Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7927

August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,

vs.
PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.
Rafael de la Sierra for petitioner.
Thos. L. Hartigan, W. A. Kincaid, and Jose Robles Lahesa for respondent Judge Moir.
Facundo Salazar in his own behalf.
Manly and McMahon for respondent Valera Basmayor.
TRENT, J.:
This is an original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in
a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided
adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on
motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed
with the enforcement of the judgment. At the request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was
issued by this court to stay the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent
judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the complaint
on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the
demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace
to try title to real state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By
Act No. 2041, section 3, it was provided:
Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real
estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two
hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six
hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of
First Instance.
By Act No. 2131, section 1, the above provision was amended by substituting "exclusive original
jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction."
In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster (11 Phil. Rep., 340) it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to
not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. This holding has never been questioned, and it seems
unnecessary now to discuss the grounds upon which it was based. Therefore, there will be sufficient
reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine
Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where
the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except in forcible entry
and detainer cases. (Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2.) Some one has said that there is no more

comprehensive word in the English language than the word "all." If this word be given its natural and
unrestricted meaning, there is no case involving the title to real estate which Court of First Instance
are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being supreme, any Act of
the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to curtail such jurisdiction must be held
void. Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real
estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in litigation does
not exceed P200. Is the word "exclusive" susceptible of a construction that would still give Courts of
First Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate where the value of the property in litigation
does not exceed P200? By no possible means can exclusive jurisdiction to try a specific class of
cases be construed so as to permit of another court entertaining jurisdiction over such cases. To give
a grant of unrestricted exclusive jurisdiction over a specific class of litigation to one court its only
proper sense, all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. To hold that
another court has jurisdiction also such in cases is to destroy the grant of exclusive jurisdiction given
to the first. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent. Were the
disputed provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 allowed to stand, therefore, the necessary result
would be to deprive Courts of First Instance of their original jurisdiction to try cases where the title to
realty valued at not more than P200 was involved. This applies, whether the phrase "exclusive
jurisdiction" or "exclusive original jurisdiction" be used. The Philippine Legislature can not deprive
Courts of First Instance of any of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Organic Law. Upon this
ground alone, then, Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, in so far as they attempt to confer exclusive original
jurisdiction upon courts of justice of the peace to try cases involving the title to realty valued at not
more than P200, must be declared void.
There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justice of the peace by
the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds P200, but is
less than P600.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N.E., 916; 128 A.
S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou.,
963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligence, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be
eliminated without causing results effecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the
intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R. Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs.
Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,
184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 III., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135;
State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute
can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs.
Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839.)
Courts of justices of the peace are courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction. They are the most
inferior courts in our judicial system. Where they have jurisdiction at all, it has never been limited by
the insignificance of the particular case. On the contrary, the province of those courts, as is well
known, is to handle precisely such cases. If litigation be divided into important and unimportant
cases, then assuredly, to justices of the peace fall only the unimportant. And when the division of

jurisdiction in a particular class is based upon the amount in controversy, as is the case with the
provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 in question, a law providing that because of the inferior
amount in controversy a case should go to the Court of First Instance, while another case of the
same nature, because of its greater amount, could be tried before a justice of the peace, would be
an anomaly and at war with the only logical distribution of jurisdiction. In other words, the case of A
vs. B is too small and inconsequential to be tried before a justice of the peace, and must be tried in
the Court of First Instance; while the case of C. vs. D, being of a larger amount, may be tried by a
justice of the peace. Such reasoning has never heretofore been used by the Legislature in
distributing jurisdiction over litigation between Courts of First Instance and justice of the peace
courts. In seems clear that the concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is more
than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive
jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be
considered as inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive
jurisdiction which has already been declared void. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be
declared void also.
Other additional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 is not
before the court. We need only say that such other additional jurisdiction bears no relation whatever
to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and
applying the same rules to the rest of the Act which we have applied to the clause conferring
concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, we are
clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon
the said void provisions.
In conclusion, it seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the respondent judge is
based upon the a priori assumption that original jurisdiction of Court of First Instance in real-estate
actions is, by the Organic Law, made exclusive. We have found it quite unnecessary to postulate any
such theory in disposing of the case. Nor has it been necessary to rely upon the second point made
by counsel to the effect that jurisdiction in real-estate actions has never been conferred upon justices
of the peace in the United States or England.
The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the respondent judge on this
action review is an absolutely nullity. The respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the cause only for
the purpose of dismissing the appeal, and in further directing the justice of the peace to proceed with
the execution of the void judgment, the respondent judge was in error.
The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the judgment, will be made
permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied. The petitioner will pay the costs of
the cause. This opinion will be substituted for the one handed down by this court in the same case at
the close of the last term. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.