Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CRIMINAL
LAW
Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines
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Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of shabu.
Ruling:
carnal knowledge with [AAA], minor, 13 years old, against her will, that after the occasion,
accused with intent to kill, attack, assault, hack and use physical violence to the victim, thus
inflicting upon her hack wounds on the different parts of her body, which is the direct and
proximate cause of her death.
Issue:
Whether or not, Abag, the accused, is guilty of rape with homicide.
Ruling:
The felony of rape with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes
that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single
criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by
means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed the woman. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. As the Court held in People v. Pascua: It is settled that in the special
complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Court has held that the crime of rape is difficult to
prove because it is generally not witnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for
herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as
here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the
requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction, viz:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
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On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines" provides:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464
July 1, 2015
Facts:
On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha
Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers
conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to
physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was
ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort,
they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to
the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing
Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite
for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
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The Supreme Court stated that it has been held that when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Appellants defense
of denial and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. Denial
cannot prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a
positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Furthermore, the court is constrained to modify
the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Article 266-B provides that in cases of qualified
statutory rape the penalty imposed shall be death. However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9346 instead
prescribes that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole be imposed in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or the sentence will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
HERMIE OLARTE y TARUG and RUBEN OLAV ARIO y MAUNAO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197731
July 6, 2015
Facts:
Petitioners Hermie Olarte y Tarug (Olarte) and Ruben Olavario y Maunao (Olavario),
together with Salvador Pasquin y Marco (Pasquin), were charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide. The prosecution averred that in the early morning of September 15, 2002, the victim
Eugene M. Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother, Charlie Penilla (Penilla), from a
drinking session. On their way home, while Villostas decided to buy cigarettes from a nearby
videoke bar, three men who belonged to a group then singing and drinking suddenly stabbed him
on different parts of his body. They only stopped when bystanders started throwing stones at
them to which Penilla witnessed. During trial, Dr. Pascual testified that Villostas sustained
multiple stab wounds which according to him, could have caused Villostas death were it not for
the timely medical attention given him. The defense, on the other hand, alleged that at while
petitioners, Pasquin and some other companions were having a drinking spree inside a videoke
bar, several persons threw stones at them hitting Olarte and another companion. Olarte, together
with a certain Joni, went to the Barangay Hall to report the stoning incident. Upon arrival thereat,
however, they were surprised that Olarte, Olavario and Pasquin were being implicated in a
stabbing incident. The three were then brought to the Valenzuela General Hospital where
Villostas identified them as his assailants. Thereafter, they were arrested and detained at the city
jail. The RTC found petitioners guilty as charged. Subsequently, on their appeal, petitioners
questioned the credibility of Villostas and Penilla as prosecution witnesses for there was
inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting the victims degree of intoxication at the time of
the incident. Petitioners argued that such inconsistencies rendered doubtful their identification as
the culprits by said prosecution witnesses. However, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting petitioners of the crime of frustrated
homicide.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court enumerated the elements of frustrated homicide which are: (1) the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
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Revised Penal Code exist. These elements were proved during trial. As for the first element, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim demonstrate petitioners intent to
kill. Next, the injuries suffered by Villostas were all fatal. Particularly critical were the 5centimeter wound below his left armpit, the 3.5-centimeter wound on the mid-part of his left
chest which required inserting a tube thereon to drain blood so as not to impede his breathing,
and the 5-centimeter stab wound on the right side of his abdomen which also injured his liver. As
testified to by Dr. Pascual, Villostas would have succumbed to death due to the said injuries if
not for the timely medical attention. Finally, no qualifying circumstance for murder was alleged
in the Information to have attended the commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not
err in not acquitting petitioners of the crime of frustrated homicide.
faith on the declarations made by his broker, who had based them on the information provided in
the shipping documents by the foreign exporter, stood unrebutted by the Prosecution. If that was
so, his intentional or deliberate participation in any misdeclaration or under declaration could not
be properly presumed. In so saying, the Court cannot but conclude that the trial court wrongly
found him criminally liable. Lastly, the petitioner's participation in the settlement payment and in
the release of the shipment could not be given any meaning or import adverse to his penal
interest. Such payment and release were actually irrelevant to the criminal act charged against
him. The Court emphasized that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send
people to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution's job is to prove that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the defense - the obligation is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused, not on the accused to prove his innocence. Thus, when the evidence of the
prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved
and released at once. Thus, accused was acquitted for failure of the State to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Court stated that it has the duty to scrutinize with caution the testimony of the victim
to rule a conviction. Jurisprudence lay down the following guidelines in evaluating the testimony
of the victim. First, while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. Guided by these principles, the Court find a nagging
doubt on the credibility of the testimony of AAA on what really transpired on those fateful hours
for there are inconsistencies with her narration of facts of what has transpired. On the other hand,
the defense's version provides a continuous chain of narration worthy of belief. Hence, after a
careful review, the Court reversed the finding of guilt and acquitted the accused of the offense
charged.
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Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Sandiganbayan. The latter found the petitioner and
Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The elements
of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code have been established by the
prosecution. To wit: that it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public
officers; that the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to
the Province of Sarangani; that Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable
public officers; and that Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take the public funds when they signed Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822.
Moreover, the Court also agree with the Sandiganbayans ruling that falsification was a
necessary means to commit the crime of Malversation, under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 5 of
the same Code.
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Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of
Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars. PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayans denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars
despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is guilty of grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Ruling:
POLITICAL LAW; Constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the
accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense
REMEDIAL LAW; Procedural Insufficiency of Evidence
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by
the prosecutor and filed with the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since
he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
REMEDIAL LAW; Ultimate Facts versus Evidentiary Facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the
evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during
the trial.
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The
term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts;
they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.
REMEDIAL LAW; Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he
has to face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. During arraignment, the accused is
granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware
of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him.
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show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a
pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be established
as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not
preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he
is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars.
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this
reason, more process is due, not less. When a persons life interest protected by the life, liberty,
and property language recognized in the due process clause is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
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The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by
accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, constitute instead the
criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829
entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
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(1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
Castillo.
Issue:
Whether or not Castillo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
Ruling:
Yes, Castillo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the elements of which
are as follows; The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
The Court finds that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements
of a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo
is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite, to the undue injury of the residents and students in the area who had to endure the illeffects of the dumpsite's operation.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not state, to the point of
specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the
point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. The Court has consistently and repeatedly held
in a number of cases that an Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was committed.
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by
Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable
laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure
the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the
specific peso amount actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation
of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are
matters of evidence best raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For
purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of
unwarranted
benefits
and
undue
injury
under
the
Information
suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one
considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment
and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to
require specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury to the point of moral certainty, no less at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
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of AAA was too uniform, almost general and lacked specific details, the Court finds her
testimony sufficient in details to sustain conviction.
Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. In this case, the acts of Roberto, Don Juan
and Bombasi clearly demonstrated unity of action to have carnal knowledge of AAA: (1) Both
Roberto and Bombasi tied AAA's hands at her back, while a handkerchief was already tied in her
mouth; (2) Both men turned AAA around, touched her body and started to take her clothes off;
(3) Roberto succeeded in undressing AAA, went on top of her and placed his penis inside her
vagina; (4) After satisfying his lust, Roberto got off from AAA and Bombasi took his turn and
inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (5) After Bombasi, Don Juan went on top of AAA, kissed
her shoulders and lips and also inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (6) When they were
satiated in their sexual desires, the three accused untied the rope binding AAA and threatened to
cut off her tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened. Unmistakably,
these
acts
demonstrated
a
concerted
effort
to
rape
AAA.
Since there was a conspiracy between Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi, the act of one of
them was the act of all and the three of them are equally guilty of all the crimes of rape
committed against AAA.
officers though later insisted that he be allowed to have breakfast before anything else. While
PO1 Jigger Tacorda (PO1 Tacorda) and Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Kag. Sarmiento) were
escorting him to the nearby eatery, they saw him throw something on the pavement. PO1 Tacorda
immediately accosted and reprimanded accused-appellant Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento
picked up the plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. A total of thirty-seven (37)
sachets were recovered from the pavement which were photographed by PO3 Raul Santos (PO3
Santos), and then were turned over to the crime laboratory for inventory, documentation, and
examination. The results of the examination of the contents of the thirty-seven (37) plastic
sachets done in the crime laboratory showed that these contained shabu.
Thereafter, Kag. Arcilla and accused-appellant Jocelyn accompanied P/Supt. Samuel
Villamer, PO1 Julius Jacinto (PO1 Jacinto), PO1 Arlan Sevilla (PO1 Sevilla), and PO1 Tacorda
to the place designated in the search warrant. While searching the kitchen, PO1 Jacinto came
upon a plastic bag of charcoal near the stove. He examined its contents and found a matchbox
hidden between the pieces of charcoal. Inside the matchbox were five (5) heat-sealed plastic
transparent sachets containing a white crystalline substance. PO3 Santos photographed the
plastic sachets and then turned these over for inventory and documentation. Upon examination of
the contents of the five (5) plastic sachets in the crime laboratory, the forensic chemist found that
they likewise contained shabu. When accused-appellant Jocelyn was asked during trial about the
picture showing the location of the charcoal stove, she categorically declared that it was
"charcoal and the place where I place the charcoal." Thus, the RTC correctly appreciated the
admission that she had control over this item.
From these established facts, it is clear that accused-appellants knowingly possessed
shabu a prohibited drug without legal authority to do so in violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Court also finds that the chain of custody over the forty-two (42) plastic sachets of
shabu was not broken. Based on the records, PO1 Jacinto narrated how he found the five (5)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets and how he turned over said items to PO1 Sevilla after
they were photographed by PO3 Santos. Kag. Arcilla, who was present during the search,
corroborated his testimony. The RTC found that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five (5) plastic
sachets in a transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape and duly signed by him.
As for the thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets, PO1 Sevilla testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw
Francisco throw the plastic sachets on the pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento and he picked up
said plastic sachets. The RTC found that all thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets were placed in a
transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento.
Finally, PSI Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen) narrated that the fortytwo (42) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances were turned over to
the crime laboratory for qualitative examination; that said confiscated items were thereafter
found positive for shabu, and were identified by PSI clemen herself before the RTC.
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of RA
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated
inadmissible. What is important is that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are preserved. The succession of events in this case show that the items seized were the same
items tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court. We thus hold that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants were duly proven not to
have been compromised.
The search warrant was valid. With regard to the designation of the place to be searched,
the RTC sufficiently justified that the search warrant particularly described the place to be
searched: a sketch showing the location of the house to be searched was attached to the
application and the search warrant pointed to only one house in the area.
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Marcelino's reaction, however, was not at all uncommon or unnatural so as to make his testimony
incredible. Placed in the same or a similar situation, some may choose to intervene, but others,
like Marcelino, would just opt to stay away and remain hidden. It is settled that there could be no
hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a
startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of startling occurrences
react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form
of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable,
and people react differently to shocking stimulus some may shout, some may faint, and others
may be plunged into insensibility.
Further, the fact that Marcelino executed an Affidavit of Retraction should be given little
weight or scant consideration. As the trial court aptly observed, in his original testimony,
Marcelino described in full and vivid details what he saw and heard in the early morning of
October 8, 1999. Such a detailed testimony could not have been the subject of fabrication,
especially since the same survived the rigors of cross-examination. Besides, a mere retraction by
a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony, if credible. In cases
where a previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is
made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison,
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly. And before this can be done, both the
previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or
motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of
retraction executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that
after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by
the law enforcers, executing an affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against
the accused, said witness would later on declare that all the foregoing was actually a farce and
the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of retraction. The Court looks with disfavor
upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. The rationale for this is simple:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration. There is always the probability that, later on, it will be repudiated. It is
only when there exist special circumstances in a given case, which, when coupled with the
recantation, raise doubts as to the truth of the previous testimony given, can retractions be
considered and upheld. No such special circumstances are extant in the case at bar.
Also, the lower courts' resort to circumstantial evidence was perfectly in order. The lack
or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no
longer be proved by any other evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if
sufficient, can replace direct evidence. Said reliance on circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused,
requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the
crime. Here, there exist sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the Baez brothers as
among the ones responsible for Baylon's death. The prosecution was able to establish that: (1) the
house of accused-appellant Randy Baez was burned just a few hours before the incident; (2)
Baylon shouted, "I have no fault!" when Rufino hit him with an iron bar, while the Baezes held
his arms; (3) the accused thereafter brought Baylon to the house of Ramil Baez; and (4)
Baylon's lifeless body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house. Moreover,
accused-appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. There was likewise
motive on the part of the Baez brothers to hurt Baylon, since they had suspected him to have
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been the one responsible for the burning of Randy's house. The totality of the aforementioned
facts point to them, to the exclusion of others, as the perpetrators of the crime.
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In the case at bar, Mustapha appealed to the CA arguing it was error on the part of the
RTC to have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He argued
that the RTC should not have given much faith and credence to the testimony of the victim
because it was tainted with inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert that even assuming
he committed the acts imputed on him, still there was no evidence showing that the lascivious
acts were committed without consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence because
the victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is apparent that petitioner anchored his appeal on a
claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his conviction of the offense
charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the Probation Law that only qualified
penitent offender are allowed to apply for probation. This clearly shows that Mustapha has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and not on the sole issue of the correctness
of the penalty imposed as invoked in the case of Colminares vs People.
Therefore, the CA did not err in applying the similar case of Lagrosa v. People wherein
the protestations of petitioners therein did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence.
Page | 30
lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age."
In this case "AAA" was 14 years and eight months old when he was subjected to sexual
abuse by the herein petitioner on March 9 and 10, 1997. This Court thus finds no reversible error
in the assailed Decision. Wherefore, the petitioners appeal was denied.
Page | 31
In the instant case, conspiracy is alleged only as a mode of committing the crime. The
Court finds that the Information filed against the petitioner adequately complied with the
requirements as set forth in Lazarte. The Information charges that the petitioner, with Clemente,
took FEBTCs money through fraudulent transfers to and withdrawal from the former's Account
Number 5115-12827-6. Although the words "conspire" and "confederated" do not appear in the
indictment, there is a clear allegation that the petitioner and Clemente were united in their
purpose of fraudulently taking FEBTC's money. The Information, thus, enables the petitioner to
amply prepare for his defense.
In Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the CA, the Court declared that "an information
alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot
pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information." Ideally, Clemente
and the petitioner should have been indicted together. However, the non-inclusion of Clemente
does not invalidate the Information filed against the petitioner especially since conspiracy is not
charged as a crime, but is merely alleged to show how criminal liability was incurred.
In addition to the circumstances which the CA had already considered in the
prosecution's favor, the Court finds the following as determinative of the petitioner's guilt as
well.
First, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that the
ordinary course of business has been followed. The petitioner in this case was a bank officer. He
can be reasonably charged with knowledge of banking procedures and the liabilities which mayattach to him by reason of maintaining current accounts. It perplexes the Court why he delivered
blank checks to Clemente and subsequently not even bothered to inquire about the status of the
said checks and his current account against which the checks may be drawn. The Court further
finds no credence in his claim that he received no statements or notices relative to his current
account in FEBTC's Boni Avenue branch. Bartolome testified that checks are microfilmed, and
thereafter, the originals are returned to the account holder. He also stated that bank statements are
sent to the account holders on or before every 15th day of the month. The petitioner ascribed no
ill motive against Bartolome and the former had not offered any evidence to show why FEBTC
would have treated his accounts as exceptions by not sending back to him the original check
which was cleared and the bank statements indicating any transactions relative to his accounts. It
bears stressing that the petitioner's employment was only severed in 1998 while the anomalous
transfers and withdrawal occurred in 1994. The petitioner had four years, more or less, to inquire
from FEBTC itself or from Clemente the details about the transfers and withdrawal. During the
trial, he pleaded lack of knowledge about the transactions. This does not inspire belief.
The Court, however, notes that while the fraudulent transaction which is the subject of
the instant petition occurred on February 9, 1994, the petitioner also testified that in September
of 1996, his payroll account was credited with P38,000.00 and P15,000.00. He withdrew the
amounts as they belonged to him as profits from their piggery business. While claiming that the
piggery business lasted only for three months, the petitioner at the same time alleged that after
more than two years, he still received profits from the said business. The inconsistencies fail to
lend credit to the petitioner's assertions.
The Supreme Court held that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by
the CA.
Page | 32
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the
latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof.
And in this case, the actual taking of the baby without the consent of her parents is clear
proof of appellants intent
to deprive AAA of her liberty.
Aside from the testimony of the eyewitness, rape was also proven by the medical findings
on AAA. As attested to by her physician,the Medico-Legal Report confirmed that AAA suffered
injuries in her vagina.
It has been established that appellant committed kidnapping and on the occasion thereof,
he raped AAA. He is thus found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346
entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of
death is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
When AAA could no longer bear it, she left the house and stayed in the house of her
teacher from 30 March to 1 April 2002 where she intimated to the latter her harrowing
experience in the hands of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his daughter.
Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established.
On 27 April 2007, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five
(5) counts of rape.
On 23 May 2013, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification as to damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for the crime of rape.
Ruling:
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellant insists that AAA's claim of sequent rape identically done is highly
improbable
and
contrary
to
human
experience.
In People v. Solomon, the Court held that the victim's uniform testimony regarding the
manner by which she was raped does not diminish her credibility. The Court explained, thus:
Men are creatures of habit and are bound to adopt a course of
action that has proven to be successful. As appellant was able to
fulfill his lustful designs upon complainant the first time, it comes
as no surprise that he would repeat the horrific acts when the
circumstances obtaining in the first rape again presented
themselves.
As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to her teacher
and instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before she broke her silence.
There is a plausible explanation for the conduct of the victim. The Court explained in
Solomon, viz.:
Complainant's youth partly accounts for her failure to escape
appellant's lust. A young girl like complainant cannot be expected
to have the intelligence to defy what she may have perceived as the
substitute parental authority that appellant wielded over her. That
complainant had to bear more sexual assaults from appellant
before she mustered enough courage to escape his bestiality does
not imply that she willingly submitted to his desires. Neither was
she expected to follow the ordinary course that other women in the
same situation would have taken. There is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. Verily,
under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow a
predictable path.Ch
Page | 36
AAA was only able to report the incident when she was away from the custody of
accused-appellant
and
when
she
felt
safe.
AAA's credibility was upheld by the trial court, which is in a position to observe the
candor, behavior and demeanor of the witness. Findings of the lower courts with respect to
credibility
of
the
rape
victim
are
conclusive.
The Court also cannot give credence to accused-appellant's claim that AAA was taking
revenge when she filed the rape charges against accused-appellant for allegedly castigating her.
No woman in her right mind, especially a young girl, would fabricate charges of this nature and
severity.
The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the twin qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship. Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his
daughter. Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established.
Anent the element of minority, the prosecution presented a certification from the UCCP
Office in Ayungon, Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the UCCP. The certification shows that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 to
accused-appellant and a certain Nely Fabel. A page of the UCCP Membership Book was
submitted bearing the same information. It was held that a birth certificate, baptismal certificate,
school records or documents of similar nature can be presented to prove the age of a victim. In
this case, the Membership Book, which is considered an entry in official records under Section
44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is admissible as prima facie of their contents and
corroborative of AAA's testimony as to her age. Moreover, entries in public or official books or
records may be proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a copy
certified
by
the
legal
keeper
thereof.
Considering that accused-appellant committed rape qualified by the twin circumstances
of minority and relationship, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. Since the imposition of
the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, the lower courts properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape.
December 9, 2015
Facts:
On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy, Vice President for Finance of
UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista, to
withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her
Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista was not able
to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount
from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the
money. On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao informed Siy that
as per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by
UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of
P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista
had done, and she immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to
reimburse UMCs petty cash account. As the checks were eventually encashed resulting in
the replenishment of UMCs petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise
Page | 37
the subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siys alleged cash advance, to which
Manansala acceded. On June 11, 1999, Lacanilao reported the incident to UMC President
Conrado G. Marty.
Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report,
re-insert the entry relating to Siys alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch
paper, and repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject
document, Siy was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On April
18, 2000, Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the
position she left vacant.
In a Decision dated October 27, 2010, the MeTC both found Lacanilao and Manansala
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents.
Aggrieved, Manansala appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 142 (RTC). Records are, however, bereft of any showing that Lacanilao made any similar
appeal, thus, her conviction had lapsed into finality.
In a Decision dated October 20, 2011, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto. It held
that Manansala clearly falsified the subject report by inserting a statement therein which she
knew from the start to be untruthful - that Siy made a cash advance for her personal needs resulting in prejudice on the part of Siy.
In a Decision dated April 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA agreed with
the MeTC and RTC's findings that Manansala made untruthful statements in the subject report
which was contrary to her duty as UMC Petty Cash Custodian and that such findings were
utilized to the detriment of Siy who was terminated on the basis of said falsified report.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of appeals correctly affirmed Manansalas conviction for
Falsification of Private Documents.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
are: (a) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171
(7) of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article
171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
Page | 38
narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian,
she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in
connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made
any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such
knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement that
Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that
findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case or any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by
the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for
the MeTC to appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without
correcting the latter court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the
mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance
provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be
appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in
committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions
of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that
matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence
of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala
to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's
criminal liability in this case - and also taking into consideration the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
v. FERNANDO
RANCHE
HAVANA A.K.A.
Facts:
The appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Page | 39
On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police
Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R.
Espenido, Jr. that the appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at SitioMangga,
Punta Princesa, Cebu City.
SPO1 Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the
civilian asset and with PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Canete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuez as back-up. The
police team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with
a PI00.00 marked money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the police blotter, to be
used for the purpose of buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust operation was allegedly
coordinated with the Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). When the
police team reached the target area, the "civilian informant" went to the house of appellant and
called the latter. Hidden from view, some 15 meters away from the house, the back-up
operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Canete, saw the civilian informant talking with the
appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant" handling over the marked PI00.00 bill
to the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white
crystalline substance which these two suspected as shabu. The "civilian informant" then placed a
face towel on his left shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated. SPO1 Espenido and
his two companions rushed towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and arrested the
latter after apprising him of his constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00
marked money from the appellant while the plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to
SPO1 Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked
money and the plastic pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2 Nuez
who marked the plastic pack with "FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter
requesting for examination of the item seized from the appellant addressed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu
City, testified that he conducted a laboratory examination of the recovered specimen that yielded
"positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.''
The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a
buy-bust operation. He claimed that on that evening of November 4, 2005 he was eating bread
when SPO2 Nuez barged inside his house, handcuffed him and brought him to the police
precinct. He claimed that he was mistaken for his neighbor "Narding" the real shabu-seller. His
daughter, Maria Theresa, corroborated him.
Issue:
Whether or not adherence to the chain of custody rule has been established.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was reversed and set aside. Appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche Abana
was acquitted of the charge, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides:
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of
its delivery and/or sale are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case.
And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime importance therefore x xx is that the identity of
the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be
Page | 40
established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity
of
the
evidence
are
removed."
The prosecution failed to establish convincingly the chain of custody of the alleged
seized plastic pack subject matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPOl Canete testified in
respect to the identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the prosecution
was not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not or no longer
in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the
poseur-buyer turned over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPOl Espenido, there is
no record as to what happened after the turn-over. SPOl Espenido to whom the specimen was
allegedly surrendered by the poseur-buyer was not presented in court to identify the person to
whom it was given thereafter and the condition thereof while it was in his possession and
control. The prosecution's cause is also marred by confusion and uncertainty regarding the
possessor of the pack of shabu when it was brought to the police station. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuez or SPOl Canete received the
evidence. There was no evidence on how they came into possession of the pack of shabu. Again,
this is a clear missing link in the chain of custody of the specimen after it left the hands of SPOl
Espenido.
Page | 41
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale
of shabu, the following elements must be proven:
-the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
-the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore
On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must concur:
-the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug;
-such possession is not authorized by law; and
-the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap,
the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline
substance in one plastic sachet and handed the marked money as payment in exchange of the
contraband.
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia were likewise established. Found in appellants pocket after he was caught in
flagrante were two (2) more plastic sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tooter
containing shabu residue and the rolled aluminum foil with shabu residue.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense. All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold
and possessed shabu and shabu paraphernalia.
Page | 42
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance
of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(2)
Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3)
A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the
time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification.
Compliance with Section 21s requirements is critical. Noncompliance is tantamount to
failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, noncompliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.
In People v. Nandi, the Court explained that four (4) links should be established in the
chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
It is glaring that despite the prosecutions allegations that a buy-bust operation was
carefully planned and carried out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully complied with. While an inventory was supposed to
have been conducted, this was done neither in the presence of petitioner, the person from whom
the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise,
not one of the persons required to be present (an elected public official, and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have been around during the
inventory and photographing.
Page | 43
Left with no other assurance of the integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving
claims of the prosecution and of its witnesses, these claims cannot sustain a conviction. As in
Garcia, the mere marking of seized items, done in violation of the safeguards of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEXANDER SANDER BANGSOY
G.R. No. 204047
Facts:
AAA testified that her uncle, herein appellant, inserted his penis inside her vagina on
two occasions. The RTC explained that AAA testified clearly despite her mental weakness,
and that she never wavered during cross-examination. It further held that the appellants
moral ascendancy over AAA, combined with the formers use of a deadly weapon and threats of
bodily harm, was more than enough to cow the victim into submitting to the appellants desires.
AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who sexually abused her on two
occasions in April 2004, and who threatened to kill her if she would report the incidents to her
father. When AAA pointed to the appellant in the courtroom as her sexual abuser, she even
stated that she filed a complaint so that he will not do it to anybody else anymore. Given the
victims mental condition, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or fabricated
arape charge against the accused. Neither was it possible that she was coached into
testifying against appellant considering her limited intellect.
In its August 16, 2010 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape. On appellate review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC's Joint Judgment. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to
prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of
age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under
the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental age of
below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape. Notably, AAA was also below 12 years old at the
time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing that she was born on March 1, 1993.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty
shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case,
however, the relationship of the appellant to the victim was not alleged.
Page | 44
Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and that the
appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the crime from
statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code.
Page | 45
The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the
accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of
causing it.
The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly does not hold
true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover,
the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified
that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the accusedappellant.
Given these testimonies, the accused-appellants defense of accident is negated as he was
carrying out an unlawful act at the time of the incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN and three (3) other
unidentified companions
GR. No. 206291
January 18, 2016
Facts:
The above-named accused, being then armed with a .45 caliber pistol and other
handguns, conspiring and confederating (sic) together, mutually aiding and assisting one another,
by means of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the
use of said weapons ATTY. SEGUNDO SOTTO, JR. y GONZALO, employing means, manner
and form which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without any danger to the
persons of the herein accused, as a result of which attack, said Atty. Segundo Sotto, Jr. y Gonzalo
sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the fatal parts of his body which directly caused his death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
That the commission of the above-stated offense has been attended by the following
aggravating circumstances, to wit:
1. Use of unlicensed firearm; and
2. Use of motorcycle to facilitate not only the commission of the crime but also the
escape of the accused from the scene of the crime.
3. That the crime be committed at night time.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. Trial ensued
afterwards.
Appellant was also charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 20665 for
having fatally wounded Liezel Mae Java, the niece of the victim, during the same shooting
incident. Since Java was alleged in the Information to be a minor, the said case was transferred to
Branch 15 of the RTC of Zamboanga City, which is the only designated family court in the city.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court's decision by increasing the
civil indemnity. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
It is well-settled that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they
gave their testimonies. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of
a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation. The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was
attended by treachery because appellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning
with a deadly weapon.
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi. However, such
defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were
not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants. Between the categorical
statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare
denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative testimony
is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it conies from the mouth of a credible
witness. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown
that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
In contrast to the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Delos Reyes and Java
who positively identified appellant as the gunman, the testimonies of the defense witnesses in
support of appellant's denial and alibi, are tainted with material inconsistencies.
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Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the
crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not
purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the
offender easier and his apprehension difficult.
The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos Reyes that
appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty. Segundo
who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the
road. The motorcycle then stopped near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice,
before leaving the crime scene aboard the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of
the crime.
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Ruling:
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great
weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. Besides, a review of the records reveals that the
CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession
of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which
were offered and admitted in evidence. Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime,
which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here, the Court is
unconvinced with Saraums statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his
arrest.
VINSON D. YOUNG a.k.a. BENZON ONG and BENNY ' YOUNG a.k.a. BENNY ONG v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL
G.R. No. 213910
February 3, 2016
Facts:
Members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), namely P02 Arsua and P02 Talingting, Jr., among others,
conducted surveillance operations on separate dates at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jagar) in Cebu City,
and observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with guest
relations officers (GROs), or Pl0,000.00 as "bar fine" if they were taken out of the establishment.
In the course of an entrapment operation, P02 Arsua, P02 Talingting, Jr., and POl
Nemenzo, acting as poseur customers, handed P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the
"mamasang"/manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. At the prearranged signal, the
rest of the RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual
paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), and the rescue of
146 women and minor children. Later, six (6) of these women -who all worked at Jaguar as
GROs, executed affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners.
In defense, petitioner denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights
and interests therein to one Charles Theodore Rivera. Not being the manager nor owner of
Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision over the victims, with whom he denied
acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and
was not even present during the raid.
Issue:
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Whether or not there is probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a)
and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, otherwise known as
the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.
The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for
the purpose of filing information in court. On the other hand, judicial determination of probable
cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause -that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
The evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of
probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the
prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4
(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. It appears from the records that
petitioners recruited and hired the victims and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution.
In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest. The Court further
notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their disclaimer that they are no longer
the owners of the establishment where the sex workers were rescued, are evidentiary in nature matters which are best threshed out in a full-blown trial.
Daguman were informed of their constitutional rights and that the two accused, together with the
item seized, were brought to the police station where the confiscated item was marked by P03
Capangyarihan with petitioner's initials "RPD." During his cross-examination, P03
Capangyarihan disclosed that there is a rampant selling of shabu at the place where the two
accused were apprehended and that his suspicion was aroused by the petitioner's delicate way of
handling the plastic sachet. P03 Capangyarihan turned over the petitioner Daguman, and the
confiscated item to SPO 1 Tapar, the investigator of the case. The parties stipulated that SPOl
Tapar received one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with "RPD" marking from P03
Capangyarihan, which item was marked in evidence as Exhibit "B". SPOl Tapar prepared the
letter-request for the examination of the substance found inside the plastic sachet. Also stipulated
was the fact that after SPOl Tapar's investigation, the seized item and the said letter-request were
transmitted by him to P02 Isla for delivery to the Philippine National Police Crime LaboratoryNorthern Police District Crime Laboratory Office (PNPCL-NPDCLO).
The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner and Dagumans witnesses.
According to the petitioner, he can no longer recall the date and time of his arrest. All the same,
the petitioner testified that he and Daguman were just sitting along the road, in front of a house
that was raided by P03 Capangyarihan and POI Santos. One or two persons were arrested from
the raid. The petitioner averred that when the police officers passed by him and Daguman, they
were arrested and frisked but nothing was found in their persons. Nevertheless, the two accused
were made to board the police vehicle, brought to the police station and detained thereat. The
petitioner insisted that he had never been involved in any drug-related incident prior to his arrest.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense
charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the prior ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the dearth of evidence supporting
the prosecution's contention; and
(2) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court notwithstanding the arresting officers' patent non-compliance with the
proper chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs.ch
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the concurrence of the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The Court finds that these elements were proven by the prosecution in the present case.
P03 Capangyarihan testified in a clear and straightforward manner that when he chanced upon
petitioner, the latter was caught red handed in the illegal possession of shabu and was arrested in
flagrante delicto. On direct examination, the police officer positively identified the petitioner as
the person holding, scrutinizing and from whom the plastic sachet was confiscated. After
conducting a chemical analysis, the forensic chemical officer certified that the plastic sachet
recovered from the petitioner was found to contain 0.03 gram of shabu. Nowhere in the records
was it shown that the petitioner is lawfully authorized to possess the dangerous drug.
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Furthermore, Daguman admitted that the petitioner intentionally sought and succeeded in getting
hold of shabu. Clearly, the petitioner knowingly possessed the dangerous drug, without any legal
authority to do so, in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
In seeking acquittal, the petitioner insists that the failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the directives outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
particularly on the requirements of markings, physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items translates to their failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item. The Court disagreed with the argument of the petitioner. The fact that the apprehending
officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not
compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon
immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the lack of
photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance
is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be
used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of shabu seized from the
petitioner had been preserved under the chain custody rule even though the prescribed procedure
under Section 21 ( 1 ), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of
the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, was not strictly complied with.
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