VII.

MARRIAGE
B. REQUISITES

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her
husband Angel Sanchez, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors
ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael
Trias, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, defendantsappellants.
G.R. No. L-16925
March 31, 1962

The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from
the Friar Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266,
2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of
strong materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said
properties on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff
contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda
are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they
acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon
estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No.
2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots
above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said
properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above
described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half
thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties described in the complaint,
or that said properties had been administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of
special and affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the
defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession
and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of
ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation
in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint
that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further
presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was contributed by them in
support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a
counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000 and a

counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the plaintiff had
appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were
joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and
control of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during the administration
by them of said properties. As cross-claim against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to oneeighth of the properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a share of oneeighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang,
Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their codefendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that
the cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda are
estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate
under certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in
part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff
to have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the
defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of
January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of
the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and
another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a
marriage contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and
another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil
register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the
contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and
Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the
municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage
existed therein; but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register
forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which
was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue
was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal
certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
registry of said birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the death
of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias)
was signed by the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or
admission: .
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel,
Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with

Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her
second marriage with Fabian Pugeda..
.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the
Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said purpose they
appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the improvement
and welfare of the said property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C.
Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion
that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not
only by the chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, who
appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and
wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .
Art. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil
register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises
in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in
articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said
marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55
Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C.
Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial
court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar
Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of
sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The
different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended
to this decision as Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question were
conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be
adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate
of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by
both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment
the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial on the
ground that they discovered copies of four documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp.
108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition

in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court,
rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the
lots in question amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of
Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should
participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments
in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment: .
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650,
2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of
percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the
installments for these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not loss the character of
conjugal property for payments were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the installments
of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of
Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to
be distributed among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be deducted
from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid
during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal between them
one half of which must go to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or
heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death of his mother who
died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his administration within three (3) months time from the
date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or
authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence.
They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth above. As
the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to
whether the land subject of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of
both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in the
action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual occupants (actual settler and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the landare not

public land in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the
provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.) .
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .
Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed
to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided
in this Act at the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...
Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement
by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate, and
he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued
interest. .... Provided however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter
into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate and executing the said receipt
whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and
occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as
above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied lands: ....
Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions
of this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been
made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.
Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section
twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to
receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of
law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not
leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons
who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the
holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before having complied with
all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the
holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration.
(Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or
the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition
that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were
made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the
law provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are
left to the buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo
Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full
price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of
the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being
that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.

... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment
in full of the purchase price, altho the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial
and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last
installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the
parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified
bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28,
Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that
the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject
only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies
and his widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right
as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies
before the payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a
widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full
during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even
after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the
name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties
themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .
Mr. Viniegra:
Q De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su
participation?
A No, seor.
Q Nunca? .
A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the
obligations have been paid annually from the products of the land.
Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being
discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean
to say ? .
A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the obligations to the Bureau of
Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participation?
A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were
being paid from the products of the lands.

Mr. Viniegra: .
Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands? .
A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was until the
Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of some big
lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .
A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November
20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the
inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and
the project of partition in said special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as
the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above
described and paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But
another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the
lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was
appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929,
was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes
the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was
adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her
share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by
Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115
of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been known
to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared
in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the
proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a
conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and
that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and
defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in the
said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to
have to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and his
wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of
improvements such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining
unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands
already belonged to the children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate
of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff
could claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer.
How much of said produce belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown,

but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted
most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal
partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her
children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the effect that
useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be
applied. But even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action to recover
his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the
year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14
years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the improvements, if any, is therefore also
barred. 1wph1.t
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been
made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of
conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to
plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of
partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children
with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as
usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not
sign it.
The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the
properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his
knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties
and later brought this action.
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he
may have had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be
deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein oneninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of
such share to plaintiff on the ground of prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children,
namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C.
Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and
decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the
plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by
the statute of limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one
part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct of the
plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties
be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is
hereby affirmed. Without costs.

PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-8014
March 14, 1955
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates
registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes
while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly
elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he
was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under
section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that
Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He
also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting
held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be
declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently,
it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of
sufficient legal grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him
ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his
brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they
pertain to only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his
resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact the
determination of which much depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since
1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has
been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that
on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to work
in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a
license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April,
1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor respondent has requested
for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has
not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United of
Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to
engage in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo,

Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious
order on August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has refrained
ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found
any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which
he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme
to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the
purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the
public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the
law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the
requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of
such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the
interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister
knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to
show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but,
considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them
as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his
disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein,
according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination
thereof one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly
remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made
at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is
disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place
in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an
express provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently
seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present
case.
. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying
the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election
in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy.
(Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee
is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no
such result, because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the
latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil.,
489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)

10

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn LetterComplaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents
to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that
they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her
own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly
issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the

11

same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on
5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of
the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal,
informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the
Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the
area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage
outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and

12

subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. [5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-4904
February 5, 1909
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before
the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same
day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It
states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office
of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in
what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented
Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of
marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of
September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace
in the presence of the witnesses on that day.

13

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day
named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed.
Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at
the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document
above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago,
the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses abovenamed, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the
peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she
signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly
considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the
house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and
that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when
the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5
o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother;
that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead
of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took
place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they
thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome
the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during
her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace
was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies
the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said
she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims
were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others
was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we
have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

14

Yours,

ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go
there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese
store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.
Yours,

ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage
before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you
see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at
this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me
this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and
that if I insist on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.
Yours,

ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my
father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if
he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no
importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during
the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after

15

consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the
decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for
the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing
until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married."
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace,
signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage
in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless
the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that
she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties
mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice
of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write
the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances
in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was
afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to
the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the
trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this
second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to
allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally
made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment.
We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any
way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.

MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO DE
LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-32473
October 6, 1930

16

This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding as follows:
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby orders the
defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described in the
complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent marriage of his parents, the
appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants.
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived
Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to
Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro
Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention
being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro
Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9,
1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her
alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were
lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee,
is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent
marriage of his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural
children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil
Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary
acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other
public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:

17

Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father,
justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment
of the issue, shall be observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding
article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo
as his son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law,
for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither
been executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio Madridejo
to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data
for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of
births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B,
or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not
of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of
baptism are no longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after
their marriage. 1awph!l.net
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and by the mother according to
article 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting
themselves up as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a
judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child,
which is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of
his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his
mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his
being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such.

18

The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is
indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before
her marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the purpose of
compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate
him.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs against the
appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of
Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is
the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance
of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four children were born out of that marriage.
[2]
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
[4]
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late Manzano
and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,

19

respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. [6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for

20

exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, [8] who, under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL
& PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding
that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. [2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law. Scnc m

21

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true
and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." [10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." [13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances

22

clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to
his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place [21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,

23

void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." [25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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