ATAS PAMBANSA BLG.

22: ANNOTATED
This is an annotation of Batas Pambansa Blg. ("BP") 22 -- "An
Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check
Without
Sufficient
Funds
or
Credit
and
for
Other
Purposes"
(See also: Full text of BP 22; Forum Discussion).
BP 22, often referred to as the "Bouncing Checks Law,"
governs the criminal liability arising from the issuance of
bounced checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of
a bouncing check and not the purpose for which the check
was issued, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. To
determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith
the
public
reposes
in
the
stability
and
commercial
value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in
trade and in banking communities. (Caras vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 129900, 2 October 2001)
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any
person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person
who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company
or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

Annotation:
Section 1 of the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two distinct
acts (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375,
6 July 2001):
(1)
Making
or
drawing
and
issuing
any
check
to
apply
on
account
or
for
value,
knowing
at
the
time
of
issue
that
the
drawer
does
not
have
sufficient
funds
in
or
credit
with
the
drawee
bank.
(2)
Having
sufficient
funds
in
or
credit
with
the
drawee
bank
shall
fail
to
keep
sufficient
funds
or
to
maintain
a
credit
to
cover
the
full
amount
of
the
check
if
presented
within
a
period
of
90
days
from
the
date
appearing
thereon,
for
which
reason
it
is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have
sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance,
while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds
at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or
maintain credit within ninety (90) days from the date appearing
on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated
by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time
of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in
nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that
involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer
had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when
issued.
Under
the
first
offense,
the
90-day
presentment
period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express
element of the second offense.
Elements: General
The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
(1) drawing and issuance of any check to apply on
account or for value;
(2) knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon presentment;
and
(3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
(Caras vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)

The second requisite or element is discussed in Section 2 below,

while the third requisite is discused in Section 3.
Applicable penalties
In A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC (2001), the Supreme Court clarified
that the earlier circular, Administrative Circular 12-2000, did not
remove
imprisonment
as
an
alternative
penalty
for
violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. The Judges may, "in the exercise of sound
discretion,
and
taking
into
consideration
the
peculiar
circumstances
of
each
case,
determine
whether
the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate
the
seriousness
of
the
offense,
work
violence
on
the
social
order,
or
otherwise
be
contrary
to
the
imperatives of justice." Also, "[s]hould only a fine be imposed
and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle
to
the
application
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment."
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient
funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee
bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit, unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.
Annotation:
The second element of the offense is the knowledge of the
accused about the insufficiency of funds. It must be shown
beyond
reasonable
doubt
that
the
accused
knew
of
the
insufficiency
of
funds
at
the
time
the
check
was
issued.
Section 2 provides that the accused must be notified of the
dishonor.
The prosecution must establish that the accused was actually
notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she
failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to
pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for its payment. The notice of dishonor of a check
to the maker must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the
drawer or maker of the dishonor of his check is not enough.
It's true that Section 2 does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing. This, however, should be taken in
conjunction with Section 3, which provides that where there

are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,

such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of
dishonor or refusal.This is consistent with the rule that penal
statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. Without a written notice of
dishonor of the checks, there is no way of determining
when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 would start
and end. (Bax vs. People, G.R. No. 149858, 5 September 2007,
citing Rico vs. People, G.R. No. 137191, 18 November 2002,
392
SCRA
61)
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a
check is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption
does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check
or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to
satisfy
the
amount
indicated
in
the
check
and
thus
avert
prosecution.(King vs. People, G.R. No. 131540, 2 December 1999)
The
foregoing
discussion
abundantly
shows
that
the
notice
must be in writing. A verbal and indirect notice, however,
was found to be sufficient in the case of Yulo vs. People,
G.R. No. 142762, 4 March 2005. The pertinent finding of fact
in this case is as follows:
As Myrna [the complainant] did not know
petitioners [the accused] address, she immediately
informed Josefina [the "best friend of the accused]
about the dishonored checks. The latter told Myrna
not to worry and repeated her assurance that
petitioner is her best friend and a good payer.
Myrna tried to get petitioners address from Josefina,
but the latter refused and instead made the
assurance that she will inform petitioner that the
checks were dishonored.
It is clear from these findings that there was no
written notice given to the accused. It is also clear
that no notice, even a verbal notice, was given
directly to the accused. Still, the Supreme Court
concluded that:
We likewise find no reason to sustain petitioners
contention that she was not given any notice of
dishonor. Myrna had no reason to be suspicious
of petitioner. It will be recalled that Josefina
Dimalanta assured Myrna that petitioner is her
"best friend" and "a good payer." Consequently,
when the checks bounced, Myrna would naturally
turn to Josefina for help. We note that Josefina
refused to give Myrna petitioners address but
promised to inform petitioner about the dishonored
checks.

This ruling would appear to be inconsistent with

the required burden of proof and the rule of
interpretation of penal laws, succinctly noted in
King vs. People, thus:
We must stress that BP 22, like all penal
statutes, is construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. Likewise, the prosecution has
the burden to prove beyond reasonable
doubt each element of the crime. Hence,
the prosecutions case must rise or
fall on the strength of its own
evidence, never on the weakness or
even absence of that of the defense.
Section 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. - It
shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when
refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon
presentment, to cause to be written, printed, or
stamped in plain language thereon, or attached
thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal
to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the
notice
of
dishonor
or
refusal.
In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in
evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason
therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie
Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that
there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such
bank for the payment in full of such check, if such
be the fact.
Annotation:
The third element of the offense is the dishonor of the check.
Under Section 3, "the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and
dishonored check, having the drawees refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor
as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee
for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly
dishonored
for
the
reason
written,
stamped,
or
attached
by
the
drawee
on
such
dishonored
check."
For
instance, in the case of King vs. People (supra), the prosecution
presented the checks which were stamped with the words
ACCOUNT CLOSED, supported by the returned check tickets

issued by the depository bank stating that the checks had been
dishonored. The documents constitute prima facie evidence that
the drawee bank dishonored the checks, and no no evidence was
presented to rebut the claim.

Section 4. Credit construed. - The word "credit" as

used herein shall be construed to mean an
arrangement or understanding with the bank for the
payment of such check.
Section 5. Liability under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code.

Annotation:
The act of issuing a bouncing check could give rise to separate
offenses punishable under BP 22 and simultaneously under the
Revised Penal Code.
Section 6. Separability clause. - If any separable
provision of this Act be declared unconstitutional,
the remaining provisions shall continue to be in
force.
Annotation:
The attacks on the constitutionality of BP 22, as discussed in
Lozano vs. Martinez (G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986),
are the
following:
(1)
it
offends
the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of
contract;
(3)
it
contravenes
the
equal
protection
clause;
(4)
it
unduly
delegates
legislative
and
executive
powers;
and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage
the
Interim
Batasan
violated
the
constitutional
provision
prohibiting
amendments
to
a
bill
on
Third
Reading.
Unless
otherwise
indicated,
the
succeeding
discussions
are
lifted
from
Lozano.
Non-imprisonment

for

debt

It had been argued that BP 22 runs counter to the inhibition

in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Since the
offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor
or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the
drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than
a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of
the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is
claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce

payment

of

debt

under

the

threat

of

penal

sanction.

The
gravamen
of
the
offense
punished
by
BP
22
is
the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law
is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation.
Because
of
its
deleterious
effects
on
the
public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an
offense
against
public
order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu.
But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical
to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which
the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but
because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum.
The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature
that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated
by the imposition of penal sanctions. It had been reported that
the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close
to
200
million
pesos.
It is not for the court to question the wisdom or policy of
the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists
between means and end. Considering the factual and legal
antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not
difficult
to
understand
the
public
concern
which
prompted
its
enactment.
Impairment

of

freedom

of

contract

Article
III,
Section
10
of
the
Constitution
provides
that:
"No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
" However, the freedom of contract which is constitutionally
protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts
which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not
be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument
which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
Equal

protection

of

the

laws

The challenge is to the effect that BP 22 is discriminatory or is

violative of the equal protection of the laws since it penalizes

the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It had been argued
that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer
of
the
check,
since
without
the
indispensable
participation
of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. It is settled, however, that the clause "equal protection
of the laws" does not preclude classification of individuals, who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. The argument
premised on the equal protection of the law is tantamount to
saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled.
Improper

delegation

of

legislative

powers

It had been argued that the law violates the Constitutional

prohibition against the delegation of legislative power, on the
theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the
maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the
payee -- if the payee does not present the check to the bank
for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime.
This argument, however, stretches to absurdity the meaning of
"delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is
the power to legislate, or the power to make laws. which means,
as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense
sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By
no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to
define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in
any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision
in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely,
as
undue
delegation
of
executive
power.
Defect

in

the

enactment

of

BP

22

It is argued that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the

1973 Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it
enacted BP 22 into law. This constitutional provision prohibits
the introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third
Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading, the bill
which eventually became BP 22 was amended in that the text
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted
on Second Reading was altered or changed in the printed text
of the bill submitted for approval on Third Reading. However,
it is clear from the records that the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually
approved
by
the
body
on
Second
Reading.
Section 7. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days
after publication in the Official Gazette. evidence of the making
or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the
same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped
or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.