You are on page 1of 10

DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs.

CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
DE LEON BROKERAGE vs. CA, 1967; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; 2015 - Digest - Free download as PDF File
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read ...
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; Case Digest: NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; CORTEJO
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; lawyerly.ph › digest › cea99
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON CORTEJO,
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; GR No. 171127, 2015-03-11. Facts: Mrs.
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), ...
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; NOEL CASUMPANG v. NELSON CORTEJO -
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; Lawyerly
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; lawyerly.ph › juris › view › cea99
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; GR No. 171127, (2015-03-11) ... [ GR No.
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; 171127, Mar 11, 2015 ] ... Dr. Casumpang
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; the morning the following day.
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; Casumpang vs Cortejo - SECOND DIVISION
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; G.R No 171127 ...
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999;
CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ, 1999; https://www.coursehero.com › ... › LAW ›
LAW 000
View Notes - Casumpang vs Cortejo from
LAW 000 at Arellano University Law
Accessibility links School. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.
Skip to main contentAccessibility help 171127, March 11, 2015 NOEL ...
Accessibility feedback Medical Malpractice: 4 Elements to
Google Understand - Fortun ...
CASUMPANG vs. CORTEJO, 2015;
https://www.fnslaw.com.ph › medical-
About 4,750 results (0.47 seconds) malpractice-4-elements-to-understand
Search Results Sep 26, 2018 - The four (4) elements are
Web results (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015 - NOEL proximate causation. Recent ... 210445,
CASUMPANG ... December 7, 2015) perfectly illustrates
how an injury to the patient can take place.
www.chanrobles.com › cralaw › In Rosit ... An illustration of proximate
2015marchdecisions causation is provided for in the case of
G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015 - NOEL Casumpang v. Cortejo (G.R. No. 171127 ...
CASUMPANG, RUBY SANGA-MIRANDA AND G.R. Nos. 171127, 171217 and 171228:
SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL, Petitioners, Noel Casumpang, et ...
v. NELSON CORTEJO ...
4. Casumpang v. Cortejo | Medical source.gosupra.com › docs › decision
Diagnosis | Negligence Translate this page
Ruby Sanga-Miranda vs. Nelson
https://www.scribd.com › doc › 4- Cortejo/San Juan De Dios Hospital vs.
Casumpang-v-Cortejo Nelson Cortejo ... 171127, 171217 and
CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO G.R. No. 171127 171228; Date of Promulgation: March 11,
| March 11, 2015. At 12:00 midnight, 2015.
Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by (PDF) Cases Doctrines on Torts&Damages
Dr. Casumpang, was transferred ... (Civil Law Review ...
(021) Dr. Noel Casumpang v. Cortejo - g.r.
No. 171127 ... https://www.academia.edu ›
Cases_Doctrines_on_Torts_and_Damages
https://www.scribd.com › document › _Civ...
021-Dr-Noel-Casumpang-v-Cortejo-... Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear
Mar 11, 2015 - (021) Dr. Noel Casumpang and unequivocal terms a .... 204866,
v. Cortejo - g.r. No. 171127 - March 11, January 21, 2015 Jurisprudence defines
negligence as the .... Cortejo, G.R. No. ... Under the rule, the principal is bound by the acts
Whether or not Dr. Casumpang and Dr. of his agent with the apparent authority which
Miranda committed a breach of duty is ... he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or
4. Casumpang v. Cortejo - Free Download which he holds to the agent out to the public as
PDF - KUPDF possessing. The question in every case is
whether the principal has by his voluntary act
https://kupdf.net › 4-casumpang-v- placed the agent with business usages and the
cortejo_5b066ec6e2b6f52342ef0f99_pdf nature of the particular business, is justified in
4. Casumpang v. Cortejo. March 9, 2017 | presuming that such agent has authority to
Author: Nori Lola | Category: N/A ... perform the particular act in question. (Hudson
CORTEJO G.R. No. 171127 | March 11, 2015 C., Loan Assn., Inc. v. Horowytz, 116 N.J.L.
FACTS: On April 22, 1988 ... 605, 608 A 437 (Supp. Ct. 1936).
Searches related to CASUMPANG vs.
CORTEJO, 2015; The applicability of the doctrine of apparent
casumpang vs cortejo lawphil authority in the field of hospital liability has been
upheld in Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake
medical malpractice lawphil Worth Inc.. In this case, it was said that there
does not appear to be any rational basis for
negligence jurisprudence philippines excluding the concept of apparent authority
from the field of hospital liability. In cases where
supreme court cases of nurses in the it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions,
philippines has held out a particular physician as its agent
and/or employee and that the patient has
expert witness philippine jurisprudence accepted treatment from the physician in the
reasonable belief that it is being tendered in
medical malpractice philippines cases behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be
liable for the physician’s negligence.
Page navigation
1 PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA, GR
2 126297, 2007;
3
4 Facts:
5
6 Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City
7 Hospital because of difficulty of bowel
8 movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.
9 Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering
10 from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil,
Next assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City
Footer links Hospital, performed an anterior resection
Philippines City Of Manila, Metro Manila - surgery on Natividad. He found that the
Based on your past activity - Use precise malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on
location - Learn more her left ovary, necessitating the removal of
HelpSend feedbackPrivacyTerms certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained
the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique
a.1. DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform
(P.3 sllabus); hysterectomy on her.

This doctrine imposes liability, not as the result After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
of the reality of a contractual relationship, but hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed
rather because of the actions of a principal or an the operation and closed the incision. However,
employer in somehow misleading the public into the operation appeared to be flawed. After a
believing that the relationship or the authority couple of days, Natividad complained of
exists. (Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake excruciating pain in her anal region. She
Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982), quoting consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about
Arthur v. St. Peters Hospital, 169 N.J. 575, 405 it. They told her that the pain was the natural
A 2d 443 (1979)). The concept is essentially one consequence of the surgery.
of estoppel.
Two weeks after Natividad returned from the cases, an employer-employee relationship in
United States to seek further treatment, her effect exists between hospitals and their
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from attending and visiting physicians.
her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr.
Ampil proceeded to her house where he In addition to the pronouncement in Ramos vs
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze CA, Its liability is also anchored upon the agency
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured principle of apparent authority or agency by
her that the pains would soon vanish. estoppel and the doctrine of corporate
negligence.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true.
Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic referred to as the “holding out” theory, or
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of estoppel, imposes liability, not as the result of
another foreign object in her vagina — a foul- the reality of a contractual relationship, but
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width rather because of the actions of a principal or an
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto- employer in somehow misleading the public into
vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive believing that the relationship or the authority
organs which forced stool to excrete through the exists.
vagina. Another surgical operation was needed
to remedy the damage. In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of
Hospital the names and specializations of the
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a physicians associated or accredited by it,
complaint for damages against the Professional including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It
Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City is now estopped from passing all the blame to
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They the physicians whose names it proudly paraded
alleged that the latter are liable for negligence in the public directory l eading the public to
for leaving two pieces of gauze inside believe that it vouched for their skill and
Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing competence. PSI’s act is tantamount to holding
their acts of negligence. out to the public that Medical City Hospital,
through its accredited physicians, offers quality
Pending the outcome of the above cases, health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil
Natividad died and was duly substituted by her and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
children (the Aganas). The RTC rendered its qualifications, the hospital created the
Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. impression that they were its agents, authorized
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and to perform medical or surgical services for its
malpractice. patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad
being one of them, accepted the services on the
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reasonable belief that such were being rendered
dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes with Dr. by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
Ampil liable to reimburse Professional Services, servants.
Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had
paid to the plaintiffs. Under the doctrine of corporate negligence or
corporate responsibility, PSI as owner, operator
Issues: Whether or not PSI may be held and manager of Medical City Hospital, did not
solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. perform the necessary supervision nor exercise
diligent efforts in the supervision of Drs. Ampil
Held: Yes, PSI is solidarily liable for the and Fuentes and its nursing staff, resident
negligence of Dr. Ampil. In Ramos v. Court of doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs.
Appeals, the court held that private hospitals, Ampil and Fuentes in the performance of their
hire, fire and exercise real control over their duties as surgeons. Premised on the doctrine of
attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While corporate negligence, the trial court held that
‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, the PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important In the present case, it was duly established that
hallmarks of an employer-employee PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
relationship, with the exception of the payment purpose and under the concept of providing
of wages. The court held that for the purpose of comprehensive medical services to the public.
allocating responsibility in medical negligence Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect from harm all relationship in effect exists between hospitals
patients admitted into its facility for medical and their attending and visiting physicians” had
treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform been reversed in a subsequent resolution.
such duty.
(ostensible agency argument) The doctrine of
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. ostensible agency or agency by estoppel cannot
Fuentes operated on Natividad with the apply because Sps. Agana failed to establish one
assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, requisite of the doctrine: That Natividad relied
composed of resident doctors, nurses, and on the representation of the hospital engaged
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude the services of Dr. Ampil
that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has
actual or constructive knowledge of the The application of the doctrine of corporate
procedures carried out, particularly the report of negligence is misplaced because the proximate
the attending nurses that the two pieces of cause of the injury of Natividad Agana was the
gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans, it was negligence Dr. Ampil, not the hospital.
held that a corporation is bound by the
knowledge acquired by or notice given to its Issue: Is PSI liable?
agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to a matter to which Held: Yes.
their authority extends. This means that the
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Ratio: MR lacks merit. Hospital still liable based
Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the on those 3 doctrine.
failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’
report, to investigate and inform Natividad PSI is not only vicariously liable for the
regarding the missing gauzes amounts to negligence of Dr. Ampil under CC2180 but also
callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its directly liable under CC2176.
duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed Re: employer-employee relationship
to take an active step in fixing the negligence Explanation of the Control Test: Hire, fire,
committed. This renders PSI, not only and exercise real control over the staff
vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also o There is a screening wherein the
directly liable for its own negligence under physicians are required to submit proof
Article 2176. of qualifications and accreditations
which are scrutinized by the members
PSI, apart from a general denial of its of the hospital administration. They can
responsibility, failed to adduce evidence either accept or reject.
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and o The physician’s performance as a
supervision of Dr. Ampil. In neglecting to offer specialist is generally evaluated by a
such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden peer review committee on the basis
under the last paragraph of Article 2180 and, ofmortality and morbidity statistics and
therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable feedback from patients, nurses, interns
with Dr. Ampil. and residents.
o A consultant remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA, the minimum standards acceptable to
2008; MR the hospital or its peer review
committee, is normally politely
2008 case terminated.
In an MR, PSI contends that the Court erred in
finding it liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Re: ostensible agency doctrine or apparent
Code because: there is no employeremployee authority doctrine or agency by estoppel.
relationship between it and its consultant, Dr.
Ampil. Nograles v. Capitol Medical Center
o General rule: a hospital is not liable
PSI arguments: for the negligence of an independent
(No Employer-employee relationship) Court’s contractor-physician.
Decision in Ramos that “an employer-employee
o Exception: The hospital may be liable o Since they knew each other, he was
if the physician is the ostensible agent expecting that he’ll be treated better
of the hospital. than other normal patients of the
doctor.
Two factors of apparent authority:
o Focuses on the hospital’s Re: corporate responsibility
manifestations and is sometimes Such responsibility includes the proper
described as an inquiry whether the supervision of the members of the medical staff:
hospital acted in a manner which would
lead a reasonable person to conclude o The hospital has a duty to make a
that the individual who was alleged to reasonable effort to monitor and
be negligent was an employee or agent oversee the treatment prescribed and
of the hospital. administered by the physicians
o Whether or not the plaintiff acted in practicing in its premises.
reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with The hospital failed to do such responsibility.
ordinary care and prudence.
o The hospital did not conduct an
Doctrine of apparent authority is a species of immediate investigation on the reported
Estoppel: missing gauzes.
o Whether a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, o Dr. Jocson, a member of the PSI’s
intentionally and deliberately led medical staff, who testified whether the
another to believe a particular thing hospital conducted an investigation
true, and to act upon such belief, he answered evasively to questions
cannot in any litigation arising out of regarding the investigation:
such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it. That he cannot answer whether or not
the hospital did investigate because
Test: until that moment he did not have any
o Whether or not the principal has by his more follow-up on the case.
voluntary act placed the agent in such a
situation that a person of ordinary o Agana testified that he will be given
prudence, conversant with business the operative report of the operation as
usages and the nature of the particular promised by Dr. Ampil, but when he
business, is justified in presuming that went to the records custodian, only
such agent has authority to perform the findings with entries and dates but the
particular act in question? operative procedure and operative
report findings were given to him.
SC says yes.
o Dr. Ampil was a prominent doctor The hospital’s omission to investigate(as
o They are neighbors testified by Dr. Jocson) shows the hospital’s lack
o He is the professor of his daughter at of concern for the injury. They also failed to take
UERM an active step to rectify the negligence
o When Agana’s daughter opted to committed.
establish a clinic in Medical City, Dr.
Ampil was one of their consultants on
how to establish that clinic in the PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA,
hospital – from this point he found out 2008; MR
about Dr. Ampil’s expertise.
SC says there was no employer-employee
o That his reason for choosing to contact Dr. relationship, so PSI cannot be held vicariously
Ampil was that: liable under the respondeat superior doctrine.
o He was a specialist
o He knew of him as a staff member of However, by its actions which reinforced the
Medical City – which is a prominent actions of Dr. Ampil of making it appear that the
hospital. latter is the former’s agent, the hospital is
vicariously liable under the Apparent Authority
doctrine; and’ the hospital is directly liable for
breach of duty to initiate investigations under
the Corporate Responsibility doctrine. The missing gauzes report was made – but
no signs of complications were exhibited during
The duties of the hospital are distinct from Natividad’s confinement in the hospital, hence,
those of the doctor-consultant practicing within they were not alerted,
its premises in relation to the patient. Hence,
the failure of PSI to fulfil its duties as a hospital No negligence on PSI’s part until the
corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the discharge of the patient
Aganas distinct from that of Dr. Ampil.
There was no complaint from Mrs. Agana
“We make it clear that PSI’s hospital liability after her discharge from the hospital
based on ostensible agency and corporate
negligence applies only to this case, pro hac Mrs. Agana only complained to Drs. Ampil
vice. It is not intended to set a precedent and and Fuentes – how could PSI possibly do
should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals something to fix the negligence of
liable for every form of negligence of their Doctor Ampil?
doctors-consultants under any and all
circumstances. The ruling is unique to this case, Issue: Is PSI liable?
for the liability of PSI arose from an implied
agency with Dr. Ampil and an admitted Held: Yes.
corporate duty to Natividad.”
Ratio: PSI is not vicariously liable (under the
PSI arguments: doctrine of respondeat superior) but is
vicariously liable under apparent agency and
Re: Employer-Employee relationship directly liable under corporate negligence 3
Legal Relationships determining liability of
The February 2009 and 2007 decision of hospital for the negligence of the doctor:
Ramos v. CA (qualifying the 2002 decision): “an
employer-employee relations between hospital Between the hospital and doctor practicing
and their consultants exists” stays but it is set within its premises – such is covered by
aside for being inconsistent with or contrary to respondeat superior (NCC 2176; NCC2180)
the import of the resolution granting the
hospital’s motion for reconsideration in 2002 is Between hospital and the patient being
applicable because: treated or examined within its premises –
○ Agana failed to prove an employer- doctrine of Corporate Negligence
employee relationship between Ampil
and PSI (Medical City). o Hospital is still liable regardless of its
○ The TC found that there is no relationship with the doctor.
employer-employee relationship.
o Directly liable for failure to follow
Re: Apparent agency established standard of conduct to
which it should conform as a
The Aganas sought Dr. Ampil’s services, not corporation.
the hospital for medical care and support.
○ Aganas did not select Medical City to Between the patient and the doctor – doctrine
provide medical care because of any of apparent authority
apparent agency. o Liable even though no employer-
Agana procured services of Ampil because of employee relationship exists
their qualifications and being friend and
neighbor. o NCC 2176; NCC 1431; NCC 1869

Re: Doctrine of Corporate Negligence Re: Respondeat Superior


In this case, there is no employer-employee
The negligence of Doctora Ampil is only an relationship
element of corporate negligence
Note PSI’s admissions in its MR: There is lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil
Captain of the Ship Doctrine makes Ampil the
only one liable (res ipsa loquitur)
RTC and CA found no employment PSI is directly liable
relationship between PSI and Ampil – The o The Court looked into their admissions
Aganas did not question that finding in their Motion for Reconsideration
which implied that:
Exact ruling in RTC: “That defendant doctors
were not employees of PSI in its hospital, they The hospital had the power to review or cause
being merely consultants without any employer- the review of what may have irregularly
employee relationship and in the capacity of transpired within its walls strictly for the
independent contractors” purpose of determining whether some form of
negligence may have attended the procedure
○ Aganas never contested this
o Treading on the Captain of the Ship
As for CA: CA mistakenly referred to PSI and Doctrine, the role of any doctor
Dr. Ampil as employer-employee, but discussion rendering services within its premises
of the proved otherwise. for the purpose of ensuring the safety of
the patients means that the patient
○ Aganas only questioned the non- avails themselves of the Hospital’s
liability of Dr. Fuentes services and facilities

Such finding is final and conclusive in this PSI barred itself from arguing in its second
Court motion for reconsideration that the concept of
corporate responsibility was not yet in existence
Re: Using the control test: determinative factor at the time Natividad underwent treatment
PSI is still not the employer of Dr. Ampil
No vicarious liability attached to the hospital o They admitted that they were
No proof of power of control of PSI over Dr responsible for the missing gauze but
Ampil not for taking an active step in fixing the
negligence committed
Re: Agency by Estoppel
o This admission in their pleading
PSI is viariously liable cannot be controverted
o Hospital’s implied manifestation to the
patient which led the latter to conclude PSI cannot excuse itself for corporate duty
that the doctor was the hospital’s agent just because the wife complained only to the
Doctors:
o The patient’s reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital and the doctor, o As stated in the previous MR, Dr.
consistent with ordinary care and Jocson (part of the group attending
prudence Natividad Agana) that toward the end of
the surgery they talked about the
o Act of Ampil: The husband consulted Dr. Ampil missing gauzes but Dr. Ampil assured
regarding the condition of his wife, after the them that he would personally notify
discussion, Dr. Ampil told husband Agana to the patient about it
proceed to Medical City for check-up and tests
o Doctor Ampil may have primary
o Act of hospital: PSI required wife Agana to responsibility of notifying Natividad
sign a “consent for hospital care” preparatory to about the gauzes, PSI imposed upon
the surgery – stating that the hospital and its itself the separate and independent
staff is given permission to conduct tests for responsibility of initiating the inquiry
diagnosis and treatments and procedure into the missing gauzes
(including confinement) to Natividad (wife
Agana) o The record taken during the operation
should have given PSI reason to initiate
o The act of the hospital reinforced the act of review of the operation due to the
Dr. Ampil – strengthening the belief of Agana missing gauzes – there is no need to
that Dr. Ampil was an agent of the hospital. wait for a complaint

Re: Doctrine of Corporate Responsibility CASUMPANG vs. CORTEJO, 2015;

You might also like