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9 Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Out of Utopia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 195-230;
Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Defense Forces: A Civilianized Military in a Partially Militarized
Society," in RomanKolkowicz and AndreiKorbonski,Soldiers, Peasantsand Bureaucrats(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 77-106; EduardLuttwakand Dan Horowitz, The Israeli
Army (London:Allen Lane, 1975); YoramPeri, "Political-MilitaryPartnershipin Israel,"International Political Science Review, 2:3 (1981), 303-15.
10 Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment(Durham:
Duke University Press, 1985), 67-98.
11 Dan Horowitz, "StrategicLimitationsof A Nation in Arms," Armed Forces and Society,
13:2 (1987), 277-94.
12 On the
tendencyto ignore the Palestiniansin the IsraeliSociology, see BaruchKimmerling,
"Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building:The Palestiniansand their Meaning in Israeli Society," AmericanSociological Review, 57:4 (1992), 446-60.
13 F. Gilbert, ed., The Historical
Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1975), 159-77; Michael Howard, "Warand the Nation-State,"in his The Causes of Wars(London: Unwin Paperbacks,1984), 23-35.
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state almost constantlyat war, blurringthe boundarybetween civil and military to the point where war became everyone'sproject. All that remainedwas
to spur the nation to war, a goal that GeneralBaron ColmarVon Der Goltz,
for example, set himself, at the turn of the century. "Wars,"the general
noted in his book, The Nation in Arms, "are the fate of mankind . . . in our
day not only the rulers must be familiarwith the art of war: wars are of the
nation."18
The aim of Japan'sleadersat the adventof the twentiethcenturywas to turn
their country into an empire able to stand on an equal footing with the
Europeanempires. Warwas one avenueto thatgoal, albeitnot in the traditional sense. A Japanesemilitary academy reportexplained:
A characteristicof moder war is a fight with the total strengthof nations. War in
earliertimes was decided by the side with the strongestmilitarypower. In modem war,
fighting is on the level of financialwar, ideological war, and strategicwar, in addition
to the military war.19
In the years following the Meiji Restorationof 1868, Japanhad the ambitions
of a great power but the resources of a small power. By applying universal
conscription,Japan'sleadersembraceda plan to use the army as a school for
the population,a means to inculcatenationaland militaristicvalues. The vast
reserve system applied from that time on turned Japan into a "nation-inreserve."20
The FrenchJacobinsand then Napoleon, the Prussianreformers,the imperial Japaneseleadersare all paradigmaticexamplesof a moder phenomenon:
Wars are no longer fought by the nobility or by mercenariesbut by mass
armies imbued with a nationalist spirit and backed by active civilian support. The nation-in-armsmodel ascribes an importantplace to the state in
creating-or exploiting-nationalist sentiment, and in linking it to the need
for war and then to the army as the state's instrumentfor waging war, thus
placing the armyin a position of no longerbeing consideredalien and separate
18 MartinKitchen, The German
OfficerCorps, 1890-1914 (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1968;
Emillio Willems, A Way of Life and Death, Three Centuries of Prussian-GermanMilitarism
(Nashville: VanderbiltUniversity Press, 1986) 49-112; Geoff Eley, "Army, State and Civil
Society: Revisiting the Problemof GermanMilitarism,"from his Unificationto Nazism (Boston:
Allen and Unwin, 1987), 85-109; Geoffry Best, "TheMilitarizationof EuropeanSociety 18701914", in J. R. Gillis, ed., The Militarizationof the WesternWorld(New York:RutgersUniversity Press, 1989), 13-29; Colmar Von Der Goltz, The Nation in Arms (London: Hugh Rees,
1913), 470-71.
19 Theodore F. Cook, "The JapaneseReserve Experience:From Nation-in-Armsto Baseline
Defense," in Louis A. Zurcherand Gwyn Harries-Jenkins,SupplementaryMilitaryForces (London: Sage, 1978), 265.
20 Ibid, 259-73; HakwonH. Sunoo, JapaneseMilitarism,Past and Present(Chicago:NelsonHall, 1975), 1-65; Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarizationof
Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987); J. B. Crowley, "FromClosed Door to Empire:The
Formationof the Meiji MilitaryEstablishment,"in BernardS. Silbermanand H. D. Harootunian,
eds., ModernJapaneseLeadership:Traditionand Change (Tucson:Universityof ArizonaPress,
1966).
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
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from society at large. For that reason, perhaps, the nation-in-armsdoes not
excel in military coups; but it is certainly not immune to militarism, which
makes wars a normativeand legitimate solution for political problems.21
Whatfollows is an analysis of how a nation-in-armswas formedas a way to
legitimize the solution of political problems by military means. The first
section deals with two causes, partypolitics on one side and nationalpolitics
on the other, that induced the state's leadershipto develop the new mode of
mobilization. The second section deals with the practices that have built the
nation-in-armsconstruct, and the third section illustrateshow this construct
was culturallylegitimized. The last section examines the relationsbetween a
fighting nation and the possibility of war.
A STATE ARMY CONSTRUCTS
A NATION
A state is not a legal entity thatderives its existence solely from a declaration
(in this case, May 14, 1948). In the seminal period of Israel, variouspolitical
actions were carriedout in an attemptto constructthe state. One such action
involved the transition from a militia and an undergroundforce to a fullfledged army fighting a war. Beginning in December 1947 and reaching a
peak the following summer,this change was markedalso by mobilizationon
the basis of order and duty.22Israel still did not resemble a nation-in-arms.
When that idea was first raised in a small forum by the acting chief of staff,
Yigael Yadin, it was rejected. "A nation-in-armscannot be trusted, we need
trainedpeople," Yadinwas told. And: "Youcannot make a commandoforce
out of vendors from the market."23
Statism (mamlakhtiut)was the principle of action that the state's leaders
invoked in orderto transferto the state the responsibilityand control of most
functions from the voluntarybodies usually attachedto political partiesin the
pre-state era. The state would thereby concentratethe bulk of power in its
hand. The process included, for example, the attemptto eliminate the different educational tracks; the formation of an independentstate bureaucracy;
and, most crucial, the placementof a monopoly on the means of violence, so
cardinalto every state.24
The process of forming one army,however, encounteredserious obstacles.
21 On the
concept of militarism, see Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an
InternationalDebate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), 31-36; Michael Mann, "The Roots and Contradictionsof Modem Militarism," in his States, War and
Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 166-87; Kjell Skejelsbaek, "Militarism, its
Dimensions and Corollaries:An Attemptto ConceptualClarification,"in AsbjornEdie and Narek
Thee, eds., Problemsof ContemporaryMilitarism(New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1980), 77-105.
22 Yoav Gelber, "Ben-Gurionand the Establishmentof the IDF," Jerusalem
Quarterly, 50
(1989), 56-80.
23 Ben-Gurion's
Diary, March 17, 1948, Ben-GurionArchive.
24 PeterY.
Medding, TheFoundingof Israeli Democracy 1946-1967 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1990), 134-37; Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel
(Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1983), 81-122.
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Many of those who had set the tone in the militaryinfrastructurebefore the
state's establishmentand during the war were identified not with the ruling
party, Mapai (Israel Labor party) but with the more left-wing opposition,
Mapam. Attemptsby Mapai, led by Ben-Gurion, to obtain influence in the
army before and duringthe war were not always successful. The army was
rife with partyfactionalism,even in the war's darkestdays, which often left it
unable to act.25Now, citing the creationof the state and his authorityas its
elected leader, Ben-Gurionaspiredto form a state armynot saddledby party
politics. Naturally,Mapamobjected. In August 1949, when the government
submittedto the Knesset a law on security,Mapamsaid it fearedthat such an
armywould producea militarist,technocraticelite estrangedfrom the nation's
needs. As an alternative,Mapamproposeda militia stronglyresembling the
forces of the pre-stateperiodthatwould drawits strengthfrom the people, not
the state bureaucraticapparatusthat operatedby law and fiat.26 Mapam, in
fact, had raisedthe idea of a people's armybased on the notionthatthe people
themselves, not the state, would determinethe use of arms. Unlike the nationin-arms, the people's army implies that the state's authorityis weakening or
being rejected.27Mapam'sunderlyingrationalewas obvious. If its proposals
were accepted, the party would gain a huge political advantageand would
dislodge Mapai's foothold in the army. But even many in the ruling party,
Mapai, could not understandwhy Ben-Gurionwas so eagerto tamperwith the
power centers in which their party wielded influence and to transfer full
political weight to the state. Ben-Gurion'spoliticalview was clear. The developmentof political partiesin public life had not necessarilyaccordedhis party
a superior position and during the pre-state period had often paralyzed its
ability to act. It was this inclusion of political parties in public life that
enabled Mapam to influence security forces. Statism, Ben-Gurion hoped,
would give a tremendouspower advantageto those who headed the state and
controlled its centralistand autonomousmechanisms. Thus, to the query of
Mapai activists-"Is it conceivable that the party will not be active in the
army?"-Ben-Gurion replied, "It is for the good of the state and not to the
detrimentof the party."28
The controversiessurroundingthe effortsby state'sleadersto form a supraparty mass army recalled disputes generatedby the Junkers'attemptsto reform their army. They, too, ostensibly acted against their own interests by
demandingsuch reforms. But their calculationwas clear. A strong Prussian
25 Anita
Shapira,The ArmyControversy,1948, Ben-Gurion'sStrugglefor Control(Tel-Aviv:
HakibutzHameuchad,1985; YoavGelber, Whythe PalmachWasDissolved (Jerusalem:Shoken,
1986).
26 August 15, 1949, Kneset Protokol(Israel's parliament);Mapai Center, February2, 1950,
Mapai Archive.
27 Roberts, Nation in Arms, 37.
28 Mapai Secretariat,August 7, 1949, Mapai Archive.
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teach the new immigrantthat the army and the uniform he sees are in fact
his." And, again:"Thearmy'shelp is furtherproofthatthe soldieris really the
right-handof the civilian."35The army,then, was not depicted in terms of its
primaryfunction, as the instrumentof organizedviolence in the society, but
was given a civil image of an intimate friendly force. Newspapers of the
period ran numerousfeaturestitled, "SoldiersTakeGood Care of the Kids,"
"Female Soldiers Teach Hebrew,"and the like.36 This intimacy attested not
only to an ethnic sympathybut, morebroadly,to the immigrants'mobilization
to the security missions of the new state.
32
July 5, 1949, KnesetProtokol;Tom Segev, TheFirst Israelis (New York:Free Press, 1986);
VardaPilovski, ed., TransitionFrom 'Yishuv'to State 1947-1949 (in Hebrew) (Haifa: Haifa
University, 1988); MordechaiNaor, ed., First Yearto Statehood, 1948-1949 (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1988).
33 Mapai Secretariat,June 1, 1950, Mapai Archive.
34 Bamachane (IDF's Bulletin), November 23, 1950; Kneset Protokol, January29, 1951,
Bamachane, September20, 1951; Kneset Protokol, December 20, 1951.
35 Bamachane, November 23, 1950; Bamachane, April 5, 1951.
36 Bamachane,
September20, 1951.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
273
Now the army was involved in civilian tasks, just as the immigrantswould
soon take part in the military.Ben-Gurionleft no doubt about the purposeof
the institutionalaffiliationsforged between the new immigrantsand the army.
They would learn, he said, "not armyHebrewbut Hebrew soldiering."37The
army's involvement in educating the new immigrants was part of a vast
projectmeantto turnthe IsraeliJewish populationinto a fighting nation along
the lines of the classic Frenchexamplepresentedin the Frenchassembly in the
following terms:The young men were to go forth to battle;the marriedmen
would forge arms;the women were to make tents and clothing; and the aged
were "to preach hatredof kings and the unity of the Republic."38
THE PRACTICES OF A NATION-IN-ARMS
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CONCEPT
OF SECURITY
Immediately after the end of the 1948 war, in reply to a question from the
army's journal, Ben-Guriondescribed the situation as a "temporarytruce."
During the Knesset debate on the militaryservice law he spoke of an "armed
peace." No one should harborillusions about the future, the prime minister
asserted, warning about the dangers of a "false peace."53On anotheroccasion, Ben-Gurionsaid that a "mini-war"was being conductedbetween Israel
and its neighbors, for which the blame lay with those states in the region that
were caught up in a maelstromof disturbances,coups, political chaos and
political assassinations-a volatile situation with unknowableconsequences
which could spreadanywhere. The Knesset listened in silence to the demoni49 Haaretz (daily newspaper),March 12, 1950. 50 Bamachane, July 20, 1950.
51 "Draft-Cardsfor Mules," Bamachane,
July 31, 1952.
52 Cook, "The JapaneseReserve
Experience,"271.
53 Bamachane, October 17, 1949; Kneset Protokol,
August 29, 1949.
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zation of Israel's neighboring countries, and only one member, from the
CommunistParty,called out: "This is a preludeto the order,it is preparation
for war."54
Ben-Gurionpresented a broad concept of security. Security, he had explained in 1949, meant more than the army.It entailed stepping up the birth
rate and populatingempty areas.55With the passing of time, Ben-Gurion's
definition of security would be broadenedstill further;and the civil sphere
would shrink correspondingly. Militarism became something universally
sharedwhen Ben-Guriondeclaredin 1955: "Securityis not possible without
immigration . . . security means settlements . . . the conquest of the sea and
air. Securityis economic independence,it meansfosteringresearchand scientific ability . . . voluntarism of the population for difficult and dangerous
missions."56
One of the means resortedto by the leadershipto create a broaddefinition
of securitywas Nahal (the acronymfor FightingPioneerYouth).This special
unit combinedcivil missions like agricultureand land settlementwith combat
roles. The civil missions, however, were part of the broad definition of
security. Whenever a dispute arose between the Defense Ministry and the
kibbutzmovementsover settlementsites for the youth movements'graduates
who comprised Nahal, the ministryhad the last word. To prevent such friction, the he'ahzut, the security settlement, was created. Its purposes were
based entirelyon militaryconsiderations:The he'ahzutwas the most complete
expression of using settlementfor militarypurposes.57
Nahal, thus, reconstructedsettlementand army into Siamese twins, never
to be separated. If a certain civilian image was attached to Nahal in the
soldiers' dress, their lax discipline, their loose sexual mores, in the informal,
communal relations within their units-and if the army made no effort to
reverse such tendencies, the goal was clear. The statist professionalarmy in
uniform was likely to arouse opposition in a country in which the socialist
ethos prevailed, labor partiesruled, and ideology strove as much to create a
voluntaristicsociety as to form a new state. The special arrangementsand
practices that brought about the nation-in-armsconstitutedthe leadership's
formulafor reconciliationand effectively merged voluntaristicwith coercive
elements. The IDF was not to be a classic state armybased on coercion only
but was to display elements of voluntarism,emotion, pioneering, comradeship, and a militia-like ethos, all imputed to the nation's needs. Ben54 KnesetProtokol,August 19, 1952;Davar (daily newspaper),August 19, 20, 1952. See also
Baruch Kimmerling's article about Israel's conception of peace ("ExchangingTerritoriesfor
Peace: A MacrosociologicalApproach,"TheJournalof AppliedBehavioralScience, 23:1 [1987],
13-33).
55 Mapai Center, January12, 1949, Mapai Archive.
56 Kneset Protokol, November 7, 1955.
57 Asnat Shiran, The Policy of SettlementDuring the IndependentWarand After (in Hebrew)
(Tel-Aviv:M. A. thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1992), 197-98.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
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278
63 Bamachane,
September18, 1956; October3, 1956.
64 Teveth, Moshe Dayan, 399; Uzi Benziman, Sharon, an Israeli Caesar (New York:Adama
Books, 1985), 50; Uri Milstein, By Blood and Fire (in Hebrew;Tel-Aviv:Levine-Epstein, 1975)
176-93.
65 Bamachane, October 5, 12, 1955.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
A NATION
279
At the end of September 1955, the arms deal between Czechoslovakia and
Egypt was made public; and a wave of popularvoluntarismswept the country
in the form of contributionsfor arms purchasesthroughwhat was called the
DefenderFund (KerenHamagen). The new immigrants,the so-called Second
Israel, now shared in a collective effort aimed at supplying the army with
funds. The press published the amounts donated and described the donors,
noting "the generalenthusiasmand manifestationsof mass voluntarismnever
before seen in the country."66
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ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
28I
peace. Now, however,thatrealitywas definedin the affirmative.In the professional literature,a frameof mindlike thatunderlyingthe news articleis known
as "positive militarism."76Its manifestationsin thatera were manifold. Thus,
the Actions Committee of the Histadrutlabor union felt that the emergency
situationand the warpreparationswould radicallyboost the economy, increase
tax collection, and lead to the total eliminationof corruptionand speculation
while motivating the young generationto new heights of voluntarism.77
The existence of positive militarismindicatedthat the nation was ready for
war. Ben-Gurionwas well-awareof this situationwhen he decided, on October 23, 1955, that Israel must go to war. Dayan supported the decision
enthusiasticallyand began preparingthe army.78The clock ran out quickly.
The IDF launched OperationsDetonation in order to provoke Nasser into
startingthe war.79During the springand summernearlyall the IDF's reserve
units were called up for trainingexercises. The deputy chief of staff, Major
GeneralHaim Laskov, issued a set of stringentnew orders, which became the
talk of the army, to streamline the mobilization of the reserves in a war
situation.80
In Jacobin France, Lazare Carnotwas able to put the economy on a war
footing in orderto armand equip the troops. Coaches and horses were nationalized; artisans'workshopswere convertedto sewing uniforms;even church
bells and ritual objects were supposedly donated. Even writers and artists
rallied to the cause.81In Japan,as well, readinessfor war involved the whole
population. When the China Incident occurred, in the summerof 1937, the
purpose of the massive call-up was quite clear. A military academy report
described it: "National mobilization is intended to control and utilize all
human and materialresources in order to concentrateall available power in
the most effective manner. ... Humanresourcesinclude not only the actual
numberof soldiers, but also the spiritualpower, technicalability,and laborof
the nation."82Similarly, in Israel, the home front now also was readied for
war. The governmentset up two civilian committees to consider placing the
economy on an emergency footing, while the Knesset passed a law for the
mobilizationof civilian vehicles andheavy machineryfor militarypurposes.83
In June, Moshe Sharet, the moderate, left the government. "Once again I
76
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asked myself," he wrote in his diary,"whetherthe emergenceof the assumption that we are on the brinkof war and instilling [thatidea] in the minds of
the masses may not by itself become a factor which will finally bring about
war."84WasSharet'sconcernjustified?The presentarticleset out not to count
causal variablesfor warbut to deliniatethe way in which a fightingnationwas
constructedwith the idea of war as a reasonable,justifiablemeans for solving
political problems if there were no other choice. However, preparationsfor
war, certainly if they consist both of a massive callup of reserves and of
mental adjustment,might operatenot only as a conditionfor waging war but
also as one of its causes.85
The Prussian-German case is very interesting in this regard, as the
Blitzkrieg, Carl von Clausewitz'sfamous militarystrategy,turnedinto a politics of war through his loyal pupils. Count Helmuth von Moltke's idea of
"people's war," or that of the "nation-in-arms"of his military successor,
GeneralBaronColmarVon Der Goltz, provedhow narrowthe gap was indeed
between a strategicmeans and a political end. Totalwar became the ultimate
and only possible option;the whole of society was subordinatedto it, even in
peacetime; and Prussia-Germanybecame a warfarestate.86The Israeli case
and the Prussian-Germancase are so dissimilar that it is precisely their
common elements that are interestingand worth examining.
When the Israeli-Egyptian war finally broke out, it was the hour of the
whole nation. Jewish citizens were quickly mobilized, with the help of civil
institutions,like town halls or the bus company.Soon, no men of militaryage
were to be seen on the streets. Many left work;publictransportationcame to a
halt. The highly oiled machine of the nation-in-armsoperatedwith considerable efficiency to wage a quick, offensive, and successful war.
The victory was not only ascribedto the entirenationbut linked to its past.
Fourteenhundredyears earlier,Ben-Guriontold the Knesset, Jewish independence had existed on the island of Yotvata(Tiran),south of Eilat, which had
been "liberated"two days before. Articles began to appearin the press about
Israel's historic right to the Sinai Peninsula. Davar, the newspaper of the
leading party,describedthe city of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsulaas "thecradle
of our transformationinto a nation and harbingersof hopes for the future."
The nation's historical attachmentto Mount Sinai was also reiterated(notwithstandingthat its exact location is unknown). But no one outdid BenGurion, who in a message to a militaryceremonysummingup the fighting at
Sharm e-Sheikh, wrote that the soldiers had "stretchedout a hand to King
84 Moshe
Sharet, Personal Diary (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv:MaarivLibrary,1978), 1385 (April
3, 1956).
85 This was also
provenin the waitingperiodof July 1967 thatprecededthe Six-Days War.See
Horowitz, "StrategicLimitationsof 'A Nation in Arms,'" 285.
86
E.g., Stig Forster,"Facing'People War':Moltkethe Elderand Germany'sMilitaryOptions
after 1871," The Journal of Strategic Studies, 10:2 (1987), 209-29; V. R. Berghahn,Germany
and the Approachof Warin 1914 (London:Macmillan, 1973).
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
283
Solomon" and that the occupied areas would become part of Israel, part of
"the third Jewish kingdom." The message was replete with biblical expressions and images, including a quotation from the Song of the Sea, which
warns other nations that Israel is strong and triumphantbecause the Lord is
with them.87Thus, the nation'spast, or its interpretationof thatpast, was also
mobilized in order to justify war and conquest.
In short order, however, Israel was forced to withdrawfrom Sinai under
pressurefrom the United Nations and an ultimatumof the superpowers.It is
possible that Ben-Gurionlearned a lesson from Sinai, as his views became
more moderateafterward.88But the mechanismof the nation-in-arms,to the
creation of which Ben-Gurioncontributedso powerfully, continued to function decades later.
CONCLUSION
Based on the literaturewhich emphasizes the centralityof the state and the
state's elite in the making of a nation, this essay dealt with the way in which
an ethnic populationwas constructedas a nation-in-arms.Following the historical precedentsand the data on Israel, the nation-in-armsshould be seen as
a form of militaristicpolitics characterizedby the attemptto turnthe affairsof
the militaryand the imminenceof war into the business of the whole population, making them the nation's occupationand concern.
In contrastto the 1948 war, which was characterizedby insufficientpreparations and the lack of a plan for activating the entire population, the 1956
Sinai Campaignwas the resultof lengthy preparationsby the state. It included
not only the creationof a strongmass armybut also practicesthatblurredthe
distinction between civil and military,a broad definition of security, and the
inculcation of the ideas that war is not always the less-preferredchoice and
that peace is not always worth the price.
Scholarsof Israelimilitarysociology have tendedto cite the nation-in-arms
as a mechanismthat enables regularcivilian life to proceed underconditions
of war. It does not preventdemocracyand does not encouragemilitarycoups
because it provides a link between the needs of the nation and the interestsof
the army in a situation of war. These scholars continued the traditionthat
started perhaps with FrederickStern's famous, but politically biased 1957
book, The CitizenArmy,and continuedwith Janowitz,Rappoport,Luckham,
and others89;all can be labelled under the category of the "civil-military
paradigm."This article describes the Israeli nation-in-armsdifferently-as
87 Davar, November7, 1956; Bamachane,
January18, 1957;Bar-On,Challengeand Quarrel,
328.
88 Yonatan
Shapiro,TheRoad to Power,HerutPartyin Israel (New York:SUNY Press, 1990),
153-9.
89 Fritz
Ster, The Citizen Army,Key to Defense in the Atomic Age (New York:St. Martin
Press, 1957). See also note 9.
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URI BEN-ELIEZER
one in which the populationwas constructedas a fighting nation, not for the
sake of a liberal democracybut for the purposeof war. Although the current
theory claims that since the modem state requiredthe population to underwrite its expendituresas taxpayersor to serve in the wars as conscript soldiers, it was forced to pay attention to the opinions of its subjects and,
therefore, gave them a voice-in the Swedish expression:"one soldier, one
rifle, one vote"-generally throughvarious kinds of elected bodies.90 I suggest a different model. According to the nation-in-armsdescribed here, the
population'sthrustfor political participationand involvement,partof Israel's
political culture, is channeledto non-liberalcollectivistic patternsof serving
in the army for the sake of the nation.91
In analyzing Israel as a nation-in-arms,in historical and political, rather
than in functional terms, I intended not to demonstratea case of an exceptionally high degree of manpowermobilizationfor a possible war but, rather,
to presentthe nation-in-armsas a mechanismcomposed of both rationaland
emotionalelements, therebyblurringthe differencebetween civilian and military institutionsand turningthem into one entity. Thus, the business of war
becomes something embedded within the spirit of the nation, a part of the
orderof things. In this respect, the Israelicase resemblesFrance,Prussia, and
Japanduringcertainhistoricalperiods. Anothersimilaritylies in the fact that
in these cases the nation-in-armsis the result of both party and national
politics. It is in fact the combinationof these two variables, the internaland
the external,which makesthe nation-in-armsan importantmodel, not perhaps
as an explanatoryvariablefor wars but certainlyas a variablefor describing
the culturalconditionsthatmake war a legitimate, even necessary,possibility.
Ever since the Sinai Campaign, Israel has been a nation-in-armsas the
resultof an institutionalprocess thatbegan with a deliberatepolicy and ended
with a mechanism that embodies "the will of the nation"no less than "the
power of the state."Israelis a nation-in-arms,not only because it continuesto
have a mass national army that is involved in wars but because its wars and
territorialoccupationsare not carriedout by the army alone. In practice, this
means that various organizationsthat are supposed to be civil-such as the
bus monopoly (Egged), the civilian armed settlers and the Civil Administration in the occupied territories,the Society for the Preservationof Natureare all engaged in security missions and tasks.
Israel, as a nation-in-arms,displays as well, social institutions that are
located on the seam between the civil and the militaryand functionto fuse the
two spheresinto one entity. To enumeratesome of them: Galei Zahal, a radio
station staffed by both civilians and soldiers;voluntaryassociations, like the
90 S. E. Finer, "StateBuilding, State Boundariesand BorderControl,"Social Science Information, 13 (1974), 79-126; Hobsbawm,Nations and Nationalism, 80.
91 Uri Ben-Eliezer, "The Meaningof Political Participationin a Non-LiberalDemocracy:The
Israeli Example," ComparativePolitics, 25:4 (June 1983).
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS
285
92