Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 147933-34. December 12, 2001]
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO S. UY, doing
business under the name and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT &
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION

and labor costs for the idle manpower. Likewise, the delay incurred by
petitioner caused the topsoil at the original supplier to be depleted, which
compelled respondent to obtain the topsoil from a farther source, thereby
incurring added costs. He also claims that he had to mobilize water trucks for
the plants and trees which have already been delivered at the site. Furthermore,
it became necessary to construct a nursery shade to protect and preserve the
young plants and trees prior to actual transplanting at the landscaped area.
On May 16, 2000, the CIAC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Claimant
Contractor ELPIDIO S. UY and Award is hereby made on its monetary claim
as follows:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Respondent PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY is directed to pay the

Claimant the following amounts:

This is a petition for review of the Joint Decision dated September 25,
2000[1] and the Joint Resolution dated April 25, 2001[2] of the Court of Appeals
in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59308 and 59849.

P19,604,132.06 --- for the cost of idle time of equipment.

Petitioner Public Estates Authority is the government agency tasked by

the Bases Conversion Development Authority to develop the first-class
memorial park known as the Heritage Park, located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig,
Metro Manila. On November 20, 1996, petitioner executed with respondent
Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style Edison Development
& Construction, a Landscaping and Construction Agreement, whereby
respondent undertook to perform all landscaping works on the 105-hectare
Heritage Park. The Agreement stipulated that the completion date for the
landscaping job was within 450 days, commencing within 14 days after receipt
by respondent from petitioner of a written notice to proceed. Due to delays, the
contracted period was extended to 693 days. Among the causes of the delay
was petitioners inability to deliver to respondent 45 hectares of the property
for landscaping, because of the existence of squatters and a public cemetery.
Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission an action, docketed as CIAC Case No. 02-2000, seeking to
collect from petitioner damages arising from its delay in the delivery of the
entire property for landscaping. Specifically, respondent alleged that he
incurred additional rental costs for the equipment which were kept on stand-by

2,275,721.00 --- for the cost of idled manpower.

6,050,165.05 --- for the construction of the nursery shade net area.
605,016.50 --- for attorneys fees.
Interest on the amount of P6,050,165.05 as cost for the construction of the
nursery shade net area shall be paid at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
the Complaint was filed on 12 January 2000. Interest on the total amount
of P21,879,853.06 for the cost of idled manpower and equipment shall be paid
at the same rate of 6% per annum from the date this Decision is
promulgated. After finality of this Decision, interest at the rate of 12% per
annum shall be paid on the total of these 3 awards amounting
to P27,930,018.11 until full payment of the awarded amount shall have been
made, this interim period being deemed to be at that time already a
forbearance of credit (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 243 SCRA 78 [1994]; Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]; Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128721, March 9, 1999).

SO ORDERED.[3]
Both petitioner and respondent filed petitions for review with the Court of
Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP No. 59308, petitioner contested the monetary awards
given by the CIAC. On the other hand, respondent filed CA-G.R. SP No.
59849, arguing that the CIAC erred in awarding a reduced amount for
equipment stand-by costs and for denying his claims for additional costs for
topsoil hauling and operating costs of water trucks.

WHEREFORE, the present Motion/s for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.

59308 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59849 are hereby both DENIED, for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let an injunction issue permanently enjoining the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 032001, entitled ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style of
EDISON DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION v. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and/or HONORABLE CARLOS P. DOBLE.

The two petitions were consolidated. On September 25, 2000, the Court
of Appeals rendered the now assailed Joint Decision, dismissing the petitions,
to wit:

SO ORDERED.[5]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308,

entitled Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the
name and style of Edison Development & Construction, and CA-G.R. SP No.
59849, Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison
Development & Construction v. Public Estates Authority, are both hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly, DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

Consequently, the Award/Decision issued by the Construction Industry

Arbitration Commission on May 16, 2000 in CIAC Case No. 02-200,
entitled Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of Edison
Development & Construction v. Public Estates Authority, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

II

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the
CIAC from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, which respondent has
filed.Petitioner alleged that the said case involved claims by respondent arising
from the same Landscaping and Construction Agreement, subject of the cases
pending with the Court of Appeals.
On April 25, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Joint
Resolution, thus:

Hence, this petition for review, raising the following arguments:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

DENYING DUE COURSE PETITIONERS (SIC) PETITION FILED
PURSUANT TO RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
APPEALING THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE CIAC A QUO

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

DENYING THE HEREIN PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THE JOINT DECISION PROMULGATED ON
SEPTEMBER 25, 2000.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ALLOWING THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS TO BE THRESHED OUT
PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ALL IN
INTEREST OF DUE PROCESS,.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR UNRECOUPED BALANCE IN THE 15%
ADVANCE PAYMENT; UNRECOUPED BALANCE ON PRE-PAID
MATERIALS, AND OVERPAYMENT BASED ON ACTUAL PAYMENT
MADE AS AGAINST PHYSICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CIAC DECISION FINDING RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS
FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF P605,096.50 WHICH IS 10% OF THE
AMOUNT AWARDED FOR THE CLAIM OF NURSERY SHADE
CONSTRUCTION WHILE DENYING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.
VI
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS OBLIGATION, IF ANY, HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY
EXTINGUISHED.
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING
THE RESPONDENT TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER THE AMOUNT
OF P345,583.20 THE LATTER PAID TO THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION.[6]
After respondent filed its comment [7] on August 20, 2001, this Court
issued a resolution dated September 3, 2001[8] requiring petitioner to file its
reply within ten days from notice. Despite service of the resolution on
petitioner and its counsel on October 1, 2001, no reply has been filed with this
Court to date. Therefore, we dispense with the filing of petitioners reply and
decide this case based on the pleadings on record.

representatives. In the case of Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals,[9] which the Court of Appeals cited, we made it clear that in the
absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation. [10] Thus, we held
in that case:
We agree with the finding of public respondent Court of Appeals, that in the
absence of any board resolution from its board of directors the [sic] authority
to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action must necessary
fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged
with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue
of authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still
pending, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Securities and Exchange Commission. [11]
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that, in view of the
absence of a board resolution authorizing petitioners Officer-in-Charge to
represent it in the petition, the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping executed by said officer failed to satisfy the requirement of the
Rules. In this connection, Rule 43, Section 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure categorically provides:
Effect of failure to comply with requirements. --- The failure of the petition to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

Petitioner assails the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals

based on a technicality, i.e., the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by its Officer-in-Charge, who did not appear to have been
authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. Petitioner moreover argues
that in an earlier resolution, the First Division of the Court of Appeals gave
due course to its petition. Despite this, it was the Seventeenth Division of the
Court of Appeals which rendered the Joint Decision dismissing its petition.

Anent petitioners contention that its petition had already been given due
course, it is well to note that under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,
each case is raffled to a Justice twice --- the first raffle for completion of
records and the second raffle for study and report. [12] Hence, there was nothing
unusual in the fact that its petition was first raffled to the First Division of the
Court of Appeals but was later decided by the Seventeenth Division
thereof. Petitioners imputations of irregularity have no basis whatsoever, and
can only viewed as a desperate attempt to muddle the issue by nit-picking on
non-essential matters. Likewise, the giving of due course to a petition is not a
guarantee that the same will be granted on its merits.

The contention is untenable. Petitioner, being a government owned and

controlled corporation, can act only through its duly authorized

Significantly, the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition was

based not only on its fatal procedural defect, but also on its lack of substantive

The petition is without merit.

merit; specifically, its failure to show that the CIAC committed gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law, such as to warrant the reversal of its factual
findings.
We have carefully gone over the decision of the CIAC in CIAC Case No.
02-2000, and we have found that it contains an exhaustive discussion of all
claims and counterclaims of respondent and petitioner, respectively. More
importantly, its findings are well supported by evidence which are properly
referred to in the record. In all, we have found no ground to disturb the
decision of the CIAC, especially since it possesses the required expertise in the
field of construction arbitration. It is well settled that findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.[13]
Thus, we affirm the factual findings and conclusions of the CIAC as
regards the arbitral awards to respondent. The records clearly show that these
are amply supported by substantial evidence.
Coming now to petitioners counterclaims, we find that the CIAC
painstakingly sifted through the records to discuss these, despite its initial
observation that petitioner absolutely omitted to make any arguments to
substantiate the same.[14] As far as the unrecouped balance on prepaid materials
are concerned, the CIAC found:
The Arbitral Tribunal finds the evidence adduced by the Respondents
(petitioner herein) sorely lacking to establish this counterclaim. The affidavit
of Mr. Jaime Millan touched on this matter by merely stating this additional
claim a) Unrecouped balance on prepaid materials amounting to
P45,372,589.85. No further elaboration was made of this bare statement. The
affidavit of Mr. Roigelio A. Cantoria merely states that as Senior Accountant,
it was he who prepared the computation for the recoupment of prepaid
materials and advance payment marked as Annex B of
Respondents Compliance/Submission dated 16 March 2000.Examination of
that single page document shows that for the 2nd Billing, the amount of
P32,695,138.86 was 75% Prepaid for some unspecified Materials on Hand.
The rest of the other items were payments for trees and shrubs, RCP, Baluster
& Cons. Paver, and GFRC (Baluster) in various amounts taken from other
billings.The billings themselves have not been introduced in evidence. No
testimonial evidence was also offered to explain how these computations were
made, if only to explain the meaning of those terms above-quoted and why the

recoupment of amounts of the various billings were generally much lower than
the payment for materials. As stated at the outset of the discussion of these
additional claims, it is not the burden of this Tribunal to dig into the haystack
to look for the proverbial needle to support these counterclaims. [15]
On the other hand, we find that the CIAC correctly deferred
determination of the counterclaim for unrecouped balance on the advance
payment. It explained that the amount of this claim is determined by deducting
from respondents progress billing a proportionate amount equal to the
percentage of work accomplished.However, this could not be done since
petitioner terminated the construction contract. At the time the CIAC rendered
its decision, the issue of the validity of the termination was still pending
determination by the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. Thus, in view of the
non-fulfillment of that precondition to the grant of petitioners counterclaim,
the CIAC deferred resolution of the same. [16] In the case at bar, petitioner still
failed to show that its termination of the construction contract was upheld by
the court as valid.
Anent petitioners claim for attorneys fees, suffice it to state that it was
represented by the Government Corporate Counsel in the proceedings before
the CIAC.Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must be
duly proved.[17] Petitioner failed to show with convincing evidence that it
incurred attorneys fees.
Petitioner further argues that its liability to respondent has been
extinguished by novation when it assigned and turned over all its contracted
works at the Heritage Park to the Heritage Park Management Corporation.
[18]
This, however, can not bind respondent, who was not a party to the
assignment. Moreover, it has not been shown that respondent gave his consent
to the turn-over. Article 1293 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the
original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of
the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. Payment by the new
debtor gives him the rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237. (emphasis
ours) Lastly, petitioner argues that respondent should reimburse to it all fees
paid to the CIAC by reason of the case. To be sure, this contention is based on
the premise that the suit filed by respondent was unwarranted and without
legal and factual basis. But as shown in the CIAC decision, this was not so. In
fact, respondent was adjudged entitled to the arbitral awards made by the
CIAC. These awards have been sustained by the Court of Appeals, and now by
this Court.

It appears that there is a pending motion to consolidate the instant petition

with G.R. No. 147925-26, filed by respondent. Considering, however, that the
instant petition has no merit, the motion for consolidation is rendered also
without merit, as there will be no more petition to consolidate with the said
case. Hence, the motion to consolidate filed in this case must be denied.
However, in order not to prejudice the deliberations of the Courts Second
Division in G.R. No. 147925-26, it should be stated that the findings made in
this case, especially as regards the correctness of the findings of the CIAC, are
limited to the arbitral awards granted to respondent Elpidio S. Uy and to the
denial of the counterclaims of petitioner Public Estates Authority. Our decision
in this case does not affect the other claims of respondent Uy which were not
granted by the CIAC in its questioned decision, the merits of which were not
submitted to us for determination in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is
DENIED. The Motion to Consolidate this petition with G.R. No. 147925-26 is
also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Cities, Branch 6, Davao City (MTCC) for the enforcement of the amicable
settlement entered into by them on August 19, 1996 before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa, Barangay Talomo, Davao. Pertinent portions of
said settlement reads:

FIRST DIVISION

ROLANDO CLAVECILLA, G.R. No. 147989

1.

That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to purchase the

property on October 15, 1996.

2.

Failure to pay the property on the said date the

respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the
assistance of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos only.

3.

The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the demand of

the respondent.[3]

Petitioner,
- versus TERESITO QUITAIN and
RICO QUITAIN, et al., Promulgated:
Respondents. February 20, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount agreed upon and
six months had already passed since the agreement was entered into and
yet Clavecilla has still not left the premises.[4]
Clavecilla answered that the August 19, 1996 agreement was no
longer enforceable since it was novated by an agreement dated October 29,
1996.[5] Said agreement reads:
xxx
1.

That both parties agreed to meet again on Nov. 5,

1996 at the Barangay for another round of talk (sic).

2.

That on Nov. 5, 1996 the respondent will pay the

50% total amount of the selling price of the said lot,
111 sq.m. more or less located at Lot 1989-A being a
portion of Lot 1989 (T.C.T. # T-6615) at Talomo proper.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 5, 2000 which
dismissed Rolando Clavecillas petition on the ground that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by counsel without the proper
authority from petitioner, as well as the Resolution dated March 28,
2001[2] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a complaint
against Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the Municipal Trial Court in

3.
4.

5.

Price per sq.m. P1,000.00 only.

Failure to accomplished (sic) this Nov. 5,
1996 requirement, the respondent will voluntarily vacate
the said lot with a P5,000.00 assistance for their effort.
All agreement is final upon signing.[6]

xxx
Clavecilla claims that on November 5, 1996, he appeared at the barangay and
was supposed to pay Quitains the 50% price of the lot in question but they
were not present.[7] Rico Quitain asserts however that he was present that day
as shown by a certification made by the office of the lupon of said barangay.
[8]

On March 8, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of

the Quitains finding that there was no novation, as the October 29, 1996 was
not incompatible with the August 19, 1996 agreement but was only a
reiteration of the earlier agreement. [9]
Clavecilla filed a notice of appeal.[10]
On June 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC)
dismissed the appeal for Clavecillas failure to file the memorandum on appeal
within the period prescribed by the Rules.[11]
Clavecilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Leave of Court to Admit
Appeal Memorandum claiming that his counsel was not able to file the
memorandum on appeal on time since said counsel was diagnosed with
pneumonia and had to rest for more than ten days. [12]Clavecilla then filed an
Appeal Memorandum claiming that the MTCC erred in rendering judgment
against him since he did not sign the agreement but it was his
wife Erlinda who signed the same without authority from him. [13]
On July 5, 2000, the RTC denied Clavecillas motion stating that the reason
advanced by Clavecillas counsel for his failure to file the appeal memorandum
on time is not a compelling reason, and even if such memorandum was given
due course, the arguments raised by Clavecillatherein are not sufficient to
justify a reversal of the Decision of the lower court. [14]
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration dated July 21, 2000 which
was denied by the RTC on the same day.[15]
On September 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court with the CA which rendered the herein assailed Resolution
on October 5, 2000 thus:

The Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping,

which accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and
signed by petitioners counsel
Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the proper authority
from petitioner, in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The duty to certify
under oath is strictly addressed to petitioner,
Rolando Clavecilla. To allow delegation of said duty to
anyone would render Revised Circular No. 28-91 inutile. [16]
xxx
Accordingly, the Court Resolves to DENY DUE
COURSE and to DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 28, 2001 as
follows:
Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution
dated 05 October 2000 dismissing the petition for the reason
that the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioners counsel and not by the petitioner.
Admitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is
addressed to the petitioner, petitioner attached to his motion a
Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000 authorizing
his counsel to sign the certificate. The court believes that this
authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a
vain attempt to cure the fatal defect, for if
Atty. Maca[d]angdang had such authority, he would have
indicated that in the Verification and Certification he signed
on 25 August 2000 attached to the petition.
In any event, it is a settled rule that the certificate against
forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner and not by
counsel. xxx To merit the Courts Consideration, petitioner
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. x x x This petitioner failed to show. (citations
omitted)

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED

for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[18]

allege a good and valid defense which, if appreciated, could probably cause
the reversal of the July 5, 2000 and March 8, 2000 issuances. [21]
The parties filed their respective Memoranda reiterating their respective
contentions.[22]

Hence, the present petition alleging that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED JURISPRUDENCE
OF ALLOWING LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
RULES OF COURT PROVIDED PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH CIRCULAR NO. 2891 AS SHOWN IN THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
WHICH HE ATTACHED TO HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.[19]
Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification
against forum shopping; the CA was hasty in concluding that the authorization
of petitioners lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should
have granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization
to his lawyer at the time that his lawyer signed the verification and
certification against forum shopping; petitioners failure to have a properly
executed certification against forum shopping attached to his petition for
review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not
override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the established liberal
interpretation of the rules despite petitioners substantial compliance with the
rule on non-forum shopping.[20]
Rico Quitain in his Comment countered that: the petition is not sufficient in
form and substance and is utterly deficient in factual and procedural bases;
petitioner named Teresito Quitain, Rico Quitain, et al. as respondents without
specifying who et al. referred to; TeresitoQuitain is already deceased and the
MTCC as early as June 5, 1998 already ordered Teresitos substitution; the
spouse and children of Teresito, to wit, Lolita, Rene, Ruel, Radi and Romy, all
surnamed Quitain, have the right to be informed of the filing of the petition
and the fact that they were not so specifically named as respondents but were
referred to as et al. makes the petition a sham pleading; petitioner failed to
attach certified true copies of the MTCC Decision dated March 8, 2000 and
the RTC Order dated July 5, 2000 which should have been included as annexes
in the present petition as they are material to the case, and the petition does not

After evaluating the records of the case and the issues raised by the parties, the
Court finds that the CA did not err in denying the petition and motion for
reconsideration filed by Clavecilla before it. The Court however finds different
grounds for denying Clavecillas petition.
First, it must be determined whether there existed a special power of attorney
in favor of petitioners counsel when the petition before the CA was filed.
The CA in its Resolution dated March 28, 2001, stated that it believes
that the special power of attorney in favor of the lawyer attached to petitioners
motion for reconsideration was only made after the petition had been filed
reasoning that if the counsel had such authority from the beginning, he would
have attached the same when the petition was first filed.
The Court disagrees.
The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the
special power of attorney which is a notarized document, thus a public
document, cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor
absent evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
[23]

In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September 13,
2000.[24] The special power of attorney meanwhile was dated August 9, 2000.
[25]
Absent any proof that the special power of attorney was not actually in
existence before the petition was filed, this Court has no recourse but to
believe that it was indeed in existence at such time.
The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was correct in
dismissing Clavecillas petition and motion for reconsideration,
notwithstanding the authority given by Clavecilla in favor of his lawyer to sign
the verification and certification in his behalf.
The Court answers in the affirmative.

Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are

to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [26] Time and
again, this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of Court. [27] This case is
no exception.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative.[28]
In this case, petitioners counsel signed the verification alleging that he
had read the petition and the contents thereof are true and correct of his own
knowledge and belief.[29]
On this ground alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided
for in Section 4 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-210-SC dated May 1, 2000:
Sec. 4. Verification. ---xxx
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing
the rules was committed when the rules have just recently taken effect, [30] the
attendant circumstances in this case however do not warrant such leniency.
The certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioners
counsel despite the clear requirement of the law that petitioners themselves
must sign the certification. The certification must be made by petitioner
himself and not by counsel, since it is petitioner who is in the best position to
know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the
same issues in any other tribunal or agency.[31] And the lack of a certification

against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by

its submission after the filing of the petition.[32]
As explained by this Court in Gutierrez v. Sec. of Dept. of Labor and
Employment:[33]
x x x [T]he certification (against forum shopping) must be
signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action.
x x x Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
whose professional services have been retained for a particular
case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that
case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel
is a defective certification.[34]
In Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[35] this Court further
elucidated that:
x x x In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the
parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. x x x [I]n the case of the corporations, the physical
act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate
entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the
simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot
personally do the task themselves.[36] (emphasis supplied)
In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[37] the Court further clarified,
that even with a special power of attorney executed by the petitioners in favor
of their counsel to sign the certification on their behalf, still the rule
stands. Thus:
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank
v. Sia that a certification against forum shopping may be
signed by an authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge
of the facts required to be disclosed in such

document. However, BA Savings Bank must be distinguished

from the case at bar because in the former, the complainant
was a corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore,
that case made an exception to the general rule that the
certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a
corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact,
physical actions, e.g., signing and delivery of documents, may
be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by
specifically authorized individuals. In the instant case,
petitioners are all natural persons and there is no showing
of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to
personally sign the certification. It is noteworthy that PEPSI
in its Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves who
executed the verification and certification requirements in all
their previous pleadings. Counsel for petitioners argues that as
a matter of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is executed to
promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative to the
handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position
since it is clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet
existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the
certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this
policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be
made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.
[38]
(emphasis supplied)
While there are cases when the Court has relaxed the rule requiring
that in case of a natural person, he shall personally sign the non-forum
shopping certification, in such cases the Court found compelling and
justifiable reasons to relax observance of the rules.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals[39] and Wee v. Galvez[40] the Court noted
that the petitioners were already in the United States, thus the signing of the
certification by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient
compliance with the rules. In Orbeta v. Sendiong[41] the Court found that the
annulment of judgment filed by the parties was meritorious thus the
certification signed by the daughter of petitioner who had a general power of
attorney in her favor was deemed sufficient. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals[42] the Court also upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of
the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked as the parties case was
meritorious.
No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist in the case at bar.

In this case, petitioner did not present any cause for his failure to personally
sign the certification against forum shopping at the time that the petition was
filed at the CA. He merely acknowledged in his motion for reconsideration of
the October 5, 2000 Resolution of the CA that he has the duty to certify under
oath.[43] He then asked for a reconsideration of the said Resolution and attached
a Special Power of Attorney executed by him in favor of his lawyer.[44]
There is also no showing that there is substantial merit in petitioners claims. In
his petition before the CA and in his Appeal Memorandum filed with the RTC,
petitioner argues that he is not a party to the amicable settlement as it was his
wife who signed the same without authority from him. [45] Petitioner in his
Answer however admitted having entered into an agreement with the Quitains,
before the lupon of their barangay on August 19, 1996.[46]
Petitioner also claims that the August 19, 1996 agreement was novated by the
one dated October 29, 1996. The claim has no merit.
Novation cannot be presumed but must be clearly shown either by the express
assent of the parties or by the complete incompatibility between the old and
the new agreements.[47] In this case, the October 29, 1996 agreement merely
held that the parties shall meet again on November 5, 1996 at which time
petitioner shall pay 50% of the purchase price or he will vacate the
property. His obligation to pay the purchase price or to vacate the property in
case of his failure to do so, still exists and was not extinguished by the October
29, 1996agreement.
Records also show that Rico Quitain was ready to comply with his part of the
agreement as he was present at the barangay on November 5, 1996 to receive
the payment from Clavecilla.[48] Quitain also consigned the amount
of P5,000.00 to the court, which is the amount he agreed to give Clavecilla to
assist him and his family when they leave the property.[49]
As correctly pointed out by the RTC, even if petitioners appeal was allowed to
proceed, still the arguments raised are not sufficient to overturn the ruling of
the MTCC.
It is also worth mentioning that the petitioner erred in including the name
of Teresito in the caption of the petition and using only the phrase et al. to refer
to the heirs who substituted him after his death. As pointed out by respondent
Rico Quitain, Teresito is already deceased and was already substituted by his
heirs, namely: Lolita, widow of Teresito, Rene, Ruel, Radi, and Romy, sons

of Teresito, in the Order of the MTCC dated June 5, 1998.[50] Consequently, the
above-named heirs are deemed co-respondents in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: G.R. No. 146459

ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL
DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN
and HEIRS OF CRISTINA
Petitioners,
- versus JOSE CARINO and COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Promulgated: June 8, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

7 (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the CA Resolution dated December

15, 2000 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern
half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section J, Camp
Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and
identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.[2]
The antecedent facts are clear:
The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the
land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had
been constructed by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber
business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cario,
son of Mateo Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco
Cario then took possession of the buildings and the land on which the
buildings were situated.
Ting-el Dicman,[3] predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely,
Ernesto Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano
Torres, Cristina Alawas, Emily Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of
Atab, a sitio within the City of Baguio but located at some distance from the
land in controversy, had been employed by Sioco Cario as his cattle herder. On
the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land
recorded in his name,[4] Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in
controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.
On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled
Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in AgriculturalLand with
Sioco Cario. The deed reads:
DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS AND

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.

This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court questioning the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731, which affirmed in toto the
Decision dated November 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and resident
of the sitio known as Atab, near Camp Seven, City of Baguio,
Philippine Islands, DO HEREBY STATE, viz:

That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of land

(public), having a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed
by the District Land Office of Baguio for me, and located in
the place known as Camp Seven, Baguio;
That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for
said survey;

That Mr. Sioco Cario has advanced all expenses for said
survey for me and in my name, and also all other expenses for
the improvement of said land, to date;
That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me
made and delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cario, I hereby pledge
and promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco
Cario, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and resident of
Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title,
rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same
to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form,
according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my
heirs, and assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me
by proper authorities.
That this conveyance, transfer, or assignment,
notwithstanding its temporary nature, shall have legal force
and effect; once it is approved by the approving authorities all
the final papers and documents, this instrument shall be
considered superseded.
After I have received my title to said parcel of land I
bind myself, my heirs and assigns, to execute the final papers
and forward same for approval of the competent authorities at
Mr. Sioco Carios expense.
WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I.,
this, the 22nd day of October, 1928, A.D.
his right

TING-EL DIAC-MAN
thumbmark[5]
After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in
possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public
instrument entitled Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject land and its
improvements with his son, Guzman Cario, as buyer. The contract states in
part:
x x x for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P
1.00) Philippine Currency and other valuable considerations
which I had received from my son, Guzman A. Cario x x x
have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do
hereby cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman
A. Cario, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all
my rights, title, interests in and participation to that parcel of
land (public) covered by an application for free patent with a
surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District
Land Office of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and
who ceded, conveyed and transferred one half of his title,
rights and interests to me under an instrument executed by the
said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd day
of October, 1928 A.D. and duly ratified before Notary Public x
x x together with all improvements therein, consisting of
oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a building of
strong materials (half finished) x x x, which building was
purchased by me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free
from all liens and encumbrances, with full rights and authority
to the said Guzman A. Cario to perfect his claim with any
government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title
as may be permitted to him under existing laws.
x x x x[6]
In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cario asked his son, Guzman
Cario, who had been doing business in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to
take possession of the subject land and building.[7] Guzman Cario moved to
Baguio as requested and occupied the property.Evidence was adduced in the

RTC to the effect that Guzman Cario took possession of the property publicly,
peacefully, and in the concept of owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones
published in October 1940 lists the residence of Guzman A. Cario at Camp 7,
Baguio City, along with his telephone number; pictures were taken of him and
his family, including the private respondent who was then an infant, depicting
the property in the background; U.S. Army authorities obtained permission
from Guzman Cario to use a part of the land in question after the war; he
introduced various improvements on the property over the years and exercised
acts of ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the land to
Governor Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts of Rizal Province; he
leased out portions of the land to Bayani Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors
confirmed the possession and occupation over the property of Guzman Cario
and, after him, his son, herein private respondent Jose Cario. These findings of
fact were either confirmed or uncontroverted by the CA. [8]

there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it
necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of
the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was
pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
628 excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain
parcels of public land known as Igorot Claims situated in the City of Baguio
and declaring the same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII
of the Public Land Act.The Proclamation further provided that the Igorot
Claims enumerated therein shall be subject to the condition that except in
favor of the government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or alienated
within a period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of
patent. One such claim pertained to the Heirs of Dicman, to wit:
Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.)

On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cario had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so
as to indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that
belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A
and 76-B, and purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square
meters, belonged to the petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953
square meters, formerly pertained to Sioco Cario and, later, to Guzman
Cario. Additionally, the resurvey indicated the house where private respondent
Jose Cario resided and, before him, where his predecessors-in-interest, Sioco
and Guzman Cario, also resided.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cario filed a Free Patent Application over
the land in question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later
withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by
the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. This petition, entitled Petition of the Heirs of
Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211, was filed by
Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman and Cating Dicman, in their capacity as
compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio.The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A
and Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an area of 10.1006
hectares. Guzman Cario opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership
over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cario likewise
filed an opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and
confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman,

Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 J 101,006

Dicman
Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court
promulgated Republic v. Marcos[9] which held that Courts of First Instance of
Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of
Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court
dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211
insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant
to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The trial court
stated that the remedy for those who were issued titles was to file a petition for
revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271, as amended by Presidential
Decrees No. 1311 and 2034.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in
his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His
remains are buried on the land in question, next to the large house purchased in
1916 by his father, Sioco Cario (the grandfather of private respondent), from
H.C. Heald. Guzmans widow and son, private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cario,
continued possession of the subject property.[10]

On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el

Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of
possession with damages involving the subject property with the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. As earlier stated, petitioners, then
complainants, originally sought to recover possession of the eastern half of the
parcel of land situated in Residence Section J, Camp Seven, Baguio City,
consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts39, Plan SWO-37115.
Petitioners, then plaintiffs, averred in their complaint:
10. That however, this Honorable Court was not able
to decide the [ ] petition for reopening as far as the remaining
eastern half portion of the above-described property is
concerned due to the fact that the said petition was dismissed
for alleged lack of jurisdiction; x x x
11. That because of the above-mentioned dismissal,
the conflict between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the
half eastern portion of the above-described property which
was one of the issues supposed to be decided in the said
judicial reopening case remains undecided;

12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned

petition and before the dispute between herein plaintiffs and
defendant over the eastern half portion of the above-described
property, defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to
occupy portion [sic] of the above-described property to the
clear damage and prejudice of herein plaintiffs;
13. That the defendant has no valid claim of
ownership and possession over any of the portions of the
above-described property;

Private respondent Jose Cario filed his answer and prayed for
dismissal. He alleged that his predecessors-in-interest had acquired the land by
onerous title through the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 10, 1938
executed by his grandfather, Sioco Cario, as seller, and his father, Guzman
Cario, as buyer; that the property was earlier acquired by Sioco Cario by virtue
of the Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land
dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman;
and that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55 years
peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title
over the same through acquisitive prescription.
On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco Cario filed
a motion to intervene with the RTC. On July 1, 1983, the RTC granted said
motion. On July 11, 1983, the Estate of Sioco Cario filed its Complaint-inIntervention, praying for quieting of title among the adverse claimants.
The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984, found
that the larger building still stands on the land in controversy and, together
with the surrounding area, constituted the residence and was in the possession
of private respondent and his family.
On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED;

2.

Plaintiffs-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention
is hereby dismissed;

3.

Defendant is hereby declared the lawful

possessor and as the party who has the better right
over the land subject matter [sic] of this action
and as such he may apply for the confirmation of
his title thereto in accordance with law (R.A. No.
8940[12])[.] Defendants counterclaim is dismissed;

4.

Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and

plaintiff-intervenor.

14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest

have been religiously paying the realty taxes covering the
above-described property x x x[11]

SO ORDERED.

To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations and their
revisions submitted as evidence by the petitioners made no reference to the
land in question;[13] that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name
of the Estate of Sioco Cario had been submitted as evidence, and that the
intervenor-estate presented tax declarations over the building only; that it was
Guzman Cario alone who declared for taxation purposes both the land and the
improvements thereon in his name;[14] that there is no evidence to the
effect that petitioners ever filed any action to challenge the validity of the
Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land dated
October 22, 1928; that even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for
whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cario and his successors-ininterest had been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely,
continuously and in concept of owner for at least 55 years before the filing of
the action;[15] that Siocos successor, Guzman Cario, had been in open and
continuous possession of the property in good faith and in the concept of
owner from 1938 until his death in 1982 and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cario
has lost all rights to recover possession from Guzman Cario or his heirs and
assigns; and that although the Estate of Sioco Cario attempted to assail the
genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 10,
1938 executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son, Guzman Cario, the
challenge failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation
of forgery.[16]

On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal. The
RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration and motion to admit
appeal filed by the Estate of Sioco Cario on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of
time.
Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals:
1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND

THE STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR

WITNESS.
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF]
PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL
LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO
CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.
3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO HAVE A
BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND NOT GRANTING
THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN.
On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in
toto the ruling of the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners
raised for the first time on appeal the issue on whether the Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land is void ab
initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu[17] (which was made applicable later to the Mountain Province and Nueva
Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then to all other cultural
minorities found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120 of the
Public Land Act[18]) and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court;
[19]
that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el
Dicman, though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws
are not applicable;[20] that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the
said deed;[21] and that even if the deed were a mere contract to sell and not an
absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco[22] the obligation on the part of the
purchaser to perfect the title papers within a certain time is not a condition
subsequent nor essential to the obligation to sell, but rather the same is an
incidental undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the
sale agreed upon.[23]
On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained counsel,
filed their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:

A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 2798 ARE NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE
EXECUTED BY PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT HE WAS A NONCHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO CITY IS NOT
COVERED BY THE SAID ACT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN BORROMEO V.
FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON
THE PART OF THE PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO
PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A CERTAIN
PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME IS NOT A
CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE
OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic].
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND OVER
WHICH RESPONDENTS IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT
BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD
APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT
AREA AND HAD BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN
HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND
HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE
AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH WHEN HIS
GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST,
THE PETITIONERS, TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED
THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER, PING-EL
DICMAN.

On March 2, 2001, petitioners filed their Manifestation and Motion to

Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs
stating, among others, that Julio F. Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman,
had been appointed by the petitioners to sign the petition for and in their
behalf, but due to distance and time constraints between Makati City and
Baguio, he was not able to submit the same in time for the deadline for the
petition on February 12, 2001. Petitioners attached the Special Power of
Attorney seeking to formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as their
attorney-in-fact and to ratify his execution of the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the petitioners.
On March 15, 2001, private respondent filed with this Court a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Motion to Dismiss and/or Deny Due Course,
arguing that the petition failed to comply with the requirements for verification
and certification of non-forum shopping. The affiant of the petition, according
to private respondent, is not a principal party in the case; rather, he is merely
the son of Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners. The verification and
certification reads:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, JULIO F. DICMAN, of legal age, Filipino, with residence
address at Camp 7, Montecillo Road, Baguio City, after being
first duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and
state:
1. I am one of the petitioners in the above-entitled case;
x x x (emphasis supplied)
To private respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners,
appears to be alive, he excludes his son as the successor-in-interest of Ting-el
Dicman. The verification, therefore, is false in view of the statement under
oath that Julio F. Dicman is a petitioner when in fact he is not, and should be
cause for the dismissal of the case and indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to administrative and criminal action.
On May 2, 2001, in their Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File
the Attached Reply and Reply, petitioners argued that while it may be true that
the verification and certification to the petition were signed by Julio F.
Dicman, the son of one of the petitioners, they subsequently confirmed his

authority to sign on behalf of all the petitioners through the Special Power of
Attorney submitted to the Court in a Manifestation and Motion to Substitute
Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs filed on March
2, 2001. Petitioners invoked substantial compliance and prayed that the Court
overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. The parties
thereafter submitted their respective memoranda.
The petition must be dismissed on the following grounds:
1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping to be
executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is mandatory, and non-compliance
therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. [24] The forum
shopping certification must be signed by the party himself as he has personal
knowledge of the facts therein stated.[25] Obviously, it is the plaintiff or
principal party who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in the case. [26] Where there are two or more
plaintiffs or petitioners, all of them must sign the verification and non-forum
certification, and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, [27] unless the
one who signs the verification and certification has been authorized to execute
the same by, and on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner.[28] But it must be
stressed that the requirement the principal party himself should sign the
certification applies only to a natural person and not to a juridical person
which can only act through its officer or duly authorized agent. [29]
However, the Court has also held that the rules on forum shopping
were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice
and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.[30] Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has
relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.[31]
But a perusal of the relevant decisions handed down by this Court
consistently shows that substantial compliance may be invoked and the
procedural lapse overlooked provided that, where the petitioner is a natural
person as in the case at bar, the authorized signatory must also be a principal
party or co-petitioner.[32] Petitioners, as natural persons, cannot therefore

appoint a non-party to sign for them, especially since only the petitioners
occupy the best position to know whether they actually filed or caused the
filing of a petition in this case and who personally know the facts stated in the
petition. On this point alone the petition should be dismissed.
2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power
of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. While jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, namely: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, could justify a different conclusion, [33] none of these exceptions
has been shown to apply in the present case and, hence, this Court may not
review the findings of fact made by the lower courts.
3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land dated October 22, 1928 executed
between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman is void ab initio for lack of approval
of competent authorities as required under Section 145 in relation to Section
146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the application of
which was later extended to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya and,
thereafter, throughout the entire national territory; [34] that the sale was without
valid consideration; and that the said deed is not an absolute sale but merely a
contract to sell subject to the suspensive condition that the papers evidencing
the title must first be perfected. These arguments were lumped under the
following issue in their appeal to the CA:
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF]

PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL

LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO
CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.
The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by
the petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that
issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the
proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. [35]Matters, theories or
arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on
review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the
alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the
basic principles of fair play, justice and due process. [36]
4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement
merely a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur,
private respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question
through acquisitive prescription.[37]
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with
just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest,
well beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive
prescription which, in this case, is 10 years. [38] The findings of fact of the lower
courts, and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably point to this
conclusion: immediately after the Deed of Absolute Sale, a public instrument
dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son,
Guzman Cario (the father of private respondent), the latter immediately
occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones lists his
residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his
permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his
introduction of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial
accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cario alone who declared
for tax purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name,
while the tax declarations of the other claimants made no reference to the
subject property.[39] Although arguably Sioco Cario may not have been the
owner of the subject property when he executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in
1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied,
which means that the mode of transferring ownership should ordinarily have
been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.[40] By the time the
successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over
the land in controversy by filing their Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to

Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 on April 24, 1959 with
the trial court, and which Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had
already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription is
deemed satisfied well before Guzmans possession can be said to be civilly
interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen. [41] After the
dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in
his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His
remains are buried on the land in question. Thereafter, Guzmans widow and
son, herein private respondent, continued possession of the subject property in
the same manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive
the case on April 20, 1983, they had, far before that time, lost all rights to
recover possession or ownership.
5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right,
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. [42] It is a delay
in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another [43] because of
the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the
property or parties.[44] It is based on public policy which, for the peace of
society,[45] ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise
could be a valid claim.[46] It is different from and applies independently of
prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this
inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in
equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed
time, laches is not.[47] Lachesmeans the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [48] It has been
held that even a registered owner of property under the Torrens Title system
may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[49]
Given the foregoing findings of fact, all the four (4) elements
of laches, as prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present in the case,
to wit:

1.a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
2.b. Delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit;
3.c. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
d.

Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to

the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. [50]

As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that

Ting-el Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question
the validity of the Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in
Agricultural Land after its execution on October 22, 1928[51]despite having
every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession of the
property from Guzman Cario instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time
when the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzmans
occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No
evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cario or his Estate ever
filed any action to contest the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 10, 1938.[52] Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cario tried
to assail the deed as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no
appeal was lodged therefrom. It will be difficult for this Court to assume that
the petitioners and their predecessors were all the while ignorant of the adverse
possession of private respondent and his predecessors given the publicity of
their conduct and the nature of their acts. Private respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that no action
would be filed against them by such passivity. There is no justifiable reason
for petitioners delay in asserting their rightsthe facts in their entirety show that
they have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land dated October
22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January
10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim
over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the
validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that
the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for
the first time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this late a
stage. The features of this case are not new. The Court has on several

occasions held in particular that despite the judicial pronouncement that the
sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of
approval of competent authorities, the right to recover possession has
nonetheless been barred through the operation of the equitable doctrine
of laches.[53]

6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then

President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of segregating and
reserving certain Igorot claims identified therein, including one purportedly
belonging to the Heirs of Dicman, and prohibiting any encumbrance or
alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of
patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the
property in question had already been vested in private respondent. The
executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot
be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not
be altered or deprived by executive fiat alone without contravening the due
process guarantees[54] of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking
of private property to be redistributed for public use without just
compensation.[55]
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigenous
peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions are
vital concerns of the State and constitute important public policies which bear
upon this case. To give life and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw
it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating measure to affirm the views and
opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities
on matters that affect their life and culture. [56] The provisions of that law unify
an otherwise fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and
statutory doctrine which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for
the protection of indigenous cultural communities as a marginalized sector,
[57]
to protect their ancestral domain and ancestral lands and ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being,[58] and to guard their patrimony from
those inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility.[59] As the final arbiter
of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has always been
mindful of the highest edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in
the interpretation and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the
loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear
and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of

right and justice as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation
of the rights of all persons concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132007. August 5, 1998]
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. HELEN
BAUTISTA RICAFORT,in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila (Branch 260),
TEAM IMAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., FELIX S. CO,
JEFFREY C. CAL, and KING CUISIA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At issue is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to
expunge private respondents answer with counterclaims on the ground that
said pleading was not served personally; moreover, there was no written
explanation as to why personal service was not accomplished, as required by
Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The antecedents are not disputed.
On 10 July 1997, petitioner, as plaintiff, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Paraaque, Metro Manila, a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for a writ of replevin [1] against herein
private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0304 and
was assigned to Branch 260 of said court, presided over by public respondent
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
Summonses and copies of the complaint were forthwith served on private
respondents. On 25 July 1997, their counsel filed a notice of appearance with
urgent ex-parte motion for extension of time to plead,[2] which the court
granted in its order of 4 August 1997.[3]

On 8 August 1997, private respondents, as defendants, filed their Answer

(with Counterclaims).[4] A copy thereof was furnished counsel for petitioner by
registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation
as to why service was not made personally upon petitioner-plaintiff, as
required by Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a motion to expunge the Answer
(with Counterclaims) and to declare herein private respondents in default,
[5]
alleging therein that the latter did not observe the mandate of the
aforementioned Section 11, and that there was:
[A]bsolutely no valid reason why defendant[s] should not have personally
served plaintiffs ... counsel with [a] copy of their answer [as] (t)he office of
defendants (sic) counsel, Atty. Froilan Cabaltera, is just a stone [sic] throw
away from the office of [petitioners] counsel, with an estimate (sic) distance of
about 200 meters more or less.
Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten (10) times farther
from the office of Atty. Cabaltera.
On 15 August 1997, private respondents filed their opposition[6] to the
above mentioned motion, alleging that petitioners rigid and inflexible reliance
on the provisions of Section 11, Rule 13 ... is an adventitious resort to
technicality and is contrary to Section 6 of Rule 3 ... which admonishes that
said Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective in
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of [e]very action and
proceeding; and that Section 11, Rule 13 notwithstanding, private respondents
religiously complied with [Section 5 of Rule 13] by personally present[ing] to
the clerk of court their said Answer ... furnishing a copy thereof to the counsel
for [petitioner] by way of registered mail.
On 8 September 1997, public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued
an order[7]stating that under Section 11 of Rule 13 it is within the discretion of
the [trial court] whether to consider the pleading as filed or not, and denying,
for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with
Counterclaims) and to declare private respondents in default.
Petitioner immediately moved for reconsideration[8] of the order,
but public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort denied this motion in her
order[9] of 17 November 1997. The order justified the denial in this wise:

Section 6 [of] Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ordains that the
Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
Liberal construction of the rules and the pleading is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, "the
error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes
than to cure it, does not appeal a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal
to plaintiff a [sic] case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a
game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather,
a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the Court
the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections or form of technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust."

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; that Section 11 of Rule 13 begins with the
phrase whenever practicable, thereby suggesting that service by mail may still
be effected depending on the relative priority of the pleading sought to be
filed; and when service is not done personally, it is more prudent and judicious
for the courts to require a written explanation rather than to expunge the
pleading outright or consider the same as not being filed.
In view of the importance of the issue raised, which is, undoubtedly, one
of the first impression, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and consider it submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings
filed by the parties.
Section 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes two
modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other
papers, namely: (1) personal service; and (2) service by mail. The first is
governed by Section 6, while the second, by Section 7 of said Rule. If service
cannot be done either personally or by mail, substituted service may be
resorted to under Section 8 thereof.

While it is desirable that the above Rules be faithfully and even meticulously
observed, courts should not strict about procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. Furthermore, it is well settled that
litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities.

Pursuant, however, to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of

pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally;
and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written
explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. The
section reads:

Petitioner thus filed the instant special civil action of certiorari,

contending that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
admitted private respondents' "Answer (with Counterclaims)" notwithstanding
private respondents' clear, admitted and inexcusable violation of Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in that: (a) the "Answer (with
Counterclaims)" was not served personally upon petitioners counsel despite
the undisputed fact that the offices of private respondents counsel and that of
petitioners counsel are only about 200 meters away from each other; and (b)
the Answer did not contain any explanation as to why the answer was not
served personally.

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to
consider the paper as not filed.(n)

In their Comment, filed in compliance with the resolution of 2 February

1998, and to which petitioner filed a Reply, private respondents aver that
public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort correctly admitted private
respondents Answer (with Counterclaims) in light of Section 6, Rule 1 of the

Note that Section 11 refers to both service of pleadings and other papers on the
adverse party or his counsel as provided for in Sections 6, 7 and 8; and to
the filing of pleadings and other papers in court.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or
filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some

lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical
practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel offguard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the
post office that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper
from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming
the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the
disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever
practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with.In adjudging the plausibility
of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of
the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court
cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation
introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of
justice.
Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was
established; moreover, that the office of private respondents counsel was ten
times farther from the post office than the distance separating the offices of
opposing counsel. Of course, proximity would seem to make personal service
most practicable, but exceptions may nonetheless apply. For instance, where
the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served with a pleading seldom
reports to office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings, or
where service is done on the last day of the reglementary period and the office

of the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served is closed, for whatever

reason.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity
between the offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant
explanation as to why personal service of the answer was not effected,
indubitably, private respondents counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the
motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial
of said motion nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial
courts discretion. Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the dictum laid down
in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to exercise its
discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead of
expunging it from the record.
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of
Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of
Rule 1 or Alonzo v. Villamor and other analogous cases, then Section 11 would
become meaningless and its sound purpose negated.Nevertheless, we sustain
the challenged ruling of the trial court, but for reasons other than those
provided for in the challenged order.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997, while
the questioned Answer (with Counterclaims) was filed only on 8 August 1997,
or on the 39th day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules. Hence, private
respondents counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and
ramifications of Section 11, Rule 13. In fact, as pointed out by petitioners
counsel, in another case where private respondents counsel was likewise
opposing counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Section 11.
It has been several months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took
effect. In the interim, this Court has generally accommodated parties and
counsel who failed to comply with the requirement of a written explanation
whenever personal service or filing was not practicable, guided, in the exercise
of our discretion, by the primary objective of Section 11, the importance of the
subject matter of the case, the issues involved and the prima facie merit of the
challenged pleading. However, as we have in the past, for the guidance of the
Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated
one month from promulgation of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED considering that while

the justification for the denial of the motion to expunge the Answer (with
Counterclaims) may not necessarily be correct, yet, for the reasons above
stated, the violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 may be condoned.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 15

Section 9. Motion for leave. A motion for leave to file a pleading or motion
shall be accompanied by the pleading or motion sought to be admitted. (n)

Motions
Section 1. Motion defined. A motion is an application for relief other than
by a pleading. (1a)
Section 2. Motions must be in writings. All motions shall be in writing
except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. (2a)
Section 3. Contents. A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained
and the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or
necessary to prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting
affidavits and other papers. (3a)
Section 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice. (4a)
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)
Section 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. (6a)
Section 7. Motion day. Except for motions requiring immediate action, all
motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a
non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day. (7a)
Section 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule
9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include
all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived. (8a)

Section 10. Form. The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written
motions so far as concerns caption, designation, signature, and other matters of
form. (9a)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40945 November 10, 1986
IGMEDIO AZAJAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) and
CHAM SAMCO & SONS, INC., respondents.

of this nature, as Azajar well knew from many such transactions in the past,
being that "any legal action thereon must be instituted in the City of Manila. 3
The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court
reading as follows:
The Clerk of Court
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
Naga City
Sir:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Court for its consideration and
resolution immediately upon receipt thereof.

NARVASA, J.:

Makati, Rizal for Naga City, February 4, 1974

Petitioner seeks reversal of the Resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals

(now Intermediate Appellate Court) dated March 25, 1975 setting aside the
judgment by default rendered against private respondent by the Court of First
Instance, and directing that said respondent be allowed to file its answer to the
complaint and after joinder of issues, trial be had and judgment rendered on
the merits.

(SGD) POLO S. PANTALEON

This case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Igmedio Azajar

against respondent Cham Samco and Sons, Inc. in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Sur. 1 Azajar's claim, briefly, is that
he had purchased from defendant (hereafter referred to simply as Cham
Samco), thru the latter's agent, 100 Kegs of nails of various sizes, specified in
one of Cham Samco's printed order forms, and had given to the agent
P18,000.00 in fun payment thereof; but in breach of contract, Cham Samco
had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity ordered.

NF-927 4

Cham Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action-the complaint's language indicating not a
perfected sale but merely an "offer to buy by plaintiff that was partly accepted
by defendant," and failing to show that as explicitly required by the order form
prices had been confirmed by Cham Samco's "Manila Office," 2 and (2) that
venue was improperly laid-Cham Samco's invariable conditions in transactions

Copy furnished:
Atty. Augusta A. Pardalias
Naga City

It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy at bar.

Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion to
Dismiss incapable of to the period to answer, Azajar filed a motion dated
February 20, 1974 to declare Cham Samco in default, which the Court granted.
By Order dated February 22, 1974 the Court pronounced Cham Samco in
default and allowed Azajar to present evidence ex parte. The Court justified
the order of default in the wise:
On February 4, 1974, defendant thru counsel instead of an answer to the
complaint, filed a "Motion to Dismiss" which, in legal contemplation, is not a
motion at an because the ."notice" therein is directed to the Clerk of Court
instead of to the party concerned (as required by Section 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court) and is without the requisite notice of time and place of

hearing; that a motion "with a notice of hearing (a) directed to the Clerk of
Court not to the parties; and (b) merely stating that the same be "submitted for
resolution of the Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," copy of which motion
was duly furnished to and received by "the adverse counsel is fatally defective
and did not toll the running of the period to appeal" (Cladera v. Sarmiento, 39
SCRA 552). Consequently, inasmuch as the "motion to dismiss in this case is a
mere scrap of paper because it is without the requisite notice of time and place
of hearing (Manakil v. Hevilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop v. Unisan,
44 Phil. 866; Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117; and Manila Surety v.
Bath, 14 SCRA 435), the filing thereof did not suspend the running ' of the
period to file the required responsive pleading. That from' February 4, 1974 to
February 21, 1974, seventeen (17) days had lapsed and defendant failed to file
any responsive pleading ... 5
Then on March 30, 1974, the Trial Court rendered judgment by default against
defendant Cham Samco ordering it:
... to deliver immediately to the plaintiff the nails mentioned in the Order Form
No. 9020 (Exhibit A); (2) requiring defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, the sum of P10,000.00 by way of
consequential damages, plus interest in both instances, and the additional sum
of P5,000.00, for exemplary damages; (3) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the sum of P7,500.00 for attorney's fees and related expenses of litigation; and
(4) to pay the costs.
Cham Samco filed a Motion for New Trial on April 9, 1974. It contended that
its failure to observe the rules governing notice of motions was due to
excusable negligence, "because the grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss
were all in such nature and character that addressed themselves to a motu
proprio resolution by the court and thus rendered a hearing dispensable. 6 It
also alleged certain defenses available to it which if duly alleged and proven,
would absolve it from any liability. 7 This motion was denied.
Cham Samco went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari asserting that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
declaring it in default and then rendering judgment by default. 8 The petition
was dismissed for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals on November 20,
1974. 9
But on motion for reconsideration seasonably presented, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself. By Resolution dated March 25, 1975, 10 it set aside the Trial

Court's order of default of February 22, 1974, judgment by default of March

13, 1974, and Order dated June 4, 1974 denying Cham Samco's motion for
new trial, and directed the lower Court to allow Cham Samco to file its answer
to the complaint and upon due joinder of issues, to try and decide the case on
the merits.
The Court held that:
... (t)he notice in the motion which was addressed to the clerk of court asking
him to submit the motion for the consideration of the court is a substantial
compliance with the provision of section 3 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Verily under the said rule, the Court has the alternative of either hearing the
case or deferring the hearing and determination thereof until the trial on the
merits. Thus upon the filing of said motion the court should have set the
motion for hearing or outrightly deny the motion, or otherwise postpone the
hearing until the trial on the ground that the grounds thereof do not appear to
be indubitable. The prompt filing and apparently valid grounds invoked in the
motion are not the acts and declarations of a defaulting party.
... (E)ven assuming that the declaration of default of the petitioner was in order
we find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the motion for new trial that was filed by the petitioner not only on the
ground of excusable negligence we have above discussed but also on the
ground that it has a meritorious defense. and
... (E)xcessive damages have been awarded to the private respondent. In
addition to ordering the petitioner to deliver to the private respondent the nails
ordered by the latter, the petitioner was also ordered to pay not only P15,000
actual damages for profits that the private respondent could have earned but
also consequential damages of P10,000 for the unrealized profits that the said
earnings and capital of the plaintiff could have earned, plus interest in both
instances, exemplary damages of P5,000 and P7,500 for attorney's fees and
related expenses of litigation. Thus for the capital of respondent of P18,100.00
in the purchase of the nails, the petitioner was ordered to pay damages of a
total of P37,500.00, which including the interest awarded can amount to over
P40,000, more than double the value of the said investment of respondent.
Under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court award of excessive damages
could be a ground for new trial.

The Court concluded its opinion with the observation that "the ends of justice
would be better served in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the
petitioner its day in court.
It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to
dismiss for hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires
that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to all parties concerned
at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; 11 and that the
notice shag be directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for
the hearing of the motion. 12 The uniform holding of this Court has been that a
failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. 13 Such notice is required
to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and
meet the arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make
determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution. 14
Cham Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the
circumstances the error be not regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as
constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It argues that legal and
logical considerations, which it took to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a
hearing on the motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its position of
affirmative defenses in addition to those set out in its motion to dismiss which
if ventilated and established at the trial would absolve it from all liability under
the complaint.
Cham Samco's belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be set
for hearing was avowedly engendered by two factors, namely:
1) the fact that while the Rules of Court "specify the motions which can be
heard only with prior service upon adverse parties, 15 said Rules "do not point
out which written motions may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to leave to
the court, in motions other than those specified, the discretion either to ex
parte resolve ... or to call the parties to a hearing ...; 16and
2) the further fact that its motion to dismiss was based on two grounds on
which a hearing was superfluous, the first, failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action, being determinable exclusively from the allegations of the
complaint and no evidence being allowable thereon; and the second, that
venue is improperly laid, being resolvable exclusively on the basis of
documents annexed to the motion. 17

These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movant's duty to give notice to
the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose
of said notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the latter time to
oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its
submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to
determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse
party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be
resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant,
not on the Court.
Withal the reasons for Cham Samco's erroneous notion of the dispensability of
a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This
circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate
Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco has meritorious
defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar's claim against it, and the
eminent desirability more than once stressed by this Court that cases should be
determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections, 18 all conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that
"the ends of justice would be better served in this case if we brush aside
technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Cebu Branch X, presided over by respondent Judge Jesus de la Pea.

[5]
Respondent then ordered Citibank to file its comment on Aznars motion for
reconsideration.[6] Citibank filed its opposition instead. In an order dated
November 25, 1998, respondent granted Aznars motion for reconsideration:

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896. April 29, 2005]
ATTY. JULIUS NERI, complainant, vs. JUDGE JESUS S. DE LA
PEA, respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The

DECISION dated May 29, 1998 is hereby reconsidered, and consequently, the
defendant is hereby condemned liable to pay the following sums of money:
a) P10,000,000.00 as moral damages;

R E S O LUTI O N

b) P 5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;

CORONA, J.:

c) P 1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

This is a case for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and/or
incompetence filed by Atty. Julius Z. Neri against Judge Jesus S. de la Pea. It
originated from a civil case for damages filed by Emmanuel Aznar against
Citibank (which was represented by complainant as counsel), docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch XX, presided over by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. [1]
Plaintiff Aznar had filed suit due to the alleged blacklisting of his
Citibank Preferred Mastercard which, according to him, was dishonored in
several establishments in Singapore and Malaysia while he was on holiday,
causing him great inconvenience and embarrassment. He presented, as
evidence, several receipts, plane tickets, a computer print-out allegedly
showing that his card had been declined for being over limit, a statement of
account and his lone testimony.[2] Defendant Citibank presented several
documentary exhibits to the effect that Aznars card had not been placed on any
hot list and could not possibly have been blacklisted. [3] After trial, Judge
Marcos dismissed the case for lack of merit. [4]
Dissatisfied with the decision, Aznar filed through counsel a motion for
reconsideration, with motion to re-raffle the case. In an order dated September
11, 1998, Acting Presiding Judge Ramon Codilla (who succeeded Marcos),
citing the fact that he was occupied with two (2) salas and the fact that the
Presiding Judge who originally penned the decision is a credit card holder of
CITIBANKwhose membership could naturally influence the outcome of this
case in favor of the defendant bank, directed the re-raffling of the case to RTC

d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.[7]
As a result of the Order, complainant filed this administrative case on July
16, 1999, which was docketed as Control No. 41-99-P. Charging respondent
with dishonesty, he alleged that respondent, contrary to his pronouncement in
his order, had rendered his decision without ever having read the transcripts of
the case.[8] To support this contention, complainant presented certifications
from the Clerk of Court of Branch XX[9] and the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Cebu City[10] that the transcripts of the case had remained in their custody and
that the respondent never borrowed them all throughout.
Complainant also charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law
and/or incompetence. He alleged that respondent had improperly considered as
a business record Aznars computer print-out which in reality did not meet the
requisites to be rightly considered as such. Aznar never testified as to the date
and time the subject print-out was encoded, or who encoded and printed the
same, nor did he establish personal knowledge of who prepared the print-out,
or whether it was prepared by one responsible for it in his professional
capacity or in the performance of his official duty or in the regular course of
his business. Finally, the person who prepared it did not testify in court or on
deposition.

Complainant went on to say that respondents incompetence and

dishonesty showed in his failure to appreciate and evaluate Citibanks extensive
documentary evidence which clearly established that it did not blacklist Aznars
Mastercard.
Finally, complainant pointed out that the damages respondent awarded to
plaintiff Aznar were scandalously exorbitant. He prayed for respondents
dismissal from the service.
On September 3, 1999, respondent filed his comment. [11] He principally
contended that, having appealed from his decision to the Court of Appeals, the
complainant should not have filed this administrative case. Respondent decried
complainants case as forum-shopping. In his defense, respondent asserted that
he had in fact read the transcripts, having received copies thereof attached to
an ex parte manifestation filed by plaintiff Aznar.[12] He also defended the
amount of damages he awarded by comparing them to those awarded in a 1973
case, with inflation taken into account.

In a manifestation dated June 14, 2004, respondent prayed for the

resolution of the case and once more asked for its dismissal. He cited the fact
that the Court of Appeals decision made no mention of his administrative
lapses and that his decision was an exercise of purely judicial discretion. He
also listed the various posts he had held as a Regional Trial Court judge as well
as the commendations he had received from the Honorable Chief Justice. He
also pointed out that this administrative complaint was the only one ever filed
against him in all his years of service.[17]
In a memorandum dated August 27, 2004, the Office of the Court
Administrator reported its findings.
Because respondent based his assailed order mostly on the ex
parte manifestation submitted by the counsel for plaintiff Aznar, the OCA
found him liable for violating Section 4, Rule 13, in relation to Section 5, Rule
15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure:
(Rule 13)

Complainant then filed his reply to the comment, [13] assailing the ex
parte manifestation which respondent had supposedly relied upon in deciding
the case. He pointed out that respondent should not have even considered the
said manifestation because Citibank had not been served a copy and it was
filed after office hours. He likewise refuted respondents allegations of forumshopping and impropriety in filing an administrative case while an appeal was
pending.

SEC. 4. Papers required to be filed and served. Every judgment, resolution,

order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the
court, and served upon the parties affected.

In his rejoinder, respondent defended his appreciation of the ex

parte manifestation. He likewise reiterated his claim that the administrative
complaint should not have been filed with the appeal. [14]

SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.

On February 28, 2001, the Second Division of this Court resolved to hold
the administrative case in abeyance until the final resolution of the Court of
Appeals of CA-GR CV No. 62554, Aznar v. Citibank. By this time, the case
had been re-docketed as AM No. 01-1131-RTJ.[15]

According to the OCA, the fact that plaintiff Aznar had failed to serve a
copy of his ex parte manifestation upon Citibank should have been reason
enough for respondent to disregard the same.

On January 8, 2004, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of Citibank,

vacating respondents decision and reinstating the dismissal of the case by
Judge Marcos.[16] On June 8, 2004, complainant filed a manifestation, with the
Court of Appeals decision attached, pointing out that this administrative
complaint was now ready for resolution.

Likewise noting the fact that the ex parte manifestation was filed beyond
office hours, the OCA found that this created an idea that there was a covert
attempt to favor Aznar. However, citing the absence of substantial evidence, it
pointed out that it should not be presumed that the procedural lapse committed
by respondent (was) attended by corrupt motive of flagrant disregard of the
rules. The OCA also considered in respondents favor his defense that he was
merely trying to help decongest the dockets. Finally, the OCA found the

(Rule 15)

charges of gross ignorance of law and incompetence to be without basis, and

found him liable instead for simple misconduct. The OCA recommended a fine
of P10,000.
We adopt part of the findings of the Court Administrator.
But we disagree with its finding that the respondent violated both Rules
13 and 15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 4, Rule 13 requires that adverse parties be served copies of all
pleadings and similar papers. Section 4, Rule 15 requires a movant to set his
motion for hearing, unless it is one of those which a court can act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the other party. The prevailing doctrine in our
jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties
is a mere scrap of paper.[18] In Cui v. Judge Madayag,[19] we held that any
motion that does not contain proof of service of notice to the other party is not
entitled to judicial cognizance. (Such) motion is nothing but a (mere) scrap of
paper. It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively
to motions.
The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a
prayer which the movant makes to the court, which is usually in the interest of
the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is
therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to
properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the
principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the
adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. The same
principle applies to objections to interrogatories which also require a notice of
hearing like motions under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Rules.[20]
However, the same cannot be said for manifestations which, unless
otherwise indicated, are usually made merely for the information of the court.
There is generally nothing to contest or argue; the manifesting party is just
making a statement for the knowledge of the court, such as in this case. There
is nothing in either the Rules or in jurisprudence that requires judges to
disregard a manifestation that does not have proof of service.
This is not to say, however, that respondent is off the hook. While it is
true that he was under no obligation to disregard Aznars ex partemanifestation,
he should have at least called attention to its irregularity, both by admonishing
Aznar and by informing the adverse party of its filing. That he acted on

it indeed, based his decision on it while Citibank was totally unaware of its
existence ran seriously afoul of the precepts of fair play, specially since
respondent only mentioned the document after this administrative case was
filed against him. Indeed, there seems to be something gravely amiss in
respondents sense of fairness and righteousness, the primary requisites of a
good judge.
Furthermore, we cannot help but find extreme bias and bad intent in
respondents award to Aznar of a whopping P16.2 million in damages
considering that, not having tried the case himself, the only records he actually
read came from no one else but Aznar himself. By itself, the unconscionable
amount of the award evinces indubitable malice on respondents part and the
shady circumstances in which he granted it show that he knowingly rendered a
manifestly unjust decision.
As a member of the judiciary, respondents every action is supposed to be
beyond reproach and above suspicion. The 2004 Code of Judicial Conduct
clearly states that Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.[21] By acting on a document which was
sorely defective (for two reasons: failure to serve a copy on the adverse party
and failure to file it during office hours), and by making an egregiously large
award of damages in favor of plaintiff Aznar, he inevitably opened himself up
to suspicion of having entered into a dirty, secret deal with Aznar and thereby
severely tarnished the impartiality with which he was at all times supposed to
conduct himself.
Given respondents actions, we disagree with the OCAs findings of simple
misconduct. Because of the highly anomalous manner in which respondent
rendered his decision, as well as the questionable content of the decision itself,
which was eventually overturned by the Court of Appeals, we find him guilty
of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a
competent court in an appropriate proceeding. [22]
The penalty for this offense ranges from a fine of P20,000, to suspension
from three to six months, to dismissal from the service. [23] In this case, the
penalty of suspension for six months is appropriate, with a warning that
another such infraction of this nature will warrant a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, Judge JESUS S. DE LA PEA is hereby found GUILTY
of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a
competent court in an appropriate proceeding and is hereby SUSPENDED

from office for six months. Considering the gravity of this offense, he is
hereby warned that another infraction of this kind will merit a penalty beyond
mere suspension from public office.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

3) For defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00

plus P1,000.00 as appearance fee and to pay the cost.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court is hereby ordered
dismissed.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886. May 16, 2005]

The case was appealed to the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 55.

ALFREDO G. BOISER, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE,

JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55, HIMAMAYLAN
CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent.

On 15 October 2003, defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion

to release bond on the ground that the MTC of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental,
in its decision dated 11 July 2003, had already resolved the writ of preliminary
injunction without mentioning the applicants liability.

DECISION
On 16 October 2003, respondent judge granted the motion. [3]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from the complaint [1] of Alfredo G.
Boiser filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge
Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 55, with Grave Abuse of Discretion and Gross Ignorance
of the Law.
Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the plaintiff in an ejectment case filed
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental. On 11 July 2003, the MTC rendered a decision[2] in favor of
complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant as follows:
1) For the defendant to vacate subject land known as Lot No. 2023 situated at
Brgy. Candumarao, Hinigaran, Negros Occiental, consisting of 5.5536 hectares
leased by the plaintiff from Mary Nonasco and Ofelia Donado, heirs of the
registered owners, the late spouses Narciso Gayares and Paz Nava, and to
peacefully turn over possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2) For the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
actual damages;

Complainant alleged that the issuance by respondent judge of the Order

dated 16 October 2003 is indicative of his ignorance of the law considering
that the motion did not state that he was furnished a copy of the motion
thereby depriving him of his right to due process. He also averred that the
motion was a mere scrap of paper for failure to state the time and date of
hearing. He further alleged that respondent manifested gross ignorance when
he resolved to grant the motion to release the injunction bond considering that
the same was meant to answer for damages that he may suffer due to
defendants continued illegal possession of the land.
On 15 January 2004, the OCA required[4] respondent to file his comment.
In his comment[5] dated 12 February 2004, respondent judge maintained
that the filing of the administrative complaint against him is hasty and uncalled
for. He said there must have been a miscommunication between the
complainant and his counsel because had either of them exerted effort to find
out the result of the appealed case, they would have discovered that he
affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court in favor of the complainant.
On 14 April 2004, complainant filed[6] a motion to withdraw complaint.
On 3 August 2004, the OCA submitted its recommendation,[7] thus:
Respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court our recommendation that this
administrative case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and

that respondent Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., be FINED in the amount of

P21,000.00 for Gross Ignorance of the Law and be STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
On 17 November 2004, we referred[8] the case to Court of Appeals Justice
Monina Zenarosa for investigation, report and investigation. Consequently, the
case was scheduled for preliminary conference on 17 February 2005. On the
said date, complainant Alfredo Boiser, with his counsel Atty. Salvador Sabio,
and respondent judge appeared. During the preliminary conference, Atty.
Sabio manifested that the complainant had already filed his motion to
withdraw the complaint and was no longer interested in pursuing the case. On
the other hand, respondent judge manifested he had retired from the service as
of 01 November 2004 and is now appearing as a private citizen. He further
informed the court that he was submitting the case without further comment as
he had already filed his comment to the complaint.
After investigation, Justice Zenarosa submitted her
report[9] recommending the dismissal of the complaint.
Prefatorily, the Court must reiterate the rule that mere desistance on the
part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative
complaint against any member of the bench. The withdrawal of complaints
cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine
the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its
investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. The courts interest in the
affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds. [10]

over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and
control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and
prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent,
respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves
the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under
the situation.
We shall now discuss respondents liability relative to the lack of notice of
hearing and proof of service of the questioned motion.
The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by
the movant, except those motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with
proof of service. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure provide:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion.- Except for motions which the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.

Anent respondents retirement on 01 November 2004, it has been settled

that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by
the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during
the pendency of respondents case.[11] This was expounded in the case of Perez
v. Abiera,[12] cited in the case of Judge Rolando G. How v. Teodora Ruiz, et.
al.,[13] thus:

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all

parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

[T]he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges
or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices
and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. x x x If only for
reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction

It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not
have a proper notice of hearing. The date and time of the hearing were not
specified. Neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof.
These were never controverted by respondent judge.

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary.- No written motion set for hearing shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It

presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to

consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule
is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be
unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do
not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. [14] The
objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide
due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial. [15]
Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing
but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. [16] The rule mandates
that the same shall not be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is
mandatory.[17]
As can be seen the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good
faith. Judicial competence requires no less. [18]
Clearly, respondent judge had ignored a fundamental rule. He acted too
precipitately in granting defendants motion despite the absence of the
requirements as above prescribed. As a judge, Judge Aguirre is expected to
keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. [19] Unfamiliarity with the
rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. A
judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
procedural rules.[20] When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. [21] Ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. [22]

subsequent issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant notwithstanding

that the records of the case had been transmitted to the provincial fiscal and an
information has already been filed in court.
3. In Josefina M. Villanueva v. MTC Judge Benjamin E. Almazan,[25] the court
found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was sentenced
to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, when he
conducted a preliminary investigation in a case cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Court.
4. In Acting Solicitor General Romeo de la Cruz v. Judge Carlito A. Eisma ,
RTC, Branch 13, Zamboanga City,[26] a fine of P5,000.00 was imposed on the
respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, for
preventing the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 17, a court of
equal rank and jurisdiction.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no
one[27] - much more so judges. It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a
dispenser of justice is one which is demanding. By virtue of the delicate
position which he occupies in the society, he is duty bound to be the
embodiment of competence and integrity.[28] Because of this, a judge who is
not knowledgeable of the law which he is obligated to implement will not be
able to live up to the judiciarys exacting standards. [29]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 55, guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, and hereby imposes on him a fine of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Thus, in the following cases a fine of Five Thousand Pesos was imposed:
SO ORDERED.
1. In Mutilan v. Adiong,[23] A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA
513, the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
granting a motion for garnishment without compliance with the proof of
service and notice of hearing requirements, and was sentenced to pay a fine of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
2. In Espino v. Salubre,[24] the court found respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and was sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), when respondent judge continued with the investigation and

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Complainant alleged inter alia that on August 26, 2002, her husband Wolfgang
Heinrich Konrad Harlinghausen (Harlinghausen) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 73, docketed as Civil Case No. 364-0-2002.

EN BANC
On August 27, 2002, Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed an Urgent ExParte Motion to Preserve Properties to be Collated. On the same day,
respondent judge issued an Order[2] setting the hearing of the motion on August
30, 2002.

MA. TERESA H. DE JESUS,

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1921

Complainant,

(Formerly OCA

- versus -

IPI No. 04-1973-RTJ)

On August 29, 2002, complainant received summons in Civil Case No. 364-02002. Forthwith, she filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue. This was denied by respondent judge.

JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG, PRESIDING

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 73, OLONGAPO CITY,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

September 30, 2005

On August 30, 2002, respondent judge considered the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Preserve Properties to be Collated submitted for resolution after hearing the
testimonies of Harlinghausens attorney-in-fact, Harry E. Joost, and his counsel
of record, Atty. Edmundo S. Carian.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

On September 3, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order [3] granting the

urgent ex-parte motion and placing under legal custody the properties
enumerated therein. The Register of Deeds of Tarlac, among others, was
directed to annotate the Order on the 62 land titles allegedly purchased by
Harlinghausens wife using his money without his consent.
On October 2, 2002, Harlinghausen, through counsel, filed
another Ex-Parte Motion praying for the issuance of an Order directing the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to allow him to enter this
country in order to prosecute his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

In a complaint[1] dated February 4, 2004 filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), complainant Maria Teresa H. De Jesus charged
respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City, Branch 73, with gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust orders,
abuse of authority and misuse of court processes.

On October 4, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order granting

Harlinghausens Ex-Parte Motion.
Eventually, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari assailing respondent judges Order dated September 3, 2002
granting Harlinghausens Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve Properties to be
Collated; Order dated October 4, 2002 granting his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
enter this country; and Order denying her (complainants) motion to dismiss the
complaint for improper venue. Complainant averred that in issuing the
challenged Orders, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion

tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 74167.
On February 20, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[4] granting complainants petition, declaring void the assailed Orders
dated September 3 and October 4, 2002 and dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 364-0-2002 for declaration of marriage for improper venue.
Harlinghausen filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by
the Appellate Court. He then filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 158333. In a Resolution of June 23, 2003,
we denied the petition for his failure to show that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error. Upon finality of our Resolution on August 12,
2003, an Entry of Judgment was made on October 3, 2003.[5]
Complainant now contends that respondent judge, in issuing the Order
of September 3, 2002 granting Harlinghausens Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Preserve Properties to be Collated, is ignorant of the law and abused his
authority. The motion lacks the notice of hearing to be served upon the adverse
party three (3) days before the hearing; and proof of service of the motion
upon the adverse party.
Complainant further contends that in issuing the Order dated October
4, 2002 directing the BID to allow Harlinghausen to enter this country,
respondent judge abused his authority and misused court processes.
In his comment, respondent judge explained that he did not disregard
the basic procedural rules. Although the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Preserve
Properties to be Collated lacks a notice of hearing, nevertheless he set the
motion for hearing to enable the adverse party, herein complainant, to
participate therein or to file an opposition. Besides, the Rules allow him to act
upon an ex-parte motion requiring quick action, like the motion before him.
There was urgency considering that the conjugal funds are being
misappropriated by complainant. Moreover, he conducted clarificatory
hearing. At any rate, his questioned Order is not tainted with bad faith or fraud.
With respect to the Order of October 4, 2002, respondent judge
explained that he did not overstep his jurisdiction. He recognized the authority
of the BID. In fact, he stated in his questioned Order that it is without
prejudice to the authority of the BID over Harlinghausen.

In his Report and Recommendation, Court Administrator Presbitero J.

Velasco, Jr. stated inter alia that:
A thorough examination of the instant case reveals
abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law.
Records show that, relative to the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, respondent Judge issued at least two
orders that were bluntly nullified by the appellate court. The
rules and principles ignored were so basic, and haste was
characteristically palpable from the incidents.
xxx
Likewise, respondent cannot take shield from the fact
that his assailed orders were already set aside by the appellate
court through the proper judicial remedies. Precisely, his cited
jurisprudence itself explicitly states, It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted or when the
appellate tribunal have spoken with finality that the door to an
inquiry to his administrative liability may be said to have
opened or closed. A display of haste and disregard of basic
rules is a norm incompatible with the prudent attitude and
sobriety expected of a good judge.
He recommended that:
1. The instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter;
2. The respondent Judge, for abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law, be accordingly meted a FINE in
the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) with
a WARNING that future similar infractions shall be dealt with
more severely.

In our Resolution[6] dated January 24, 2005, we required the parties to

manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings and records filed.

Subsequently, both parties submitted their respective Manifestations

stating their willingness to submit the case for decision based on the records.

Likewise, respondents failure to afford complainant the opportunity to

be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction. [8]

On the challenged Order of September 3, 2002, Sections 4, 5 and 6,

Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are pertinent, thus:

Relative to the challenged Order dated October 4, 2002, respondent

judge shows his ignorance of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. This law confers upon the Commissioner of the BID, to the
exclusion of the courts of justice, the power and authority to enforce its
provisions, specifically the admission of foreigners to this country.

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions

which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing
by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner
as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets
the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof.

Obviously, respondent judge blatantly disregarded the above

provisions. Instead of denying the motion outright for being manifestly
defective, he granted the same. While he set the motion for hearing, still the
three-day notice was not observed, thus complainant failed to attend the
hearing. Clearly, she was deprived of her right to due process.
When a judge fails to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or
a principle in the discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and
undeserving of his position, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In
both instances, the judges dismissal is in order.[7]

We sustain the observation of the Court of Appeals[9] that the Order of

respondent judge directing the BID to allow the entry of Harlinghausen to this
country would effectively countermand the order of detention [10] issued by the
BID and constitutes an intrusion into its prerogatives as regards the entry,
admission, exclusion, registration, repatriation, monitoring and deportation of
foreigners within our national territory.
In his desperate attempt to evade administrative sanction, respondent
judge maintains that since complainant has already resorted to a proper
remedy, i.e., by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning his twin Orders, she is barred from filing the instant administrative
complaint involving the same Orders. He cited our ruling in Hilario vs.
Ocampo III, 371 SCRA 260 (2001) that where some judicial means is
available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for an act
of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals has set aside the questioned
twin Orders, the fact remains that respondent judge has shown his ignorance of
both substantive and procedural laws which warrants an administrative
sanction.
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.
Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be
beyond permissible margins of error, as in this case, to still err thereon
amounts to ignorance of the law.[11]In this case, respondent judge displayed a
deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing motions,
specifically, the three-day notice rule and the requisite proof of service. Also,
he showed his utter lack of knowledge and understanding of our immigration
laws.

As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a

judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the application and
interpretation of the law.[12] When the law is sufficiently basic, as what is
involved in the present case, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.[13]
In Tugot v. Coliflores,[14] we held that judicial competence demands
that judges should be proficient in both procedural and substantive aspects of
the law. Anything less than this strict standard would subject them to
administrative sanction.
It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. [15]
Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge
punishable by either dismissal from the service, suspension from office or a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
We believe that an imposition of P30,000.00 fine upon respondent
judge is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is
ordered to pay a FINE of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) upon
notice.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal
informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as
respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among
other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the
"Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the
1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect,
petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft
and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177
were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner
Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly
Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177
insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and
resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September
1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be
filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again,
petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due
course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a
comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering
respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the
Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the
Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon
Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8
December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for
an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period
within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as partyrespondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs.
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation

therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective

immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of
the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578,
and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite
in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the
acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information
against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation
to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner
annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto,
which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily
Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court
order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent
the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that
while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have
been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because
the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from

investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if
they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.

SO ORDERED.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino governmentCommissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a
trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and
that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during
election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the
voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during
election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right
of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should
be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February
1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion
within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its
Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion
thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next

day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued
the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated
to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ...
and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass
the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he
claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding
for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released
his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or
repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers
for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and
variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the
following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez
under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner
to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements

to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear
offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and
calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit
and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the
Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten
(10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of
court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily
Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position
he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him
'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988

addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served
on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE
of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an
Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things:
that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have
overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely
doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to
him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be
able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent
Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of
the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the
deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied
the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was
made "final and immediately executory.

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not
to be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on
Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will
embarass the Court;

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21dated 20 May 1988

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex

Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and
now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements
and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also
to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May

1988;

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May

1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and
addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier,
respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation
and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the
contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court.
Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with
annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline
officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator
and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which
includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental
to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of
ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons
connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish
for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon
the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in
cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both

in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the

contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority
over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which
the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for
the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct
warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar,
the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the
same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case
for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this
proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process
from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him
impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such
proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then
Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this
contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in
the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the
Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but
only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereofas well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy
demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim
any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from
acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It
also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from
sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution
has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory
upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure
under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where
the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need
for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements
ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part,
having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which
thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was
saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the
above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the
statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per
curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That
decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation
by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme
Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating
against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)."
The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision
of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent
Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases.
Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to
accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This
should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by
respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for
the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution
without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the
judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions
he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon,
the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also
totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of
the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this
Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more
than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also
ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist
from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent
Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987,
upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 870934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the
constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8)
months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against
respondent.

A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the

Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render
decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of
"cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable
charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents
of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to
respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win
show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the
subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try
to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a
wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total
effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court
into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and
distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of
the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect
discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor
and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused
persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the
conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded
as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as
intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of
the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges
'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The
Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements
made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and
willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its
critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and
lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack
against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two
(2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he
would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had

ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support

thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for
and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the
Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the
membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due
process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations,
require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain
why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent
pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the
language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process
in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it
is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt
and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps
passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the
entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it
extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act
with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due

process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be
the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made,
respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of
being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law.
Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold
up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one
obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very
difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready
and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any
imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court
revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably
be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the
disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be
assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been
held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the
exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo,
who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the
Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered
through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself
to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court
of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them
liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated,
however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the
Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages
to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case.
This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court

asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of
and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his
Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco
M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein
but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with
for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar
made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts
to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy
to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at
242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of
law saying:

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the
duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do
remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount
importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in
turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's
finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective
stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption
and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to
follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of
the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were

required by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third

Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the
mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in
a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit
filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It
that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of
the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and
illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary
injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging
and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse
on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about
respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and
that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and
filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which
Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the aboveentitled casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it
will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on
the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He
speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary
of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he
proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim
that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would
be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect.
He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not
only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss
of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact
and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also
asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any boardpetitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know

this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in
ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide
the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act
has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is
the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what
he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme
Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged
that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying
that "justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court
[was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue
the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of
this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty.
Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September
1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose
the tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns
his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible
to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it
is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has
ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications,
and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one
word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The
Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding,
through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the
boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was
dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for
Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this

Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a
violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this
very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)'
(1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by
all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the
rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the
ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and
again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City
Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all
times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of
Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press

Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his
by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and
author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of
daily newspapers in Manila:

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the
Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative action should
not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related
factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire
to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements
contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not
only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end
to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect,
I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly,
very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a
far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598;
emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him
to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily

to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before
the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he
has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been
the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726;
emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in
contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell
the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the

court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard
of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or
with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from
which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means
exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish
Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a
special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort
to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his
motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this
country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid
of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil.
at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our
case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme
Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had
made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed
above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99
Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported),
Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the
Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application
of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements
here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily
implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to
wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some
impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated
by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then
fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of
which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising
his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of
qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an

independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both
are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following
terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel
Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens
should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for
the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of
the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings
to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its
limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth
noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or
comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of
the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the
part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the
task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it
appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more
limited than that of a layman. 52

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court.

The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of
his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to
disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his
two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an
officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity
and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the
repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier
than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the

judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his
Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and
reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the
first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in
general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the
disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are
concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected
the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the

rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed

his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to
account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is
not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent
and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular.
Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in
time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez
are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily
measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is
critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the
proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have
recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by
individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent
Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in
the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the
Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be
an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez
from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court,
the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the
Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA
SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDWIN A.
HIDALGO, respondent.
R E S O LUTI O N
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001, [1] spouses
Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A.
Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath
and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a
parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly
notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc.
No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses
averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute
with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case
was estafa through falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit
executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed
of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed. [2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the
disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized
document, including an impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being
persons who were learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act,
spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of herein

respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial
register, and could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or signature
on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against
him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed
property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at
Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a
notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in
that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He
explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny
by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that
notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in
the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates
on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that
he normally required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and
made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared
before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said
he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or
about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale.
Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on
the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.
He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the
time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27,
1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to
the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the
senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a
criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report [5] it submitted to the
Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the
deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he submitted
during the investigation of the present case. [6] However, it ruled that
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to
perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry
seal and notarial register.[7] It thus recommended:

WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that

respondents commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is
commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary
public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof. [8]

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization

but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary
entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him
alone; and should not have relied on somebody else. [10]

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did
not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of
sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this
allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as
he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if
respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact
that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well
as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found

GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is
hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of
two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an
appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this
resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he

only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged
notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by
one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17, 2001[9]wherein
she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her
house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be
introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo
and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo
personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that the
spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the
IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive
respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his
duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the
secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even
the respondents signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done
by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]
ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA,
JR., respondent.
R E S O LUTI O N
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member
of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud,
deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez.
According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed
the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died
on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had
entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the
architectural and engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two
consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the
consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001
in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical
Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the
latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear
that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did
not.

In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000,

Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it
was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the
SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because
Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death,
on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled
the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that
existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According
to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed
act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD
1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other pertinent rules of the Commission on
Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were
recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,[6] the Court referred the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation
report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney
dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after
Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence
and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time
because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee
of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter
appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the
Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of
individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was
allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of
Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans. [7]
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial commission
be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year.[8]
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never
disputed complainants accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly
executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the

fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach
of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer
and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, [9] not
to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance
with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the
public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession. [10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the
respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased
father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there
guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[12] The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as
notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who
signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the
basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence
of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25,
2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that
Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his
free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated
an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act.[13] It converts a private document into a public instrument,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of
its authenticity and due execution.[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was superfluous
and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His
assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most
cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the

truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he

should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public
but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent
should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously
performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta.
Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could
not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have
foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the
very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA
Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article
171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the
transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed
Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation,
manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts,
misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of
creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated
against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial
payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the
required outputs. x x x[15]
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the
penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of
the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.