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Cagayan State University

COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES
Department of Social Sciences & Humanities
Political Science Program

NOTES & WORKBOOK

IN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW & LEGAL
HISTORY
Archimedes Carag Articulo
AB Philosophy, cum laude, University of the Philippines, Diliman
MA in Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman
Bachelor of Laws and Letters (LL.B.), University of Cagayan Valley
Master in Business Administration (MBA), University of Cagayan Valley
Doctor in Legal and Public Administration, Cagayan State University

Copyright 2017
No parts of this material may be reproduced without the express
approval of the Author. Exclusively for use of CSU. Not For Sale.

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SECTION 1
The Nature of Law
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Lawyers are typically interested in the question: What is the law on a particular issue?
This is always a local question and answers to it are bound to differ according to the
specific jurisdiction in which they are asked;
2. In contrast, the philosophy of law is interested in the general question: What is Law? This
general question about the nature of law presupposes that law is a unique social-political
phenomenon, with more or less universal characteristics that can be discerned through
philosophical analysis.
3. General jurisprudence, as this philosophical inquiry about the nature of law is called, is
meant to be universal. It assumes that law possesses certain features, and it possesses
them by its very nature, or essence, as law, whenever and wherever it happens to exist.
However, even if there are such universal characteristics of law, the reasons for a
philosophical interest in elucidating them remain to be explained. First, there is the sheer
intellectual interest in understanding such a complex social phenomenon which is, after
all, one of the most intricate aspects of human culture.
4. Law, however, is also a normative social practice: it purports to guide human behavior,
giving rise to reasons for action. An attempt to explain this normative, reason-giving
aspect of law is one of the main challenges of general jurisprudence.
5. These two sources of interest in the nature of law are closely linked. Law is not the only
normative domain in our culture; morality, religion, social conventions, etiquette, and so
on, also guide human conduct in many ways which are similar to law. Therefore, part of
what is involved in the understanding of the nature of law consists in an explanation of
how law differs from these similar normative domains, how it interacts with them, and
whether its intelligibility depends on such other normative orders, like morality or social
conventions.
6. Contemporary legal theories define these two main interests in the nature of law in the
following terms.
6.1. First, we need to understand the general conditions which would render any putative
norm legally valid. Is it, for example, just a matter of the source of the norm, such as
its enactment by a particular political institution, or is it also a matter of the norm's
content? This is the general question about the conditions of legal validity (Source
versus content);
6.2. Second, there is the interest in the normative aspect of law. This philosophical
interest is twofold: A complete philosophical account of the normativity of law
comprises both an explanatory and a normative-justificatory task. The explanatory
task consists of an attempt to explain how legal norms can give rise to reasons for

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action, and what kinds of reasons are involved. The task of justification concerns the
elucidation of the reasons people ought to have for acknowledging law's normative
aspect. In other words, it is the attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law. A
theory about the nature of law, as opposed to critical theories of law, concentrates on
the first of these two questions. It purports to explain what the normativity of law
actually consists in.
7. Thus, elucidating the conditions of legal validity and explaining the normativity of law
form the two main subjects of any general theory about the nature of law:
7.1. In the course of the last few centuries, two main rival philosophical traditions have
emerged, providing different answers to these questions. The older one, dating back
to late mediaeval Christian scholarship, is called the natural law tradition. Since the
early 19th century, Natural Law theories have been fiercely challenged by the legal
positivism tradition promulgated by such scholars as Jeremy Bentham and John
Austin. The philosophical origins of Legal Positivism are much earlier, though,
probably in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes;
7.2. The main controversy between these two traditions concerns the conditions of legal
validity. Basically, Legal Positivism asserts, and Natural Law denies, that the
conditions of legal validity are purely a matter of social facts. In contrast to
Positivism, Natural Law claims that the conditions of legal validity are not exhausted
by social facts; the moral content of the putative norms also bears on their legal
validity. As the famous dictum of Saint Augustine has it: lex iniusta non est lex
(unjust law is not law).

B. EVALUATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND THE NATURE OF LAW

8. If you cannot tell what counts as a vehicle without evaluative reasoning, then
you cannot tell what law the Road Traffic Act makes merely by pointing out
physical facts (such as that there were wheels on the chicken coop) and social
facts (such as that Parliament used the word vehicle in the Act). You cannot
identify the law (that is, you cannot tell what legal rights and duties people have)
without evaluative reasoning. That conclusion, if it is sound, seems to have
important implications for the long-running debates in theory of law over the
relation between fact and value in law, and over relations between law and
morality.
9. The conclusion seems to contradict one of the most provocative and controversial
claims in the theory of law--the sources thesis, which Joseph Raz has stated as
follows:
All law is source-based. A law is source-based if its existence and content
can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any
evaluative argument. (Raz (1994) at 194-5; see entry On the Nature of
Law)
10. We can only decide whether the chicken coop was a vehicle for the purpose of
the Road Traffic Act by understanding the Act as pursuing a value, and by

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making an evaluative judgment as to whether the word vehicle can be
interpreted as applying to the chicken coop with due respect for the requirement
of certainty in criminal liability. So we cannot identify the content of the law
without resort to evaluative reasoning;
11. One way to rescue the sources thesis would be by saying that judges need to make
such evaluative judgments only in borderline cases for the application of legal
languageand that they have discretion (that is, the law provides no standard that
determines the matter) in those cases. But a clear case of a vehicle counts as a
vehicle for the purpose of the Road Traffic Act just because the evaluative
considerations that justify the use of the word vehicle in that context clearly
support its application. The sources thesis seems to be contradicted even in the
clearest cases of the application of a law stated in descriptive language. The
content of such laws can only be identified on the basis of an evaluative judgment
as to how the purposes of the law ought to be conceived. That form of evaluation,
you may say, can only be carried out by engaging in the very same form of
reasoning that, in Raz's theory, law excludes;
12. It is certainly true that, in order to decide what the sources have directed (and
thereby, in Raz's terms, to identify the existence and content of a law), you need
to understand the sense in which a word like vehicle is used. But the existence
and content of the offence can still be identified without first judging whether it
ought to be an offence to do what Mr.Burr did, or whether there ought to be any
offence at all of driving without pneumatic tires. The sources thesis articulates
this important insight: in English law, there was no offence of driving without
pneumatic tires, until Parliament acted to create it. Parliament might not have
done so;
13. Moreover, if the institutions of the law had not been prepared to treat the chicken
coop as a vehicle, then because of that social fact, it would have been false (after a
decision with precedential effect) to say that it was an offence to pull a chicken
coop on iron wheels on the road. Because law is systematic (in the respect that the
law gives legal institutions authority to identify the law), the courts' decisions
determine legal rights and obligations;
14. Raz's explanation of the nature of law is not undermined by the fact that
evaluative judgments are necessary in order to identify the content of the law, as
long as it is still possible for legal directives to have the exclusionary force that, in
his theory of authority, they claim. The sources thesis is not undermined as long
as the court in Garner v Burr can decide whether it is an offence to pull a chicken
coop on wheels without pneumatic tires, without answering the question, should
it be an offence to use a vehicle without pneumatic tires? And indeed the court
can do so. But it needs to ask the related question: what is the relevant sense of
"vehicle" for the purposes of this Act? It is what Parliament did that determines
Lawrence Burr's liability; it may take evaluative reasoning to answer the question
of social fact, what did Parliament prohibit?

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C. THE EXISTENCE AND SOURCES OF LAW

15. Every human society has some form of social order, some way of marking and
encouraging approved behavior, deterring disapproved behavior, and resolving
disputes.
16. What then is distinctive of societies with legal systems and, within those societies,
of their law? Before exploring some positivist answers, it bears emphasizing that
these are not the only questions worth asking. While an understanding of the
nature of law requires an account of what makes law distinctive, it also requires
an understanding of what it has in common with other forms of social control.
Some Marxists are positivists about the nature of law while insisting that its
distinguishing characteristics matter less than its role in replicating and facilitating
other forms of domination.
17. They think that the specific nature of law casts little light on their primary
concerns. But one can hardly know that in advance; it depends on what the nature
of law actually is;
18. According to Bentham and Austin, law is a phenomenon of large societies with a
sovereign: a determinate person or group who have supreme and absolute de facto
power -- they are obeyed by all or most others but do not themselves similarly
obey anyone else.
18.1.

The laws in that society are a subset of the sovereign's commands: general
orders that apply to classes of actions and people and that are backed up
by threat of force or sanction. This imperatival theory is positivist, for it
identifies the existence of legal systems with patterns of command and
obedience that can be ascertained without considering whether the
sovereign has a moral right to rule or whether his commands are
meritorious.

18.2.

It has two other distinctive features.

a) The theory is monistic: it represents all laws as having a single form,
imposing obligations on their subjects, though not on the sovereign
himself. The imperativalist acknowledges that ultimate legislative
power may be self-limiting, or limited externally by what public
opinion will tolerate, and also that legal systems contain provisions
that are not imperatives (for example, permissions, definitions, and so
on). But they regard these as part of the non-legal material that is
necessary for, and part of, every legal system. (Austin is a bit more
liberal on this point).

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b) The theory is also reductivist, for it maintains that the normative
language used in describing and stating the law -- talk of authority,
rights, obligations, and so on -- can all be analyzed without remainder
in non-normative terms, ultimately as concatenations of statements
about power and obedience.
19. Imperatival theories are now without influence in legal philosophy. What survives
of their outlook is the idea that legal theory must ultimately be rooted in some
account of the political system, an insight that came to be shared by all major
positivists. Their particular conception of a society under a sovereign commander,
however, is friendless. It is clear that in complex societies there may be no one
who has all the attributes of sovereignty, for ultimate authority may be divided
among organs and may itself be limited by law.
20. Moreover, even when sovereignty is not being used in its legal sense it is
nonetheless a normative concept.
20.1. A legislator is one who has authority to make laws, and not merely
someone with great social power and it is doubtful that habits of
obedience is a candidate reduction for explaining authority. Obedience is a
normative concept. To distinguish it from coincidental compliance we need
something like the idea of subjects being oriented to, or guided by, the
commands. Explicating this will carry us far from the power-based notions
with which classical positivism hoped to work.
20.2. The imperativalists' account of obligation is also subject to decisive
objections (Hart, 1994, pp. 26-78; and Hacker). Treating all laws as
commands conceals important differences in their social functions, in the
ways they operate in practical reasoning, and in the sort of justifications to
which they are liable. For instance, laws conferring the power to marry
command nothing; they do not obligate people to marry, or even to marry
according to the prescribed formalities. Nor is reductivism any more
plausible here: we speak of legal obligations when there is no probability of
sanctions being applied and when there is no provision for sanctions (as in
the duty of the highest courts to apply the law).
20.3. Moreover, we take the existence of legal obligations to be a reason for
imposing sanctions, not merely a consequence of it.
21. Hans Kelsen retains the imperativalists' monism but abandons their reductivism.
On his view, law is characterized by a basic form and basic norm.
21.1. The form of every law is that of a conditional order, directed at the courts,
to apply sanctions if a certain behavior (the delict) is performed. On this
view, law is an indirect system of guidance: it does not tell subjects what
to do; it tells officials what to do to its subjects under certain conditions.
Thus, what we ordinarily regard as the legal duty not to steal is for Kelsen
merely a logical correlate of the primary norm which stipulates a sanction
for stealing (1945, p. 61). The objections to imperatival monism apply also

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to this more sophisticated version: the reduction misses important facts,
such as the point of having a prohibition on theft. (The courts are not
indifferent between, on the one hand, people not stealing and, on the other,
stealing and suffering the sanctions.) But in one respect the conditional
sanction theory is in worse shape than is imperativalism, for it has no
principled way to fix on the delict as the duty-defining condition of the
sanction -- that is but one of a large number of relevant antecedent
conditions, including the legal capacity of the offender, the jurisdiction of
the judge, the constitutionality of the offense, and so forth. Which among
all these is the content of a legal duty?
21.2.

Kelsen's most important contribution lies in his attack on reductivism and

his doctrine of the basic norm. He maintains that law is normative and
must understood as such. Might does not make right -- not even legal right
-- so the philosophy of law must explain the fact that law is taken to
impose obligations on its subjects. Moreover, law is a normative system:
Law is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having the
kind of unity we understand by a system (1945, p. 3).
a) For the imperativalists, the unity of a legal system consists in the fact
that all its laws are commanded by one sovereign. For Kelsen, it
consists in the fact that they are all links in one chain of authority. For
example, a by-law is legally valid because it is created by a
corporation lawfully exercising the powers conferred on it by the
legislature, which confers those powers in a manner provided by the
constitution, which was itself created in a way provided by an earlier
constitution.
b) But what about the very first constitution, historically speaking? Its
authority, says Kelsen, is presupposed. The condition for
interpreting any legal norm as binding is that the first constitution is
validated by the following basic norm: the original constitution is
to be obeyed.
c) Now, the basic norm cannot be a legal norm -- we cannot fully explain
the bindingness of law by reference to more law. Nor can it be a social
fact, for Kelsen maintains that the reason for the validity of a norm
must always be another norm -- no ought from is. It follows, then, that
a legal system must consist of norms all the way down. It bottoms in a
hypothetical, transcendental norm that is the condition of the
intelligibility of any (and all) other norms as binding.
d) To presuppose this basic norm is not to endorse it as good or just -presupposition is a cognitive stance only -- but it is, Kelsen thinks, the
necessary precondition for a non-reductivist account of law as a
normative system.
e) There are many difficulties with this, not least of which is the fact that
if we are willing to tolerate the basic norm as a solution it is not clear
why we thought there was a problem in the first place. One cannot say

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both that the basic norm is the norm presupposing which validates all
inferior norms and also that an inferior norm is part of the legal system
only if it is connected by a chain of validity to the basic norm. We
need a way into the circle.
f) Moreover, it draws the boundaries of legal systems incorrectly. The
Canadian Constitution of 1982 was lawfully created by an Act of the
U.K. Parliament, and on that basis Canadian law and English law
should be parts of a single legal system, rooted in one basic norm:
The (first) U.K. constitution is to be obeyed. Yet no English law is
binding in Canada, and a purported repeal of the Constitution Act by
the U.K. would be without legal effect in Canada.
22. If law cannot ultimately be grounded in force, or in law, or in a presupposed
norm, on what does its authority rest? The most influential solution is now H.L.A.
Hart's.
22.1. His solution resembles Kelsen's in its emphasis on the normative
foundations of legal systems, but Hart rejects Kelsen's transcendentalist,
Kantian view of authority in favor of an empirical, Weberian one. For Hart,
the authority of law is social.
22.2. The ultimate criterion of validity in a legal system is neither a legal norm
nor a presupposed norm, but a social rule that exists only because it is
actually practiced.
22.3. Law ultimately rests on custom: customs about who shall have the
authority to decide disputes, what they shall treat as binding reasons for
decision, i.e. as sources of law, and how customs may be changed.
22.4. Of these three secondary rules, as Hart calls them, the sourcedetermining rule of recognition is most important, for it specifies the
ultimate criteria of validity in the legal system.
22.5. It exists only because it is practiced by officials, and it is not only the
recognition rule (or rules) that best explains their practice, it is rule to
which they actually appeal in arguments about what standards they are
bound to apply. Hart's account is therefore conventionalist: ultimate legal
rules are social norms, although they are neither the product of express
agreement.
22.6. Thus for Hart too the legal system is norms all the way down, but at its root
is a social norm that has the kind of normative force that customs have. It is
a regularity of behavior towards which officials take the internal point of
view: they use it as a standard for guiding and evaluating their own and
others' behavior, and this use is displayed in their conduct and speech,
including the resort to various forms of social pressure to support the rule
and the ready application of normative terms such as duty and
obligation when invoking it.
23. It is an important feature of Hart's account that the rule of recognition is an
official custom, and not a standard necessarily shared by the broader community.

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23.1. If the imperativalists' picture of the political system was pyramidal power,
Hart's is more like Weber's rational bureaucracy. Law is normally a
technical enterprise, characterized by a division of labor. Ordinary subjects'
contribution to the existence of law may therefore amount to no more than
passive compliance.
23.2. Thus, Hart's necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal
system are that those rules of behavior which are valid according to the
system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and ... its
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of
change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behavior by its officials.
23.3. And this division of labour is not a normatively neutral fact about law; it is
politically charged, for it sets up the possibility of law becoming remote
from the life of a society, a hazard to which Hart is acutely alert.
24. Although Hart introduces the rule of recognition through a speculative
anthropology of how it might emerge in response to certain deficiencies in a
customary social order, he is not committed to the view that law is a cultural
achievement.
24.1. To the contrary, the idea that legal order is always a good thing, and that
societies without it are deficient, is a familiar element of many antipositivist views. The objection embraces the error it seeks to avoid. It
imperialistically assumes that it is always a bad thing to lack law, and then
makes a dazzling inference from ought to is: if it is good to have law, then
each society must have it, and the concept of law must be adjusted to show
that it does. If one thinks that law is a many splendored thing, one will be
tempted by a very wide concept of law, for it would seem improper to
charge others with missing out. Positivism simply releases the harness.
Law is a distinctive form of political order, not a moral achievement, and
whether it is necessary or even useful depends entirely on its content and
context. Societies without law may be perfectly adapted to their
environments, missing nothing;
25. A positivist account of the existence and content of law, along any of the above
lines, offers a theory of the validity of law in one of the two main senses of that
term. Kelsen says that validity is the specific mode of existence of a norm.
25.1. An invalid marriage is not a special kind of marriage having the property
of invalidity; it is not a marriage at all. In this sense a valid law is one that
is systemically valid in the jurisdiction - it is part of the legal system.
25.2. This is the question that positivists answer by reference to social sources.
It is distinct from the idea of validity as moral propriety, i.e. a sound
justification for respecting the norm. For the positivist, this depends on its
merits.
25.3. One indication that these senses differ is that one may know that a society
has a legal system, and know what its laws are, without having any idea
whether they are morally justified. For example, one may know that the

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law of ancient Athens included the punishment of ostracism without
knowing whether it was justified, because one does not know enough
about its effects, about the social context, and so forth.
26. No legal positivist argues that the systemic validity of law establishes its moral
validity, i.e. that it should be obeyed by subjects or applied by judges. Even
Hobbes, to whom this view is sometimes ascribed, required that law actually be
able to keep the peace, failing which we owe it nothing.
27. Bentham and Austin, as utilitarians, hold that such questions always turn on the
consequences and both acknowledge that disobedience is therefore sometimes
fully justified.
28. Kelsen insists that The science of law does not prescribe that one ought to obey
the commands of the creator of the constitution (1967, p. 204). Hart thinks that
there is only a prima facie duty to obey, grounded in and thus limited by fairness - so there is no obligation to unfair or pointless laws (Hart 1955).
29. Raz goes further still, arguing that there isn't even a prima facie duty to obey the
law, not even in a just state (Raz 1979, pp. 233-49). The peculiar accusation that
positivists believe the law is always to be obeyed is without foundation. Hart's
own view is that an overweening deference to law consorts more easily with
theories that imbue it with moral ideals, permitting an enormous overvaluation of
the importance of the bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of law, as
if this, once declared, was conclusive of the final moral question: Ought this law
to be obeyed? (Hart 1958, p. 75)

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Worksheet No. 1
Introduction to Law and Legal History

Name: ______________________________________________

Answer the following questions clearly, with reasons, and comprehensively:

1. Do you think it is possible for communities to exist without laws? (5 points)
2. What is the difference between a lawyer and a Philosopher of Law? Based on
your reading of this Section, do you agree with the proposition that Lawyers
should be Philosophers of Law? (10 points)
3. Discuss H.L.A. Harts solution to the problem that if law cannot ultimately be
grounded in force, or in law, or in a presupposed norm, on what does its authority
rest? (5 points)
4. Hart thinks that there is only a prima facie duty to obey, grounded in and thus
limited by fairness -- so there is no obligation to unfair or pointless laws. Do you
agree? Provide illustrative cases based on your experience. (5 points)
5. Why do you think that the study of law is important for your course? Illustrate.

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Section 2
Understanding Public and Private Law
1. The law affects every aspect of our lives; it governs our conduct from the cradle
to the grave and its influence even extends from before our birth to after our
death.
2. We live in a society which has developed a complex body of rules to control the
activities of its members. There are laws which govern working conditions (e.g.
by laying down minimum standards of health and safety), laws which regulate
leisure pursuits (e.g. by banning alcohol on coaches and trains travelling to
football matches), and laws which control personal relationships (e.g. by
prohibiting marriage between close relatives).
3. So, what is law and how is it different from other kinds of rules? The law is a set
of rules, enforceable by the courts, which regulate the government of the state and
govern the relationship between the state and its citizens and between one citizen
and another. As individuals we encounter many rules. The rules of a particular
sport, such as the off-side rule in football, or the rules of a club, are designed to
bring order to a particular activity. Other kinds of rule may really be social
conventions, such as not speaking ill of the dead. In this case, the rule is merely
a reflection of what a community regards to be appropriate behaviour. In neither
situation would we expect the rule to have the force of law and to be enforced by
the courts.
4. There are various ways in which the law may be classified; the most important are
as follows:
4.1.
a)

Public and private law

Public law. Public law is concerned with the relationship between the
state and its citizens. This comprises several specialist areas such as:
1) Constitutional law. Constitutional law is concerned with the
workings of the British constitution. It covers such matters as
the position of the Crown, the composition and procedures of
Parliament, the functioning of central and local government,
citizenship and the civil liberties of individual citizens;
2)

Administrative law. There has been a dramatic increase in the

activities of government during the last hundred years.
Schemes have been introduced to help ensure a minimum
standard of living for everybody. Government agencies are
involved, for example, in the provision of a state retirement
pension, income support and child benefit. A large number of

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disputes arise from the administration of these schemes and a
body of law, administrative law, has developed to deal with the
complaints of individuals against the decisions of the
administering agency;
3)

b)

Criminal law. Certain kinds of wrongdoing pose such a serious

threat to the good order of society that they are considered
crimes against the whole community. The criminal law makes
such anti-social behaviour an offence against the state and
offenders are liable to punishment. The state accepts
responsibility for the detection, prosecution and punishment of
offenders.

Private law. Private law is primarily concerned with the rights and duties
of individuals towards each other. The states involvement in this area of
law is confined to providing a civilised method of resolving the dispute
that has arisen. Thus, the legal process is begun by the aggrieved citizen
and not by the state. Private law is also called civil law and is often
contrasted with criminal law.

4.2.Criminal and civil law. Legal rules are generally divided into two categories:
criminal and civil. It is important to understand the nature of the division because
there are fundamental differences in the purpose, procedures and terminology of
each branch of law.
a) Criminal law. The criminal law is concerned with forbidding certain forms
of wrongful conduct and punishing those who engage in the prohibited
acts. Criminal proceedings are normally brought in the name of the People
of the Republic of the Philippines and are called prosecutions. In criminal
cases you have a prosecutor who prosecutes a defendant in the criminal
courts. The consequences of being found guilty are so serious that the
standard of proof is higher than in civil cases: the allegations of criminal
conduct must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution is
successful, the defendant is found guilty (convicted) and may be
punished by the courts. Punishments available to the court include
imprisonment, fines, or community orders such as an unpaid work
requirement. If the prosecution is unsuccessful, the defendant is found not
guilty (acquitted);
b) Civil law. The civil law deals with the private rights and obligations which
arise between individuals. The purpose of the action is to remedy the
wrong that has been suffered. Enforcement of the civil law is the
responsibility of the individual who has been wronged; the states role is
to provide the procedure and the courts necessary to resolve the dispute. In
civil proceedings a claimant sues a defendant in the civil courts. The
claimant will be successful if he can prove his case on the balance of
probabilities, i.e. the evidence weighs more in favour of the claimant than

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the defendant. If the claimant wins his action, the defendant is said to be
liable and the court will order an appropriate remedy, such as damages
(financial compensation) or an injunction (an order to do or not do
something). If the claimant is not successful, the defendant is found not
liable.
5. The distinction between the criminal and civil law does not depend on the nature
of the wrongful act, because the same act may give rise to both civil and criminal
proceedings.

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Worksheet No. 2
Introduction to Law and Legal History

Name: ______________________________________________

Answer the following questions clearly, with reasons, and comprehensively:

1. What is law and why is it necessary?
2. Explain the difference between the following pairs:
a) Public law and private law;
b) Civil law and criminal law;
c) Contract and tort;
d) Common law and equity;
e) Ownership and possession.

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Section 3
Understanding Common Law
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Common law and equity. Legal rules may also be classified according to
whether they form part of the common law or equity. The distinction between
these two systems of law is rooted in history and can only be understood properly
by examining the origins of English law. English legal development can be traced
back to 1066 when William of Normandy gained the crown of England by
defeating King Harold at the Battle of Hastings. Before the arrival of the Normans
in 1066 there really was no such thing as English law. The Anglo-Saxon legal
system was based on the local community.
2. Each area had its own courts in which local customs were applied. The Norman
Conquest did not have an immediate effect on English law; indeed, William
promised the English that they could keep their customary laws. The Normans
were great administrators and they soon embarked on a process of centralisation,
which created the right climate for the evolution of a uniform system of law for
the whole country.
B. THE COMMON LAW
1. The Norman kings ruled with the help of the most important and powerful men in
the land who formed a body known as the Curia Regis (Kings Council). This
assembly carried out a number of functions: it acted as a primitive legislature,
performed administrative tasks and exercised certain judicial powers. The
meetings of the Curia Regis came to be of two types: occasional assemblies
attended by the barons and more frequent but smaller meetings of royal officials.
These officials began to specialise in certain types of work and departments were
formed. This trend eventually led to the development of courts to hear cases of a
particular kind. The courts which had emerged by the end of the 13th century
became known as the Courts of Common Law and they sat at Westminster. The
first to appear was the Court of Exchequer. It dealt with taxation disputes but later
extended its jurisdiction to other civil cases. The Court of Common Pleas was the
next court to be established. It heard disputes of a civil nature between one citizen
and another. The Court of Kings Bench, the last court to appear, became the most
important of the three courts because of its close association with the king.
2. Its jurisdiction included civil and criminal cases and it developed a supervisory
function over the activities of inferior courts.

P a g e | 17
3. The Normans exercised central control by sending representatives of the king
from Westminster to all parts of the country to check up on the local
administration.
4. At first these royal commissioners performed a number of tasks: they made
records of land and wealth, collected taxes and adjudicated in disputes brought
before them.
5. Their judicial powers gradually became more important than their other functions.
To begin with, these commissioners (or justices) applied local customary law at
the hearings, but in time local customs were replaced by a body of rules applying
to the whole country. When they had completed their travels round the country,
the justices returned to Westminster where they discussed the customs they had
encountered. By a gradual process of sifting these customs, rejecting those which
were unreasonable and accepting those which were not, they formed a uniform
pattern of law throughout England. Thus, by selecting certain customs and
applying them in all future similar cases, the common law of England was
created.
6. A civil action at common law was begun with the issue of a writ which was
purchased from the offices of the Chancery, a department of the Curia Regis
under the control of the Chancellor. Different kinds of action were covered by
different writs. The procedural rules and type of trial varied with the nature of the
writ. It was essential that the correct writ was chosen, otherwise the claimant
would not be allowed to proceed with his action.
C. EQUITY
7. Over a period of time the common law became a very rigid system of law and in
many cases it was impossible to obtain justice from the courts. The main defects
of the common law were as follows:
7.1.
The common law failed to keep pace with the needs of an increasingly
complex society. The writ system was slow to respond to new types of action.
If a suitable writ was not available, an injured party could not obtain a
remedy, no matter how just his claim.
7.2.
The writ system was very complicated, but trivial mistakes could defeat a
claim.
7.3.
The only remedy available in the common law courts was an award of
damages. This was not always a suitable or adequate remedy.
7.4.
Men of wealth and power could overawe a court, and there were
complaints of bribery and intimidation of jurors.
8. It became the practice of aggrieved citizens to petition the king for assistance. As
the volume of petitions increased, the king passed them to the Curia Regis and a
committee was set up to hear the petitions. The hearings were presided over by
the Chancellor and in time petitions were addressed to him alone. By the 15th

P a g e | 18
century the Chancellor had started to hear petitions on his own distinct legal
systems and the Court of Chancery was established.
9. The body of rules applied by the court was called equity. The early Chancellors
were drawn from the ranks of the clergy and their decisions reflected their
ecclesiastical background. They examined the consciences of the parties and then
ordered what was fair and just. At first, each Chancellor acted as he thought best.
Decisions varied from Chancellor to Chancellor and this resulted in a great deal of
uncertainty for petitioners. Eventually, Chancellors began to follow previous
decisions and a large body of fixed rules grew up. The decisions of the Court of
Chancery were often at odds with those made in the common law courts. This
proved a source of conflict until the start of the 17th century when James I ruled
that, in cases of conflict, equity was to prevail. For several centuries the English
legal system continued to develop with two distinct sets of rules administered in
separate courts.
10. Equity is not a complete system of law. Equitable principles were formulated to
remedy specific defects in the common law. They were designed to complement
the common law rules and not to replace them. Equity has made an important
contribution to the development of English law, particularly in the following
areas:
10.1. Recognition of new rights. The common law did not recognise the
concept of the trust. A trust arises where a settlor (S) conveys property to a
trustee (T) to hold on trust for a beneficiary (B). The common law treated
T as if he were the owner of the property and Bs claims were ignored.
The Court of Chancery, however, would require T to act according to his
conscience and administer the trust on Bs behalf. Thus, equity recognised
and enforced the rights of a beneficiary under a trust. The Court of
Chancery also came to the aid of borrowers who had mortgaged their
property as security for a loan. If the loan was not repaid by the agreed
date, the common law position was that the lender (mortgagee) became the
owner of the property and the borrower (mortgagor) was still required to
pay the outstanding balance. Equity gave the mortgagor the right to pay
off the loan and recover his property even though the repayment date had
passed. This equitable principle is known as the equity of redemption;
10.2.

Introduction of new remedies. The new equitable rights were enforced

by means of new equitable remedies. In the field of contract law, the Court
of Chancery developed such remedies as the injunction, specific
performance, rescission and rectification. These remedies were not
available as of right like common law remedies: they were discretionary.
The Court of Chancery could refuse to grant an equitable remedy if, for
example, the claimant had himself acted unfairly. By the 19th century the
administration of justice had reached an unhappy state of affairs and was
heavily criticised. The existence of separate courts for the administration
of common law and equity meant that someone who wanted help from

P a g e | 19
both the common law and equity had to bring two separate cases in two
separate courts. If a person started an action in the wrong court, he could
not get a remedy until he brought his case to the right court.
10.3.

The proceedings in the Court of Chancery had become notorious for their
length and expense. Comprehensive reform of the many deficiencies of
the English legal system was effected by several statutes in the 19th
century culminating in the Judicature Acts 187375. The separate
common law courts and Court of Chancery were replaced by a Supreme
Court of Judicature which comprised the Court of Appeal and High Court.

10.4.

Every judge was empowered thenceforth to administer both common law

and equity in his court. Thus, a claimant seeking a common law and an
equitable remedy need only pursue one action in one court. The Acts also
confirmed that, where common law and equity conflict, equity should
prevail. These reforms did not have the effect of removing the distinction
between the two sets of rules: common law and equity are still two
separate but complementary systems of law. A judge may draw upon both
sets of rules to decide a case.

D. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL LIABILITY

11. Before we consider the specific areas of law governing the activities of business
organisations, we must first of all consider the branches of law which are most
likely to affect those in business and certain basic principles of liability;
12. It is a basic function of the law to set out the circumstances in which a person may
be required to answer for his actions. Legal liability describes a situation where a
person is legally responsible for a breach of an obligation imposed by the law.
Such obligations may arise from the operation of either the civil or criminal law.
The activities of business organisations are subject to a wide range of potential
liability. So, before we consider the law governing the formation, operation and
dissolution of business organisations, we must first examine in outline the nature
and scope of legal liability for wrongful acts.
13. CIVIL LIABILITY
13.1. As we have already seen, the civil law is concerned with the rights and
duties which arise between private individuals. The aim of taking legal
action is to put right a wrong which has occurred, often by means of an
award of compensation;
13.2. The areas of civil liability which have the greatest impact on businesses are
liability in contract and tort.

P a g e | 20
14. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
14.1. Contractual liability arises when two or more persons enter into a legally
enforceable agreement with each other;
14.2. The law of contract is concerned with determining which agreements are
binding, the nature and extent of the obligations freely undertaken by the
parties and the legal consequences of breaking contractual promises.
15. TORTIOUS LIABILITY
15.1.

A tort consists of the breach of a duty imposed by the law;

15.2.

The law of tort seeks to compensate the victims of certain forms of

harmful conduct by an award of damages or to prevent harm occurring by
granting an injunction. Examples of torts include negligence, nuisance,
trespass, defamation (libel and slander) and conversion.

16. CRIMINAL LIABILITY

16.1.

A crime is an offence against the state. The consequences of a criminal

conviction are not confined to the punishment inflicted by the court. For
example, if a person is convicted of theft, his name will probably appear in
the local papers causing shame and embarrassment and he may even lose
his job.

16.2.

The sanctions are so severe that the criminal law normally requires an
element of moral fault on the part of the offender. Thus, the prosecution
must establish two essential requirements: actus reus (prohibited act) and
mens rea (guilty mind);

16.3.

For most criminal offences, both elements must be present to create

criminal liability. If you pick someones umbrella up thinking that it is
your own, you cannot be guilty of theft, because of the absence of a guilty
mind;

16.4.

There are, however, some statutory offences where Parliament has

dispensed with the requirement of mens rea. Performance of the wrongful
act alone makes the offender liable;

16.5.

These are known as crimes of strict liability. Violations of the

Procurement Law is an example.

P a g e | 21
17. LAW OF PROPERTY
17.1.

The law of property is concerned with the rights which may arise in
relation to anything that can be owned. Thus, property covers land, goods
and intangible rights such as debts, patents or the goodwill of a business.

17.2.

It is necessary to consider the relationships which may arise between

persons and property, namely, the rights of ownership and possession:
a)

Ownership. Ownership describes the greatest rights that a person can

have in relation to property. An owner enjoys the fullest powers of
use and disposal over the property allowed by law. The owner of this
book, for example, has the right to read it, lend it to a friend, hire it
out, pledge it as security for a loan, or even tear it into shreds. An
owner does not enjoy absolute rights; restrictions may be imposed to
protect the rights of other members of the community. The ownership
of a house does not entitle the occupants to hold frequent wild parties
to the annoyance of neighbours;

b)

Possession. Possession consists of two elements: physical control and

the intention to exclude others. For example, you have possession of
the watch you are wearing, the clothes in your wardrobe at home and
your car which is parked while you are at work. Ownership and
possession often go hand in hand, but may be divorced. The viewer of
a hired TV enjoys possession of the set, but ownership remains with
the TV rental firm. If your house is burgled, you remain the owner of
the stolen property, but the burglar obtains (unlawful) possession.

P a g e | 22

Worksheet No. 3
Introduction to Law and Legal History

Name: ______________________________________________

Answer the following questions clearly, with reasons, and comprehensively:

1. In punishing violators of criminal law, why do we normally requires an

element of moral fault on the part of the offender? Explain the two essential
requirements which must be established first by the prosecution before one
may be convicted for violating criminal law;
2. When is men rea not required to establish guilt in violating penal/criminal
laws? Provide examples.

P a g e | 23

Section 4
Law and Its Application
A. COURTS DUTY TO DECIDE EVERY CASE1
1.

A judgment cannot decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity

or insufficiency of the laws. In other words, he must decide the case assigned to
him whether or not he knows what law shall be applied. In case of silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, a judgment may still be guided by the
following:
a) Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or public policy;
b) Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases;
c) Legal opinions of qualified writers and professors;
d) General principles of justice and equity; and
e) Rules of statutory construction.

2.

In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no crime when

there is no law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE. If there is no law,
therefore, which punishes an act complained of, the judge must dismiss the case.

B. INTERPRETATIONS OF LAWS
3. It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without the fear or favor. In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
4. There are many rules of statutory construction but in order not to saddle and
confuse the beginner in the study of law, it is enough in the meantime to know the
most basic rules, namely:
a) When the law and its meaning is clear and unmistakable, there is no need
to interpret it any further;
b) When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court should interpret
the law according to the meaning the legislature intended to give it;
c) If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which will be
achieve the ends desired by Congress should be adopted;
d) Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding;
e) In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws and when all
other rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.

Suarez, Rolando A. Introduction to Law, 2009.

P a g e | 24
C. APPLICATION OF LAWS
5. In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and purpose of the
legislature. If that intent and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is duty
of the court to carry out that intention. If the same cannot be discovered within the
law, the court shall be guided by extrinsic aids.
D. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE AND EFFECT
6. Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly for in the law.
E. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERPRETATION
7. Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent. A distinction, however, has been drawn
between construction and interpretation.
8. One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself,
while one who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside the
written language of the law. Based on this distinction, the basic rule therefore is
ONE MUST INTERPRET FIRST BEFORE HE CONTRUES.
F. MEANING OF THE RULE: ONE MUST INTERPRET FIRST BEFORE
HE CONSTRUES
9. In trying to ascertain the legislative intent, courts should first be guided by
intrinsic aids, or those found in the law itself.
10. If the legislative intent could be ascertained by merely making use of intrinsic
aids, there is no need to make use of extrinsic aids, or those found outside of the
written language of the law. This is the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court in
a long line of cases.
G. INTRINSIC AIDS DISTINGUISHED FROM EXTRINSIC AIDS
11. Intrinsic aids are any of the following: title, preamble, words, phrases and
sentences context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; and legislative
definitions and interpretation clauses. All of these are found in the law itself.
12. Extrinsic aids may consist of contemporaneous circumstances, policy, legislative
history of the statute, contemporaneous or practical construction, executive
construction, legislative construction, judicial construction, and construction by
the bar and legal commentators.

P a g e | 25

H. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

13. Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent.

I. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY AND NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND

CONSTRUCT?
14. WHEN NECESSARY
14.1. It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the following reasons
exists:
a) When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful or obscure when
taken in relation to a set of facts;
b) When reasonable minds disagree as to meaning of the language used in the
statute.
15. WHEN NOT NECESSSARY
15.1. It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language. The duty of the court, in such a case, is to APPLY THE
LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT.
J. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW AND WHO DETERMINES LEGISLATIVE
INTENT?

16. Anyone can interpret the law, Lawyers, policemen, arbiters, administrative boards
and agencies, government as well as private executives are involved from time to
time in the interpretation of laws. Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily
conclusive nor can they bind the courts. Hence, in many occasions, the decisions
of regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and appealed
to the Supreme Court in cases where there is abuse of discretion and authority or
when there is violation of due process or denial of substantial justice or erroneous
interpretation of the law;
17. The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the significance of a
constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural or a
municipal ordinance. It discharges a role no crucial than the roles played by the
two other departments in maintaining the rule of law. To assure stability legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. Logically and
rightly, it does so with finality through the highest judicial organ, the Supreme

P a g e | 26
Court. What it says is definite and authoritative binding on those who occupy the
lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.
K. WHICH PREVAILS THE LETTER OF THE LAW OR THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAW?
18. When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the courts duty is to
apply it, not to interpret it. The Supreme Court in the case of Chartered Bank
Employees Association vs Ople, G.R. No. 44747, August 28, 1985, restated the
said rule in more elaborate language. It said: If the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, then the read the law to mean exactly what it says. If not, look
for the intention of the legislature
19. What if the letter of the law conflicts with its spirit, which prevails?
20. There are two schools of thought on his matter. In the case of People vs. Sales, et
al., G.R. No. 66469, July 29, 1986, Justice Isagani Cruz articulated his thought on
this matter. He said: A too literal reading of the law is apt to constrict rather than
fulfill is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth, which is not really evanescent or elusive. Judges must look beyond and
be bound by the language of the law seeking to discover by their own lights the
reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That they may properly apply in
accordance to its ends, they need and must use not only learning but also vision.
21. The thinking of Justice Isagani Cruz is more in line with Article 10 of the Civil
Code which says:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also the
gist of the decisions of the Supreme Court on the old cases of Torres vs. Limhays,
56 Phil. 141, De Coster vs. Olondriz and Esendero, 50 Phil. 725 and in the
celebrated case of Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo, et al.
22. Former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino on the other hand, finds it risky to rely on
the so-called spirit of the law. He said: It is dangerous to rely on the so-called
spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and about which we do not know
very much.
L. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION USE INTRINSIC AIDS
BEFORE RESORTING TO EXTRINSIC AIDS
23. In determining the intention of the legislature, courts should resort first to intrinsic
aids before resorting to extrinsic aids.

P a g e | 27
24. INTRINSIC AIDS are any of the following: title; preamble; the words, phrases
and sentences context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; legislative
definition and interpretation clauses.
24.1. TITLE. That which expresses the subject matter of the law. It
can help in the construction of statutes but it is not controlling and
not entitled to much weight.
24.2. PREAMBLE. That part of the statute following the title and
preceding the enacting clause which states the reasons or the
objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers, or
cure inherent defects in the statue.
24.3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES CONTEXT. The
intention of the legislature must primarily be determined words,
phrases and sentences used therein. The meaning of the law
should, however, be taken from any single part, portion or section
or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences used.
24.4. PUNCTUATION. It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the
intelligible meaning of the written word. However, if the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable
and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as
an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words thus punctuated.
24.5. HEADINGS AND MARGINAL NOTES. If the meaning of the
statute is clear or if the text of the statute is clear they will prevail
as against the headings especially if the heading have been
prepared by compilers and not by the legislature.
24.6. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION. If
the legislature has defined the words used in the used in the statute
and has declared the construction to be placed thereon, such
definition or construction should be followed by the courts. The
rules are as follows:
a) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be
constructed or interpreted in a certain manner, the courts
should follow such instruction.
b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the
legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute considered in
its totality, the latter shall prevail.
c) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in
which it is first defined.
d) Legislative definition of similar terms in other statutes may
be resorted to EXCEPT where a particular expressly declares
that its definition there in is limited in application to the
statutes in which they appear.
25. EXTRINSIC AIDS are of the following contemporaneous circumstances, policy,
legislative history of the statute, contemporaneous or practical construction,
legislative construction, judicial construction by the bar and legal commentators.

P a g e | 28
Extrinsic aids can be resorted to only after the intrinsic aids have been used and
exhausted.
25.1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES These are the
conditions existing at the time the law was enacted:
a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law was
enacted;
b) Previous state of the law;
c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and
d) The customs and usages of the people.
The above-mentioned circumstances constitute the reasons why the law
was enacted. Hence, the one interpreting the law should place himself in
the position and circumstances of those who used the words in question and
be able to feel the atmosphere, the conditions and the reasons why the law
was enacted.
25.2. POLICY The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the state
may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the intention of the legislature
in enacting the same. Hence, if a new agrarian law is enacted and few years
from now, there will arise the need to find out why such a law is enacted,
the conditions prevailing sentiment of the people, the policy of the state and
the executive order issued by the Office of the President preceding the
legislative enactment will throw light upon the intention of the legislative
in enacting said law. The same thing is true if death sentence is imposed for
drug pushers and for those currently involved in the so-called Satanism
offenses. The conditions of the times and the very destructive and heinous
crimes committed even in broad daylight, whether in the city or in the
provinces, will convince future interpreters of the law that such a penalty is
needed to protect society.
25.3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE Such history may be
found in reports of legislative committee, in the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during a hearing, legislative investigation, or legislative
debates. Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of
construction? As a general rule, they are not appropriate aids of
construction. However, if there is unanimity among the supporters and
depositors to a bill with respect to the objective sought to be accomplished,
the debates may then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act.
25.4. CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
Those who lived at or near the time when the law was passed were more
acquainted with the conditions and the reasons why that law was enacted.
Their understanding and application of the law, especially if the same has
been continued and acquiesced by the judicial tribunals and the legal
profession, deserve to be considered by the courts.

P a g e | 29
25.5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. The construction given by the
executive department deserves great weight should be respected of said
construction has been formed and observed for long period of time. The
rules to remember are as follows:
a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contemporaneous and
practical construction made by the officers with the administration
and enforcement of the law.
b) The courts should respect that contemporaneous construction
EXCEPT if it is clearly erroneous.
c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the Chief
Legal adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist
various departments of the government charged with the duty to
administrator the law.
d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal adviser is subservient to the
ruling of the judiciary which is in charge of applying and interpreting
laws.
25.6. LEGISLATIVVE CONSTRUCTION Legislative construction is
entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot control as against
the courts prerogative to decide on what is the right or wrong
interpretation.
25.7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION It is presumed that the legislature was
acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction of former
statutes on the subject. It is also presumed that the statute was enacted had
received. With respect to a statute adopted from another state, it is
presumed that it was adopted with the construction placed upon it by
courts of that state. Should this construction be followed. It should be
followed only if it is reasonable, in harmony with justice and public policy
and consistent with the local law.
25.8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COMMENTATORS
It is presumed that the meaning publicly given a statute by the members
of the legal profession is a true one regarded as one that should not be
lightly changed. The opinion and commentaries of text writers and legal
commentators, whether they are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be
consulted as, in fact they are oftentimes cited or made as references in
court decisions.
Other Notes:
26. Intrinsic Aids Preamble, Title, Body/Context, Chapters, Sections Headings,
Punctuations, Interpretation Clause
27. Title of the Law (Charter of Manila case) or RA 954 An Act to prohibit certain
activities in connection with jai-alai. Text of the Statute RA 954 vis-a-vis The

P a g e | 30
Charter of Manila. Subtitle Defensor v. COMELEC case. Preamble Eugenio v.
Exec. Sec. Franklin Drilon (E&S Delta Village case) People v. Echavez Squatting
on Agricultural lands.

28. SIMPLICATION OF THE RULE REGARDING THE USE EXTRINSIC

AIDS
28.1. Extrinsic aids, such as those mentioned above, are entitled to respect,
consideration and weight but the courts are at liberty to decide whether
they are applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision;
28.2. Interpreter must avail first of all the intrinsic aids before going to the
intrinsic ones.
a) History of the statute
b) Opinions and Rulings of Administrative & Executing Officials
c) Proceedings of the legislative body d. Individual statements of the
congressmen culled as a whole
d) Authors of the law (separate or dissenting opinions)
1. History for enactment, reason for the passage of the bill and
purpose Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard
Special Import Tax v. Special Tax Law;
2. Opinions and Rulings of the government officials called upon
to execute or implement these laws. Misael P. Vera v.
Commissioner on Internal Revenue filled milk case PAFLU
v. NAFLU contemporaneous construction by the
implementing officials used as aid;
3. Proceedings / Deliberations of the Legislative Body De Villa v.
CA BP 22 National Police Commission v. De Guzman
early retirement of PC;
4. Individual Statements of the Congressmen on the floor do not
necessarily reflect legislative intent CASCO v. Gimenez urea
formaldehyde case;
5. Author of the Law best interpreter of the law Kilosbayan v.
Morato PCSO charter and the Davide amendment /
dissenting opinion Chapter VIII: Strict and Liberal
Interpretations;
6. Not applicable if the statute is clear and unambiguous.
29. Sutherland Guidelines in Interpretation:
29.1. Former Law on the matter
29.2. Persons & Rights which it deals with
29.3. Letter & Language of the Law
29.4. Purpose & Object

P a g e | 31

LAW
Labor Code

INTERPRETATION
CASE
Resolved in favor of labor and social Ramon Corporal v. ECC
legislation;
Manahan v. ECC

Local Government

Liberally interpreted in its favor; resolved in

favor of its devolution of powers and of the
lower local government;

Tax Laws

Strict: against
enacting it;

local

government

unit Republic v. IAC/Pastors (tax

amnesty case)

Liberal: for the taxpayer;

Tax Exemptions

Strict: against taxpayer claiming it;

Strictissimi Juris against Taxpayer

Comm. of Customs v. Manila

Electric
Misamis Oriental Traders v.
Finance Sec
Resins Inc. v. Auditor General
Comm. of Internal Revenue v.
PLDT

Civil Procedure

Liberally construed to promote the objective DSM Construction v.

of a just, speedy and inexpensive deposition CA/Megaworld
of actions and proceedings

COMELEC
Procedure

Liberally construed to promote effective &

Pahilan v. Tabalba (failure to
efficient implementation of free, orderly and appeal)
honest elections;
Just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of actions and proceedings
Will of the People not defeated by
technicalities

Penal Statutes

Strict vs. State / Liberal in favor of the Ursua v. CA (CA 142, aliases
accused
case)
Centeno v. Villalon (Solicitation case)
People v. Ladjalaam (Illegal
Poss. Firearms)
Laws Strict vs. Applicant
Chia v. Republic
Liberally in favor of the insured / Strict Finman Gen. Assurance v. CA
=Insurer
(fiesta stabbing)
Liberally construed to afford relief to the Salvador Lazo v. ECC (Security
workers in the society
Guard case)
Liberally construed to favor beneficiaries
Domingo Vicente v. ECC
(disability)
Liberally in favor of retiree for sustenance Tantuico v. Domingo (COA
and comfort
retiree)

Naturalization
Insurance Laws
Social Legislation
Social Security
Retirement Laws

P a g e | 32
30. Retrospective takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws.
Creates new obligations and imposes new duties. Attaches new disabilities in respect
to transactions already past;
31. Interpreted based on application and operation. NCC 4 Laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. Sound canon of statutory
construction is that laws operate prospectively unless the legislative intends
otherwise; made manifest by express terms or necessary implication. Depends on the
legislative intent;
32. Laws impairing vested rights are not given retrospective application (NCC 2252)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Corp
legislative intent for tax exemption;
33. Gallardo v. Borromeo RA 6389 (Disposed tenants for agricultural lands);
retroactive law. Balatbat v. CA & Domingo Pasion retroactivity expressly declared
or necessarily implied from the language used. Erectors Inc. v. NLRC Salary
dispute.
Penal Statutes

As a rule, applied
prospectively (RPC 336).
Retroactive in favor of the
accused. (RPC 22)

Albino Co v. CA (BP 22 and

Que Doctrine v. Circular 4
DOJ)
People v. Arnold Narciso
(Illegal Possesion of Firearms
not an aggravating
circumstance in this case)
People v. Ballagan Benefits
of Heinous Crimes Law
retroactive

Procedural Laws

Retroactive - Applicable to
pending
actions
and
undetermined at time of
passage.
Not given retroactivity if it
impairs substantive rights

Curative Statutes

Retroactive - Cure errors and

irregularities and
administrative proceedings.
Not retroactive if it is contrary
to the constitution and impairs

Ocampo v. CA demurrer to
evidence
Yakult & Larry Salvado v. CA

damages
case,
civil
action/criminal action
Martinez v. People motion
to litigate as pauper
Jaime Tan v. CA - procedural
law retroactive, impairs right
of redemption
Diu v. CA Pangkat
Tagapagkasundo case
Municipality of San Narciso v.
Mendez Sr. San Andres
separation issue
Briad-Agro Devt Corp. v.
Dela Cerna (Jurisdiction of

P a g e | 33
vested rights.

labor arbiters)

P a g e | 34

Section 5
Introduction Statutory Construction
A. INTRODUCTION2
1. Introduction Statutory Construction - defined as the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where the intention is rendered doubtful, among
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided by law.
Interpretation: Discovering the true meaning of the language used. Construction:
Drawing of conclusions that are beyond the direct expression of the text, from the
elements known and given.
2. The situs of construction and interpretation is the forte of the judicial department.
Requisites of Statutory Construction Actual Case or Controversy Ambiguity in
the law. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation. Director of Lands v. CA publication requirement of the law / noncompliance.3
3. The first duty of the courts it to apply the law.4
4. The duty of the courts is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy
or pity for the accused.5
5. Hermeneutics - the science and art of construction and interpretation. - A
systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the construction
and interpretation of legal writing.
6. Kinds of Interpretation:
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
6.6.

Close - literal. Narrow interpretation

Extensive liberal
Extravagant substitutes another meaning. Not genuine.
Free interpretation in good faith.
Limited influenced by other principles other than hermeneutics.
Predestined biased

7. The most common subject of interpretation are the constitution and statutes.
(Ordinances, resolutions, executive orders and department circulars.
2

Notes in Statutory Construction, Ma. Patricia F. Rebao. PLM College of Law. Freshman Year, 20092010
3
Pascual v. Pascual application of laws. When the laws are clear they do not need further interpretation.
4
People v. Mapa Illegal possession of firearms; Justice of peace not exempted.
5
People v. Amigo Life imprisonment (Dura lex, Sed lex)

P a g e | 35

8. Statutes Starts with a bill. (Draft of a proposed law) Act acted on and passed
by the legislature. How a Bill becomes a Law:
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.

8.4.
8.5.
8.6.
8.7.
8.8.
8.9.

Proposal and calendar schedule for first reading.

First reading; number and title only
Referred by the Speaker to a committee for apt study. Public hearings.
Committee submits either a positive or negative report, otherwise the bill
is dead.
Favorable action = calendar for second reading
Second reading and op0en debates for amendments.
2 calendar days before passage, bill is printed in its final form and copies
are distributed to members of the house.
Calendar date for 3rd and final reading. Voting. Majority of a quorum is
needed to pass the bill.
Passed to the Senate; 3 readings again on 3 separate days. May need
bicameral conference.
If Bicam becomes final, it will be submitted to the president for approval. /
He may veto and return it to the House, where 2/3 votes make it a law.
Mechanical Procedure in the Passage of a Bill (Constitutional
Requirements):
a) One subject only in title. - To prevent log-rolling statutes - To prevent
surprise or fraud - To fairly apprise the people.
b) Three readings in three separate days. Copies in final form must be
distributed three days before it is passed.
c) Presentation to the President, subject to approval or veto. Parts of a
Statute: 1. Title heading 2. Preamble reasons / subjects for
enactment. Whereas 3. Enacting Clause identifier as an act of
legislation. 4. Body procedural provisions and substantive parts. 5.
Repealing Clause prior statues abrogated. 6. Saving Clauserestriction in the repealing act intended to save rights, pending
proceedings form abrogation. 7. Separability Clause in the event
that one or more provisions are repealed, others would remain
effective. 8. Effectivity Clause date of effectivity.

9. Kinds of Statutes:
9.1.
General Affects the community at large.
9.2.
Special designed for a particular purpose.
9.3.
Local Operates over a particular locality.
9.4.
Public Constitutional, Admin, Criminal, International. (May be General
Local Special) .
9.5.
Private governing individuals or corporations
9.6.
Remedial means or method where cause of actions can be effectuated.
Redress and relief.
9.7.
Curative retrospective
9.8.
Penal RPC 9. Prospective only applies to cases after enactment

P a g e | 36
9.9.
9.10.

Affirmative one that declares what shall be done.

Mandatory requires cause of action

10. Vague statutes obscure on its face. Lacks comprehensible standards of common
intelligence. Repugnant because: - Violates due process for failure to accord
persons due notice of what conduct to avoid. - Leave law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions.
11. Repeals Express Repealing clause Implied Irreconcilable inconsistency /
system codifying former laws.
12. Ordinances Acts passed by a local legislative body.
13. Valid Ordinances:
13.1. Must not contravene constitution
13.2. Not unfair / oppressive
13.3. Impartial & Undiscriminatory
13.4. Regulates trade
13.5. General and consistent with public policy
13.6. Reasonable
14. Basic Guidelines in Construction and Interpretation 1. Legislative Intent object of
all interpretation and construction of statutes. - Clauses and phrases of the statue are
to be taken as a whole.
15. When the words and language of the statute is clear, it should be given its natural
meaning.
16. Language of the statute legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of the statute Socorro Ramirez v. CA wiretapping case. Features clear
intent of the law parallel to the deliberations of Congress.
17. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of the statute there should be no
departure. (Clear, unambiguous meaning) Globe Mckay v. NLRC plain meaning
rule. Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) Basbacio v. DOJ
Secretary- verba legis rule din. Compensation for pardoned criminals
18. Statute as a whole cardinal rule in stat con is to consider the statute as a whole and
not rely separately on its provisions. - Legislature is not presumed to have used
useless words. - If a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, courts
should adopt a reasonable construction that renders the statute operative. JMM
Promotions v. NLRC In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part
be given effect. Radiola Toshiba v. IAC Ut res magis valen quam pereat
(construction is it be sought which gives effect to the whole statute.)

P a g e | 37
19. Spirit and Purpose of the Law - applies if the literal meaning renders the whole
statute absurd or will have inapt. Consequences. De Guia v. COMELEC
ambiguous law. Construction should be rejected that gives a statute a purposeless
meaning. Salenillas v. CA Between 2 statutory interpretations, that which better
serves the purpose of the law should prevail. Commendador v. Camera- (Peremptory
Challenges) when the reason of the law ceases, the law ceases (Cessante ratione
legis) - Ratio legis est anima (The reason of the law is its soul)
20. Implications only necessary implications are read into the statute. Mere
desirability or plausibility. The implication must be strong that opposition cannot
take place. Chua v. Civil Service Commission (Co-terminus employee case).
Doctrine of necessary implications. Ex necessitate legis (every statutory grant of
right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental rights and privileges as well).
In eo plus sit, superinest et minus City of Manila Treas. V. Gomez Special
Education fund law tax case.
21. Casus Omissus If the statute makes specific provisions re: enumerated objects or
cases, but omits to make a provision for one, It may be omitted by inadvertence
(overlooked). These defects cannot be supplied by courts. - The Casus Omissus Rule
can apply only if the omission is clearly established. Under this rule, a person or
object omitted from an enumeration is held to have been omitted intentionally by the
legislature. People v. Manantan (Justice of Peace). Casus Omissus not applicable
since justice of peace were considered as judges.
22. Stare Decisis stability of past precedents. It is N/A if it is in violation of a law in
force. JM Tuason v. Mariano (Aquials) land dispute already settled by previous
decisions.
23. Construction & Interpretation for Words and Phrases: Ubu Lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemos when the laws do not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. - The words and phrases of a statute should be accorded its natural or
general significance. Phil. British Assurance Co. v. IAC applies the rule that a
general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts, and one part distinguished
from another, so as to justify its exclusion from the application of the law. Pilar v.
COMELEC candidate who withdrew. Failure to file statement of contributions,
sanctioned. People v. Evangelista Probation case;
24. Exceptions in the statute when the law does not make exceptions, courts should
not also; except if they have justified reasons. Cecilio de Villa v. CA BP 22.
(Refer to extrinsic aids);
25. General & Special Terms General terms /general construction unless restrained by
context or specific terms. Special Terms: expanded to general specification by
considering that the law is general. Rule: General terms may be restricted by specific
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language

P a g e | 38
which indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule is applicable to all cases,
except for one general term, all items in the enumeration fall into one specific class;
26. Colgate Palmolive v.v Auditor General Exchange Tax Law case. Stabilizers and
flavors.
27. Ejusdem Generis General terms following special terms. Broad expressions in an
act (all others /any other) are restricted usually to things of the same kind within
those mentioned in the preceding terms. Republic v. Migrinio Graft and corruption
case of AFP personnel. People v. Echavez - Squatting on agricultural lands. Misael
Vera v. Cuevas Filled milk differentiated from skimmed milk
28. Express Mention and Implied Exclusion (Expressio Unius et exclusio alterius) Applied under proper conditions and limitations. The express mention of one thing,
person or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.
29. Exception to the Rule: If no reason exists why things not enumerated should not
have been included, the rule should not be invoked if manifest injustice will follow
by not including them. San Pablo Manufacturing v. BIR Commissioner Deficiency
Millers tax case. (Strictissimi Juris case as well)
30. Associated Words They limit and explain each other. Mutually qualifying each
other. Buenasera v. Juan Flavier Preventive suspension case.
31. Negative Words (Mandatory) / Affirmative Words (Directory) Fule v. CA BP 22.
Pre-trial evidence unaccepted. 8. May (Permissible) / Shall (Imperative) Bersabal v.
Salvador Filing of memorandum on time for appeal. Use of may accepted.
Crisologo v. globe Telecom Public Affairs manager case. Use of alternative,
wrong solution for a case, remanded to CA. Loyola Grand Villas South v. CA use
of the word MUST is not always mandatory. Consistent with an exercise of
discretion.
32. And (Conjunctive) / Or (Disjunctive) / And-or (Both functions)
33. Computation of Time (NCC 13)
33.1.
33.2.
33.3.
33.4.
33.5.

Years = 365 days

Months = 30 Days
Day = 24 Hours
Night = sunset-sunrise
Week = 7 consecutive days w/o regard to the day of the week were it
begins Months by name = respective to the days they have

34. First day excluded, last day included.

P a g e | 39
35. RPC 90 1 month/30 days, to determine if a crime has prescribed PNB v. CA
computation of a week. (Concepcion v. Zandueta decision defines a week)
36. Proviso clause or part of a clause in a statute excepting something from the
enacting clause to qualify/ restrain its generality. - To exclude possible grounds for
misinterpretation to its extent. (Provided) ALU-TUCP v. NLRC Project
employee case. Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Co. - insulating
oils case. Tax exemption. (Strict and Liberal Interpretation) Paras v. COMELEC
recall election / SK case. (Presumptions of Effective Statutes)
37. Presumptions presumption of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, just law;
38. Presumption of Constitutional Laws unless there is a clear and unequivocal
violation of the constitution. - Since the law should have been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it is enacted;
39. Rebuttal of presumption relies on the party challenging its validity. Aris Phils. V.
NLRC Illegal dismissal case. Fred Lim v. ADC & Felipe Pacquing Charter of
Manila & Jai-Alai case Jovencio Lim v. People BP 22 sanctions constitutional;
40. Presumption against Injustice some laws may be arbitrary if applied to a specific
case because of peculiar circumstances. - Finding a balance between the word and
the will of the law. In case of doubt or application of the laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended to have right and justice prevail. Karen Salvacion v.
Central Bank foreign account for attachment in criminal case Alonzo v. Padua
land dispute & right of redemption prescribed. (Exception to the rule);
41. Presumption against Implied Repeals legislature should be presumed to have know
existing laws on subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Presumption
against inconsistency and repugnancy. Achilles Berces v. Guingona as Exec. Sec.
presumption against implied repeal upheld. Mecano v. COA new code did not
repeal old administrative code.
42. Presumption against Ineffectiveness the legislature intend to impart to its
enactments such a meaning that will render them operative and effective. Paras v.
COMELEC SK election not a regular election.
43. Presumption against Absurdity statutes will receive a sensible construction such as
will give effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid an absurd or unjust
conclusion. Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard overpaid tax
credit. Ursua v. CA C.A. 142 (aliases case) undesirable consequences were never
intended by the legislature.
44. Presumption against Violation of International Law conforms with the declaration
of state principles and policies of thegovernment in the constitution. LOI 229
Early warning devices, concurrent to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs &

P a g e | 40
Signals US Embassy Rally receiving state has a special duty to protect the
premises of another country.

P a g e | 41

Section 6
KEY LAWS, DECREES AND
PROCEDURES RELATING TO ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPTION
1. 1987 Constitution of the Philippines - Article XI Accountability of Public
Officials
2. Republic Act No 1379 - Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State
3. Republic Act No 3019 - Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
4. Republic Act No 6770 - The Ombudsman Act of 1989
5. Administrative Order No 7 - Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
6. Administrative Order 2010 - Guidelines on the Instillation of Resident
Ombudsman 2001
7. Republic Act of 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees
8. Implementing Rules of Republic Act 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
9. Republic Act 7080 - An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder
10. Revised Penal Code (Title II) - Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the
State
11. Revised Penal Code (Title VII) - Crimes Committed by Public Officers
12. Presidential Decree 46 - Making it punishable for Public Officials and
Employees to receive, and for private persons, to give, gifts on any occasion,
including Christmas
13. Presidential Decree 749 - Granting Immunity from Prosecution to Givers of
Bribes and other Gifts and their Accomplices in Bribery, and Other Graft Cases
Against Public Officers
14. Presidential Decree No 1606, as amended by RA No 7975 and RA No 8249,
Revising A Special Court To Be Known as Sandiganbayan
15. Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Other Acts critically related to Graft and Corruption in the Public Sector:
16. The Government Procurement Reform Act

P a g e | 42
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with
the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.
Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term
(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the
government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other
instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their
branches.
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as
defined in the preceding subparagraph.
(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift
from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in
behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth
civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a
family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift
is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.
(d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for
whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained,
or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration
for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this
Act.

P a g e | 43
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency
thereof or within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him
for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested
in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any
law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a
material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board,
panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in
such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the
action of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall
be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of
manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board,
panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license,
permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his
office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

P a g e | 44
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in
subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the
confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together
with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting
business in any form with the Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such
family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other
person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third
civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal
friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all
giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public
official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any
relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the
Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the
above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government
along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already
existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application
filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or
rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an
official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any
Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or
receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be
directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him
previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term.

P a g e | 45
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended
the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and
acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who,
having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or
recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after
the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of
every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon
his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an
independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the
Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before
the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has
been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name
of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal.
Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may
be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be
satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement
of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
Section 9. Penalties for violations.
(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the
Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was
initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the
criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the
amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of
such thing.

P a g e | 46
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall
be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall
be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under
this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.
Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall
prescribe in ten years.
Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered
or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or
usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any
profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who
under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his
incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves
conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations
penalized in this Act.
Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or
the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
by such declaration.
Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of
determining unexplained wealth, all property acquired by a public officer since he
assumed office shall be taken into consideration.
R.A. 3019

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ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Summary
Modes of committing acts penalized under the law provided under Section 3
(a) Elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. That he:
i. Persuades, induced or influence another public officer to:
1. Perform an act that violates rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority;
2. Perform an offense in connection with his official duties; OR
ii. Allows himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation or
offense
(b) Elements:
a. The offender is a public employee;
b. That he made a request or asked a gift;
c. The request was made in connection with a transaction in the government; and
d. He has the right to intervene in the transaction based on his official capacity
(c) Elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. That he secured or obtained a permit or license for another person;
c. That he directly/indirectly requested any pecuniary or material benefit in consideration
with the help given
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him
a. During the pendency thereof or
b. Within one year after its termination.
(e) Elements:
a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former ;
b. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
c. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions
(f) Elements:
a. The public officer neglected or refused to act without valid reason after due demand has
been made on him;
b. Reasonable time has elapsed after due demand or request;
c. Such failure to act is for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party

(g) Elements:
a. That the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government;
b. That such contract is grossly disadvantageous to the government
(h) Elements:
a. The accused is a public officer
b. He has direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; and
c. That (a) he either intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with
such interest OR (b) prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.

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(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest:
a. In any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group
i. Of which he is a member, and
ii. Which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favour:
a. Of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege
or advantage, or
b. Of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
a. Acquired by his office or by him
b. On account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
Releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress.
During term, unlawful to to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any
specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by
any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress
during the same term.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities.
Within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration
of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office,
Shall prepare and file a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities;
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth
An amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his
other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal.
Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

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Republic Act No. 6713
February 20, 1989
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE
TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,
GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE,
ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high
standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be
accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility,
integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and
uphold public interest over personal interest.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and
all other instrumentalities, agencies or branches of the Republic of the
Philippines including government-owned or controlled corporations, and
their subsidiaries.
(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service,
including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.
(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or
liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and shall include a simulated
sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an
unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of,
or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.
(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift
from a person other than a member of his family or relative as defined in this
Act, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal nor insignificant, or the
gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.

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(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees,
financing arrangements or accommodations intended to ensure its approval.
(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly,
shares of stock sufficient to elect a director of a corporation. This term shall
also apply to the parties to a voting trust.
(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried
children under eighteen (18) years of age.
(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates
otherwise.
(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of
a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or
owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such
corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or
affected by the faithful performance of official duty.
(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by
voluntarily, completely and actually depriving or dispossessing oneself of his
right or title to it in favor of a person or persons other than his spouse and
relatives as defined in this Act.
(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or
employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
including bilas, inso and balae.
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the
discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always
uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government
resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid
wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to
the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall

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not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.
They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend
undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such
relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their
personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to
everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend
prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information of their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times
be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally
produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and
pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend
Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit
themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of
public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian
authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution
and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead
modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not
indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1)
observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs
and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a
limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding
in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and
experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials
and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.

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Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties,
all public officials and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees
shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters,
telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply
must contain the action taken on the request.
(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other responsible officers
of offices and agencies of the government and of government-owned or
controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working days from the
end of the year, render a performance report of the agency or office or
corporation concerned. Such report shall be open and available to the public
within regular office hours.
(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers and
documents must be processed and completed within a reasonable time from
the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more than
three (3) signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized signatories, the
official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign for and in their behalf.
(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All public officials
and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the
services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be
made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public within
reasonable working hours.
Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of annual incentives and
rewards is hereby established in order to motivate and inspire public servants to uphold
the highest standards of ethics. For this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding
Public Officials and Employees is hereby created composed of the following: the
Ombudsman and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-Chairmen, and the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and two government employees to be appointed
by the President, as members.
It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic, continuing review of the
performance of public officials and employees, in all the branches and agencies of
Government and establish a system of annual incentives and rewards to the end that due
recognition is given to public officials and employees of outstanding merit on the basis of
the standards set forth in this Act.
The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other things, the following: the
years of service and the quality and consistency of performance, the obscurity of the

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position, the level of salary, the unique and exemplary quality of a certain achievement,
and the risks or temptations inherent in the work. Incentives and rewards to government
officials and employees of the year to be announced in public ceremonies honoring them
may take the form of bonuses, citations, directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations, local and foreign scholarship grants, paid vacations and the like. They shall
likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher position with the commensurate
salary suitable to their qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is not
vacant, said position shall be included in the budget of the office in the next General
Appropriations Act. The Committee on Awards shall adopt its own rules to govern the
conduct of its activities.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not,
directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which
has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and
employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone;
or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.

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(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not
solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their
official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office. As to gifts
or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift
of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of
courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature
of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or
expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as
allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests
of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or
agency to which he belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure
requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational,
scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to national security requirements.
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the
right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests
including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public
officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers
and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and
current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks,
bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.

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The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the
aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of
their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to
obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also
their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if
possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the
required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office
of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator;
and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy
Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official
or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information,
his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the
Civil Service Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents.
(1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for
inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten
(10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a
reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period
of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the
statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

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(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement
filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public.
Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at
all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any
private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or
divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such
assumption.
The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a
partnership.
The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an
honorary capacity nor to laborers and casual or temporary workers.
Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure.
(a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish
procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements
which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In
the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the
appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him
to take the necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated
Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power within their
respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing,
to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by
affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned. The
individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved
in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in
good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided
in this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a)
and (b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department
and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial
Department.
Section 11. Penalties.
(a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office
or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular
capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine
not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not

P a g e | 57
exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense
after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the
violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be
prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act
shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine
not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of
the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee,
even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories, with public officials or employees, in violation of this Act,
shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or
employees and shall be tried jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person
who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of
this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such
person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the
latter shall apply.
Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of
this Act. - The Civil Service Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of this Act. It shall transmit all cases for prosecution
arising from violations of this Act to the proper authorities for appropriate action:
Provided, however, That it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary
measures as may be warranted in accordance with law. Nothing in this provision shall be
construed as a deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to discipline its
Members for disorderly behavior.
The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals who
render free voluntary service to the Government. The Ombudsman shall likewise take
steps to protect citizens who denounce acts or omissions of public officials and
employees which are in violation of this Act.
Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to derogate from any law, or any regulation prescribed by any body or agency,
which provides for more stringent standards for its official and employees.
Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the effective implementation of this
Act shall be taken from the appropriations of the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter,
such sum as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

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Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or
the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
by such declaration.
Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent
herewith, are deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same provide for a
heavier penalty.
Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty (30) days following the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
Approved, February 20, 1989.