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was
fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during
a session of that body could be called disorder and misbehavior. It turned out that the movement
had its origin in religious differences. The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other
participants were indicted and convicted of sedition in that they allegedly prevented the municipal
government from freely exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Carson, who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the prosecution be permitted to
seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities,
then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and
a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest form of punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities." 18 The principle to be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly conduct
occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious
conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising." 19 A careful
reading of this decision is in order before private respondents attach, as they did in their

comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of
petitioners.
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that
transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a
place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed.
According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such
assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m. 20 Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On
those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the
appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of
such infraction considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took placethere was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They
would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of the matter. Even then a
one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both respondent
University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls
for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the offense connoted and the
sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a
due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a
one-week suspension would be punishment enough.
9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being
the case, especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time
being of the essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What
cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be
in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do
as citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill of Rights.
10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this
Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present.
As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the nonacademic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of respondent
Ramento imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court in the resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that
date, petitioners had been suspended for more than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty
had been served. No costs.